# Türkiye Aff

## 1AC

### Advantage 1: Türkiyish Emboldenment

#### Turkey has US nukes now, but can’t use them.

Kristensen 19 [Hans, Director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists where he provides the public with analysis and background information about the status of nuclear forces and the role of nuclear weapons. He specializes in using the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in his research and is a frequent consultant to and is widely referenced in the news media on the role and status of nuclear weapons. His collaboration with researchers at NRDC in 2010 resulted in an estimate of the size of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile that was only 13 weapons off the actual number declassified by the U.S. government. Kristensen is co-author of the Nuclear Notebook column in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the World Nuclear Forces overview in the SIPRI Yearbook. The Nuclear Notebook is, according to the publisher, “widely regarded as the most accurate source of information on nuclear weapons and weapons facilities available to the public.” Between 2002 and 2005, Kristensen was a consultant to the nuclear program at the Natural Resources Defense Council in Washington, D.C, where he researched nuclear weapons issues and wrote the report “U.S. Nuclear Weapons In Europe” (February 2005) and co-authored numerous articles. Between 1998 and 2002, Kristensen directed the Nuclear Strategy Project at the Nautilus Institute in Berkeley, CA, and he was a Special Advisor to the Danish Ministry of Defense in 1997-1998 as a member of the Danish Defense Commission. He was a Senior Researcher with the Nuclear Information Unit of Greenpeace International in Washington D.C from 1991 to 1996, prior to which he coordinated the Greenpeace Nuclear Free Seas Campaign in Denmark, Norway, Finland and Sweden.], 10-16-2019, "Urgent: Move US Nuclear Weapons Out Of Turkey," Federation of American Scientists, <https://fas.org/publication/nukes-out-of-turkey/>

The specific reference in the New York Times article made by officials to nuclear weapons at Incirlik is the most recent and authoritative confirmation that nuclear weapons are still stored at the base. That confirms what I have been hearing and sources at US Air Forces Europe confirmed the report, telling William Arkin the weapons are still there. There have been rumors the weapons were removed after the coup attempt in 2016 (and some really bad disinformation that they had been moved to Romania). All of those rumors were wrong. An article on the official Incirlik Air Base web site even confirms that the mission of the 39th Operations Support Squadron is “to orchestrate and control US, Turkish, and coalition forces operating at Incirlik Airbase in the execution of full-spectrum airpower and nuclear deterrent operations” (emphasis added). Given that the article will likely be removed now that I have pointed this out, it is reproduced in full below:

I have estimated for the past several years that the Air Force stores about 50 B61 nuclear gravity bombs at Incirlik, one-third of the 150 nuclear weapons currently deployed in Europe (see figure below). This estimate has been used by a wide range of news reports and commentators. The number of bombs at Incirlik has decreased over the past two decades from 90 in 2000. In those days, 40 of the 90 bombs were earmarked for delivery by Turkish F-16s. Those 40 bombs used to be stored in 6 vaults at both Akinci AB and Balikesir AB (20 at each) until they were moved to Incirlik when the US Air Force withdrew its Munition Support Squadrons from the Turkish bases in 1996. The 40 “Turkish” bombs remained at Incirlik until around 2005 when they were shipped back to the United States as part of the Bush administration’s unilateral nuclear reduction in Europe.

The US Air Force stores 150 nuclear bombs at six bases in five NATO countries. Click on map to view full size.

The remaining 50 bombs are for use by US jets, even though Turkey never allowed the US Air Force to permanently base fighter-squadrons at Incirlik. Jets would have to fly in during a crisis to pick up the weapons or they would have to be shipped to other locations before use. As a result, the nuclear posture at Incirlik has been more a storage site than a fighter-bomber base during the past two decades.

Although the Turkish participation in the NATO nuclear sharing mission was lessened (some would say mothballed) by the withdrawal of the “Turkish” weapons, the Turkish F-16s continued to serve a nuclear role. Despite local reports that F-16s never had a nuclear role, the US Air Force in 2010 informed Congress that “Turkey uses Turkish F-16s to execute their nuclear mission,” and that some of the F-16s would be upgraded to be able to deliver the new B61-12 bomb until the F-35A could take over the nuclear strike mission in the 2020s. That is now not going to happen after the Trump administration canceled the F-35 sale.

#### AND, the nukes can’t even reach Russia.

Unal 17 [Ali, a Turkish author and former chief writer at Zaman newspaper], 11-9-2017, "Removal of nukes at İncirlik might benefit both US, Turkey," Daily Sabah, https://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2017/11/09/removal-of-nukes-at-incirlik-might-benefit-both-us-turkey

Amid U.S. media speculation over the removal of nuclear weapons from İncirlik Air Base in southern Turkey, experts argue that the nuclear stockpile held over from the Cold War has lost its use for deterrence and therefore its removal might be beneficial for both sides. Existence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey has been an open secret for decades, but it was acknowledged for the first time in a recent report from Parliament. The report, "Data on Nuclear Weapons," was released on Oct. 31, prepared by Parliament's Research Department.

It says the U.S has 150 nuclear weapons in five NATO member countries, including Turkey. More specifically, the report says that some 50 B-61 thermonuclear hydrogen bombs, which are 12-times greater than the atomic bomb that wiped out Hiroshima in 1945, are deployed at İncirlik.

Excusing the soured relations between the two countries, several U.S media outlets have speculated from time to time that that removal of the nuclear arsenal from Turkey would be to punish its NATO ally. Turkish-U.S relations are passing through turbulent times due to U.S support for the Gülenist Terror Group (FETÖ), which was behind last year's failed July 15 coup attempt, and the PKK Syrian affiliate Democratic Union Party's (PYD) People's Protection Units (YPG) militia. Nevertheless, it seems pretty hard to punish Turkey by removing outdated U.S nukes.

Professor Mustafa Kibaroğlu from MEF University in Istanbul and senior lecturer Tom Sauer from the University of Antwerp argue in their article for Insight Turkey, "Mr. Trump, Post Nuclear Ban Treaty, NATO's Nuclear Weapons in Europe are Obsolete," that U.S nuclear weapons in European NATO countries, including Turkey, are becoming a liability on a variety of fronts rather than being a deterrent. "There is no consensus on withdrawing them, but at the same time there is no consensus on keeping them. This inertia is a recipe for escalating internal political frictions within the Alliance, and it is all the more problematic in an age where nuclear weapons are being banned."

According to the article, another compelling reason to withdraw the weapons is the reality that the delivery systems for these bombs are tactical aircraft such as F-16s, which cannot reach Russia. "During the Cold War, these aircraft were supposed to bomb the Warsaw Pact countries. Today, Central European states like Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and the Baltic states have become full members of NATO and the European Union. In short, there is no military justification to retain American tactical nuclear weapons on European territory."

The article also argues that apart from their symbolic value as a representation of the U.S. commitment to NATO, the nuclear weapons are ineffective and have no deterrence ability. The academics also say that B-61 nuclear weapons at İncirlik need to be modernized in the foreseeable future along with the U.S arsenal in other European countries and that the modernization of each nuclear bomb will cost $25 million, making the total cost of updating the nuclear arsenal at İncirlik around $1.25 billion to NATO member country tax payers.

"If the strength of NATO depends on a few outdated tactical nuclear weapons that will not be used anymore, we are afraid that this state of affairs says a lot about the strength of the Alliance in general," the article says.

#### Even though the nukes have no strategic value, they embolden Turkey – it perceives them as a signal of US commitment to Turkey.

Kibaroglu 11 [Mustafa, chair of department of political science and international relations at MEF university in Istanbul, research centering on proliferation of WMDs and Turkish foreign policy, phD from Bilkent University in Ankara in IR], “Turkey, NATO and Nuclear Sharing: Prospects after NATO’s Lisbon Summit,” in “An Arms Control Association and British American Security Information Council Report,” May 2011, <https://basicint.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Tactical_Nuclear_Report_May_10.pdf#page=36>.

Even in the absence of an imminent nuclear threat to Turkey’s security, the view among both civilian and military Turkish security elites does not seem to have changed since the Cold War. One explanation for the uniformity of their views lies in the prestige attributed to nuclear weapons. There are specific reasons that explain why Turkish government officials and civilian and military bureaucrats want to retain U.S. nuclear weapons on Turkey’s soil, first and foremost being the perceived threat from the still uncertain international security environment. Turkish government officials’ views were expressed (in not-for-attribution notes) as follows: “Nuclear weapons continue to preserve their critical importance for the security of the [North Atlantic] alliance, yet they are regarded more as political weapons. Our country is committed to the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, and thus we support every effort in that direction. … Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that attaining such a goal will not be possible any time soon, and that more time and patience will be needed to realize this objective. Hence, so long as these weapons do still exist in other parts of the world, it is indispensable for NATO to preserve a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal that will be capable of deterring all sorts of enemies in order to ensure the security of all of its allies. … [In NATO’s new Strategic Concept] our country want[ed] to see an explicit confirmation of the commitment [of the alliance] to the preservation of an effective and credible deterrent by way of maintaining a combination of conventional and nuclear weapons capability. In addition to that, our determination for the preservation of the transatlantic link and solidarity as well as fair risk and burden sharing to continue to constitute the fundamental principles of the nuclear strategy of the alliance will persist.”7 The above quote emphasizes that while Turkey supports nuclear disarmament, in the foreseeable future it wants to maintain nuclear weapons on its soil for both security and political reasons.

Logic behind deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey There is, indeed, a very simple logic connecting Turkey’s membership within NATO and the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on its territory. For a long time, the Turkish political and security elite9 has viewed Turkey’s NATO membership as a potent symbol of Turkey’s belonging to the West and the U.S. nuclear weapons stationed in Turkey have been seen, in this respect, as a symbol of Turkey’s privileged status within NATO. In this context, there is an unexpressed fear that an American decision to withdraw nuclear weapons from Turkey could weaken Turkey’s position within the alliance, and hence undermine to an extent the attraction of NATO membership in the minds of many. This perspective remained prevalent in the higher echelons of the Turkish state mechanism through dozens of governments formed by various political parties coming from different ideological dispositions and diverse worldviews for half a century. It has been so evenwith the AKP in power since 2002, which has brought a new approach to Turkish foreign policy making by opening many of the taboo-like issues to public debate. The AKP government has taken a series of bold and courageous steps in Turkey’s long-established security strategies, such as the Cyprus issue as well as the relations with Middle Eastern neighbors in particular, in accordance with the “zero confl ict” doctrine, which is a brainchild of the current Foreign Minister Ahmed Davutoglu. Notwithstanding its reformist attitude toward many traditional foreign policy issues of Turkey, the AKP government as well has preferred to shy away from displaying its well-known pragmatism in the area of U.S. nuclear weapons that are stationed in Turkey

#### That’s good – continued commitments greenlights Turkish revisionism and adventurism.

Armbruster 21 (Natalie, Foreign Policy Research Associate Fellow at Defense Priorities, 10/8/21, Newsweek, “Turkey is Becoming a Problem for NATO—the U.S. Should Pay Attention | Opinion,” <https://www.newsweek.com/turkey-becoming-problem-nato-us-should-pay-attention-opinion-1636810>; accessed 6/20/2022)

Turkey, despite having the second-largest standing military force in NATO, is inching toward a point where it becomes a possible liability, instead of an asset. While not discounting the points of tension in Syria and Libya, the most glaring flashpoint for possible conflict is Turkey's enduring commitment to the defense of Azerbaijan against Armenia, through training Azerbaijani officers and supplying military equipment. Should a conflict erupt once more, it would be between Turkish-backed Azerbaijan and Russian-backed Armenia, presenting the potential for Turkey to, once again, be at odds with the Russian military and call for NATO aid or assistance. Even among NATO allies themselves, Turkey has fanned the flames of conflict, with Erdogan becoming more and more aggressive in the Mediterranean. In 2020, Turkey disregarded a U.N.-enforced arms embargo around Libya and responded with hostility when confronted by French patrols. Greco-Turkish tensions in the Aegean almost erupted into war in the same year after Greek and Turkish frigates nearly collided over drilling disputes, forcing the U.S. to step in and push for de-escalation and negotiations. Nevertheless, among these hostilities, Turkey has been left relatively unscathed by its NATO allies. As Turkey continues to stoke the fires of ongoing tensions, the U.S. must make clear that it will not fight Erdogan's wars under the obligation of NATO defense if these disputes erupt beyond Erdogan's control. Continued concessions and aid to U.S. partners, for simply being allies, are why American allies like Turkey have abused and taken advantage of these leniencies and strayed away from American interests. Alliances are not meant to be treated as sacred bonds of a covenant. They are formed to recognize parallel interests and commit to jointly serving those interests. NATO was formed to support European nations who wanted to counter the influence and might of Moscow and provide a unified defense against the now dissolved Soviet Union. If these same NATO allies are now flirting with Putin unapologetically, the U.S. should adjust the extent of its obligation to those whose interests lie opposite of American interests. The U.S. should rethink its responsibility of perpetual European defense and stop serving allies like Turkey their cake on a platter so that they can both have it and eat it too.

#### Specifically, Turkey exploits US desire to maintain Incirlik as leverage to do what it wants.

Steven A. Cook 18. Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), He holds a BA in international studies from Vassar College, an MA in international relations from Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, and an MA and a PhD in political science from the University of Pennsylvania, “Neither Friend Nor Foe: The Future of US-Turkey Relations”, Council on Foreign Relations, November 2018, [https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report\_pdf/CSR82\_Cook\_Turkey\_0.pdf](https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/CSR82_Cook_Turkey_0.pdf//)

U.S. policymakers have often pursued a “more honey than vinegar” policy toward Turkey, emphasizing incentives, which has not yielded results. The underlying rationale for this approach is the idea that intensive American diplomacy could encourage Ankara to support the United States and that Turkey is too important a “strategic partner” to risk creating a rift. Presidents Bush, Obama, and Trump have been willing to countenance the Turkish government’s efforts to undermine U.S. policy in large part because of the utility of Turkey’s Incirlik Air Base. Yet officials in Washington tend to underestimate the hidden costs associated with their willingness to strike agreements with Turkey over the use of the base. The problem was brought into sharp relief on July 22, 2015, when, after a year of negotiations, the Turkish government gave permission for the anti-ISIS coalition to undertake combat operations from Incirlik. As part of the deal, the Turks were supposed to increase their operations against the Islamic State, while U.S. policymakers provided assurances that the United States would increase its help to Turkey in the fight against the PKK. The Turks, by their own admission, prioritized the latter at the expense of the former.20 The Obama administration chose to overlook the Turkish government’s ambivalence about the counter-ISIS campaign so long as the United States continued to have access to Incirlik. 12 Neither Friend nor Foe The agreement over the base had broader implications, however. It sent the message to Ankara that Turkey is indispensable to the United States, which leaves Washington vulnerable to Turkish threats to rescind permission to use Incirlik. This, in turn, led Turkey’s leaders to believe that they could act without regard for U.S. interests. Until recently, the White House had been publicly passive in response to a range of Turkish policies that were unhelpful, even damaging, to American interests. For example, after Ankara arrested a number of Turkish employees of the U.S. Embassy and harassed their families in October 2017, the Trump administration suspended visa processing for Turks traveling to the United States. In an effort to forestall continued decomposition of bilateral ties, the administration rescinded the order soon after. In response, Turkish leaders have simply pocketed American goodwill without any reciprocal effort, as they have routinely done in the past, and continued to target Foreign Service nationals.

#### That causes escalatory conflict in Syria. An explicit call-out reverses aggression.

Willis Krumholz 20. J.D., University of St. Thomas. "The US shouldn't support Turkey's reckless moves in Syria." Business Insider. 3-3-2020. https://www.businessinsider.com/the-us-shouldnt-support-turkeys-reckless-moves-in-syria-2020-3.

What's more, Turkish belligerence in Syria is revealing the cracks within the NATO alliance. America's European NATO allies are also relying on Turkey to control the flow of migrants from Syria into Europe—and Turkey's willingness to use this as a bargaining chip has given Turkey leverage over its European neighbors.

Going forward America needs to tread carefully, lest an alliance with Turkey drags the US into a wider conflict we have absolutely no interest in.

First off, the US State Department's unequivocal support for Turkey's actions is likely to embolden Ankara, as it stumbles into disaster in Syria. An emboldened Turkey increases the risk that Turkey and Russia stumble toward open conflict. Again, because Turkey is a NATO member, America has an Article 5 commitment to come to Turkey's defense if it is attacked.

By the way, Turkey already carries much responsibility for—from the get-go—funding the jihadist elements who fought in the bloody civil war. The Assad regime is brutal and has committed a host of human rights violations, but so have many of the jihadists Turkey has funded and armed.

Because of this, from an anti-terror perspective, Turkey is not the good guy in this fight. Areas outside the control of the Assad regime in Damascus are more hospitable to anti-US terrorists—including both ISIS and al-Qaeda. The fact that ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi was hiding out in one of these ungoverned spaces near Idlib is a stark reminder of this fact.

Turkey is neither a good friend nor an enemy, but right now America is committed to voice support for Turkey. That's a mistake. The truth is that NATO membership shouldn't be a one-way street, and collective-defense alliances with belligerent countries like Turkey are extremely far from cost-free. Cheerleading Turkey's footprint in Syria is the last thing the US State Department should be doing, as such a situation is directly opposed to US interests in the region.

Finally, an emboldened Turkey, less restrained in its attempt to depose Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, will also exacerbate the ongoing humanitarian catastrophe in Syria. Right now, Turkey is prolonging the civil war in Syria.

This undermines both American humanitarian and counterterrorism aims, because the longer the war goes on the more violence and suffering ensues. Instead of applauding Turkey's actions in Syria, because Turkey seeks to take out Assad, the US foreign policy establishment should be calling Turkey out for destabilizing the region further.

#### US-Russia war

Hunt 22 [Edward Hunt, PhD in American Studies from the College of William & Mary; "Turkey Is Threatening War Against Syrian Kurds"; Progressive.org; Published: 6-8-2022; Accessed: 6-24-2022; https://progressive.org/latest/turkey-war-syrian-kurds-hunt-220608/;

As President Erdoğan mulls military intervention in Rojava, the Biden Administration is facing the fact that a NATO country could be the aggressor in the world’s next major war.

The United States is preparing for the possibility that Turkey, a NATO member, may invade Rojava, an autonomous region in northeastern Syria where both U.S. and Russian soldiers are currently stationed.

With Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan making increasingly ominous threats to launch a military intervention in Rojava, officials from the Biden Administration have been working to address these threats, aware that a NATO country could be the aggressor in the world’s next major war.

“Basically, Turkey wants to do the same thing that Russia is doing in Ukraine, which is to come in and commit war crimes against the citizens here,” said Nadine Maenza, the former chair of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, when she visited Rojava late last month. “I do hope the international community and the United States stand up.”

For several years, Turkey has been trying to destroy Rojava, a Kurdish-led enclave. The Turkish government wants to eliminate the region’s revolutionary Syrian Kurds, who have created an autonomous region inside Syria while providing a model of self-government for Turkey’s minority Kurdish population.

Erdoğan portrays Rojava’s Kurdish militants as terrorists. He accuses them of being part of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, a revolutionary movement that has been seeking Kurdish liberation in Turkey.

Turkey has already, in recent years, launched several incursions into Rojava. Its last major intervention, conducted in October 2019 with the support of the Trump Administration, devastated the area, leaving Turkey in control of a large swathe of territory.

Ceasefire agreements have created a highly complex environment, with security forces from several countries stationed in Rojava. Both Russia and the United States conduct military patrols, sometimes coming into conflict with one another.

Despite the Trump Administration’s backing of Turkey’s 2019 invasion, the United States has maintained a close partnership with Rojava’s Kurdish militants. Since the Syrian Civil War, the U.S. military has worked closely with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces in combating the Islamic State, and U.S. officials have repeatedly praised them for their bravery.

As a presidential candidate, Joe Biden described the Kurdish-led forces as “courageous” and indicated that he would continue to support them.

The Syrian Kurds have created a revolutionary new society on a model that they call “democratic confederalism.” Since the early years of the Syrian Civil War, they have been building a confederated and autonomous region in northeastern Syria that is democratic, pluralist, feminist, and multi-ethnic.

“Progressives should support their effort to build a secure base for direct democracy, feminism, and pluralism,” Meredith Tax wrote earlier this year in The Nation.

Though many U.S. officials oppose the Syrian Kurds’ revolutionary project, sometimes even working against it, others have praised them for their achievements. At a hearing last month by the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, several participants commended Rojava for its religious freedom and ethnic diversity, conditions that are unique to north and east Syria. And for the second year in a row, the commission called on the U.S. government to grant political recognition to Rojava.

“They’ve built a government where they have these remarkable conditions of acceptance and tolerance that really the rest of the world can learn from,” Maenza said during her visit to Rojava in May.

Turkey’s recent threats follow moves by Finland and Sweden to join NATO. Since Finland and Sweden have been sympathetic to the Syrian Kurds, with Sweden providing Rojava with financial and political support, Turkey has opposed NATO membership for the two countries.

Some analysts believe that Erdoğan is hoping the West will ignore another Turkish-led military intervention in exchange for Turkey’s support for Finland and Sweden to join NATO.

So far, the Biden Administration has moved slowly to address Turkey’s provocations. Though several high-level officials have stated their opposition to another Turkish military intervention, they have acknowledged that they are looking for ways to accommodate Turkey.

“Concerns that Turkey has raised directly with Finland and Sweden are being addressed by the Finns and the Swedes with the assistance of NATO,” said U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken in a press briefing last week. “We want to make sure that all allies have their security concerns taken into account, and that, of course, includes Turkey.”

For now, the main factor that could prevent the Biden Administration from siding against the Syrian Kurds is Rojava’s strategic importance in the Syrian Civil War. With the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces still controlling most of northeastern Syria, they have prevented Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from regaining control of an important region where oil reserves and wheat fields are located.

“That’s a point of leverage because the Syrian government would love to have dominion over those resources,” Blinken said in 2020, referring to the region’s oil. “We should not give that up for free.”

As Turkey continues to threaten Rojava, the situation is growing increasingly precarious, with recent reports indicating that Turkey has already begun conducting military operations. Any major Turkish-led military incursion could spark a broader conflict, which would be especially dangerous with U.S. and Russian forces continuing to operate in the area.

“A potential war will not be an easy one,” warned Mazloum Abdi, the leader of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, in a recent interview. “It will not end in a short period of time—unlike Turkey’s expectations. It will be a hard war and will last for a long time.”

#### Emboldenment triggers Turkish aggression against Greece. That escalates

Gingeras 22, professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School and is an expert on Turkish, Balkan, and Middle East history (Ryan, “DOGFIGHT OVER THE AEGEAN: TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS IN LIGHT OF UKRAINE,” War on the Rocks, [https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/dogfight-over-the-aegean-turkish-greek-relations-in-light-of-ukraine/)](https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/dogfight-over-the-aegean-turkish-greek-relations-in-light-of-ukraine/)//BB)

Making matters worse, Turkey’s current posture toward the Aegean is not solely the product of domestic politics. In assessing the impact the war in Ukraine could have upon Turkish foreign policy, scholar Selim Koru suggested that Erdogan may sense a moment of opportunity to pursue a broad set of revisionist goals in its near abroad. Koru prophesized that, with the backing of right-wing politicians and the country’s security establishment, Ankara “could push more strongly against Greek naval boundaries, which it believes to be unfairly stacked against it.” To some extent, Turkey’s expressions of insecurity echo those of Russia’s in the lead-up to the war with Ukraine. Like the case of Turkish-Greek relations, Russia and Ukraine share a long history of antagonism and disagreement over matters of territory. Like Russian supporters of Putin’s war against Ukraine, prominent voices in Turkey similarly see the Aegean as a potential front in a proxy struggle against the United States. It may be this fear that has led Erdogan’s government to reiterate its threat to “take matters further” in challenging Greek sovereignty in the Aegean. If the current crisis in Ukraine imparts any lesson, it is that one should not underrate the risk of conflict. A war between Greece and Turkey is not only possible but perhaps, at some point, probable.

#### Greece war goes nuclear – accidental and intentional escalation is likely

Psaropoulos 18 (John Psaropoulos, independent journalist based in Athens, with two decades of experience covering Greece, Cyprus and southeast Europe. Freelance correspondent for Al Jazeera International, NPR, the Daily Beast and others; “Greece vs. Turkey: Are We Headed for an Intra-NATO War?”; Washington Examiner; 3/28/18; https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/greece-vs-turkey-are-we-headed-for-an-intra-nato-war

The Aegean Sea between Greece and Turkey hosts one of the world’s highest concentrations of high-tech weaponry. Sixty-seven surface ships and two dozen submarines are deployed on a body of water the size of Lake Superior. The two air forces command 448 fighter jets armed with smart bombs and guided missiles. On land, 832 heavy tanks and more than 2,500 lighter artillery vehicles—as much tank firepower as in all the rest of Europe combined—could rapidly be brought to bear along a Greek-Turkish border only 105 miles long.

These arsenals, built up over decades and constantly modernized, were not merely a boon to U.S. and German defence contractors. Western policymakers wanted to believe that loyalty to NATO’s mission of containing the USSR, rather than regional rivalries, motivated this exemplary level of Greek and Turkish defense spending. After the Soviet Union collapsed, good diplomacy and Turkey’s EU aspirations made it possible, most of the time, to overlook the downsides of an arms race between uneasy neighbors. Recently, however, the Aegean has become a dangerously narrow sea.

For decades, Turkish military aircraft have regularly violated Greece’s 10-mile airspace around its islands, on the grounds that Greece’s territorial waters extend only six nautical miles from shore, and that air and sea borders should match. Turkish ships also ignore the territorial waters around a number of small islands whose Greek ownership Turkey questions. These ships and planes are intercepted by their Greek counterparts, and mock dogfights result. Occasionally fatal accidents occur.

Kostas Grivas, who teaches advanced weapons systems at the Hellenic Army Academy, calls it a “a unique theater of confrontation,” where “land, sea and air forces are simultaneously in use in a very confined area, and there is an enormous amount of weapons systems and men-at-arms in deployment.” In the event of war, he believes, it would be very difficult to maintain command-and-control systems because of the intensity and speed of activity, meaning heavy fratricidal losses. In such chaos, the outcome might ultimately be up to local commanders’ ability to take intelligent initiatives. An Aegean war, Grivas says, would resemble “a mini-nuclear war because there will be so much high-tech ordnance discharged it will cause a huge amount of damage.”

The prospect of such hostilities has been suddenly brought closer this year, following events that are individually and as a series without parallel in recent decades.

Last autumn, Greek foreign minister Nikos Kotzias expressed concern that Turkey had become an “irritable power.” What inspired this concern was a record 3,317 airspace and 1,998 territorial water violations recorded in the Aegean last year—respectively double and quadruple the previous year’s numbers. “Our job is to behave responsibly,” Kotzias declared, so he invited Recep Tayyip Erdogan to become the first Turkish president in six decades to visit Greece.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s December 7 visit was a disaster. On its eve, Erdogan gave an interview calling for revisions of the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. This is the treaty that defines the borders of the modern Turkish state, while guaranteeing the rights of Greek and Muslim minorities in the two countries. It has kept Greece and Turkey at peace for a century and forms the bedrock of their détente. No Greek or Turkish head of state or government had ever publicly called for its revision. Greece’s President Prokopis Pavlopoulos reacted by overstepping his role as ceremonial head of state to lecture Erdogan. Lausanne, he asserted, was “non-negotiable.”

"It has no gaps. It needs neither revision nor updating. It stands as it is, it covers absolutely the issues that it needs to cover, and stresses that among other things it leaves no leeway for gray zones or minority issues," Pavlopoulos said.

Erdogan gave as good as he got. Greece had plunged its Muslim minority into poverty, he said, and is racially prejudiced against it. Erdogan also demanded of Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras the extradition of ten Turkish military officers who fled to Greece after the failed July 2016 coup. The Greek Supreme Court had barred their extradition on the grounds that their lives would be endangered in Turkey. The government cannot overrule the decision and there is no higher court of appeal, but Erdogan insisted: “What I told Mr. Tsipras is that these putschists may be returned to Turkey, a country that has abolished the death penalty, a country where torture does not take place.”

Kotzias’s charm offensive has since collapsed. A planned February revival of the Greek-Turkish Supreme Council, a diplomatic forum, never took place, and a May visit to Athens by the Turkish foreign minister is very much in doubt. But there is worse.

On February 12, a Turkish coast guard vessel rammed a Greek one while performing what the Greek coast guard called “dangerous maneuvers inconsistent with international collision avoidance practices.” Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim called Tsipras to explain that the ramming was accidental; but the fact that it happened near Imia, a pair of Greek islets whose ownership Turkey has disputed for 20 years, suggests to the Greeks a territorial power play.

Turkey upped the ante on the last day of February, arresting two Greek officers who apparently strayed into Turkish territory while on a routine patrol on the Thracian border. The standard practice for both sides during the last three decades has been to return wayward patrols at the nearest checkpoint after a routine procedure. Turkish authorities instead jailed the men and charged them with illegal entry. More serious charges may follow. Greek Defense minister Panos Kammenos refers to the two soldiers as “hostages,” and Greek public opinion takes for granted their seizure as connected with the ten Turkish military fugitives.

Since these incidents, polls say 92 percent of Greeks believe Turkey constitutes Greece’s biggest threat. Is Turkey generating grievances as a pretext for war? Who would gain from such a war? How would America react? And why has Erdogan chosen this moment to escalate tension?

Brinkmanship in 1996: preview of a far worse confrontation?

“What I worry about is the risk of an unintentional confrontation,” says U.S. ambassador to Athens Geoffrey Pyatt. Greece and Turkey nearly did stumble into war two decades ago. On Christmas Day 1995, the Figen Akat, a small Turkish cargo ship, ran aground on the western twin islet of Imia. A Greek tug was dispatched to refloat her, but the Turkish captain refused Greek help, saying he was in Turkish territorial waters. He eventually accepted Greek assistance, but not before the Turkish government had voiced a claim to the Imia islets as Turkish.

In the new year, the mayor of the largest nearby Greek island, Kalymnos, hoisted a Greek flag on Imia. The owners of a newly-licensed Turkish television channel CNN Turk decided to boost ratings by filming two journalists replacing the Greek flag with a Turkish one. Prime Minister Tansu Ciller fueled the fire. “We can’t let a foreign flag fly on Turkish soil. The flag will come down,” she said.

“The Turkish claims have no basis at all. There is no space for negotiations in … matters which concern our sovereignty,” said Greek Premier Kostas Simitis. Greece landed special forces on one of the two islets while Turkish frogmen took the other. As many as 20 Greek and Turkish ships and submarines converged on Imia (or Kardik, as the Turks call it).

On January 31, the United States intervened to avert an unintended war. “In 1996 the Americans stepped in and that sobered both sides,” says retired ambassador Christos Rozakis, one of Greece’s leading experts on international law. “We parted under the understanding, “no ships, no flags,” and reverted to the status quo ante. It wasn’t exactly that, but until the latest incident it was almost that. Greek shepherds didn’t herd their goats there any more, but neither did Turks go there.”

Treaties vs. politics

Imia stands as a textbook case of calculated escalation leading to the brink of an unintended war, and conditions now are even more conducive to such a war than they were in 1996, because new causes of instability have been added to older ones.

### Plan

#### Plan: The United States ought to significantly reduce its military presence in the Republic of Türkiye by at least removing its presence from the Incirlik air base.

### Advantage 2: Black Sea

#### Russia-Turkey competition is interconnected between every theatre—ignore isolated rapprochement.

Ivanescu 20 - (\*Isabel Ivanescu and \*\*Ezgi Yazici, \*Isabel Ivanescu is a research assistant on the Syria portfolio at the Institute for the Study of War. Her work focuses on al Qaeda's network in Syria and intra-opposition dynamics in greater Idlib. She graduated from Duke University in 2020 with a BA in Political Science: Security, Peace, and Conflict. She is a graduate of ISW's Hertog War Studies Program \*\*Ezgi Yazici is a teaching assistant for the Hertog War Studies Program at the Institute for the Study of War. Ezgi received her Bachelor of Arts in International Relations and Middle Eastern Studies from Tufts University where she also studied Arabic. Ezgi wrote her undergraduate thesis on the Turkish political and military intervention in northern Syria. Prior to joining ISW as a full-time staff member, Ezgi worked as a Turkey research intern at ISW and is an alumna of ISW’s 2019 Hertog War Studies Program; 10-27-2020, Institute for the Study of War, "Institute for the Study of War," doa: 2-28-2021) url: <http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-turkey-competition-escalates-across-theaters>

Russia and Turkey are supporting belligerents on opposite sides of three conflicts – in Syria, in Libya, and in Nagorno-Karabakh – and are competing for influence in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Russia-Turkey competition is not a new phenomenon but has escalated as both countries have adopted more ambitious foreign policy objectives and expanded their regional influence in the past decade.

The situation in Syria is precarious; Syria remains a priority effort for both Russia and Turkey while the two parties are increasingly at odds. Turkey views Syria as core to its national security, fearing both a renewed refugee influx and autonomous Kurdish governance on the Turkish border. For Russia, Syria is a critical venue for projecting power in the Middle East and Mediterranean and pressuring the United States. Turkish occupation of swathes of northern Syria and Russian freedom of action throughout regime-held areas has resulted in a shaky balance. Turkey and Russia have been facing off in opposition-held greater Idlib to pressuring one another into a negotiated settlement since mid-September 2020.[1] Turkish and Russian proxies are also manning opposing, but stable front lines in Syria’s northeast. Moscow or Ankara must alter this balance, through diplomacy or force, if either is to achieve its objectives. The Russian air force carried out one of the deadliest-ever Russian airstrikes in Syria targeting a Turkish proxy in Idlib on October 26 in a possible play to shift the situation in Syria or impose costs on Turkey for actions elsewhere.[2]

Russia and Turkey back opposing parties in Libya and will likely remain militarily engaged despite a recent ceasefire. Turkey intervened in Libya in January 2020 to halt the advance of forces backed by geopolitical opponents Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Russia on Tripoli, while carving out a Turkish maritime sphere of influence in the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey’s intervention derailed Russia’s campaign in Libya but produced intensified Russian engagement. The Kremlin remains committed to establishing permanent Russian basing and access to Libya’s oil supply, even amid constraints imposed by Russia’s own local partners and regional allies. Russia and Turkey are locked in an armed race for influence in Libya below the level of outright conflict. The parties are unlikely to pull away from Libya even while a purported “permanent ceasefire” signed by their respective local partners on October 23 calls for the withdrawal of all foreign forces.[3]

Recent hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh are both born of and further fueling Russia-Turkey competition. Turkey coordinated with Azerbaijan to reignite the long-standing conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over disputed territory Nagorno-Karabakh in September.[4] Ankara sees the conflict as a low-cost opportunity to solidify a Turkish foothold in the Caucasus and challenge growing bilateral ties between Baku and Moscow while profiting from arms sales to Azerbaijan. Russia brokered two failed ceasefires since fighting began in September 2020 in a bid to keep both Armenia and Azerbaijan within its sphere of influence. The Kremlin seeks rapid de-escalation in Nagorno-Karabakh with minimum Russian investment. Russia’s neutrality is an opportunity for Ankara to cash in rapid Azerbaijani territorial gains for regional influence without triggering a Russian escalation. A new ceasefire—brokered by the US without Russian involvement—went into effect on October 26 with both Armenian and Azerbaijani violations reported within hours.[5] The Kremlin may attempt to compel a resolution by force in response to Turkey’s growing military role and the United States’ growing diplomatic role in the conflict, reasserting Russia’s role as the sole powerbroker in the Caucasus. ISW has not observed indicators of an imminent Russian deployment to Armenia, however.

Developments in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh cannot be analyzed in a vacuum, but must instead be contextualized in the landscape of cross-theater Russia-Turkey competition. The two revisionist powers will likely continue to search for a comparative advantage, including by establishing new and advantageous theaters for competition or further investing in existing theaters. Seemingly inexplicable Russian or Turkish decisions in one theater may be readily understandable when considered alongside developments in another theater. A Russian or Turkish decision to commit resources in a new area, if not obviously compatible with policy objectives, may well result from a desire to obtain leverage over the other party. Whether Russia-Turkey competition de-escalates through negotiations or escalates kinetically, it will have profound and lasting effects in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Caucasus.

#### Tensions in the black sea high now – Russian aggressiveness plus Turkey adventurism make the black sea ripe for conflict that draws in NATO.

Ben Hubbard and Gulsin Harman 23 3-15-2023 NYT Why the Black Sea Is a Flashpoint Between Russia and the West [https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/15/world/middleeast/black-sea-ukraine-war.html Accessed 7-24-2023](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/15/world/middleeast/black-sea-ukraine-war.html%20Accessed%207-24-2023) CSUF JmB TDI

The Russian air force’s downing of an American surveillance drone on Tuesday served as a stark reminder to the many countries operating in and around the Black Sea of the region’s potential to become a flash point, accidentally or otherwise. “It has always been complicated, it remains complicated, but the stakes are much higher now,” said Ian Lesser, the vice president of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, a research group. “And the longer the conflict goes on, the higher the risks of things spinning out of control.” The Black Sea is larger than California, with six countries on its coast. Three of those countries, Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria, are members of NATO, while others, like Ukraine, are friendly to the alliance, which has long considered the Black Sea essential to its efforts to contain Russia. Turkey has tremendous influence over the Black Sea since it controls two straits, the Dardanelles and the Bosporus, which ships must pass through to transit between the Black Sea and other global waterways. The Montreux Convention of 1936 gives Turkey the right to close the straits to most military traffic in times of war, a power it exercised after Russia invaded Ukraine last year. The Black Sea is hugely important to the efforts of President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia to expand Moscow’s influence and, stemming from that, it has been a locus of instability. The surrounding region in recent years has seen Russia’s war with Georgia in 2008, political uprisings against Russian-backed leaders in Ukraine and Belarus and a war between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 2020, eventually mediated by Moscow. But Mr. Putin’s biggest power play around the Black Sea was the occupation of Crimea, a strategic peninsula that Russia seized from neighboring Ukraine in 2014. That enhanced Russia’s position in the Black Sea and helped it try to cement control of Sevastopol, a warm-water port. In the years since, Mr. Putin has increased Russia’s naval presence in the Black Sea, so much so that in 2016, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey warned that the sea had “almost become a Russian lake.” Russia’s foes responded by intensifying their own military maneuvers around the Black Sea. NATO members flew regular surveillance flights and the United States and Britain often dispatched warships, although international conventions kept them from remaining longer than 21 days. Then Russia invaded Ukraine, causing both sides to further expand their maneuvers in the area. “The tensions in the Black Sea were obviously amplified after the war,” said Arda Mevlutoglu, an independent Turkish defense analyst. The war complicated maritime trade for Black Sea nations, and Russia initially blocked the export of grain from Ukraine, one of the world’s top producers, raising fears of an exacerbated hunger crisis in poor nations. But Turkey helped broker an agreement overseen by the United Nations that has facilitated the export of more than 22 million metric tons of that grain through Turkey’s territorial waters. Turkey’s closure of the straits to most military traffic, which was meant to prevent Russia from bolstering its naval force against Ukraine with ships from elsewhere, also kept ships from the United States and other NATO nations from entering the Black Sea. At present, only countries with Black Sea coastlines have vessels in the water, said Yoruk Isik, a nonresident scholar at the Middle East Institute who closely monitors marine traffic through Turkey’s straits. Of those, only Russia and Turkey have powerful navies, Mr. Isik said. Romania and Bulgaria have smaller forces, Georgia has only a coast guard and the movements of Ukrainian vessels are complicated by the war.

#### Turkey adventurism in black sea conflict draws in NATO.

Zviad Adzinbaia, 17 — [Zviad Adzinbaia (Ph.D. scholar of information integrity and technology-enabled democracy at The Fletcher School, he is a Co-Founder and Managing Partner of LEADx Change, a multinational senior leadership accelerator in Central and Eastern Europe, in partnership with the Fletcher School’s Security Studies Program and the Institute for War and Peace Reporting), “NATO in the Black Sea: What to Expect Next?,” JSTOR, 11-1-2017, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep17617.pdf, accessed 7-24-2023] nishio TDI

Black Sea security directly impacts the economic development, peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic theater. NATO and the EU, as well as their members and partners, have immense interests in ensuring a secure and prosperous environment in the Black Sea, advancing trade relations through the East-West corridor, and further promoting the notion of a Europe “whole, free and at peace.” However, Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, which was followed by Moscow’s impudent annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea and the waging of hybrid warfare against these two Black Sea NATO-aspirant countries, emphasizes Russia’s explicitly belligerent attitude toward the Western institutions and their members. Furthermore, Moscow is impotent to offer any viable alternative to either Tbilisi or Kiev that would guarantee sovereignty, economic prosperity and political stability in these two countries. Instead, Russia effectively employs conventional and asymmetrical means of warfare to counter the process of democratization, Western integration and economic advancement in Georgia and Ukraine, as well as in NATO’s Black Sea member states. In ensuring its dominance in the Black Sea, Russia not only exerts its overwhelming pressure on NATO-partner countries, but it also seriously challenges the security of the three Alliance member states – Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey. Even though all of the Black Sea member countries maintain their close cooperation with NATO, Turkey’s attempts at rapprochement with Moscow, especially in energy and missile defense initiatives, are alarming for NATO. In addition, Bulgaria’s current government, which does not necessarily oppose Russia’s growing influence in the Black Sea, presents an additional obstacle to NATO’s unified posture in the region. In the face of these rapidly changing security developments in the Black Sea area, NATO cannot remain a mere observer. The Alliance has a direct interest in as well as a commitment to ensure security in the Black Sea in order to achieve greater security and stability in the broader European and Euro-Atlantic space. The unparalleled need for NATO’s enhanced engagement in the region is further amplified by growing interest by the EU and the United States in trade and economics, as well as security and political stability in the wider Black Sea area, including Central Asia, the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

#### Black Sea conflict causes great power war

Joja 20[Iulia-Sabina Joja is a DAAD Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC, where she researches Black Sea security, “Three Conflict Scenarios for The Black Sea in 2020,” Jan 7, 2020, Black Sea Strategy Papers, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/01/three-conflict-scenarios-for-the-black-sea-in-2020/>]

Conclusion

These three conflict scenarios are plausible risks for the Black Sea in 2020. Looking at “the wider Black Sea area” over a medium-term perspective, a more complex array of challenges is visible. In the Western Balkans, proposed land swaps and France’s veto against the European Union expansion add tension to a vulnerable region at the heart of Europe. To the south, Turkey’s divergence from other NATO members and the development of Russia’s offensive military capability development and projection into the Mediterranean add fuel to the fire. Along Turkey’s southern border, Iraq and Syria will be consumed by humanitarian tragedies. Finally, looking east, China’s Belt and Road Initiative is expanding Beijing’s influence in the Black Sea and into Europe more broadly. Increased security and stability in the Black Sea will be essential.

To prevent further conflict, American and European policymakers should prioritize the Black Sea as a security region. At a minimum, sanctions against Russia should be maintained. The West should support Ukraine’s and Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as their Western path. To prevent China’s buying up of the region, Western powers should consider offering infrastructure investment opportunities as alternatives to a poor and underdeveloped region while ensuring visibility with regard to regional public opinion. Lastly, in the NATO framework, pressure should be exerted to prevent Turkey from acting against collective interests.

#### Goes nuclear

Amineh 3[Mehdi Parvizi Amineh, Ph. D in Poli Sci @ University of Amsterdam & Senior research fellow and Programme director of the Energy Programme Asia @ International Institute for Asian Studies) “Globalisation, Geopolitics and Energy Security in Central Eurasia and the Caspian Region,” Hand-out of lecture held on June 19 2003, Clingendael International Energy Programme, pg. <http://www.clingendael.nl/ciep/events/20030619/20030619_amineh.pdf>] \*CEA = post-Soviet Central Eurasia ]

The increasing involvement of the US, the EU, Russia, China, Iran, and Turkey, and also TNCs in the region underscores the significance of the oil and gas resources in CEA and the potential competition for the control of these resources. What we are witnessing now is, a re-composition of the geo-strategic map not only for CEA and the Caspian region, but also of the whole world.

Tensions could be further aggravated by disparities in military power, if conflicts were to escalate. The Eurasian region includes states with a number of the largest armed forces in Europe and Asia: Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Iran, Pakistan, China, India and Uzbekistan. The region also has four nuclear-armed countries – Russia, China, Pakistan and India – making it a dangerous potential flash point of global significance. Further, security risks concern the US / NATO involvement in numerous political and economic crises in post-Soviet CEA, the war on terrorism in Afghanistan, and the war and crisis in Iraq.

#### Russia is building up their maritime military capabilities now – including Poseidon UUV

Kadam 23 (Tanmay Kadam, Defense and International Affairs Journalist, “Russian Nuclear Submarine Belgorod Completes Throw Test Of Nuke-Tipped Poseidon Torpedo – State Media”, January 10, 2023, The Eurasian Times, <https://eurasiantimes.com/russian-nuclear-submarine-belgorod-completes-throw-test/>)

The crew of the Belgorod nuclear submarine has reportedly completed a series of tests of the Poseidon torpedo mock-up. This was reported to TASS, citing a source close to the Russian military department. According to the source, the test’s purpose was to check the operation of the Poseidon launch system. Throw firing of the Poseidon super-torpedo model was carried out to clarify the behavior of the submarine at different depths after the launch,” the source said. According to unnamed senior US officials cited by CNN earlier, the US Intelligence observed the Russian naval vessels possibly preparing for the first-ever test of Poseidon nuclear torpedoes capable of hitting American coastal cities. Among the vessels involved in the alleged preparations was the nuclear-powered Belgorod submarine the Russian Navy inducted in July. However, at the time of its induction, it was not revealed where the Belgorod would be deployed. The Belgorod submarine was constructed from the hull of an Oscar-II cruise missile submarine that was never completed. It is specially customized to launch uncrewed underwater vehicles, including the Poseidon torpedo. According to a US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, the Belgorod could carry up to eight nuclear-tipped Poseidons. However, some weapons experts say its payload is more likely to be six torpedoes. Earlier, the US observed the Russian naval vessels, including Belgorod, leaving the testing area in the Arctic Sea and heading back to port without conducting a test. The US officials believe the test might not have been carried out because of technical difficulties. Belgorod: Russia's Stealth Submarine Has the Navy Really Confused | The National Interest Russia’s Belgorod Submarine The latest report comes after a secret NATO report in late September raised concerns about Belgorod’s deployment in Arctic seas, possibly to test the Poseidon UUV for the first time. Based on the reports above, it appears that the Russian Navy might have spent more than a month in the Arctic Sea preparing for the test but aborted allegedly due to technical difficulties. Nevertheless, US officials had accessed that Russia could make another attempt to test the torpedo. Reports suggest the test of the nuclear torpedo could “inflame tensions” between the US and Russia even further at a time when Washington and its European allies are monitoring signs of the Russian military’s potential use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine. The US does not expect the tests to involve the detonation of a nuclear device, however, besides being nuclear-capable, the Poseidon is also nuclear-powered, and any potential danger from a malfunction of the miniaturized nuclear propulsion system inside that torpedo could cause a radiation leak. Poseidon Underwater Uncrewed Vehicle (UUV) The Poseidon UUV is one of Russia’s six strategic weapons, also known as ‘Super Weapons,’ that Russian President Vladimir Putin unveiled during a speech in 2018 at the Manezh Central Exhibition Hall near the Kremlin. Other super weapons include the Sarmat Inter-continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), Avangard Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV), the Burevestnik cruise missile, the Kinzhal air-launched hypersonic missile, and the Tsirkon ship-launched hypersonic missile. Russia’s Poseidon nuclear-armed underwater vehicle (Russian Defense Ministry’s press service) Poseidon is perhaps the biggest game-changing super-weapon in the Russian arsenal, adding another dimension to nuclear deterrence. It is an ‘Intercontinental Nuclear-Powered Nuclear-Armed Autonomous Torpedo.’ The weapon’s speed is expected to be around 70 knots – faster than existing torpedoes – and according to some reports, maybe even 108 knots, making it uncatchable. Its operating depth is about 1,000 meters (3,300 feet), thus making it elusive as well. Powered by a nuclear reactor, the Poseidon UUV has an unlimited range of operational flexibility in terms of launch and target locations. It can also be launched from under the ice caps. Poseidon: Ingenious Method Of Nuclear Deterrence The Poseidon represents a very ingenious method of nuclear deterrence envisioned by Russian military planners. Russians have long wanted to circumvent the American ballistic missile defense systems deployed in Europe, creating a strategic imbalance against Russia. So, deploying nuclear weapons underwater enables the Russian military to evade a US Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) screening. The Poseidon is also said to be capable of performing “three-dimensional” evasive maneuvers to increase its longevity. Moreover, the US has a network of satellites equipped with infrared sensors to detect and track Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles. In the air, the ignition of the missile engine generates extreme heat, creating a temperature difference against the cold background for the satellites overhead to pick up. Instead, satellites can’t see what happens in the depths of the sea. Besides, Poseidon is reportedly designed to emit very little heat and travel silently. Armed with a two-megaton nuclear warhead, the Poseidon can destroy aircraft carrier strike groups (CSG) and enemy infrastructural facilities in coastal regions. It will most likely serve in the Pacific Fleet, threatening US naval bases on the West Coast and key cities like Los Angeles. Russia intends to deploy just over 30 Poseidon UUVs. In November 2020, Christopher Ford, then US assistant secretary of state for international security and non-proliferation, said Poseidons are being designed to “inundate US coastal cities with radioactive tsunamis.”

