## 1ac

### self-determination---1ac

#### The contention is self-determination:

#### Limiting the right to secede violates self-determination:

#### 1. RECTIFICATORY JUSTICE. It’s necessary for reclamation and rectification of historical injustice.

Buchanan ’92 [Allen; Laureate Professor of Philosophy, University of Arizona; Distinguished Research Fellow, Oxford University; Visiting Professor of the philosophy of international law, Dickson Poon School of Law at King's College; James B. Duke Professor Emeritus, Duke University. “Self-Determination and the Right to Secede.” Journal of International Affairs, Volume 45, Number 2] TDI

The most obviously compelling justification for secession may be called the argument from rectificatory justice and is illustrated by the case of Lithuania. The argument's power stems from the assumption that secession is simply the reappropriation, by the legitimate owners, of stolen property. The right to secede, under these circumstances, is just the right to reclaim what is one's own. This simple interpretation is most plausible, of course, in situations in which the people attempting to secede are literally the same people who held legitimate title to the territory at the time of its unjust annexation, or at least are the indisputable descendants of those people.

The appeal of the argument from rectificatory justice is so strong that one might be tempted to assume that it provides the only conclusive justification for secession. This view may be called the historical grievance version of the territoriality thesis. The territoriality thesis states that every sound justification for secession must include a valid claim to territory on the part of the secessionists.13 The historical grievance version asserts that the valid claim to territory necessary for every sound justification for secession must be grounded in a historical grievance concerning a pre-existing right to the territory.

The territoriality thesis is clearly correct: Justified secession does require that the secessionist have a right to the territory in question, since secession, unlike emigration, involves not only the severing of political obligation, but also the taking of land. However, the historical grievance version of the territoriality thesis is overly restrictive. There are cases in which secession is justified even if there has been no violation of a pre-existing right to territory on the part of the secessionists. Below I will discuss ways that secessionists can establish a valid claim to territory other than by showing that the state never had a valid claim to it and that they did.

#### 2. DISCRIMINATORY REDISTRIBUTION. It violates legitimate governance and justifies secession.

Buchanan ’92 [Allen; Laureate Professor of Philosophy, University of Arizona; Distinguished Research Fellow, Oxford University; Visiting Professor of the philosophy of international law, Dickson Poon School of Law at King's College; James B. Duke Professor Emeritus, Duke University. “Self-Determination and the Right to Secede.” Journal of International Affairs, Volume 45, Number 2] TDI

Perhaps the most compelling of these, and the one that is most often applicable in actual cases of secession, is for the secessionists to show that they are victims of "discriminatory redistribution" at the hands of the state. A state engages in discriminatory redistribution whenever it implements taxation schemes, regulatory policies or economic programs that systematically work to the disadvantage of some groups while benefitting others, in morally arbitrary ways. A clear example would be a government imposing higher taxes on one group while spending less on it or placing special economic restrictions on the region the group occupies, without any sound moral justification for this unequal treatment.

Charges of discriminatory redistribution abound in actual secessionist movements. Indeed, it would be difficult to find cases in which this charge did not play a central role in justifications for secession. American Southerners complained that the federal tariff laws were discriminatory in intent and effect — they served to foster the growth of infant industries in the North by protecting them from European (especially British) competition, at the expense of the South's import-dependent economy. Calhoun and others argued that the amount of money the South was contributing to the federal government, once the effects of the tariff were taken into account, far exceeded what that region was receiving in return.14 Basque secessionists have noted that the percentage of total tax revenues in Spain paid by those in their region is over three times the percentage of state expenditures on it. A popular Basque protest song expresses the point vividly, saying that the cow of state has its mouth in the Basque country but its udder elsewhere.15 Biafra, which unsuccessfully attempted to become independent from Nigeria in 1967, while containing only 22 per cent of the Nigerian population, contributed 38 percent of total revenues and received back from the government only 14 percent of those revenues.16 At the time of its attempt to become independent of the Congo, Katanga province contributed 50 percent the Congo's total revenues yet received only 20 percent of total government expenditures.17

Secessionists in the Baltic republics and Soviet Central Asia protested that the government in Moscow implemented economic policies that benefitted the rest of the country at the expense of staggering environmental damage in their regions. To support this allegation of discriminatory redistribution, they cited reports of abnormally high rates of birth defects in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, apparently due to chemical pollutants from heavy industry that Soviet economic policy had concentrated there. Similarly, the Central Asian republics cited contamination of water supplies due to massive use of pesticides at the orders of planners in Moscow, whose goal was to make that area a major cotton producer.

While it is no doubt true that where discriminatory redistribution occurs, one also usually finds violations of basic individual civil and political rights, this need not be the case. And even where it is not, discriminatory redistribution is a distinct and serious injustice.

It is important to emphasize that the mere fact of unequal economic treatment does not itself establish that discriminatory redistribution is occurring. For example, whether the American South was in fact a victim of discriminatory redistribution cannot be decisively determined simply by showing that there was a net revenue flow from South to North. At most, this quantitative fact establishes a presumption that there is discrimination or counts as some evidence of discrimination. Whether it in fact constitutes an injustice depends on whether the redistributive pattern in question is morally arbitrary, and that in turn depends upon what distributive justice requires. For example, if distributive justice requires a net transfer of resources from the better-off citizens to the worse-off to ensure that everyone has some minimal level of welfare goods, then the fact that there is a net revenue flow from the former to the latter does not show that the better-off are victims of discriminatory redistribution. (It is worth noting, however, that during the period in question the United States was not a welfare state in any significant sense. So if, as the data cited earlier indicate, there was a net revenue transfer from the South to the North, it could not be explained as the appropriate result of a just welfare system to which the country was then committed. Further, by most reasonable measures, it was the South that was the worse-off region.)

In this sense, a moral theory of the right to secede depends upon the theory of distributive justice. Different theories of distributive justice may yield different answers to the question of whether a certain pattern of redistribution counts as discriminatory redistribution and thus can serve as a sound basis for claiming the right to secede. Although the validity of a complaint of discriminatory redistribution will be no more or less controversial than the theory of distributive justice upon which it is based, there are certainly some cases in which there is a broad consensus that unequal treatment is not morally justifiable.

The case of the American colonies' struggle for independence from Britain illustrates more clearly how, in the absence of an unjust taking of territory on the part of the state, the grievance of discriminatory redistribution can justify secession and the taking of territory that secession entails. Strictly speaking, the colonists' action was secession, not revolution. They did not aim to over throw the British government but only to remove a part of North America from the British Empire. The chief justification for American secession was discriminatory redistribution: Britain's mercantilist policies systematically worked to the disadvantage of the colonies for the benefit of the mother country. Lacking representation in the British Parliament, the colonists reasonably concluded that this injustice would persist.

#### That’s true even if governance is ‘perfect’. That oversimplifies democratic principles to restrict self-determination.

Vaca & Artiga ’21 [Moises; Institute for Philosophical Research, National Autonomous University of Mexico. Marc; Department of Philosophy, University of Valencia. “A defense of the moral and legal right to secede.” Ethics & Global Politics, Volume 14] TDI

According to Patten, assuming that a multinational state already guarantees equal institutional recognition to the nationals of the secessionist minority, the best way to maximize the preferences of all individuals living in the secessionist territory is to uphold the existing multinational state. For the individuals of the three mentioned groups get ‘some of what they want’: the first group is ensured the institutional recognition of its identity (albeit within the existing state), the second group is granted its belonging to the state they recognize as theirs, and the third group maintains its dual identity.

