# TDI — 2023 — Consult NATO

## NEG

### 1NC – Shell

#### CP text: the United States should enter into a prior and binding consultation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization over a substantial reduction of military presence in the West Asia-North Africa region. The United States should adopt the results of the consultation.

#### That solves---NATO favors restraint and says yes.

Baldor ’19 [Lolita; Foreign Policy Reporter at AP; “U.S. gets no commitment from NATO for help on Iran threat”; PBS; 7-29-2019; <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/u-s-gets-no-commitment-from-nato-for-help-on-iran-threat>] TDI

NATO allies have expressed reluctance to get involved in any military effort to help secure the region or counter Iran. Europe wants more emphasis on minimizing the chances of war, especially after the events of last week, when President Donald Trump approved military retaliation for Iran’s strike against the drone, then withdrew the order at the last minute.

Esper said Thursday there is a range of options that allies could participate in, ranging from increased air surveillance and maritime escorts to the establishment of a “picket line” of ships to protect the waterways near the Gulf. Those ships would essentially set up a series of checkpoints in the Gulf region.

Asked about allies’ reaction to the U.S. request, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said Thursday that there were no decisions made to take any action.

“Allies agreed that we are deeply concerned about what Iran has done and is doing in the region,” said Stoltenberg. “The dialogue between allies will continue, but the main message — the main focus — of all allies is to de-escalate, is to actually avoid a conflict, is to find ways to reduce tensions.

One European NATO diplomat said the alliance wants to stay away from the issues linked to Iran. Instead, the alliance wants to see more calm from the U.S. and Iran, and don’t want the matter to become a NATO issue, said the diplomat, who spoke on condition of anonymity to reveal private discussions.

Trump, who withdrew the United States last year from an international deal to limit Iran’s nuclear program and then reinstated harsh economic sanctions, says he wants to work out an even more restrictive deal with Tehran. Germany, France and Britain, as well as Russia and China, remain part of the Obama administration-backed nuclear deal that Trump abandoned last year. The 2015 agreement aimed at curbing Iran’s nuclear ambitions in exchange for relief from economic sanctions.

Iran, however, has denounced the latest U.S. sanctions as “idiotic” and an obstacle to talks. In response, Trump fired back that “any attack by Iran on anything American” would be answered with overwhelming military force that “in some areas” would mean “obliteration.”

The attacks and escalating tensions have raised worries of an impending conflict between the U.S. and Iran. But, in public and private meetings, Esper repeatedly pressed the Trump administration message that America does not want war.

“Most partners in the room acknowledged the challenges we face,” said Esper. “I think they appreciate that the United States is not seeking war with Iran that we want to get this off of a military track and onto a diplomacy track.”

#### **They’ll definitely agree---reliance on the US forces their hand, and its empirically likely in the region.**

Erlanger ’21 [Steven; chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe for The New York Times, a position he assumed in 2017. Mr. Erlanger was previously the bureau chief in London, from 2013 to 2017; in Paris, from 2008 to 2013; in Jerusalem, from 2004 to 2008; in Berlin, from 2001 to 2002; in Prague, from 1999 to 2001; in Moscow, from 1994 to 1996; and in Bangkok, Thailand, from 1988 to 1991, received the German Marshall Fund’s Peter Weitz Prize in 2000 for excellence and originality in reporting and analyzing European and transatlantic affairs and the Robert Livingston Award for international reporting in 1981 for a series of articles about Eastern Europe. Mr. Erlanger graduated from the Taft School in Watertown, Conn., and received an A.B. degree, magna cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa, from Harvard College in 1974. He majored in political philosophy in the government department; “NATO Confirms Its Troop Withdrawal From Afghanistan”; 4-14-2021; <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/14/world/asia/nato-afghanistan-troops-withdrawal.html>] TDI

BRUSSELS — Following the news that the United States was pulling all its troops from Afghanistan by Sept. 11, NATO’s foreign and defense ministers agreed on Wednesday to begin withdrawing NATO forces on May 1 and finish “within a few months,” the alliance said in a statement.

The withdrawal will be “orderly, coordinated and deliberate,’’ the statement said, adding: “Any Taliban attacks on allied troops during this withdrawal will be met with a forceful response.”

The allies support efforts for “an Afghan-owned and Afghan-led peace process,” the statement said, and called the withdrawal “the start of a new chapter.’’

At the moment, of the 9,600 NATO troops officially in Afghanistan, about 2,500 of them are American, though that number can be as many as 1,000 higher. The second-largest contingent is from Germany, with some 1,300 troops.

In a news conference after the meeting with Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken said that the NATO troop withdrawal by Sept. 11 did not mean an end to the American commitment to Afghanistan, which would include aid and advice to the military and to the government. Today, he said, NATO “began to hammer out what ‘out together’ looks like.”

Mr. Austin said he fully **supported** President **Biden’s decision to leave**, and he thanked NATO allies and American troops for their sacrifices. “Our troops have accomplished the mission for which they were sent to Afghanistan to accomplish, and they have much to be proud of,” Mr. Austin said.

Earlier, speaking at NATO headquarters, Mr. Blinken insisted that the two-decade military mission in Afghanistan had been a success.

After the attacks on the United States on Sept. 11, 2001, “Together we went into Afghanistan to deal with those who attacked us and to make sure that Afghanistan would not again become a haven for terrorists who might attack any of us,” Mr. Blinken said.

“We have achieved the goals we set out to achieve,” he added. “Now it’s time to bring our forces home.”

In brief remarks, he limited those goals narrowly to antiterrorism, not mentioning the larger NATO efforts to liberate women, help girls to attend school and shift agriculture away from growing opium poppies.

Some current and former American officials agree that Afghanistan is not expected to emerge as a terrorist threat to the United States in the short term, but they say that the question is more difficult to assess in the long run.

Germany’s defense minister, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, referring to NATO, told the German television station ARD on Wednesday: “We always said, ‘**We’ll go in together, we’ll leave together**.’ I am for an orderly withdrawal and that is why I assume that we will agree to that today.”

NATO allies had been waiting for Mr. Biden to decide on a withdrawal deadline and have had consultations with U.S. officials. It was important now, Ms. Kramp-Karrenbauer said, “for us in NATO to **synchronize our planning with the U.S.** planning.”

The Atlantic alliance’s troops rely on the Americans for force protection, logistics and intelligence and would be highly vulnerable if they remained after the United States left.

#### Consultation shores up legitimacy, BUT unilateral action decks allied confidence---Afghan proves.

Seligman ’21 [Lara; an award-winning journalist who covers the Pentagon for POLITICO. Her reporting on the military and the defense industry has taken her around the world, from the Middle East to Mongolia to the backseat of an Air Force Thunderbird; “Biden heads to NATO amid friction over Afghanistan withdrawal” Politico; 6-13-21; <https://www.politico.com/news/2021/06/13/biden-nato-afghanistan-withdrawal-493580>] TDI

NATO allies have made no secret of their frustration with President Joe Biden’s decision to withdraw forces from Afghanistan unconditionally by Sept. 11. Now as he arrives in Brussels this week for his first NATO summit as president, Biden must confront allies’ lingering resentment over the drawdown and tackle the thorny issues involved in securing the country’s future.