#### Poseidon is being tested in the Black Sea now

**Cuesta 1/17** [(Journalist with love for photography, especially social portrait. Born in Madrid (1984) and resident in Russia since 2014.) “Russian Navy takes delivery of ‘weapon of the apocalypse’ as Putin delivers on strategic threat” El País January 17 2023, <https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-01-17/russian-navy-takes-delivery-of-weapon-of-the-apocalypse-as-putin-delivers-on-strategic-threat.html>] EL TDI

The Russian Navy has taken delivery of the first nuclear submarine drones announced under Vladimir Putin’s strategic weapons program in March 2018. Tests on the Poseidon nuclear-powered unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) have concluded, and the system will soon be deployed on one of Moscow’s new-generation submarines, according to Russian media reports. In the context of the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine, NATO has expressed its concern over Poseidon, which is capable of delivering both nuclear and conventional warheads, triggering tsunamis and contaminating vast expanses of water with radioactive materials.

“Russia still has the greatest nuclear potential in the world, but nobody listened to us,” Putin said in his speech to the federal assembly almost five years ago. “Listen now.” The Russian leader unveiled a raft of proposed new weapons systems, among them the then-unnamed Poseidon, which he noted would be “practically indestructible,” almost silent and capable of great maneuverability. Another of the arms announced by Putin has already been deployed in Ukraine: the Kinzhal hypersonic missile. Poseidon will represent another escalation of Russia’s nuclear threat against the West.

The Russian industrial military sector has tested the principal components of Poseidon, including its atomic motor, and the first models will be deployed on the Russian Navy’s Oscar-class nuclear submarine Belgorod “in the near future,” according to sources close to the project quoted by the TASS news agency.

Poseidon is essentially a drone capable of carrying a nuclear warhead over intercontinental distances while submerged at great depth and reaching faster speeds than a naval vessel or a conventional torpedo. In its nuclear torpedo variant, the Poseidon’s main objectives would be coastal cities and enemy battle groups. The systems feature stealth technology, making them extremely hard to detect.

According to reports in the Russian media when Poseidon was first presented, its payload was intended to be 100 megatons, twice as powerful as the biggest nuclear bomb in history, the Tsar. The former Soviet Union tested Tsar in the 1970s in a remote Arctic location, although TASS has since reduced its level of destruction to two megatons, which is still more powerful than the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in World War II.

Poseidon has been nicknamed “the weapon of the apocalypse” due to their destructive power. In November 2020, then-US assistant secretary of state for international security and non-proliferation Christopher Ford said that the arms had been designed to “inundate US coastal cities with radioactive tsunamis.” As such, US intelligence has stated that Poseidon could be used to withstand a hypothetical first nuclear strike against Russia to then hit back in a second or third wave of retaliatory attacks.

NATO believes that Moscow tested Poseidon without a nuclear payload in the Black Sea last autumn. However, at the moment only the Belgorod, which has been specifically modified for the purpose, is capable of carrying Poseidon torpedoes. At 180 meters, the Belgorod is the largest nuclear submarine in the world and entered into service in July, 2022. According to Italian newspaper La Repubblica, NATO issued an alert shortly afterward when it disappeared from radar amid escalating Kremlin rhetoric of a nuclear confrontation with the West. The Belgorod reappeared in the Arctic in October.

According to a report by the US Congressional Research Service, “Russia may deploy the Poseidon drone on four submarines, two in the Northern Fleet and two in the Pacific Fleet. Each submarine would carry eight drones.”

“Russia is pursuing several novel nuclear-capable systems designed to hold the US homeland or Allies and partners at risk, some of which are also not accountable under [nuclear arms reduction treaty] New START,” the Biden administration noted in its 2022 Nuclear Posture Review.

Last year, the US Naval Institute said Russia’s development of the Poseidon turned assumptions about submarine-launched nuclear weapons on their head. “Perhaps most frighteningly, this nuclear weapon has the potential for autonomous operation,” the institute said. “A fully operational Kanyon [the NATO designation assigned to Poseidon] would have an incredible strategic impact. As a new delivery platform, it is not covered by current nuclear weapons treaties.”

#### A single use causes escalation

Lockie 19 [Alex, Senior Front Page Editor at Business Insider. “The real purpose of Russia’s 100-megaton underwater nuclear doomsday device.” Business Insider. February 11, 2019. <https://www.businessinsider.my/the-real-purpose-of-russias-poseidon-nuclear-doomsday-device-2019-2/?fbclid=IwAR2_pCU5-NG5lbhBdriP9OhMAj4zYPWEB8OPJ6rHHhHRi9HMjXl2ZBFdBkw>]

Russia is said to have built a new 100-megaton underwater nuclear doomsday device, and it has threatened the US with it. The device goes beyond traditional ideas of nuclear warfighting and poses a direct threat to the future of humanity or life on Earth. Nobody has ever built a weapon like this before, because there’s almost no military utility in so badly destroying the world. But an expert on nuclear strategy told Business Insider the weapon might have a larger role in helping Russian President Vladimir Putin break down NATO with the threat of nuclear destruction. Since 2015, when images of a Russian nuclear torpedo first leaked on state television, the world has asked itself why Moscow would build a weapon that could end all life on Earth. While all nuclear weapons can kill thousands in the blink of an eye and leave radiation poisoning the environment for years to come, Russia’s new doomsday device, called “Poseidon,” takes steps to maximize this effect. If the US fired one of its Minutemen III nuclear weapons at a target, it would detonate in the air above the target and rely on the blast’s incredible downward pressure to crush it. The fireball from the nuke may not even touch the ground, and the only radiation would come from the bomb itself and any dust particles swept up in the explosion, Stephen Schwartz, the author of “Atomic Audit,” previously told Business Insider. But Russia’s Poseidon is said to use a warhead many times as strong, perhaps even as strong as the largest bomb ever detonated. Additionally, it’s designed to come into direct contact with water, marine animals, and the ocean floor, kicking up a radioactive tsunami that could spread deadly radiation over hundreds of thousands of miles of land and sea and render it uninhabitable for decades. In short, while most nuclear weapons can end a city, Russia’s Poseidon could end a continent. Read more: Why Putin’s new ‘doomsday’ device is so much more deadly and horrific than a regular nuke Even in the mania at the height of the Cold War, nobody took seriously the idea of building such a world-ender, Malcolm Davis, a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, told Business Insider. So why build one now? A NATO-ender A briefing slide captured from Russian state TV is said to be about the Poseidon nuclear torpedo. A briefing slide captured from Russian state TV is said to be about the Poseidon nuclear torpedo. BBC Davis called the Poseidon a “third-strike vengeance weapon” – meaning Russia would attack a NATO member, the US would respond, and a devastated Russia would flip the switch on a hidden nuke that would lay waste to an entire US seaboard. According to Davis, the Poseidon would give Russia a “coercive power” to discourage a NATO response to a Russian first strike. Read more: Navy chief says the US needs to hit first and get ‘muscular’ with Russian and Chinese ships Russia here would seek to not only reoccupy Eastern Europe “but coerce NATO to not act upon an Article 5 declaration and thus lose credibility,” he said, referring to the alliance’s key clause that guarantees a collective response to an attack on a member state. Russian President Vladimir Putin “has made it clear he seeks the collapse of NATO,” Davis continued. “If NATO doesn’t come to the aid of a member state, it’s pretty much finished as a defense alliance.” Essentially, Russia could use the Poseidon as an insurance policy while it picks apart NATO. The US, for fear that its coastlines could become irradiated for decades by a stealthy underwater torpedo it has no defenses against, might seriously question how badly it needs to save Estonia from Moscow’s clutches. “Putin may calculate that NATO will blink first rather than risk escalation to a nuclear exchange,” Davis said. “Poseidon accentuates the risks to NATO in responding to any Russian threat greatly, dramatically increasing Russia’s coercive power.” Davis also suggested the Poseidon would make a capable but heavy-handed naval weapon, which he said could most likely take out an entire carrier strike group in one shot. Russia’s new nuclear ferocity A news briefing in Moscow in January organized by Russia's defense and foreign ministries and dedicated to cruise-missile systems. A news briefing in Moscow in January organized by Russia’s defense and foreign ministries and dedicated to cruise-missile systems. REUTERS/Maxim Shemetov Russia has recently signaled its willingness to use nuclear weapons to coerce the West with its violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, Davis said. These missiles are purpose-built for taking out European capitals from the Russian mainland.

#### Only US-Russia Nuclear War causes extinction

Lynas 22’ [Mark Lynas is an environmental activist who has written extensively about the climate crisis. He was awarded the Royal Society science books prize in 2008, has numerous publications, and advises the former Maldives president on climate policy. “What the science says: Could humans survive a nuclear war between NATO and Russia?”, Alliance For Science, March 30, 2022. <https://allianceforscience.cornell.edu/blog/2022/03/what-the-science-says-could-humans-survive-a-nuclear-war-between-nato-and-russia/>]

Russian leader Vladimir Putin has suggested that he would consider using nuclear weapons if confronted with a **NATO military response in Ukraine**, or if faced with a direct threat to his person or regime. If the war spreads to a NATO country like Estonia or Poland a direct US-Russia confrontation would take place, with a clear danger of runaway nuclear escalation. The world is therefore arguably now closer to nuclear conflict than at any time since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. So what would a full-scale nuclear exchange look like in reality? Is it truly global Armageddon, or would it be survivable for some people and places? Many scientists have investigated this question already. Their work is surprisingly little known, likely because in peacetime no one wants to think the unthinkable. But we are no longer in peacetime and the shadows of multiple mushroom clouds are looming once again over our planet. Current nuclear weapons inventories The **latest assessment of Russian nuclear military capability** estimates that as of early 2022 Russia has a **stockpile of approximately 4,477 nuclear** **warheads** — nearly 6,000 if “retired” warheads are included. The US maintains a similar inventory of 5,500 warheads, with 3,800 of those rapidly deployable. The explosive power of these weapons is difficult to comprehend. It has been estimated that about 3 million tons (megatons or Mt) of TNT equivalent were detonated in World War II. For comparison, each of the UK’s Trident submarines carries 4 megatons of TNT equivalent on 40 nuclear warheads, meaning each submarine can cause more explosive destruction than took place during the entirety of World War II. Hiroshima and Nagasaki In 1945 the US attacked the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with atomic bombs, giving us two real-world examples of the effects of nuclear weapons on human populations. A total of 140,000 people in Hiroshima and 73,000 in Nagasaki died instantaneously or within five months due to the nuclear blast, intense radiant heat from the fireball and ionizing radiation. Many people caught within 1km of ground zero were carbonized by heat rays, and those up to 1.5km away suffered flash burning with large areas of skin later peeling off. Some, especially those inside buildings, were reduced to white bones as all flesh was vaporized by the intense heat. Many survivors, later to become known as hibakusha in Japanese, suffered acute radiation sickness (ARS) from neutron and gamma rays released by nuclear fission in the blasts. Symptoms included bloody diarrhea, hair loss, fever and intense thirst. Many later died. As well as direct radiation from the fireballs they were also exposed to radioactive fallout from the bomb. The longer-term effects of radiation experienced by the hibakusha have been intensively studied, and include increased levels of leukemia and solid cancers. However, experiencing an atomic bombing was not an automatic death sentence: among the 100,000 or so survivors the excess rates of cancer over the subsequent years were about 850, and leukemia less than 100. Hiroshima and Nagasaki show that — apart from short-term ARS — long-term radiation from fallout will be the least of our problems following a nuclear war. Much more serious will be social collapse, famine and the breakdown of much of the planetary biosphere. ‘Limited’ nuclear conflict – 100 warheads between India and Pakistan Prior to the Ukraine war it seemed very unlikely that the superpowers would confront each other again, so many researchers turned to studying the impacts of more limited nuclear conflicts. One study published two years ago looked at the likely impacts of a nuclear exchange of about 100 Hiroshima-sized detonations (15 kt yield each) on the most-populated urban areas of India and Pakistan. Each detonation was estimated to incinerate an area of 13 square km, with this scenario generating about 5 Tg (teragrams) of soot as smoke from wildfires and burning buildings entered the atmosphere. Direct human deaths in this “limited” nuclear war scenario are not quantified in the study, but would presumably number in the tens to hundreds of millions. The planetary impacts are also severe: as the soot reaches the stratosphere it circulates globally, blocking incoming solar radiation and dropping the Earth’s surface temperature by 1.8C in the first five years. This would be a greater cooling than caused by any recent volcanic eruption, and more than any climate perturbation for at least the last 1,000 years. Rainfall patterns are drastically altered, and total precipitation declines by about 8 percent. (These results come from widely-used climate models of the same types used to project long-term impacts of greenhouse gas emissions.) Food exports collapse as stocks are depleted within a single year, and by year four a total of 1.3 billion people face a loss of about a fifth of their current food supply. The researchers conclude that “**a regional conflict using <1 percent of the worldwide nuclear arsenal could have adverse consequences for global food security unmatched in modern history.**” A 2014 study of the same scenario (of a 100-weapon nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan) found that the soot penetrating the stratosphere would cause severe damage to the Earth’s ozone layer, increasing UV penetration by 30-80 percent over the mid-latitudes. This would cause “widespread damage to human health, agriculture, and terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems,” the researchers wrote. “The combined cooling and enhanced UV would put significant pressures on global food supplies and could trigger a global nuclear famine.” Full-scale nuclear exchange If global nuclear famine could result from just 100 nuclear detonations, what might be the result of a fuller exchange of the several thousand warheads held in current inventories by the US and Russia? One 2008 study looked at a Russia-US nuclear war scenario, where Russia would target 2,200 weapons on Western countries and the US would target 1,100 weapons each on China and Russia. In total, therefore, 4,400 warheads detonate, equivalent to roughly half the current inventories held each by Russia and the US. Nuclear weapons held by other states were not used in this scenario, which has a 440-Mt explosive yield, equivalent to about 150 times all the bombs detonated in World War II. This full-scale nuclear war was estimated to cause 770 million direct deaths and generate 180 Tg of soot from burning cities and forests. In the US, about half the population would be within 5km of a ground zero, and a fifth of the country’s citizens would be killed outright. A subsequent study, published in 2019, looked at a comparable but slightly lower 150 Tg atmospheric soot injection following an equivalent scale nuclear war. The devastation causes so much smoke that only 30-40 percent of sunlight reaches the Earth’s surface for the subsequent six months. A massive drop in temperature follows, with the weather staying below freezing throughout the subsequent Northern Hemisphere summer. In Iowa, for example, the model shows temperatures staying below 0°C for 730 days straight. There is no growing season. **This is a true nuclear winter.** Nor is it just a short blip. Temperatures still drop below freezing in summer for several years thereafter, and global precipitation falls by half by years three and four. It takes over a decade for anything like climatic normality to return to the planet. By this time, most of Earth’s human population will be long dead. The world’s food production would crash by more than 90 percent, causing global famine that would kill billions by starvation. In most countries less than a quarter of the population survives by the end of year two in this scenario. Global fish stocks are decimated and the ozone layer collapses. The models are eerily specific. In the 4,400 warhead/150 Tg soot nuclear war scenario, averaged over the subsequent five years, China sees a reduction in food calories of 97.2 percent, France by 97.5 percent, Russia by 99.7 percent, the UK by 99.5 percent and the US by 98.9 percent. In all these countries, virtually everyone who survived the initial blasts would subsequently starve. Human extinction? Even the 150 Tg soot nuclear war scenario is orders of magnitude less than the amount of smoke and other particulates put into the atmosphere by the asteroid that hit the Earth at the end of the Cretaceous, 65 million years ago, killing the dinosaurs and about two-thirds of species alive at the time. This implies that some humans would survive, eventually to repopulate the planet, and that a species-level extinction of Homo sapiens is unlikely even after a full-scale nuclear war. But the vast majority of the human population would suffer extremely unpleasant deaths from burns, radiation and starvation, and **human civilization would likely collapse entirely**. Survivors would eke out a living on a devastated, barren planet. It was this shared understanding of the consequences of nuclear Armageddon that led to the 1985 statement by then US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” This statement was reaffirmed by Presidents Biden and Putin as recently as January 2022. Even as war rages in Ukraine it remains as true now as it was then. With children’s hospitals bombed and refugees shelled as they flee, emotions run high. But cool heads must ultimately prevail, so that we can collectively step back from the brink of Russia-NATO confrontation before it is too late. **The price of nuclear escalation is planetary suicide**, with no winners at all. That won’t save lives in Ukraine — it will simply take the death toll of the current war from the thousands to the billions.

# 1AR

## Case

### 1AR – Addon – Turkey Coups

#### Independently, a Turkish coup could gain control of the weapons – recent events prove.

Lewis 16 [Jeffrey, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies], 7-18-2016, "America’s Nukes Aren’t Safe in Turkey Anymore," Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/18/americas-nukes-arent-safe-in-turkey-anymore/>

Among the candidates for most iconic image of this past weekend’s attempted coup in Turkey has to be the many videos of Turkish F-16s, hijacked by the mutineers, flying low over Istanbul and Ankara. Eventually, those planes seem to have bombed the parliament. There were rumors that they considered shooting down the plane of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

What’s clear is that mutineers managed to keep the F-16s in the air only because they were able to refuel them mid-flight using at least one tanker aircraft operated out of Incirlik Air Base. Eventually Turkish authorities closed the airspace over Incirlik and cut power to it. The next day, the security forces loyal to the government arrested the Turkish commander at the base. (The images of him being escorted away in handcuffs are in the contest to qualify as the weekend’s most iconic.)

In retrospect, it is understandable why the Turkish government closed the airspace over Incirlik, even if it did temporarily disrupt air operations against the Islamic State in Syria. But that is in retrospect. In the moment, it raised a disquieting thought. There are a few dozen U.S. B61 nuclear gravity bombs stored at Incirlik. Does it seem like a good idea to station American nuclear weapons at an air base commanded by someone who may have just helped bomb his own country’s parliament?

To be sure, coups have occurred in other countries where the United States stores nuclear weapons. Turkey, Greece, and South Korea have all seen military juntas seize control while U.S. nuclear weapons were present on their soil.

Counterintuitive as it might seem, nuclear weapons have tended not to be a primary target of coup plotters. This has been true for countries that host U.S. nuclear weapons stationed abroad, but also for coup attempts in France and the Soviet Union. My friend Bruno Tertrais found the French case so peculiar that he wrote a great little paper about it.

The weapons at Incirlik are stored in vaults in the floor of the protective aircraft shelters. The shelters are inside a security perimeter. The United States and its NATO allies recently invested $160 million on security upgrades for nuclear weapons, the most visible aspect of which is new security perimeter at Incirlik visible in satellite images. And, of course, if the coup plotters have accessed a weapon, it would require someone to enter a code to arm it. It would not be a simple thing to snatch and use a U.S. nuclear weapon. Coup plotters generally have other things to worry about.

At the same time, if a hostile junta were to seize control of a country with U.S. nuclear weapons stationed in it, things might be dicier. An airbase is a not a fortress; it is not intended to withstand a siege by the host government any more than an embassy might. Use control devices such as “Permissive Action Links” can prevent someone from easily using a stolen weapon, but may eventually be bypassed. There has long been talk about developing security features that would render a lost or stolen weapon a “paperweight” but that’s mostly been just that — talk.

So while the precautions to protect U.S. nuclear weapons at Incirlik are reasonable, they are based on a series of assumptions about the stability and friendliness of the country. The sight of the Incirlik base commander being frog-marched off the base is disquieting precisely because it undermines such assumptions.

The security situation in Turkey has been deteriorating for some time. Earlier this year, the Department of Defense evacuated military and civilian families from Incirlik, citing concerns about terrorist threats. Then, in April, two goons from a local right-wing group attempted to “sack” a U.S. airman on base. (Sacking is just that — throwing a sack over someone’s head, in this case retaliation for a perceived slight against Turkish soldiers.) This occurred about one kilometer from the weapons perimeter. And now an official in the Erdogan government insinuated that the United States may have played a role in the coup, largely on the basis that a cleric named Fethullah Gulen, who has a large number of followers in Turkey, resides in exile in the United States.

Given the general climate of instability, you might ask why U.S. nuclear weapons are even stored in Turkey in the first place. That’s especially relevant because one of the peculiar things about U.S. gravity bombs in Turkey is that there are no planes available to deliver them. In other NATO states with U.S. nuclear weapons, the host nation maintains so-called dual capable aircraft that, in theory, would be outfitted with U.S. nuclear weapons to use in a crisis. (Stop guffawing, it’s unseemly.) But unlike Belgium, Germany, Italy, or the Netherlands, there are no aircraft in Turkey certified to carry nuclear weapons. And the U.S. only rotates combat aircraft through Incirlik, so there are no U.S. aircraft certified to carry nuclear weapons there either. In other words, Incirlik is a glorified storage depot.

I humbly submit that we could find a more stable location to serve as such a depot.

There’s nothing stopping the United States from immediately removing the weapons from Turkey, just as it pulled them out of Greece in 2001 once it was clear the weapons there were not safely protected. Those weapons could come back to the United States.

Some analysts argue this is not the time to reduce the number of U.S. nuclear weapons deployed to NATO member states, not with the recent downturn in relations with Russia. Fine; if they are so important, then they could go to another NATO member state. The United States has built plenty of nuclear weapons storage vaults in nearby European countries.

Who should get the honor? Scratch Belgium and the Netherlands off the list, even if you like the chocolate. The local security at those bases is crap, with activists repeatedly having breached security at them. Incirlik and Aviano Air Base in Italy, by contrast, are U.S.-operated air bases with U.S. forces providing security for the nuclear weapons stored there. They recently got new security perimeters, paid for by NATO states including the United States. Aviano could potentially take some of Incirlik’s nuclear weapons, but it has only a moderate number of available vaults.

#### Past attempts to seize the nukes

Micallef 19 [Joseph, keynote speaker on world politics, best-selling author, and a commentator on military and international affairs for CNN and Fox News.], 11-13-2019, "Is It Time to Withdraw US Nuclear Weapons from Incirlik?," Military, <https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/11/14/it-time-withdraw-us-nuclear-weapons-incirlik.html>

The base has been a logistical hub and support facility in a range of Middle East conflicts, from the 1958 Lebanon crisis to the Gulf War; to policing the no-fly zone and subsequent invasion of Iraq; the war in Afghanistan; and most recently in the air war against Islamic State militants in Syria and Iraq. Aircraft based in Incirlik can reach every current Mideast hot spot.

U.S.-Turkish relations regarding Incirlik have been through rocky periods. In 1975, in response to the imposition of an arms embargo against Turkey, by the U.S. Congress, for using U.S.-supplied equipment during the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, Ankara suspended all non-NATO activities from Incirlik and Izmir air bases and expelled the U.S. from all other Turkish bases. The U.S. was allowed to resume operations after the embargo was lifted.

Turkey initially seemed reluctant to allow the U.S. the use of Incirlik for military operations against the Islamic State, but eventually gave its consent, provided that the flights were "against the Islamic state and [did] not include air support for allied Kurdish fighters in northern Syria."

During the 2016 coup attempt against Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Ankara discontinued electrical power to the base and put a no-fly order against U.S. military aircraft in the area, including operations against the Islamic State. The Turkish government claimed that dissident generals were using the base and were being secretly aided by the US.

On July 31, 2016, encouraged by the Erdogan government, a mob of thousands of Turks stormed the gates of the base, threatening to seize the facility from the United States.

Since then, U.S.-Turkish relations have become increasingly strained, especially after the Turkish decision to purchase an S-400 air defense system from Russia; Turkey's expulsion by the U.S. from participation in the F-35 development program; and their invasion of the Kurdish-held areas in northern Syria.

One of the particularly delicate issues between Washington and Ankara is the presence of approximately 50 B61 nuclear bombs at the base. This is the primary thermonuclear gravity bomb in the American arsenal. Historically, the U.S. would neither confirm nor deny the existence of nuclear weapons held overseas. Recently, however, the Trump administration confirmed the existence of the devices at Incirlik.

### U – AT Relations Decline Inevitable

#### Relations set to improve – new strategic relation proves

Coskun 22 [Coskun; senior fellow in the Europe Program and leads the Türkiye and the World Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC], 5-12-2022, "Making the New U.S.-Turkey Strategic Mechanism Meaningful," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/05/12/making-new-u.s.-turkey-strategic-mechanism-meaningful-pub-87117>

As the war between Russia and Ukraine grinds on and as the need to maintain a united front against Moscow grows, Turkey and the United States are seeking to put their long-troubled relationship on a better path. The new U.S.-Turkey Strategic Mechanism, announced in early April 2022, is a promising (but tentative) step forward.

The mechanism grew out of an understanding reached between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and U.S. President Joe Biden during their meeting on the margins of the October 2021 G20 summit in Rome. Though the idea is said to belong to Biden, the U.S. readout after the meeting lacked any reference to the mechanism, whereas it was the highlight of the Turkish narrative. This difference in emphasis initially triggered rumors that the United States might be dragging its feet.

After the initiative was announced, U.S. Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade Marisa Lago visited Turkey to explore opportunities in commercial relations and to discuss how Turkey’s Russia-dependent energy mix could be diversified. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu will travel to the United States to meet with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken on May 18 in the first cabinet-level bilateral visit between the two countries since the Biden administration took office. The initial plans had been to have this meeting in Washington, DC, but the venue has been moved to New York, and the program has been curtailed, reportedly at the behest of the United States and probably in reaction to the conviction of Turkish philanthropist Osman Kavala. While the process hasn’t been derailed, this experience serves as a reminder that the mechanism is vulnerable to different dynamics. Its sustainability and potential to have a positive impact depend on Ankara and Washington making the right choices to facilitate and not undermine policy convergences.

Turkish and American sources talk of the Strategic Mechanism as a structured platform in which all matters can be discussed, with an emphasis on advancing practical bilateral cooperation. The level of ambition that Ankara and Washington will set for the mechanism is yet to be seen and will be important, particularly in view of the failure of some past attempts. The two governments established working groups in 2018 to resolve disputes on consular affairs, Syria policy, and Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system, but these efforts failed to deliver results and were quickly forgotten. The United States had been reluctant to go forward with the idea at the time, and the lesson from that experience is that, unless the parties have a shared sense of understanding of and joint commitment to the process, its chances of success are slim.

If the Strategic Mechanism is to avoid the fate of the 2018 working groups, Washington and Ankara will need to invest seriously in the process and display real political ownership; agree on clear, shared, and diverse objectives; and simultaneously work to resolve or at least minimize their bilateral disputes.

DEMONSTRATING POLITICAL OWNERSHIP

The mechanism will be dead on arrival unless there is shared commitment in Ankara and Washington. Geopolitical considerations are currently driving this commitment in both countries. Russia’s brazen war in Ukraine and the global divide of systemic rivalry have affected how Turkey and the United States view each other. These events have changed their calculus in favor of closer relations and, in turn, have nurtured the idea of such a mechanism.

For Turkey, balancing Russia has consistently been a consideration. From Ankara’s perspective, the reality is that its security, deterrence, and economic livelihood are bolstered by its membership in NATO, its alliance with the United States, and its albeit shaky inclusion nowadays in the family of liberal democracies. Meanwhile, the Turkish economy is in dire straits as the country’s 2023 parliamentary and presidential elections loom on the horizon, forcing the government into looking for international success stories. The United States, on the other hand, is grappling with the fact that Turkey is a significant geopolitical middle power in its immediate region and beyond. Having Turkey as an ally has started to matter more again. In short, realpolitik calculations are at play for both sides.

For the purposes of optics and practicality, the Strategic Mechanism would benefit from being designed and seen as something more than a bureaucratic exercise. For this to happen, it needs a meaningful political embrace from both sides. Underscoring the mechanism’s importance with a meeting between the two countries’ presidents would give it a big boost. It is no secret that the Biden administration has been cold-shouldering Turkey. This has been evident in the choice Biden and his senior team have made to limit their interactions with their Turkish counterparts, something that Erdoğan has publicly lamented.

U.S. officials have already spoken of the possibility of such a meeting on the mechanism, and Turkey would certainly welcome the idea. The two presidents have only met twice so far since Biden took office, with both encounters on the margins of international meetings. The same arrangement could be made, for example, during the upcoming UN General Assembly meeting in New York in September 2022. The direct involvement of Erdoğan and Biden would give the mechanism good optics, add impetus to the initiative, and (maybe even more importantly) perhaps restrain potential spoilers on either side.

SETTING SHARED OBJECTIVES

U.S.-Turkey relations have deteriorated seriously since the early 2000s, starting with differences over the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. The tenor of bilateral ties has mostly been on a downward trajectory since. An accumulated host of disagreements have kept a damper on the relationship, including on topics like Syria policy, Washington’s half-hearted reaction to the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, the unfettered ability of the Gulen movement (which Ankara holds accountable for this failed attempt) to still function in the United States, Ankara’s decision to purchase Russia’s S-400 air defense system and ensuing U.S. sanctions, and the overall unhappiness in Washington with the incremental dismantling of democratic governance in Turkey.

A byproduct of the regression in U.S.-Turkey relations has been a decrease in bilateral exchanges, which is slowly eroding valuable human networks and taking a toll on the culture of cooperation between the two countries. The Strategic Mechanism can reverse this trend by breaking the numbing effect that disagreements have had on U.S.-Turkey ties. But for this to happen, Washington and Ankara will need to set clear, mutually agreed-on objectives and diversify their objectives to avoid simply trying to address the well-worn agenda of existing disputes.

The 2018 working groups exemplified the damaging effects of failing to achieve these goals. This time, the idea behind the Strategic Mechanism is different. Stimulating an agenda of practical cooperation, without ruling out the possibility of discussing disagreements, is a good way to strike a balance.

Ukraine will be a natural topic of discussion within the mechanism. This should be more than an act of ritualistic exchange and should instead focus on concrete deliverables, including for the post-conflict stage. The future Euroatlantic security architecture and Russia’s role therein and bilateral U.S.-Turkey collaboration in rebuilding and rehabilitating war-torn Ukraine are two themes that come to mind. Meanwhile, the departure of U.S. firms from Russia and the need for at least some of them to relocate their investments and production lines, as well as the realization about the importance of reliable supply chains, create new dynamics where Turkey can bring added value. Given that the United States has become Turkey’s second-largest gas supplier after Russia and that bilateral U.S.-Turkey trade posted a 30 percent increase last year to reach record highs, energy and trade are two other promising areas of cooperation that the Strategic Mechanism can help consolidate.

The list can be extended. Turkey’s ambitious outreach to Africa and its growing footprint on the continent, as well as its renewed efforts to mend fences with Armenia, present further opportunities of convergence with the United States. And despite some serious differences over Syria policy, Turkish and U.S. officials need to continue exploring options for facilitating a political settlement that would allow for the voluntary return of Syrian refugees to their home country.

If Ankara and Washington can advance cooperation in some of these areas, that would qualitatively improve a U.S.-Turkey partnership that has traditionally been set in a straitjacket of sometimes divergent security and defense interests. The Strategic Mechanism can help broaden this relationship and make it more resilient. The proposal’s added value would lie in introducing structure and continuity to different strands of engagement between the two countries and in its potential to swiftly elevate ripe schemes to political decisionmakers for their endorsement. In short, if the objectives are set right, the Strategic Mechanism could hasten both the incubation and implementation of useful ideas.

REDUCING THE POISONING EFFECTS OF DISAGREEMENTS

If the Strategic Mechanism is to help Turkey and the United States engage more deeply and enhance practical cooperation, something will have to be done in tandem to mitigate the poisoning effects of bilateral disagreements. This is where things get more complicated, and there is a mismatch between Ankara and Washington in terms of not only policy substance but also methods of diplomatic negotiations.

#### We’re at a crossroads right now – evidence from last week.

Zanotti 7/14 [Jim; specialist in Middle Eastern affairs at the Congressional Research Service, author of many books on US-Israel relations and a book on US-Turkey relations], “Turkey (Turkiye): Major Issues and US Relations,” Congressional Research Service, <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/R44000.pdf> TDI

U.S. relations with Turkey take place within a complicated geopolitical environment, as Turkey also faces deep-seated economic problems and continues to recover from disastrous February 2023 earthquakes. U.S.-Turkey tensions that worsened after a failed 2016 coup in Turkey highlight uncertainties about the future of bilateral relations. Ongoing disagreements stem from U.S. support for Syrian Kurds linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), and Turkey’s 2019 procurement of a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system. Congressional action has included holds and conditions on U.S. arms sales to Turkey, as well as support for certain sanctions against Turkey. Nevertheless, U.S. and Turkish officials emphasize the importance of the bilateral relationship and Turkey’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). At the same time, Turkey apparently seeks to reduce its dependence on the West, as it and other “midsize powers” such as Saudi Arabia and India seek advantages in a global system with growing great-power competition. Turkey’s desire for greater strategic autonomy may partly explain its willingness to coordinate some actions with Russia, though the two countries retain significant differences on Ukraine and other issues. One analyst has argued that most of Turkey’s core security problems around its borders and coastlines—involving Syria, Iraq, Greece, Cyprus, Libya, and the Caucasus—require it to deal with Russia, Iran, and various other actors without much help from the West. Turkey’s future foreign policy course could depend partly on its leaders’ willingness to risk breaks in traditional ties with Western powers while building other global relationships. Congressional and executive branch action regarding Turkey and its neighboring countries could have implications for bilateral ties and U.S. political-military options in the region, as well as Turkey’s strategic orientation. Under President Joe Biden, existing U.S.-Turkey tensions have continued alongside cooperation on other foreign policy matters. In a June 2023 CNN interview, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said that Turkey is “charting an independent foreign policy but one in which we can have a constructive relationship with them.” While Turkey’s deepening ties with Russia remain a cause for U.S. concern, its emergence as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine after Russia’s 2022 invasion has arguably increased Turkey’s importance for U.S. policy. U.S.-Turkey relations also have improved due to Turkey’s support for Ukraine’s defense; its limitation of Russian naval access to and from the Black Sea; and its moves toward rapprochement with Israel, some Arab states, and Armenia. Citing the importance of NATO strength and interoperability, President Biden has voiced support for sales that would revamp Turkey’s aging F-16 fleet, but some Members of Congress have expressed opposition. The Administration reportedly provided informal notification to Congress in January 2023 of a possible sale of F-16s to Turkey, plus associated equipment and munitions. Factors potentially influencing congressional consideration of the proposed sale include whether Turkey might approve of Sweden joining NATO, and Turkey’s tense relations with Greece. Turkey agreed to Finland’s NATO membership in March 2023, but has conditioned approval for Sweden on it taking actions against individuals and groups that Turkey deems to be terrorists. In July 2023, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan agreed to send the NATO accession protocol for Sweden to Turkey’s parliament and work closely with it to “ensure ratification,” but the process could extend into the fall and potentially depend on additional action from Sweden, along with assurances of congressional support for the F-16 sale. Turkish concerns regarding its southern border with Syria have deepened further during Syria’s civil war, due largely to (1) the flow of nearly four million refugees into Turkey, (2) U.S. efforts to counter the Islamic State by working with Syrian Kurds linked to the PKK, and (3) the presence of Russian, American, and Iranian forces in Syria that complicate and somewhat constrain Turkish action. Turkey and allied Syrian armed opposition groups have occupied various areas of northern Syria since 2016, and Turkey’s military continues to target Kurdish fighters in Syria and Iraq. Domestically, many observers voice concerns about the largely authoritarian rule of President Erdogan. Despite major inflation and the earthquakes’ aftermath, he emerged victorious in May 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections. An official international observer mission stated that while voters had a “choice between genuine political alternatives,” government actions favoring Erdogan gave him an “unjustified advantage,” amid broader debate about the electoral process and how it related to past Turkish elections.

#### Aligned interests mean that relationships will remain stable. Prefer because our evidence accounts for Turkey’s actions surrounding Ukraine.

Carafano 7/3 [James Jay; a leading expert in America’s national security and foreign policy challenges, is the Washington-based Heritage Foundation’s vice president for foreign and defence policy studies and director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies.], “The Future of US-Turkey Relations,” GIS Reports, 7/3/23, <https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/u-s-turkey-relations/>

Despite President Joe Biden’s declared democracy promotion agenda, relations between America and Turkey will likely remain stable and may even improve throughout the remainder of the United States president’s term.

With President Biden’s swearing-in as U.S. president on January 20, 2021, came a claim that the administration would reassert the promotion of democracy globally as a principal instrument of American foreign policy. This objective was also asserted in the administration’s National Security Strategy published in 2022.

The most visible representation of the policy was the U.S.-sponsored Summit for Democracies in 2023. Turkey was among the allies that the Biden team declined to invite to the summit.

“They’re NATO allies, and we’re going to continue to work together with them on lots of different issues of mutual concern,” National Security Council spokesman John Kirby stated in a call with reporters before the summit, but “at the same time, we’re committed to supporting democratic institutions, human rights, the rule of law [and] media freedom.” The U.S. administration was signaling major concerns with democratic backsliding under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Turkey was not the only friendly power singled out for criticism. Hungary, ruled by Prime Minister Viktor Orban, was not invited to the summit. The U.S. administration also consistently singled out Poland and Israel for criticism over judicial reforms and other issues.

The problem with the administration’s application of democracy promotion is that it is so unevenly applied that it is seen as illegitimate and ineffective. Before Russia’s war on Ukraine, the administration attempted to improve relations with Russia. President Biden continues to seek to engage Iran. Even as competition with China increases, the U.S. wants to work constructively with Beijing on a range of issues, especially climate policy. On the other hand, it singled out democracies with center-right governments for ridicule, principally over policy differences, often reflecting domestic U.S. political sensitivities and an effort to strengthen relations with the European Union by joining criticism of nations targeted for punishment by Brussels.

After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, however, the administration quickly discovered that politically isolating strategic allies was unworkable. Washington has had to work closely with Turkey and Poland. Failing to secure a new Iran Deal to prevent Tehran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, and with continuing instability in Syria and Lebanon, the U.S. has had to renew close security cooperation with Israel.

President Erdogan, in response, helped on some of the most contentious issues by putting aside the democracy snubs in favor of stabilizing relations with Washington and other Western-allied capitals during the reelection bid that he won on May 28, 2023. Examples include greenlighting Finland’s accession to NATO and brokering the Ukraine grain export compromise.

An alignment of agency

Many speculated that an opposition victory would lead to better relations among Ankara, Washington, Europeans and the Middle East. The expectation of significant shifts in Turkish policies was overblown. There is also reason to expect Mr. Erdogan to adopt very similar policies.

Even with a strong popular mandate, President Erdogan faces significant challenges at home, including national recovery from the recent earthquake and staggering inflation. Turkey can ill afford foreign adventures that add to the nation’s woes. Conversely, the country needs foreign investment, trade and international economic partnerships to deliver growth.

With the election in the rearview mirror, the U.S. has to be realistic and recognize there are several issues in which American and Turkish interests complement each other, or at the very least, do not overtly conflict:

Russia. Turkey will never completely isolate Russia or break relations. That said, Ankara has never had a trusted relationship with Moscow, nor do prospects exist for a partnership. Indeed, Turkey views membership in NATO as vital to its national interests, an insurance card against Russian expansion.

The Black Sea. While Turkey will never consent to revise the Montreux Convention of 1936, which allows Ankara authority over the passage of military ships into the Black Sea, it remains in Turkey’s interest to see a free and open Black Sea to unimpeded commercial traffic, as well as the safety of undersea cables and pipelines. While Ankara remains wary of an increased NATO presence in the Black Sea, it will likely be more amenable to cooperation among the littoral nations to safeguard undersea, surface and airspace commercial activities.

Middle Corridor. Developing energy, transport and supply-chain corridors through the Caucasus to the Central Asian nations is a project that would serve the interests of Europe, the U.S. and Turkey equally well. Through The Organization of Turkic States (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey and Uzbekistan), Ankara is part of an intergovernmental body that can be an essential instrument for cooperation.

Greece. The U.S. is keenly interested in improving the bilateral cooperation between Ankara and Athens’ center-right, pro-U.S. government. Relations between the two countries have improved since the earthquake and the Greek effort to contribute humanitarian support.

Armenia. Recent negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan could improve regional stability and reduce the influence of Iran and Russia, which would benefit Turkey, Europe and the U.S.

The Middle East. Turkey has a mixed bag of relations with Israel and the Arab states. For example, relations between Turkey and Egypt have been at a nadir for years, with virtually no direct dialogue between the two governments. It is in U.S. interests for more harmonious relations. The postelection prospects for more outreach from Ankara seem promising. Regional analyst James Dorsey noted that, after years of strained relations, Saudi and Emirati support for Mr. Erdogan was quickly displayed after the Turkish leader’s reelection.

Africa. While U.S. and Turkish interests do not always align in Africa, Ankara is determined to play a more active role in the continent. The U.S., Europe and Turkey share a common interest in mitigating malicious Chinese and Russian behavior, particularly in North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa.

Scenarios

The most likely future scenario is that U.S. and Turkish relations will remain stable in the near term. Heading into national elections in the U.S., where foreign policy is not decisive, look for the Biden administration not wanting to add new confrontations with allies. Turkey remains a controversial issue with some members of Congress, but it is unlikely that leadership from either party would like to have a significant confrontation over U.S.-Turkish relations.

One possible wild card could be migration if Turkey triggered a major crisis with Europe.

The conditions for stable relations are clear – Sweden’s accession to NATO, transfers of F-16s to Turkey and reintegration of Turkey into the F-35 fighter program. Beyond these expectations, signs of a warming relationship might include closer cooperation on Syria, Libya or the Middle Corridor countries.

### U – AT Relations Decline Inevitable – S-400s

#### Turkey only bought S-400s from russia because there was no US agreement on modalities

Pamir et al 20-- Ahmet Üzümcü- Former Director-General of the OPCW, Former Permanent Representative of Turkey to NATO, Mehmet Fatih Ceylan- Turkish Permanent Representative to NATO, 2013-2018, Ümit Pamir- Turkish Permanent Representative to NATO, 2004-2006 (“Turkey and NATO: resolving the S-400 spat,” European leadership network, 16 December 2020, <https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/turkey-and-nato-resolving-the-s-400-spat/>)

Bashing Turkey in international fora has become fashionable. Some suggest that Turkey is no longer a reliable or trustworthy member of NATO. Some go further, claiming that Turkey is a liability, ignoring its history as a staunch ally. As former Turkish Ambassadors to NATO, we believe that a healthy dose of reality should be injected into this debate, which risks descending into a blame game in which only NATO’s opponents stand to gain. For the good of NATO and Turkey we offer some constructive proposals and perspectives to restore a sense of balance. First, we should seek to understand and resolve the one issue overshadowing all else, the Turkish purchase of Russian made S-400 air defence systems and the U.S. decision to both disengage Turkey from the F35 programme and to place some sanctions on it. It should be remembered that Turkey wanted to buy US air defence systems but there was no agreement on the modalities. Nevertheless, this impasse in bilateral relations between Turkey and the U.S., and therefore within the Alliance, must and can be overcome with a modicum of give-and-take on both sides. In our opinion, the issue of the Russian-made S-400s could be satisfactorily resolved if Turkey makes a verifiable pledge within NATO not to activate the system and the U.S. takes a decision in parallel to reverse its position on the exclusion of Turkey from the F35 programme and on the recently imposed sanctions. Such conciliatory moves should be complemented by a decision, backed by Alliance solidarity, to enable Turkey to reach a deal on the joint production of a missile defence system under a generous technology sharing agreement. We firmly believe that such a compromise is achievable.

### S – Hostage Taking

#### Erdogan can use servicepeople as hostages.

Rubin 21 [Michael, Senior Fellow at the Washington Examiner], 9-10-2021, "The One Foreign Base Biden Should Abandon," American Enterprise Institute - AEI, <https://www.aei.org/op-eds/the-one-foreign-base-biden-should-abandon/>

President Joe Biden is unapologetic about his Afghanistan withdrawal, no matter the chaos that has followed. Similarly, when Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Kadhimi visited the White House on July 26, 2021, he and Biden agreed to end the U.S. combat mission in Iraq. Many Iraqis believe not only that the U.S. military presence won’t be far behind, but that the ensuing vacuum will put them at the mercy of Iran and the Islamic State. The residual American military presence in both Syria and Somalia is also on the chopping block, much to the delight of al Qaeda and al Shabab. How ironic it is, then, that the Biden administration is determined to hold on to the one base that America should have abandoned a decade ago. Incirlik Air Base in Turkey. During the Cold War, Incirlik was crucial. Turkey was one of only two NATO states to border the Soviet Union. The base supported U-2 surveillance flights, U.S. operations during the 1958 Lebanon crisis, the 1991 liberation of Kuwait, and, most recently, the fight against the Taliban. Incirlik also hosts approximately 50 nuclear weapons. Yet, rather than a strategic asset, Incirlik is now a strategic liability. Turkey is as much an enemy as an ally. Its president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, says he has no problem with the Taliban’s ideology. While Turkey is a NATO member, Erdogan increasingly tilts toward Russia. Some Turkey lobbyists say that the problem is Erdogan and not Turkey itself. But the damage Erdogan has done will not be easy to reverse: Over his 18 years in power, he has reshaped the military in its entirety and indoctrinated more than 30 million Turkish schoolchildren. The real problem is not just that of Turkey’s hostility. It is the fact that Erdogan might one day view the American presence in Incirlik as that of a hostage bonanza. Every American ~~serviceman~~ [serviceperson], contractor, and family at Incirlik are potential hostages. The threat is real. Erdogan is not one to accept responsibility for his own actions. He often tries to redirect anger toward the Americans. In the aftermath of the 2016 “Reichstag Fire” coup , Erdogan directed mobs to the gates of the base. He blamed the American commander of complicity in the plot. Simply put, Incirlik now risks a repeat of the 1979 Iran hostage crisis. Nor, unlike Bagram in Afghanistan, would an American departure from Incirlik affect U.S. operations. The United States can now use the Mihail Kogalniceanu air base in Romania, something that was never possible during the Cold War. Greece has also recently expanded the Souda Bay Naval Base. Indeed, the only loser to a withdrawal from Incirlik would be the local Turkish economy. Biden’s push to end “forever wars” may be irresponsible, but leaving an obsolete base would not be. Let’s end the U.S. military presence in Turkey.

### S – Appeasement

#### Absent pushback, Erdogan’s expands military presence into multiple hotspots.

Aykan Erdemir & Philip Kowalski 20. Erdemir is the senior director of the Turkey Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a former member of the Turkish parliament. Kowalski is a research associate at the Turkey Program of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, “‘Blue Homeland’ and the Irredentist Future of Turkish Foreign Policy”, War on the Rocks,9-30-2020, <https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/blue-homeland-and-the-irredentist-future-of-turkish-foreign-policy/>

Turkey and Greece, two NATO allies, nearly experienced a full-fledged military conflict in August. Two of their warships collided during a naval standoff over hydrocarbon exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean. This follows a similar naval incident in June between three Turkish vessels and the frigate of another NATO ally, France, prompting an inquiry that the alliance has been trying to keep under wraps to prevent further discord among its ranks. Behind these incidents lies Turkey’s embrace of an assertive naval concept, namely the “blue homeland,” that is poised to disrupt the transatlantic alliance in the years to come.

The “blue homeland” is an irredentist concept that claims vast sections of the Aegean and Mediterranean seas, including Greek and Cypriot maritime borders and hydrocarbon deposits, for Turkey. What began as a fringe idea among the anti-Western brass of the Turkish navy has morphed into a popular nationalist aspiration fronted by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. “Blue homeland” will continue to damage Ankara’s diplomatic relations, since Erdoğan will find it difficult to step away from maximalist claims he has personally cultivated.

The tendency to see the Turkish president’s belligerence merely as posturing for domestic consumption, and failure to develop a concerted transatlantic strategy, has provided Erdoğan with the time and opportunity to institutionalize his irredentist thinking. Absent pushback from the West, Turkish foreign and security policy will reflect Erdoğan’s worldview for decades to come. The United States and the European Union should, in response, work together to discourage the Turkish president from continuing to play a destabilizing role in NATO’s southeastern flank. They should also engage and support Turkey’s pro-Western dissidents and help amplify their voices in a media landscape almost entirely dominated by Erdoğan. Coordinating a Western response — while extremely difficult — is essential to mitigating the most damaging effects of current Turkish foreign policy.

Background to ‘Blue Homeland’

The “blue homeland” naval concept, first coined in 2006, does not stem from Erdoğan’s Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party. Instead, as Ryan Gingeras lays out in detail in his War on the Rocks piece, its origins lie with two staunchly secularist naval officers who later developed links with the Maoist-rooted neo-nationalist Homeland Party. The party and its predecessor, the Workers’ Party, were once fierce opponents of Erdoğan and his political party. However, the Homeland Party has since entered into a tactical alliance with the Justice and Development Party as the Turkish president gradually turned to his former adversaries among the ultranationalists and Eurasianists (a faction that advocates Turkey joining the Russia- and China-led anti-Western geopolitical camp) in a bid to hold onto power.

Cem Gürdeniz, a retired Turkish rear admiral who is one of the architects of the “blue homeland,” presents the concept as a response to an existential threat, and offers it as guaranteeing the ability to “sleep comfortably at home.” Gürdeniz sees the Ottoman failure to control the seas as the cause of the empire’s demise and warns that naval supremacy is crucial for the survival of the Turkish Republic, which in his opinion continues to remain in the crosshairs of Western imperialism. While the “blue homeland” is most immediately linked to maximalist Turkish claims in areas where Cyprus and Greece assert jurisdiction, Gürdeniz ultimately argues that it is also key for Turkey’s expansion of its political and economic influence across the region. Since he believes that “the Mediterranean is not sufficient for an expanding Turkey,” he urges Ankara to take control of the “Persian Gulf, Sea of Oman, Arabian Sea, Red Sea, the Eastern waters of the Atlantic Ocean, [and] North Africa.” Within the Eurasianist paradigm, the “blue homeland” is part of a broader strategy of confronting the West and establishing Turkish supremacy in the region.