This is an interesting reasoning that opens serious questions in regard to the aptness of the majority rule. However, there are at least three complications with it. First, once it is discarded that a simple or qualified democratic majority is the strategy that mostly respects the autonomy of group members, Patten owes us an account of how many people on groups two and three are needed in order for their preferences to tip the balance against secession. For instance, is he recommending a general principle according to which if some people want A and not B, others B and not A and a third group prefer A and B, then A and B should always be implemented, irrespective of majorities? That looks like a very implausible principle to us. For one thing: in any secessionist dispute some people are attached to the larger state and some other to the secessionist group so that, if majorities were not taken into account, all cases of secession would be illegitimate. This result not only makes resistance to secession too cheap (one just needs to find some people with allegiance to the two groups) but in certain cases would lead to very counterintuitive results. For instance, if 90% of the population in the territory identifies as nationals wanting to secede, 5% as nationals of the current state, and 5% as both, why is it that forming a new state is not the best way to respect everyone’s individual autonomy, given that all had the same opportunity for political influence by means of their vote? Surely, it would be important to try to meet the preferences of these last two groups; however, it seems that the best result in this case is to comply with the decision of the vast majority. This is especially clear once we remember that, according to PT’s condition (9), full institutional recognition and rights would be granted to minorities in the state formed after secession.

Second, Patten’s argument is committed to another deep counterintuitive consequence: let us suppose that we can divide the whole state, and not only the secessionist territory, into the same three groups of citizens (those who identify exclusively with the nationals struggling for the creation of a new state, those who identify as nationals of the larger state, and those who have a dual identity). Now, suppose that 80% of all citizens in this state vote for the secession of the given territory. This would be an example of a non-unilateral secession in which a majority in the entire state thinks the best thing is for a region to secede. However, if Patten’s argument is correct, it follows that it would be preferable to maintain the already existing multinational state since this arrangement gives all citizens some of what they want in regard to their associative preference.Footnote8

Finally, Patten’s argument seems to commit a common pitfall of restrictive accounts of secession: they confuse reasons against secession for reasons against the right to secession (for more on this see footnote 11 below). Even if one thinks that in a certain case secession is not the best option, this should not be used as an argument against the right of a certain group to decide which is the option they prefer.

#### Violating self-determination violates the only innate right.

Rauscher ’22 [Frederick; Professor & Undergraduate Program Director of Philosophy, Michigan State University. “Kant’s Social and Political Philosophy.” https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-social-political/#FreBasSta] TDI

This explains why happiness is not universal, but not why freedom is universal. By “freedom” in political philosophy, Kant is not referring to the transcendental conception of freedom usually associated with the problem of the freedom of the will amid determinism in accordance with laws of nature, a solution to which is provided in the Third Antinomy of the Critique of Pure Reason. Rather, freedom in political philosophy is defined, as in the claim above about the only innate right, as “independence from being constrained by another’s choice”. His concern in political philosophy is not with laws of nature determining a human being’s choice but by other human beings determining a human being’s choice, hence the kind of freedom Kant is concerned with in political philosophy is individual freedom of action. Still, the universality of political freedom is linked to transcendental freedom. Kant assumes that a human being’s use of choice (at least when it is properly guided by reason) is free in the transcendental sense. Since every human being does enjoy transcendental freedom by virtue of being rational, freedom of choice is a universal human attribute. And this freedom of choice is to be respected and promoted, even when this choice is not exercised in rational or virtuous activity. Presumably respecting freedom of choice involves allowing it to be effective in determining actions; this is why Kant calls political freedom, or “independence from being constrained by another’s choice”, the only innate right. One might still object that this freedom of choice is incapable of being the basis of a pure principle of right for the same reason that happiness was incapable of being its basis, namely, that it is too vague in itself and that when specified by the particular decisions individuals make with their free choice, it loses its universality. Kant holds that this problem does not arise for freedom, since freedom of choice can be understood both in terms of its content (the particular decisions individuals make) and its form (the free, unconstrained nature of choice of any possible particular end) (6:230). Freedom is universal in the proper sense because, unlike happiness, it can be understood in such a way that it is susceptible to specification without losing its universality. Right will be based on the form of free choice.

#### Thus: In a democracy, a people ought to have the right to secede from their government.

Vaca & Artiga ’21 [Moises; Institute for Philosophical Research, National Autonomous University of Mexico. Marc; Department of Philosophy, University of Valencia. “A defense of the moral and legal right to secede.” Ethics & Global Politics, Volume 14] TDI

(P1) The individual autonomy of a group’s members should be respected.

(P1) simply asserts the importance of respecting the individual autonomy of persons; as such, it is a statement of one of the most important premises in which liberal democracies are built. As it is well known, different and prominent defences of such a premise can be found in Mill, Rawls (Citation1999), Dworkin (Citation2000), Raz (Citation1986) and Kymlicka (Citation1989) – to mention a few. It is common ground of these authors that persons must be able to build their own lives, decide for themselves which plan they want to pursue (and change it if so they wish), being able to partake on equal footing in the political organization of their society, etc.

In turn, some authors have tried to ground the value of group self-determination on (P1). According to Philpott (Citation1998), for instance, a constraint on the right for self-determination would arbitrarily limit citizen’s autonomy and should be rejected for this reason. More recently, Stilz (Citation2015, Citation2016) has defended that citizens have an interest in being the authors or ‘makers’ of their own life. This interest requires being able to ‘affirm’ their own political institutions, and that is what ultimately grounds the value of a group’s self-determination. Consequently, and ideal political unit is one in which not only the value of justice is perfectly realized but also one that is ‘self-determining – i.e., it would rest on the shared will of its people’ (Stilz Citation2016: 125). She also notes that only by assuming this understanding of self-determination we can explain the wrong of a putative benevolent colonialism – i.e., taking control of another country to impose a perfectly just political regime without its consent (Stilz Citation2015: 8). Despite the fact that Philpott and Stilz’ arguments differ in significant respects,Footnote5 they point to the very same idea: that collective self-determination is grounded in a specification of the value of individual autonomy:

(P2) Respecting a group’s moral right to self-determination is a necessary condition for respecting the individual autonomy of the group’s members.

From (P1) and (P2) we can infer

(P3) Thus, a group’s moral right to self-determination should be respected (from P1 and P2).

We think this is a compelling reasoning for the recognition of a group’s right to self-determination. As we saw, (P2) is supported by important reasons that explain why benevolent forms of colonialism are wrong. Furthermore, note that (P2) is compatible with reductive and non-reductive views of group rights on the rights individuals. In any event, for our purposes we only need to vindicate (P3). Accordingly, if there are further reasons for vindicating a group’s right to self-determination (for instance, if one thinks groups have properties that ground this right independently of its contribution to individual autonomy – see Altman and Wellman Citation2009: 4-5 – or that granting self-determination to a group is required to treat its members as equals – see Copp Citation1997: 291-292) this is perfectly congenial with our main strategy.Footnote6

Once respect for the group's self-determination is established, the argument in favour of secession seems to follow. Again, with important differences and caveats, Philpott, Altman & Wellman, and others defend a distinct version of this claim. In our case, the premise takes the following form:

(P4) The moral right to secede of a group that satisfies (5)-(10) is a justified exercise of a group’s right to self-determination.