European officials say they are frustrated by what they saw as the Biden administration’s failure to sufficiently consult with allies ahead of the announcement, and the decision to move from a conditions-based withdrawal to one based on the calendar. U.K. Secretary of State for Defense Ben Wallace echoed those sentiments last month, telling parliament that he “regrets” the decision to withdraw forces without setting conditions on the Taliban.

That disappointment will likely color the discussions this week in Brussels, where officials must begin to tackle a series of unanswered questions about the future of Afghanistan — from securing critical infrastructure such as embassies and aircraft to ensuring that the country does not once again become a haven for terrorists.

“It’s not a surprise that you’ve seen some countries express, pretty straightforwardly, their dissatisfaction with the way things were done,” said one European official, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive topic. “This is another example of one of the issues where within NATO, we should be more substantially discussing and consulting with one another before making decisions.”

Left with little choice but to go along with the withdrawal, NATO allies have since gotten on board, European officials say. The last Western troops will likely leave Afghanistan weeks before the Sept. 11 deadline, possibly as soon as July; as of Tuesday, the U.S. withdrawal was more than 50 percent complete, according to U.S. Central Command. As of 2021, NATO countries had nearly 10,000 troops in Afghanistan, from countries including Germany, the U.K., Turkey, Georgia, Romania and Italy.

A senior Biden administration official pushed back on the characterization that NATO was out of the loop, noting that in early February, U.S. officials set up a “listening session” with allies “to hear their perspectives and priorities,” which was “widely appreciated by allies.”

“This set the stage for an improved tempo of consultation with NATO, during which several scenarios and possible outcomes were discussed,” the official said. The official declined to say whether the proposal to move to a time-based withdrawal was discussed.

#### Reviving strategic consultation uniquely legitimizes NATO---returning to a culture of consultation is key to NATO survival

Rynning ’19 [Sten; University of Southern Denmar; "Sustaining NATO by consultation: hard choices for Europe”; 3-14-19; <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s42738-019-00018-w#Abs1>] TDI

NATO allies have since the inception of the alliance sought to establish an Atlanticist habit of political consultation to prevent political go-it-alone drift on the part of key allies and help define NATO in regard to major strategic issues. Today, observers dispute the ability of Atlanticism to sustain the Alliance. This article reviews the history and current politics of Atlanticist consultations to assess the conditions under which consultations are most likely to serve as a force of alliance continuity. The article argues that European allies have become accustomed to an incremental Atlanticist approach that no longer serves them well. Reviewing Atlanticist history, the article suggests how Europe can leap forward to revive the tradition of consultations. It involves a balancing act for Europe between on the one hand expanded power to manage global issues such as the rise of China and on the other limited ambitions of strategic autonomy. NATO’s future ability to sustain itself by political consultations, the article argues, is hostage to this balancing act and the support accorded to it by all allies. Soon after NATO’s creation in April 1949, the allies went in search of a culture of consultation and coordination to protect their Alliance from the disruption that wider global events or national impulses to go-it-alone threatened to inflict on it. The NATO treaty quite powerfully promised consultations “whenever, in the opinion of any [of the Parties], the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened,”Footnote1 but, in practice, consultation extended beyond the invocation of the treaty to involve habits of coordination and compromise. In 1956, three “wise men”—Lester Pearson of Canada, Halvard Lange of Norway, and Gaetano Martino of Italy—tasked by NATO to clarify what such a habit of consultation involved, concluded that it concerned a reflex to talk on important issues, shape national policy in respect of NATO consensus, and if no such consensus was possible, take care not to offend the views of NATO allies.Footnote2 To capture the allies’ commitment to sustaining the Alliance by political dialogue and compromise, we can usefully define Atlanticism in line with the “wise men”—as a tradition of consultation that builds on the treaty but also extends beyond it. Sometimes, scholars define Atlanticism in opposition to Europeanism, which is useful for the purpose of tracing political views on the role of the USA in European affairs.Footnote3 Atlanticism as consultation is related in that it is (mostly) about US–European diplomacy but also distinct in that it draws out historical approaches to and practices of compromise in NATO strategic affairs. As this article will demonstrate, Atlanticism as consultation draws out a pattern of high drama followed by a sustained period of relative stability where European allies stuck to a formula developed in the late 1960s of incremental consultation. However, as the article also highlights, Atlanticist allies wishing to sustain the Alliance by consultation must today fundamentally rethink their approach to consultations, which notably involves defining Europe’s contribution to key global issues, including China’s rise. A stronger European pillar of global relevance, the article argues, is in fact a precondition for continued Atlanticism. There is plenty of evidence to support a skeptical view of continued Atlanticism. President Trump tears apart the “institutional fabric of Atlanticism,”Footnote4 feeds European investments in “post-Atlanticist” security options,Footnote5 and his “disingenuous manipulation of a high order” plays to Russia’s advantages and robs Europeans of any illusion that NATO is here to stay.Footnote6 President Trump is enhancing an underlying tension between Europe’s communitarian and pluralist outlook on the one hand and America’s unipolar and Hobbesian outlook on the other.Footnote7 Keeping this impulse of antagonism at bay was always a supreme challenge of Atlanticism, but Trump’s presidency might be more than traditional Atlanticists can handle, and in fact, it may have been President Trump’s design all along that the USA should pull out of NATO.Footnote8 Yet Atlanticism may not be a spent force. The Trump presidency is drawing attention—and occasional outrage—because vested interests in the Alliance are pervasive, and these interests will be hard to fully dislodge. Moreover, even as it might want to give China its full geopolitical attention, the USA would be well advised to consider the adverse impact on its Asian allies that its decision to end or erode its established security guarantees in Europe would cause.

#### Revitalized NATO solves extinction, prolif, and European wars

Brands and Feaver ’17 [Hal and Peter; Professor of Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at Duke University, Director of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies, Director of the Duke Program in American Grand Strategy; The U.S. Army War College Quarterly Parameters; 2017; “What Are America’s Alliances Good For?”; <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=803998/>] TDI

Geostrategic Influence and Global Stability

If alliances are thus helpful in terms of the conflicts America wages, they are more helpful still in terms of the conflicts they prevent and the broader geostrategic influence they confer. Indeed, although the ultimate test of America’s alliances lies in their efficacy as warfighting coalitions, the most powerful benefits they provide come in the normal course of peacetime geostrategic management and competition.

First, US alliances bind many of the richest and most militarily capable countries in the world to Washington through enduring relationships of deep cooperation. Alliances reflect shared interests rather than creating them, of course, and the United States would presumably have close ties to countries such as the United Kingdom even without formal alliances. But alliances nonetheless serve as “hoops of steel.” They help create a sense of permanence and shared purpose in key relationships; they provide forums for regular interaction and cooperation; they conduce to deeply institutionalized exchanges (of intelligence, personnel, and other assets) that insulate and perpetuate friendly associations even when political leaders clash.38 And insofar as US alliances serve these purposes with respect to immensely influential countries in Europe and the Asia-Pacific, they help Washington preserve a significant overbalance of power vis-à-vis any competitor.