For Erdoğan, this concept is also a means to expand Islamist influence. More specifically, he hopes that Turkish domination of the Eastern Mediterranean will boost Turkey’s military and proxy presence in Libya, Syria, Iraq, and beyond, and thereby strengthen the footprint of the Muslim Brotherhood and its agenda.

#### Appeasement makes Erdogan feel invulnerable to American pressure. Increases aggression.

Steven A. Cook 18. Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), He holds a BA in international studies from Vassar College, an MA in international relations from Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, and an MA and a PhD in political science from the University of Pennsylvania, “Neither Friend Nor Foe: The Future of US-Turkey Relations”, Council on Foreign Relations, November 2018, <https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/CSR82_Cook_Turkey_0.pdf>

A LOT OF HONEY AND SOME VINEGAR

U.S. policymakers have often pursued a “more honey than vinegar” policy toward Turkey, emphasizing incentives, which has not yielded results. The underlying rationale for this approach is the idea that intensive American diplomacy could encourage Ankara to support the United States and that Turkey is too important a “strategic partner” to risk creating a rift. Presidents Bush, Obama, and Trump have been willing to countenance the Turkish government’s efforts to undermine U.S. policy in large part because of the utility of Turkey’s Incirlik Air Base.

Yet officials in Washington tend to underestimate the hidden costs associated with their willingness to strike agreements with Turkey over the use of the base. The problem was brought into sharp relief on July 22, 2015, when, after a year of negotiations, the Turkish government gave permission for the anti-ISIS coalition to undertake combat operations from Incirlik. As part of the deal, the Turks were supposed to increase their operations against the Islamic State, while U.S. policymakers provided assurances that the United States would increase its help to Turkey in the fight against the PKK. The Turks, by their own admission, prioritized the latter at the expense of the former.20 The Obama administration chose to overlook the Turkish government’s ambivalence about the counter-ISIS campaign so long as the United States continued to have access to Incirlik.

The agreement over the base had broader implications, however. It sent the message to Ankara that Turkey is indispensable to the United States, which leaves Washington vulnerable to Turkish threats to rescind permission to use Incirlik. This, in turn, led Turkey’s leaders to believe that they could act without regard for U.S. interests. Until recently, the White House had been publicly passive in response to a range of Turkish policies that were unhelpful, even damaging, to American interests. For example, after Ankara arrested a number of Turkish employees of the U.S. Embassy and harassed their families in October 2017, the Trump administration suspended visa processing for Turks traveling to the United States. In an effort to forestall continued decomposition of bilateral ties, the administration rescinded the order soon after. In response, Turkish leaders have simply pocketed American goodwill without any reciprocal effort, as they have routinely done in the past, and continued to target Foreign Service nationals.

#### Concessions to Turkey validate their behavior. Increases aggression.

Hegedüs 22, visiting fellow for Central Europe at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. He researches populism and democratic backsliding in Central and Eastern Europe and the European and foreign affairs of the Visegrad countries (Daniel, “US, EU Face Higher Hurdles Now for Action Against Orbán’s Tightening Grip in Hungary,” Just Security, [https://www.justsecurity.org/81438/us-eu-face-higher-hurdles-now-for-action-against-orbans-tightening-grip-in-hungary/)](https://www.justsecurity.org/81438/us-eu-face-higher-hurdles-now-for-action-against-orbans-tightening-grip-in-hungary/)//BB)

Clearly, democracy is not the only game in town anymore in Central Europe. While many Western stakeholders might be tempted to make concessions to the region’s illiberal strongmen in order to preserve EU and NATO unity, this approach was a key enabling factor and will only continue to weaken European and transatlantic organizations further. In the face of the clear authoritarian threat posed by Russia and China, challenging these trends in Central Europe to strengthen the democratic integrity of the Western alliance is more crucial than ever.

#### Unconditional assistance triggers aggressive and non-cooperative allied behavior

Sullivan 11, Professor at UNC-Chapel Hill, with Brock Tessman, Assistant Professor at Georgia and Xiaojun Li, PhD in Political Science from Stanford (Patricia, “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation,” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, No. 7)

In this model, we anticipate a paradoxical effect of military aid in which powerful donor states become dependent on the recipients of their military aid (Mott 2002). The United States gives military aid to gain leverage and influence. But it is in a competitive market for leverage through aid; it must compete with other states to keep its influence over client states. At the same time, we can assume that the United States chooses to invest heavily in training and equipping the military forces of other countries, with all the attendant risks this entails, because it needs something from these states. Materially weak states can exploit the fact that a much stronger donor relies on them to provide some vital good—and the threat of defection to an alternative supplier—to exert influence over the donor. According to Mott (2002), during the Cold War, US security assistance recipients learned to manipulate the United States ‘‘by putting Moscow and Washington into an aid competition, by diversifying across suppliers, and converting the expected recipient dependence into a perverse sort of supplier dependence’’ (8). Although the Cold War competition with Moscow is no longer central to US foreign policy, other states and even nonstate actors have stepped in to replace the Soviet Union as alternative arms suppliers. Stokke (1995) observes that strong states have typically used foreign aid ‘‘as a lever to promote objectives set by the donor, which the recipient government would not have otherwise agreed to’’ (12). But Singer (2003) argues that the increasingly privatized military market ‘‘fundamentally alters this patron-client relationship’’ (211). Since weaker states can now purchase weapons on the open market, the patron’s ability to influence client behavior is greatly diminished. Generous US military funding runs the risk of creating militarily strong, assertive clients that become more willing to ignore US interests (Mott 2002). Recipient states should be more likely to defy the United States if they believe that the United States will be unable or unwilling to punish them for defection (Walt 2005). US dependence on recipient states for oil, troop basing, over-flight permission, counternarcotic and counterterrorism operations, etc… makes withdrawing aid potentially more costly for the United States than for the aid recipients. It may be easier for aid recipients to find alternative suppliers than it would be for the United States to find an equally valuable place to base its troops.

### S – Security Cooperation

#### Security Cooperation with religiously fractious states cause crackdown on political dissidents and incites religious conflict

Bushey 17, J.D., SUNY Buffalo Law School, Buffalo, New York, 2007 (Adam, “GOVERNANCE: THE MISSING INGREDIENT IN SECURITY COOPERATION,”

Well-intentioned SC/SA programming can harm partner nations in four ways. First, the U.S. could negatively affect the rights and protections of citizens within a country if there is a lack of transparency and checks and balances in the defense institutions. 160 For example, when DOD has ignored host nation corruption in the past, which has had detrimental results. As written in 2016 by Lieutenant General H. R. McMaster, current U.S. National Security Advisor, “Paradoxically, avoiding state building or sidestepping the political causes of state weakness in the hope of avoiding costly or protracted commitments often increases costs and extends efforts in time.”161 In fragile states, the government often does not have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Therefore, the default in fragile states is often self-protection forces and other powerbrokers providing security, distributing aid, delivering justice, and supplying jobs in lieu of government intervention. They operate along ethnic, religious, or tribal lines and are frequently under political protection. While U.S. assistance to self-protection forces may secure short-term gains, such as in Afghanistan, these forces over the long run often exploit weaknesses in the political and economic systems, and “have a tendency to evolve into predatory groups, attacking external enemies while extorting or preying upon their own community.”162 Such extortion and corruption actually reinforce ethnic, religious, and other divisions that fuel cycles of violence, thereby making peace more difficult and prolonging the need for international forces. Instead, foreign assistance should be used to support the government in displacing these groups. While this thesis does not address conflict countries, it should be noted that in 2014, DOD concluded that the United States’ initial support of warlords in Afghanistan created an environment that exacerbated criminal patronage networks and fostered corruption, which ultimately had significant unintended consequences for U.S. strategy.163 Second, harm can be done by empowering a military that already has undue influence in a country without also strengthening oversight institutions. Unmatched military assistance to an already militarized society may tip the scales of power and permit the military to act as a tool to “suppress democratic opposition or movements.”164 In fact, “a coup or attempted coup occurred once every four months in Latin America (1945-1972), once every seven months in Asia (1947-1972), [and] once every three months in the Middle East (1949-1972).”165 There have been forty-four coups in West Africa alone over the last fifty years.166 Not all of these coups were antidemocratic, not all were successful, and not all of them were even against democratically elected regimes. Nonetheless, the point remains that if SC/SA programs followed the framework of other U.S. Government foreign assistance initiatives, security sector programs would be part of a multidimensional effort, and would incorporate systematic assessments and simultaneously address weak government policies, inadequate laws, or poorly functioning legislatures to counterbalance any assistance given to a military with a misbalance of power. It is USAID’s position that when legislative committee and bill drafter capacity is increased, additional checks and balances on overly powerful executives or corrupt ministries of defense can be established as an additional oversight body to safeguard against power-grabs.167

### S – AT Cooperation Turn – General

#### Security cooperation causes anti-alignment from recipient states. It triggers allied aggression and entrapment

Sullivan 11, Professor at UNC-Chapel Hill, with Brock Tessman, Assistant Professor at Georgia and Xiaojun Li, PhD in Political Science from Stanford (Patricia, “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation,” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, No. 7)

The United States spends more than eleven billion dollars per year on direct military assistance to foreign governments and substate groups (USAID 2009). The American government expresses a wide variety of goals motivating their use of military assistance as a foreign policy tool. Frequently, US administrations have explicitly linked military aid or arms transfers to a quid-pro-quo expectation of compliance from a government (Sislin 1994). More generally, military assistance is expected to augment US national security by increasing recipient state cooperation with US objectives. According to the State Department's 2007 Report to Congress: Section 1206(f) of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act:

Security cooperation remains a critical foreign policy tool that allows the United States to advance its national security interests worldwide…. Building partner nation security capacity is one of the most important strategic requirements for the United States to promote international security, advance U.S. interests and prevail in the war against terrorism (1).

Importantly, the policies that guide the provision of US military aid have changed significantly in recent years. Shortly after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the Bush administration sent Congress an antiterrorism bill that would have lifted all restrictions on military aid and arms transfers to foreign governments in cases where such assistance could “help fight terrorism” (Federation of American Scientists 2002, 1). The provision specifically called for lifting bans on counterterrorism aid for states with a history of human rights abuses or noncooperation on counterterrorism.1 The bill was eventually modified to include “sunset clauses” and some requirements for Congressional oversight, but it initiated a year of radical changes in the way US military aid was allocated, restricted, and justified. In 2002, Congress amended the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, removing Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan from a list of states barred from receiving US arms transfers. The United States has also extended military aid to Pakistan, the Philippines, Turkey, Georgia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Oman, Yemen, Uzbekistan, and Columbia, among others, in the name of rewarding or encouraging cooperation in the fight against terrorism (DSCA News Releases, 2002–2008).

What are the consequences of US military aid in a rapidly changing, unpredictable global security environment? In this study, we systematically investigate the effects of US military assistance on recipient state behavior toward the United States between 1990 and 2004. Our analysis improves upon existing studies in several ways. First, we develop three competing, clearly defined, and falsifiable theoretical models of the relationship between military aid and recipient state behavior. These models—Arms for Influence, Lonely Superpower, and Reverse Leverage—range from a conventional understanding of US military aid as a way to buy cooperation from the recipient state to a more counterintuitive assessment of US aid as a sign of American dependence on the recipient government for the provision of some foreign policy good. Second, our focus on the post-Cold War era allows us to measure recipient state compliance using events data rather than the UN voting records that most studies rely on. Third, we employ multiple statistical methods in order to match our empirical models to the hypotheses we are testing. For example, a number of our hypotheses predict a reciprocal relationship between military aid and cooperation or anticipate selection effects. To address these challenges, we use both a simultaneous equations model with fixed effects and a two-stage Heckman model. Finally, we control for pre-existing preference similarity between the United States and aid recipients in our empirical analyses, so that our results capture the influence military aid has on recipient state behavior independent of any dyadic predisposition toward cooperation or conflict.

Our research is relevant to larger academic debates about the utility and limitations of foreign aid as a policy instrument. We attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of foreign aid, and security assistance more specifically, in terms of its ability to move recipients toward more cooperative foreign policies. We test the conventional “arms for influence” explanation of military aid but find that the relationship between US assistance and recipient state behavior is considerably more complicated. In general, we find that military aid does not lead to more cooperative behavior on the part of recipient states. With limited exceptions, increasing levels of US aid are linked to a significant reduction in cooperative foreign policy behavior with the United States. US reaction to recipient state behavior is also somewhat counterintuitive; instead of using a carrot-and-stick approach to military aid allocations, our results show that increased recipient state cooperation is likely to lead to subsequent reductions in US military assistance.

The results of our inquiry also have implications for US foreign policy. Policymakers and military advisors invariably justify military assistance to foreign governments on the basis of an expectation that providing military aid to these governments will increase US influence over the recipients' foreign or domestic policies. In the 1980s, despite concerns about Pakistan's efforts to develop nuclear weapons, the Reagan administration began providing direct military assistance to Pakistan and funneling money and weapons to Afghan rebels through Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The primary objective was to support Islamic insurgents fighting the USSR and the Soviet-backed government of Afghanistan. And, in one important sense, the US policy was a tremendous success. The Afghan rebels prevailed and the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan—a result some attribute directly to US assistance and, more specifically, to the highly accurate FIM-92 Stinger Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs) the US provided. However, several hundred of the Stinger missiles are unaccounted for, and Osama bin Laden is thought to have procured a number of Stingers and other SAMs with which he could target US military or civilian aircraft (Jane's Intelligence Review). Moreover, the Pakistan Army's Inter-Services Intelligence diverted an unknown quantity of US arms and assistance to groups it considered less threatening to Pakistan than the Afghan mujahedeen—including some radically anti-US Islamic factions (Debate in US House, June 22, 2001). After a total ban on military assistance to Pakistan throughout the 1990s, the United States resumed providing billions of dollars of military assistance and arms to Pakistan after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (Grimmett 2009). And, once again, there are concerns that Pakistan is channeling some of the money to extremist groups on its border with India. Perhaps more seriously, the ISI remains closely linked to the Taliban militants the American military is fighting in Afghanistan (Gopal 2008; Mazzetti and Schmitt 2009; Murphy 2010).

#### Military support causes more defiance

Sullivan 11, Professor at UNC-Chapel Hill, with Brock Tessman, Assistant Professor at Georgia and Xiaojun Li, PhD in Political Science from Stanford (Patricia, “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation,” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, No. 7)

In this paper, we attempted a systematic investigation into the relationship between US military aid and the level of foreign policy cooperation exhibited by the states that receive that aid. We aimed to improve on the existing literature by building and testing three explicit theoretical models (Arms for Influence, Lonely Superpower and Reverse Leverage), focusing on a new measure of cooperation generated from events data rather than UN voting records, and controlling for preference similarity, so that our results capture the influence military aid has on recipient state behavior independent of any dyadic predisposition toward cooperation or conflict.

We test seven hypotheses associated with three different theoretical models and find mixed results. There is little evidence in favor of the Arms for Influence model: there is an inverse relationship between absolute levels of US military aid and recipient state cooperation, and there is no relationship at all between recipient state dependence on US aid and recipient state behavior. Thus, while the Lonely Superpower hypothesis was on the right track by predicting an unorthodox relationship between aid and cooperation, it did not perform as well as some of the Reverse Leverage hypotheses when it came to explaining exactly what form such unorthodoxy would take.

In several ways, the Reverse Leverage model was quite accurate: (i) states receiving military aid from the United States exhibit lower levels of cooperation than states that do not receive military aid, (ii) in the population of all states, higher levels of military aid appear to produce more defiant behavior, and (iii) the United States does not punish defiance with reductions in aid or reward greater cooperation with increases in military aid. Together, these results suggest that US military assistance is allocated for reasons that are largely independent of overall recipient state behavior toward the United States. The Reverse Leverage model contends that military aid is delivered to states that the United States depends on for security reasons. Realizing their leverage over Washington, states that receive high amounts of aid are actually more able to engage in uncooperative behavior than are states that the United States does not depend so heavily upon. We attempted to test for the effects of an aid recipient's “security value” directly by comparing US allies to nonallies. Consistent with the Reverse Leverage model, we find that states with a defensive alliance with the United States are more likely to receive US military aid but less likely to respond to aid by increasing their cooperation with American preferences.

#### Studies!

Sullivan 11, Professor at UNC-Chapel Hill, with Brock Tessman, Assistant Professor at Georgia and Xiaojun Li, PhD in Political Science from Stanford (Patricia, “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation,” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, No. 7)

In the results from equation 1, we see that, contrary to Hypothesis 1a (Arms for Influence), but consistent with Hypothesis 3b (Reverse Leverage), there is a significant, negative correlation between levels of US military aid and recipient state cooperation. Economic aid, on the other hand, appears to have no effect on recipient state cooperation. The recipient country's GDP and S score are also not correlated with a state's behavior toward the United States. Recipient states that are democratic, and those that have US troops stationed on their soil, appear to be more cooperative with the United States, all else equal.

Table 3 presents results from using equation 1 to simulate the substantive impact of the statistically significant independent variables on recipient state cooperation. States that do not receive any US military aid display an average level of cooperation with the United States of +1.5 when all other variables are held constant at their means. The model predicts that states that obtain the average amount of US military aid ($20 million) will be less cooperative—scoring an average of −11 on the cooperation-conflict scale. An increase in US military aid to one standard deviation above the mean leads to an additional six-point reduction in the monthly cooperation score of the recipient state. In contrast, an increase in the number of US troops from its mean to one standard deviation above the mean raises recipient state cooperation almost one point. Democratic recipients are on average four points more cooperative than nondemocratic recipients.

### S – AT Cooperation Turn – Specific

#### Every Turkish conflict in the Middle East proves Western appeasement is met with Turkish adventurism.

BPC 16. Bipartisan Policy Center, “Beyond the Myth of Partnership: Rethinking U.S. Policy Toward Turkey”, Bipartisan Policy Center, December 2016, https://bipartisanpolicy.org/download/?file=/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/BPC-Turkey-Partnership-Myth.pdf

Myth: Erdogan is a strongman America can work with or appease.

Despite the evidence, it still might be tempting to conclude that Erdoğan could prove to be an authoritarian leader with whom Washington could have a mutually beneficial, transactional relationship—as it did with Egypt’s General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, for example, or even with the Turkish generals who came to power after the country’s 1980 coup. In this light, observers have been tempted to dismiss Erdoğan’s most provocative positions, especially in foreign policy, as rhetoric designed for domestic consumption that does not necessarily reflect Ankara’s actual interests. Yet this optimism misunderstands both the depth and sincerity of Erdoğan’s anti-Western attitudes and the extent to which his populist rhetoric comes to shape policy. This assessment also ignores the extent to which Erdoğan’s consolidation of power makes Turkish policy more erratic, more dependent on Erdoğan’s shifting personal ambitions, and, in many cases, more divorced from reality.12

Erdoğan’s apparently sincere belief that the United States orchestrated a coup attempt against him, for example, is perhaps the most telling example of how deep Erdoğan’s anti-American thinking goes and how easily it can influence Turkish policy. Following the trauma that unfolded on the night of July 15, Turkish government rhetoric—coming from the president, the prime minister, the AKP cabinet, and the pro-AKP media—has argued that the United States backed the effort with a degree of vehemence and consistency that suggests real conviction. Turkey’s labor minister, Süleyman Soylu, was perhaps the most direct, declaring, “America is behind the coup.”13 Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım was only slightly subtler, saying Turkey would “consider itself at war with any country that supports Gülen.”14 Ibrahim Karagül—writing in a newspaper controlled by Erdoğan’s in-laws—went further, arguing without evidence that the United States actually tried to kill the Turkish president. From Erdoğan to ordinary citizens, it seemed impossible that such an event could have unfolded without Washington’s complicity, especially when the coup’s supposed mastermind, Gülen, resides in the United States. In subsequent statements, Turkish officials argued that as long as Washington kept “sheltering” Gülen, it could never be considered a friend of Turkey’s.

The result of this suspicion is that even if the administration tried to reassure Ankara by, say, handing over Gülen, the sense of abiding hostility would remain, creating a fundamental cleaving of interests. More importantly, Erdoğan long ago realized the value of anti-American posturing as a way of mobilizing his base and discrediting his opposition. With Erdoğan trying to consolidate his power as president and fend off the potential fallout from a likely economic crash, this anti-American approach will become even more important to his domestic position.

Yet even absent this unique anti-American dynamic, there is good reason to doubt that appeasement could ever be an effective strategy—especially when Turkish policy is driven by domestic concerns. The story of Turkey’s failed refugee deal with Europe might be the best example of this. When European leaders worked out an arrangement with Ankara in which Turkey would receive financial and political benefits for preventing the flow of Syrian refugees into Europe, many observers denounced it as a cynical capitulation, particularly as European leaders went on to mute their criticism of Erdoğan in order to ensure the deal’s survival.

The German government even allowed a lawsuit to proceed against a comedian who mocked Erdoğan on television.15 But if the deal was cynical, it was also short-lived and short-sighted.16 Turkey’s eagerness to arrest Kurdish politicians and human rights advocates—who, in calling for peace, supposedly supported the PKK—made it impossible to amend Turkey’s anti-terrorism laws to come into compliance with the legal requirements for EU visaliberalization.17 With Turkey refusing to make this change, and, more broadly, persecuting critics and driving the country toward a destabilizing civil conflict, EU officials were confronted with the distinct possibility that allowing Turks to travel to Europe visa-free would result in a new wave of Turkish refugees and asylum seekers in place of the Syrians they were already trying to limit. As a result, the European Union was unable to move forward with the liberalization process, which had been one of the most popular concessions offered by Europe. Turkish politicians responded to this impasse by lashing out at the European Union, condemning Europe’s hypocrisy and supposed support for terrorism.18 Not surprisingly, this reaction only deepened the backlash against the deal among European critics, making it more difficult for pro-inclusion European leaders to further fulfill their end of the agreement, and leaving the deal teetering on the edge of collapse. 19 In short, even when European leaders were willing to look the other way on Erdoğan’s political excesses and sins, it was his very authoritarianism that ended up undermining the security goals they were trying to cooperate with Turkey on.

Europe’s experience, indeed, has been indicative of the results Washington has obtained in its periodic efforts to curtail criticism of Turkish authoritarianism in return for concessions on crucial foreign policy issues. While Washington has inspired considerable anger in Ankara by cooperating with Syrian Kurds in the war against ISIS, it has at the same time tried to assuage that anger by turning a blind eye to Ankara’s blatant assaults on basic freedoms. Vice President Joe Biden’s visit to Turkey at the height of the government’s postcoup purge stood out as a particularly striking example of this approach, especially when he seemed to imply that there was no need for Washington to speak out as no one had actually been executed yet. While in the short run Biden’s silence may have won limited cooperation from Ankara, it has not prevented tensions from escalating over plans for how to take Raqqa from ISIS or over threats to disrupt the operation by targeting Syrian Kurdish forces.20 Indeed, as Ankara has redoubled its crackdown on Kurdish politicians within Turkey, arresting a number of leading members of the pro-Kurdish People’s Democracy Party,21 it has only increased the odds that Turkey’s domestic Kurdish conflict will spill over into Syria and undermine the war against ISIS there. In other words, Washington looked the other way on Turkey’s domestic fight against the PKK in the hope that this would win greater cooperation in Syria, but it is now Ankara’s domestic war with the PKK that is pushing Turkey toward intervening against the YPG.22 Trying to sideline Turkey’s domestic challenges in the hope of securing foreign policy cooperation is a strategy that will only fail.

## T

### Presence = Nukes

#### Military presence includes nuclear missiles

Kelly 22 [(Lidia Kelly author of Reuters in Melbourne) (Editing by Kevin Liffey), “New Russian recruits train in Crimea and near Ukrainian border”, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-defence-ministry-says-newly-mobilised-reservists-begin-training-2022-09-28/>, September 28, 2022] SS TDI

In Kaliningrad, where Russia's large military presence includes nuclear-capable missiles, training began on the Baltic Fleet's base.

"Citizens called up from the reserve are restoring their skills in the operation and maintenance of weapons, and military and special equipment," the ministry said in a statement.

Courses had been also held to improve firing skills and prepare military personnel for "confident actions on the battlefield".

#### Military presence includes Incirlik Air base in Turkey

NVAL ND [(National VA Loans), Largest U.S. Military Bases, <https://www.nationalvaloans.com/us-military/largest-u-s-military-bases/>, No Date] SS TDI

U.S. Military Bases Around the World

The United States military operates bases and facilities in many countries around the world. Some of the countries where the US has a significant military presence include Japan, South Korea, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Turkey, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The US also maintains a number of smaller facilities and bases in other countries. The presence and number of bases can change depending on military operations and diplomatic relations with host countries.

Some examples of US military bases around the world include:

Yokota Air Base in Japan

Osan Air Base in South Korea

Ramstein Air Base in Germany

Aviano Air Base in Italy

RAF Lakenheath and RAF Mildenhall in the United Kingdom

Incirlik Air Base in Turkey

Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar

Camp Arifjan in Kuwait

Naval Support Activity Bahrain

Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates

Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan

Al Asad Airbase in Iraq

#### Military presence includes Incirlik Air base in Turkey

Rubin 20 [(Michael Rubin, Senior Fellow FOR American Enterprise Institute), “Incirlik: Time for the U.S. Military to Leave”, <https://www.aei.org/op-eds/incirlik-time-for-the-u-s-military-to-leave/>, September 17, 2020] SS TDI

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stopped in Cyprus on September 12 amidst heightened tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean while on his way to the Middle East. Shortly before Pompeo arrived, the Cypriot National Guard began a week-long exercise with the U.S. Navy. Senator Ron Johnson, meanwhile, has said the United States is “beefing up” its military presence at Souda Bay on Crete in part because of uncertainty about the future of the U.S. presence at the Incirlik Air Base outside the southern Turkish city of Adana.

#### Incirlik Air base in Turkey has nuclear weapons

NTI 21 [(Nuclear Threat Initiative, Is a nonprofit global security organization focused on reducing nuclear and biological threats imperiling humanity), Turkey Overview, <https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/turkey-overview/#:~:text=As%20part%20of%20NATO's%20nuclear,territory%20at%20Incirlik%20Air%20Base>., Mar 31, 2021] SS TDI

As part of NATO’s nuclear umbrella, Turkey continues to host approximately 50 U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on its territory at Incirlik Air Base. 5 While the Cold War-era B61 bombs serve little military purpose, they provide tangible evidence of a continued American commitment to Turkish security. There is ongoing debate in the policy community about whether the United States should continue to station tactical nuclear weapons in Turkey, given political instability in Turkey and the wider Middle East. 6 However, advocates for the continued presence of the weapons argue that, although they serve little military purpose, they provide tangible evidence of a continued American commitment to Turkish security.

#### Bases in Turkey have nukes

**ERGİN 21** [(Sedat, is a leading Turkish journalist. After graduating from Robert College High School in Istanbul and receiving a B.A. degree in international relations from Faculty of Political Sciences of Ankara University, Ergin has been active in journalism since 1975 when he began to work for Turkish News Agency as a general assignment reporter. He served as diplomatic reporter at daily Cumhuriyet’s Ankara office from 1979 to 1987. Ergin was awarded the prestigious Sedat Simavi Journalism Prize twice (1997 and 2003), as well as the press freedom awards of the Turkish Journalists' Association (2010) and Deutsche Welle (2016).) “What Biden said about nuclear weapons at İncirlik base and what he can do” HurriYet Daily News, May 6 2021. <https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/sedat-ergin/what-biden-said-about-nuclear-weapons-at-incirlik-base-and-what-he-can-do-164487> ] EL TDI

The date was Oct. 16, 2019. A journalist, in front of all cameras, asked Trump the following question: “One of the things that has been exposed by this Turkey situation is that as many as 50 nuclear weapons are at İncirlik Air Base in Turkey. How confident are you of those weapons’ safety?”

“We’re confident,” Trump said, and continued: “We have a great air base there, a very powerful air base.”

#### Bases used to store nukes

**Burns 19** [(Robert, National Security Writer · The Associated Press) “Some worries about nuclear weapons at Turkey base” AP, <https://apnews.com/article/182a2170a1d24ac6b4f0c7242d8ff514>, October 18 2019.] EL TDI

WASHINGTON (AP) — Frayed U.S. relations with Turkey over its incursion in Syria raise a sensitive question rarely discussed in public: Should the United States remove the nuclear bombs it has long stored at a Turkish air base?

## DA – Terror

### 1AR – Turkey Worsens ISIS

#### Turkey worsens ISIS attacks

**Soz 12/12** [(Jiwan Soz is a researcher and journalist specializing in Turkish and minority affairs in the Middle East. He is a member of the French Press Syndicate (SNJ)). “Mazloum Abdi: Turkish Attacks Impact Fight Against ISIS” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 12 2022, <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/88619>] EL TDI

Turkish attacks on northern and eastern Syria have brought the areas controlled by the Autonomous Administration of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the spotlight. The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) is a de facto autonomous region in northern Syria that is made up of several Syrian governorates including Raqqa, Hasaka, Deir Ez-Zor, and Aleppo. The main military force in the region is the SDF which works in close cooperation with the US-led international coalition against ISIS. The SDF is supported by troops from the Russian military police and some units of the Syrian army that were allowed into the area as a result of an agreement with the SDF which followed the Turkish ground incursion of October 2019.

Mazloum Abdi, commander-in-chief of the SDF, discusses the possibility of a new Turkish incursion into areas controlled by AANES. He explains his perspective on how such an attack could imperil the war against ISIS and what Washington and the international coalition should do to prevent it.1

In an exclusive interview for Sada, Commander General Mazloum Abdi of the SDF discusses the impact of an anticipated Turkish offensive in northern Syria.

HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE THE RECENT TURKISH ATTACKS ON NORTHERN AND EASTERN SYRIA?

Since November 20, Turkey has been intensively targeting our regions, our military forces, our civilian population, and our infrastructure with scores of airstrikes, drones, and artillery shelling. In doing so, Turkey is committing war crimes against us and violating international law. The attacks resulted in the deaths of 18 civilians and 17 combatants. They also led to the destruction of 45 vital infrastructure facilities including electricity, oil, gas, and water plants, as well as hospitals and service delivery centers.

HOW DO THESE ATTACKS AFFECT YOUR FIGHT AGAINST ISIS?

We have noticed that there was an increase in the activities of ISIS in conjunction with these attacks. According to our information, ISIS is planning to carry out attacks from the south, taking advantage of the fact that our forces are busy defending the region and protecting the citizens against the Turkish aggression in the north. Thus, any Turkish military escalation against our forces directly leads to an increase in ISIS activity. This is what we have experienced over the past few years.

Also, the Turkish bombardment has recently targeted the security forces responsible for protecting Al-Hol camp which houses more than 55,000 families (some with ties to ISIS fighters), thus depleting the ability of our security and military forces to ensure the safety of the camps and the security of other detention centers. These attacks also incapacitate the humanitarian response and create an insecure situation that threatens stability.

HOW, THEN, DO YOU COUNTER THESE ATTACKS?

We respond to these attacks by peaceful means to prevent a potentially catastrophic war. We have spoken with our friends, partners, and the guarantor powers to stop these attacks and prevent Turkey from carrying out a new ground invasion that will negatively affect all parties and inflame the Syrian-Turkish border region. But, in the event of any ground invasion, our forces will fight to protect our people and defend our areas. We have been, and continue to be, committed to the ceasefire agreements that Russia and the United States reached with Turkey in October 2019.

WHAT, IN YOUR OPINION, ARE TURKEY’S GOALS IN THESE CONTINUOUS ATTACKS THAT TARGET VITAL FACILITIES SUCH AS GAS AND OIL FIELDS?

By targeting vital facilities, Turkey aims to displace the population, bring about demographic changes, and create a permanent state of instability that will benefit terrorist organizations while negatively affecting regional and global security. Turkey wants to create permanent hotbeds of conflict that will undermine the region's long-term security.

BUT WHY WOULD TURKEY WANT TO CREATE SUCH HOTBEDS?

The AANES provides a reasonable governance model for Syrians that gives them hope for a future in which all elements of Syrian society could coexist. The fact that more than one million displaced people from different regions of Syria are now living in areas controlled by AANES is evidence enough. By destroying vital infrastructure in our regions, Turkey seeks to undermine this model of self-administration which now enjoys broad local legitimacy and provides services and security to more than five million Syrians.

WHAT IS THE POSITION OF SYRIAN GOVERNMENT FORCES ON THESE TURKISH ATTACKS? HOW DO YOU COORDINATE?

After the Turkish invasion of the cities of Serekaniye (Ras al-Ayn) and Tal Abyad in 2019, we allowed, in agreement with Russia, some Syrian army units into the Syrian-Turkish border region and into the lines of contact with Turkish forces. These units are deployed on the entire Syrian-Turkish border. However, the ambiguous position of the authorities in Damascus towards the recent Turkish attacks—which basically aim to permanently occupy Syrian territory—is incomprehensible to us.

In the absence of a political solution, the objective of our military coordination with the Syrian army is to prevent a Turkish occupation of Syria. We believe that Syrians must unite in the face of external interference and fight to preserve Syria's territorial integrity.

HAVE YOU RECEIVED ANY ASSURANCES FROM EITHER THE UNITED STATES OR RUSSIA THAT TURKISH MILITARY OPERATIONS, SIMILAR TO THOSE THAT OCCURRED IN 2019, WILL BE DETERRED? AND WILL MOSCOW CONTINUE ITS MEDIATORY ROLE BETWEEN THE SDF AND DAMASCUS?

Both the US and Russia have declared their opposition to any Turkish attack on Syrian territory, and while we commend their position, we do not see it as sufficient to hinder such an attack or to prevent a Turkish ground offensive against northern and eastern Syria.

As for the Russian mediation between us [the SDF] and Damascus, it is ongoing, but there is a need for a political solution to the Syrian crisis. However, what we can see today is that Damascus is not yet ready for such a solution.

THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION IS YOUR PARTNER IN THE FIGHT AGAINST ISIS. WHY DO YOU NOT COORDINATE TO THWART TURKISH ATTACKS?

The role and task of the international coalition forces in Syria is clearly to fight ISIS. We and the international coalition are conducting joint counterterrorism operations in Syria with the sole objective of bringing about the final defeat of this organization. Yet, the Turkish escalation against our regions has long hampered these joint efforts. We have always sought to solve these problems by peaceful methods and means. This is what we attempted in 2019 when we tried to implement a security mechanism on the Syrian-Turkish border that was guaranteed to nullify the Turkish arguments and pretexts, but the Turkish response was to declare war and occupy more of our lands.

Despite the current Turkish escalation, our commitment to eradicate ISIS is unwavering as we continue to work with our partners in the international coalition to achieve common goals.

CAN WASHINGTON, BEING THE LEADER OF THE COALITION, MEDIATE BETWEEN THE SDF AND TURKEY WITH THE AIM OF REACHING A FINAL SOLUTION TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF THE REGION?

Yes, certainly. Washington’s weight on the international stage gives us hope of resolving our problems with Turkey through diplomatic means. We have always been open to dialogue and to the achievement of peace, and that is a principled position for us. We have distinctive relations with the United States with whom we coordinate security and military efforts within the framework of the international campaign to eliminate ISIS. The United States also has security and military relations with Turkey within the framework of NATO. This is particularly advantageous as it affords the United States the influence and capacity to resolve the problems between the SDF and Turkey.

## DA – Assurances

### 1AR – Turkey Non-Uq to Alliance

#### Turkey no longer assures US interests

Cook 18 [(Steven A, Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies and Director of the International Affairs Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholars), “Neither Friend nor Foe”, <https://www.cfr.org/report/future-u.s.-turkey>, Nov 2018] SS TDI

“While Turkey remains formally a NATO ally, it is not a partner of the United States,” writes Steven A. Cook in the Council Special Report Neither Friend nor Foe: The Future of U.S.-Turkey Relations. “Unlike in previous eras, Washington and Ankara no longer share overarching threats or interests that bind them together,” Cook notes.

“[President Recep Tayyip] Erdogan’s consolidation of power and corresponding suppression of journalists, academics, civil society organizations, and minorities” contradicts the underlying principles of American society and Turkey’s own North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership, Cook writes. Diverging policies and perspectives—such as Turkey’s incursion into northern Syria, its intention to purchase an advanced air defense system from Russia, and the arrest of more than a dozen Americans and three Turks employed by the U.S. embassy—have further widened the chasm between the United States and Turkey.

Cook, the Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, also details Turkey’s own list of grievances against the United States, including tariffs on Turkish steel and aluminum after an agreement on the release of Pastor Andrew Brunson fell through in the summer of 2018; U.S. military coordination with the People’s Protection Units (YPG), which the Turkish government claims is part of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), long designated as a terrorist group by the United States; and the refusal of the United States to extradite Fethullah Gulen, whom Ankara blames for the failed July 2016 coup d’état that killed 249 people.

“It is not clear that even with enough diplomatic tenacity, Washington can rebuild trust and strategic ties with Ankara,” Cook cautions. U.S officials should instead work to “manage the change in U.S.-Turkey relations.” Cook advises U.S. policymakers to take the following steps:

Recognize that the United States and Turkey have gone from ambivalent allies to antagonists. “Going forward, the United States needs to adjust its expectations, ask for less, and develop other options.”

Develop alternatives to Incirlik Air Base. “Because Erdogan’s domestic political needs can dictate Turkey’s foreign policy . . . the use of the base to advance U.S. interests is no longer assured. American officials should never again be forced into a position that leaves U.S. security interests vulnerable to the changing interests of Turkish politicians.”

Reject Turkey’s demands that the United States end its military ties with the YPG. The YPG has been “an effective force fighting the Islamic State and stabilizing northeastern Syria.” For the United States to turn its back on the YPG would give Washington a reputation as an unreliable ally.

Take a stronger public stand on Turkish policies that undermine U.S. policy. Specifically, “the United States should end its cooperation with Turkey on the F-35 program.” Turkey’s open undermining of U.S. interests and policies cannot continue to go unchecked while Turkey enjoys "the benefits of America’s most advanced military aircraft.”

“Legislators on both sides of the aisle [in the United States] have an opportunity to make Turks aware of Washington’s anger at Ankara’s mistreatment of Americans, its displeasure over a foreign policy at variance with U.S. interests and goals, and its dismay over Turkey’s transformation into an elected autocracy,” writes Cook. “Washington can work with Ankara where it remains possible, work around the Turks where it is necessary, and work against them where it has to,” the author concludes.

### 1AR – Nukes Not Key

#### Nukes in Turkey do nothing for assurances – allies would actually prefer them out

**Pifer 19** [(Steven, Nonresident Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative) “It’s time to get US nukes out of Turkey” Brookings, November 5, 2019, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/its-time-to-get-us-nukes-out-of-turkey/>] EL TDI

U.S.-Turkish relations have plunged to a new nadir. In the past month, a senior Republican senator has suggested suspending Turkey’s membership in the NATO alliance, while the secretary of state implied a readiness to use military force against America’s wayward ally. In these circumstances, U.S. nuclear weapons have no business in Turkey. It is time to bring them home.

The signs of a strained and deteriorating relationship are hard to miss. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s increasingly autocratic leader, has turned away from both Europe and the United States. He instead is actively cultivating a close relationship with fellow authoritarian Vladimir Putin, as evidenced by their eight meetings just this year.

Erdogan rejected buying U.S. Patriot air defense missiles in favor of Russian S-400s—missiles that are incompatible with NATO’s integrated air defense system. As a result, the United States excluded Turkey from taking part in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, leaving the question of Turkey’s next-generation fighter literally up in the air.

Following President Donald Trump’s rash decision to withdraw the small U.S. military contingent from eastern Syria, Erdogan launched the Turkish army on a major offensive. In doing so, he showed no regard for the Kurdish forces that did so much in collaboration with the U.S. military to destroy ISIS at great cost—some ten thousand Kurdish fighters killed. At one point, Turkish artillery bracketed a position still occupied by U.S. troops. Trump has threatened various sanctions and repeatedly expressed his readiness to “devastate” the Turkish economy.

One other worrying matter. Erdogan says he wants nuclear weapons. In September, he told his political party: “Some countries have missiles with nuclear warheads. But the West insists ‘we can’t have them.’ This, I cannot accept.”

Turkey is not the place to host U.S. nuclear arms.

According to the Federation of American Scientists, the U.S. military maintains 150 B61 nuclear gravity bombs in Europe for use in conflict by the U.S. and certain allied air forces. Reportedly, fifty of those are located at an American facility at the Turkish airbase at Incirlik (bases in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy host the other one hundred). The 39th Weapons Systems Security Group, numbering about five hundred U.S. Air Force personnel, secures and maintains the bombs at Incirlik.

The United States has deployed nuclear weapons in Europe going back to the 1950s, though the number today is drastically lower than the peak of more than seven thousand in the 1970s. The long-stated purpose of these deployments has been to help deter an attack against NATO member states in Europe while reassuring European allies of America’s commitment to their defense.

Ten years ago, many in Europe questioned the need for such forward-basing of U.S. nuclear arms. That talk has become muted as Moscow adopted a belligerent attitude toward the West, and the Russian military seized Crimea and provoked an armed conflict in eastern Ukraine.

Washington and NATO still see a need for American nuclear bombs in Europe. While any use of a nuclear weapon would have a military effect, the Alliance has come to regard these bombs as having primarily a political purpose: deterrence and, should deterrence fail and a conflict break out, to signal (by their use) that matters are about to escalate to potentially horrific levels and thus bring the conflict to an end.

The one hundred B61 bombs deployed at bases in NATO countries other than Turkey can fulfill those requirements. There is no requirement to have U.S. nuclear weapons on the territory of five NATO members in order to deter attack and provide assurance to the twenty-seven European members of the Alliance; that can readily be done with B61 bombs based in four countries.

Moreover, while the U.S., German, Dutch, Belgian and Italian air forces each have dual-capable aircraft certified to carry nuclear weapons and crews trained in nuclear delivery, questions arose some time ago as to whether that is so with the Turkish Air Force. In that case, the most likely scenario in which a Turkish-based nuclear bomb would be used would envisage a U.S. fighter flying into Incirlik, loading a B61 bomb, and then taking off to fly to and strike its target. It would seem much simpler to launch a nuclear-armed U.S. F-16 from its base at Aviano, Italy.

The rationale for maintaining nuclear weapons at Incirlik becomes more dubious by the day. It is time for the U.S. Air Force to bring them home.

## CP – Conditions

### 1AR – Turkey Not Key to NATO

#### Turkey not key to NATO

**Tisdall 2/5** [(Simon Tisdall is a foreign affairs commentator. He has been a foreign leader writer, foreign editor and US editor for the Guardian.) “Turkey’s two-faced ‘sultan’ is no friend of the west. It’s time to play hardball” The Guardian, February 5 2023, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/feb/05/turkeys-two-faced-sultan-is-no-friend-of-the-west-its-time-to-play-hardball>] EL TDI

That Turkey is a “vital strategic ally” of the west is the sort of truism on which people such as Joe Biden and Jens Stoltenberg, Nato’s secretary general, are raised. Yet what if the old saw no longer holds true? What if Turkey’s leader, exploiting this notion, betrays western interests in a pretence of partnership? Should not that leader be treated as a liability, a threat – even ostracised as an enemy?

Geography doesn’t change. Turkey wields significant influence at the crossroads of Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Yet the increasingly aggressive, authoritarian and schismatic policies pursued at home and abroad over two decades by its choleric sultan-president have upended long-cherished assumptions. Turkey’s reliability and usefulness as a trusted western ally is almost at an end.

As the most important Turkish elections in a generation move towards a febrile climax in May, and as the western democracies contemplate critical choices in Ukraine, over Vladimir Putin’s Russia, and in Iran, Syria and Israel-Palestine, these dilemmas boil down to one basic question: is it time to admit that two-faced Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is no friend of the west – and punish him accordingly?

Erdoğan’s blocking of Sweden’s attempt to join Nato is the latest, egregious example of hostile behaviour. He claims Stockholm harbours “terrorists” from the militant Kurdish group the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ party). In truth, his veto stems from his long-running anti-Kurd vendetta, which includes legal moves to close the HDP (Peoples’ Democratic party), the main Kurdish-backed opposition, before the elections. The Nato row now threatens to explode amid a spate of Qur’an burnings, diplomatic protests and violent retaliation.

Erdoğan is also demanding the extradition from Sweden of political refugees, notably Bülent Keneş, former editor-in-chief of the Today Zaman newspaper, whom he accuses of supporting a failed coup in 2016. Intimidatory tactics targeting journalists are part of a broader post-coup drive to stifle public debate, manipulate the constitution, subjugate judges, purge the army and civil service – and strengthen de facto one-man rule.

Using Turkey’s Nato membership for domestic political ends is a typical Erdoğan gambit. Yet it also wilfully obstructs Sweden’s (and Finland’s) legitimate wish to bolster their defences after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, while undermining Nato efforts to show unity and resolve. This is by no means the first time Erdoğan has favoured Moscow over Nato partners.

Erdoğan rejects and circumvents Ukraine-related sanctions. Turkey’s trade with Russia grew by nearly 200% in the six months after the invasion, including higher energy imports. His purchase of Russian surface-to-air missile systems infuriated Washington, which views them as a threat to Nato forces. His posturing as a Ukraine mediator helps Putin maintain the pretence he’s interested in peace.

Erdoğan’s plans to launch another armed invasion of northern Syria fly in the face of US-led efforts to support the anti-Bashar al-Assad democratic opposition and suppress Islamist terrorism. In reality, destabilising incursions and occupations of the Syrian and Iraqi borderlands are yet another extension of Erdoğan’s obsessive war on the Kurds. His prospective rapprochement with Damascus further undercuts western security policy.

In any normal democratic contest, his incompetence would cost him the presidency. But Erdoğan does not do normal

If Erdoğan’s sickening schmoozing of Putin, double-dealing over Ukraine, neo-Ottoman overreaching and on-off aggression towards fellow Nato member Greece are not sufficient proof of bad faith, then consider his other war – on his country’s democracy. Human rights abuses aside, Erdoğan has made a huge mess of Turkey’s economy. Inflation is at 58%, living standards are plummeting. More than 70% of 18 to 25-year-olds say they would prefer to live elsewhere.

In any normal democratic contest, such incompetence would cost him the presidency and his AK (Justice and Development) party’s parliamentary majority. But Erdoğan does not do normal. In recent weeks, he has increased the national minimum wage by 55%, lowered the retirement age, boosted public sector salaries, and expanded loan and debt-forgiveness programmes. It’s a blatant, state-funded attempt to buy votes.

At the same time, Erdoğan appears bent on eliminating presidential rivals. The HDP’s best-known leader, Selahattin Demirtaş, is already in jail. And if Erdoğan has his way, he will soon be joined by Ekrem İmamoğlu, Istanbul’s popular mayor and a leading light of the main CHP (Republican People’s party) opposition. İmamoğlu is appealing against a politically inspired prison sentence and faces a range of additional trumped-up charges.

Electoral bribes and political skulduggery, unchallenged by state-controlled media and obscured by a climate of fear, point to another Erdoğan victory. Six opposition parties, joined together in a new Nation Alliance grouping, issued a manifesto last week vowing, among many other things, to curb presidential powers. But they have yet to agree on a standard-bearer – and without the HDP, polls suggest, they will not win a parliamentary majority.

All of which leads back to the original question: what should the western democracies do about Erdoğan, assuming he wins again? More sanctions, including on him personally, are one possibility. US senators suggest that Ankara may be denied F-16 fighter jets promised by Biden if it continues to sabotage Nato. Stalled EU membership talks could be formally frozen, indefinitely. Yet, to get Erdoğan’s attention, any punitive measures will need to go further.

Overcautious, risk-averse Biden and Stoltenberg must let go of old, discredited thinking. They should remind Erdoğan that Nato is a community of values as well as rules; welcome Sweden and Finland into the alliance via a vote of all 30 members; and suspend Turkey’s membership, if necessary by amending the North Atlantic treaty. If he doesn’t like it, well, tough.

Turkey inhabits a rough neighbourhood. No one expects torrents of peace and love from its leaders. And it could be a valued ally again. But Turkey is not indispensable. If need be, the western democracies can live safely without it – until that happy day dawns when Ankara’s cantankerous sultan is finally defenestrated and debagged.

### 1AR – Say No

#### Turkey will not make reforms—frozen EU application proves

Kirişci 21 [(Kemal, Nonresident Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe, The Turkey Project), “Biden’s exclusion of Erdoğan from the democracy summit may be a blessing in disguise for Turkey”, <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9806/>, December 8, 2021] SS TDI

The AKP in power

Since coming into power in 2002, Erdoğan and the AKP have dominated politics in Turkey and have shifted the country away from the secularism embedded in the early years of the Republic. Erdoğan’s governments have also curbed the role of the military. which had previously intervened to remove civilian governments in Turkey, most recently in 1980.

Early reforms introduced by the government reduced the military’s role in civilian affairs. These were part of a package to prepare Turkey to meet the criteria for EU membership. However, in 2007, the military warned it might intervene again to protect secularism in Turkey. Long running trials from 2008 to 2013 saw several former military officers prosecuted for leading a clandestine network with the aim of overthrowing the government. Journalists and opposition politicians were also charged. Some received life sentences, including the former chief of staff of the armed forces. However, the convictions were later overturned by the constitutional court.

In 2008, the constitutional court ruleded that the AKP was guilty of seeking to undermine secularism in Turkey and imposed a fine, although the state prosecutor had sought a ban on the party and its leading political figures including Erdoğan. This followed attempts by the AKP to lift the ban on the wearing of the hijab in universities. The Government lifted the ban on the hijab across state institutions in 2013.

Initially the AKP pursued pro-market economic reforms and other reforms, including full abolition of the death penalty, to support Turkey’s application to join the EU. EU accession negotiations began in 2005 but made little progress and were eventually frozen in 2018 because of EU concerns about the functioning of the democratic system in Turkey, respect for fundamental rights and independence of the judiciary.