#### The resolution’s specification of ‘a people’ means a plebiscitary theory of secession is most accurate, which avoids DAs.

Vaca & Artiga ’21 [Moises; Institute for Philosophical Research, National Autonomous University of Mexico. Marc; Department of Philosophy, University of Valencia. “A defense of the moral and legal right to secede.” Ethics & Global Politics, Volume 14] TDI

The normative status of secession is incredibly controversial. The debate around it has nowadays heated practical instances and longstanding theoretical discrepancies. In the theoretical realm, it is common practice to group the different positions in two main camps: remedial-right theories and plebiscitary theories. It is well-known that remedial-right theories see secession as a very last resort and are thus quite strict on the conditions that normatively justify particular instances.Footnote1 In particular, Buchanan, 1991, 2004, has famously defended that the secession of a given group is justified only when one of the following conditions is metFootnote2

1. Violation to human rights: there are severe and sustained violations to minimal standards of justice targeted at the secessionist group.
2. Unjust annexation: the secessionist group has been recently and unjustly annexed by the given state.
3. Violations to autonomy agreements: the state has violated agreements conferring degrees of autonomy and self-determination to the secessionist group.

To these conditions posed by Buchanan, some authors (see Costa Citation2003; Patten Citation2002, Citation2014) have added a further one:

(4) Lack of recognition: the state has failed to establish institutional provisions that guarantee the equal recognition of the secessionist national minority.

By adding this further condition, both Costa and Patten think that a remedial-right theory can respond to the important claims of equal recognition that national minorities usually make against their host states. For with condition (4) on the table, it becomes clear that the lack of equal institutional standing alongside the larger national group is a justified cause of secession. According to this form of remedial-right theory (for short, RRT), thus, each of these four conditions suffices to normatively justify an instance of secession. Let us schematize this claim as follows:

RRT: (1)-(4) and only (1)-(4) are individually sufficient to justify that a group has a right to secede, even if such right is not recognized by its host state.

Conversely, plebiscitary theories are less restrictive. There is a rich variation on the different forms that these theories have. For the purposes of this paper, we will take the plebiscitary theory to subscribe the following claims:

(5) Eligibility: the members of the secessionist unit form an eligible group for secession.

(6) Fair terms: the proposed terms of secession must be fair to the current host state.

(7) Regional security: the new state will not pose a threat to the security of the current host state.

(8) Justice: the new state will not violate basic rights and further standards of justice.

(9) Equal recognition: the new state will offer equal institutional standing to the different minority groups within its territory.

(10) Democratic determination: the decision to secede from the host state will follow democratic procedures either in collaboration with the host state (if they actually exist) or at least in the territory of the secessionist unit.

Conditions (5) to (10) delineate the commitments that a specifically liberal plebiscitary theory should meet. As it is well known in the literature (and as we will defend here at length), plebiscitary theories are less restrictive than RRT in permitting secessions because of the primary importance they put on the political autonomy and self-determination of the preferred secessionist groups. However, by being committed to a broader liberal view, such values should be coherently balanced with other liberal commitments – such as respect for others and their concerns for a just distribution of resources, their physical integrity, etc. These conditions show, then, that political autonomy is not an absolute right – see Philpott (Citation1995): 181–183. They also show why most authors defending plebiscitary theories think that a right to secede is compatible with a broader liberal view – and, as we will see, that it is also a requirement of it.

Accordingly, condition (5) specifies a very first filter. It identifies which groups can qualify as secessionist groups. In the literature, there are two positions in this regard. According to Margalit and Raz (Citation1990), Miller (Citation1995), Neran 1998, Kymlicka (Citation2001), Bossacoma (Citation2020), and others, only national minorities (i.e. groups that share a particular cultural identity and whose existence usually precede the formation of their current host state), if any, may have the right to secede. Contrarily, according to Beran (Citation1984), Wellman (Citation1995, Citation2005) and others, any group with the capacity to form a viable state has this right – regardless of whether they share a cultural identity or not. We will not take a stand on this debate here and, thus, our defence of the plebiscitary theory will cover both positions.Footnote3 Notice, however, that these two positions in the plebiscitary theory literature are exhaustive: when taken together, the only group of people that is excluded from the possibility of seceding from a state is the one who could not form a viable state. Since the aim of seceding from a state is to form another viable state, excluding that possible group from this right seems to be justified.

Conditions (6) and (7) try to prevent a negative impact of a given secession on the state that experiences it. On the one hand, condition (6) is usually taken to mean that the separation of a given region should be acceptable considering the economy of the larger state, the division of natural resources, and the like. This ensures that secession will not be too burdensome economically speaking for the old state (see Gauthier Citation1994 for a radical version of that claim; see also Dietrich Citation2014; Catala Citation2017). On the other hand, condition (7) guarantees that the newly formed state will not be a permanent and intractable threat to the old state. This ensures that secession will not create a long-standing security problem in the region (see Philpott Citation1995, 181). Again, these two conditions show that political autonomy is not an absolute right, and that its correct exercise should respect other values as well, such as non-domination (see Catala Citation2017, 539–546), equal respect for others, and reciprocity (see Moore Citation2015: 128-134).

Conditions (8) and (9) regulate the internal organization of the new state that a given secession will bring about. Condition (8) ensures that the new state will properly meet standards of justice for its citizens. Condition (9) ensures that the new state will respect the rights of the minority groups that will now leave under its jurisdiction (see Philpott Citation1995, Citation1998, 92). Allocating these rights will always be a complex contextual matter; however, a good normative guide here consists in trying to identify the nature of the group in question (i.e. whether the group is a territorially concentrated national minority, a community of disaggregated nationals, etc.). These two conditions are also of primary importance for liberal plebiscitary theories to be successful. As we mentioned earlier, the main argument in favour of such theories is based on the value of autonomy as such, and thus not respecting such a value and its consequences with regards to liberal justice and minority rights for all the members of the new state would simply be incoherent.

Finally, condition (10) sets a standard regarding how the procedure that might or might not end up in secession should be conducted. In particular, this condition is committed to the idea that if feasible democratic procedures already exist or have been agreed with the host state, these must be employed and followed by the minority seeking to secede. However, and this is why the discussion that follows centres mostly on a unilateral right to secede (as opposed to cases of consensual secessions – see Buchanan Citation2017), condition (10) states that when no agreement between the host state and the minority is in place, it suffices that secession is sought through democratic procedures at least in the secessionist minority’s territory – if, of course, all previous conditions can be met.

We are now in a position to define the plebiscitary theory more succinctly. For the purpose of this paper, we will take such a theory to state:

PT: A group has a right to secede, even if such a right is not recognized by its host state, if and only if one of (1) to (4) holds or all of (5) to (10) hold.

## 1nc

### quebec---1nc

#### Excepting the Province of Quebec, in a democracy, a people ought to have the right to secede from their government.

#### Quebec fulfills the criteria for secession under the plan. Proclamation alone triggers the link.

Matas ’75 [David; Norton, O'Sullivan, Schwartz and Associates, Winnipeg. “Can Quebec Separate.” McGill Law Journal, Volume 21, Issue 3] TDI

A unilateral secession by Quebec without an amendment to the B.N.A. Act is not necessarily illegal. A seceding government will be considered a legally valid government if it fulfils certain criteria laid down by common law. One of the most important criteria is that it must be in effective control of the territory it claims a right to govern.38 Courts within the territory cannot refuse to give legal validity to the acts of a regime in control of a territory over which the courts have jurisdiction simply because the seceding regime is illegal in terms of the constitution of the federation abandoned. Whereas a court outside a seceding territory must determine the view of its government as to whether or not the seceding government is the lawful government and act upon that view, the courts within a seceding territory do not have the luxury of relying on the decision of another as to who is lawful government. They must decide themselves.