Second, alliances have a strong deterrent effect on would-be aggressors. American alliances lay down “redlines” regarding areas in which territorial aggression is impermissible; they complicate the calculus of any potential aggressor by raising the strong possibility that an attack on a US ally will mean a fight with the world’s most formidable military. The proposition that “defensive alliances deter the initiation of disputes” is, in fact, supported by empirical evidence, and the forward deployment of troops strengthens this deterrence further still.39

NATO clearly had an important deterrent effect on Soviet calculations during the Cold War, for instance; more recently, Russia has behaved most aggressively toward countries lacking US alliance guarantees (Georgia and Ukraine), rather than toward those countries possessing them (the Baltic states or Poland). In other words, alliances make the geostrategic status quo—which is enormously favorable to the United States—far “stickier” than it might otherwise be.

Third, and related to this second benefit, alliances tamp down international instability more broadly. American security guarantees allow US allies to underbuild their own militaries; while always annoying and problematic when taken to extremes, this phenomenon also helps avert the arms races and febrile security competitions that plagued Europe and East Asia in earlier eras. In fact, US alliances are as useful in managing tensions among America’s allies as they are in constraining America’s adversaries.

NATO was always intended to keep the “Americans in” and the “Germans down” as well as the “Russians out”; US presence, along with the creation of a framework in which France and Germany were incentivized to cooperate rather than compete with one another, would help stifle any resurgence of tensions between these historical rivals.40 Similarly, US alliance guarantees in the Asia-Pacific were designed, in part, to create a climate of security in which Japan could be revived economically without threatening its neighbors, just as the expansion of NATO after the Cold War helped prevent incipient rivalries and territorial irredentism among former members of the Warsaw Pact.41 US alliances keep things quiet in regions Washington cannot ignore, thereby fostering a climate of peace in which America and its partners can flourish.

Fourth, US alliances impede dangerous geostrategic phenomena such as nuclear proliferation. As scholars such as Francis Gavin have emphasized, US security guarantees and forward deployments have played a critical role in convincing historically insecure, technologically advanced countries—Germany, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, among others—to forego possession of the world’s absolute weapon. In several of these cases, moreover, the United States has used the security leverage provided by alliance guarantees to dissuade allies from pursuing the bomb after they had given indications of their intent to start down that path.42 If, as seems likely, a world with more nuclear powers is likely to be a more dangerous world in which crises more frequently take on a nuclear dimension and the risk of nuclear conflict is higher, then the value of American alliances looms large indeed.

### 1NC – Say Yes – General

#### NATO wants the US to reduce military involvement in the Persian Gulf.

Baldor ’19 [Lolita; Foreign Policy Reporter at AP; “U.S. gets no commitment from NATO for help on Iran threat”; PBS; 7-29-2019; <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/u-s-gets-no-commitment-from-nato-for-help-on-iran-threat>] TDI

NATO allies have expressed reluctance to get involved in any military effort to help secure the region or counter Iran. Europe wants more emphasis on minimizing the chances of war, especially after the events of last week, when President Donald Trump approved military retaliation for Iran’s strike against the drone, then withdrew the order at the last minute.

Esper said Thursday there is a range of options that allies could participate in, ranging from increased air surveillance and maritime escorts to the establishment of a “picket line” of ships to protect the waterways near the Gulf. Those ships would essentially set up a series of checkpoints in the Gulf region.

Asked about allies’ reaction to the U.S. request, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said Thursday that there were no decisions made to take any action.

“Allies agreed that we are deeply concerned about what Iran has done and is doing in the region,” said Stoltenberg. “The dialogue between allies will continue, but the main message — the main focus — of all allies is to de-escalate, is to actually avoid a conflict, is to find ways to reduce tensions.

One European NATO diplomat said the alliance wants to stay away from the issues linked to Iran. Instead, the alliance wants to see more calm from the U.S. and Iran, and don’t want the matter to become a NATO issue, said the diplomat, who spoke on condition of anonymity to reveal private discussions.

Trump, who withdrew the United States last year from an international deal to limit Iran’s nuclear program and then reinstated harsh economic sanctions, says he wants to work out an even more restrictive deal with Tehran. Germany, France and Britain, as well as Russia and China, remain part of the Obama administration-backed nuclear deal that Trump abandoned last year. The 2015 agreement aimed at curbing Iran’s nuclear ambitions in exchange for relief from economic sanctions.

Iran, however, has denounced the latest U.S. sanctions as “idiotic” and an obstacle to talks. In response, Trump fired back that “any attack by Iran on anything American” would be answered with overwhelming military force that “in some areas” would mean “obliteration.”

The attacks and escalating tensions have raised worries of an impending conflict between the U.S. and Iran. But, in public and private meetings, Esper repeatedly pressed the Trump administration message that America does not want war.

“Most partners in the room acknowledged the challenges we face,” said Esper. “I think they appreciate that the United States is not seeking war with Iran that we want to get this off of a military track and onto a diplomacy track.”

#### NATO lacks the ability to stay in any region on their own --- If the US leaves, so does NATO --- Afghanistan proves. A lack of consultation drives European insecurity.

Kirby 21 [Jen; senior foreign and national security reporter at Vox, where she covers global stability. She joined Vox after working as a homepage and assistant editor at New York magazine. She was part of the team that won the 2015 George Polk Award for Magazine Reporting for the New York cover story: "Cosby: The Women." Kirby attended journalism school at Northwestern University and received her undergraduate degree from Georgetown University, where she studied international politics and security; “NATO allies are preparing for a future without America’s "forever wars",”; Vox; 8-31-21; https://www.vox.com/22639474/afghanistan-nato-europe-refugees-germany-uk] TDI