In recent years concerns have mounted, both domestically and internationally, about a shift towards more authoritarian practices under Erdoğan. Following an attempted coup against the Turkish government in July 2016, the government declared a state of emergency that suspended some of the normal functions of the constitution. Over 100,000 people were arrested and 130,000 state employees were dismissed, while thousands of educational institutions and nongovernmental organisations were shut down.

The government blamed the attempted coup on the followers of the exiled Islamic preacher Fethullah Gülen. The AKP initially worked closely with the Gülenists to move Turkey away from its previous secular establishment. The AKP later blamed the Gülenists for instigating corruption allegations. The state crackdown following the attempted coup was viewed as also targeting a range of opponents and critics who had no connection with the Gülenists.

Under constitutional reforms approved by referendum in 2017, the president took on a greater executive role and the role of prime minister was abolished. Turkey effectively transitioned from being a parliamentary democracy to a presidential model. The Council of Europe’s advisory group on constitutional matters warned that the new presidential model lacked the necessary checks and balances to prevent authoritarian rule.

Conflict with Kurds

The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) launched an insurgency against the Turkish state in 1984, with the resulting conflict costing nearly 40,000 lives. In his early years in power Erdoğan made some concessions towards Kurdish demands for greater cultural rights, and there have been periodic ceasefires. Following a resumption in hostilities, around 2,000 people were reportedly killed in the context of security operations in Kurdish areas of southeast Turkey in 2015 and 2016. A United Nations reports referred to an excessive use of force by state forces, involving killings, enforced disappearances and torture. Turkey also launched military actions against Kurdish groups in Iraq and Syria.

The emergency powers following the coup in 2016 were also used to target Kurdish groups and politicians. Several members of parliament, local mayors and the co-leaders of the main Kurdish political party, the People’s Democratic Party (HDP), were arrested. The constitutional court is currently considering a case brought by the state prosecutor to close down the HDP.

International concerns

International organisations have expressed concerns about developments in Turkey. In 2017, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) placed Turkey under a monitoring procedure until “serious concerns” about respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law were addressed. A report by the United Nations Human Rights Hight Commissioner in 2018 also expressed concern about the deterioration of the human rights situation and the erosion of the rule of law in Turkey.

Turkey was also criticised in 2021 by the Council of Europe, EU, USA for withdrawing Turkey from the Council of Europe Istanbul Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence.

In December 2022, the EU criticised a prison sentence for the opposition mayor of Istanbul, as a “major setback for democracy in Turkey” and called on Turkey to “reverse the continuous backsliding on human rights and rule of law”. In March 2023, the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers (Foreign Ministers of the Member States) reiterated calls for the release of former HDP co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş, and activist Osman Kavala, following European Court of Human Rights’ judgments in their cases.

#### Turkey too populist for democratic reforms to work

**Werz 5/31** [(Michael, Senior Fellow DEPARTMENT National Security and International Policy) “Erdoğan’s Reelection Illustrates the Bleak Future of Turkish Democracy” Center for American Progress May 31 2023, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/erdogans-reelection-illustrates-the-bleak-future-of-turkish-democracy/>] EL TDI

Turkey’s presidential and parliamentary elections did not bring the change that many advocates of democracy and accountability have championed. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared himself winner on the evening of Sunday, May 28, in a close and unprecedented run-off vote after securing a comfortable majority in the new parliament for his conservative block during first round elections two weeks ago.

The opposition could not seize what may have been its best chance to save democracy, despite decidedly optimistic assessments by the major polling institutes. The predicted voter turnout in the first round on May 14 was significantly higher than anticipated, exceeding 88 percent. Turkey saw unprecedented political mobilization, partly because going to the ballot box offered one of the last opportunities to make one’s voice heard. But little changed.

The May 14 vote resulted in a dramatic defeat at the parliamentary level for the democratic anti-Erdoğan alliance (also contrary to the pollsters’ figures). Three candidates fought for the presidency: President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (AKP) achieved 49.5 percent; opposition leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu (CHP) won 45 percent; and ultranationalist Sinan Oğan gained just more than 5 percent. Hopes for a newly democratic Turkey were almost certainly read the last rites after the first round. With Oğan’s support moving to the AKP in the May 28 second-round election, the final vote count represented the end of the dreams of most democracy advocates.

Despite the electoral process, the elections were neither free nor fair. The power of the state apparatus, the judiciary, and the media—concentrated in the hands of the AKP—proved insurmountable, even though claims of a rigged voting process were not particularly strong. Turkey’s regime suppresses civil society organization; aggressively curbs the work of international NGOs and universities; and it is responsible for extremely high levels of jailed journalists.

The opposition parties had established the broadest political coalition imaginable—perhaps too broad. One of the encouraging results of this unique alliance was that it forced voters to act pragmatically: The national-conservative IYI party—whose leader, Meral Akşener, was visibly uncomfortable campaigning with her coalition partners—had to enter an alliance with Kurds and leftists. And the social-democratic Kemalist CHP not only nominated a presidential candidate from the Alevi minority—Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu—but CHP supporters also had to digest his highly symbolic speech in which he openly admitted his origins, thus challenging the notion of a homogeneous Turkish nationality. Such a distancing from the rigidly secular traditions of his party was historical; the video of his speech was viewed well over 100 million times. One positive consequence was the courageous election campaign that Kurds waged on behalf of the CHP in the metropolis of Diyarbakir and other Kurdish regions, where the CHP had formerly been perceived as the arch enemy.

In the weeks leading up to the election and in the face of promising opinion polls, such pragmatic behavior appeared to indicate an election outcome that would likely improve relations between Turkish society and Europe as well as the broader global arena.

However, the results turned out differently. Despite a disastrous economic situation; skyrocketing inflation; a devastating earthquake with more than 55,000 fatalities; and a negligent government response, the elections were not winnable for the coalition of secular and democratic parties.

The ethnoreligious mélange of the AKP campaign still proved irresistible to many voters and is related to the dramatic social and cultural change within the lifetime of a generation, including substantial migration from rural to urban areas. In the 1950s, only about 18 percent of Turks lived in cities; today, the urbanization rate is about 85 percent. The experience of rapid urbanization and the migration of rural population groups to metropolitan centers appears to have left its mark on people: Cultural and personal disorientation generate longings for reliable reference points. Erdoğan represents the memory of lost traditions during an era of senseless construction and industrialization.

During the election campaign, the AKP reduced Turkish cities’ dramatic and often overwhelming transformation to a simple equation: diversity, migrants, gay individuals, and Kurds were to blame. In that narrative, it is not the modern economy and AKP corruption that are spreading but, rather, incompatible minorities of various stripes. The opposition focused on “inclusion” instead as a counter-model—tolerant, future-oriented, and enlightened—but that message failed to win a majority under conditions of such sophisticated repression.

Interestingly, the AKP’s long-standing practice of limiting freedom of expression, curbing academic independence, suppressing civil society organizations, and continued clientelism did not put off many of its core urban, middle-class supporters. In addition, first-time voters made surprising decisions: 5 million Turks voted for the first time on May 14, out of a total of 65 million voters. This is a generation that was born into the economic boom of the first decade of the century and is now experiencing systemic crises. Nevertheless, there was no sufficiently intense mood for change in this group. However, the legitimate discussion of Turkish authoritarianism must consider that the country is not comparable to Syria, Azerbaijan, or Belarus. Turkish society is multilayered, complex, and, with 84 million inhabitants, one of the 20-largest nations in the world.

Why significant sections of the urban middle classes rejected political change at the ballot box despite the deterioration of the rule of law—paired with rampant corruption and clientelism—requires deep analysis. This is all the more true since the younger generation will pay an exceptionally high price for the AKP’s continued governance, particularly its fiscal mismanagement. In addition, Turkey will lose its demographic bonus within the next 15 years when society begins to age rapidly. The parallelism of authoritarian dominance, militaristic foreign policy, politically motivated social programs, free health insurance, and aging could all combine to drive an exodus of young, qualified Turks, which is likely to severely harm Turkey’s long-term economy.

Elections play an essential role in President Erdoğan’s dominant positioning because his victories legitimize his claim to power and targeted repressive action against the opposition. Votes underscore public support and are essential in a highly differentiated, undemocratic system that goes to great lengths to claim democratic credentials that, in reality, do not exist. And they immunize the president against international criticism. In a CNN interview after the election, Erdoğan replied to a comment in which President Biden had called him an autocrat: “Would a dictator ever participate in a runoff election?”

In times of high inflation and economic problems, Erdoğan could not credibly claim he was protecting the material interests of his political clientele. Instead, it became apparent during the election campaign that Erdoğan pivoted to addressing the immaterial needs of his voters. Culture war and nationalism were and still are his most successful tools in appealing to a profoundly nationalistic and conservative country. Contrary to popular belief, nativism is more prominent in the AKP than religious conservatism. Most AKP voters do not have Islamist political convictions. A significant minority of “compassionate Islamists” exists within the AKP coalition, whom the president and party leader loudly supplies with religious edification rhetoric. In addition, he has once again pushed the “restless conservatives”—a term coined by pollster Can Selcuki—into his camp. These are petty-bourgeois and often religious conservatives who were catapulted from the periphery of Turkish society into its economic and political center during the modernization phase of the past two decades. Five million new jobs were created in Turkey in the three years following the 2008 financial crisis alone.

However, mobilizing anti-Western and anti-refugee resentment proved even more critical and effective. Opposition leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu also uses a similar rhetoric. Along with Europe, Turkey has also moved to the political right because of the accelerated influx of refugees, mainly from Syria and Afghanistan after 2015. Erdoğan campaigned on a “Turkey First” platform, not unlike Trump’s 2020 campaign in the United States, suggesting a supposed defense of culture and country. In addition, Erdoğan’s international recognition, especially in undemocratic states, and his political influence outside Turkey nourish his domestic political ambitions.

For Erdoğan, the attempted coup against him in July of 2016 (the background of which is still unclear) has become a central reference point of a new national myth: a self-referential approach to the world that sees Turkey as the natural leader of the Muslim cosmos, bundled in the slogan, “Not West, not East, we are Turkey.” Erdogan’s election campaign leaned into patriotic displays. A militaristic technology show with fighter jets and a half-finished aircraft carrier was brought forward; the country’s first (still unfinished) nuclear power plant was inaugurated together with Vladimir Putin; and, at the same time, calls were made from minarets to attend Erdoğan rallies.

The outlook for Turkish democracy is bleak. The fact that the AKP was still able to score points with the issue of “religious oppression” and that this also caught on with urban millennials shows the enormous reach of populist indoctrination. Another often neglected phenomena is women’s high voter turnout and relatively low integration into the labor market. Only one-third of Turkish women are employed, while the global average is more than 50 percent. The rest spend the day at home, where they are more likely exposed to the AKP’s constant media barrage. Election researchers have calculated that the various state TV channels broadcast Erdoğan a combined total of about 32 hours in April in the lead-up to the election, while his opponent Kılıçdaroğlu had only 32 minutes.

The election victory for the incumbent president on May 28 shows that he was able to win the missing votes from the extreme nationalist fringe of Oğan’s supporters. Under his government, Turkey has moved further to the right, so the AKP is now forced to adapt to this development. Oğan’s quick endorsement of Erdoğan would have been unthinkable only a few years ago. This principle also applies on the religious side: Hüda-Par, the legal wing of Hezbollah in Turkey, is an official ally of the AKP and is represented in the new parliament.

Erdoğan—the entire election campaign was focused on him alone—has achieved a sociological and political coup in recent years. He managed to place himself in the imperial Muslim tradition of the Ottoman Empire and, at the same time, appropriates the secular nationalism of the state’s founder Kemal Atatürk. Both traditions converge in the widespread resentment against the European Union, the United States, and “the West.” For the upcoming debates on relations with Turkey that will begin in Europe and the United States, it is essential to acknowledge that Erdoğan does not want to be a member of the “Democratic Club” because it does not benefit him. The same is true for a critical review of U.S.-Turkey policies after President Obama’s groundbreaking Turkey visit and his offer of a “strategic partnership” in 2009 that emphasized regional security and shied away from pushing harder for freedom of speech and human rights.

Democracy is dying a slow death in Turkey, and difficult years lie ahead, but the opposition has also shown that many Turks support a modern country. These people deserve the solidarity of the United States, Europe, and other allies of democratic accountability.

## CP – Sanctions

### 1AR – Sanctions Fail Generic

#### Empirics — Turkey ignored threats.

AFP '20 [AFP; December 25; International news agency headquartered in Paris; The Moscow Times, "Turkey Rejects U.S. Pressure Over Russian Air Defense System," <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/10/24/turkey-rejects-us-pressure-over-russian-air-defense-system-a71845>] TDI

Turkey on Saturday dismissed U.S. criticism that the Russian defense systems it has bought are not compatible with Ankara's NATO commitments.

The Pentagon on Friday strongly condemned the first test of a Russian-made S-400.

"We have been clear and unwavering in our position: an operational S-400 system is not consistent with Turkey's commitments as a U.S. and NATO ally," said U.S. Department of Defense spokesman Jonathan Hoffman.

But Turkey stood by its decision Saturday, insisting it was meeting its NATO commitments.

"Turkey's goal is not upset anyone but to ensure its people's security," defense ministry spokesperson Sebnem Aktop said in a statement.

The S-400 test came despite repeated warnings of sanctions from the U.S. State Department if the system was activated.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Friday confirmed the first test of the S-400 defense system saying: "We are not going to ask America for permission."

### 1AR – Sanctions Fails = Refugee Crisis

#### Sanctions fail and cause a refugee crisis — exacerbates terrorism and decreases energy security.

Orbán '22 [Tamás; October 8; Senior research fellow at the Danube Institute, IR from Babeş–Bolyai University in Kolozsvár; Hungary Conservative, "Why Sanctioning Turkey Is Probably a Bad Idea," https://www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/current/why-sanctioning-turkey-is-probably-a-bad-idea/] TDI

Now the EU wants to force Turkey to hop on its bandwagon of predictably terrible choices. As many politicians, such as Viktor Orbán. have already pointed out, the Western sanctions have had no significant effect whatsoever – at least not on Russia, since they pretty much ruined Europe’s already weakened economies. The solution? Get more countries to join and maybe the joint pressure could become big enough to force Putin into a corner. That’s why they need Ankara, a country with a sizeable population and major economic connections to Russia to fall in line. After all, EU candidates should follow Brussels out of sheer respect, shouldn’t they?

Turkey is also a member of NATO, although its commitment to the Alliance is questionable at best, for all the reasons I outlined above. It views NATO as the defensive alliance it is, and refuses to be bullied into economic decisions by the group, just like in the case of the EU. Turkish officials have stated many times that they fully support Ukraine’s independence and sovereignty, but ‘as a matter of principle’, Turkey ‘exclusively joins sanctions that are imposed by the United Nations’.

According to the Financial Times, the EU Commission plans to heavily sanction Turkey over its deepening ties with Russia as a response to Erdogan and Putin’s meeting just days ago. At the meeting, the leaders agreed to maintain (and even expand some of) the mutually beneficial areas of cooperation between their nations, primarily in the fields of energy, finance, agriculture and industry. Western official– and rightly so–fear that Russia may use the opportunities provided by the relatively robust Turkish economy to circumvent some of the sanctions imposed on it, and therefore the EU plans to “punish” Ankara with the next package of sanctions.

Now, endless arguments can be engaged in about whether Turkey’s overly pragmatic approach to EU sanctions and the war in Ukraine was morally correct or not, but that would be counterproductive at this point, since the question of whether the Western sanctions would work if more countries (like Turkey) joined needs to be addressed instead. And the answer to the question is probably no, they would not. Regarding Turkey, it is a sovereign country that decides to act in pursuit of its best-perceived interests. And to be fair, so does the EU if it goes forward with its plans to sanction Turkey. So the final questions remain: is it worth it? Ankara has been having the upper hand over Brussels when it comes to threats for quite a few years now, and for one particular reason: it could flood Europe with migrants whenever it wishes to do so.

Between 2016 and 2020, the EU signed eight contracts for €6 billion in exchange for Turkey to manage and keep the migration crisis inside its borders. At the present moment, Turkey hosts nearly four million refugees on its soil, who primarily came from Syria and other parts of the Middle East during and after the 2015 European migration crisis. The years that followed saw many European governments facing enormous backlash for their participation in the Willkommenskultur, terrorist attacks felt like commonplace in Western Europe and the general atmosphere heavily shifted the whole political paradigm of the West – resulting in Brexit, for instance. And that was only one and a half million refugees. Now imagine it happening again–once Turkey has had enough of us–with significantly bigger numbers. Not only the four million currently in the country but also the countless masses that will predictably arrive in the next couple of months due to the worsening global energy and food situation may end up in Europe.

And no, I don’t advocate for giving in to Turkish blackmail at all; in such dire times, that would be a sign of weakness Europe simply cannot afford. Instead, we should reconsider our entire strategy toward the war in Ukraine. The sanctions don’t work, and this kind of aggressive solution seems to just birth more problems along the road and we have no idea how long the whole conflict will drag on. Europe doesn’t have too much time, unfortunately. Unless we end the war–and end it soon–Europe will crumble under the weight of the current energy crises by the end of the year. Therefore, let us come together and find a peace agreement that’s acceptable for all. Otherwise, we not only risk freezing this winter, but possibly the start of a second and much more serious migration crisis. Europeans won’t care what Turkey or others did or didn’t do – the responsibility to act falls solely on Brussels and the time to act is now.

### 1AR – Sanctions Collapses Economy

#### if sanctions are successful, it collapses the global economy

Antonopoulos '20 [Paul; September 20; Project Director and a Research Fellow on MENA and Latin America Studies at the Center for Syncretic Studies; Greek City Times, "If the Turkish economy collapses, banks in Europe will 'fall'," <https://greekcitytimes.com/2020/09/20/if-the-turkish-economy-collapses-banks-in-europe-will-fall/>]

A report in German newspaper Die Welt by Holger Zschäpitz, titled “Erdogan has strong allies especially in Europe,” wrote that the current Turkish “economic problems may be due to itself, but they could spread to Europe and become a problem for the West.”

The subtitle of the article says “Europe’s financial institutions must fear the collapse of Turkey. Many of them are still involved in the country with billions of Euros, and the West has a lot to lose. This makes sanctions more difficult – and strengthens President Erdogan’s authoritarian position.”

Effectively, due to the intimate economic relations between Western Europe, particularly Germany, with Turkey, it makes it difficult for sanctions to be applied despite Turkey’s constant violations and threats against European Union member states Greece and Cyprus.

“At first glance, it seems that Recep Tayyip Erdogan is completely alone. Completely alone against the power of the markets, which do not have a good view of him and his economic policy, which long ago degraded his country to the ‘level of garbage.’ But there are strong players who support it indirectly – why they have to do it – because they have a common destiny with him,” wrote Zschäpitz.

“These are the European banks which, even after four years of ongoing Turkish crisis, are still involved in Turkey with investments of billions of Euros. Western financial institutions will have to fear serious depreciation if the country is to truly enter into an extensive balance of payments crisis, as Moody’s recently warned,” the financial expert continued.

“Turkey’s economic problems may be due to itself, but they could spread to Europe and become a problem for the West. Thus, Europeans are likely to turn their attention to their own banks, in view of discussions on possible sanctions against Ankara at the EU summit in late September, which in turn strengthens Erdogan’s position,” he explained, adding that “the Turkish president does not need to fear that Europeans will cut off Turkish banks from international financial markets, as the US once did with Russian banks after the annexation of Crimea.”

Although European financial institutions have reduced their activities in Turkey in recent years, Spanish, French, British and German banks still have over a hundred billion dollars invested in Turkey.

#### Decline cascades – nuclear war

Maavak '21 [Mathew; 2021; PhD in Risk Foresight from the Universiti Teknologi Malaysia; Salus Journal – The Australian Journal for Law Enforcement, Security and Intelligence Professionals, "Horizon 2030: Will Emerging Risks Unravel Our Global Systems?" Vol. 9 no. 1]

Various scholars and institutions regard global social instability as the greatest threat facing this decade. The catalyst has been postulated to be a Second Great Depression which, in turn, will have profound implications for global security and national integrity. This paper, written from a broad systems perspective, illustrates how emerging risks are getting more complex and intertwined; blurring boundaries between the economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological taxonomy used by the World Economic Forum for its annual global risk forecasts. Tight couplings in our global systems have also enabled risks accrued in one area to snowball into a full-blown crisis elsewhere. The COVID-19 pandemic and its socioeconomic fallouts exemplify this systemic chain-reaction. Onceinexorable forces of globalization are rupturing as the current global system can no longer be sustained due to poor governance and runaway wealth fractionation. The coronavirus pandemic is also enabling Big Tech to expropriate the levers of governments and mass communications worldwide. This paper concludes by highlighting how this development poses a dilemma for security professionals.

Key Words: Global Systems, Emergence, VUCA, COVID-9, Social Instability, Big Tech, Great Reset

INTRODUCTION

The new decade is witnessing rising volatility across global systems. Pick any random “system” today and chart out its trajectory: Are our education systems becoming more robust and affordable? What about food security? Are our healthcare systems improving? Are our pension systems sound? Wherever one looks, there are dark clouds gathering on a global horizon marked by volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (VUCA).

But what exactly is a global system? Our planet itself is an autonomous and selfsustaining mega-system, marked by periodic cycles and elemental vagaries. Human activities within however are not system isolates as our banking, utility, farming, healthcare and retail sectors etc. are increasingly entwined. Risks accrued in one system may cascade into an unforeseen crisis within and/or without (Choo, Smith & McCusker, 2007). Scholars call this phenomenon “emergence”; one where the behaviour of intersecting systems is determined by complex and largely invisible interactions at the substratum (Goldstein, 1999; Holland, 1998).

The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is a case in point. While experts remain divided over the source and morphology of the virus, the contagion has ramified into a global health crisis and supply chain nightmare. It is also tilting the geopolitical balance. China is the largest exporter of intermediate products, and had generated nearly 20% of global imports in 2015 alone (Cousin, 2020). The pharmaceutical sector is particularly vulnerable. Nearly “85% of medicines in the U.S. strategic national stockpile” sources components from China (Owens, 2020).

An initial run on respiratory masks has now been eclipsed by rowdy queues at supermarkets and the bankruptcy of small businesses. The entire global population – save for major pockets such as Sweden, Belarus, Taiwan and Japan – have been subjected to cyclical lockdowns and quarantines. Never before in history have humans faced such a systemic, borderless calamity.

COVID-19 represents a classic emergent crisis that necessitates real-time response and adaptivity in a real-time world, particularly since the global Just-in-Time (JIT) production and delivery system serves as both an enabler and vector for transboundary risks. From a systems thinking perspective, emerging risk management should therefore address a whole spectrum of activity across the economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological (EEGST) taxonomy. Every emerging threat can be slotted into this taxonomy – a reason why it is used by the World Economic Forum (WEF) for its annual global risk exercises (Maavak, 2019a).

As traditional forces of globalization unravel, security professionals should take cognizance of emerging threats through a systems thinking approach.

METHODOLOGY

An EEGST sectional breakdown was adopted to illustrate a sampling of extreme risks facing the world for the 2020-2030 decade. The transcendental quality of emerging risks, as outlined on Figure 1, below, was primarily informed by the following pillars of systems thinking (Rickards, 2020):

• Diminishing diversity (or increasing homogeneity) of actors in the global system (Boli & Thomas, 1997; Meyer, 2000; Young et al, 2006);

• Interconnections in the global system (Homer-Dixon et al, 2015; Lee & Preston, 2012);

• Interactions of actors, events and components in the global system (Buldyrev et al, 2010; Bashan et al, 2013; Homer-Dixon et al, 2015); and • Adaptive qualities in particular systems (Bodin & Norberg, 2005; Scheffer et al, 2012)

Since scholastic material on this topic remains somewhat inchoate, this paper buttresses many of its contentions through secondary (i.e. news/institutional) sources.

ECONOMY

According to Professor Stanislaw Drozdz (2018) of the Polish Academy of Sciences, “a global financial crash of a previously unprecedented scale is highly probable” by the mid- 2020s. This will lead to a trickle-down meltdown, impacting all areas of human activity.

The economist John Mauldin (2018) similarly warns that the “2020s might be the worst decade in US history” and may lead to a Second Great Depression. Other forecasts are equally alarming. According to the International Institute of Finance, global debt may have surpassed $255 trillion by 2020 (IIF, 2019). Yet another study revealed that global debts and liabilities amounted to a staggering $2.5 quadrillion (Ausman, 2018). The reader should note that these figures were tabulated before the COVID-19 outbreak.

The IMF singles out widening income inequality as the trigger for the next Great Depression (Georgieva, 2020). The wealthiest 1% now own more than twice as much wealth as 6.9 billion people (Coffey et al, 2020) and this chasm is widening with each passing month. COVID-19 had, in fact, boosted global billionaire wealth to an unprecedented $10.2 trillion by July 2020 (UBS-PWC, 2020). Global GDP, worth $88 trillion in 2019, may have contracted by 5.2% in 2020 (World Bank, 2020).

As the Greek historian Plutarch warned in the 1st century AD: “An imbalance between rich and poor is the oldest and most fatal ailment of all republics” (Mauldin, 2014). The stability of a society, as Aristotle argued even earlier, depends on a robust middle element or middle class. At the rate the global middle class is facing catastrophic debt and unemployment levels, widespread social disaffection may morph into outright anarchy (Maavak, 2012; DCDC, 2007).

Economic stressors, in transcendent VUCA fashion, may also induce radical geopolitical realignments. Bullions now carry more weight than NATO’s security guarantees in Eastern Europe. After Poland repatriated 100 tons of gold from the Bank of England in 2019, Slovakia, Serbia and Hungary quickly followed suit.

According to former Slovak Premier Robert Fico, this erosion in regional trust was based on historical precedents – in particular the 1938 Munich Agreement which ceded Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. As Fico reiterated (Dudik & Tomek, 2019):

“You can hardly trust even the closest allies after the Munich Agreement… I guarantee that if something happens, we won’t see a single gram of this (offshore-held) gold. Let’s do it (repatriation) as quickly as possible.” (Parenthesis added by author).

President Aleksandar Vucic of Serbia (a non-NATO nation) justified his central bank’s gold-repatriation program by hinting at economic headwinds ahead: “We see in which direction the crisis in the world is moving” (Dudik & Tomek, 2019). Indeed, with two global Titanics – the United States and China – set on a collision course with a quadrillions-denominated iceberg in the middle, and a viral outbreak on its tip, the seismic ripples will be felt far, wide and for a considerable period.

A reality check is nonetheless needed here: Can additional bullions realistically circumvallate the economies of 80 million plus peoples in these Eastern European nations, worth a collective $1.8 trillion by purchasing power parity? Gold however is a potent psychological symbol as it represents national sovereignty and economic reassurance in a potentially hyperinflationary world. The portents are clear: The current global economic system will be weakened by rising nationalism and autarkic demands. Much uncertainty remains ahead. Mauldin (2018) proposes the introduction of Old Testament-style debt jubilees to facilitate gradual national recoveries. The World Economic Forum, on the other hand, has long proposed a “Great Reset” by 2030; a socialist utopia where “you’ll own nothing and you’ll be happy” (WEF, 2016).

In the final analysis, COVID-19 is not the root cause of the current global economic turmoil; it is merely an accelerant to a burning house of cards that was left smouldering since the 2008 Great Recession (Maavak, 2020a). We also see how the four main pillars of systems thinking (diversity, interconnectivity, interactivity and “adaptivity”) form the mise en scene in a VUCA decade.

ENVIRONMENTAL

What happens to the environment when our economies implode? Think of a debt-laden workforce at sensitive nuclear and chemical plants, along with a concomitant surge in industrial accidents? Economic stressors, workforce demoralization and rampant profiteering – rather than manmade climate change – arguably pose the biggest threats to the environment. In a WEF report, Buehler et al (2017) made the following pre-COVID-19 observation:

The ILO estimates that the annual cost to the global economy from accidents and work-related diseases alone is a staggering $3 trillion. Moreover, a recent report suggests the world’s 3.2 billion workers are increasingly unwell, with the vast majority facing significant economic insecurity: 77% work in part-time, temporary, “vulnerable” or unpaid jobs.

Shouldn’t this phenomenon be better categorized as a societal or economic risk rather than an environmental one? In line with the systems thinking approach, however, global risks can no longer be boxed into a taxonomical silo. Frazzled workforces may precipitate another Bhopal (1984), Chernobyl (1986), Deepwater Horizon (2010) or Flint water crisis (2014). These disasters were notably not the result of manmade climate change. Neither was the Fukushima nuclear disaster (2011) nor the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004). Indeed, the combustion of a long-overlooked cargo of 2,750 tonnes of ammonium nitrate had nearly levelled the city of Beirut, Lebanon, on Aug 4 2020. The explosion left 204 dead; 7,500 injured; US$15 billion in property damages; and an estimated 300,000 people homeless (Urbina, 2020). The environmental costs have yet to be adequately tabulated.

Environmental disasters are more attributable to Black Swan events, systems breakdowns and corporate greed rather than to mundane human activity.

Our JIT world aggravates the cascading potential of risks (Korowicz, 2012). Production and delivery delays, caused by the COVID-19 outbreak, will eventually require industrial overcompensation. This will further stress senior executives, workers, machines and a variety of computerized systems. The trickle-down effects will likely include substandard products, contaminated food and a general lowering in health and safety standards (Maavak, 2019a). Unpaid or demoralized sanitation workers may also resort to indiscriminate waste dumping. Many cities across the United States (and elsewhere in the world) are no longer recycling wastes due to prohibitive costs in the global corona-economy (Liacko, 2021).

Even in good times, strict protocols on waste disposals were routinely ignored. While Sweden championed the global climate change narrative, its clothing flagship H&M was busy covering up toxic effluences disgorged by vendors along the Citarum River in Java, Indonesia. As a result, countless children among 14 million Indonesians straddling the “world’s most polluted river” began to suffer from dermatitis, intestinal problems, developmental disorders, renal failure, chronic bronchitis and cancer (DW, 2020). It is also in cauldrons like the Citarum River where pathogens may mutate with emergent ramifications.

On an equally alarming note, depressed economic conditions have traditionally provided a waste disposal boon for organized crime elements. Throughout 1980s, the Calabriabased ‘Ndrangheta mafia – in collusion with governments in Europe and North America – began to dump radioactive wastes along the coast of Somalia. Reeling from pollution and revenue loss, Somali fisherman eventually resorted to mass piracy (Knaup, 2008).

The coast of Somalia is now a maritime hotspot, and exemplifies an entwined form of economic-environmental-geopolitical-societal emergence. In a VUCA world, indiscriminate waste dumping can unexpectedly morph into a Black Hawk Down incident. The laws of unintended consequences are governed by actors, interconnections, interactions and adaptations in a system under study – as outlined in the methodology section.

Environmentally-devastating industrial sabotages – whether by disgruntled workers, industrial competitors, ideological maniacs or terrorist groups – cannot be discounted in a VUCA world. Immiserated societies, in stark defiance of climate change diktats, may resort to dirty coal plants and wood stoves for survival. Interlinked ecosystems, particularly water resources, may be hijacked by nationalist sentiments. The environmental fallouts of critical infrastructure (CI) breakdowns loom like a Sword of Damocles over this decade.

GEOPOLITICAL

The primary catalyst behind WWII was the Great Depression. Since history often repeats itself, expect familiar bogeymen to reappear in societies roiling with impoverishment and ideological clefts. Anti-Semitism – a societal risk on its own – may reach alarming proportions in the West (Reuters, 2019), possibly forcing Israel to undertake reprisal operations inside allied nations. If that happens, how will affected nations react? Will security resources be reallocated to protect certain minorities (or the Top 1%) while larger segments of society are exposed to restive forces? Balloon effects like these present a classic VUCA problematic.

Contemporary geopolitical risks include a possible Iran-Israel war; US-China military confrontation over Taiwan or the South China Sea; North Korean proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies; an India-Pakistan nuclear war; an Iranian closure of the Straits of Hormuz; fundamentalist-driven implosion in the Islamic world; or a nuclear confrontation between NATO and Russia. Fears that the Jan 3 2020 assassination of Iranian Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani might lead to WWIII were grossly overblown. From a systems perspective, the killing of Soleimani did not fundamentally change the actor-interconnection-interaction adaptivity equation in the Middle East. Soleimani was simply a cog who got replaced.

## DA – Turkey Kickout

### 1AR – N/L

#### Turkey won’t leave NATO or respond to the plan

TASS 5-30 (TASS, 30 MAY 2022, “Turkey will not leave NATO, but press for its interests — expert,” <https://tass.com/world/1458067?utm_source=google.com&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=google.com&utm_referrer=google.com>; accessed 6/23/2022) ng TDI

MOSCOW, May 30. /TASS/. Turkey will continue to pursue an independent military policy, but will refrain from "challenging" the United States or quitting the North Atlantic alliance, the head of the Russian International Affairs Council, Andrey Kortunov, told TASS on Monday. "Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, while being a full-fledged member of the North Atlantic Alliance, pursues an independent, externally unrestrained military policy. The way I see it, he will continue like this this further on," Kortunov said. Erdogan "firmly defends his interests, for he is well aware that Turkey will not be expelled from NATO, while he will not leave on his own," the analyst said. At the same time, Kortunov predicts Ankara’s conflicts with NATO. "There will be harsh statements and threats from both sides, but I don't think it will come to Turkey's withdrawal or expulsion from NATO. It would cost both sides too much." Turkey’s interests Without Turkey, Kortunov explained, "NATO's southern flank will lose a lot, if not everything," since the country is the bloc’s leading member and its armed forces are inferior only to those of the US. For this reason, he continued, the Turkish leadership will be pressing for concessions from the US and EU countries, "but it will never challenge them." Erdogan has a whole list of complaints against the United States, Kortunov recalled. For instance, Turkey wants the lifting sanctions related to its purchase of Russia’s S-400 air defense systems and its return to the US F-35 fighter program. "There is as great deal to bargain about. Clearly, Erdogan will not get everything, but he will be able to get something in the end," he believes. The expert also suggested that the Turkish side might be able to defend its interests on the issue of Finland and Sweden joining NATO. For one, the Turkish leadership wants these countries to curtail their traditional support for the Kurdish opposition. "I think they will eventually come to an agreement. Here, concessions are expected not only from Stockholm, but also from Brussels," Kortunov explained. While commenting on the Turkish leader's contacts with Russian President Vladimir Putin, the expert noted: "In the alliance, no one would want Erdogan to play his own game with Moscow behind its back. But it be impossible to prevent it, so they will have to leave everything as it is." The analyst stressed that Turkey had long had a very special relationship with the North Atlantic Alliance and declared certain interests that often do not coincide with the stance of other NATO members. The Turkish leadership, Kortunov forecasts, will continue to pursue a policy that, in a sense, might violate the unity of the bloc. "However, in this regard, Erdogan will go as far as he will be allowed to," he stressed. "He will be declaring his special interests in Libya or the Eastern Mediterranean, he will put himself in opposition to some European countries, or position himself as a global advocate of Islam, but I don't think he will go to extremes."

## DA – Deterrence

### 1AR – No Operational Capability

#### 1 – Turkey does not have the operational capability to even use the nukes

Kibaroglu, M. (2010). Reassessing the role of US nuclear weapons in Turkey. une, 20, 10. CSUF JmB TDI

Turkey has hosted U.S. nuclear weapons since intermediate-range Jupiter missiles were deployed there in 1961 as a result of decisions made at the alliance’s 1957 Paris summit. Those missiles were withdrawn in 1963 in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis. Since then, no nuclear missiles have been stationed in Turkey. The only nuclear weapons that have been deployed are the bombs that would be delivered by U.S. F-16s or Turkish F-100, F-104, and F-4 “Phantom” aircraft at air bases in Eskisehir, Malatya (Erhac), Ankara (Akinci/Murted), and Balikesir.12 All such weapons, whether on U.S. or Turkish aircraft, have been under the custody of the U.S. Air Force. Turkey still hosts these U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on its territory, albeit in much smaller numbers.13 They are limited to one location, the Incirlik base near Adana on the eastern Mediterranean coast of Turkey.14 All other nuclear weapons have been withdrawn from the bases mentioned above.15 Moreover, the Turkish air force no longer has any operational link with the remaining tactical nuclear weapons deployed at Incirlik.16 F-104s have not been in service since 1994. F-4s are still in service after modernization of some 54 of them by Israeli Aerospace Industries in 1997. Yet, only the F-16 “Fighting Falcons” of the Turkish air force participate in NATO`s nuclear strike exercises known as “Steadfast Noon,” during which crews are trained in loading, unloading, and employing B61 tactical nuclear weapons.17 The Turkish aircraft in these exercises serve as a non-nuclear air defense escort rather than a nuclear strike force.18Neg – Turkey TNWs

#### AND, the nukes can’t even reach Russia!

<https://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2017/11/09/removal-of-nukes-at-incirlik-might-benefit-both-us-turkey>

Amid U.S. media speculation over the removal of nuclear weapons from İncirlik Air Base in southern Turkey, experts argue that the nuclear stockpile held over from the Cold War has lost its use for deterrence and therefore its removal might be beneficial for both sides. Existence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey has been an open secret for decades, but it was acknowledged for the first time in a recent report from Parliament. The report, "Data on Nuclear Weapons," was released on Oct. 31, prepared by Parliament's Research Department.

It says the U.S has 150 nuclear weapons in five NATO member countries, including Turkey. More specifically, the report says that some 50 B-61 thermonuclear hydrogen bombs, which are 12-times greater than the atomic bomb that wiped out Hiroshima in 1945, are deployed at İncirlik.

Excusing the soured relations between the two countries, several U.S media outlets have speculated from time to time that that removal of the nuclear arsenal from Turkey would be to punish its NATO ally. Turkish-U.S relations are passing through turbulent times due to U.S support for the Gülenist Terror Group (FETÖ), which was behind last year's failed July 15 coup attempt, and the PKK Syrian affiliate Democratic Union Party's (PYD) People's Protection Units (YPG) militia. Nevertheless, it seems pretty hard to punish Turkey by removing outdated U.S nukes.

Professor Mustafa Kibaroğlu from MEF University in Istanbul and senior lecturer Tom Sauer from the University of Antwerp argue in their article for Insight Turkey, "Mr. Trump, Post Nuclear Ban Treaty, NATO's Nuclear Weapons in Europe are Obsolete," that U.S nuclear weapons in European NATO countries, including Turkey, are becoming a liability on a variety of fronts rather than being a deterrent. "There is no consensus on withdrawing them, but at the same time there is no consensus on keeping them. This inertia is a recipe for escalating internal political frictions within the Alliance, and it is all the more problematic in an age where nuclear weapons are being banned."

According to the article, another compelling reason to withdraw the weapons is the reality that the delivery systems for these bombs are tactical aircraft such as F-16s, which cannot reach Russia. "During the Cold War, these aircraft were supposed to bomb the Warsaw Pact countries. Today, Central European states like Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and the Baltic states have become full members of NATO and the European Union. In short, there is no military justification to retain American tactical nuclear weapons on European territory."

The article also argues that apart from their symbolic value as a representation of the U.S. commitment to NATO, the nuclear weapons are ineffective and have no deterrence ability. The academics also say that B-61 nuclear weapons at İncirlik need to be modernized in the foreseeable future along with the U.S arsenal in other European countries and that the modernization of each nuclear bomb will cost $25 million, making the total cost of updating the nuclear arsenal at İncirlik around $1.25 billion to NATO member country tax payers.

"If the strength of NATO depends on a few outdated tactical nuclear weapons that will not be used anymore, we are afraid that this state of affairs says a lot about the strength of the Alliance in general," the article says.

## DA – Assurances

### 1AR – N/L – No Nukes

#### Turkey can’t build a nuke

Iddon 19 (Paul Iddon, freelance journalist based in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan who writes about Middle East affairs; “Turkey’s nuclear future”; Ahval; 10/21/19; https://ahvalnews.com/turkey-nuclear-power/turkeys-nuclear-future?language\_content\_entity=en kp)

Turkey is not presently pursuing a nuclear weapons programme and also lacks the basic infrastructure to build one even if it decides to do so.

The only nuclear-related technology being developed in Turkey today is the Akkuyu nuclear power plant on its Mediterranean coast. Russia won the contract to build the facility in 2010 and construction work began in April 2018.

Erdoğan hopes the $20 billion project will be completed by the 2023 centennial. But it will likely take longer since Rosatom, the Russian manufacturer, has had trouble finding Turkish partners to take a 49 percent stake in the project.

Also, the plant is being built in an area prone to earthquakes. This, along with reportedly recurring cracks in the concrete foundation of the site, has led to concerns and questions about its safety.

Even if Akkuyu is completed soon and Turkey procures all the technical knowhow to build reactors of its own, neither of which is likely, it still would not have the means to make nuclear weapons.

“Developing nuclear power is one thing,” Dr. Ali Bakeer, a political analyst and consultant, told Ahval. “Developing nuclear weapons is quite another.” He said that while “Moscow is helping Ankara in the Akkuyu project it has no interest in a nuclear-capable Turkey and certainly will not help a NATO member to develop nuclear weapons or the means to do so.”

“This just does not add up.”

Aaron Stein, Director of the Middle East Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, also saw no way the Akkuyu project could help Turkey even begin to develop nuclear weapons.

“Akkuyu is a bizarre reactor project,” Stein told Ahval.

“Russia is going to build it, own it, and operate it,” he said. “Rosatom has also included a fuel supply contract and will reprocess spent fuel from the plant and then return the vitrified waste to Turkey for permanent storage.”

Consequently, this arrangement makes Akkuyu “one of the most proliferation-resistant agreements on the planet” because “Russia is essentially operating a national reactor inside Turkey because of how Ankara has set up the financing arrangements.”

Turkish students studying nuclear engineering in Russian universities are not taught about critical technology in this field, according to Moscow-based Russian-Turkish affairs analyst Kerim Has.

This underscores Russia’s unwillingness to help Turkey become self-sufficient in the development of nuclear technology.

### 1AR – N/L – Desire Inevitable

#### Prolif desire is inevitable – Erdogan sees nukes as status symbols – distrust of Western institutions, NATO unreliability, AND regional threats

Lindenstrauss 19 (Gallia Lindenstrauss, a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies and specializes in Turkish foreign policy; “Erdogan’s Threat on Nuclear Militarization”; INSS Insight No. 1213, September 18, 2019 kp)

In a speech in Sivas, Turkey, on September 4, 2019, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated, “Some countries have missiles with nuclear warheads, not one or two. But [they tell us] we can’t have them. This, I cannot accept,” adding that “we have Israel nearby, as almost neighbors. They scare [other nations] by possessing these. No one can touch them.” This was Erdogan’s first direct, public reference to the possibility that Turkey might decide to seek a nuclear military capability.

This statement reflects in part Erdogan’s view that achievement of a nuclear capability is a manifestation of the level of development of a state. Indeed, in the same speech he noted that “almost all the developed countries” have nuclear capabilities, although this is not true of military nuclear capabilities. For a long time, Erdogan has attributed much importance to development of the Turkish defense industry (including for export purposes) and attainment of independent military capabilities; in this context, Ankara’s attempt to condition military purchases from external sources on knowledge sharing is significant. In the past, Erdogan has made specific reference to the problematic situation whereby Iran has long range missiles while Turkey does not. Recent years have seen progress in Turkey’s missile building capabilities, even though Turkey obligated itself to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which restricts the export of missiles with a range of more than 300 km, and therefore in theory was supposed to show less interest in progress in this direction. The crisis between Turkey and the United States over the purchase of the S-400 missile defense system from Russia and the consequent July 2019 freeze on Turkey’s participation in the F-35 project has further clarified for Ankara the problematics of relying on external providers to attain advanced military capabilities.

As a NATO member since 1952, Turkey is protected by a nuclear umbrella, yet even during and after the Cold War, Ankara had doubts about the commitment of other NATO members – most notably the United States – to Turkey. Turkey is one of the few European states with US tactical nuclear weapons still on its soil. Estimates say that in the Turkish Air Force base in Incirlik there are approximately 50 B-61 nuclear bombs under US command. After the July 2016 failed attempted coup in Turkey, which included an attempted rebellion from inside the base, the external supply of electricity to the base was cut off altogether for a few days. Consequently, more voices in Washington called for finding alternatives to Incirlik, both for using other regional airbases for operational purposes and for consideration whether it was wise to continue to maintain tactical nuclear bombs in Turkey.

Erdogan’s recent declaration departs from previous statements on the nuclear issue, as this is the first time he has hinted that Turkey might develop a military nuclear capability. Turkey already has a civilian nuclear program, with plans to build some 20 electrical reactors; the first is currently under construction and will be operated by the Russian government company Rosatom. According to critics of the project, the cracks that have already appeared in the concrete poured for the reactor strengthen the claim that no nuclear reactor must ever be built on Turkish soil as the region is prone to earthquakes. In talks with other states, including Japan, about constructing further nuclear reactors, Turkey insisted on reserving the option of uranium enrichment open, despite the fact that it has no such capability at present. This insistence has aroused the suspicion that Turkey also intends to develop future nuclear capabilities of a non-civilian nature.

Erdogan’s recent statement should also be viewed in the broader context of the crisis in US-Turkish relations and the anti-American sentiments in the country, which existed beforehand but were inflamed by Ankara’s accusations that the United States was involved in the failed attempted coup and by Washington’s support for the Kurdish forces in northern Syria. This has eroded the already-limited trust Turkey had that NATO would come to its side in a crisis. Moreover, not only does Ankara have less trust in the guarantees it already possesses, but its defiant policy toward the United States in fact further undermines them. In addition, Ankara also believes that the global status of the United States is waning, and therefore Turkey must prepare for a multipolar international system.

Furthermore, Erdogan’s statement should be viewed as part of his broader critique of the current international system and the need for Security Council reforms. In this light, one may see his claim – that states with nuclear capabilities place unfair obstacles in the path of states without them, thus creating a sort of nuclear OPEC – as part of his overall approach that “the world is bigger than five.” Already in 2012, Erdogan accused the international community of hypocrisy in its criticism of Iran’s “peaceful nuclear program” along with its reticence about Israel’s “250 to 300 nuclear warheads.” In May 2018 he asserted that the “main threats against our country and region are nuclear weapons,” and therefore called for nuclear disarmament. While Turkey is unhappy with the Iranian nuclear program, its stance differs radically from the Israeli and Saudi position: Ankara thinks that the Iranian nuclear issue should be approached through negotiations, and it opposed the US withdrawal from the JCPOA. Erdogan will presumably revisit the nuclear issue as part of his criticism of the “unfair” international system in his forthcoming speech at the General Assembly later this month.

Given the Iranian effort to attain nuclear weapons, Erdogan’s statement on the nuclear issue feeds a central fear, namely, that the Middle East will become home to several nuclear powers. For its part, Turkey has signed all key treaties dealing with weapons of mass destruction, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the IAEA Additional Protocol. Moreover, its nuclear infrastructure is negligible, and the public nature of Erdogan’s reference to a military nuclear capability may actually make it more difficult for Ankara to go that route, because any action it now takes will be scrutinized with added suspicion. Nonetheless, the change in the rhetoric emerging from Ankara – from criticism of Israel and the call for nuclear disarmament, to the threat to join the circle of states with military nuclear capabilities – cannot be ignored. It is a clear warning sign not only to the states of the region but also to the global powers.

### 1AR – No !

#### impact

Mueller ’16 [John; July 2016; Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science at Ohio State University, Woody Hayes Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies; Should We Let the Bomb Spread, “At All Costs: The Destructive Consequences of Antiproliferation Policy,” Ch. 3] TDI

These considerations help explain why alarmists have been wrong for decades about the pace of nuclear proliferation. Dozens of technologically capable countries have considered obtaining nuclear arsenals, but very few have done so. Indeed, as Jacques Hymans has pointed out, even supposedly optimistic forecasts about nuclear dispersion have proved to be too pessimistic.15 Thus, in 1958 the National Planning Association predicted “a rapid rise in the number of atomic powers … by the mid-1960s.”16 A few years later C. P. Snow sternly predicted, “Within, at the most, six years, China and several other states [will] have a stock of nuclear bombs” while U.S. President John Kennedy observed that there might be “ten, fifteen, twenty” countries with a nuclear capacity by 1964.17

Such punditry has gone astray in part because the pundits insist on extrapolating from the wrong cases. A more pertinent prototype would have been Canada, a country that could easily have had nuclear weapons by the 1960s but declined to make the effort.18 In fact, over the decades, a huge number of countries capable of developing nuclear weapons have neglected even to consider the opportunity—for example, Canada, Italy, and Norway—even as Argentina, Brazil, Libya, South Korea, and Taiwan have backed away from or reversed nuclear weapons programs, and Belarus, Kazakhstan, South Africa, and Ukraine have actually surrendered or dismantled an existing nuclear arsenal.19 Some of that reduction is no doubt due to the hostility of the nuclear nations, but even without that the Canadian case seems to have proved to have rather general relevance. Its experience certainly suggests, as Stephen Meyer has shown, there is no “technological imperative” for countries to obtain nuclear weapons once they have achieved the technical capacity to do so.20

In consequence, alarmist predictions about proliferation chains, cascades, dominoes, waves, avalanches, epidemics, and points of no return have proved to be faulty. Insofar as most leaders of most countries (even rogue ones) have considered acquiring the weapons, they have come to appreciate several defects: nuclear weapons are dangerous, distasteful, costly, and likely to rile the neighbors. Moreover, as Hymans has demonstrated, the weapons have also been exceedingly difficult to obtain for administratively dysfunctional countries like Iran.21

## CP – A5

### 1AR – Abandonment DA

#### Additionally, modifying Article V signals willingness to renegotiate fundamental parameters of the transatlantic bargain which triggers intense abandonment fear

Dr. Matti Pesu 19, PhD in International Relations from Temple University, Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, and Ville Sinkkonen, Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, “Managing Transatlantic (Mis)Trust: The Trump Era in Perspective”, FIIA Working Paper, March 2019, <https://tinyurl.com/y5ztkg88>

Moreover, as discussed above, one issue that is highly indicative of the nature of trust within NATO is nuclear deterrence. In terms of concrete hedging measures, should suggestions of independent European nuclear deterrence or a greater role for the French nuclear deterrent in European defence proliferate, it would indicate growing European mistrust towards the US. Washington, in turn, could easily fuel European mistrust by hinting about troop withdrawals or by watering down its commitment to Article 5, thus signalling willingness to disengage or to renegotiate the fundamental parameters of the transatlantic bargain.