It is an historical fact that in many countries there are regimes recognized as lawful which derive their origins from unlawful acts. The law must take account of that fact. However, a court does not have to give effect to a secession as soon as it is proclaimed. A court cannot give legal validity to a regime simply because it seems likely to remain, nor can it assess which of two contending parties is more likely to maintain control and support the likelier of the two contenders. On the contrary, until such time as the courts can predict with certainty that the secession has succeeded, they must support the federation. If the courts held otherwise, they would in effect be saying that the federation, by striving to assert its lawful rights, was opposing the lawful ruler.

#### Quebec secession causes World War III.

Matthews ’14 [Daniel; Lieutenant, Marine Corps University; Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer, III MEF; Old Dominion University. “The Quebec Wars.” http://cimsec.org/quebec-wars/11757] TDI

Thought of Canada being the region where the sparks for World War III will be struck may not seem likely, but there is one area where a foreign foe could surprise the West: Quebec. If Quebec were to secede from Canada, two unsettling possibilities could occur. The first is that Canada could go to war with its wayward province. The second is that some power like China or Russia could build an alliance with Quebec. While such possibilities are unlikely, there are means of defense.

The Canadian Civil War

If Quebec were to secede from Canada, there are several points that could spark a civil war between the two. The least likely would be national pride. There are several economic reasons that could provide the tinder for war. Quebec controls the mouth of the St. Lawrence River, and Quebec could use that control to wage economic war with Western Canada. In addition, Quebec possesses significant reserves of natural resources that currently contribute to the North American economy on a free basis. An independent Quebec would change that. Finally, Canada proper would become a split country, with a third of Canadian provinces being geographically separated from the Capital. In light of the fact that no state wants to be divided, and Canada already has several fluttering independence movements, the urge to prevent further dissolution will be strong.

While it is true that Canada does not have a large military, and Quebec has none, it is not impossible for war to break out. The Quebec separatists have used violence before, most notably with the murder of Quebec Labour Minister Pierre Laporte, and it would be easy for a semi-independent Quebec to buy arms on the international market.

If Canada did get involved in civil war with Quebec, there are several options open to both sides if the war drags on. Canada could invoke Article 5 of the NATO treaty, which could split NATO as France has traditionally expressed support for Francophone Quebec. It is unlikely Britain would be unconcerned with a core Commonwealth state being embroiled in civil war; especially depending on how the vote for Scottish independence goes this year. The United States would be committed, as they are deeply intertwined with Canada at every level.

States like Russia, China, or Iran could use the distraction of a civil war in the very center of the Anglosphere to press their boundaries with the Western Alliance. Furthermore, they could start supporting the Quebec rebels, either directly or through third party means. If the war was presaged by an internationally recognized referendum, then Russia or China could take the position that they are upholding international norms, and paint the Western states in a negative light. Attempts at arming the rebels or openly supporting them would directly threaten the fundamental security of the United States, as it would provide a foothold on the continent from which hostile states could threaten the United States.

The Bear and the Dragon in Quebec

While the first scenario of a successful Quebec independence movement immediately descending into world war is unlikely, the far more dangerous one of an independent Quebec making allies with states hostile to the West is possible. An independent Quebec would have the full ability to make alliances with foreign powers, and it is unlikely they would be readily welcomed into NATO, NAFTA, or other treaties with the Western powers. Canada would put pressure on any attempts to allow Quebec a seat at the table, and European countries would be wary of admitting Quebec, as it could fuel separatist movements within their own countries.

In addition, the United States would not want the possibility of Canada dissolving, even if most of the providences would likely join the United States. This method of amalgamation would be undesirable, if for no other reason than there is no guarantee that each section of Canada would join the US, and a unified Canada is better for the US than a series of states on its northern border. The dissolution of Canada could also embolden separatist movements in the United States.

Given the internal danger to Western countries an independent Quebec would present, it is likely that Quebec would be forced to look for friends elsewhere. Russia and China are the most likely candidates. Both countries would be interested in the natural resources of Quebec. China and Russia would also both enjoy the prospects of helping to develop Quebec’s Arctic resources. In addition, the possibility of a military alliance with Quebec would present an opportunity not present since Alaska became part of the United States; a land connection to the United States.

Right now the Anglosphere is protected by its island status, with no major hostile powers sharing a land border with any member. An independent Quebec would be courted by hostile powers to allow such a chance thought. Russia would view it as retaliation for NATO expanding into the Baltics, Poland, and developing close relations with Ukraine and Georgia. China would view it as a chance to have a mirror for the US alliances in China’s First Island Chain, with the added bonus of a large land connection to the American heartland, as opposed to the slender one that the US has against China on the Korean peninsula. The presence of a near-peer competitor with bases on the North American heartland would greatly reduce the flexibility of Western countries as they exert their influence on the world. Such a situation would be more bothersome to the United States and its allies than the Zimmerman telegram of a century ago, or the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba half a century ago. It would have the same effect as Germany’s race to rival Britain on the high seas before World War I.

#### Independently, follow-on separatism globally---extinction.

Valaskakis ’14 [Kimon; Former OECD Ambassador, Canada. “Separatism Everywhere: The New Global Epidemic.” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kimon-valaskakis/separatism-everywhere-the\_b\_4977800.html] TDI

Crimea wants to leave Ukraine. Scotland has scheduled an independence referendum from Britain in September 2014 and Britain is considering one to possibly leave Europe in 2015. Catalonia’s referendum to secede from Spain is in November 2014, and Quebec may possibly organize its own in the next couple of years. Wallonie, Corsica, North Italy, Bretagne etc. may one day follow suit. There is even talk of splitting California in two!

Why are these centrifugal forces emerging now? There seems to be four leading reasons.

The first is a knee jerk reaction against excessive and unregulated globalization which leaves the ordinary citizen lost and with no identity. He therefore seeks a new sense of belongingness in a small, newly independent country, favoring localism over globalism.

The second is the fact that most so called ‘nation’ states are actually multinational and diverse. The ethnic minorities which feel oppressed in such states, are tempted to seek a divorce, set up their own nation, where they are will then be the majority — and perhaps, in the process, exact revenge on their former tormentors, now in the minority.

The third is the worldwide failure of national governments, who seem to be chronically unable to deliver on their electoral promises. One response is to ‘throw the rascals out’, which explains why governments of the left, right and center are regularly kicked out of office at the next election. In the U.S., an irate electorate consistently punishes the governing parry at the mid-terms regardless of its ideology.

An alternative response to ineffective governance is to seek independence, whenever there is a geographical concentration of like minded opponents to a central regime. This was what the U.S. Civil War was all about and is what many contemporary ethnic struggles are leading towards.

Fourth and finally, there is simple self interest. Rich provinces, in a country, whose constitution obliges them to help poorer ones, (like Canada) may want to end these subsidies and keep all the money to themselves. Under this logic it should be Alberta rather than Quebec considering secession.

When all is said and done, is all this good or bad news?