The Trump administration signed a peace deal with the Taliban in February 2020. According to the terms of the deal, US-led NATO forces would depart Afghanistan by May 2021. Biden, as president, recommitted to the US withdrawal, though in April he extended the final deadline, first to September 11, and later inching it back to Tuesday, August 31. In April, Secretary of State Antony Blinken met in Brussels with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, who said NATO would also begin its drawdown. “We went into Afghanistan together, we have adjusted our posture together and we are united in leaving together,” Stoltenberg said. Togetherness was simply the default. NATO governments didn’t have the capacity to stay in Afghanistan after the US left. Privately, diplomats grumbled that they weren’t fully consulted, or raised doubts about the US plans. But once the US made its decision, the decision was also made for approximately 7,000 non-American NATO forces on the ground. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg visits the Italian-run military base Camp Arena in Herat, Afghanistan, in 2018. Antonio Masiello/Getty Images “It showed, basically, how dependent we really are,” Jana Puglierin, senior policy fellow and head of the Berlin office at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), said of allies like Germany. “Because then it was immediately clear that we needed to follow the American withdrawal, and withdraw, as well.” Allies took steps to wind down their presence, and as the security situation started deteriorating, some began asking personnel and nationals to leave. But the US and its allies did not fully anticipate (or chose to downplay) the Taliban’s accelerated push through Afghanistan and the collapse of Afghan defenses. That left NATO and European governments also rushing to get their personnel out. “The immediate feeling around this whole situation is that perhaps there should have been more consultation and more joint planning about how to manage the exit strategy,” said David O’Sullivan, who served as EU ambassador to the United States from 2014 to 2019. “The feeling is that this all kind of descended into something of a scramble,” he continued, “which is very difficult to manage, which put the European countries in a lot of difficulty — not only to get their own nationals out, but also to get out all the Afghans who are working closely with them, and were clearly at risk.” Governments like Germany and the United Kingdom faced harsh criticism for their failures to prepare and evacuate their citizens and their Afghan allies. Some UK lawmakers responded by pushing the idea that after 20 years, the US — and Western allies — should have stayed even longer in Afghanistan. “The Biden choice, I thought, was false. It was either total commitment of American forces and a lot more American deaths with a never-ending war, or pulling out,” Owen Paterson, a Conservative British MP, said on the Telegraph’s Chopper’s Politics podcast. UK military personnel board an aircraft departing Kabul on August 28. Jonathan Gifford/UK Ministry of Defense via AP But the prevailing sentiment revolved around the idea that the Biden administration had failed to consult with allies and refused to be flexible in ways that might have lessened the chaos of the withdrawal — though what could have been done differently wasn’t always articulated. “Nobody asked us whether it was a good idea to leave that country in such a quick way,” Johann Wadephul, a deputy caucus leader for Merkel’s Christian Democrats in Germany’s parliament, told Bloomberg Television. “So, the very irritating situation we now have — the chaos we are facing in Kabul — is of course the result of this.” Even though many NATO governments had already largely scaled back their commitments in Afghanistan, they too inherited the mayhem and perception of failure in the US’s military withdrawal. And with that came the realization that they were limited in the ability to influence the narrative, or the final outcome. “I think definitely the shock and the optics of how quickly things fell apart play a big part in the scope of the reaction,” said Garret Martin, a senior professional lecturer in the School of International Service at American University. A sense of impotence, Martin said, has laid bare the extent of allies’ dependence on the United States. “I think that was hard to swallow that once the United States decided that it was over, the game was over.” At a G7 meeting last week, European leaders pushed the United States to extend the August 31 deadline for troop departure. The available days to evacuate nationals and Afghan allies were dwindling, made worse by an unstable security situation that, after the meeting, became even more volatile. The US didn’t change course. That means people will be left behind; now the United States and its allies are depending on the Taliban to let people continue to leave after August 31. French President Emmanuel Macron has proposed the United Nations designate a “safe zone” in Kabul to allow people to depart. “Will we be able to do it? I cannot guarantee that,” he said in an interview with the French television channel TF1, according to the Washington Post. All of these machinations from allies in the past week also showed how little control they had over the situation in Afghanistan. Puglierin described it, at least in Germany, as a sense of “helplessness.” “We realize that we are completely dependent, that it would not even be possible to evacuate our own citizens without the Americans going back in the thousands, without Americans running this military airport,” she said. The dependency on the United States fuels insecurity about what happens if the country’s domestic interests diverge more profoundly from Europe’s. Since the Obama administration, the United States has made clear it is losing its appetite for forever wars, but the Trump administration’s “America First” policies — and sometimes open hostility to the EU and NATO — accelerated fears that Europe wouldn’t be able to rely on the US. President Biden joins G7 summit leaders in a group photo in June 2021. In a G7 meeting last week, European leaders pushed the US to extend the August 31 deadline for troop departure. Jonny Weeks/Getty Images Biden has said the right things, and has promised allies he will work to rebuild the relationship. But the Afghanistan exit adds to “this realization that maybe some of the things that were attributed to Trump were actually part of something deeper that’s going on in the US on both sides of the political spectrum,” Benjamin Haddad, director of the Europe Center at the Atlantic Council, said.

#### NATO says yes to US when pulling out forces— Afghanistan proves

Barigazzi 23 [Jacopo; Senior EU Reporter, covering mainly migration, foreign policy and Italian politics; “Biden’s Afghan pullout triggers unease among NATO allies,” POLITICO; 7-24-2023; <https://www.politico.eu/article/united-states-afghanistan-pullout-triggers-unease-among-nato-allies-joe-biden/>] TDI

Joe Biden’s decision to pull U.S. forces out of Afghanistan by September 11 this year gave NATO allies their marching orders — they had little choice but to salute smartly and declare their troops will follow suit. Some officials from the NATO countries most involved in Afghanistan said they appreciated the consultation undertaken by the Biden administration, which contrasted sharply with the rough treatment they suffered under Donald Trump. Biden sent his secretaries of state and defense to Brussels this week to discuss the move and they stood shoulder to shoulder with NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg to announce it.

#### **NATO says yes – they support US military withdrawal – Afghan proves**

Erlanger ’21 [Steven; chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe for The New York Times, a position he assumed in 2017. Mr. Erlanger was previously the bureau chief in London, from 2013 to 2017; in Paris, from 2008 to 2013; in Jerusalem, from 2004 to 2008; in Berlin, from 2001 to 2002; in Prague, from 1999 to 2001; in Moscow, from 1994 to 1996; and in Bangkok, Thailand, from 1988 to 1991, received the German Marshall Fund’s Peter Weitz Prize in 2000 for excellence and originality in reporting and analyzing European and transatlantic affairs and the Robert Livingston Award for international reporting in 1981 for a series of articles about Eastern Europe. Mr. Erlanger graduated from the Taft School in Watertown, Conn., and received an A.B. degree, magna cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa, from Harvard College in 1974. He majored in political philosophy in the government department; “NATO Confirms Its Troop Withdrawal From Afghanistan”; 4-14-2021; <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/14/world/asia/nato-afghanistan-troops-withdrawal.html>] TDI

BRUSSELS — Following the news that the United States was pulling all its troops from Afghanistan by Sept. 11, NATO’s foreign and defense ministers agreed on Wednesday to begin withdrawing NATO forces on May 1 and finish “within a few months,” the alliance said in a statement.

The withdrawal will be “orderly, coordinated and deliberate,’’ the statement said, adding: “Any Taliban attacks on allied troops during this withdrawal will be met with a forceful response.”

The allies support efforts for “an Afghan-owned and Afghan-led peace process,” the statement said, and called the withdrawal “the start of a new chapter.’’

At the moment, of the 9,600 NATO troops officially in Afghanistan, about 2,500 of them are American, though that number can be as many as 1,000 higher. The second-largest contingent is from Germany, with some 1,300 troops.

In a news conference after the meeting with Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken said that the NATO troop withdrawal by Sept. 11 did not mean an end to the American commitment to Afghanistan, which would include aid and advice to the military and to the government. Today, he said, NATO “began to hammer out what ‘out together’ looks like.”