To what extent is it possible, then, to contain the erosion of trust? As already argued, there are multiple factors facilitating the maintenance of the trusting relationship among the transatlantic allies. It is unlikely that the current US president will change his opinions on America’s friends, and thus the Europeans should treat the current administration with healthy scepticism. As a prominent scholar and practitioner of transatlantic politics has written, ‘Europeans will never feel safe with a Trump White House’.94 However, the current political disarray in Washington is not a particularly fertile environment for trust-based multilateral foreign policy. In fact, it is incumbent upon the Europeans to become more attentive towards the domestic-political fluctuations in the United States, as America’s political polarisation might produce more violent swings in America’s foreign engagement in the future.95

On the other hand, US concerns about burden-sharing are legitimate, and Europeans must work in earnest to redress the existing imbalance.96 Washington should accept that a more capable Europe is also more independent. However, US allies in Europe should not frame their defence efforts as a hedge against American unreliability, and overly grandiose statements about European defence should be avoided. Instead, Europe should remain patient and engage in selective sector-based proactivity, for instance, by coordinating responses to the Chinese exercise of power, especially in novel domains.97

Those policymakers in Washington who are mindful of the importance of the transatlantic link should still try to reassure Europeans. At the moment, European mistrust is mainly directed towards the president and his ‘loyalists’. This means that transatlanticist voices emanating from the administration should continue to reassure Europeans of the longevity of US commitments. Avoiding overtly unilateral decision-making and posturing – to the extent that this is possible given the impulses of the White House incumbent – would prevent further transatlantic alienation.

To conclude our discussion, it is clear that the structural uncertainties that govern alliance politics – and international politics more broadly – render perfectly trusting relationships between states illusory, even in a well-established alliance with a long and illustrious history. In the case of NATO, the asymmetric nature of the transatlantic bargain means that the trust issue looks qualitatively different from the European and American vantage points. The prospect of abandonment places the Europeans in an asymmetrically vulnerable position vis-à-vis the US. Any signals from Washington – especially ones that arouse the prospect of betrayal, even if only on specific issues – will be studied intently on the old continent. For this reason, the recent uptick in burden-sharing talk emanating from the White House, coupled with the president’s ambivalence regarding the core norms of alliance obligation, have aroused fears in Europe. Were such ideas to permeate Washington beyond the incumbent’s immediate coterie of advisors, the prospect of specific mistrust questions morphing into more general suspicions would be heightened. For the foreseeable future, the focus of transatlanticists on both sides of the ocean should therefore be on finding strategies of engagement that paper over specific issues of mistrust. This would serve the goal of keeping the alliance afloat through troubled times by maintaining a sufficient reservoir of general trust.

### 1AR – S/D

#### Article 5 can’t lawfully be activated by a Turkish war of aggression---Syria proves.

Sari 20, an Associate Professor of Public International Law at the University of Exeter (United Kingdom) and the Director of the Exeter Centre for International Law. His scholarship focuses primarily on international conflict and security law and the law relating to military operations, (Aurel, March 2nd, 2020, “Turkey’s Troubles in Idlib: Does Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Hold the Answer?”, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/turkeys-troubles-idlib-does-article-5-north-atlantic-treaty-hold-answer>)

However, notwithstanding this revision, the duty to provide mutual assistance does not apply to attacks on the territory of Syria nor to attacks on forces, vessels of aircraft of any NATO member state, including Turkey, present inside Syrian territory. Matters would be different if Turkey’s territory were subject to an armed attack from within Syrian territory or if Turkish forces, vessels or aircraft were attacked in or over the Mediterranean Sea. However, this is not the case here. Accordingly, Turkey may not invoke Article 5 in the present circumstances.

In any event, even if the geographic conditions governing the application of Article 5 were met, the duty of mutual assistance is not triggered by the mere fact that Turkish forces have suffered combat losses. As the preamble, text and negotiating history of the North Atlantic Treaty make abundantly clear, any action under Article 5 involving the use of force would be an exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense set out in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty does not supersede the conditions that govern the exercise of this right of self-defense under the charter or customary international law. Consequently, since self-defense is available only against an unlawful armed attack, but not against the lawful use of force in self-defense, the legality or illegality of the air strike carried out against Turkish forces has a bearing on whether Article 5 could be invoked by Turkey. In other words, if a NATO member state is the target of lawful self-defense rather than an unlawful armed attack, it cannot request support from its allies under Article 5 in response.

# Neg

## Case

### 1NC – Relations Decline Inev

#### Relations decline is inevitable – laundry list of reasons. This ev should end the debate.

Dalay 21 [Galip; a scholar and think-tanker specializing on Turkish politics and the Middle Eastern affairs. He is Richard von Weizsäcker Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy. He was IPC – Mercator Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), non-resident fellow at Brookings Doha Centre, and visiting scholar at the University of Oxford], “US-Turkey Relations will Remain Crisis-Ridden for a Long Time to Come,” 1/29/21, The Brookings Institute, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/us-turkey-relations-will-remain-crisis-ridden-for-a-long-time-to-come/

The U.S.-Turkey relationship has a long history of complexities, with no golden era to point to. However, even by these standards, recent years have been exceptionally bad. An accumulated series of crises, a dysfunctional framework for the relationship, and diverging threat perceptions have plagued ties.

In particular, five crises that have tested U.S.-Turkey relations in recent years are likely to be on the Biden administration’s agenda: Turkey’s purchase of the Russian-made S-400 missile defense systems and the ensuing U.S. sanctions on Turkey, the Syrian Kurds, the Eastern Mediterranean crisis, the court case against Turkey’s state-owned Halkbank related to U.S. sanctions on Iran, and Biden’s views on Turkey’s democratic regression.

Despite this long list of disputes, former President Trump shielded Turkey from many possible punitive actions. In this regard, his departure bodes ill for Ankara. In his confirmation hearing on January 19, Secretary of State Antony Blinken referred to Turkey as our “so-called strategic partner” in response to a question on Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 systems; this is indicative of the new administration’s mood toward Turkey. In the same vein, in almost all public opinion polls in Turkey, the United States tops the list of countries that people perceive to threaten Turkey’s national security.

Zooming out, in spite of recent positive messaging from Ankara, the crisis in Turkey’s relations with the broader West are set to worsen. This will be evident in divergent readings of international affairs, Turkey’s quest to reduce dependency on the West, and different ideas of what a “reset” would look like.

Conflicting worldviews on international affairs

Unlike Turkey’s relations with Europe, U.S.-Turkey relations are essentially a single-file issue: a security partnership that was established within the Cold War context. However, at present, geopolitical decoupling and a divergence in threat perceptions have become the dominant feature of U.S.-Turkey relations, and as the long-running friction between Turkey and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) on the Syrian crisis illustrates, the military-to-military ties are becoming increasingly acrimonious.

One of the key issues is Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 air defense systems, which, according to many in the West, illustrates Turkey’s realignment away from NATO and the U.S. in defense procurement and geopolitical orientation. For Turkey, the S-400s are not solely — arguably not primarily — motivated by defense considerations; rather this purchase has a geopolitical motivation as well. It has underpinned and strengthened Turkey-Russia relations, particularly in Syria, following their 2016 rapprochement after Turkey shot down a Russian jet in 2015. Even though Russia has refrained from technology-sharing with Turkey regarding the S-400 systems, Turkey has gone ahead with the purchase. The development is deeply concerning to Washington, which worries that Turkey’s purchase could also pave the way for other partners, such as India, to do the same.

More broadly, the way Washington and Ankara read international affairs is diverging. At a time when the U.S. regards China as a systemic rival and relations with Russia are set to become more tumultuous, the governing coalition in Turkey — which is made up of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), and Eurasianist groups and figures (who argue that Turkey should align more closely with Russia and China) — appears to believe that today’s international system is not as Western-centric as it used to be (if not post-Western), and hence Turkey should pursue its interest via a more varied geopolitical balancing act. Turkey’s such reading of international affairs might be seen as abnormal in Washington, but for the governing coalition in Ankara, it is seen as adjusting to the new normal in global politics. And the Turkish government’s reading of international affairs as such is unlikely to change during the Biden administration.

Reducing dependency on the West

Strategic autonomy has been a fashionable concept in Turkey. Many analysts and policymakers see the independence that this concept insinuates as forming the overarching goal of contemporary Turkish foreign policy.

However, in its application, this nebulous concept effectively means reducing Turkey’s dependency on the West rather than making Turkey an autonomous or independent actor altogether in international affairs. For instance, Turkey is less vocal and less keen in asserting its “strategic autonomy” vis-à-vis China or Russia. The Erdoğan government has been nearly silent on the Chinese persecution of the Uyghur Muslims in order to not antagonize China, as one example. Turkey displays similar extreme caution towards Russia’s sensitivities and redlines. Today, this quest and concept represents Turkey’s paradox in its foreign policy: Seeking to reduce dependency on the West has culminated in Turkey’s increased dependency on and vulnerability regarding China and Russia.

Different ideas of a reset

Another key manifestation of fundamental differences are seen in the different U.S. and Turkish ideas of what a “reset” in the relationship should look like.

For the new Biden administration — which emphasizes strengthening alliances, institutions, and the liberal international order — a reset would appear to mean that Turkey should reverse the course in its relations with Russia and China, particularly by giving up the S-400 systems, and come back to the NATO and Western fold.

In contrast, for the Erdoğan government, a reset means that the U.S. would come to terms with the new geopolitical reality in Turkey’s neighborhood, including Turkey’s role in it, and the broader changes in international affairs. It would mean that Ankara would not reverse course vis-à-vis Russia and China in any significant way. In other words, as great power competition continues to heat up, the U.S. would expect more cohesion and solidarity within the Western bloc, whereas Turkey believes that its best bet lies in engaging a form of balancing act between different powers.

The current government’s idea of a reset is in accordance with its changing idea of the West. In general, one can speak of three different meanings of “the West” in Turkish context — the idea of the West (which has historically served a reference point for Turkish domestic political and economic character), the indispensability of the West (with historically Turkey seeing its ties to the West as indispensable, and filtering its relations with non-Western powers through the lens of its own Western geopolitical identity), and the institutions of the West — we see that, at present, Turkey has largely given up on the first two but still appears attached to the third. It still values its place in NATO and its customs union with the European Union. But attempts to decouple membership in Western institutions from their political, normative, and geopolitical underpinnings is what forms a great source of friction in Turkish-Western relations.

### 1NC – Black Sea Defense

#### No Black Sea impact.

Jackson ’22 — Jon; Reporter for Newsweek. May 2, 2022; "Russia risks losing its power in the Black Sea"; *Newsweek*; <https://www.newsweek.com/russia-risks-losing-its-power-black-sea-1702625>;

Russia's long-held dominance in the Black Sea appears to be suffering due to recent setbacks its forces have faced against Ukraine, as well as from international opposition to Russia's war there.

Russia has historically laid claim to the body of water between Europe and Asia for centuries, and the Soviet Union maintained a dominant presence there following World War II. But after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's power waned in the Black Sea due to a lack of funding, according to a 2000 Center for Naval Analyses report. However, Russia later regained much of its influence in the sea after invading and annexing the Crimean Peninsula in 2014. Now, its authority in the sea is once again threatened after being dealt a few key strategic losses by Ukrainian forces, according to several experts.

In late January, Russian President Vladimir Putin deployed more than 20 warships into the Black Sea during the military escalation before his forces attacked Ukraine on February 24. His Black Sea Fleet, which traces its origins back to 1783, was hit with a significant public loss after the flagship cruiser Moskva sunk in mid-April. Though Russian officials blamed a fire for the ship's destruction, Ukraine claimed two of its anti-ship missiles were responsible for sinking the vessel that became famous during the early days of the invasion.

On Monday, Ukraine's military chief said a drone destroyed two Russian Raptor-class patrol ships near Snake Island. Russia cannot replace these losses by deploying more ships to attack Ukraine because Turkey controls the straits between the countries and has announced no vessels can enter during the war.

Last week, British Defense Secretary Ben Wallace declared Russia had already lost its claims of power over the waters.

### 1NC – No Greece War

#### No Greece war

Carassava 6/1 Journalist at The Times. Anthee Carassava, "Greek Forces on High Alert over Crisis with Turkey," VOA, 6-1-2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/greek-forces-on-high-alert-over-crisis-with-turkey/6598746.html, accessed 6-25-2022,

Greece's armed forces are on high alert in the Eastern Aegean Sea as tensions escalate with Turkey. Officials have been responding to what they say are mounting provocations by Turkey's leadership.

Senior Greek Defense Ministry sources say the military intelligence they have gathered point to the prospect of so-called hybrid threats that Greece may face from its neighbor Turkey as the two NATO allies compete for oil and gas drilling rights in contested parts of the Aegean and Mediterranean seas.

The points of friction between the two countries are many.

A crisis, the sources say, may also spring from a sudden surge in refugee flows from Turkey, or from unexpected wildfires in remote locations or islands in the Aegean Sea that Turkey wants to see demilitarized.

Some security analysts say that while Turkey's recent actions - including the bellicose remarks of its leader - are serious, an armed conflict is unlikely. Retired General Leonidas Tzoumis said both countries stand to lose from a military confrontation, but he warned that Turkish actions may lead to a miscalculation. That prospect, he said, requires heightened vigilance by Greece's armed forces.

Tzoumis said Greece is facing what he calls a classic Turkish game of controlled escalation, one of repeated provocations that can trigger a serious enough incident that would eventually force Greece to negotiate matters like the Aegean Sea dispute and territorial rights that Greece has been refusing to discuss because - the analyst said - it does not want to cede an inch.

### 1NC – No Russia War

#### 1---Zero chance of any further Russian aggression. Russia’s wrecked.

Carugati 22 - a master’s student in International Studies at Laval University. Passionate about strategic studies, he works as a research assistant in the Department of Political Science under the supervision of Professor Jonathan Paquin (Rémy, “Ukraine: Why NATO Must Make Concessions,” Network for Strategic Assistance, 1-24-22, https://ras-nsa.ca/ukraine-why-nato-must-make-concessions/,

What would be Russia’s next steps if NATO accommodates it in Eastern Ukraine? It is unlikely that Russia would keep expanding if the Ukrainian crisis were resolved on terms that Moscow could live with. First, because Russia’s economy would endure massive costs to sustain the war effort just to hold Kyiv, not to mention other holds in Russia’s near-abroad. The maximum-pressure scenario – Russia’s exclusion from the global economy – would make it near impossible for Russia to finance expansionist policies in the long run, not to mention the local resistance Russia would face.

#### No Russia war or escalation

Bergman 22 - director of the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.,(Max Bergmann, “Russia’s Coming Great Power Struggle,” CSIS, May 12, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-coming-great-power-struggle)//mcu

On Monday, all eyes were on Red Square for the annual May 9 victory day celebration to see what Vladimir Putin would do. The answer was not much. Instead of mobilizing the country for total war against Ukraine or declaring some sort of Potemkin victory, Putin stayed the course. This is not because the current trajectory of Russia’s operation in Ukraine is working as planned. What has become apparent in the war in Ukraine, especially since Russia gave up its offensive against Kyiv, is that there is a gap between Russia’s grandiose geopolitical objectives and its capacity to deliver. In the case of Ukraine, escalating the conflict might turn the war in Putin’s favor, but mass mobilization would not guarantee success in the battlefield. It could also lead to intense public backlash, putting his regime at risk. Thus, the two defining obsessions of the Putin era—regime survival and Russia’s geopolitical might—are in tension. As sanctions take their toll and battlefield losses mount, the gap between Putin’s ambitions and Russia’s capacity is likely to grow. As a leader obsessed with geopolitics, Putin will inevitably engage in a desperate scramble to maintain Russia’s great power status, but he will find it incredibly difficult in the weeks, months, and years ahead to do so. The basic problem for Putin is that Western strategy to weaken Russia is working better than anyone could have expected. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s comment may have overstepped when he bluntly said, “We want to see Russia weakened.” But underlying Austin’s comments is a clear sense of confidence that the strategy is clearly working. The initial thrust of this strategy began on the economic front with sanctions. The original assumption behind sanctions was not that they would get Putin to end the war. Banks do not stop tanks, after all. But instead, by imposing significant medium- to long-term costs on Russia, such that in the next 1 year, 5 years, and 10 years, the Russian economy would be severely weakened, the Kremlin would be forced into a tough juggling act between guns (geopolitical ambition) or butter (domestic tranquility). What has surprised U.S. policymakers is the speed and intensity through which the U.S. and European public have demanded stronger actions. European outrage has led to a far stronger sanctions response than imagined possible before the war. Europe has demonstrated it is willing to bear substantial economic costs to weaken Russia and is now moving at an incredible pace to decouple from Russia, now targeting Russian oil. This is having a devastating impact on Russia’s economy. The Russian Central Bank survey reveals expectations of soaring inflation, economic contraction, and no growth. Furthermore, Russia is facing a massive brain drain as up to 200,000 Russians may have left the country by the second week of March alone. It has also suffered substantial damage to its burgeoning tech industry, as it lost access to some overseas markets and may lose up to 170,000 tech workers. The biggest surprise, however, is the performance of Ukraine on the battlefield, the ineptitude of Russia’s military, and the game-changing efficacy Western security assistance. Russia’s forces have suffered shocking losses. The Pentagon estimates that Russia has lost around 25 percent of the combat power it had used to invade Ukraine, with the UK defense minister claiming that Russia suffered losses of 15,000 in personnel and over 2,500 in large equipment. If the war ended tomorrow, Russia would have considerable costs to recapitalize its forces—build more tanks and Kalibr cruise missile systems, as well as train new personnel—not to mention seek to address the deficiencies exposed in the war. But the war is not going to end tomorrow, and the long-term costs to Russia will grow. Thus, Russia finds itself in a huge hole. But to make matters much worse for the Kremlin, the export controls—one of the most innovative aspects of the sanctions—is just starting to bite. The export controls are designed to restrict commercial exports to Russia of advanced technology. This raises major questions for the Kremlin. For instance, how will Russia be able to rebuild its military when it cannot buy semiconductors to build new Kalibr cruise missiles? When a Western component used to manufacture Russian tanks breaks, will Russia be able to get another? If not, can it build its own? According to the White House, two major plants that specialize in manufacturing and repair of tanks—Uralvagonzavod Corporation and the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant—have suspended their work due to the lack of foreign components. There is no doubt that Russia will aggressively pursue work-arounds. Sanctions evasion will be a nonstop pursuit, aided by China, as well as other complicit countries. Russia will use “burner banks” that pop up to handle a transaction, get sanctioned, and go away. It will use shell companies, smugglers, and the criminal underworld to gain access to materials. It will, in short, act like North Korea. But while this type of smuggling can support a bespoke missile development operation, it is highly uncertain whether this will suffice to keep the Russian defense industrial sector humming. Nevertheless, even if Russia finds a way, acquiring items through the black market and through convoluted means will add substantial costs, further depleting Russia’s economic coffers. Russia will seek to turn to domestic production, pursuing classic import substitution, hoping domestic production will replace imported goods. This could work in some areas, but items like semiconductors cannot just be conjured out of thin air, especially when Russia’s knowledge workers have fled in droves. Even if Russia can replace imported parts domestically, this will still add costs and is unlikely to result in the same level of quality of imported goods. Whether export controls succeed in starving Russia of the technology and machinery necessary to rebuild its military is of immense geopolitical importance. Russia’s defense industrial prowess is key to its foreign policy and undergirds its relationships with countries across the globe. This is especially true for a country like India. India is dependent on the Russian arms industry and has $8 billion worth of outstanding military orders from Russia, and also needs a continuous supply of spare parts and components. Indian officials said they expect some short-term delays in the “S-400 Triumf missile systems, Grigorovich-class stealth frigates, and Kalashnikov AK 203-7.62x39mm assault rifles, as well as spares supplies for Kilo-class submarines, MiG-29 fighters, and Kamov Mi-17 military transport helicopters. . . . India today imports over 10,000 types of spares and line replacement units worth over $500 million annually from Russia.” Will Russia be able to meet its deliveries? If Russia can’t deliver, India will have to scramble, increasingly turning to U.S., European, and Asian partners for alternatives. But beyond India, Russia’s defense industrial troubles could severely impact its foreign policy with countries around the world. In Southeast Asia, Vietnam is reliant on Russia’s defense industry and could be further alienated by closer Sino-Russian relations. Furthermore, 50 percent of Africa’s defense industrial imports come from Russia. Thus, if sanctions and export restrictions work as expected, Putin will have to scramble to maintain Russia’s global standing. The most direct way for Putin to assert Russia’s strength and deter the West from taking advantage of a militarily weakened Russia, is nuclear saber rattling. This is already evident in loose talk from Russian officials, leading to understandable concerns about risks of nuclear escalation. Reviving such concerns in the West could be a boon to a Kremlin, as it might foster prestige-building Cold War-era nuclear talks or help constrain Western belligerence. Russia could also continue to look to asymmetric means to hit back and impose costs on the West. Cyberattacks, political influence and disinformation campaigns, money laundering and corruption efforts are few of the many tools in its toolbox. However, its effectiveness has eroded somewhat, as Russia has lost the element of surprise. The United States and Europe have obsessively studied Russia’s active measures campaigns since 2016. Russian disinformation campaigns on the war in Ukraine have had little impact on the West. Instead, it is the United States, with its aggressive disclosures of intelligence, and Ukraine, with Zelensky filming cell phone videos and posting Ukrainian battlefield successes on social media, that have been winning the information war. Russian political influencing efforts will also prove increasingly difficult. Putin-friendly politicians, from Marine Le Pen in France to Matteo Salvini in Italy, have sought to create their distance. Russia can still attempt at the margins to impact politics, corrupting politicians or secretly donating or funding political campaigns. But U.S. and European intelligence and law enforcement are focused on this threat. Additionally, the massive wealth and influence of Russian oligarchs, which has had a corrosive impact on their democratic hosts, has been aggressively uprooted. Russia has thus lost one of its most important soft power tools. The end result is that the West is both on guard and has built up a degree of resilience. Cyberattacks against the West are another potential option for Putin. There are significant concerns about the vulnerability of critical infrastructure in the United States to Russian cyberattacks. But attacks on critical infrastructure, such as the May 2021 Colonial Pipeline attack, allegedly by a nominally private Russian actors, also carry greater risks for the Kremlin now. While the Biden administration decided to prioritize summitry with Putin rather than responding in kind, a Russian cyberattack in this environment would likely be treated far differently, possibly resulting in a U.S. cyber response against Russian infrastructure or expanding direct involvement in Ukraine. A vulnerable Russia, with its hands full in eastern Ukraine, will likely be nervous about provoking an escalatory spiral.

#### 2---Limited cultural desire. No expansion beyond Ukraine. They only invaded for unique cultural reasons.

Carugati 22 - a master’s student in International Studies at Laval University. Passionate about strategic studies, he works as a research assistant in the Department of Political Science under the supervision of Professor Jonathan Paquin (Rémy, “Ukraine: Why NATO Must Make Concessions,” Network for Strategic Assistance, 1-24-22, https://ras-nsa.ca/ukraine-why-nato-must-make-concessions/, Accessed 6-25-22, LASA-AH)

Furthermore, Russia has high stakes in protecting the status of the Russian minority in Eastern Ukraine. The Ukrainization of Russian minority areas in Ukraine, and Kyiv’s indigenous law excluding Russian minorities (as well as Ukrainian), directly affects Russia’s identity as the protector of Russian minorities. This Russian emotional involvement favors Russian irredentism in Eastern Ukraine and militates against the idea that Russia contemplates expansionist aims. Ukraine’s ideational importance to Russia plays a significant part in motivating Russia’s revisionist policy towards Ukraine. Moscow ideational interests elsewhere in the post-Soviet sphere are not as salient as they are in Ukraine. Therefore, Russian expansion is unlikely, as not all land is equally valuable from an emotional (and security) standpoint.

### 1NC – No Turkish Adventurism

**Even if Turkey goes rogue, the US reins them in.**

**Gulmez, 20**

(Didem Buhar, IR at Izmir Katip Celebi University “The resilience of the US–Turkey alliance: divergent threat perceptions and worldviews,” *Contemporary Politics* p. 1-18)

In order to persuade the Trump administration to withdraw from Syria, prevent the US Congress’ punitive measures against Turkey and to sell the Patriot system to Turkey, the AKP leadership tried both diplomacy and threats to close both the Incirlik base and the Kürecik radar station (Taylor, 2020). According to Cagaptay (2019), Turkey resorted to a ‘double-track strategy’ of ‘manipulating Washington by playing on the theme that Moscow [was] willing to do more for **Turkey** regarding the YPG than [was] the US’. It threatened to veto the **NATO defence plans** for Poland and the Baltic states unless YPG/PYD was officially listed as a terrorist organisation by NATO. Yet, it quickly **backed down** out of fear of **marginalisation** by its **NATO allies** (Reuters, 2019b). In particular, it fears that the **US– Greece defence** agreement signed in October 2019 which ensures US access to **three Greek air bases**, may undermine the significance of Turkey’s **Incirlik base** (Taylor, 2020).

**The U.S. won’t get drawn-in---no interest in de-escalating the conflict**

**Shepp 20**

(Jonah, writer based in New York City, (Jonah, October 10th, 2020, “Armenia and Azerbaijan Are at War. Does President Trump Even Know?”, <https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/10/armenia-and-azerbaijan-are-at-war-does-trump-even-know.html>) TDI

One member of that international mediation committee has been conspicuously absent from this effort. U.S. representatives have been involved in the Moscow effort to broker a ceasefire, but the highest levels of U.S. leadership have largely backed off. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo only [commented](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/04/us-armenia-azerbaijan-nagaon-karabakh) on the conflict after being asked about it last week, and his comments made it clear that the **U.S. wasn’t going to get involved**: “We’re discouraging internationalization of this. We think outsiders ought to stay out. We’re urging a ceasefire. We want them both to back up. We’ve spoken to the leadership in each of the two countries, asking them to do just that.” In past administrations, a shooting war involving Russia and a NATO member would be a **drop-everything event** for the State Department. President Donald Trump, who is friendly with Erdogan, could try calling his Turkish counterpart and persuade him to stop escalating the conflict. But of course, the president is **too busy** trying to rescue his spiraling reelection campaign and persuade the American people that he is not debilitatingly ill with COVID-19. Anyway, resolving a conflict between two countries most Americans can’t find on a map would not win him any votes next month, so why should he care?

**Nobody gets involved**

**alKhaleej, 20**

(provides complete Gulf news and international news coverage,(“Turkey seeks to implicate NATO in the Azeri-Armenian war – Erm...”, https://alkhaleejtoday.co/international/5071790/Turkey-seeks-to-implicate-NATO-in-the-Azeri-Armenian-war-%E2%80%93-Erm.html)

Invoking Article 5 in this way and in making the Turkish aggression, would lead to a diplomatic dilemma for NATO and its leading power, mainly the United States. Should it provide assistance to Turkey and risk a war with a nuclear-armed Russia, or abandon the Turks, whose mission has become to sow problems in many Countries – this is under the pressure of the powerful Armenian lobby in America – and it also seriously undermines NATO’s credibility. Turkey’s ambition to ignite a war in which NATO is implicated will make it feel that it has triumphed over it, including the member states.  
What may mitigate the Turkish agitation is that there is **no desire** for **anyone to go to war** because of the Nagorno Karabakh region, because there is **no great interest** for any country in this issue, so the most likely end result is a **negotiated settlement**, perhaps mediated by relatively neutral parties, such as the European Union, and perhaps even Russia itself. Last Monday evening, the foreign ministers of Russia, the United States and France called for a de-escalation in the conflict.In any case, if the clashes do not include the territories of Armenia or Turkey, there will be **no legal basis** for inviting any of the allies to intervene militarily, because these lands are **outside** the **geographical scope** of their **treaties**, and then and most importantly, Russia and Turkey can still fight by indirect means and other proxy conflicts. Conflict escalates locally. Azerbaijan feels the power of its arming from Israel and Turkey, and Armenia feels abandoned by the world. It will **not transform** into a **broader conflict** between major powers, yet it is clear that the fundamental importance of the ongoing clashes in Karabakh does not stem from local territorial gains, but rather from the ability of the conflict to ignite a broader war between opposing coalition regimes.Now Canada has suspended arms sales to Turkey due to their use in Azerbaijan. Erdogan knows that it is not for his sake that a third world war will start, even if it flares up, the Sultanate will not return and will not be a ruler.

**NATO checks and Putin cares more about domestic issues, any conflict won’t be militarized.**

**Trenin, 18** **–** Dmitri Trenin (PhD is the director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, “Fears of World War III are overblown”, 7-20-18, ttps://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-vladimir-putin-nato-crimea-fears-of-world-war-iii-are-overblown/)

Europeans fretted about the **end of NATO**. But **seen from Moscow**, the military alliance still appears to be **very** much **alive**. Trump's harsh words to his allies on spending haven't changed that. **Russia** is **all too aware** that the **alliance** is **focused on its eastern flank**, and not only rhetorically. Since it rediscovered Russia as a threat in 2014, there have been new deployments, a higher degree of mobility, and more military exercises along the Russian border, from the Barents to the Black Seas. **Hardly a boon** for Russia. It was clear at last week's NATO summit that allies agree on the need to upgrade the bloc’s military efforts. Germany, Italy, France, the U.S. — they **all agree** members’ defense spending should go up. Whether by 2 percent of GDP as agreed in Wales, or by 4 percent as now demanded by Trump, is, of course, important. However, with Russia’s GDP often likened to that of Spain, or the state of New York, either figure is considered significant in Moscow, given that the money will be spent with Russia in mind. NATO allies also worry about Trump’s comment this week that it is problematic for the U.S. to come to the defense of smaller NATO allies such as Montenegro. But let’s not forget that at the height of the Cold War it was never 100 percent certain what the U.S. would do in case of an attack on West Germany. Former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt would not have asked for U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe in the 1970s had he had full confidence in NATO's largest member. Nor is NATO enlargement off the table completely. Macedonia has just crossed a major hurdle in its push for membership. Predictions that Trump would recognize Crimea at the Helsinki meeting were also overblown. There was never any question of the U.S. accepting Crimea’s status as part of Russia, or Washington leaning on Kiev to fulfill its side of the Minsk II accords. In Helsinki, Trump and Putin simply acknowledged the issue, and moved on. The U.S. continues to support both Ukraine and Georgia in their conflicts with Russia and to promote their eventual membership in NATO, which most in the West privately regard as increasingly dangerous. NATO is still very much **exerting pressure** on **Russia**. It's considered more of an annoyance than an immediate threat in Moscow, but also keeps the country in permanent "war mode" vis-à-vis the U.S. Because Moscow is focused on Washington, this means Europeans usually get a pass. As for **Russia’s** own **intentions**, two things are clear. There is **no interest** in Moscow in attacking the **Baltic states** or **Poland**. These countries are as safe now as they were before 2014. Suggestions otherwise simply point to the deep wounds in both nations' psyche, which will not be healed for many decades. Should Ukraine's leaders decide to repeat Mikheil Saakashvili’s mistake in 2008 and launch a major offensive to retake Donbas — however unlikely — the Russian response could indeed be devastating and lead to Ukraine's loss of sovereignty, as Putin recently stated. But does this mean Russia will move on Ukraine unprovoked? Most certainly not. **Putin's main concerns** are largely **domestic**. He has an ambitious program that logically calls for **more economic ties** with the **West**. To move forward, he is looking to **ease tensions** with the **EU** and the **U.S**. What Putin wanted to get out of Helsinki was mainly to **start a dialogue** with Washington. Those hopes are now visibly going up in smoke. It is safe to bet that Russia will continue to face the same opposition from a coalition of U.S. and EU interests. The first **détente** in the hybrid war between Russia and the West was indeed **nipped in the bud** by **Trump's behavior** and the vehemence of his domestic critics. So be it. Moscow will **not capitulate**, and will indeed push back. **But** it's **not likely** to take the form of an **aggressive**, overt **military attack**. **Fears of** new **wars** are **far from accurate**.

**Their impact starts at 0.38%**

Luisa **Rodriguez 19**, research fellow at the Forethought Foundation for Global Priorities Research, she also researched nuclear war at Rethink Priorities and as a visiting researcher at the Future of Humanity Institute, holds an M.A. from The Heller School for Social Policy and Management at Brandeis University, “How likely is a nuclear exchange between the US and Russia?”, https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/PAYa6on5gJKwAywrF/how-likely-is-a-nuclear-exchange-between-the-us-and-russia

My previous posts address how bad a nuclear war is likely to be, conditional on there being a nuclear war (see [this post on the deaths caused directly by a US-Russia nuclear exchange](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/pMsnCieusmYqGW26W/how-bad-would-nuclear-winter-caused-by-a-us-russia-nuclear), and [this post on the deaths caused by a nuclear famine](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/dtQ5hpYjniYKWhmhx/would-us-and-russian-nuclear-forces-survive-a-first-strike)), but they don’t consider the likelihood that we actually see a US-Russia nuclear exchange unfold in the first place. In this post, I get a rough sense of how **probable a nuclear war might be** by looking at **historical evidence**, **the views of experts**, and **predictions made by forecasters**. I find that, if we **aggregate those perspectives**, there’s about a 1.1% chance of nuclear war each year, and that the chances of a **nuclear war between the US and Russia**, in particular, **are around 0.38%** per year

### 1NC – No Russia/Syria

#### No Syria or Russia impact — NATO won’t activate Article 5 and Turkey’s interests are limited.

Chulov ‘2/28 [Martin; Middle East Correspondent @ Guardian; “Russia and Turkey's next moves will define the Syrian war's end”; 2/28/20; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/28/russia-and-turkeys-next-moves-will-define-the-syrian-wars-end;

Turkey, a Nato power, could conceivably invoke Article 5 of the NATO pact, which would compel other member states to come to its defence. But the response that would solicit from the alliance itself, part of which could view the flare-up as an indulgent spat, rather than a sovereign threat – the benchmark for NATO involvement – could not be guaranteed. Both sides could do without the relationship being tested.

The Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, seems disinclined to pursue a NATO route and has instead threatened Europe with a flow of Syrian refugees being held back by a border wall along its southern frontier. Another exodus from Turkey, like the huge numbers that went to central Europe in 2015, would be politically unpalatable for European leaders and is powerful leverage for Turkey. To what end, few seem certain of.

The fog of the Syrian war has mired all its protagonists. Even as Russia and Turkey engaged deeper in Idlib, their endgames remained poorly defined. Vladimir Putin seemed determined to finish the war at all costs, using the power of his air force to compel a ceasefire and then hand over the smouldering ruins to a puppet leader whose strings are pulled by Moscow. Gas and oil interests, plus the lucre of reconstruction, would follow. After four years of blood and treasure, Russia would also secure a prominent foothold in the Middle East, a bulwark to Iran and the US, with a sea route, in the heartland of the region. Quite the prize. And a very different outcome to Washington’s disastrous war in Iraq.

Turkey’s interests in Syria have been less clear. An overarching embrace of the Syrian opposition from 2012 to 2016, which ended with the fall of Aleppo, has been replaced with more narrow national interests in mind. Keeping Kurds from the border zone west of the Euphrates became the paramount concern, alongside strategic reach far into northern Syria and securing the region’s main highway. But how that would take shape could only be agreed after the shooting stopped.

#### No great power war in Syria — nobody cares enough.

Walt ’19 [Stephen, Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs @Harvard, PhD in Political Science @Cal, “Assad Is Now Syria’s Best-Case Scenario,” 10/17/19, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/17/assad-syria-turkey-kurds-leadership/, AS]

We are also told that the debacle in Syria—and to be clear, it is an embarrassing display of ineptitude—is a great victory for the United States’ so-called enemies. Really? Syria is hardly a major strategic prize, and neither Russia nor Iran, nor anyone else, is going to get a lot richer or more powerful as a result. I doubt that Assad wants either Moscow or Teheran to maintain a big permanent presence in his country, so their influence is likely to decline as he reconstitutes his authority. It’s possible that one or both countries might remain entangled in Syria for some time, and that means they’ll be pouring additional resources into a country of little strategic value. In international politics, sticking rivals with costly burdens is sometimes a smart play, and it usually makes more sense than trying to solve an intractable problem more or less alone.

More importantly, to the extent that Russia and Iran do look like winners here, it is mostly because they pursued a smarter strategy from the start. From the very beginning, Russia and Iran had one clear, limited, and feasible objective: keep Assad in power. The United States, by contrast, had ambitious and unrealistic goals: It wanted to get rid of Assad, defeat the Islamic State, keep other jihadis from gaining power, and eventually bring some nice Syrian liberal democrats to power. These goals were complex and contradictory—the United States couldn’t get rid of Assad without opening the door to the Islamic State or various al Qaeda offshoots—and there weren’t any reliable and competent Syria liberals on whom it could rely.

### 1NC – Withdraw Doesn’t Stop Adventurism

#### US military involvement doesn’t affect it’s relationship with turkey and trust deficit inevitable.

Sinan ÜLgen, 21 — [Sinan ÜLgen(is a senior fellow at Carnegie Europe in Brussels, where his research focuses on Turkish foreign policy, nuclear policy, cyberpolicy, and transatlantic relations. He is a founding partner of Istanbul Economics, a Turkish consulting firm that specializes in public and regulatory affairs, and chairman of the Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies, an independent think tank in Istanbul. Ülgen has served in the Turkish Foreign Service in several capacities: in Ankara on the United Nations desk (1990–1992); in Brussels at the Turkish Permanent Delegation to the European Union (1992–1996); and at the Turkish embassy in Tripoli (1996)), “Redefining the U.S.-Turkey Relationship,” Carnegie Europe, 7-26-2021, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/07/26/redefining-u.s.-turkey-relationship-pub-85016, accessed 7-24-2023] nishio TDI

The Turkey-U.S. relationship has long been defined as a strategic alliance underwritten by NATO. Today, this definition has become obsolete and does not capture the new reality of this relationship. Turkey undoubtedly will remain a strong NATO ally, but its relationship with the United States will no longer be shaped by the power asymmetry of this military alliance. In other words, the reality of the United States being the main security provider will not be sufficient to override and contain the centrifugal trends that have shaped the relationship since the end of the Cold War and that have gained momentum in the past decade as a result of the growing divergences between Ankara and Washington. These differences are not only the result of Turkey’s democratic deficit and its quest for a more independent foreign policy but also of the structural changes in global and regional geopolitics. In addition, the current Turkey-U.S. relationship is handicapped by such a large mutual trust deficit that it stands apart from other gulfs in Washington’s bilateral ties with other NATO nations.

The reaction of the Biden administration to this uncomfortable reality has been to seek to transpose to Turkey the conceptual framework that initially was designed to undergird the relationship with adversaries like China and Russia. This approach postulates that there will be unbridgeable differences between the United States and its diplomatic counterparts. The United States will not concede on its established positions for the sake of maintaining an improved climate for its bilateral ties. At the same time, it will seek to collaborate with these countries in other areas where a convergence of policies can be secured. For instance, Washington will continue to criticize the human rights abuses in China or the aggressive politics of Russia while at the same time urging these countries to cooperate on climate change and the global pandemic. This willingness to accept and manage differences while at the same time seeking commonalities defines the Biden administration’s emerging policy toward its strategic rivals. In stark contrast to Turkey’s status as a NATO ally, the White House seems inclined to transpose this frame of relationship to Turkey as well. The lack of any serious reaction in Washington to Ankara’s demands to reassess the U.S. position on the Syrian PYD/YPG or even on the S-400 issue is evidence, at least so far, of this observation.

This “clinical” approach is bound to fail, however; Turkey is not an adversary, and hence the categorical separation of areas of agreement and cooperation from areas of disagreement is unrealistic. Unlike in the case of the United States and its true adversaries, the perpetuation of areas of dispute will always hinder the scope of U.S. collaboration with Turkey. The underlying alliance relationship has a built-in expectation of solidarity and mutual trust. Without these values, the bilateral relationship cannot function effectively.

### 1NC – Poseidon

#### Poseidon doesn’t work and will never be used – basic physics, and any tsunami in the Black Sea would hit Russia too.

**Mosher 18**

Mosher, D. (2018). [Interviewing Greg Spriggs, a nuclear-weapons physicist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory “A new Russian video may show a “doomsday machine” able to trigger 300-foot tsunamis — but nuclear weapons experts question why you’d ever build one”. Business Insider. <https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-doomsday-weapon-submarine-nuke-2018-4>. cactus

The problem with blowing up nukes underwater putin doomsday weapon kanyon satus 6 madnessgenius ccbysa4 An annotated diagram of Russia's so-called doomsday machine autonomous submarine nuclear weapon. Brookings Institution; Madnessgenius (CC BY-SA 4.0) Some experts question the purpose and effectiveness of Putin's potential new weapon, given the far more terrible destruction that nuclear explosions can inflict when detonated aboveground. Greg Spriggs, a nuclear-weapons physicist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, said a 50-megaton weapon "could possibly induce a tsunami" and hit a shoreline with the energy equivalent to a 650-kiloton blast. But he also suggested that it "would be a stupid waste of a perfectly good nuclear weapon." That's because Spriggs believes it's unlikely that even the most powerful nuclear bombs could unleash a significant tsunami after detonating underwater, especially miles from shore. "The energy in a large nuclear weapon is but a drop in the bucket compared to the energy of a [naturally] occurring tsunami," Spriggs told Business Insider last year. "So any tsunami created by a nuclear weapon couldn't be very large." For example, the 2011 tsunami in Japan released about 9.3 million megatons of TNT energy. That's hundreds of millions of times as much as the bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945 and roughly 163,000 times as much as the Soviet Union's test of Tsar Bomba on October 30, 1961. Plus, Spriggs said, the energy of a blast wouldn't all be directed toward shore — it would radiate outward in all directions, so most of it "would be wasted going back out to sea." A detonation several miles from a coastline would deposit only about 1% of its energy as waves hitting the shore. That scenario may be more likely than an attack closer to shore, assuming US systems could detect an incoming Poseidon torpedo. But even if such a weapon exploded on the doorstep of a coastal city or base, its purpose would be questionable, Spriggs said. "This would produce a fraction of the damage the same 50 MT weapon could do if it were detonated above a large city," Spriggs said. "If there is some country out there that is angry enough at the United States to use a nuclear weapon against us, why would they opt to reduce the amount of damage they impose in an attack?" Why would Putin develop a 'doomsday machine'? valdimir putin russia icbm missile election speech march 1 2018 reuters sputnik news agency RTX4ZS89 Russian President Vladimir Putin. Sputnik Photo Agency/Reuters It's still unknown whether Russia has really developed this underwater weapon, though the Trump administration addressed its possible existence in the US' most recent nuclear posture review. If realized, the "doomsday machine" would join thousands of nuclear weapons in Russia's arsenal. In Lewis' 2015 article, he wrote that there was speculation that the underwater weapon might be "salted," or surrounded with metals like cobalt, which would dramatically extend fatal radiation levels from fallout for at least several months, or possibly even decades. That's because the burst of neutrons emitted in a nuclear blast could transform those metals into long-lived, highly radioactive chemicals and sprinkle them all over. "What sort of sick bastards dream up this kind of weapon?" Lewis wrote, noting that such salted weapons were featured in the 1964 science-fiction Cold War parody film "Dr. Strangelove." russia underwater missile Sky News But Spriggs said the fallout — also called "source term" — from an underwater explosion would be dramatically reduced. "In reality, the vast majority of the source term will never escape from the ocean as air-borne particles," Spriggs told Business Insider via email in April. "Most of the fission products and activation products that are thrown into the air during the explosion will be trapped in the water droplets in the water spout and will fall back to the ocean within just a few 1000 feet from the detonation point." But if a nuclear bomb were dropped from the air, "almost 100% of the source term [...] ends up on the land," Spriggs said. So the fallout from a "salted" weapon blown up above a target could "be many, many orders of magnitude worse than the fallout produced by an underwater detonation." To Lewis, it doesn't necessarily matter whether the nuclear torpedo will be completed or if the descriptions and videos are Russian posturing designed to prevent the US from attacking Russia or its allies. "Simply announcing to the world that you find this to be a reasonable approach to [nuclear] deterrence should be enough to mark you out as a dangerous creep," Lewis said.

## T – Military Presence

### Presence = Only Troops

#### Presence is only troops – from NATO

**NATO 6/23** [(NATO’s purpose is to guarantee the freedom and security of its members through political and military means. NATO is an alliance of countries from Europe and North America. It provides a unique link between these two continents, enabling them to consult and cooperate in the field of defence and security, and conduct multinational crisis-management operations together. “NATO’s military presence in the east of the Alliance” NATO, June 22 2023 <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm> ] EL TDI

NATO’s forward presence comprises eight multinational battlegroups, provided by framework nations and other contributing Allies on a voluntary, fully sustainable and rotational basis. The battlegroups operate in concert with national home defence forces and are present at all times in the host countries. All eight battlegroups are fully combat-capable formations

The battlegroups are not identical; their size and composition are tailored to specific geographic factors and threats. Overall, military requirements guide each battlegroup’s composition.

Today, troops and personnel from all Allies serve, train and exercise together, representing a strong expression of Alliance unity and solidarity. Forces from contributing nations rotate in and out of the battlegroups; at any given time, they may be deployed to the battlegroups or stationed in their home countries with the ability to deploy rapidly, if needed.