At first blush, by invoking the principle of self-determination, the virtues of decentralization and more responsible local government, we might be tempted to welcome these centrifugal forces.

But upon reflection and careful analysis we should instead fear them because they will exacerbate the present mismanagement of our planet.

The separatists often believe that they can repeal globalization by a simple declaration of sovereignty, the adoption of a new flag and national anthem and by being awarded a seat in the United Nations.

This, unfortunately is a delusion.

Globalization is fueled by international capital, labor and technology movements, the internet, global finance and powerful worldwide networks — some visible, others covert. Multinational corporations are going to remain global, and so are mafias, narco-cartels, organized crime, jihadists etc.

If all the separatist movements in the world were to succeed, we could move from a present world of under 200 countries to one of over 1,000 — all with an equal seat at the UN. Can you imagine how difficult it would be to decide on anything in a 1,000 strong UN general assembly? Think, also, of the balance of power: 1,000 fragmented small countries, plus their subnational governments, competing for the favors of a dozen huge unregulated global conglomerates. It would be an embarrassment of riches for the footloose conglomerates. It would also be Eldorado for organized crime, jihadists, tax evaders and assorted criminals vaulting from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.

The sociologist, Daniel Bell once remarked,in the 1970s, that the nation state had become too big for the small problems and too small for the big ones. His words were prophetic but they cut both ways. National governments can no longer cope with pandemics, global warming, international terrorism, unregulated global finance — unless they act in unison in intergovernmental organizations. But, by the same token, Lilliputian micro states, emerging from the global separatist wave, would be even be less capable to deal with these problems. Global governance would then be completely controlled by the remaining, still international, private networks. A scary scenario to be sure.

Does that mean we must stay put and freeze present borders in perpetuity. No, obviously not. Re-arrangements and restructuring are necessary. But the more sustainable answer may be in new forms of federalism rather than in the pure multiplication of sovereignties.

In today's interdependent world, sovereignty is an illusion except if you are a superpower. The problems are too big while the means available to the new so-called 'sovereign' government are too small.

The 'balkanization' of Eastern and Southern Europe after the First World War, led to the Second World War.

The balkanization of the world through wide-spread separatism could increase the probability of a third one. Not an inspiring scenario.

#### It turns the case.

Horowitz ’03 [Donald; James B. Duke Professor of Law and Political Science, Duke University. “THE CRACKED FOUNDATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO SECEDE.” Journal of Democracy, Volume 14, Number 2] TDI

Recognition of a right to secede is thus not likely to be the end of an old bitterness but the beginning of new bitterness. It is, of course, easy to question whether a slavish devotion to territorial integrity is still appropriate. There has been a great deal of loose talk about the allegedly artificial character of many international boundaries and the part played by colonial convenience in settling them. In point of fact, even in Africa, where this charge is most frequently encountered, boundaries were not settled as disrespectfully of ethnic patterns as is frequently asserted.13 In any event, patterns of settlement are such that virtually any boundaries would have a large element of arbitrariness to them. Secession would not be a way of rectifying boundaries, because there are no truly natural boundaries.

If it does not solve boundary problems, secession does do something else. A secession or partition converts a domestic ethnic dispute into a more dangerous international one. And since states are able to procure arms with few of the restraints that periodically bedevil insurgents, the international dispute often involves escalating weapons and the prospect of international warfare. Consider the nuclear armaments possessed by India and Pakistan and the recurrent warfare between those states.

One reason for the greater danger that often follows secession is the activation of irredentist claims. For reasons I have explicated elsewhere,14 the serious pursuit of irredentas — movements to retrieve kindred people and their territory across international boundaries — has been relatively rare in the post-World War II world. But successful secession or partition is likely to change this benign state of affairs. Either the rump state or the secessionist state will desire to retrieve minorities stranded on the wrong side of the border. There are examples readily at hand: Kashmir, Serb claims in Bosnia and in the Krajina region of Croatia, warfare between Ethiopia and Eritrea. And when irredentism gets going, it usually involves ethnic cleansing, so as to eliminate troublesome minorities in the region to be retrieved. A recent quantitative study of the effects of partition finds that partition does not prevent further warfare between ethnic antagonists, and it has only a negligible (and easily reversed) positive effect on low-grade violence short of war.15

The recurrent temptation to create a multitude of homogeneous ministates, even if it could be realized, might well increase the sum total of warfare, rather than reduce it. The right direction for international boundaries is upward, not downward, so that states are so heterogeneous that no one group can plausibly dominate others.16 Although this degree of benign ethnic complexity is exceedingly difficult to achieve, it is still true that India, with its many groups, is a better model than Kosovo or Rwanda, with just two or three.

### self-determination---1nc

#### Use consequentialism. It’s explanatory of moral intuitions and deductive.

Sinnott-Armstrong ’23 [Walter; Chauncey Stillman Professor of Practical Ethics, Duke University; Resource Faculty, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Partner Investigator, Oxford; Research Scientist, The Mind Research Network. Fellowships, Harvard, Princeton, Oxford, Australian National University, University of California, Santa Barbara; Vice-chair of the Board of Officers, American Philosophical Association; Co-director, MacArthur Law and Neuroscience Project; B.A., Amherst College; Ph.D., Yale University. “Consequentialism.” https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/] TDI

Consequentialism also might be supported by an inference to the best explanation of our moral intuitions. This argument might surprise those who think of consequentialism as counterintuitive, but in fact consequentialists can explain many moral intuitions that trouble deontological theories. Moderate deontologists, for example, often judge that it is morally wrong to kill one person to save five but not morally wrong to kill one person to save a million. They never specify the line between what is morally wrong and what is not morally wrong, and it is hard to imagine any non-arbitrary way for deontologists to justify a cutoff point. In contrast, consequentialists can simply say that the line belongs wherever the benefits outweigh the costs (including any bad side effects). Similarly, when two promises conflict, it often seems clear which one we should keep, and that intuition can often be explained by the amount of harm that would be caused by breaking each promise. In contrast, deontologists are hard pressed to explain which promise is overriding if the reason to keep each promise is simply that it was made (Sinnott-Armstrong 2009). If consequentialists can better explain more common moral intuitions, then consequentialism might have more explanatory coherence overall, despite being counterintuitive in some cases. (Compare Sidgwick 1907, Book IV, Chap. III; and Sverdlik 2011.) And even if act consequentialists cannot argue in this way, it still might work for rule consequentialists (such as Hooker 2000).

Consequentialists also might be supported by deductive arguments from abstract moral intuitions. Sidgwick (1907, Book III, Chap. XIII) seemed to think that the principle of utility follows from certain very general self-evident principles, including universalizability (if an act ought to be done, then every other act that resembles it in all relevant respects also ought to be done), rationality (one ought to aim at the good generally rather than at any particular part of the good), and equality (“the good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view ... of the Universe, than the good of any other”).

Other consequentialists are more skeptical about moral intuitions, so they seek foundations outside morality, either in non-normative facts or in non-moral norms. Mill (1861) is infamous for his “proof” of the principle of utility from empirical observations about what we desire (cf. Sayre-McCord 2001). In contrast, Hare (1963, 1981) tries to derive his version of utilitarianism from substantively neutral accounts of morality, of moral language, and of rationality (cf. Sinnott-Armstrong 2001). Similarly, Gewirth (1978) tries to derive his variant of consequentialism from metaphysical truths about actions.