Mr. Austin said he fully **supported** President **Biden’s decision to leave**, and he thanked NATO allies and American troops for their sacrifices. “Our troops have accomplished the mission for which they were sent to Afghanistan to accomplish, and they have much to be proud of,” Mr. Austin said.

Earlier, speaking at NATO headquarters, Mr. Blinken insisted that the two-decade military mission in Afghanistan had been a success.

After the attacks on the United States on Sept. 11, 2001, “Together we went into Afghanistan to deal with those who attacked us and to make sure that Afghanistan would not again become a haven for terrorists who might attack any of us,” Mr. Blinken said.

“We have achieved the goals we set out to achieve,” he added. “Now it’s time to bring our forces home.”

In brief remarks, he limited those goals narrowly to antiterrorism, not mentioning the larger NATO efforts to liberate women, help girls to attend school and shift agriculture away from growing opium poppies.

Some current and former American officials agree that Afghanistan is not expected to emerge as a terrorist threat to the United States in the short term, but they say that the question is more difficult to assess in the long run.

Germany’s defense minister, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, referring to NATO, told the German television station ARD on Wednesday: “We always said, ‘**We’ll go in together, we’ll leave together**.’ I am for an orderly withdrawal and that is why I assume that we will agree to that today.”

NATO allies had been waiting for Mr. Biden to decide on a withdrawal deadline and have had consultations with U.S. officials. It was important now, Ms. Kramp-Karrenbauer said, “for us in NATO to **synchronize our planning with the U.S.** planning.”

The Atlantic alliance’s troops rely on the Americans for force protection, logistics and intelligence and would be highly vulnerable if they remained after the United States left.

#### NATO only wants troops in Middle East if they want us there – no exceptions

Rusi ‘09 [RUSI – Royal United Services Institute; the leading authority on UK and international defence and security issues. Through its [Journal](http://www.rusi.org/journal/) and other [publications](http://www.rusi.org/publications.html), RUSI fosters informed, policy-relevant debate and research on national and international defence and security matters; “NATO treads carefully in the Middle East”; 2009; https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/nato-treads-carefully-middle-east]

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has launched two initiatives that would improve its relationship with countries in the Middle East. Whilst there are undoubtedly common interests on which to build, the public perception of NATO in the region leaves much to be desired. The Alliance must tread carefully if it wishes to build lasting relationships in the region. By Mina Al-Oraibi for RUSI.org With the end of the Cold War ushering in NATO’s soul-searching for a raison d’etre beyond the basic mission of keeping the USSR at bay, new tasks were considered both within the Alliance and outside it. One such role was the stabilisation of the Middle East, resulting in two different programmes, the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). The projects deal with two of the most pertinent threats to the Middle East. While the ICI is concerned with the Gulf region and covers Iran, the MD is a body that was initiated as part of a series of schemes built around the Mediterranean in the 1990s to provide a platform for Arab-Israeli interaction and help work towards a common sense of security. Both of these have been based on training and on light-touch military cooperation for which much political capital has been expended. The Tricky Task of Public Diplomacy The politics behind NATO’s relations with the Arab world are complicated, to say the least. There are clear points of shared interest. However there are also popular doubts about what NATO’s real ambitions are for the region. NATO’s mission in Afghanistan is vital and has an impact on the Middle East, from Saudi-Pakistani relations to Iran’s role as a regional power. There is no dispute that Afghanistan’s security is crucial for all in the region and the possibility of American-Iranian dialogue around this issue means an easing for tensions for all those concerned. However, the way the operations have been conducted, from the targeting of civilians to the way the ‘Mujahideen’ are now vilified after once being considered as heroes, makes the perception of NATO vulnerable. While a few Arab countries have agreed to participate in ISAF forces, their insistence on keeping that role discreet is but one example of how sensitive the mission is in the Arab world. NATO will have a difficult task explaining to a concerned Arab audience what its ambitions and objectives are in the region. The public policy line concentrates on stability and cooperation, which, while it is clearly valid, does not counter the arguments that NATO wishes to further the interests of the ‘West’ at the expense of others in the region. More importantly, there is still a wide misperception in the region that NATO is controlled by Washington, despite the unanimity required for the Alliance’s decision-making. The public policy arm of NATO has worked hard at clearing misperceptions in the region – from inviting Arab journalists regularly on press tours to holding conferences in the region itself. Nicola De Santis, Head of Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative Countries Section at NATO, insists that his job is ‘to provide information about NATO and then for the people to make up their minds about us’. NATO officials continue to insist that if only they were better understood, they would surely have more support in the region. NATO and Israel-Palestine One potential role for NATO that is suggested time and again is for an assignment to the Palestinian territories – or at least to monitoring the borders between Palestine and Israel. On the record, NATO officials have always distanced themselves from this idea; with the official policy line being that the idea would only be considered after a peace settlement is reached by with two sides and both made a request for the help of NATO troops. Time and again, they insist that even at that point the idea would only be discussed and not necessarily accepted. However, behind the scenes, this issue is in fact discussed and considered. NATO must be realistic in its ambitions in the region and not be seen to supplant the United Nations and its peace-keeping missions. NATO’s wariness about acting without a UN resolution is important, a gesture of support for the international body. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, on a visit to the United Arab Emirates, assured Arabs that ‘We do not want to be a global policeman, that is not and should not be NATO’s ambition, or to compete with the United Nations. We are working both in the interest of, and indeed closely with, the rest of the international community’. There have been marginal voices in Israel, Europe and the United States who have in the past raised the possibility of Israel joining the Transatlantic Alliance. This has alarmed many Arabs and NATO officials have consistently assured them that being a partner through the MD or ICI is not a step towards membership. This remains to be a cause for concern amongst those not well briefed on NATO. Potential for Cooperation While the Palestinian-Israeli situation is the most high-profile security issue in the region, there are many other intersections for NATO and Middle East interests. Fighting piracy off the Gulf of Aden is one of the most recent instances of cooperation, while NATO’s role in Iraq is an example of a non-intrusive and mutually beneficial relationship with the region. While the training programme at the Rustumiya Academy is limited, it was an important contribution to the development of Iraqi forces. Moreover, it opens the door for future cooperation with Iraq after the deep divisions which occurred in NATO six years ago over the 2003 war. Collective security interests for the United States, Canada and Europe undoubtedly include the Middle East. Developing the ties between the two regions has accelerated in the past decade – with the current Secretary General of NATO Jaap de Hoop Scheffer being the first Secretary General to visit quite a few of the countries of the region. As NATO celebrates it sixtieth birthday and plans how it will reach its centenary, the Middle East will be one of the higher priorities for the Alliance. However, it must tread carefully in the region, acting delicately in matters of politics and particularly in matters of military intervention.