## Assurances DA

### 1NC Link

#### The plan crushes Turkish assurance—causes wildfire prolif that spreads through the Middle East and causes nuclear war

Garfinkle ‘18 (Adam Garfinkle; PhD, senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies @ the Nanyang Technological University; 9/3/18; “The U.S.-Turkish Unraveling and the Arabs”; American Interest; <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/09/03/the-u-s-turkish-unraveling-and-the-arabs/>)

Unfortunately, most country and regional experts do not think in strategic military terms, and most people who do think in strategic military terms either cannot or do not think like country or regional experts. So there is a disconnection here, which, again, explains why most of the recent acerbic American commentary on U.S.-Turkish troubles never even mentions nuclear weapons or their larger ramifications for European security. I sympathize with the experts’ frustration, but it is a mistake to conclude that there is nothing left to lose; and as I laid out in my most recent piece in these pages, I shudder particularly at the implications of threatening to remove U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey at a time like this. Those weapons still bind Turkey to both NATO and United States in a major strategic relationship, if clingingly at this point on account of the bad political blood flowing all about. This kind of relationship is traditionally called extended deterrence, which means that the United States pledges to protect ultimate Turkish security interests with its own weapons—in this case based on Turkish soil—so that Turkey need not deploy such weapons of its own. Aside from being considered necessary to protect NATO and other allies during the Cold War, the U.S. provision of extended deterrence has been, since the early years of the nuclear age, a key element in its grand strategy, which has included the imperative to suppress security competitions in key regions of the world. The reasons for wanting to suppress such regional security competitions have been several. First, competitions between and among allies—Turkey and Greece, for example, over Cyprus—were thought to provide opportunities for adversaries to divide alliances and complicate alliance management.1 Second, competitions could breed local arms races, and thus invite ambient insecurity and raise the costs of any crises gotten out of hand. Third, some arms races could lead to weapons-of-mass-destruction proliferation, threatening the global security commons in general and generating a more dangerous world overall for the United States, as webmaster of the system, to manage. From the U.S. point of view, minimizing the number and size of wars and minimizing WMD proliferation constituted an act of doing good and doing well simultaneously: It was valuable for most others even as it was also valuable for the United States at the pinnacle of the postwar pecking order. The Cold War is over, but the imperative to limit WMD proliferation remains—and so back to the Turkish situation we must go. Consider that Turkey sits in a regional environment in which states armed with nuclear weapons, or prospectively armed with nuclear weapons, are abundant. If a statesman or military planner sits in a swivel chair in Ankara and rotates 360° around, he can barely catch his breath between identifying actors capable of targeting Turkey with nuclear weapons: Russia, Pakistan, India, Israel, France, the United Kingdom, the United States both from its homeland and from other points in Europe, and of course prospectively Iran.2 Now, the logic of the security dilemma is such that in the absence of the credible U.S. provision of extended deterrence, Turkey would feel pressure to develop its own nuclear weapons. That it has not exerted itself in that direction, despite its formidable engineering and scientific capacities, illustrates the stability of Turkish trust in U.S. protection—until recently—and the ability of both sides to bracket the core security relationship away from various disagreements. As with other nuclear-armed states, should Turkey go its own way it would do so with no active intention of actually using such weapons, but rather as a kind of insurance policy against diplomatic extortion at the hands of other nuclear-armed powers. But of course if Turkey, no longer tethered to U.S. security protection in one way or another, developed nuclear weapons for such a purpose, other regional states would probably feel obliged to develop or otherwise acquire their own weapons, if they could, as an insurance policy against nuclear extortion by Turkey.3 They have already practiced that way of thinking in reaction to the possibility of an Iranian nuclear breakout, of course. Indeed, that kind of hedging behavior is exactly what analysts have discussed for many years now as the so-called N+ danger inherent in the development of Iranian nuclear weapons. It is not just the danger posed by Iranian nuclear weapons, bad enough as that would be, but the mousetrap effect of proliferation that would likely drive other states to want such an insurance policy: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Algeria, and so on. Now, some observers have argued that nuclear weapons are really not very important after all. If the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as China, France, and the United Kingdom, survived the Cold War without any nuclear use, it must be because deterrence is easy and hence stable, since all rational people know that the weapons are unusable save for the since-become-impossible exception of a state holding a monopoly over them. One well-known scholar, Kenneth Waltz, argued persistently that the more nuclear the weapons the better—because they would sober everyone up and lead to more stability and fewer wars. Happily, those with actual government responsibility did not agree. It is unspeakably lazy thinking to glibly superimpose the U.S.-Soviet Cold War deterrence experience onto places like the Middle East. It is, after all, one thing to maintain stable deterrence when there are only two, or a small number of, nuclear powers, and quite another to maintain stable deterrence when the number of nuclear actors gets larger and becomes somewhat open-ended as more states lean that way. Under such conditions it becomes much more difficult to calculate what a sufficient deterrent is, and so efforts to make sure of having “enough” can touch off a multilateral arms competition in which sufficiency becomes an ever-moving target, almost impossible to hit. At the same time it becomes much more difficult to imagine crisis stability if one or more states resort to launch-on-warning deployment postures, which are more likely when young arsenals are small and unprotectable against preemptive attack. Other important potential differences between U.S.-Soviet Cold War deterrence and potential multiparty deterrence in the Middle East exist, too. Let us note just three. First, U.S. and Soviet arsenals displayed clear lines of civil-military authority in highly institutionalized state systems, but many Middle Eastern countries lack both such clear lines of authority and highly institutionalized arrangements, being instead looser and more personalized by nature. Second, it was taken for granted that both U.S. and Soviet leaderships cared about the safety of their populations, a necessary assumption for effective deterrence. But in some heterogeneous and authoritarian Middle Eastern countries this premise may not so surely apply—think both Iraq and Syria under minoritarian (and coincidentally Ba‘athi) leadership, both of which committed mass murder against its own citizens. And third, U.S.-Soviet deterrence operations became inextricably bound up in the minds of observers with intercontinental ballistic missile delivery systems. The result is that some people today think that if missiles can be limited in one way or another, then the dangers of nuclear weapons, even if they come to exist, would be much mitigated. This is delusional because it is technologically obtuse. You need intercontinental ballistic missiles if you’re trying to shoot a warhead across an ocean. But if your enemy target is not across an ocean, but, as in the Middle East, quite nearby, airplanes are immensely less expensive and more reliable as delivery systems. The basic point is that in both theory and practice, there is little difference between the proliferation stimulating effects of a Turkish nuclear weapons breakout and an Iranian one. So if the U.S.-Turkish strategic partnership unravels, logic does indeed suggest a Turkish effort to develop its own nuclear capabilities. (Of course, the same kinds of pressures pertain to other key countries were they to lose, one way or another, their U.S. nuclear umbrellas, including Germany, Japan, South Korea, and others.) If that happens, the Turkish government could probably develop deliverable nuclear warheads at least on its side of the ocean within two to three years. If the Iranian government had thought for its own good reasons to avoid overt testing and breakout postures once the nuclear deal expires by calendar or “is expired” by volition, a Turkish bomb would make that posture far more difficult to justify. One could therefore imagine a situation of twinned or near-simultaneous breakouts of Turkish and Iranian nuclear weapons even a mere three, four, or five years from now. The shock to the region would be profound, and possibly very dangerous. It almost goes without saying that these larger strategic implications of the current U.S.-Turkish disagreement bear significantly on the security of U.S. allies, friends, and associates in the Arab world. First of all, any significant weakening of the structure of the U.S. alliance system diminishes the reputation and effective power of the U.S. government, and hence its ability to protect its friends and associates even outside the core of that alliance system. The United States does not have explicit defense treaty obligations, as ratified by the U.S. Senate according to the U.S. Constitution, with any Arab state on a par with its obligations within NATO, ANZUS, and its bilateral obligations to Japan and South Korea in Asia. Nevertheless, its longstanding ties to Jordan and Saudi Arabia, its special arrangements with Egypt since 1973, its more recent ties with Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar, and its looser but still friendly arrangements with Morocco and Tunisia, are all affected by both America’s reputation as a reliable and sympathetic partner and its willingness to affirm consistently its interests in those relationships. In a sense, America’s associated Arab governments (whatever one thinks of them) have been indirect but still real beneficiaries of a strong NATO, not much less so than European “neutral” countries such as Sweden, Finland, and Austria, or Israel for that matter. This is why the fact that some Arab leaders rejoiced at the coming of the Trump Administration now looks so maladroit. They rejoiced because the new President clearly took a far less benign view of the potential for a major amelioration of U.S. relations with Iran. Some of these leaders had previously urged the Obama Administration to “cut off the head of the snake,” not to cozy up in bed with the snake, so to them, Trump seemed a huge improvement. This, however, was a narrow and shortsighted judgment. It has since become clear that the Trump Administration is busy with an historically unprecedented act of great power self-abnegation. The President does not believe in any but zero-sum relationships. He thinks of inherited alliance ties on an entirely transactional basis, and the thinking—such as it is—proceeds almost exclusively in the literal “coin” of trade dollar numbers. Trump is not just a protectionist in trade; he is a mercantilist in terms of overall statecraft—an approach that had heretofore been obsolete for nearly two centuries, and for good reason. Trump’s reticence to think of the United Stated as a provider of global common security goods has expressed itself in his manifest desire to have nothing to do with Syria; his instinct to leave, and let the Russians have their way with it, has been restrained only by dint of great and subtle effort by key advisers. This instinct shows even more clearly in the President’s dour attitude toward the Article 5 pledge that is the very foundation of NATO, and toward the European Union which, however troubled at present, has been a major postwar project of every U.S. administration—again, for good reason. In short, this Administration’s admittedly tougher attitude toward Iran does not presume any willingness to take significant risks on behalf of Arab associates who may find themselves in some sort of trouble. In this context, Turkey has been and remains special as a link between NATO-Europe and the Near East. During the Cold War the U.S. government explicitly guaranteed Turkey’s borders with the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, as a Warsaw Pact Soviet ally. It managed Turkey’s border with Greece as an intra-NATO affair, again in the interest of suppressing regional security competitions among allies. Successive U.S. administrations did not formally guarantee Turkey’s borders with Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Informally, however, those countries aligned with the Soviet Union and possessing a Soviet-supplied order of battle (Iraq and Syria) were considered threats and were addressed accordingly. For example, the Soviet government used its position in Syria, largely via Syria’s Kurdish community, to build up and support the PKK inside Turkey. Arguably, that was a factor in stimulating a 1980 Turkish military coup—a development that clearly concerned the U.S. government and complicated the bilateral relationship. So Turkey had a dual status as a U.S. ally—formal with respect to its NATO-facing flanks, informal but still real with respect to its Near Eastern flanks. Of course, things have changed: There is no more Soviet Union and Iraq is no longer a Russian client; but Russia’s role in Syria, with Iran and for a time ISIS playing roles in the context of the revenant Kurdish question, is if anything more important to Turkey than ever. The Russian position in Syria gives it considerable leverage over Turkey, so much so that in the current declined state of U.S.-Turkish relations, the U.S. government is at a loss to offset it at reasonable cost or risk. The United States and Turkey have had, at best, sometimes overlapping and sometimes incongruent interests in all of these shifting sands of events, which in the absence of a dominant Soviet threat has vastly complicated the bilateral relationship. Suffice it to say that if Turkey were indeed to fall away from its core strategic relationship with the United States it would have different effects on the strategic environment in Europe and in the Near East. For one thing, as to the Near East, one needs to think of the U.S. military and intelligence footprint in the region as an integrated whole: Assets at Incirlik cover the Gulf as well as the Levant, just as al-Odeid in Qatar, as a command-and-control facility for air power, covers Afghanistan as well as the Gulf. The same can be said, more or perhaps less, about the basing of the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain and the concentration of U.S. intelligence assets in Jordan: These assets radiate generally, their reputational clout transcending the specific countries in which they are located. When it comes to the Near East, the end of the U.S.-Turkish strategic relationship would basically come down to this: Instead of Turkey being part of a coherent, stabilizing, and protective U.S.-led power in the region, it would play a more independent and divisive role.4 One case in point is already manifest: When the Saudi/UAE-Qatari spat broke out in June of this past year, the Turkish leadership sent troops to Qatar as a symbol of its support; and just recently, in the face of punitive U.S. tariffs slapped on Turkey, Qatar pledged $15 billion in investment to ease the impact. Were the U.S.-Turkish strategic partnership to fully end, the political and geostrategic landscape of the Levant and the Gulf would be transformed on account of a truly independent, unfettered Turkish policy—in ways we can study, but cannot possibly know for sure. Some of the scenarios one can imagine are fairly stunning. For example, there was an extended time, before the United States even existed, when Turks and Persians tried to kill one another in large numbers. The Ottoman-Safavid wars raged for much of the 16th century, their enmity reshaping the sectarian bounds within dar al-Islam. But as much tragedy as those wars caused back then, it pales in comparison to the destruction that an Iranian-Turkish nuclear war would cause in the 21st century for all the peoples of the region. Of course there is nothing inevitable about Turkish-Iranian enmity in the years ahead; but given the sectarian, cultural, and strategic cleavages between the two, only a fool would rule it out completely. It therefore behooves everyone, each according to their own capacities, to do everything possible to prevent the development of additional independent nuclear weapons capabilities in or near the Middle East. For the moment, everything possible certainly includes not threatening to remove U.S. nuclear weapons from Turkey, let alone actually doing it, for that would be the single most powerful motivating force behind a Turkish decision to build its own nuclear weapons arsenal. The U.S. government must not allow its pique at President Erdoğan to displace its good and common sense—whatever remains of it—despite what some experts may now be saying. For note well: It would be much harder, and perhaps impossible, to reknit the strategic relationship in the post-Erdoğan era if the core military-strategic understanding upon which it has been based were no longer in existence. A decision of this kind, whether sparked by a judgment on the U.S. or the Turkish side, is not a toggle switch that one can throw this way or that with equal ease. It would produce something more like a Humpty Dumpty scenario. As one current head of state likes to say, “Not good.”

## Deterrence DA

### 1NC Link

#### Turkey’s bases are key to check back against Russia

TRT 19 [(TRT World, provides worldwide news and current affairs focusing on Turkey, Europe, Africa, and Western and Southern Asia), “Why are US military bases in Turkey so crucial for Washington?”, <https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/why-are-us-military-bases-in-turkey-so-crucial-for-washington-32243>, 2019] SS TDI

The US also allied with the YPG, the Syrian wing of the PKK, which is recognised as a terrorist organisation by Turkey, the US and NATO.

Turkey is the second biggest army in NATO. Since the 1950s, its bases have helped the alliance in protecting its southern wing against perceived threats emerging from the former Soviet Union and its successor state Russia.

But Washington’s recent moves endanger the relations between the two NATO allies a great deal as the US domestic political turbulence puts both countries’ regional interests at stake.

Why is Incirlik air base a crucial station for the alliance?

Since 1956, the US has operated strategic reconnaissance missions from Incirlik air base to the areas close to the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea and Central Asia, mainly to follow the moves of the former Soviet Union and later Russia and its allies.

In 2004, the base was reportedly one of the centres of Washington’s largest military movement concerning Iraq in the US history, providing its troops what they need during their stops there after their comeback from deployments.

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the base had also been a principal focal point for Washington’s Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.

Since 2014, the base was used to conduct for operations against Daesh in Syria and Iraq.

Beyond regular military missions, the Incirlik base hosts at least 50 B61 nuclear bombs in its hangars, demonstrating its strategic significance for Washington and NATO.

The base has been one of the unique locations, holding US nuclear weapons alongside with Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, since the Cold War.

#### US TNWs in Turkey are key to deterrence and Turkey alliance.

Alkış, M.A., 2023. Türkiye in the New World Order: The Nuclear Debate. <https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Muhammed-Ali-Alkis-2/publication/370779899_Turkiye_in_the_New_World_Order_The_Nuclear_Debate/links/64636ed7f43b8a29ba53c1e8/Tuerkiye-in-the-New-World-Order-The-Nuclear-Debate.pdf> [byeongmin]

Türkiye’s foreign and security policies are shaped by both independent variables, such as its history, geographical position, fears, and traumas, and dependent variables, such as international and domestic developments. While there are some exceptions, it could be argued that Türkiye has developed alliances and pursued a defensive realpolitik approach through multilateralism and cooperation with the international community. This security approach has been developed and implemented in line with the country’s threat perceptions, while the primary determinant of Turkish foreign policy has always been the principle of **maintaining equilibrium in the wider region**. These foreign and security policies mean that domestic, regional, and international stability reinforces Türkiye’s security and is basic to the country’s approach to nuclear weapons in particular. 19

In this framework, as a member of the nuclear-armed Alliance since 1952, Türkiye has **embraced NATO’s security guarantees** and extended deterrence as the cornerstone of its security policy.20 Article 5 of the NATO charter establishes the basis of the “positive security guarantees” given to Türkiye or any other NATO member, which state that an attack on any member is an attack on all of them. This means that **Türkiye’s entire territory is protected by NATO’s nuclear umbrella, deterring any possible nuclear attack** from other states. Furthermore, Türkiye has been hosting B61 nuclear weapons on its soil at the İncirlik Air Base under nuclear sharing arrangements as part of the NATO extended deterrence capability, which has been criticised as a violation of the country’s NPT commitments. As a term with roots in the Cold War period, “extended deterrence” means that the United States is ready to retaliate with nuclear weapons against adversaries if a NATO member state comes under nuclear attack. Since the beginning of the Cold War this arrangement has served as a way of maintaining credibility, reassuring NATO allies, and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons among NATO members. As a part of this policy, the United States forward-deployed tactical nuclear weapons in several NATO states, including Türkiye.21

Since the end of the Cold War, even though Türkiye’s geopolitical concerns have been replaced with diverse threats predominantly emanating from the Middle East rather than from a political-military superpower to the country’s north, this new threat perception in the 1990s and 2000s did not result in a profound diversion from the previous Turkish military strategic understanding concerning the stationing of tactical nuclear weapons on its soil.22 In addition, the country has continued to attach non-military **importance to the US nuclear weapons in Türkiye as a symbol of the status of the Turkish-US defence partnership**, which in turn has political implications.

Among the Turkish public, there is still broad support for Türkiye’s continued participation in the **NATO collective defence system**. As a NATO member state, Türkiye’s entire territory has been protected under NATO’s nuclear umbrella, deterring any possible nuclear attacks from other states. This suggests that Türkiye’s nuclear future will remain firmly linked to extended deterrence to address its security concerns, on the one hand, and comply with its commitments to the international non-proliferation regime, on the other.23 In this regard, Türkiye’s national security priorities still require a robust system of deterrence for defensive purposes, which has been historically maintained by the presence of tactical nuclear weapons on Turkish soil and is also maintained to counterbalance the offensive capabilities of countries that Türkiye considers to be its regional threats. This means that NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements will continue to be the cornerstone of Türkiye’s national security and a symbol of its commitments to NATO, despite recent negative developments such as the country’s acquisition of a mobile surface-to-air S-400 missile system from Russia, which resulted in the imposition of US sanctions on Türkiye and the country being expelled from the F-35 multirole combat aircraft programme, because the S-400 is believed to pose a risk to the NATO alliance and the F-35.24

#### Turkey is running away from the US and towards Russia. Maintaining deterrence is key to solving Middle East and Russia war.

Hess 6-22-2022, Central Asia fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (Maximillian, “Why the West Should Make Peace With Erdogan Now: He is the one unsavory character the West urgently needs better relations with.,” Foreign Policy, [https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/22/turkey-erdogan-ukraine-russia-war-west-us-geopolitics-black-sea-europe-energy/?tpcc=recirc\_latest062921) [byeongmin]](https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/22/turkey-erdogan-ukraine-russia-war-west-us-geopolitics-black-sea-europe-energy/?tpcc=recirc_latest062921)%20%5bbyeongmin%5d%20%20) TDI

The democratic West has a long and controversial history of entering alliances of convenience with dictators and strongmen around the world—unsavory but necessary partners in confronting threats to the international order. Denounced as ethically dubious, this sort of stance is also realist, balance-of-power politics par excellence. It enabled the world to unite to defeat Adolf Hitler in World War II and the West to win the Cold War. Atop the list of unsavory partners the **West urgently** needs better relations with today sits Turkish President Recep Tayyip **Erdogan**. That he is unsavory is clear: He has actively undermined Turkish democracy, undone decades of liberalization, weaponized migration, terrorized the Kurdish minority both at home and in neighboring Syria, and helped Iran violate U.S. sanctions. Most recently, he has threatened to block NATO membership for Sweden and Finland. It will take a long time before the West can genuinely trust him. However, the reality is that the West needs Erdogan more than ever. **Russia’s brutal, all-out war against Ukraine has vastly raised Turkey’s profile on the geostrategic chessboard.** Ankara has emerged as a key supplier of drones to Kyiv—shipments it has luckily shown no intention of halting. Ukraine’s chances of victory would be significantly improved if Turkish arms deliveries were expanded. Erdogan, who controls access to the Black Sea through the Turkish Straits, crucially shut the passage to warships in late February. At the same time, Ankara has also been willing to cooperate with Moscow on Ukraine where Erdogan sees an opportunity. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu discussed plans to secure a route for Ukrainian grain exports with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, in Ankara on June 8, reportedly asking for a 25 percent discount on Turkish grain purchases as part of the deal. Without Ankara on board, **any Western proposals to break the Russian blockade of Ukrainian ports are dead on arrival.** The West also needs Turkey on its side in the economic war against Russia. Ankara’s support alone can restrict the flow of sanctioned Russian goods in and out of the Black Sea, which continue even as Ukrainian ships are stuck in port. Ankara’s help is crucial in cutting ratlines for Russian money and kleptocrats. Turkey has become a major destination for Russian money (and oligarchs’ yachts) fleeing sanctions and plays a growing role in supporting Russian President Vladimir Putin’s new autarkic economy. Turkey is one of the few major countries that freely accept Russian payment, undercutting the impact of Western banking sanctions**. Bringing Turkey onboard would plug one of the largest holes in the sanctions regime.** Russia’s brutal, all-out war against Ukraine has vastly raised Turkey’s profile on the geostrategic chessboard. But most importantly, Turkey will be a key player in the reordering of European energy supplies, not least because it controls energy access through a number of crucial pipelines. The key to Europe’s Southern Gas Corridor strategy, for example, is gas from Azerbaijan supplied via Turkey’s Trans-Anatolian and Trans-Adriatic pipelines—inaugurated in 2018 and 2020, respectively—and feeding into the European gas grid in the Balkans and Italy. Erdogan is also actively seeking to develop Turkey’s own gas resources and potentially even link Israeli and Cypriot offshore gas fields to the European pipeline network. Such efforts are of course complicated by Greco-Turkish disputes over Cyprus and its surrounding waters. **A revived European-Turkish partnership may be the only way the Eastern Mediterranean’s rich energy resources can be fully utilized**. Such a partnership might also nudge Erdogan to make an about-face vis-à-vis Russia, where the inauguration of the TurkStream pipeline in 2020 signaled a new high point in Turkish-Russian relations. Finally, aligning with Erdogan would offer the West more geostrategic leverage over the Kremlin beyond the war in Ukraine. **Turkey is also a key player in three additional conflicts where Russia is involved:** Syria, Libya, and **the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over** Nagorno-Karabakh**.** Erdogan moved from a policy of benign neglect to active intervention in these conflicts over the past decade, motivated by a desire to boost Turkey’s role as a regional power independent of the West. **A resumed partnership with Erdogan offers further pressure points in the effort to constrain Moscow’s global influence**. For Erdogan’s drift away from the West and closer relations with Moscow to be reversed, it is important to understand what motivated it. Today, the West is paying a price for failing to listen to his concerns. The drift initially began in 2011, as the Arab Spring swept across North Africa and the Middle East. Erdogan was ebullient, as the uprisings offered the prospect of bringing Islamists similar to himself to power across the region. He felt betrayed when then-U.S. President Barack Obama failed to uphold his redlines in Syria and abandoned then-Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and publicly backed by Erdogan, when the Egyptian military ousted Morsi in a coup. “Turkey has learned the hard way that the U.S. is unwilling to invest in the region,” Muhammet Kocak, an international relations specialist based in Ankara, told me. Similarly, “Turkey’s security concerns have not been perceived as a particularly relevant issue in the NATO agenda,” said Elizabete Aunina, a doctoral researcher at the University of Amsterdam focused on Turkish security policy. But **what accelerated Erdogan’s drift away from the West**—and shift to Moscow—**was his sense of betrayal after** the 2016 failed Turkish coup, which he publicly accused the United States of fostering. He also felt abandoned by his NATO allies when **Washington withdrew its Patriot missile defense systems from Turkey** and when NATO barely even reacted after Turkey shot down a Russian fighter aircraft intruding on its airspace, the first such incident involving NATO and Russian or Soviet airpower in 60 years. Since then, Erdogan felt that Moscow offered a better route to improving his regional and domestic position. Turkish-Russian cooperation since then includes the TurkStream pipeline, plans for Russia to build a $20 billion nuclear power plant in Turkey, and the 2017 announcement that Ankara would buy Moscow’s S-400 missile defense system. And although Turkey and Russia have occasionally sparred—they back differing sides in the Syrian and Libyan civil wars, for example—relations have remained broadly warm and manageable. That only increases the potential strategic leverage the West would gain if it reversed Erdogan’s orientation. What carrot could the West offer Erdogan for abandoning Moscow? Turkey’s economic crisis may be just the opportunity. With annual inflation reaching 73.5 percent in May, currency reserves near all-time lows, and the Turkish lira down by 30 percent versus the dollar year-to-date following a 44 percent drop in 2021, Turkey’s risk of default has spiked. Foreign investors have fled the market. Desperately searching for fresh foreign capital, Erdogan even patched up relations with his key regional rival, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. It would be better for the West to offer Erdogan an economic lifeline than to allow Moscow to do so. The U.S. Federal Reserve and European Central Bank, for example, should consider offering Erdogan a currency swap line, a stabilizing instrument they have significantly expanded in recent decades. Access to dollars and euros could alleviate many of Ankara’s mounting economic challenges and set the stage for a more cooperative partnership. Erdogan knows he has a strong hand and is likely to make other demands. He has already exerted his leverage over Sweden’s and Finland’s desired accession to NATO, linking it to a freer hand for Turkey against the Syrian Kurds, who have been the West’s valiant allies in the fight against the Islamic State. Earlier this month, Erdogan announced plans for a new operation targeting them. He may well make demands about other regional interests, and he will certainly seek to blunt Western criticism of his domestic governance. These concessions could prove costly to other Western interests. There is clear hesitancy to engage Erdogan at the moment. The West’s strategy appears to be to “count on the possibility Erdogan will lose the [June 2023] elections,” according to Kocak. Counting on Erdogan to allow a free and fair election and a potential peaceful transfer of power a year from now is idealistic at best and hopelessly naive at worst. Erdogan is an unsavory character and will likely remain one. But it is in the West’s interest that he be on its side—not Russia’s—in order to weaken Putin and ensure Ukraine’s survival. **The opportunity is there, and it would be unwise of the West not to try.**

#### Middle east war causes extinction – it escalates

Saab 9-25, [Bilal Y. Saab is senior fellow and director of the Defense and Security Program at the Middle East Institute, and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University, The coming Middle East missile arms race, <https://thebulletin.org/2018/09/the-coming-middle-east-missile-arms-race/>]

The main reason Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have yet to pursue ballistic missiles is that Washington has managed for years to convince them not to. The last thing the United States needs in the Middle East is an offensive missile race, which could quickly lead the antagonists into a deadly military confrontation that drags Washington and Moscow into war. Missiles are inherently destabilizing weapons because of their potential to quickly escalate conflicts. Their flight times can be very short, and new technologies are dramatically improving their accuracy and lethality.

As if that were not scary enough, the nuclear future of the Middle East is also increasingly uncertain, now that the United States has withdrawn from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the deal that limited Iran’s nuclear development in exchange for sanctions relief. At the same time, at least half a dozen regional powers including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, and Qatar see peaceful nuclear energy as a long-term solution to their fossil-fuel dependence. The growth of nuclear power generation in the region could exacerbate the risk of nuclear proliferation, as the same technologies and materials are required to develop both nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. Should Middle East civilian nuclear development become militarized, possession of fleets of offensive missiles—arguably the most effective delivery vehicle for nuclear warheads—could magnify the potential danger.

### 2NR – Link

#### Deterrence credibility is good now, but fragile. Maintaining commitments is key.

Eldridge, W.G., 2009. The Credibility of America’s Extended Nuclear Deterrent: the Case of the Republic of Turkey. Air University, AU/AFF/NNN/2009-XX (April 2009), at< https://www. afresearch. org/skins/RIMS/display. aspx. [byeongmin]

In a 2008 essay for the Turkish paper Today’s Zaman, Turkish author Mehmet Kalyoncu provided a scenario in which Turkey decides to build nuclear weapons.1 His scenario envisioned declining US presence and influence in Iraq coupled with an increasingly aggressive Iran. While completing a nuclear weapons program, Iran increases aggressive rhetoric against Israel, fuels unrest in Iraq, and encourages domestic strife in Riyadh, Damascus, and Cairo. As a result, the Turkish public pressures the government to address the declining regional security issues and criticizes the ruling party for its reliance on western security alliances such as NATO, the United States, and the European Union. The United States and the European Union both fail to provide assistance for a Turkish nuclear weapons program forcing the Turks to turn to its old ally, Pakistan, for assistance. Kalyoncu’s fictional scenario includes many of the theoretical elements that influence the credibility of an extended deterrent: alliances, political relationships, regional issues, and trade. This chapter builds on the theory provided in the previous chapter and uses credibility elements to assess the strength of US extended nuclear deterrence for the Republic of Turkey. Additionally, it assesses the likelihood of Turkey pursuing a nuclear weapons program. The assessment concludes that the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence for Turkey currently is good but possibly eroding. This is occurring not because of nuclear reduction policies, nor due to recent nuclear missteps by the US Air Force, but because of the perceived weakening of the political-security relationship between the United States and Turkey.

## Terror DA

### 1NC

#### Terrorism threat is low now—but ISIS is still a threat

ODNI 2/6 [(Office of the Director of National Intelligence), Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2023-Unclassified-Report.pdf, February 6, 2023] SS TDI

GLOBAL TERRORISM

U.S. persons and interests at home and abroad will face a persistent and increasingly diverse threat from terrorism during the next year. Individuals and cells adhering to ideologies espoused by ISIS, al-Qa‘ida, or the transnational Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists (RMVE) movement pose a significant terrorist threat to U.S. persons, facilities, and interests. Iran and Lebanese Hizballah remain committed to conducting terrorist attacks and could seek to do so on U.S. soil. While ISIS and al-Qa‘ida suffered major leadership losses in 2022, degrading external operations and capabilities, both organizations’ offshoots continue to exploit local conflicts and broader political instability to make territorial and operational gains.

Even following the loss of several key ISIS leaders in 2022, ISIS’s insurgency in Iraq and Syria will persist as the group seeks to rebuild capabilities and replenish its ranks. The threat from ISIS against U.S. persons, facilities, and interests probably will remain greatest in regions where the group has an operational presence. ISIS’s ideology and propaganda, however, almost certainly will continue to inspire attacks in the West, including in the United States.

In Iraq and Syria, ISIS has slowed its operational tempo relative to when it controlled physical territory from 2014–19, probably because of logistical, financial, personnel, and leadership shortfalls.

ISIS’s threat to U.S. persons and interests is greatest in regions where ISIS possesses a dangerous affiliate such as Africa, Central and South Asia, and the Middle East.

In Afghanistan, ISIS–Khorasan will maintain its campaign against the Taliban and religious minorities with deadly repercussions for the country’s civilians. ISIS–Khorasan almost certainly retains the intent to conduct operations in the West and will continue efforts to attack outside Afghanistan.

#### Turkey key to suppress ISIS

DOS 1/9 [(U.S. Department of State), “U.S. Relations With Turkey (Türkiye)”, Bureau of European and Eurasian affairs, <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-turkey/>, January 9, 2023] SS TDI

U.S.-TURKEY RELATIONS

The U.S.-Turkey friendship dates to 1831, when the United States established diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire. After World War I and the founding of the Turkish Republic, the United States established diplomatic relations with the Republic of Turkey in 1927. The Economic and Technical Cooperation agreement – signed July 12, 1947 between the United States and Turkey – advanced the relationship further. The agreement implemented the Truman Doctrine and its policy “to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” The United States condemned the July 15, 2016, coup attempt in Turkey, and the United States continues to emphasize the importance of the Turkish government’s adherence to policies and actions that build public trust in the country’s democratic institutions and the rule of law, as well as upholding human rights commitments. Turkey is a key NATO Ally and critical regional partner, and the United States is committed to improving the relationship between our two countries. It is in our interest to keep Turkey anchored to the Euro-Atlantic community.

Security Cooperation

Turkey is an important U.S. security partner. Turkey has been a valued North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Ally since 1952. Turkey was a leader in the Alliance’s Resolute Support Mission, continues to contribute to security in Afghanistan, and serves as NATO’s vital eastern anchor, controlling (in accordance with international conventions) the straits of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, which link the Black Sea with the Mediterranean.

Turkey is engaged in intensive efforts to defeat terrorist organizations both inside and outside its borders, including the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP-C), and ISIS. As a vital member of the Defeat ISIS Coalition, Turkey opened its military bases to the United States and Coalition partners in July 2015. Since that time, Incirlik Air Base has been critical in the effort to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIS in Syria and Iraq.

Turkey contributes to international security alongside U.S. forces in Europe, the seas bordering Somalia, and in the Mediterranean. Turkey borders Greece, Bulgaria, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, and is a key partner for U.S. policy in the surrounding region.

#### ISIS resurgence is existential.

Target ’23 [Target Media Platform; independent communication platform emphasizing Middle East issues. May 2, 2023; “Leaked documents reveal ISIS resurgence attempts”; https://targetplatform.net/en/?p=2133] TDI

Confidential US documents shared by a reserve Air Force technician in online chat groups reveal the efforts of ISIS to resurrect. According to classified documents leaked by young Air Force technician Jack Teixera, ISIS is using Afghanistan to plan its attacks. At the same time, it continues to carry out its most wicked acts, such as planning terrorist attacks, especially in Europe, while trying to regain its chemical weapons capacity. In its report on the leaked documents, the Washington Post also states that Afghanistan has become a coordination zone for the Islamic State to plan attacks in Europe and Asia.

According to intelligence, ISIS had the intention to attack places such as embassies, churches, business centers, and the FIFA World Cup tournament that took place in Qatar last summer. The report of the Washington Post also marks that the documents reveal ISIS’ persistent efforts to gain expertise in creating chemical weapons. Last year, the United Nations Investigative Team for Accountability of ISIS (UNITAD) revealed that the Islamic State used chemical weapons in Iraq. It filed the findings that ISIS used chemical weapons in the areas it controlled in Iraq and Syria between 2014 and 2019. The newly leaked assessments indicate that the terrorist organization is aiming to provide specialty again.

The top-secret statement reads: “ISIS has been developing a cost-effective model for external operations that relies on resources from outside Afghanistan, operatives in target countries, and extensive facilitation networks. The model will likely enable ISIS to overcome obstacles – such as competent security services – and reduce some plot timelines, minimizing disruption opportunities.” Last month, the commander of US Central Command (CENTCOM), General Michael “Erik” Kurilla, also publicly announced that the Islamic State Khorasan (ISIS-K), the Afghan branch of the Islamic State, could launch attacks against US interests outside Afghanistan in less than six months.

## Democratic Conditions Counterplan

### 1NC

#### The United States ought to condition significantly reducing its military presence in the Republic of Türkiye by removing its presence in Incirlik air base on Turkish compliance with incremental tailored standards for adopting democratic reforms.

#### Turkish democratic backsliding is causing adventurism.

Max Hoffman 18 7-31-2018 Center for American Progress What Turkey’s Political Changes Mean for U.S.-Turkish Relations https://www.americanprogress.org/article/turkeys-political-changes-mean-u-s-turkish-relations/ Accessed 7-24-2023 CSUF JmB TDI

Despite taking a harder-line approach to Turkish government policies, it is important for the United States to demonstrate that it wants good relations with Turkish society writ large. To that end, civil society remains a way through which the West can productively engage Turkey at a time when high-level political relations are at a nadir. Broadening engagement to include issues that are both normative and pertinent to Turkey’s economic situation—such as rule of law, educational reform, and women’s participation—could be productive and help minimize public controversy in Turkey over U.S. support. Obviously, the more political the Turkish nongovernmental organization, the more problematic it might be for its members to work with U.S. partners.37 Support for civil society is also the best remaining avenue to supporting democratization in Turkey. One possibility is a congressionally mandated program to support engagement with Turkish nongovernmental organizations, along the lines of the Near East Regional Democracy program established to work primarily with Iranian nongovernmental organizations.38 Of course, the establishment of such a program for a NATO ally would be unprecedented, and any congressional action regarding Turkey is bound to be politically fraught. Yet, Turkey is not likely to be a reliable partner over the long term, absent renewed democratic progress or, at a minimum, an easing of political, ethnic, and social tension. While support for civil society will not change Turkey’s political trajectory on its own, it could help preserve the connective tissue that binds Turkey to the West as Turkey weathers its current period of democratic backsliding. Yet another way to informally address the current estrangement in bilateral ties is for the U.S. government to discreetly encourage Track II encounters between American and Turkish nonofficials who are intimately familiar with bilateral issues. Such encounters would help both sides understand the policy imperatives that may currently be lost in official miscommunication and public recrimination.

#### Placing conditions incentives good behavior

Lee 19, graduated with a Master in Public Policy degree from the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, et al, 2019 (Martha, “Partnering to Protect: Reforming US Security Assistance to Reduce Civilian Harm,” *Belfer Center*, <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/partnering-protect-reforming-us-security-assistance-reduce-civilian-harm>)

Others argue that the “total package” approach of US security assistance does provide the United States with real influence over partners, and thus a real opportunity to enforce conditions. Partners are dependent on American expertise to operate, maintain, and modernize weapons systems throughout their entire life-cycles. This dependency should give US officials leverage, but one expert noted that the US government is often “constitutionally incapable or unwilling to use that leverage” for fear of disrupting the bilateral relationship.256 Given this mixed record, policymakers might try to identify opportunities to implement positive conditionality: a conditions-based framework where partners are incentivized to demonstrate good behavior over time in exchange for security assistance. Rather than authorizing aid and then withholding it when confronted with undesirable behavior, the United States could identify specific positive actions the partner is open to taking, and the specific incentives the United States would provide if benchmarks were met. To implement this, the State Department could negotiate a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the United States and the partner. It should reflect the elements, including civilian protection measures, that would govern security assistance between the two countries over a certain period of time. Milestones should be built over the course of the MOU such that when the partner meets a goal, they are rewarded. If the partner fails to meet the milestone, they do not receive the agreed-upon security assistance. The implementation of this framework would have a real impact by lending predictability to the relationship and limit the potential for mismanaged expectations on both sides.257 One major hurdles would be overcoming entrenched bureaucratic tendencies to “shovel security assistance out the door,” as one expert put it.258 However, if tackled in a piecemeal fashion – for example, starting with a few “easy” partnerships and building on momentum and success – this approach could feasibly be implemented at either State or DoD.

#### Counterplan promotes democracy in NATO and is a pre-requisite to NATO viability

Matthijs 19 – Matthias Matthijs, assistant professor of international political economy at Johns Hopkins University, Senior Fellow for Europe Council on Foreign Relations (“Hearing on Democracy and the NATO Alliance: Upholding Our Shared Democratic Values”, before the Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy and the Environment, 11/13/2019, <https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/Democracy%20and%20the%20NATO%20Alliance.%20Upholding%20Our%20Shared%20Democratic%20Values.pdf>)

What can the United States and the European Union Do?

Both the United States through NATO and our European allies through the EU should do more to encourage common values like the rule of law and democracy in Turkey, Hungary and Poland. While it may be hard to achieve concrete results in the very short term, both organizations should be aware that they are playing a long game, and that none of the three current leaders in Ankara, Budapest, and Warsaw will be in power indefinitely. While lecturing allies and friends on democratic principles may easily backfire and be quickly condemned as hypocrisy, the US especially should stand by its enduring commitment to democratic freedoms and the rule of law in all its official (and unofficial) foreign policy statements. Going forward, the European Union can: • make its funding more conditional on abiding by democratic principles and rule of law and withhold funding if necessary. The EU is currently debating instituting tougher ‘rule of law’ conditions on its funding in the next budget cyle. • condemn anti-democratic countries directly, rather than focusing on economics, the EU could also rank countries based on political freedoms, by naming and shaming the worst performers. • encourage its mainstream pan-European political parties – especially the center-right EPP and the center-left D&S – to not allow parties with autocratic or illiberal tendencies within their political groupings. Going forward, the United States should: • continue to support civil society groups and free media in countries experiencing democratic backsliding. For instance, recent reports that Radio Free Europe would be recommencing operations in Hungary are a step in the right direction. • emphasize that NATO membership means rights as well as responsibilities beyond spending 2% of GDP on defense. NATO must be an alliance based on basic common democratic values. The transatlantic alliance has proven so strong and enduring not simply because of Realpolitik, but also because it has been an alliance based on a shared commitment to freedom and democratic values. If those values are no longer seen as common to the alliance, it will inevitably erode. • encourage overseas investment through OPIC in countries that show a strong commitment to the rule of law and democracy while showing a higher level of reluctance to support investment in regimes that are distmantling those institutions.

#### That saves the LIO. AND illiberalism shreds all NATO initiatives.

Tome 21, Professor at the Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa where he is currently Director of the Department of International Relations (Luis, “Future of NATO: Significant Insights from 2021 Meeting of NATO Ministries of Foreign Affairs,” [https://cesran.org/interview-with-professor-luis-tome-future-of-nato-significant-insights-from-2021-meeting-of-nato-ministries-of-foreign-affairs.html)](https://cesran.org/interview-with-professor-luis-tome-future-of-nato-significant-insights-from-2021-meeting-of-nato-ministries-of-foreign-affairs.html)//BB)

Question: Rising rightist or leftist populist political groups in Europe and the US indicate that they would be quite influential in their own national politics in the near future. Do you think that this could complicate NATO’s stance regarding democracy and freedom?

Luis Tome: Of course it can. The spread of nationalism, populism, authoritarianism and extremisms threatens the liberal international order and the security environment. And if national egoisms, populisms, autocratic tendencies and “illiberal democracies” flourish in NATO member countries, as is already happening, then it makes it very complicated for the transatlantic Alliance to be the bulwark for the defence and promotion of freedom, democracy and liberal order. Fortunately, there seems to be a sense of urgency within NATO today to put democratic values back at the heart of the transatlantic Alliance’s action. But we must recognise that the virus of nationalism and populism is difficult to fight even within NATO countries.

Question: There are too many significant points to cover in an interview, but as a closing question, I would like to have your comments on an issue that is the most important one regarding NATO’s future.

Luis Tome: The decisive factor for the evolution and future of NATO is the strengthening of its political dimension, namely dialogue, articulation, cooperation and political cohesion among Allied countries. Organisations are what their members make of them, and NATO is no exception. NATO is a military alliance, but it is also the main political forum of the transatlantic community of shared values and interests. Without political cohesion among Allies, powerful deterrent and defence capabilities have less value. Without constructive political dialogue, differences between member countries cannot be overcome or minimised. Without political cooperation, it is not possible to formulate common and coherent strategies. Without political articulation, the transatlantic Alliance will face many difficulties in projecting security and stability in its periphery, whether to the East or to the South; effectively confronting the many risks and threats; managing crises and conflicts; establishing fruitful partnerships with external partners; or dealing with major rivals such as Russia and China. Without political cohesion, it will not be possible for NATO to make the necessary re-adaptation to a geopolitical and security context in great transformation. Nor to be the pillar of democracy and liberal order that the Allies want and preach NATO to be. NATO’s military dimension remains robust, but the Alliance’s political dimension and political role are undervalued and underused. NATO’s future success depends on the ability of the Allies to leverage the political dimension of the transatlantic alliance.

#### LIO solves nuclear war, climate change and tech disruption – all existential

Harari 18, Professor of History at Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Yuval Noah, “We need a post-liberal order now,” *The Economist*, <https://www.economist.com/open-future/2018/09/26/we-need-a-post-liberal-order-now>)

The second thing to note about this vision of friendly fortresses is that it has been tried—and it failed spectacularly. All attempts to divide the world into clear-cut nations have so far resulted in war and genocide. When the heirs of Garibaldi, Mazzini and Mickiewicz managed to overthrow the multi-ethnic Habsburg Empire, it proved impossible to find a clear line dividing Italians from Slovenes or Poles from Ukrainians. This had set the stage for the second world war. The key problem with the network of fortresses is that each national fortress wants a bit more land, security and prosperity for itself at the expense of the neighbors, and without the help of universal values and global organisations, rival fortresses cannot agree on any common rules. Walled fortresses are seldom friendly. But if you happen to live inside a particularly strong fortress, such as America or Russia, why should you care? Some nationalists indeed adopt a more extreme isolationist position. They don’t believe in either a global empire or in a global network of fortresses. Instead, they deny the necessity of any global order whatsoever. “Our fortress should just raise the drawbridges,” they say, “and the rest of the world can go to hell. We should refuse entry to foreign people, foreign ideas and foreign goods, and as long as our walls are stout and the guards are loyal, who cares what happens to the foreigners?” Such extreme isolationism, however, is completely divorced from economic realities. Without a global trade network, all existing national economies will collapse—including that of North Korea. Many countries will not be able even to feed themselves without imports, and prices of almost all products will skyrocket. The made-in-China shirt I am wearing cost me about $5. If it had been produced by Israeli workers from Israeli-grown cotton using Israeli-made machines powered by non-existing Israeli oil, it may well have cost ten times as much. Nationalist leaders from Donald Trump to Vladimir Putin may therefore heap abuse on the global trade network, but none thinks seriously of taking their country completely out of that network. And we cannot have a global trade network without some global order that sets the rules of the game. Even more importantly, whether people like it or not, humankind today faces three common problems that make a mockery of all national borders, and that can only be solved through global cooperation. These are nuclear war, climate change and technological disruption. You cannot build a wall against nuclear winter or against global warming, and no nation can regulate artificial intelligence (AI) or bioengineering single-handedly. It won’t be enough if only the European Union forbids producing killer robots or only America bans genetically-engineering human babies. Due to the immense potential of such disruptive technologies, if even one country decides to pursue these high-risk high-gain paths, other countries will be forced to follow its dangerous lead for fear of being left behind. An AI arms race or a biotechnological arms race almost guarantees the worst outcome. Whoever wins the arms race, the loser will likely be humanity itself. For in an arms race, all regulations will collapse. Consider, for example, conducting genetic-engineering experiments on human babies. Every country will say: “We don’t want to conduct such experiments—we are the good guys. But how do we know our rivals are not doing it? We cannot afford to remain behind. So we must do it before them.” Similarly, consider developing autonomous-weapon systems, that can decide for themselves whether to shoot and kill people. Again, every country will say: “This is a very dangerous technology, and it should be regulated carefully. But we don’t trust our rivals to regulate it, so we must develop it first”. The only thing that can prevent such destructive arms races is greater trust between countries. This is not an impossible mission. If today the Germans promise the French: “Trust us, we aren’t developing killer robots in a secret laboratory under the Bavarian Alps,” the French are likely to believe the Germans, despite the terrible history of these two countries. We need to build such trust globally. We need to reach a point when Americans and Chinese can trust one another like the French and Germans. Similarly, we need to create a global safety-net to protect humans against the economic shocks that AI is likely to cause. Automation will create immense new wealth in high-tech hubs such as Silicon Valley, while the worst effects will be felt in developing countries whose economies depend on cheap manual labor. There will be more jobs to software engineers in California, but fewer jobs to Mexican factory workers and truck drivers. We now have a global economy, but politics is still very national. Unless we find solutions on a global level to the disruptions caused by AI, entire countries might collapse, and the resulting chaos, violence and waves of immigration will destabilise the entire world. This is the proper perspective to look at recent developments such as Brexit. In itself, Brexit isn’t necessarily a bad idea. But is this what Britain and the EU should be dealing with right now? How does Brexit help prevent nuclear war? How does Brexit help prevent climate change? How does Brexit help regulate artificial intelligence and bioengineering? Instead of helping, Brexit makes it harder to solve all of these problems. Every minute that Britain and the EU spend on Brexit is one less minute they spend on preventing climate change and on regulating AI. In order to survive and flourish in the 21st century, humankind needs effective global cooperation, and so far the only viable blueprint for such cooperation is offered by liberalism. Nevertheless, governments all over the world are undermining the foundations of the liberal order, and the world is turning into a network of fortresses. The first to feel the impact are the weakest members of humanity, who find themselves without any fortress willing to protect them: refugees, illegal migrants, persecuted minorities. But if the walls keep rising, eventually the whole of humankind will feel the squeeze.

### 2NR – Conditions K2 Democracy

#### US conditions forces Turkish democracy

Max Hoffman 18 7-31-2018 Center for American Progress What Turkey’s Political Changes Mean for U.S.-Turkish Relations https://www.americanprogress.org/article/turkeys-political-changes-mean-u-s-turkish-relations/ Accessed 7-24-2023 CSUF JmB TDI

This continuity means that there may be little visible change in many areas of government. But the shift is emblematic of Turkey’s transformation over the last decade from an institutional, bureaucratic state into a highly personalized one. This personalization will affect Turkey’s foreign policy management, which may become even more unpredictable than it was before, with ramifications for U.S. and EU policy. As just one element of this change, Western diplomats may find that long-time Turkish diplomatic or military contacts have diminished authority and responsibility as foreign and security policy development is centralized in the presidential palace.2 Given his complete personal control, it is time to take seriously President Erdoğan’s apparent desire for Turkey to chart a more independent course, one that shows less deference to the ties that have long bound Turkey to the Western security architecture. During the swearing-in ceremony in Ankara, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro hailed his Turkish counterpart as the “leader of the new multi-polar world.”3 Erdoğan and his advisers certainly share this view: They believe that the United States is in decline, that the world is fundamentally multipolar, and that Turkey deserves to be a center of gravity in its own right.4 They further feel that the West is hypocritical in its espousal of democratic values and human rights. Therefore, they have concluded that Turkey’s traditional, Western-oriented foreign policy is obsolete.5 This worldview has led Erdoğan to adopt a transactional approach toward the United States and Europe and cultivate ties with Iran, China, and—especially—Russia.6 Alongside this understanding of a changing world, President Erdoğan has built his domestic political legitimacy on an aggressive nationalism that includes at its core deeply anti-Western and anti-American rhetoric.7 This was on full display in Erdoğan’s recent electoral campaign, which relied heavily on anti-Western resentment, conspiratorial thinking, and the cultivation of a sense of national threat—all staples of the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) politics in recent years. Meanwhile, the election empowered the extreme nationalists of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). This will only reinforce the negative trends in the government’s political orientation, given the MHP’s deep suspicion toward the United States and hostility toward any reopening of dialogue with Kurdish populations in eastern Turkey and northern Syria. This issue brief considers the ramifications of these changes for U.S. policy, providing recommendations for how the U.S. government should approach bilateral relations with Turkey in the months ahead. It is a policy designed to maintain the viability of U.S.-Turkish relations while seeking to restore Turkish respect for U.S. interests. The effects of Turkish nationalism on U.S. policy Previously, U.S. policy sought to weather turbulent periods in U.S-Turkish relations by investing in institutional ties between the two governments. President Erdoğan’s complete control over the Turkish state means that once-authoritative institutions have been vastly weakened, while Erdoğan himself is the source of much of the bilateral tension. In the absence of strong institutions, Erdoğan’s worldview and perceived domestic political imperatives are decisive; these instincts and pressures, along with the well-documented policy disagreements of the last five years,8 have led him toward confrontation with the United States and Europe. The main stresses on relations between the United States and Turkey are well-known. Washington is angered by Turkey’s planned purchase of the Russian-made S-400 air defense system; its drift toward authoritarianism; and the arbitrary arrests of American citizens and local employees of U.S. consulates in Turkey. Meanwhile, Ankara is angered by ongoing U.S. support for the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) militia and the presence in the United States of Fethullah Gülen, a religious leader and former Erdoğan ally now accused of orchestrating the 2016 military coup attempt. Even if Turkey were to release its most prominent political prisoner, American citizen Andrew Brunson—as some continue to believe is a near-term possibility—there is little reason for optimism on the other subjects.9 American policymakers have long sought to adjudicate these issues through traditional government contacts, with some feeling that limited concessions will placate Turkey. This approach is increasingly outdated, because the problems are rooted in Turkey’s domestic political transformation rather than in the discrete bilateral issues outlined above. The aggressive nationalist strain that has emerged—assiduously cultivated by Erdoğan—is pushing the Turkish government toward confrontation rather than toward conciliation. The AKP’s political interests are served by rhetorical attacks on the United States; geopolitical hedging with Russia and other non-Western powers; and an aggressively anti-Kurdish security policy both at home and in Syria.10 This structural dynamic is unlikely to change in the midterm. The recent election results are likely to strengthen these tendencies, having affirmed to Erdoğan the nationalist mood of the electorate. Even if Erdoğan were inclined toward greater pragmatism on Kurdish issues, the MHP—and the nationalist right, more broadly—would likely have enough political leverage to sink any such initiative. These domestic political imperatives leave little room for rapprochement. Recommendations for the U.S. administration and Congress On a basic level, it remains clear that U.S.-Turkish relations are not likely to improve significantly unless the latter halts and reverses its drift toward authoritarianism, however unlikely that may be. The functional end of competitive politics in Turkey has transformed Western perceptions of that country as a fellow democracy. Still, the United States has very limited ability to shape Turkey’s domestic course, and the Trump administration is unlikely to prioritize human rights and democracy in Turkey. Nevertheless, this section offers recommendations as to how the U.S. government can realistically approach bilateral ties in President Erdoğan’s second term. This approach focuses on rebalancing bilateral relations and beginning to insulate the Western security architecture from a potential worst-case scenario; it would be imprudent not to prepare for a potential rupture in relations with Turkey. Re-establish balance in bilateral security ties It is time for Washington to try a new approach in U.S.-Turkish relations. For several years, Turkey has pursued a more independent and, increasingly, militarily aggressive foreign policy at odds with the interests of its Western allies—while continuing to enjoy the benefits of NATO membership in terms of know-how, technology, protection, and prestige. The centerpiece of this more independent line has been the cultivation of closer ties with Moscow.11 The military aggressiveness, meanwhile, has been in evidence along Turkey’s volatile southern border, with multiple large-scale, long-term ground incursions into Syria and Iraq and a violent crackdown on Kurdish insurgents in southeastern Turkey.12 Indeed, the longevity of Turkey’s military presence in both its southern neighbors—as well as the nonmilitary government infrastructure it is building in Syria—could be flashpoints for future conflict. Turkey might even request NATO support were Syria, Iran, or Russia to attack its forces in Syria or Iraq, though it could have little hope of receiving such support for unilateral operations taken outside its borders. For the sake of long-term bilateral ties, NATO cohesion, and regional security, the United States should try to halt this trend toward military and foreign policy assertiveness. Attempts at conciliation and concession are not working, so the United States should determinedly pursue its interests and hedge against continued Turkish drift.