Yet another argument for a kind of consequentialism is contractarian. Harsanyi (1977, 1978) argues that all informed, rational people whose impartiality is ensured because they do not know their place in society would favor a kind of consequentialism. Broome (1991) elaborates and extends Harsanyi’s argument.

Other forms of arguments have also been invoked on behalf of consequentialism (e.g. Cummiskey 1996, P. Singer 1993; Sinnott-Armstrong 1992). However, each of these arguments has also been subjected to criticisms.

Even if none of these arguments proves consequentialism, there still might be no adequate reason to deny consequentialism. We might have no reason either to deny consequentialism or to assert it. Consequentialism could then remain a live option even if it is not proven.

#### Thus, extinction outweighs.

Pummer ’15 [Theron; Professor of Philosophy, University of St Andrews; Former Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy, University of Oxford. “Moral Agreement on Saving the World.” http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/05/moral-agreement-on-saving-the-world/] TDI

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we — whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists — should all agree that we should try to save the world.

According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future — there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions.

There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view — according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people — the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives.

You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character.

What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize ~~her~~ [their] own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk — perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act).

To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility — suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk.

We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk — not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future — there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation).

#### We’ll also link turn self-determination:

#### 1. COMMUNITY. It’s a prerequisite to common good.

Sellers ’06 [Mortimer; Regents Professor, University System of Maryland; Director, University of Baltimore Center for International and Comparative Law. “The Right to Secede.” *Republican Principles in International Law*, Chapter 17] TDI

Secession concerns boundaries between states and the lines between republics. Since the separation of peoples into distinct and independent states is justified (if at all) by local geographical and cultural differences, to facilitate the development of the public good through national institutions, it follows that these boundaries should be as stable as possible over time. Changing boundaries disrupts the development of community, both directly, by destroying shared institutions, and indirectly, by removing the expectation of permanence that encourages long-term cooperation and mutual compromises for the common good. The common good is partly discovered and partly created from a given set of people, history and circumstances. Changing borders severs this line of development.

The republican requirements of democracy, the rule of law, checks and balances, and fundamental human rights do not provide any obvious rules for drawing the initial borders between states. Pursuit of the common good implies the existence (or the development) of a sense of community, without specifying which community to develop. Borders should be geographically sensible, culturally unified and above all territorially stable to support the development of common interests and public institutions over time. The cardinal rule of republican borders should be that they do not change.7

The question of secession arises when states already exist, within established borders. The question presented by the right to secede does not concern the initial allocation of territory, but rather its possible reallocation, to serve the common good. Given the general agnosticism of republican principles of justice about state borders – beyond the fundamental observation that they should not be too large – national boundaries should not be disturbed without some good reason for doing so. This reason should arise from the common good of all citizens, which means in practice from the purpose of advancing those fundamental civil and constitutional procedures that serve the common good best, including democracy, the rule of law, checks and balances, and fundamental human rights.

#### 2. GOVERNANCE. Kant agrees coercion isn’t necessarily a violation of the right to freedom.

1ac Rauscher ’22 [Frederick; Professor & Undergraduate Program Director of Philosophy, Michigan State University. “Kant’s Social and Political Philosophy.” https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-social-political/#FreBasSta] TDI

The very existence of a state might seem to some as a limitation of freedom, since a state possesses power to control the external freedom of individual citizens through force. This is the basic claim of anarchism. Kant holds in contrast that there is no innate right to unlimited freedom but only an innate right to freedom “insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with universal law” (6:237). Rightful freedom for each individual is limited, and the state is not an impediment to freedom but is the means for freedom. State action that is a hindrance to freedom can, when properly directed, support and maintain rightful freedom if the state action is aimed at hindering actions that themselves would hinder the rightful freedom of others and thus be wrongful uses of freedom. Given a subject’s action that would limit the freedom of another subject, the state may hinder the first subject to defend the second by “hindering a hindrance to freedom”. Such state coercion is compatible with the maximal freedom demanded in the principle of right because it does not reduce overall freedom but instead provides the necessary background conditions needed to secure rightful freedom. The amount of freedom lost by the first subject through direct state coercion is equal to the amount gained by the second subject through lifting the hindrance to actions. State action sustains the maximal amount of freedom consistent with identical freedom for all without reducing it.

#### 3. MINORITIES. They’re further harmed.

Horowitz ’03 [Donald; James B. Duke Professor of Law and Political Science, Duke University. “THE CRACKED FOUNDATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO SECEDE.” Journal of Democracy, Volume 14, Number 2] TDI

There are always ethnic minorities in secessionist regions. There were Efik and Ijaw, among others, in Biafra; there are Hindus in Kashmir, Muslims in Tamil areas of Sri Lanka, Javanese in Aceh and Irian Jaya, Serbs and Roma in Kosovo; and there are minorities in all the rump states as well. As a matter of fact, it is often the desire of regional majorities to deal with minorities — and not to deal with them in a democratic way — that motivates or contributes to the secessionist movement in the first instance. Proponents of rights to secession assure us that minority rights must be guaranteed in secessionist states and that secession should be less favored if minority rights are unlikely to be respected,11 but the verbal facility of this formulation masks the difficulty of achieving any such results. If, after all, conditions on the exercise of an international law right to secede can be enforced, why not enforce those conditions in the undivided state so as to forestall the need to secede? International law has been notoriously ineffective in assuring longstanding, internationally recognized minority rights, and proponents of secession have no new ideas to offer on this matter. If the failure to respect minority rights in the undivided state induced a regional group to consider secession, why should anyone assume that the situation will be different when that group, a minority in the undivided state, comprises a majority in the secessionist state? If anything, the treatment of minorities in smaller states is less visible to outsiders.

The more circumscribed the asserted right to secede, ironically enough, the more dangerous conditions may become for minorities in the secessionist region. By the time it is concluded that the majority in the undivided state is unalterably hostile to minority interests, thus in some formulations permitting the minority to secede, that group may have accumulated so many grudges that, in their turn, minorities in the secessionist region may be particularly vulnerable to the expression of violent hostility or the settlement of old scores. There are many examples: the fate of Serbs and Roma in Kosovo, of Biharis in Bangladesh, of Sikhs and Hindus in Pakistan at the time of partition, and of Muslims in India at the same time. If the problem of minorities is that they do not enjoy “meaningful political participation”12 in the undivided state, there is no reason to think that minorities will enjoy it in the secessionist state either. Secession merely proliferates the arenas in which the problem of intergroup political accommodation must be faced — and often more starkly. Contrast Yugoslavia, with six or seven groups and the complex alignments they created with Bosnia, in which three groups confront each other. Secession can hardly be said to solve the problem of intergroup accommodation, except, of course, insofar as it enables the former minority, now a new majority, to cleanse the secessionist state of its minorities — which it could not do previously — and induces the rump state to do the same with members of the secessionist group who find themselves left on the wrong side of a new international boundary.

## 1ar

### at: governance

#### They oversimplify Kant. Even if governance is perfect, it doesn’t necessarily maximize freedom as per Rauscher. That’s Vaca.

<<FOR REFERENCE>>

According to Patten, assuming that a multinational state already guarantees equal institutional recognition to the nationals of the secessionist minority, the best way to maximize the preferences of all individuals living in the secessionist territory is to uphold the existing multinational state. For the individuals of the three mentioned groups get ‘some of what they want’: the first group is ensured the institutional recognition of its identity (albeit within the existing state), the second group is granted its belonging to the state they recognize as theirs, and the third group maintains its dual identity.