### 1NC – Say Yes – Israel

#### European countries say yes to pulling out in Israel

Gaess 23 [Roger; "The EU and Justice in Palestine: An Interview with Grace O'Sullivan"; 6-17-23; <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/mepo.12697>] TDI

The European Union is, at least on paper, supportive of a two-state solution to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as is an overwhelming majority of the global community. Israel seized the West Bank in the 1967 war, almost immediately allowed and then encouraged its Jewish-only settlements there, in contravention of international law. That process of usurping Palestinian territory—lands the Palestinians would need for their contiguous state—has continued unabated to this day. What are EU decision makers thinking? Do they have a plan to halt and ultimately reverse this state of affairs? Palestinians are increasingly suffering on an hour-to-hour basis. Not only the West Bank but also occupied East Jerusalem is being Judaized in accordance with Israel's virtual apartheid policies. There has been no glimmering of a peace process since Israel stymied the Obama administration's efforts, led by John Kerry, in 2013–14. It's not that the EU has done nothing, but it's done nothing of consequence. Is it simply unwilling to confront the American alliance with Israel? What options does the EU—or its individual member countries—have? What must it do to make a difference? What do you see as the EU's priorities in securing peace and at least a meaningful outcome of justice for Palestinians in their historic homeland? GRACE O'SULLIVAN: The European Union and its member states have always been consistent in calling for a two-state solution. They have been less consistent when it comes to action in making that a reality. Only a handful of countries [in the EU] have recognized the State of Palestine, while the realistic chance of the two-state outcome happening has been solidly eroded since the Oslo Accords, as Israel continues to annex Palestinian land en masse. Hardly a month goes by without a condemnation from EU leaders of Israeli human-rights abuses in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, yet those condemnations are never accompanied by action. On the contrary, trade and cooperation with Israel has only increased over recent years, effectively rewarding Israel for its actions. However, there are some opportunities for action against Israeli violence and annexation, which I hope can act as the thin end of the wedge in the battle against the apartheid regime that Tel Aviv is developing in the Occupied Territories: a ban on trade with illegal settlements, commercial action and boycott from civil society, cutting EU cooperation and research funding, and a ban on weapons sales to Israel as long as the occupation continues. GAESS: In the past several years we've seen a dramatic change in world opinion, at least at ground level, on the issue of Palestine, with polls showing an upsurge in support for the Palestinians as more and more people become knowledgeable about the situation. Despite that, a clear gap persists between those ground-level sentiments and the political and economic elites in the West, and Israel continues to enjoy relative immunity to accountability. And in these past years, numerous national parliaments in EU member countries and the United Kingdom have passed nonbinding resolutions urging their governments to recognize the State of Palestine, not least because of the situation on the ground but also because they already recognize Israel. Still, aside from former Soviet-bloc countries that took such action on Palestine before their entries into the EU, only Sweden, in 2014, has extended recognition to Palestine. There was talk not too many years ago that several EU governments (including Belgium and, if I'm not mistaken, Ireland) were moving in this direction, but nothing happened. What do you think has prevented these governments from acting on this—that is, on recognizing both Israel and Palestine and giving more substance to their professed two-state stance? Given the direction of the Israeli government, has there, in recent memory, been a better time than this to make such a move? O'SULLIVAN: As part of the program for government when the Green Party entered into the Dáil (lower house of parliament) in Ireland with two other political parties, we insisted at the time on including language on the recognition of the State of Palestine in that document. For small states like Ireland, however, we often do not see it as helpful to move unilaterally on this without working together with our neighbors. The recognition by Sweden was a positive move, but it resulted in a loss of momentum among other countries to follow suit. There are, however, some opportunities given recent circumstances. The far-right government in Israel has made no secret of its intention to accelerate the annexation of the West Bank and to increase the violent repression of the people who live there and work the land. The Israeli government normally benefits from the protection of strong EU member states; however, as the government in Tel Aviv lurches toward the authoritarian, this support is waning. It was always easier for the government in Tel Aviv to build support using a narrative of self-defense, but as that government increasingly targets its own citizens, including women and the LGBT+ community, for example, it is less likely to receive the support of Berlin or Vienna. GAESS: In what way did Sweden's recognition of the State of Palestine cause a loss of momentum for other EU member states to do the same thing? I would have thought that such recognition by any EU state, whether large or small, could make it easier for others to follow the same path. And it would give hope to Palestinians that countries within the EU are committed to a two-state reality rather than allowing Israel to hold veto power over their fate. As it stands, Palestinians are increasingly feeling abandoned by the international community. O'SULLIVAN: I fully support Sweden's recognition of the State of Palestine, which marked a significant step forward and is the reason why parties like my own have adopted positions in favor of recognition. I do not think, however, that Sweden's move was backed up by sufficient action in terms of diplomatic pressure on other EU states, and successive right-wing governments in Sweden have failed to live up to the promises that come with recognition of statehood. Palestinians are increasingly feeling abandoned by the international community because they are, in fact, being abandoned by the international community. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen's recent praise of Israel for “making the desert bloom” is a perfect example of that. Israel continues to steal water and land from the Palestinian territories, replace indigenous agricultural methods with intensive production, and displace Palestinian people, and in the end, Israel is rewarded and encouraged by EU leaders. Change is needed, but that will only come from elected progressive governments in Europe and especially in Germany. GAESS: Over the past decades, the Israeli government has moved further and further and further to the right, leading some observers to mull that the central motivation of Zionism and Zionists is the imposition of a reign of Jewish supremacy over the whole of Palestine. In the new Israeli government, for example, the far-right Jewish Power party's leader, Itamar Ben-Gvir, who was previously convicted of inciting racism, is the minister of national security. He began by ordering a police crackdown on anti-government protests, banning Palestinian flags, and paying a deliberately provocative visit to Jerusalem's most sensitive Islamic holy site. In his position of overseeing the police, he will be able to inflame relations between Jews and Palestinians further—only this time acting from “inside” and using the resources of the state. He will even have a private army of sorts since the border police will be under his direct control. He apparently wants to build on the settlers' earlier success in penetrating the Israeli military. This will accelerate a trend of closer cooperation between the police and armed settler groups, legitimizing ever greater use of formal and informal types of violence against Palestinians in the occupied West Bank and Palestinian citizens of Israel. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, leader of the Religious Zionist Party, advocates annexation of the entire occupied West Bank and is now in charge of settlement construction. The justice minister, Yariv Levin, has sought to curb the powers of the judiciary, including allowing lawmakers to pass laws that the high court has struck down and in effect deemed unconstitutional. Such changes would permit the Israeli parliament's ultra-Orthodox and ultranationalist block to legalize Israeli outposts on private Palestinian land in the West Bank. The European Union's political elite can rationalize their virtual complicity in all this. They don't want to hear, or consider, comparisons between Israeli and Nazi policies, against which much of Europe sacrificed scores of millions of lives. But how reactionary must Israel show itself before Europe holds it to full account? Is there any red line that Israel cannot cross? O'SULLIVAN: Making friends and allies with authoritarian regimes is no new concept to European countries. In fact, a growing number of European countries could be described in the very least as illiberal regimes. Many EU member states will continue to develop ties with Israel no matter what kind of government is in place in Tel Aviv. Some, like Hungary, much prefer it this way. However, this new illiberal government in Tel Aviv does provide more opportunities for criticism, not just from European capitals, but from civil society and from within Israel itself. It also lends more strength to the argument that Israel operates an apartheid regime in the Occupied Territories, with one system of rule for Israelis and another for Palestinians. I am working to build pressure from below in European member states in support of Palestinian self-determination and human rights, while also promoting laws banning trade with illegal settlements. A recent petition in the European Parliament will advance those discussions this year. GAESS: You recently took part in a mission to the Occupied Palestinian Territories as a member of the Delegation for relations with Palestine of the European Parliament. What specifically was the delegation seeking to learn? Who did you see there? What did you discover? What conclusions did you draw from your trip? To what purpose can they be applied? That is, to what degree can they be utilized to alleviate Palestinian suffering and reverse the now-stalled movement toward resolving this conflict? O'SULLIVAN: I traveled to the Occupied Territories in February 2023. This follows attempts last year to travel which were thwarted by the Israeli authorities' ban on our chairperson, Manu Pineda, from even entering Tel Aviv. This year, another MEP [member of the European Parliament], from Galicia, was also barred from entry. For a country that often describes itself as “the only democracy in the Middle East,” Israel is very intimidated by elected representatives. I am no stranger to this behavior. I have lost count of the times I have been detained and deported when I was working with Greenpeace throughout the 1980s. It is the behavior of a regime that doesn't want the public to know what is going on inside its borders. Our job was to do what all delegations do—speak to civil society, NGOs, politicians, and stakeholders to gain a better understanding of the situation on the ground. The government in Tel Aviv clearly was not happy with this mission. Meanwhile, Israel continues to court more sympathetic MEPs from European conservative and right-wing parties, providing a significant number of MEPs with all-expenses-paid trips to Israel. Israel has successfully tapped into European democracies for its own benefit. As a Green politician, I was particularly interested in the environmental situation for Palestinians and how the occupation exacerbates issues such as environmental degradation, a failure to mitigate the impacts of climate change, access to water, gender discrimination, and a host of other issues faced by Palestinians today. At the Palestine Institute for Biodiversity and Sustainability in Bethlehem, Dr. Mazin Qumsiyeh is undertaking a fascinating project charting the cynical use by Israel of environmental protections and national park designation as a way to annex land from Palestinians. Meanwhile, I also witnessed the oil and gas projects Israel has established that extract fossil fuels from under Palestinian land, while Palestinian civil society struggles to adapt to the impacts of climate change. The purpose of this for me was to build a case—to build a case for Palestinian human rights that united a host of different issues and campaigns that are close to Europeans' hearts. I want to show that support for Palestinian human rights and sovereignty is not a matter of taking sides in a conflict but is instead a matter of standing up for basic humanity. On a related note, our delegation was almost entirely made up of MEPs with an interest in Palestinian human rights, and the delegation has a strong left-wing membership. The Parliament Delegation for relations with Israel has a completely different makeup and is more right wing and conservative. This means that there is very little debate or discussion of the issues among MEPs and results in a bit of an “echo chamber” situation. We need to find a way to handle this to ensure a better outcome for Palestinians and Israelis alike. GAESS: I want to talk about such Palestinian organizations as Hamas and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. These groups are still listed as terrorist entities, not only by Israel and the US but also by the European Union. I could understand labeling them as terrorist if they were pursuing indiscriminate violence against civilians in Israel, but they are instead part of an occupied people resisting Israel's occupation of their lands. I, for one—and you may disagree—regard Israeli settlers as nothing more than paramilitaries who are working hand and glove with the Israeli military (and government) to actualize Israeli expansionist ambitions, in contravention of international law. As it stands, the US and EU will not talk with Hamas, nor will Israel negotiate with any entity that includes them. The West demands that Hamas must first, among other things, accept previous agreements signed between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (the accepted Palestinian negotiating entity) and recognize Israel as a state. This is even in the absence of Israel's itself recognizing the right of existence of the State of Palestine (in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza), which more than 130 countries worldwide have done so far. Yet, at the same time, the platform of Ben-Gvir's Jewish Power party vows the establishment of Israeli sovereignty over all parts of Eretz Israel (so-called Greater Israel; essentially, historic Palestine) seized in the Six-Day War of 1967 (with the possible exception of the Gaza Strip) and resettlement of noncomplying Palestinians to neighboring Arab states. Israel's Likud party platform rejects the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state west of the Jordan River. The overwhelming number of Zionist parties in Israel have similar platforms opposing a two-state solution, seeking the annexation of the occupied West Bank, and refusing to honor the Oslo Accords signed by Israel and the PLO in 1993 and 1995. And in July 2018, Israel's parliament, the Knesset, passed a new basic law, “Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people.” Its first clause states, “The right to exercise national self-determination in the State of Israel is unique to the Jewish people” and therefore denied to the Palestinians. In contrast, Hamas recognizes the PLO as the Palestinian negotiator with Israel, and Hamas—effectively signing on to a possible two-state outcome—has said it will accept any peace agreement the PLO brokers with Israel if it is passed by Palestinians in a referendum. Yet the West talks with Israel without demanding the same terms it imposes on Hamas. What is the rationale behind this stance? O'SULLIVAN: Our approach to extremism in all its forms must be uniform across the board. I don't believe that the EU and its member states should normalize relations with any movement or party that uses the gun as an extension of politics. Taking a lesson from Ireland's own past on including parties like Sinn Féin in the Northern Ireland peace process, I do believe, however, that we should work actively to bring militant political parties into the democratic and nonviolent political fold. I also believe we should come down hard on all breaches of international law committed by state actors, just as we are currently doing with Hungary and Poland in the EU. GAESS: To further point to a prevailing double-standard, a reporter from Al Quds al-Arabi not long ago posed the rhetorical question to Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the US ambassador to the UN: So, when the people of Ukraine resist their occupiers, they are heroes. When Russia bombed these buildings and those hospitals and train stations, these are war crimes. Same thing is done to the Palestinians, but when they resist their occupiers, they are called terrorists. And when these buildings are destroyed in Gaza that's self-defense. Why are Western governments so quick to slap a series of sanctions on Russia (which, correctly or not, sees an existential threat from US-led NATO expansion along its borders), while even talk of imposing sanctions on Israel for its militarism and expansionism are considered out-of-bounds? Where is the consistency in the so-called international rules-based order that we hear so often espoused in the West? How can the direction of Israel be changed without something akin to sanctions? O'SULLIVAN: The brutal invasion by Vladimir Putin's Russia of Ukraine is to be condemned and punished with everything the EU has in its power to bring to bear. As a Green MEP and lifelong environmental activist, I fully