### 2NR – Inducements Solve

#### Material inducements are a sufficient incentive

Ross and Dalton 20, Tommy Ross, non-resident senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Melissa Dalton, directs the Cooperative Defense Project and is a senior fellow and deputy director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, (“A ROADMAP FOR BETTER CHOICES FROM SECURITY PARTNERS,” *War on the Rocks*, <https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/a-roadmap-for-better-choices-from-security-partners/>)

Toward a Framework for Positive Conditionality

What if the United States had approached its relationship with Uganda differently in pursuit of shared objectives? It’s possible that if the United States had structured its assistance in a way that incentivized Uganda’s politicians and security officials to take specific steps toward clearly — and mutually — identified milestones, that could have led to the development of stronger capabilities for and commitment to civilian protection and governance by Uganda’s military over time. Instead, a reactive posture to human rights and corruption transgressions has had limited effects, and punitive measures may only strain the relationship and undermine possibilities for cooperation.

The United States should develop a framework for positive conditionality in security sector assistance to better shape political and security outcomes with partner countries. On balance an affirmative framework will offer the United States the widest latitude in shaping outcomes in a broad range of circumstances. This approach also does not rule out the sequencing of punitive steps — or a pause to assess partner performance.

First, this framework assumes an ex ante/positive approach to conditionality, at least in some manner. With the U.S. government providing security sector assistance to nearly 200 countries around the world, it is unlikely that the United States will be initiating a security sector assistance relationship wholly from scratch. An ex ante approach would focus on developing concrete plans, including triggers for clearly identified conditions, at the inception of an initiative or set of programs. It should involve a plan covering at least five years, identifying ultimate objectives and intermediate milestones, a theory of change for how objectives will be achieved, and metrics to provide a basis for assessing progress. Policymakers and planners can then link conditions to milestones and metrics. Moreover, such an approach builds on recognized best practices for capacity-building initiatives.

Second, the framework must include a partner government’s mutual participation in the creation of the assistance plan, the identification of objectives, and the agreement on conditions. The partner will be more incentivized to progress toward objectives when it understands and commits to such objectives based on its own identified interests. A memorandum of understanding, bilateral compact, or some other formal written instrument can commit both parties to its terms.

Third, the framework should structure conditions as positive inducements for the recipient to take steps toward milestones or objectives. Milestones could include completion of defense institutional reforms, starting with development of a process to align budget to strategy, progressing to completion of a first budget cycle with the new process, and culminating in institutionalization of the process through policy and/or law. They might also include progress toward capability or interoperability milestones (e.g., ability to conduct nighttime counter-terrorism operations in accordance with the laws of armed conflict or command and control and intelligence integration across platforms and systems). In addition, milestones could include transparency and accountability activities (e.g., publication of public budget, completion of audit, investigation of specific incidents of resource waste and abuse or diversion, establishment and activity of an independent third-party investigative unit for accountability).

Partners will likely respond to inducements that are material in nature, including access to an expanded variety of types of assistance and an expanded quantity of assistance. However, partners may also value incentives such as eligibility for key agreements to facilitate access and information and/or technology sharing (e.g., acquisition and cross-servicing, general security of military information, etc.) or eligibility for expanded partnership opportunities (e.g., National Guard State Partnership Program or the Military Personnel Exchange Program). Moreover, incentives may also be political, such as access to membership in certain organizations or eligibility for certain agreements.

### 2NR – Democratic Backsliding Crushes NATO

#### Turkey is playing spoiler for the alliance

Rogan 1/24 [(Tom, National Security Writer & Online Editor), “Turkey and Hungary should be suspended from NATO”, <https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/turkey-and-hungary-should-be-suspended-from-nato>, January 24, 2023] SS TDI

In order to be credible, a defensive military alliance requires the common confidence of its members that, should one member be attacked, other members will provide it with decisive support. Whatever other interests they may have with the United States and its NATO allies, it is now obvious that Turkey and Hungary cannot fulfill this expectation. Both nations should be suspended from the alliance.

While there would be legal complexities involved in any suspension, it would be possible. Moreover, action toward suspension might itself induce significant changes in Turkish and Hungarian policy.

The most immediate cause for Turkey's suspension is its obstruction of Finland and Sweden in their effort to join NATO. Turkey suspended related talks on Tuesday in response to Swedish protests, which have seen the burning of a Quran and an effigy of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The most immediate cause for Hungary's suspension is the kowtowing of its Prime Minister Viktor Orban to Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping. (Incidentally, Hungary is the only other member state yet to ratify Finland and Sweden's accession.)

Suspension isn't a step that should be taken lightly. Via its position at the Mediterranean entry point to the Black Sea and its proximity to Middle Eastern energy reserves, Turkey has long been a key NATO ally. As with Hungary, Turkey will hopefully one day restore NATO's confidence. Still, an examination of the NATO treaty outlines where both nations are in breach of their obligations.

Under the treaty's Article 2, a member commits to "contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions."

Neither Orban nor Erdogan is "strengthening their free institutions." On the contrary, both leaders have expanded state media dominance at the expense of truly free discourse. Both have cracked down on dissenting minority voices, politicians and activists, and nongovernmental organizations. Erdogan has thrown hundreds of journalists in prison, some simply because he says they insulted him.

Under Article 3, a member commits to "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack."

Erdogan has shredded this commitment with his purchase of Russia's S-400 air defense system, which is specifically designed to destroy NATO air forces. Doing so, Erdogan weakened NATO's credibility and endangered its aircrews.

Orban has shredded this commitment with his embrace of Russian intelligence activity and his undermining of European sanctions imposed on Russia. Those sanctions support NATO security by imposing costs for Putin's aggression in Ukraine and thus deterring the Russian leader's further aggression.

Under Article 8, a member "undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty."

Turkey has broken this pledge with the aforementioned S-400 purchase and Erdogan's demand that Sweden abandon its free speech laws and extradite people without regard for due process. Of equal note are Erdogan's threats toward fellow NATO member Greece, his wars of conquest in Syria, and his military support of Azerbaijan against Armenia. Yes, Turkey has legitimate grievances with regard to Kurdish terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria. But Erdogan's fetish for indiscriminate bombings is unacceptable.

Hungary has broken this pledge with its undermining of European sanctions and Orban's service as Xi and Putin's viceroy/servant boy within NATO and the European Union.

To emphasize, an alliance has no value unless its members retain shared trust. Under Orban and Erdogan, Hungary and Turkey can no longer command that trust within NATO. Until that changes, they must be separated from this alliance in which they now do more harm than good.

### 2NR – Leverages Nukes

#### Turkey wants nukes, US should leverage this to promote democracy

**Cagaptay 5/11** [( Dr. Soner Cagaptay, PhD is the Beyer Family fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute. He has written extensively on U.S.-Turkish relations, Turkish domestic politics, and Turkish nationalism, publishing in scholarly journals and major international print media… A historian by training, Dr. Cagaptay wrote his doctoral dissertation at Yale University (2003) on Turkish nationalism. Dr. Cagaptay has taught courses at Yale, Princeton University, Georgetown University, and Smith College on the Middle East, Mediterranean, and Eastern Europe.) “Even if Erdogan is defeated, Turkey is still up for grabs” May 11 2023, The Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/05/11/turkey-elections-democracy-vulnerable-russia/ ] EL TDI

The fall of populist President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, should it come in Sunday’s closely watched and closely contested election, could put Turkey firmly back on a democratic path. But Turkey’s actual geopolitical orientation is still up in the air. Western partners have an opportunity to help steer a post-Erdogan Turkey in the right direction.

They have the tools to do it.

In his first days as president, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, leader of the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), has promised to reestablish the rule of law. His broad six-party coalition has committed to releasing those wrongfully jailed under Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) and to lift restrictions on key freedoms. It has also promised to repair the autonomy of various institutions that have come under pressure from Erdogan’s government, including the judiciary. Given the Biden administration’s commitment to supporting democracies against autocracy, all of these changes would no doubt be warmly welcomed.

But the geopolitical calculus is less clear. Over the past decade, Erdogan has gradually steered Turkey away from the United States and Europe. Especially since the 2016 failed coup attempt in Turkey, he has formed a bond with Russian President Vladimir Putin, with the two leaders often meeting and agreeing on power-sharing deals in Syria, Libya and the South Caucasus. And although Turkey has provided drones and other military hardware to Ukraine, Erdogan has refused to participate in U.S.-led sanctions targeting Russia, providing the latter with valuable access to global markets.

Kilicdaroglu is no friend of Russia. In a recent interview with the Wall Street Journal, he said that Ankara would comply with Western decisions on sanctions. He has also pledged to steer Turkey closer to NATO and the European Union. He vowed to approve Sweden’s NATO accession — held up by Erdogan — before the alliance’s summit in July.

But Turkey’s deep economic bonds with Russia could prevent it from aligning completely with the West. In the Wall Street Journal interview, Kilicdaroglu gave a hint of how difficult this balancing act would be. He said that he would try to maintain Turkish investments in Russia, while supporting the broader Russia sanctions policy. Business realities would clearly limit his room for maneuver.

The prospect of U.S.-Turkish rapprochement is sure to upset Putin, who will be tempted to derail a Kilicdaroglu presidency. However, expect Putin to avoid directly confronting Turkey. Historically speaking, when Russia threatens the Turks, the latter fully align with the West.

Instead, Putin is likely to turn to his commercial weapon to target Turkey’s economy. Putin might ban tourist visits to Turkey (probably citing “security concerns”) and could seek to limit agricultural imports. He might also demand immediate payment of Ankara’s delayed energy bills — perhaps up to $4 billion — and impose higher prices on natural gas exports to Turkey. These steps would cost Turkey’s already fragile economy tens of billion dollars, probably triggering a currency crisis.

All of this has to be in the forefront of Kilicdaroglu’s mind. He knows that no coalition government has finished its full term since the country’s first coalition-led administration appeared on the scene in the 1960s. An economic meltdown, combined with coalition squabbling, would render his administration feeble and ineffective in the eyes of the electorate. These developments could allow Erdogan to stage a political comeback in the fashion of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

The E.U. and the United States could, however, help make Turkey’s transition to democracy irreversible.

Since the 1995 customs union, which covers only industrial goods, economic ties have formed the bedrock of E.U.-Turkey relations. Kilicdaroglu wants to deepen the union to also cover services. The E.U. should signal at the onset of a Kilicdaroglu presidency its willingness to do just that.

Washington could also play a key role — by restoring defense ties, the bedrock of U.S.-Turkey relations. One of the festering issues in the relationship centers on Erdogan’s decision to purchase the [S-400](https://archive.ph/o/FDqRs/https:/www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/07/12/what-is-russian-s-air-defense-system-why-is-us-upset-turkey-bought-it/) missile defense system from Russia. The United States expelled Turkey from its F-35 fighter jet program in 2019, and the next year slapped [sanctions](https://archive.ph/o/FDqRs/https:/www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/us-sanctions-nato-ally-turkey-over-its-purchase-of-russian-missile-defense-system/2020/12/14/f442c342-3e38-11eb-8bc0-ae155bee4aff_story.html) on Turkey’s defense industry.

The Biden administration ought to work hard on a way out of this impasse. If Kilicdaroglu would commit to not activating the S-400s, and agree to putting them under eventual joint custody with NATO, Washington ought to green-light Ankara’s request to purchase F-16 and F-35 fighter planes.

Gestures such as these won’t remove all friction between Turkey and its partners. For example, the United States’ support for the Syria-based Kurdish People’s Protection Unit (YPG) is sure to remain a sticking point in the relationship.

But taken together, both moves would send powerful signals to markets. Global investors have been paying close attention to Turkey’s geopolitical orientation, worried about what a drift into Russia’s orbit means for long-term returns. Showing that Turkey is firmly back in the transatlantic fold would invite large cash inflows — inflows that could help offset any critical losses Putin might inflict.

Although a Kilicdaroglu presidency is packed with uncertainties, if Turkey’s citizens pick democracy over autocracy, the United States and Europe must support this choice. A more democratic Turkey is within reach, and would benefit everyone.

## Sanctions Counterplan

### 1NC

#### The United States should publicly condemn Turkish involvement in conflicts, initiate a targeted sanctions program and a complete arms embargo on the Republic of Türkiye conditioned on withdrawal of Turkish aggression.

#### That's key to solve adventurism.

Khzmalyan '20 [Erik and Armen Sahakyan; October 1; 1 MA in National Security Affairs from the Institute of World Politics 2 Executive director of Armenian National Committee of America; The National Interest, "To Stop the Conflict in the South Caucasus, the U.S. Must Restrain Turkey," <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/stop-conflict-south-caucasus-us-must-restrain-turkey-169913>]

Meanwhile, NATO-member Turkey is running loose, creating major headaches for Washington. Recent discussions surrounding Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s visit to Greece regarding the relocation of U.S. strategic assets from Incirlik Air Base to Crete do show some waning patience with Ankara, yet even if realized this may be too little too late.

Left unchecked, Ankara’s destabilizing rampage threatens to set off the geopolitical ticking bomb stretching from the Eastern Mediterranean to North Africa to the greater Near East.

Having usurped much of the state power following the alleged 2016 coup d’etat attempt, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been trying to realize his neo-Ottoman dreams.

First, by brazenly accusing the United States of orchestrating the coup, Erdogan has lately intensified his aggressive posturing vis-a-vis Israel, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and other pro-Western Arab states with the goal to establish himself as the new legitimate leader of the Sunni world.

Domestically, he used the coup as an excuse to initiate a nationwide elimination of political opponents, shutdown of the media, and arrest of academics and business owners to cement his one-person rule.

Facing little to no consequences for its meddling in Syria, Libya, and other hotspots, Ankara has now turned its eyes to the South Caucasus.

Turkey’s unprecedented direct, large-scale military involvement in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict marks the cross of a rubicon. With this tipping of scales in the regional power balance, it remains yet to be seen how chips fall along the nexus of Russian, Turkish, and Iranian interests.

Azerbaijan’s September 27 large-scale invasion of Artsakh (Armenian historic toponym for Nagorno-Karabakh) in conjunction with Erdogan’s transfer of 4,000 Islamist terrorists from Syria to Azerbaijan as well as Turkey’s use of American-made weaponry including F-16 fighter jets, mark the biggest flareup of the conflict since the signing of trilateral ceasefire agreement in 1994.

The United States has significant leverage to restrain Turkey. By putting a leash on Erdogan’s rogue adventurism, Washington can deescalate the situation to prevent the conflict from devolving into a total quagmire, which is exactly what Ankara is trying to achieve.

The growing Washington consensus is that the days of Turkey as a reliable partner willing to bandwagon with the United States are over. Erdogan’s fervent anti-Americanism and overall disdain for the West have de facto turned Turkey into a regional pariah.

Once an alliance of like-minded nations, Ankara has devalued NATO, compelling many to question the raison d'etre of the organization altogether. After all, Turkey has done nothing but complicate America’s counterinsurgency operations in the Middle East, such as by supporting terrorist factions affiliated with ISIS and Al Qaeda.

Washington’s indecisiveness to contain Ankara’s belligerence runs the risk of entrapping the United States in never-ending conflicts that Turkey is facilitating.

A good starting point would be parting with illusions that Erdogan’s Turkey will eventually abandon the damaging behavior and become the democratic state that everyone hoped for.

Having sacrificed the long-term regional stability at the expense of short-term political expediency, Washington has willingly closed its eyes on Ankara’s backslide in human rights, solidification of autocracy, and an ever-apparent divergent foreign policy.

In an increasingly repressive region, America should first and foremost defend Armenia’s vibrant democracy as a beacon of freedom.

Additionally, the United States should hold Ankara and Baku’s hostile regimes responsible through diplomatic isolation, targeted sanctions, and arms embargo.

Without facing consequences, the violent aggression perpetuated by these regimes will go unabated, harming U.S. and NATO interests in the region. America must act now.

### 2NR — Solvency

#### The combination of diplomacy and actionably condemning Turkey’s action solves.

Phillips '20 [David; October 7; Director of the Program on Peace-building and Human Rights at Columbia University; Boston Globe, "Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict is spiraling out of Control," <https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/10/07/opinion/armenia-azerbaijan-conflict-is-spiraling-out-control/>]

When the Minsk Group recently called for a ceasefire, Erdogan dismissed its appeal and blamed the international community for the problem. Diplomacy should be upgraded by the UN Security Council.

The United States, Russia, and France — permanent members of the Security Council — must work together to advance a diplomatic solution. A resolution should identify Azerbaijan and Turkey as aggressors and establish an international monitoring mission on Nagorno-Karabakh’s borders under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. Chapter 7 authorizes all necessary means to preserve peace and security.

The Trump administration must do its part by ceasing all military assistance to Azerbaijan, and enforcing Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, which prohibits US assistance to the government of Azerbaijan until it takes “demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other offensive force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.”

In addition, the United States should apply sanctions against Turkey under the Countering American Sanctions Against Adversaries Act, adopted by Congress in response to Turkey’s purchase of S400 missiles from Russia. The Trump administration is reluctant to back its rhetoric with meaningful action. Trump has opaque business ties in both Turkey and Azerbaijan. He received millions of dollars from licensing agreements in Turkey as well as fees from Azerbaijani oligarchs. He may need financing from Turkish and Azerbaijani concerns to service the Trump Organization’s $400 million debt.

### 2NR — Condemn

#### Publicly condemning Turkey’s action calls their bluff.

Rubin '20 [Michael; July 24; Resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute; National Interest, " War between Greece and Turkey Is Now a Real Possibility," <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/war-between-greece-and-turkey-now-real-possibility-165465>]

Erdoğan, like Vladimir Putin, has long thrived by playing chicken with conflict-adverse diplomats. Everyone from U.S. Special Envoy James Jeffrey to German chancellor Angela Merkel has previously folded much stronger hands in the face of Erdoğan bluffs, hoping that by ameliorating the Turkish leader, they could calm tension in the short-term. They never recognized that Erdoğan’s bluster was a tactic and grievance feigned for negotiation advantage. Caving into an aggressor, however, seldom brings peace; it only encourages aggression. Not only amorphous concepts of credibility but very real notions of Greek sovereignty are at stake. If Erdoğan pushes forward in the Eastern Mediterranean, Greece may need to fight. Certainly, Athens should consider all options to be on the table. If such a scenario comes to pass, the United States should not be neutral, but should rather recognize publicly that Turkey is the aggressor and its claims invalid.

### 2NR — Sanctions

#### The threat of severe sanctions forces Turkey to back down, and fear of Russia solves inevitably.

Cagaptay '19 [Soner interviewed by Ari Shapiro; October 16; Director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute; NPR, "What Impacts U.S. Sanctions May Have On Turkey's Economy," <https://www.npr.org/2019/10/16/770712249/what-impacts-u-s-sanctions-may-have-on-turkeys-economy>]

CAGAPTAY: I think the implication that the United States is considering to put economic sanctions which would devastate Turkey's economy could be enough for President Erdogan to consider a cease-fire. Perhaps that is the reason why President Erdogan earlier announced that he would not meet Vice President Pence today but tomorrow. Maybe Turkey needs one more day to gain some of its objectives in northern Syria before settling down for a cease-fire.

SHAPIRO: So you're saying this might be a very short, focused military mission and if Turkey has even just a week or two to accomplish its goals, that might be enough.

CAGAPTAY: Well, beyond U.S. pressure, there's also the issue of Russia. I mean, Turkey's relationship with the United States is riddled with tensions, but Turkey's ties with Russia are very different. And Russia is now deploying into areas that U.S. troops have vacated. Turkey is actually afraid of Russia, the country that happens to be Turkey's historic nemesis. Starting with Catherine the Great until Putin the Great, Russians have had a policy of bullying Turkey as the country's nemesis.

So I think that it is Russian military presence that will present a more realistic check on the ground, coupled with American threat of sanctions that - ironically, you could say that in this case, United States and Russia are both aligned from - coming from different angles in blocking Turkey's expansion into northern Syria.

### 2NR — AT: Economy

#### Recession does not spiral.

Heath '18 [Thomas; August 17; Local business reporter and columnist writing about the economy; Washington Post, "Could Turkey’s financial crisis have a snowball effect on world markets?" https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/could-turkeys-financial-crisis-have-a-snowball-effect-on-world-markets/2018/08/17/8fdccd88-a16b-11e8-93e3-24d1703d2a7a\_story.html]

The good news is that Turkey, considered an emerging market, is not Italy or Spain, which also have heavy debts on the balance sheets at public and private institutions.

The Northwest Washington lifestyle trap: $500,000 in income and still can’t save

But Italy has a $2.2 trillion economy, and Spain’s is $1.5 trillion, and both are part of the fabric of the European economy. So an economic infection in one of those countries could quickly ripple across the continent.

Turkey’s gross domestic product is far smaller at $800 billion and change — or close to the entire stock market value of Microsoft. And Turkey, which straddles Europe and Asia, has an economy that is less integrated into Europe, making it less of a threat to its more developed neighbors to the west and north.

Its major trading partners include Germany, Russia and Iran. In 2016, Turkey exported $156 billion and imported $186 billion, resulting in a negative trade balance of $29.6 billion, according to one study.

“Given the limited exposure of foreign banks to Turkish debt, this is far less likely to be the global event that the U.S. housing crisis was,” Bernstein said.

#### No impact to economic decline — COVID proves it stays peaceful.

Walt '20 [Stephen; May 13; Columnist at Foreign Policy and Professor of International Relations at Harvard; Foreign Policy, "Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?" <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-depression-economy-world-war/>]

One familiar argument is the so-called diversionary (or “scapegoat”) theory of war. It suggests that leaders who are worried about their popularity at home will try to divert attention from their failures by provoking a crisis with a foreign power and maybe even using force against it. Drawing on this logic, some Americans now worry that President Donald Trump will decide to attack a country like Iran or Venezuela in the run-up to the presidential election and especially if he thinks he’s likely to lose.

This outcome strikes me as unlikely, even if one ignores the logical and empirical flaws in the theory itself. War is always a gamble, and should things go badly—even a little bit—it would hammer the last nail in the coffin of Trump’s declining fortunes. Moreover, none of the countries Trump might consider going after pose an imminent threat to U.S. security, and even his staunchest supporters may wonder why he is wasting time and money going after Iran or Venezuela at a moment when thousands of Americans are dying preventable deaths at home. Even a successful military action won’t put Americans back to work, create the sort of testing-and-tracing regime that competent governments around the world have been able to implement already, or hasten the development of a vaccine. The same logic is likely to guide the decisions of other world leaders too.

Another familiar folk theory is “military Keynesianism.” War generates a lot of economic demand, and it can sometimes lift depressed economies out of the doldrums and back toward prosperity and full employment. The obvious case in point here is World War II, which did help the U.S economy finally escape the quicksand of the Great Depression. Those who are convinced that great powers go to war primarily to keep Big Business (or the arms industry) happy are naturally drawn to this sort of argument, and they might worry that governments looking at bleak economic forecasts will try to restart their economies through some sort of military adventure.

I doubt it. It takes a really big war to generate a significant stimulus, and it is hard to imagine any country launching a large-scale war—with all its attendant risks—at a moment when debt levels are already soaring. More importantly, there are lots of easier and more direct ways to stimulate the economy—infrastructure spending, unemployment insurance, even “helicopter payments”—and launching a war has to be one of the least efficient methods available. The threat of war usually spooks investors too, which any politician with their eye on the stock market would be loath to do.

Economic downturns can encourage war in some special circumstances, especially when a war would enable a country facing severe hardships to capture something of immediate and significant value. Saddam Hussein’s decision to seize Kuwait in 1990 fits this model perfectly: The Iraqi economy was in terrible shape after its long war with Iran; unemployment was threatening Saddam’s domestic position; Kuwait’s vast oil riches were a considerable prize; and seizing the lightly armed emirate was exceedingly easy to do. Iraq also owed Kuwait a lot of money, and a hostile takeover by Baghdad would wipe those debts off the books overnight. In this case, Iraq’s parlous economic condition clearly made war more likely.

Yet I cannot think of any country in similar circumstances today. Now is hardly the time for Russia to try to grab more of Ukraine—if it even wanted to—or for China to make a play for Taiwan, because the costs of doing so would clearly outweigh the economic benefits. Even conquering an oil-rich country—the sort of greedy acquisitiveness that Trump occasionally hints at—doesn’t look attractive when there’s a vast glut on the market. I might be worried if some weak and defenseless country somehow came to possess the entire global stock of a successful coronavirus vaccine, but that scenario is not even remotely possible.

If one takes a longer-term perspective, however, a sustained economic depression could make war more likely by strengthening fascist or xenophobic political movements, fueling protectionism and hypernationalism, and making it more difficult for countries to reach mutually acceptable bargains with each other. The history of the 1930s shows where such trends can lead, although the economic effects of the Depression are hardly the only reason world politics took such a deadly turn in the 1930s. Nationalism, xenophobia, and authoritarian rule were making a comeback well before COVID-19 struck, but the economic misery now occurring in every corner of the world could intensify these trends and leave us in a more war-prone condition when fear of the virus has diminished.

On balance, however, I do not think that even the extraordinary economic conditions we are witnessing today are going to have much impact on the likelihood of war. Why? First of all, if depressions were a powerful cause of war, there would be a lot more of the latter. To take one example, the United States has suffered 40 or more recessions since the country was founded, yet it has fought perhaps 20 interstate wars, most of them unrelated to the state of the economy. To paraphrase the economist Paul Samuelson’s famous quip about the stock market, if recessions were a powerful cause of war, they would have predicted “nine out of the last five (or fewer).”

Second, states do not start wars unless they believe they will win a quick and relatively cheap victory. As John Mearsheimer showed in his classic book Conventional Deterrence, national leaders avoid war when they are convinced it will be long, bloody, costly, and uncertain. To choose war, political leaders have to convince themselves they can either win a quick, cheap, and decisive victory or achieve some limited objective at low cost. Europe went to war in 1914 with each side believing it would win a rapid and easy victory, and Nazi Germany developed the strategy of blitzkrieg in order to subdue its foes as quickly and cheaply as possible. Iraq attacked Iran in 1980 because Saddam believed the Islamic Republic was in disarray and would be easy to defeat, and George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 convinced the war would be short, successful, and pay for itself.

The fact that each of these leaders miscalculated badly does not alter the main point: No matter what a country’s economic condition might be, its leaders will not go to war unless they think they can do so quickly, cheaply, and with a reasonable probability of success.

Third, and most important, the primary motivation for most wars is the desire for security, not economic gain. For this reason, the odds of war increase when states believe the long-term balance of power may be shifting against them, when they are convinced that adversaries are unalterably hostile and cannot be accommodated, and when they are confident they can reverse the unfavorable trends and establish a secure position if they act now. The historian A.J.P. Taylor once observed that “every war between Great Powers [between 1848 and 1918] … started as a preventive war, not as a war of conquest,” and that remains true of most wars fought since then.

The bottom line: Economic conditions (i.e., a depression) may affect the broader political environment in which decisions for war or peace are made, but they are only one factor among many and rarely the most significant. Even if the COVID-19 pandemic has large, lasting, and negative effects on the world economy—as seems quite likely—it is not likely to affect the probability of war very much, especially in the short term.

## Turkey Kickout DA

### 1NC – L – Turkish Overreaction

#### Withdrawal from Incirlik causes massive Turkish overreaction and realignment to Russia.

Jones 19 [reporter for the Voice of America, based in Istanbul], 11-26-2019, "US Military Base in Turkey Has Uncertain Future ," VOA, <https://www.voanews.com/a/europe_us-military-base-turkey-has-uncertain-future/6180061.html>

With U.S.-Turkish relations at their lowest ebb in decades, the future of a critical American air base in Turkey is increasingly in the spotlight.

The vast Incirlik Air Base, located in southern Turkey close to Syria, has been a longstanding symbol of U.S.-Turkish cooperation. At the height of the Cold War, it underscored America's commitment to its NATO partner against the Soviet Union.

"We have to underline the Incirlik is one of the most important bases in the Middle East with the placement of tactical nuclear weapons at the base," said professor Mesut Casin, a Turkish presidential foreign policy adviser. "This shows Turkey continues to support the value of the NATO organization."

It's widely reported that the United States retains around 50 nuclear free-fall bombs at the facility. During the Cold War, the weapons were relied on to deter vast Soviet ground forces massed on the Turkish border.

However, with Ankara and Washington at loggerheads over a myriad of issues, including Turkey's deepening ties with Russia and the removal of Turkey from a U.S. jet fighter program, the future of Incirlik is increasingly murky.

The Countering Turkish Aggression Act, a bipartisan bill under consideration in the U.S. Senate, would require the Trump administration to consider alternative bases for "personnel and assets" deployed at Incirlik. The bill comes in response to Ankara's offensive into Syria against a Kurdish militia, which is an ally in Washington's war against Islamic State.

House Armed Services Committee member Representative Kendra Horn tweeted last month that she is "deeply concerned that strategic nuclear weapons remain on an air base within Turkish borders." Horn later removed the tweet.

"They (Congress) are talking about removing the nuclear arsenal from Incirlik," said former Turkish ambassador Mithat Rende. "If they (nuclear weapons) are removed, that would be a sign of a huge lack of confidence (by Washington in Ankara)."

"There would be a trust problem, and relations might unravel if you withdraw the nuclear arsenal from Turkey," he added. "And you would expect an overreaction from the Turkish side if the U.S. pulls out its nuclear arsenal."

"Turkey-U.S. relations cannot continue in this climate of threats," warns Casin. "Turkey has a long history of being the United States' best ally in the region. Who is the winner of this present situation, Russia and China."

Analysts warn Moscow will be eager to take advantage of any U.S. reduction in Incirlik.

"If the Americans take their nuclear weapons, then I can tell you if they do, then the Turks will take Russian missiles there," said international relations professor Huseyin Bagci of Ankara's Middle East Technical University. "Then the Russians will have much more free hand to gain Turkey. So the architect of a lost Turkey will be American policy, and the winner will be (Russian President Vladimir) Putin."

"Turkey is not on the defensive anymore," he added." The more the Americans make pressure, the more Turkey will work closely with Russia -- this is a historical change in Turkish foreign policy."

Russian President Vladimir Putin has carefully cultivated a relationship with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, as relations with Ankara's traditional western allies deteriorate.

FILE - Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan shake hands after their joint news conference following their talks in the Bocharov Ruchei residence in the Black Sea resort of Sochi, Russia, Oct. 22, 2019.

FILE - Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan shake hands after their joint news conference following their talks in the Bocharov Ruchei residence in the Black Sea resort of Sochi, Russia, Oct. 22, 2019.

While Incirlik has been pivotal to U.S. strategic operations, including a significant withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan and Iraq, Ankara's imposing restrictions on the base's use in Syrian operations is, analysts say, a point of tension.

Last month's American operation to kill Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in Syria saw U.S. forces use a base in Iraq instead of the much closer Incirlik, requiring a round trip of many hours.

Other allies, too, have expressed frustration about Turkish operational demands. In 2017, Germany removed its forces from Incirlik because of a diplomatic spat with Ankara, relocating to Jordan.

American armed forces appear to be already taking steps to diversify their dependence on Incirlik. The U.S. has spent over $150 million in the last two years improving Jordan's Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, while American bases are reportedly being considered to be established in Turkey's neighbors, Greece and Cyprus.

Observers claim, given Incirlik's size and location, no base in the region can replace it. But Washington could be calculating that a combination of bases across the region could provide a patchwork alternative to Incirlik.

Such efforts are likely to continue, given a continued current downward spiral in U.S.-Turkish relations. However, analysts warn, abandoning Incirlik will not be without consequences.

"So American has to choose between losing Turkey or not losing Turkey. At the moment, they are more intending to lose Turkey," said Bagci.

### 1NC – ! – Kickout Bad – Radars

#### Turkish radars are key to shielding Russian and Iranian ballistic missiles.

Ali Murat Alhas 19, reporter for Anadolu Agency, 12/29/2021, "Despite issues, Turkish military bases still key for US," <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/despite-issues-turkish-military-bases-still-key-for-us/1686726>,

Kurecik, a radar station located in the Malatya province, was used for three decades until the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union for NATO to counter ballistic missiles. What makes it vital for NATO -- which Turkey has been a member of for nearly 70 years -- is that the AN/TPY-2 radar (Army/Navy Transportable Surveillance) deployed in Kurecik can shield ballistic missiles fired from Russia and Iran as well as protect NATO members.

#### Kickout compromises NATO BMD.

Bahri Kosar 19, non-resident fellow at Beyond the Horizon ISSG, 12/26/2019, "Who should worry first, if the BMD radar in Turkey is to be shut down?," <https://behorizon.org/who-should-worry-first-if-the-bmd-radar-in-turkey-is-to-be-shut-down/>,

The matter of the possible ‘closure’ of the Incirlik base, which has always been on the agenda in every turbulent period in Turkish-American relations, has come up once again in the previous days. This time, the new turbulent period started with the Turkish acquisition of Russian S-400 systems and resulted in expelling Turkey from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program. At a time where it is not still clear whether the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) would be imposed to Turkey, President Erdoğan stated in his speech in a live TV broadcast two weeks ago that, both Incirlik Air Base and the Kürecik ballistic missile radar site would be subject to closure if the USA imposes sanctions against Turkey.[1] Is this statement however a ploy for domestic politics or is Turkey considering this option as a trump card for international relations?

Unlike the Incirlik Base, which has lost its strategic importance for many years, the missile defense early warning radar in Kürecik serves indeed a very important role in NATO’s Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) Mission. Therefore, Erdoğan’s wish to use this radar as a trump card may seem logical to his strategy. But is that really the case?

In 2009 former U.S. President Obama announced a new approach for regional BMD operations called the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA). The first application of this approach is in Europe and is called the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). For the first phase of EPAA, an AN/TPY-2 X-Band radar was positioned in Kürecik, Turkey (a.k.a Site K) and BMD capable Aegis destroyers deployed to the Mediterranean. Phase 2 involved establishing the Aegis Ashore site in Romania, which declared its initial operational capability in May 2016, with SM-3 Block IB interceptors, increasing the defended area significantly. Phase 3 of EPAA involves establishing Aegis Ashore site in Poland with more capable SM-3 Block IIA interceptors probably till 2020.[2]

In parallel, NATO decided at the 2010 Lisbon Summit to expand its legacy Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program and wanted to alter it to a program that provides protection to all Alliance territory and populations in Europe against ballistic missiles. This mission was named as NATO Ballistic Missile Defence and the backbone of NATO BMD was and still is EPAA. In order to understand the importance of this radar for EPAA, therefore for NATO BMD, I would like to give a brief, yet not so technical background information.

When a ballistic missile is launched, it is initially detected by satellites with IR sensors. Nevertheless, this initial warning from the satellites does not provide necessary and precise information to the interceptor systems. In this case, ballistic missile tracking radars like TPY-2 come into play. This radar thereafter acquires the target and passes the necessary information to the interceptor systems, namely Aegis. Aegis tracks the target missiles by its SPY-1 radar and fires the interceptor missiles (i.e. SM-3) for a ‘hit to kill’ destruction. Hence the TPY-2 radar plays a critical role in this data network-intensive kill chain. But what happens if this radar is removed from the cycle? Could the ballistic missiles not be intercepted?

Yes, they still can be. However, the success of the mission would be severely degraded. Intercepting a very fast missile with another missile is a very complex process that requires overcoming some technical challenges associated with ‘hitting a bullet with a bullet’. The four key technical challenges in missile defence are target acquisition, discrimination, interception, and data networking. These powerful X-Band radars provide a solution not only to early target acquisition but also discriminate incoming warheads or missiles from the separated rocket booster stage or a penetration decoy. Target discrimination is essential in order not to waste interceptors by shooting at missile junk or decoys, which is especially important when we think how expensive those interceptors are.[3] Time is possibly the most important factor in effective discrimination since early discrimination and timely data relay would increase the probability of intercept. Therefore, when we take out the radar in Kürecik from the cycle, the probability of a successful intercept would be reduced.

At this point, we should not forget the fact that Turkey shares a border with a regional adversary, Iran, which possesses an advancing ballistic missile arsenal that puts Turkey at risk. Turkey is indeed within range of many of Iran’s short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Furthermore, NATO BMD officially defines the target as the threats emanating from outside the Euro-Atlantic area and it is not directed against Russia.[4] So, Turkey itself is, in fact, the primary country that requires that crucial information coming from the radar for a successful defence. Considering the relatively short ranges and fly times of incoming threat missiles from the Middle East area, the Aegis ships deployed into the Mediterranean in a possible crisis scenario could only intercept those ballistic missiles when they timely receive the required information. The available intercept window is very limited for a successful kill and no doubt will be more limited if an attack may occur to Turkey. There are some other onboard radars from Aegis ships and Aegis Ashore systems. For a missile going beyond the west of Turkey, those on-board SPY-1 radars may substitute the role of TPY-2 radar but there would be a significant defence gap over Turkish soil.

A possible scenario that could lead to the closure of the Kürecik radar would undoubtedly harm the NATO BMD, which is considered as a very important and a strategic capability by NATO. But most important of all, it would stab the dagger to NATO’s collective defence. Many people already think that Turkey’s S-400 acquisition was a lunge against solidarity. So that kind of move would cause another ‘crisis of trust’ within a very short time.

### 1NC – ! – Kickout Bad – Radars – US-Iran War

#### Iran strikes escalate and cause extinction.

Alex Ward 20, former associate director in the Atlantic Council’s Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Vox reporter covering the White House, 7/8/2019, ""A nasty, brutal fight": what a US-Iran war would look like," Vox, <https://www.vox.com/world/2019/7/8/18693297/us-iran-war-trump-nuclear-iraq>,

A deadly opening attack. Nearly untraceable, ruthless proxies spreading chaos on multiple continents. Costly miscalculations. And thousands — perhaps hundreds of thousands — killed in a conflict that would dwarf the war in Iraq.

Welcome to the US-Iran war, which has the potential to be one of the worst conflicts in history.

The Thursday night killing of Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, who led Iranian covert operations and intelligence and was one of the country’s most senior leaders, brought Washington and Tehran closer to fighting that war. Iran has every incentive to retaliate, experts says, using its proxies to target US commercial interests in the Middle East, American allies, or even American troops and diplomats hunkered down in regional bases and embassies.

It’s partly why the Eurasia Group, a prominent international consulting firm, now puts the chance of “a limited or major military confrontation” at 40 percent.

But the seeds of conflict weren’t planted with Thursday’s airstrikes alone. Washington and Tehran have remained locked in a months-long standoff that only continues to escalate. The US imposed crushing sanctions on Iran’s economy over its support for terrorism and its growing missile program, among other things, after withdrawing from the 2015 nuclear deal last year; Iran has fought back by violating parts of the nuclear agreement, bombing oil tankers, and downing an American military drone.

The crisis has become more acute over the past week. An Iranian-backed militia killed an American contractor while wounding others in rocket attacks, leading the Trump administration to order retaliatory strikes on five targets in Iraq and Syria that killed 25 of the militia’s fighters. In protest, the militia — Ketaib Hezbollah — organized a rally outside the US embassy in Baghdad where some got inside the compound and set parts of it ablaze.

That led Secretary of Defense Mark Esper to tell reporters on Thursday that “if we get word of attacks, we will take pre-emptive action as well to protect American forces, protect American lives,” adding “the game has changed.” The US killed Soleimani hours after that statement, underscoring that change.

Importantly, experts note that neither country wants a full-blown conflict, with President Donald Trump saying he prefers “peace” when it comes to Iran. But the possibility of war breaking out anyway shouldn’t be discounted, especially now that Iran’s leadership has sworn to avenge Soleimani. “The great nation of Iran will take revenge for this heinous crime,” Iranian President Hassan Rouhani tweeted Friday morning.

Which means US-Iran relations teeter on a knife edge, and it won’t take much more to knock them off. So to understand just how bad the situation could get, I asked eight current and former White House, Pentagon, and intelligence officials, as well as Middle East experts, last July about how a war between the US and Iran might play out.

The bottom line: It would be hell on earth.

“This would be a violent convulsion similar to chaos of the Arab Spring inflicted on the region for years,” said Ilan Goldenberg, the Defense Department’s Iran team chief from 2009 to 2012, with the potential for it to get “so much worse than Iraq.”

How the US-Iran war starts

US-imposed sanctions have tanked Iran’s economy, and Tehran desperately wants them lifted. But with few options to compel the Trump administration to change course, Iranian leaders may choose a more violent tactic to make their point, especially after Soleimani’s death.

Iranian forces could bomb an American oil tanker traveling through the Strait of Hormuz, a vital waterway for the global energy trade aggressively patrolled by Tehran’s forces, causing loss of life or a catastrophic oil spill. The country’s skillful hackers could launch a major cyberattack on regional allies like Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates.

Israel could kill an Iranian nuclear scientist, leading Iran to strike back and drawing the US into the spat, especially if Tehran responds forcefully. Or Iranian-linked proxies could target and murder American troops and diplomats in Iraq.

That last option is particularly likely, experts say. After all, Iran bombed US Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983 and, according to the Pentagon, Iranian-backed fighters killed more than 600 US troops during the Iraq War. Taking this step may seem extreme, but “Iran could convince itself that it could do this,” Goldenberg, now at the Center for a New American Security think tank in Washington, told me.

At that point, it’d be nearly impossible for the Trump administration not to respond in kind. The recommendations given to the president would correspond to whatever action Iran took.

If Tehran destroyed an oil tanker, killing people and causing an oil spill, the US might destroy some of Iran’s ships. If Iran took out another US military drone, the US might take out some of Iran’s air defenses. And if Iranian-backed militants killed Americans in Iraq, then US troops stationed there could retaliate, killing militia fighters and targeting their bases of operation in return. The US could even bomb certain training grounds inside Iran or kill high-level officials.

It’s at this point that both sides would need to communicate their red lines to each other and how not to cross them. The problem is there are no direct channels between the two countries and they don’t particularly trust each other. So the situation could easily spiral out of control.

Messaging “is often more important than physical action,” Jasmine El-Gamal, formerly a Middle East adviser at the Pentagon, told me. “Action without corresponding messaging, public or private, could most certainly lead to escalation because the other side is free to interpret the action as they wish.”

Which means the initial tit-for-tat would serve as the precursor to much more bloodshed.

“What are we going to be wrong about?”

You may have heard the phrase “the fog of war.” It refers to how hard it is for opposing sides to know what’s going on in the heat of battle. It’s particularly difficult when they don’t talk to one another, as is the case with the US and Iran.

Which means that the way the US and Iran interpret each other’s next moves would mainly come down to guesswork.

Eric Brewer, who spent years in the intelligence community before joining Trump’s National Security Council to work on Iran, told me that’s when the Pentagon and other parts of the government rely heavily on their best-laid plans.

The problem, he noted, is that wars rarely play out as even the smartest officials think they will. A guiding question for him, then, is “what are we going to be wrong about?”

Here’s one scenario in which the US might get something wrong — and open up the door to chaos: After America launches its first set of retaliatory strikes, Iran decides to scatter its missiles to different parts of the country.

Now the Trump administration has to figure out why Iran did that. Some people in the administration might think it’s because Tehran plans to attack US embassies, troops, or allies in the region and is moving its missiles into position to do so. Others might believe that it was merely for defensive reasons, with Iran essentially trying to protect its missile arsenal from being taken out by future US strikes.

Without a clear answer, which interpretation wins out comes down to which camp in the Trump administration is the most persuasive. And if the camp that believes Iran is about to launch missile strikes wins, they could convince the president to take preemptive action against Iran.

That could be a good thing if they were right; after all, they’d have made sure Iran couldn’t carry out those planned attacks. But what if they were wrong? What if the other camp guessed correctly that Iran was merely moving its missiles around because it was scared the US would strike once more? In that case, the US would have bombed Iran again, this time for essentially no reason — thus looking like the aggressor.

That could cause Iran to retaliate with a bigger attack, setting off a spiral that could end in full-scale war.

Iran could make a grave error too. Imagine Trump sends thousands of troops, say 25,000, along with advanced warplanes to the Middle East in the hope that they’ll deter Iran from escalating the conflict any further.

Tehran could just as easily read that buildup as preparation for a US invasion. If that’s the case, Iranian forces could choose to strike first in an effort to complicate the perceived incursion.

Of course, cooler heads could prevail in those moments. But experts say the political pressures on both Washington and Tehran not to be attacked first — and not to be embarrassed or look weak — might be too strong for the countries’ leaders to ignore.

“Unintended civilian casualties or other collateral damage is always possible, and it is not clear that this administration — or any administration — understands what Iran’s own red lines are,” El-Gamal, now at the Atlantic Council think tank in Washington, told me. “As such, the greatest risk of a full-blown war comes from one side miscalculating the other’s tolerance” for conflict.

If that proves true, and the US and Iran officially escalate their fighting to more than a few one-off attacks, it’s war.

What the US-Iran war might look like

At this point, it’s hard to be very precise about a hypothetical full-blown conflict. We know it would feature a series of moves and countermoves, we know it’d be very messy and confusing, and we know it’d be extremely deadly.

But unlike with the path to war, it’s less useful to offer a play-by-play of what could happen. So with that in mind, it’s better to look at what the US and Iranian war plans would likely be — to better understand the devastation each could exact.

How the US might try to win the war

The US strategy would almost certainly involve using overwhelming air and naval power to beat Iran into submission early on. “You don’t poke the beehive, you take the whole thing down,” Goldenberg said.

The US military would bomb Iranian ships, parked warplanes, missile sites, nuclear facilities, and training grounds, as well as launch cyberattacks on much of the country’s military infrastructure. The goal would be to degrade Iran’s conventional forces within the first few days and weeks, making it even harder for Tehran to resist American strength.

That plan definitely makes sense as an opening salvo, experts say, but it will come nowhere close to winning the war.

“It’s very unlikely that the Iranians would capitulate,” Michael Hanna, a Middle East expert at the Century Foundation in New York, told me. “It’s almost impossible to imagine that a massive air campaign will produce the desired result. It’s only going to produce escalation, not surrender.”

It won’t help that a sustained barrage of airstrikes will likely lead to thousands of Iranians dead, among them innocent civilians. That, among other things, could galvanize Iranian society against the US and put it firmly behind the regime, even though it has in many ways treated the population horribly over decades in power.

There’s another risk: A 2002 war game showed that Iran could sink an American ship and kill US sailors, even though the US Navy is far more powerful. If the Islamic Republic’s forces succeeded in doing that, it could provide a searing image that could serve as a propaganda coup for the Iranians. Washington won’t garner the same amount of enthusiasm for destroying Iranian warships — that’s what’s supposed to happen.

Trump has already signaled he doesn’t want to send ground troops into Iran or even spend a long time fighting the country. That tracks with his own inclinations to keep the US out of foreign wars, particularly in the Middle East. But with hawkish aides at his side, like Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, there’s a chance they could convince him not to look weak and to go all-in and grasp victory.

But the options facing the president at that point will be extremely problematic, experts say.

The riskiest one — by far — would be to invade Iran. The logistics alone boggle the mind, and any attempt to try it would be seen from miles away. “There’s no surprise invasion of Iran,” Brewer, who is now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank in Washington, told me.

Iran has nearly three times the amount of people Iraq did in 2003, when the war began, and is about three and a half times as big. In fact, it’s the world’s 17th-largest country, with territory greater than France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, and Portugal combined.

The geography is also treacherous. It has small mountain ranges along some of its borders. Entering from the Afghanistan side in the east would mean traversing two deserts. Trying to get in from the west could also prove difficult even with Turkey — a NATO ally — as a bordering nation. After all, Ankara wouldn’t let the US use Turkey to invade Iraq, and its relations with Washington have only soured since.

The US could try to enter Iran the way Saddam Hussein did during the Iran-Iraq war, near a water pass bordering Iran’s southwest. But it’s swampy — the Tigris and Euphrates rivers meet there — and relatively easy to protect. Plus, an invading force would run up against the Zagros Mountains after passing through, just like Saddam’s forces did.

It’s for these reasons that the private intelligence firm Stratfor called Iran a “fortress” back in 2011. If Trump chose to launch an incursion, he’d likely need around 1.6 million troops to take control of the capital and country, a force so big it would overwhelm America’s ability to host them in regional bases. By contrast, America never had more than 180,000 service members in Iraq.