This is an interesting reasoning that opens serious questions in regard to the aptness of the majority rule. However, there are at least three complications with it. First, once it is discarded that a simple or qualified democratic majority is the strategy that mostly respects the autonomy of group members, Patten owes us an account of how many people on groups two and three are needed in order for their preferences to tip the balance against secession. For instance, is he recommending a general principle according to which if some people want A and not B, others B and not A and a third group prefer A and B, then A and B should always be implemented, irrespective of majorities? That looks like a very implausible principle to us. For one thing: in any secessionist dispute some people are attached to the larger state and some other to the secessionist group so that, if majorities were not taken into account, all cases of secession would be illegitimate. This result not only makes resistance to secession too cheap (one just needs to find some people with allegiance to the two groups) but in certain cases would lead to very counterintuitive results. For instance, if 90% of the population in the territory identifies as nationals wanting to secede, 5% as nationals of the current state, and 5% as both, why is it that forming a new state is not the best way to respect everyone’s individual autonomy, given that all had the same opportunity for political influence by means of their vote? Surely, it would be important to try to meet the preferences of these last two groups; however, it seems that the best result in this case is to comply with the decision of the vast majority. This is especially clear once we remember that, according to PT’s condition (9), full institutional recognition and rights would be granted to minorities in the state formed after secession.

### at: community / minorities

#### They’re wrong. ‘Seceding states are worse’ is warrantless.

Vaca & Artiga ’21 [Moises; Institute for Philosophical Research, National Autonomous University of Mexico. Marc; Department of Philosophy, University of Valencia. “A defense of the moral and legal right to secede.” Ethics & Global Politics, Volume 14] TDI

Yet this objection assumes that the seceding state would fail to include the meaningful arrangements necessary to fulfil the equal recognition requirement. As Patten admits, ‘a well-founded expectation that a new set of confederal arrangements would be established in the aftermath of secession would diminish, and perhaps nullify, the recognition-based objection to plebiscitary secession’ (Patten Citation2014, 263). But why should we assume that the new state would be unable to comply with this desideratum? Note that the whole force of Patten’s objection depends on justifying the claim that the new state will fail to appropriately recognize its own national minorities. This assumption, however, needs to be backed up. In its support, Patten mentions the difficulty of creating successful institutions that are able to guarantee the equal recognition of all national groups in a given state since to get such institutions up and running requires a degree of genius at institutional design, together with a high level of trust and cooperative commitment on the part of the major parties:

There is no guarantee that an intention, however sincere, on the part of one or more of the parties concerned to build institutions providing for the recognition of different national identities will meet with success. (Patten Citation2014: 263)

Unfortunately, this reason seems too weak to support the value of multinational states objection. Although we certainly agree that it might be insufficient to merely assert the intention to create respectful multinational arrangements in the new state, there are different strategies for making this intention more credible – such as a legal commitment or allowing some supranational organization to supervise the process. On the other hand, whether the new state can be trusted to appropriately recognize its national minorities seems to be an empirical question that should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. For this reason, the importance of ensuring a just treatment to minorities should not be used as a general argument against PT but as a qualification that, when it is not properly met, offers sufficient ground to invalidate a given claim to secede. PT contemplates this qualification as we defend it, for it includes the requirement that a newly formed state produced by a given secession should respect and confer equal institutional standing to national minorities (i. e., condition (9)).

### at: pic

#### Solves NONE of the case. It prohibits secession generally, which violates self-determination. That’s Vaca.

<<FOR REFERENCE>>

Finally, Patten’s argument seems to commit a common pitfall of restrictive accounts of secession: they confuse reasons against secession for reasons against the right to secession (for more on this see footnote 11 below). Even if one thinks that in a certain case secession is not the best option, this should not be used as an argument against the right of a certain group to decide which is the option they prefer.

### at: link

#### The plan’s right is conditional. That’s Vaca.

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Conversely, plebiscitary theories are less restrictive. There is a rich variation on the different forms that these theories have. For the purposes of this paper, we will take the plebiscitary theory to subscribe the following claims:

(5) Eligibility: the members of the secessionist unit form an eligible group for secession.

(6) Fair terms: the proposed terms of secession must be fair to the current host state.

(7) Regional security: the new state will not pose a threat to the security of the current host state.

(8) Justice: the new state will not violate basic rights and further standards of justice.

(9) Equal recognition: the new state will offer equal institutional standing to the different minority groups within its territory.

(10) Democratic determination: the decision to secede from the host state will follow democratic procedures either in collaboration with the host state (if they actually exist) or at least in the territory of the secessionist unit.

#### Two implications:

#### 1. NO LINK. Quebec doesn’t meet that criteria.

Depalma ’98 [Anthony; Staff Writer, New York Times. “Canadian Court Rules Quebec Cannot Secede on Its Own.” https://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/21/world/canadian-court-rules-quebec-cannot-secede-on-its-own.html] TDI

A simple vote in Quebec is not enough to allow the French-speaking province to legally separate from the rest of Canada, the country's Supreme Court said yesterday in a landmark opinion widely seen as fortifying the federal Government's efforts to keep the United States' closest ally from breaking up.

#### 2. PROCESS. It shields the DA. That’s Vaca.

<<FOR REFERENCE>>

Conditions (6) and (7) try to prevent a negative impact of a given secession on the state that experiences it. On the one hand, condition (6) is usually taken to mean that the separation of a given region should be acceptable considering the economy of the larger state, the division of natural resources, and the like. This ensures that secession will not be too burdensome economically speaking for the old state (see Gauthier Citation1994 for a radical version of that claim; see also Dietrich Citation2014; Catala Citation2017). On the other hand, condition (7) guarantees that the newly formed state will not be a permanent and intractable threat to the old state. This ensures that secession will not create a long-standing security problem in the region (see Philpott Citation1995, 181). Again, these two conditions show that political autonomy is not an absolute right, and that its correct exercise should respect other values as well, such as non-domination (see Catala Citation2017, 539–546), equal respect for others, and reciprocity (see Moore Citation2015: 128-134).

### at: regional stability

#### No regional instability.

Vaca & Artiga ’21 [Moises; Institute for Philosophical Research, National Autonomous University of Mexico. Marc; Department of Philosophy, University of Valencia. “A defense of the moral and legal right to secede.” Ethics & Global Politics, Volume 14] TDI

We certainly do not want to deny that secessionist processes have often involved such terrible forms of regional instability. However, there are four reasons for thinking one should not use this tragic set of examples against PT. First, note again that PT specifies necessary and sufficient conditions for a group to have the right to secede, but it does not entail that once these conditions are met a group should secede. In other words, the right to secession involves a privilege and a claim-right (see Copp Citation1997; Buchanan 1993), but it does not provide normative reasons for seceding.Footnote11 As we have already pointed out, it does not follow that from granting the right to secede a massive bulk of secessions will or should necessarily occur. Second, in some situations in which a group already strives for secession, it is unclear that merely conceding this right would affect regional instability in any significant way (see Weinstock Citation2001). Third, in fact, it may well be that in many cases providing the right to secede even helps in reducing regional tensions (see Costa Citation2003: 83). It is not obvious, for instance, that a sufficiently large majority of Corsicans, Catalans or Basques would vote for independence, and nonetheless it is undeniable that conceding them this right would decisively promote regional stabilization. Also, as it became clear in the recent Scottish referendum on independence, conceding such a right might contribute to debunk one powerful argument in favour of secession, since the very idea that a group is forced to stay in a union is usually a determining reason for some to try to abandon it. Finally, we recall that some of the conditions included in PT (such as (8) or (10)) restrict the right to secede from those groups who would engage in fully democratic and peaceful processes. Thus, it is just wrong to think that PT would concede a right to secession in those cases in which regional stability could be jeopardized.