And there’s the human cost. A US-Iran war would likely lead to thousands or hundreds of thousands of dead. Trying to forcibly remove the country’s leadership, experts say, might drive that total into the millions.

That helps explain why nations in the region hope they won’t see a fight. Goldenberg, who traveled recently to meet with officials in the Gulf, said that none of them wanted a US-Iran war. European nations will also worry greatly about millions of refugees streaming into the continent, which would put immense pressure on governments already dealing with the fallout of the Syrian refugee crisis. Israel also would worry about Iranian proxies targeting it (more on that below).

Meanwhile, countries like Russia and China — both friendly to Iran — would try to curtail the fighting and exploit it at the same time, the Century Foundation’s Hanna told me. China depends heavily on its goods traveling through the Strait of Hormuz, so it would probably call for calm and for Tehran not to close down the waterway. Russia would likely demand restraint as well, but use the opportunity to solidify its ties with the Islamic Republic.

And since both countries have veto power on the UN Security Council, they could ruin any political legitimacy for the war that the US may aim to gain through that body.

The hope for the Trump administration would therefore be that the conflict ends soon after the opening salvos begin. If it doesn’t, and Iran resists, all that’d really be left are a slew of bad options to make a horrid situation much, much worse.

How Iran might try to win the war

Retired Marine Lt. Gen. Vincent Stewart left his post as the No. 2 at US Cyber Command in 2019, ending a decorated four-decade career. Toward the end of it, he spent his time at the forefront of the military intelligence and cybersecurity communities.

If anyone has the most up-to-date information on how Iran may fight the US, then, it’s Stewart.

“The Iranian strategy would be to avoid, where possible, direct conventional force-on-force operations,” he wrote for the Cipher Brief on July 2, 2019. “They would attempt to impose cost on a global scale, striking at US interests through cyber operations and targeted terrorism with the intent of expanding the conflict, while encouraging the international community to restrain America’s actions.”

In other words, Tehran can’t match Washington’s firepower. But it can spread chaos in the Middle East and around the world, hoping that a war-weary US public, an intervention-skeptical president, and an angered international community cause America to stand down.

That may seem like a huge task — and it is — but experts believe the Islamic Republic has the capability, knowhow, and will to pull off such an ambitious campaign. “The Iranians can escalate the situation in a lot of different ways and in a lot of different places,” Hanna told me. “They have the capacity to do a lot of damage.”

Take what it could do in the Middle East. Iran’s vast network of proxies and elite units — like Soleimani’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps — could be activated to kill American troops, diplomats, and citizens throughout the region. US troops in Syria are poorly defended and have little support, making them easy targets, experts say. America also has thousands of civilians, troops, and contractors in Iraq, many of whom work in areas near where Iranian militias operate within the country.

US allies would also be prime targets. Hezbollah, an Iran-backed terrorist group in Lebanon, might attack Israel with rockets and start its own brutal fight. We’ve heard this story before: In 2006, they battled in a month-long war where the militant group fired more than 4,000 rockets into Israel, and Israeli forces fired around 7,000 bombs and missiles into Lebanon.

About 160 Israelis troops and civilians died, according to the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and about 1,100 Lebanese — most of them civilians — perished, per Human Rights Watch, a US-headquartered advocacy organization. It also reports about 4,400 Lebanese were injured, and around 1 million people were displaced.

But that’s not all. Iran could encourage terrorist organizations or other proxies to strike inside Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other Gulf nations. Last year, it planned and executed drone strikes on two major Saudi oil facilities deep inside the kingdom, convulsing world markets. Its support for Houthis rebels in Yemen would mostly certainly increase, offering them more weapons and funds to attack Saudi Arabia’s airports, military bases, and energy plants.

Experts note that the Islamic Republic likely has sleeper cells in Europe and Latin America, and they could resurface in dramatic and violent ways. In 1994, for example, Iranian-linked terrorists bombed the hub of the Jewish community in Argentina’s capital, Buenos Aires, killing 85 people and injuring roughly 300 more.

That remains the largest terrorist attack in Latin America’s history, and the possibility for an even bigger one exists. In 2018, Argentina arrested two men suspected of having ties with Hezbollah.

But Chris Musselman, formerly the National Security Council’s counterterrorism director under Trump, told me the US and its allies may have the most trouble containing the proxy swarm in Western Africa.

“We could see a conflict that spread quickly to places the US may not be able to protect people, and it’s a fight that we are grossly unprepared for,” he said, adding that there’s a strong Hezbollah presence in the region and American embassy security there isn’t great. Making matters worse, he continued, the US isn’t particularly good at collecting intelligence there, meaning some militants could operate relatively under the radar.

“This isn’t really a law enforcement function that US can take on a global scale,” he said. It would require that countries unwittingly hosting proxies to lead on defeating the Iranian-linked fighters, with US support when needed.

The chaos would also extend into the cyber realm. Iran is a major threat to the US in cyberspace. Starting in 2011, Iran attacked more than 40 American banks, including JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America. The attack made it so the banks had trouble serving its customers and customers had trouble using the bank’s services.

In 2012, Iran released malware into the networks of Saudi Aramco, a major oil company, which erased documents, emails, and other files on around 75 percent of the company’s computers — replacing them with an image of a burning American flag.

In the middle of a war, one could imagine Tehran’s hackers wreaking even more havoc.

“I would expect them to have begun selected targeting through socially-engineered phishing activities focused on the oil and gas sector, the financial sector and the electric power grid in that order,” Stewart wrote. “There may be instances now where they already have some persistent access. If they do, I expect they would use it, or risk losing the access and employ that capability early in the escalation of the crisis.”

Recent reports indicate that Iranian cyberwarriors have stepped up their online operations, with a particular emphasis on preparing to attack US firms. Among other moves, they’re aiming to trick employees at major businesses to hand over passwords and other vital information, giving them greater access to a firm’s networks.

“When you combine this increase with past destructive attacks launched by Iranian-linked actors, we’re concerned enough about the potential for new destructive attacks to continue sounding the alarm,” Christopher Krebs, a top cybersecurity official at the Department of Homeland Security, told Foreign Policy last July.

All of this — proxies striking around the world, cyberattacks on enterprise — would happen while Iran continued to resist conventional American forces.

In the Strait of Hormuz, for instance, Iranian sailors could use speedboats to place bombs on oil tankers or place mines in the water to destroy US warships. The Islamic Republic’s submarines would also play a huge part in trying to sink an American vessel. And the nation’s anti-ship missiles and drones could prove constant and deadly nuisances.

Should US troops try to enter Iranian territory on land, Iranian ground forces would also push back on them fiercely using insurgent-like tactics while the US painfully marches toward Tehran.

Put together, Brewer notes succinctly, a US-Iran war would be “a nasty, brutal fight.”

Aftermath: “The worst-case scenarios here are quite serious”

Imagine, as we already have, that the earlier stages of strife escalate to a major war. That’s already bad enough. But assume for a moment not only that the fighting takes place, but that the US does the unlikely and near impossible: It invades and overthrows the Iranian regime (which Trump’s former National Security Adviser John Bolton, at least, has openly called for in the past).

If that happens, it’s worth keeping two things in mind.

First, experts say upward of a million people — troops from both sides as well as Iranian men, women, and children, and American diplomats and contractors — likely will have died by that point. Cities will burn and smolder. Those who survived the conflict will mainly live in a state of economic devastation for years and some, perhaps, will pick up arms and form insurgent groups to fight the invading US force.

Second, power abhors a vacuum. With no entrenched regime in place, multiple authority figures from Iran’s clerical and military circles, among others, will jockey for control. Those sides could split into violent factions, initiating a civil war that would bring more carnage to the country. Millions more refugees might flock out of the country, overwhelming already taxed nations nearby, and ungoverned pockets will give terrorist groups new safe havens from which to operate.

Iran would be on the verge of being a failed state, if it wasn’t already by that point, and the US would be the main reason why. To turn the tide, America may feel compelled to help rebuild the country at the cost of billions of dollars, years of effort, and likely more dead. It could also choose to withdraw, leaving behind a gaping wound in the center of the Middle East.

In some ways, then, what comes after the war could be worse than the war itself. It should therefore not be lost on anyone: A US-Iran war would be a bloody hell during and after the fighting. It’s a good thing neither Trump nor Iran’s leadership currently wants a conflict. But if they change their minds, only carnage follows.

“The worst-case scenarios here are quite serious,” Hanna told me.

### 1NC – ! – Kickout Bad – Radars – Israel-Iran War

#### Israel strikes on Iran are likely and cause extinction in a Middle East war.

Sean Durns 22, Senior Research Analyst at Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America, 6/22/2022, "Deal or No Deal, Iran-Israel War Is Coming to the Middle East," National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/deal-or-no-deal-iran-israel-war-coming-middle-east-203135>,

Iran, Israeli prime minister Naftali Bennett warned on June 12, “is dangerously close to getting their hands on a nuclear weapon.” In an interview with The Telegraph, the premier pointed out that “Iran is enriching uranium at an unprecedented rate.” Bennett added: “Iran’s nuclear program won’t stop until it’s stopped.”

Bennett isn’t alone in expressing concern.

The United States has also raised alarm. In a March 2022 hearing of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Sen. Jack Reed (D-RI) observed that “Iran has made key advances” and has “decreased its [nuclear] breakout time to several weeks from a year” compared to what it was under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), colloquially known as the Iran nuclear deal. Indeed, in April 2022, U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken said that Iran’s breakout time was “down to a couple of weeks.”

On June 6, 2022, the director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Rafael Grossi, said that Tehran was “very close” to crossing the nuclear threshold and that it “cannot be avoided at this point.” Grossi also presented the board with a report “showing that Iran effectively already has enough enriched uranium for three bombs,” the news service JNS reported.

Grossi also told the IAEA’s board of governors that “Iran has not provided explanations that are technically credible in relation to the Agency’s findings at three undeclared locations in Iran.” Grossi noted that Iran has also failed to provide the IAEA with “the current location, or locations, of the nuclear material and/or of the equipment contaminated with the nuclear material” that was moved from the site of Turquzabad in 2018.

Adding to concerns, the Islamic Republic has begun installing advanced IR-6 centrifuges at its underground enrichment plant in Natanz and has said that it plans to install more at other sites. The centrifuges will enable the Islamic Republic to increase enrichment by as much as 50 percent.

The agency formally censured Iran for its activities.

In response, the Islamic Republic called the IAEA “ungrateful” and cut off the agency’s camera feeds which monitor Tehran’s nuclear activities at declared facilities. This, Grossi asserted, was a “fatal blow” to negotiations between the United States and Tehran over its nuclear weapons program. But this overlooks some key points.

As Reuters, among others, has noted, the IAEA hasn’t had access to the data collected by the cameras for more than a year. The agency “hopes that it will gain access to that data, which remains with Iran, at a later date.”

Hope, however, is not a good basis for policy—particularly when it’s a policy designed to prevent the world’s leading state sponsor of terror from acquiring nuclear weapons.

But while several analysts have pointed to a stall in U.S.-Iran negotiations as increasing tensions and making a breakout possible, it is worth noting the following: the very terms of the JCPOA did not prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power. And Israel will not allow the Islamic Republic to become such a power. It is that simple.

The JCPOA’s sunset provisions and poor verifications regime enabled Iran to eventually join the nuclear club. Indeed, in a 2015 interview, then-President Barack Obama admitted that the deal would enable Iran to have “near zero” breakout time in as little as thirteen years—or six years from now.

But even this assessment was overly optimistic: the JCPOA did not require Iran to come clean about its past nuclear behavior—thus preventing an accurate benchmark of its progress. Similarly, the JCPOA only allowed inspections at “declared” facilities. And it didn’t fully restrict research and development in key areas, thereby allowing Iran to reduce the time of a nuclear breakout potentially further. This, of course, is to say nothing of the decision by JCPOA architects not to address Iran’s other “malign activities”—code for its support for terrorism and development of intercontinental ballistic missiles, among other things.

The limits of that policy were highlighted in 2018 when Israel revealed that it had broken into Iran’s so-called “nuclear archive.” The findings, later authenticated by the United States, showed that Iran not only lied about its nuclear program but was engaged in hiding it during negotiations with the United States and others.

Iran may lie about its nuclear activities, but it doesn’t always hide its intentions.

Regime apparatchiks from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on down have called for Israel’s destruction. The history of both the Jewish people and the Jewish state show that such calls aren’t to be taken lightly.

In June 1981, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) successfully took out Iraq’s nuclear reactor. And in September 2007, the IDF carried out a strike against Syria’s nuclear program. Israel has been clear: it will not tolerate a hostile power acquiring nuclear weapons. But this time promises to be different.

Unlike the 1981 and 2007 strikes, Israel faces a more difficult security predicament. The Islamic Republic has proxies wrapped around Israel like a snake. Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Gaza’s Hamas are funded, trained, and equipped by Tehran. And both have documented histories of using human shields.

Hezbollah alone is widely regarded as the most well-armed terrorist group in the world and maintains a global presence with operatives in dozens of countries. And it has carried out attacks against Jewish communities worldwide, murdering hundreds.

Similarly, Iran is also deeply embedded in both Syria and Iraq, with capabilities to strike Israel from these satrapies.

In recent weeks, Israel has carried out several targeted assassinations in Iran itself, taking out top Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) operatives as well as nuclear scientists. It is not the first time that Israel has taken out high-level targets inside Iran. But the increase in strikes—nearly half a dozen in less than a month—suggests a shift.

Ditto for Bennett’s vow to implement the “Octopus Doctrine.” The Israeli prime minister recently stated: “We no longer play with the tentacles, with Iran’s proxies: we’ve created a new equation by going for the head.” By letting Tehran know that it can and will be struck, Israel is changing the rules of the game. Jerusalem is no longer content to “mow the grass”—an expression for strategically limited strikes—but is upping the ante in response to what it sees as a growing threat.

Israel has also stepped up the scale and scope of its strikes in Syria, recently hitting the Damascus airport. The IDF recently held the largest military drill in decades, dubbed “Chariots of Fire.” In its own words, the exercises “aim to both increase the IDF’s defensive readiness and examine its preparedness for an intensive and prolonged campaign.”

In late May 2022, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted drills which included “long-range flights, aerial refueling and striking distant targets.” It was, the Times of Israel noted, meant to simulate striking Iranian nuclear facilities. According to Israel’s Channel 13 news, the exercises spanned more than 10,000 kilometers and included more than 100 aircraft and navy submarines.

The IAF, the Jerusalem Post reported in early June 2022, can now fly F-35 fighter jets from Israel to Iran without refueling. And now they can be equipped with a new one-ton bomb “that can be carried inside the plane’s internal weapons compartment without jeopardizing its stealth radar signature.”

The IDF is, of course, an exceptionally well-trained military. It isn’t a stranger to major drills and exercises. But it seems clear that something is afoot and the parameters of the long-running conflict between Israel and Iran are changing. Coupled with Tehran’s imminent “nuclear break out,” such developments indicate that Jerusalem is doing more than mowing the grass—it might be preparing to get rid of the entire yard.

Should Israel strike Iran’s nuclear facilities it would likely bring about the worst war that the Middle East has seen in decades—if not longer. The conflict that would follow would look nothing like many of the recent wars between Israel and Iranian proxies like Hamas and Hezbollah. For both Israel and the Islamic Republic, it would be an existential battle, with the fate of both the Jewish state and the regime in Tehran hinging on the war’s outcome. The losses and destruction would be devastating.

Hezbollah is estimated to have 130-150,000 rockets and missiles and Hamas is thought to have at least 30,000. Both hide their arsenals behind human shields.

Indeed, according to a 2021 study by the Alma Center, numerous Hezbollah military sites in southern Lebanon are “located in buildings within populated villages and areas very close to villages.” Researcher Tal Beeri found that “each of the 200 Shi’ite villages in the area south of the Zaharani River up to the border with Israel and the adjacent areas have become part of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure,” constituting part of the terror group’s “regional defensive plan.” Further away, Hezbollah is also firmly ensconced in major cities like Beirut.

And costs will likely extend beyond the Middle East. Iranian proxies have shown themselves to be capable of attacking both Jewish and American targets throughout the world. It also seems likely that a war will fuel anti-Semitic attacks in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere—just as the conflict between Iranian proxies and Israel did in the spring of 2021.

### 1NC – ! – Kickout Bad – Turkey Key

#### Turkey radars are key

ÇELIK ’17 [ERSIN; 11-19-2017; News Reporter For YENI ŞAFAK; “Turkey may remove US radar if F-35s not delivered on schedule” <https://www.yenisafak.com/en/news/turkey-may-remove-us-radar-if-f-35s-not-delivered-on-schedule-2808663>

Israel will become blind

Thanks to the radar located in Kürecik, the entire western territories of Iran, all the way to the borders of Tehran are visible to NATO. Other radars in the region that boast similar features are located in Israel, Jordan, Qatar and the UAE. However, the range of Israel’s 1300-kilometer radar is only capable of reaching Iran’s borders. The ones set up by the U.S. in Qatar and the UAE, which aren’t part of NATO, are only capable of observing as far as Iran’s southern regions.

In case Turkey decides to dismantle the Kürecik radar in response to the ongoing attempts by the U.S. to use the F-35 jets to blackmail Turkey, Israel will lose its “early warning system” in case of a missile launch from eastern or northern Iran.

### 1NC – ! – Kickout Bad – Radars – AT: Erdogan Removes Now

#### Erdogan won’t remove the radar.

Bahri Kosar 19, non-resident fellow at Beyond the Horizon ISSG, 12/26/2019, "Who should worry first, if the BMD radar in Turkey is to be shut down?," <https://behorizon.org/who-should-worry-first-if-the-bmd-radar-in-turkey-is-to-be-shut-down/>,

Although Site K is crucial for NATO BMD, it is not indispensable or irreplaceable at all. As it is a mobile platform, TPY-2 radar could easily be deployed to another place, albeit with less effectivity. On the other hand, U.S Navy is currently working on a new Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR), also designated as SPY-6(V)1, which is allegedly at least 100 times more sensitive than the current SPY-1 radar.[5] This radar is expected to be deployed in Aegis destroyers in about 2023. Besides, the latest version of SM-3, Blok IIA missiles are significantly faster and have more range than their predecessors.[6] Thus, these developments would compensate for the deficiencies emanating from a possible TPY-2 replacement. Nevertheless, such a decision from a Turkish government would more be a waiver from its own defence than a deficiency in European missile defence. I am not sure if Turkey would squeeze its own feet but I think this statement from Erdoğan was only a ‘butter’ for domestic politics and not based on a rational reason.

Despite Turkey’s axis shift toward Russia and the rising ‘Euroasianist’ tendencies among the security and government officials, I still think that Erdoğan’s advisors would try to discourage him from taking such a decision, which would otherwise basically tear off Turkey from NATO. Or at least I hope they would do that. Hope never dies!

### 1NC – ! – Kickout Bad – Russia

#### Turkey is key to stop Russian adventurism into the black sea, and past efforts to cooperate prove they're not a spoiler

[Tol](https://www.mei.edu/profile/gonul-tol) 21 [Gönül Tol is the founding director of the Middle East Institute’s [Turkey program](https://www.mei.edu/programs/turkish-studies) and a senior fellow for the [Frontier Europe Initiative](https://www.mei.edu/programs/frontier-europe). She is also an adjunct professor at George Washington University’s Institute for Middle East Studies. She was also an adjunct professor at the College of International Security Affairs at the National Defense University. She has taught courses on Islamist movements in Western Europe, Turkey, world politics, and the Middle East. She has written extensively on Turkey-U.S. relations, Turkish domestic politics, and foreign policy and the Kurdish issue. She is a frequent media commentator. "Turkey-NATO ties are problematic, but there is one bright spot"; 2-16-2021; Middle East Institute; https://www.mei.edu/publications/turkey-nato-ties-are-problematic-there-one-bright-spot;

America’s presence in the Black Sea is important to check Russian expansionism, but a more effective strategy calls for a coordinated response from regional allies such as Turkey. Turkey’s relationship with NATO and the U.S. in particular has been rocky of late. Ignoring warnings from NATO and the threat of sanctions from the U..S, Turkey went ahead with its purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system, taking delivery of the first shipment in mid-2019. But despite its growing defense partnership with Moscow, Ankara is equally uneasy about the growing Russian military presence in a region where Turkey once had the edge. In a 2016 plea to Turkey’s NATO allies, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said the Black Sea had become a “Russian lake” and called for a greater NATO presence, reversing a decades-old Turkish policy of keeping the alliance out.

Turkey has developed a multi-pronged strategy to counter Russian influence in the Black Sea. One important leg of that strategy is on the home front, where Turkey is strengthening its navy. A project called MILGEM, a contraction of the Turkish for “national ship” (milli gemi), was launched to design and construct naval vessels in-country, including ADA class corvettes. In 2018, the [Pakistani Navy signed a contract](https://twitter.com/YorukIsik/status/1178795282798202880?s=20) to acquire four of these ships from Turkey’s state-run defense contractor ASFAT, the first successful export of these vessels. Turkey has also been building up its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities to counter Russia’s growing A2/AD assets in the Black Sea by ordering four new frigates, called both Istanbul and MILGEM II. The frigates are based on the ADA class corvette design but extended by 14 meters to enable the inclusion of a vertical launching system for surface to air missiles. The naval version of the army’s[Korkut](https://twitter.com/YorukIsik/status/970694646216249345?s=20) low-altitude air defense system, Gökdeniz, will be added to the inventory for the first time with the frigate. The national [Atmaca](https://twitter.com/YorukIsik/status/1191311364343681024?s=20) anti-ship missile will also be integrated into the first unit of the class, TCG Istanbul, which is forecast for entry into service later this year.

Balancing Russia through regional military cooperation

Turkey is taking steps on the foreign policy front as well, stepping up its cooperation with Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. Ankara views these countries as instrumental in its efforts to balance the Russian military presence in the Black Sea and South Caucasus. Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Turkish-Ukrainian relations have expanded significantly. Last year, Erdoğan unveiled a $36 million military aid package for Ukraine. The two countries agreed to cooperate on the design and manufacture of aircraft engines, radar units, [drones](https://twitter.com/YorukIsik/status/1108309446034423808?s=20), and navigation systems and consider collaboration on advanced technology projects, such as ballistic missile systems. Turkey also plans to sell its ships to Ukraine as part of a much bigger defense deal, which, if it comes to fruition, could change the balance of power in the Black Sea. Besides cooperation in defense industries, the Ukrainian and Turkish navies also [conduct](https://www.newsweek.com/estranged-russia-turkey-and-ukraine-join-forces-447473) joint training in the Black Sea to showcase their ability to operate "in accordance with NATO standards."

Turkey has also invested in shoring up the defenses of Georgia, another Black Sea country threatened by Russia’s growing influence in the region. Turkey has [allocated](https://turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/652-turkey%E2%80%99s-commitment-to-azerbaijan%E2%80%99s-defense-shows-the-limits-of-ankara%E2%80%99s-tilt-to-moscow.html) millions of dollars to the Georgian Ministry of Defense to reform the country’s military logistics and transfer defense capabilities to its northeastern neighbor while advocating for the extension of NATO membership to Georgia, a move Russia opposes.

Turkey’s defense cooperation with Azerbaijan has been growing as well, which was on full display in the fighting in the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh late last year, when Ankara threw its full military support behind Baku. Turkish drones provided Azerbaijan a huge advantage in the conflict, which ended with Azerbaijan capturing significant swathes of territory from Armenian forces. Turkey’s military exports to Azerbaijan rose six-fold in 2020, with Azerbaijan jumping to the top of the list of Turkish arms buyers in September.

NATO and the Black Sea

NATO should support these Turkish efforts. It should also establish a permanent “Black Sea Maritime Patrol” group modeled on the successful Operation Sea Guardian in the Mediterranean. Operation Sea Guardian is a flexible effort that can potentially cover the full range of NATO’s maritime security needs. In accordance with NATO’s “framework nation” concept, Turkey can be assigned the leading nation role in the Black Sea and smaller members can integrate their own, more limited capabilities into an organizational structure provided by Ankara.

Mirroring other NATO missions in the Baltic or Mediterranean, Turkey can play a coordinating role to bring in other NATO allies willing to participate and provide support. Such a force would require NATO’s coordination and political pressure among non-Black Sea members to commit in advance to a regular and rotational maritime presence in the Black Sea, in line with the 1936 Montreux Convention, which limits the presence of warships from non-littoral states to a maximum of 21 days. Although the development of such a multinational unit would require a sustained diplomatic effort, once active, it would boost NATO’s deterrence in a strategic region that has become a springboard for Russia to project power from Georgia all the way to Syria and Libya.

## A5 Counterplan

### 1NC

#### CP: The United States ought to substantially limit the conditions under which the Republic of Turkiye can invoke collective defense pacts with the United States and with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

#### Denying Article 5 forces Turkish draw down – solves Adventurism

de Jong and Meinend 20 (Johannes de Jong, director of Sallux, think tank of the European Christian Political Movement, and Christiaan Meinend; “European security, Turkish foreign policy and Article 5 of the NATO Treaty”; Sallux ECPM Foundation; December 2020; https://sallux.eu/free/european-security-turkish-agression-and-article-5-of-the-nato-treaty.html kp)

Clarity on Turkey and Article 5 of the NATO Treaty as road to curb Turkish expansionism

The recurring debate on Turkish NATO membership and a road forward

The debate on Turkey’s membership in NATO is by now a permanent issue132. Turkey entered NATO in 1952 in order to counter the threat of communism133. In 1974 it became already clear how problematic Turkish membership was when Turkey invaded Cyprus. Internally Tur- key’s democracy was from 1960 to 1997 ultimately under control of the military that in 1960, 1971 and 1980 took control of the country. There was hope for change for the better in 2002 but that lasted only until 2011. Meanwhile the Turkish track-record on human rights and the rights of minorities has remained poor even before 2011134. After Turkey invaded Afrin and all subsequent escalations, the debate on Turkish membership of NATO became more and more a mainstream issue135136137.

There is nevertheless little appetite among most leaders of government of NATO members to try to remove Turkey from NATO. From a legal perspective there is no mechanism in the NATO Treaty to remove a Member State from NATO. The application of the ‘Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’ has been suggested but some NATO members are not party to that Treaty138. Removing Turkey would require suspending or changing the NATO Treaty which (from a legal perspective) would require the support of Turkey which would not cooperate to that end139. Aside from the legal impossibility there is a reluctance to create such a rough rupture in relations without any clarity over the future or leverage left.

However, given the Turkish purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense missile system and its activation and testing on 16 October 2020 it is becoming clearer that NATO needs to make a strong move in regard to Turkey (seen from a purely NATO perspective alone)140. The described developments since 2013 are in any case sufficient ground to take decisive action against Turkey in the NATO framework. As described, suspensions of arms sales or economic sanctions may not have the desired effect and need at the very least a strong additional measure that will immediately impact Turkish security.

This publication will for these reasons now focus on a middle road between a total rupture and continuation of the existing policy that is now tantamount to appeasement. Appeasement is no longer an option as Turkish malign actions are gaining pace in 2020. A total rupture without any leverage left would make it very difficult for other forces in Turkey to shift the country back to a more normal and democratic situation. So a middle road between extremes is needed that is at the same time firm and consequential

As stated above there is no question regarding the popular opinion in the West over Turkey. The simple fact that opposition against Turkey is seen as a vote winner is a sufficient answer to that question. That the support for Turkish accession to the EU has plummeted is indicative of the public mood on the matter141. It is therefore no surprise that defending Turkey with western military forces is understood as something unpopular. However, in democracies it is widely understood that the military acts to defend the people and is not outside the democratic process. The principle of parliamentary and therefore democratic oversight of the military is a given in all western democracies and military deployment is understood as ultimately being subject to democratic control. The lack of democratic support for an actual defense of Turkey should therefore matter in dealing with the role of Turkey in NATO. This publication maintains that it is at that point that there is a solution that provides a strong response to Turkey that respects democracy without losing all leverage.

This publication maintains that it is democratically responsible to clarify openly to the electorate that if Turkey would ask for assistance in the framework of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, no support would be given unless Turkey ends and withdraws from all its acts of aggression and areas it now occupies. This would force Turkey to reconsider its expansionist and aggressive agenda and instead focus on its own security.

Article 5 of the NATO Treaty according to NATO

Time and again, US and European Foreign Affairs officials repeat this one phrase ‘Turkey, our NATO ally’. That one phrase implies a reality that does not exist anymore and now needs to be called out. The fact that Turkey is called ‘a NATO ally’ implies that it can rely on NATO for defense if it is attacked. That idea is one of the deepest commitments any nation can make. It means that a nation is prepared to sacrifice its men and women in uniform to defend another country. The phrase ‘Turkey, our NATO ally’ implies that NATO states still have this commitment to Turkey. Given all developments since 2013, it is clear that Turkey no longer adheres to NATO values. It is time to inform our citizens and Turkey that its membership of NATO does not mean that other NATO members will sacrifice their men and women if Turkey is being attacked.

It is often assumed that article 5 of the NATO Treaty means that there is an automatic obligation to defend NATO member states. According to NATO this is not the case.

Article 5 of the NATO Treaty says: ‘The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in con- cert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.’

The NATO website clarifies the precise meaning and working of Article 5142. Ultimately, NATO is the only source that can determine how the NATO Treaty is interpreted and therefore their clarification on their own website is the most authorita- tive source on this issue.

The NATO website clarifies that when the NATO Treaty was drafted, ‘the European participants wanted to ensure that the United States would automatically come to their assistance should one of the sig- natories come under attack. The Unit- ed States did not want to make such a pledge and obtained that this be reflected in the wording of Article 5’. The US inserted ‘such action as it deems necessary’ precisely to avoid any automatic duty to aid NATO members if they are attacked.

The NATO website further clarifies the following on the working of Article 5:

‘With the invocation of Article 5, Allies can provide any form of assistance they deem necessary to respond to a situation. This is an individual obligation on each Ally and each Ally is responsible for determining what it deems necessary in the particular circumstances. This assistance is taken forward in concert with other Al-lies. It is not necessarily military and de- pends on the material resources of each country. It is therefore left to the judgment of each individual member country to determine how it will contribute. Each country will consult with the other mem- bers, bearing in mind that the ultimate aim is to “to restore and maintain the se- curity of the North Atlantic area”.

From this explanation it is clear that there is no automatic binding obligation to provide assistance under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. Each NATO member state can and will make its own decision in that regard. That clarifies that it is possible for any NATO government or its parliament to inform its citizens, and Turkey, that there will be no support for Turkey in the case it was attacked. For that there is no need to change the NATO treaty or remove Turkey from NATO. It is therefore possible to take this political action to provide clarity on this issue.

There is no provision in Article 5 that denies the possibility to give this clarity in advance. Given the tension that Turkey is creating with all its neighbours, it would not be far-fetched to inform the public and Turkey before any escalation happens. This publication maintains that this will have a de-escalating effect as it will reveal Turkey’s vulnerability in the region and force it to change its behaviour. Denying Turkey this support until it changes its behaviour will therefore contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.

### 2NR – Solves Emboldenment

#### Article 5 is a shield for Turkish behavior – removing the illusion of protection is key to spur behavioral change

De Jong and Meinend 20 (Johannes de Jong, director of Sallux, think tank of the European Christian Political Movement, and Christiaan Meinend; “European security, Turkish foreign policy and Article 5 of the NATO Treaty”; Sallux ECPM Foundation; December 2020; https://sallux.eu/free/european-security-turkish-agression-and-article-5-of-the-nato-treaty.html kp)

Article 5 of the NATO Treaty as shield for Turkish behaviour

The Foreign Affairs status quo until now has been that Turkish membership of NATO has been beneficial for the security of Europe and NATO as a whole, especially in the light of Russia’s expansionism. Furthermore, the ‘cooperation against terrorism’ is still cited as a reason not to introduce real change in relation to Turkey or apply real pressure on the Erdogan regime143/144.

The idea that the West can cooperate with Turkey in combating terrorism while Tur- key is moving jihadists from battlefield to battlefield since 2013 is in clear contradiction. There is still an unwillingness among many foreign affairs thinktanks and the diplomatic corps to understand Turkish aggression as a threat to European security on a par with that of Russia. The message that Turkey is indispensable for European and NATO security is still repeated 145146147. However, the fact that Turkey is smaller than Russia does not make it less dangerous for European security. The facts since 2013 show that Turkey has already actively destabilized Europe’s security on a level on par with Russia.

The refugee crisis of 2015 is an example of how Turkey’s subsequent moves created destabilization in Europe. Turkey blocked from the beginning of the Syrian crisis the unity of the Syrian opposi- tion through blocking any cooperation between the officially recognized Syrian opposition and the (predecessors of the) Syrian Democratic Forces and their political representation. Instead Turkey favored extremism. That policy guaranteed the victory of Assad as the opposition remained divided and created therefore a much larger stream of refugees from Syria. A refugee stream that in turn was used against the EU in 2015 when Turkey ensured that these desperate people overwhelmed the governance and politi- cal capacity of Europe. This in turn created upheaval and instability in the EU. In addition, Turkish active and passive support for ISIS has had a massive impact on Europe’s security. To various degrees the other Turkish actions as described earlier in this publication and agenda that drives Turkish foreign and domestic policy, sim- ilarly represent a threat to Europe’s secu- rity and stability.

The status quo opinion on Turkey has failed to present and understand the extent of the seriousness of this situa- tion and its real consequences for our security. The communis opinin in Foreign Affairs continued to emphasize up until very recently that ‘Turkey is our indispen- sable ally’. Turkey has taken this as appeasement of its policies as there was little or no consequence to the subsequent acts of escalation, support for extremism, military conflicts and the egregious violations of human rights. There has been an almost ‘blind’ blanket application of Turkish NATO membership and a con- tinuation of the implicit application of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty.

This has at least created the impression that when push comes to shove, the NATO will defend Turkey, regardless of the Turkish realities as described before. And indeed that message of continued protection is still the main message from most of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, many in the State Department and in the diplomatic corps as the old paradigms from the 20th century continues to de- termine their attitude and policies148. The fact that this is also motivated by economic and business interests is not denied149. Economic ties are used as an argument to continue the current policy towards Turkey150. The problem is that the benefits of these economic ties do not outweigh the costs that the taxpayers are having to carry. The costs of the Syrian refugee crisis and ISIS terrorism, as well as other consequences of Turkish behaviour, need to be put on the table when it comes to relations with Turkey. The question is whether the average tax- payer sees any of the benefits, as there is no question at all that the taxpayers ultmately carry the costs which is important from a democratic perspective Therefore, it is necessary to take such action as to make clear to Turkey that it can no longer continue to be under the illusion that it is protected by Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. A new balance of power between NATO, the EU and the US on the one side and Turkey on the other is needed to curb the human and economic costs of Turkish foreign policies. Turkey can no longer be allowed to be in a position to blackmail Europe and NATO.

Moreover, the purpose of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty is ‘to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.’ Ignoring Turkish acts of violence and maintaining the illusion of NATO protection through Article 5 has produced the opposite. At the very least it has not produced any result in terms of reigning in Turkish aggression. This fact alone is evidence that Turkey has concluded that its behaviour enjoys protection which is in contradiction with how the NATO Treaty defines both security and its values.

NATO describes its values and the NATO understanding of security in Articles 1 and 2 of the NATO Treaty:

1. The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endan- gered, and to refrain in their internation- al relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the pur-poses of the United Nations.

2. The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these insti- tutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

Emphasis has been added to those essential elements that have been violated by Turkey since 2013. The facts as de- scribed in this publication have all played out in the sight of global media. Both the ideology driving the Turkish agenda, and the acts and policies carried out by the Turkish state because of this agenda, are in flagrant contradiction with Articles 1 & 2 of the NATO Treaty. Therefore, maintaining the illusion of protection for Turkey in its current state is not contributing to the goal of NATO but rather the reverse as it is creating more insecurity and instability. Turkey feels protected ‘at home’ through the impression of being protected by NATO and feels therefore free to operate abroad. This publication recommends to take away this impression in order to stem the destructive Turkish operations.

Ignoring human dignity and democratic values seldom carry costs in the short term. However, as can be seen in this situation, the costs of ignoring fundamental values will ultimately become apparent.

As the pace of Turkish escalations is accelerating, it is of the essence to make sure Turkey is very soon forced to return to maintaining its own security.

### 2NR – CP Signals to Turkey

#### Unambiguous US pressure is necessary – the root cause of Turkish revisionism is US inaction and inducements

Litas 20 (Spyridon N. Litsas, Professor in Theory of International Relations, University of Macedonia; “US Foreign Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean Power Politics and Ideology Under the Sun”; 2/6/20; ISBN 978-3-030-36895-1)

Furthermore, immediately after the end of the Cold War, Turkey began to feel uncomfortable in the shoes of a bandwagoner for profit simply because it began to regard itself not as a regional power, or simply as a pivotal state for NATO, but as one of the great powers of the new multipolar era. This can be seen in every state- ment of the Turkish Government today, with President Erdogan to be the first in line, repeating that Turkey is a great power and has to be treated accordingly.17 However, Erdogan and his entourage are not the first promoting this kind of rheto- ric. During the early post-Cold War days, in February 1992, the then Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel stated that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, a gigantic Turkish world merged, stretching from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China (Robins 2003: 280). During the same period the then Turkish President of the Republic Turgut Özal stated, “If we do not make major mistakes, the next century [i.e. the twenty-first century] will be the century of the Turks” (Aral 2001: 85). Evidently, the Turkish narcissistic revisionism had been nourished long before Erdogan, during the early days of the post-Cold War era, when the dawn of a new era simultaneously fed Turkish narcissistic revisionism. Currently, Ankara’s aggressive behavior towards Greece in the Aegean Sea, its pro-Hamas stance against Israeli status, the purchase of the Russian S-400 antimissile system, and the deal with ROSATOM for the construction of a nuclear plant at Akkuyu in the Mersin Province, all point towards evidence of the Turkish excessive post-Cold War conduct.

How does the U.S. face this critical consequence both for the American status in the Eastern Mediterranean and for the unity of NATO? Admittedly very poor, and outside of the framework of the five schools of thought of the U.S. foreign policy. The Trump administration, in an attempt to avoid a conclusive rift with Ankara, seems unwilling to show to Turkey that its erratic behavior is not acceptable under any conditions. Instead, the American officials are projecting an equivocal approach towards Turkey, combining strict public rhetoric with no diplomatic activity when Ankara does not readjust its course, which convinces Erdogan and the rest of the international system that the White House is not going to adopt any harsh measures against it. Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama followed that line, yet nothing can be compared with Trump’s approach towards Turkey. For example, the American President publicly stated in mid-July 2019, when the Russo-Turkish deal for the S-400 was closed and the first parts of the Russian antimissile system began to arrive in the Mürted Air Base near Ankara, that it is not fair for the U.S. nor for Turkey to have to cancel the deal with the F-35 stealth fighter program because Erdogan bought the Russian arsenal (Mason and Stewart 2019). What the American President did not mention is that the cancellation of the F-35 deal is strictly a legal issue for the U.S. Under the 2017 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act [CAATSA], no NATO member state can purchase military equipment from Russia without facing the U.S. retribution. As things proceed, a NATO mem- ber will be able to fully operate an advanced Russian technological antimissile sys- tem by April 2020, while Turkish officials keep threatening Washington that soon the Turkish Air Force will acquire the Russian-made Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets.

The U.S. has not clarified its own stance towards Turkish ambiguous approach. On the one hand, it sends strict messages to Ankara that is not going to tolerate its erratic behavior in the Eastern Mediterranean against Cyprus or Greece, while on the other hand Washington encourages Turkey to implement its revisionist plans in the Eastern Mediterranean. During his official visit to Athens the Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, presented a crystal clear position towards the Turkish aggressive conduct in the region. In his official speech at the Stavros Niarchos Foundation Cultural Center on October 5, 2019, the same venue that Barack Obama used during his official visit in Athens back in 2016, the U.S. Secretary of State sent a strict warning to Turkey. Pompeo, in an unusual nondiplomatic language, reassured the Greek audience that Washington will not tolerate Turkish illegal drillings inside Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone, and that the U.S. will “act in ways that protect and preserve these basic ideas of sovereignty, these basic ideas of the rule of law, and these basic ideas around the protection of private property” when he was asked what will be the American response in case of a new Imia Crisis (Ellis 2019b). While the Greeks left the Stavros Niarchos Foundation contented with what they heard, the American President was announcing that American troops of around 1000 would withdraw from the area around Syria’s borders with Turkey. This meant that Washington gave the green light to Ankara to invade North Syria and attack the units of the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party [Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat/ PYD] and the People’s Protection Units [Yekineyen Parastina Gel/YPG], imple- menting Operation Peace Spring [Baris Pinari Harekati] (Wilson 2019; Frantzman 2019; Hall and Daragahi 2019).

At first glance, Pompeo’s statement with that of Trump does not correlate with each other. While the first describes the American stance towards Turkish aggressiveness against two Western states in the Eastern Mediterranean, Greece and Cyprus, the latter tries to reshuffle the cards in Syria, making a bold decision that aims to weaken the links between Russia and Turkey. In an attempt to decipher Trump’s decision to give the green light to the Turkish Army for invading North Syria, Washington presumes that this would create a forceful military reaction from the Assad regime with Moscow in the middle, trying to balance things between its puppet state and its new accessory in the region. Nevertheless, this is an utterly simplistic approach. On the one hand, Russia can fully control the reactions from the side of Assad’s regime as things already show. This means that the diplomatic crisis which Washington anticipates in the Russo-Syrian-Turkish triangle will not take place, since Assad is fully dependable on the Kremlin. On the other hand, Donald Trump repeats exactly the same mistake that Barack Obama committed dur- ing his presidency with Hosni Mubarak. The Syrian Kurds were successfully fight- ing by the side of the U.S. Army against ISIS since 2015. Leaving PYD and YPG at the mercy of the Turkish Army is a direct self-blow against the American prestige. The Russian argument that Washington does not stand by the side of its allies gradu- ally reappears, hammering American exceptionalism and credibility. For example, on October 16, 2019, during his appearance in the International Forum of Dialogue of Culture in the Greek island of Rhodes, the Russian Ambassador to the European Union, Vladimir Chizhov, publicly stated the following:

We warned the Kurds that the American would abandon them. And here in Rhodes, I can personally warn the Greeks to think about whether a similar fate awaits them (EURACTIV 2019).

It goes without saying that this statement made quite an impact not only in Greece but also in the whole of the Eastern Mediterranean, mainly because it brings back memories of the commencement of the Egyptian Spring, the collapse of Mubarak regime, and also that the U.S., in effect, jettisoned Mubarak at the start of the Arab Spring. It also shows what the Russian official line will be for the next months and how it will move in the steep paths of international politics, since Vladimir Chizhov is a top Russian diplomat with direct links with the Kremlin.

The U.S. approach sends the Syrian Kurds directly to Moscow’s arms, weakens Washington’s strong links with the Kurds in North Iraq, offers the whole of Syria to Russia, and gives the ground to Russia and Turkey to work closer together in Syria, while Turkey’s neo-revisionism is encouraged once again. Syrian Kurds comprehended that no other state can stand between them and Turkey except Russia; there- fore the deepening of diplomatic relations between the two sides emerged almost immediately after the commencement of the Turkish Operation Peace Spring. As a matter of fact, on October 22, 2019, Moscow and Ankara, during a meeting between Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the Black Sea resort town of Sochi, agreed to jointly patrol the 20-mile-deep zone in the Turkish-Syrian borders after removing all Kurdish militias from the area (Fahim et al. 2019). The evacuation of the U.S. Armed Forces from North Syria is an extremely bad decision from the Trump administration, perhaps the greatest mistake of the U.S. foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean together with Barack Obama’s nonintervention policy dur- ing the first stages of the Syrian Civil War which will gravely affect the American prestige globally and the U.S. status regionally. Perhaps, a good idea for Donald Trump’s opponent in the Presidential Elections 2020 is to compete for office under the general slogan MARA.18

In case Ankara will continue its own paradoxical policies with no consequences from the Western side, then this will continue having a negative effect on Western presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. If Turkey is not admonished for its actions, then it is only a matter of time that other Western elements will follow Ankara’s footsteps, or simply they will downgrade their participation in the North Atlantic Treaty. Turkey is trapped in a sort of illusionary Luffberry, a descending circle chasing its tail, which arouses even further its narcissistic revisionism. As long as the U.S. delays drawing a red line, the possibilities for an existential crisis inside NATO grow larger, while at the same time, American prestige suffers a considerable loss of leverage. On top of that, the longer the U.S. ignores facing the oriental music com- ing out of the Presidential palace in Ankara, the harder will be later on to efficiently find an exit from the current conundrum. As I have already mentioned in previous paragraphs, this kind of approach arguing that as soon as President Erdogan finishes his political career Turkey will put an end to its narcissistic behavior is a misconception. Turkey always had a revisionist agenda, yet today it has to be treated as a great power and not as a pivotal regional actor. As long as this belief is indirectly accommodated by the U.S. in particular through inaction or profound inconsistency of the White House, the Eastern Mediterranean will be facing the dire consequences of Turkish neo-revisionism (Litsas 2019).

How can Washington face this Turkish eccentric behavior? It goes without say- ing that hesitancy does not help. On the contrary, for the Turkish political culture such a behavior is being considered as a clear sign of weakness or of inadequacy. The White House must clearly convey the message to Ankara that the American presence in the Eastern Mediterranean is not being dependent on the Turkish prefer- ences. By failing to show to Ankara that there are other elements in the Eastern Mediterranean too that may reinforce the Western presence in the region, e.g., Israel, Cyprus, Greece, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Egypt, the Kurdish Syrian militias, and the Kurds of Northern Iraq, Turkish narcissistic revisionism will be getting bigger and bigger. This approach must also be accompanied by specific resolutions from the U.S. administration towards the aforementioned states and actors, including Washington’s political support, new American hi-tech investments, etc. Last but not least, the U.S. must inform every involved side in the region’s bal- ance of power that any decision promoting Turkish nuclear aspirations will not be tolerated, simply because Ankara with an access to nuclear weaponry will be a constant threat for international politics and for the Eastern Mediterranean peace. Now is the time for the American foreign policy to adopt once again the Hamiltonian decisiveness, the Wilsonian virtue, and the Jacksonian dynamic response and prove with its attitude that international politics is not just a Hobbesian venue where the most cunning may survive. If Turkish narcissistic revisionism will not be defeated diplomatically, then the U.S. presence in the Eastern Mediterranean will be severely affected, the status quo of the region will be broken down, and peaceful coexistence will be undermined.

### 2NR – A5 = Adventurism

#### Article 5 is sufficient to fuel adventurism

Krumholz 19 (Willis L. Krumholz, a fellow at Defense Priorities. He holds a JD and MBA degree from the University of St. Thomas; “Turkey Is A Case Study In What’s Wrong With NATO”; The Federalist; 8/1/19; <https://thefederalist.com/2019/08/01/turkey-case-study-whats-wrong-nato/>)

The problem is that Turkey is a North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally. And as a NATO ally, Washington has committed America to come to Turkey’s defense if Turkey is attacked. This has not only failed to moderate Turkey’s behavior, it has allowed Turkey’s government to aggressively pursue its own interests at the expense of American interests, comfortable in the security U.S. protection provides.

Fifty years ago, it made sense for Turkey to be in NATO, because it was a Cold War ally on the front lines against the Soviet Union and is strategically located as the bridge between the Islamic world and Europe. But after the Cold War, Turkey has fallen away from the West.

Modern Turkey’s first leader, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, was a dictator, but he also instituted political and religious reforms that made Turkey into a secular and democratic state after his death. The legacy of Atatürk has been rolled away, however, under the Islamist Justice and Development Party of current Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has been in power since the early 2000s. Under Erdoğan, Turkey has been slipping away from democracy.

Erdoğan Has Pulled Turkey Back Into Autocracy

Erdoğan showed signs of thuggery from the start, using state power to harass and even jail his political enemies. Things got worse after July 2016, when a failed coup attempt allowed Erdoğan to double down on his strongman tactics (this coup is one reason for Erdoğan to buy the Russian system, which is better at shooting down his planes).

He jailed thousands of alleged followers of the exiled cleric Fethullah Gülen—a man now living in a compound in Pennsylvania who used to be an ally of Erdoğan’s government, but with whom Erdoğan had a falling out—who just happened to be political critics. This included many journalists, judges, and secular members of Turkey’s military, whom the Turkish president accused of being “Gülenists.”

Erdoğan’s government also jailed American pastor Andrew Brunson, accusing him of being a “Gülenist,” only to eventually release the pastor after the Trump administration sanctioned two Turkish ministers and increased and threatened tariffs on Turkish goods.

Meanwhile, because of Erdoğan’s economic mismanagement, Turkey’s economy is in shambles. The lira has lost well more than half of its value versus the dollar since the start of 2015. As a result, the inflation rate officially runs at about 20 percent annually, but some estimates put it as high as 50 percent. Turkey is now in recession, meaning economic growth is contracting, which could last throughout 2019.

This year, the Justice and Development Party lost a mayoral election in Istanbul. Erdoğan alleged cheating by the opposition and held the vote again, only to lose again. There were also allegations of widespread cheating by Erdoğan’s side in the last national Turkish election.

Turkey is no better in foreign affairs, where NATO (and by extension America’s) security guarantees have allowed it to act provocatively. The country funded the worst elements of the Sunni Islamists (terrorists) fighting in Syria’s civil war.

Before its recent rapprochement with Russia, Turkey shot down a Russian jet near its airspace, triggering a political crisis that could have dragged NATO as a whole into conflict with Russia. The latest dustup is Turkey’s drilling in Cypriot waters, leading the European Union to begin imposing sanctions on Turkey. Now, after Turkey bought Russia’s missile system, there are calls to kick Turkey out of NATO.