### at: impact

#### Conflicts won’t escalate---limiting factors maintain stability.

Lipson ’11 [Joshua; World Editor for the Harvard Political Review. “The New Horsemen of Secession.” http://hpronline.org/world/the-new-horsemen-of-secession/] TDI

More skeptical observers maintain that measures of local autonomy and regional integration successfully quell calls for separation. Since the onset of local autonomy in Spain’s Basque Country, the mass movement for secession led by ETA, the armed Basque separatist movement, has slowed to a trickle. Khanna explains that, counter-intuitively, “[concessions of autonomy] are often used as mechanisms to ensure some kind of federal union,” exemplified by the cases of Quebec and the Basque Country.

Furthermore, integrating forces might overwhelm the interests of local and ethnic separatists. Jerry Muller, professor of history at Catholic University, contends that “insofar as the European Union takes over the function of the traditional nation-state, it diminishes the ongoing attraction of separating from the nation-state.” To the credit of his argument, not a single state has seceded from an E.U. member nation since the organization’s inception.

Economics of Change s

Beyond the role of power in secession debates, the issue of economics looms large. In a financial sense, the separation of a polity into two amounts to the separation of one market into two. Indeed, Muller notes that “many issues of ethnic tension,” the raison d’être of most secessionist movements, “have to do with the flow of various revenue streams.” The critical importance of resource sharing in the mediation of secessionist conflicts rings truest in the developing world. In newly minted South Sudan, set to declare official independence in July, secession has succeeded “on the understanding that [petroleum] revenue streams to the South will continue to flow to the North,” Mueller claims. In the case of Iraqi Kurdistan, a lack of consensus over the sharing of oil revenues has hamstrung efforts toward full sovereignty.

#### The DA starts low. Pink.

Matthews ’14 [Daniel; Lieutenant at the Marine Corps University, Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer for III MEF, Graduated from Old Dominion University. “The Quebec Wars.” http://cimsec.org/quebec-wars/11757] TDI

Thought of Canada being the region where the sparks for World War III will be struck may not seem likely, but there is one area where a foreign foe could surprise the West: Quebec. If Quebec were to secede from Canada, two unsettling possibilities could occur. The first is that Canada could go to war with its wayward province. The second is that some power like China or Russia could build an alliance with Quebec. While such possibilities are unlikely, there are means of defense.

### at: transition turns case

#### No transitional instability.

Vaca & Artiga ’21 [Moises; Institute for Philosophical Research, National Autonomous University of Mexico. Marc; Department of Philosophy, University of Valencia. “A defense of the moral and legal right to secede.” Ethics & Global Politics, Volume 14] TDI

Despite the common invocation of this reasoning, transitional instability as such seems to be unobjectionable. For note that in any event only the stability that results from fair political relations should be respected. Surely, a dictatorship could be extremely stable, and yet this on its own does not provide normative reasons against fighting for a just regime, even when such a struggle might create instability. This attests to the claim that, at least when it comes to the creation of new viable and just multinational states, the stability of old multinational states on its own offers no normative reasons against it. Furthermore, as defenders of PT usually point out, recognizing the right to secede does not entail that a significant majority of groups will exercise such a right (see Copp Citation1997; Philpott Citation1998: 90; Wellman Citation2005), and thus the practical consequences of adopting PT might not be as broad as it is sometimes suggested. Accordingly, for the two reasons just mentioned (i.e. that there are no normative reasons for protecting stability as such and that not many minorities would exercise their right to secede), the fact that PT would allow some transitional instability is not a compelling objection against it.

#### No uniqueness for turns case. Only a risk of the link turn.

Vaca & Artiga ’21 [Moises; Institute for Philosophical Research, National Autonomous University of Mexico. Marc; Department of Philosophy, University of Valencia. “A defense of the moral and legal right to secede.” Ethics & Global Politics, Volume 14] TDI

We agree with Sunstein and Buchanan that these are possible consequences of adopting PT. However, there are two ways of showing that they fail to put pressure on PT. First of all, note that there is a tension in Buchanan’s presentation of the wrong incentive argument. On the one hand, he claims that PT gives regions the power to blackmail states in all areas of political life (Buchanan Citation1991: 98-100, Citation1997: 48). A consequence seems to be that PT would favour decentralization and regional development (because, otherwise, a region could go ahead and create its own state). However, he also claims that PT would encourage state centralization and a serious limitation of regional economic distribution (out of the state’s fear of the creation of sub-state political units) (Buchanan Citation2004: 377). So, if Buchanan’s analysis was right, both incentives would push in opposite directions, and this might lead to a technical tie. At the very least, the opposite direction of these incentives points to a situation of constant negotiations between the state and its regions, which should be a normal political procedure in a just and democratic multinational state. As a result, these putative consequences of PT might not be as ‘perverse’ as Buchanan envisages.

Second, there are reasons for thinking that, in fact, not granting a right to secede creates worse motivations for both types of political units than conceding such a right. For in many cases the fact that the state’s government knows that a group cannot legitimately create a new state has given it reasons for resisting decentralization. After all, if a minority can systematically be disregarded and the region can never claim for secession, why would the state ever take into account their views? On the other hand, consider what happens when a minority is denied the right to secede. It is undeniable that some members of national minorities around the world take secession as their primary political goal. Is it not the best thing for a country that they advance such a goal by normal institutional and political processes? By taking secession out of the political agenda in advance and for good, central powers might be opening wrong avenues to pursue such a goal; that is, putting secession out of the political agenda might do more wrong than good when it comes to political stability.

From this, it seems to follow that, with regard to states, there is at least one very important positive incentive that arises from PT: in general, conceding the right to secede might promote the state’s interest in national minorities feeling respected and well-treated. For once PT is adopted, limiting regional economic development or the free circulation of citizens will become irrational polices to pursue. In other words, providing the right to secede may help in achieving what recent RRT defenders (such as Patten and Costa) correctly worry about: granting full institutional recognition to minorities within multinational states – knowing that, if they are mistreated, they could engage in a secessionist process.

## 2nr

### at: no link (depalma)

#### Concludes NEG. Pink.

1ar Depalma ’98 [Anthony; Staff Writer, New York Times. “Canadian Court Rules Quebec Cannot Secede on Its Own.” https://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/21/world/canadian-court-rules-quebec-cannot-secede-on-its-own.html] TDI

A simple vote in Quebec is not enough to allow the French-speaking province to legally separate from the rest of Canada, the country's Supreme Court said yesterday in a landmark opinion widely seen as fortifying the federal Government's efforts to keep the United States' closest ally from breaking up.

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However, the unanimous opinion by the nine justices of Canada's highest court does not go so far as to declare Canada indivisible. If a clear majority of the people in Quebec want to secede, the justices said, the rest of Canada would be obliged to negotiate the terms of secession as though it were an amendment to the constitution.