support the EU's efforts to reduce its dependence on Russian fossil fuels. However, one issue I have raised repeatedly in the European Parliament is the current practice where the EU swaps one occupier's oil and gas for another's. Following the invasion of Ukraine, von der Leyen signed an agreement with Egypt and Israel for increasing natural-gas imports from those countries. I personally traveled to the Israeli Meged oil and gas field this year, where I witnessed Israeli infrastructure extracting fossil fuels out from underneath the West Bank. By signing agreements like this, the European Union practices complete hypocrisy and undermines its own statements of condemnation of Israeli violence and annexation of Palestinian territory. Ultimately, as long as we rely on fossil fuels, we will be dependent on dictators and authoritarian regimes. That is why for me the fight against climate change is also a matter of social justice. GAESS: Then there's the EU-Israel Association Agreement, which took effect in 2000. That agreement gives Israel preferential terms of access to European Union markets, exempting most Israeli goods from duties. (Israeli exports account for some 40 percent of its GDP, and every year Europe takes in about two-thirds of Israel's exports.) Article 2 of that agreement describes respect for human rights as an “essential element” of the accord. But no real action is taken on trade arrangements when Israel is guilty of large-scale abuses of elementary human rights. And in 2008, EU governments made legally binding a code of conduct on arms exports. It requires each EU member state to assess any export application according to eight criteria. These include the record that the country of destination has on respect for human rights and international humanitarian law and whether or not the country is prone to becoming embroiled in an armed conflict or is situated in a volatile region—parameters clearly applicable to Israel. “If both the spirit and letter of this code were properly applied,” as David Cronin pointed out in his book Europe's Alliance with Israel, “EU countries would not sell a single weapon—or even a component of a weapon—to Israel.” The European Union seems to be inching closer and closer to Israel and its military-driven economy, making ever wider the gap between the EU's rhetoric on human rights and reality. What behind-the-scenes forces are at work in shaping this issue? To what extent are Palestinian human rights actually a factor in discussions among EU parliament members when related votes or implementations are pending? O'SULLIVAN: It is fair to say that there are many political and commercial interests in a strong and militarized Israel. Recent reports have found that Israel was one of the most visited destinations by members of the European Parliament on trips paid for by lobbies and interests. On a national basis, only a handful of member states of the European Union have opposed some of the most violent acts and behaviors of the Tel Aviv government, most of them small nations like Ireland, Portugal, and Cyprus. Human rights are often the main factor of discussions around Palestine and Israel, but some tropes remain as strong as ever—Israel's “right to defend itself,” for example. The issue is often divided on a left-right basis in the European Parliament, with conservative parties increasingly and unconditionally pro-Israel—even in the face of an increasingly authoritarian and illiberal Tel Aviv government. The next EU elections are due in 2024, and if the polls are to be believed, the European Parliament will be more right wing than ever. For Palestinian human-rights considerations, this is bad news. GAESS: As far as I'm aware, Israel has been ignoring the European Union's requests for compensation for its destruction and theft of EU-funded projects in the occupied West Bank. Such destruction and theft have amounted to millions of dollars of EU taxpayer money. What is Brussels doing about it? O'SULLIVAN: I believe there is now room for European member states to start asking for receipts and refunds from Israel. Schools and facilities built with EU funds have been demolished and destroyed by the IDF [Israel Defense Forces]. At the very least, this money should be refunded to the EU or should be cut from cooperation funding such as Horizon [an EU research and innovation program with which Israel enjoys close ties]. I have not seen or heard any evidence that the European Commission is doing anything concrete to progress this. GAESS: What kinds of pressures and what kinds of special-interest groups do you or other MEPs encounter with respect to Palestinian-related issues? And what is the impact of peer pressure from careerists or others—that is, from those who are too timid to buck the status quo? O'SULLIVAN: We hear from all kinds of actors on these issues. The European Parliament has a number of “friendship groups” with countries and communities, while lobbies and NGOs are very active here in Brussels. The Palestinian Mission to Brussels has recently expanded its offices and has increased its outreach efforts with MEPs and member states. I have also met with NGOs who work on issues like the detention of children by the IDF, the destruction of Masafer Yatta [resulting in the forced transfer of 1,200 Palestinians in the West Bank to establish an Israeli army firing zone, a move the Israeli Supreme Court justified in May 2022], and the continuing annexation of Palestinian land by Israel's illegal settlements. These are hardworking organizations who put their life and soul into campaigning for justice, and they are to be praised for it. GAESS: Even including some of the issues we've already discussed, it could be argued that the priority now is for the holding of Palestinian presidential and legislative elections, which last occurred around 2006 and have been repeatedly delayed on various grounds by the Mahmoud Abbas-led Palestinian Authority, by Israel, and to some degree even by Hamas. The Western elites are of course not enthusiastic about disturbing the status quo and putting in jeopardy the Palestinian Authority and its role as a security enforcer for Israel. But do you see movement on actual EU pressure to hold fair and open Palestinian elections, so as to better enable Palestinians to speak with a single voice? O'SULLIVAN: I wholeheartedly support immediate elections in the Palestinian Territories, though I fear that no matter the outcome, the results will be used by Tel Aviv as a stick to beat Palestinians with. So far, I have not seen any concrete support from Brussels toward supporting new elections in terms of funding, advice, or infrastructural support. GAESS: Of course, for Palestinian elections to be of real significance, the international community must accept their outcome unreservedly and be willing to engage them, irrespective of whether representatives of Hamas and other groups comprise those elected. Do you see that as an insurmountable obstacle? O'SULLIVAN: After years of criticism from European capitals that the Palestinian Authority is not upholding its democratic duty by holding elections, the EU and its member states must accept the will of the Palestinian electorate when elections come. In the context of an increasingly authoritarian Tel Aviv government, I think it will be more difficult for the international community to reject the results. For European member states, we must be prepared to engage better with the Palestinian Authority and develop our own foreign policy with regard to Ramallah, independent of the United States. GAESS: To come full circle here, let me refer to Noam Chomsky. Chomsky says, “There is every reason to expect [Zionist colonization] to persist as long as the US provides the necessary military, economic, diplomatic, and ideological support….There can be no higher priority than working to change US policies.” What are your thoughts on this? What is the EU's role, if any, in this regard? Can there be game-changing progress on the Israel-Palestinian issue without America's real cooperation? O'SULLIVAN: I am fully convinced that game-changing progress on the Israel-Palestine issue is possible if the EU and its member states change their current approach and develop their own independent foreign policy on the issue, independent of US policy. The EU's power is fundamentally economic. The EU is Israel's largest trade partner, not the US. We have the power and ability to influence Israel's behavior, although up until now the EU's political leaders have not had the bravery to wield it. That must change or else we will see the slow death of the two-state solution dream in this lifetime.

### 1NC – Say Yes – Turkey

#### **NATO says yes to Turkey**

Kirk 23 [Donald; Opinion Contributor @ The Hill; "Why the US cannot turn its back on Turkey,"; 6-13-2023; <https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4046147-why-the-us-cannot-turn-its-back-on-turkey/>] TDI

The reelection of [Recep Tayyip Erdoğan](https://thehill.com/people/recep-tayyip-erdogan/) to a [third five-year term](https://time.com/6284682/turkeys-erdogan-third-presidential-term/) as president of Turkey sends a stark warning to the United States and its NATO allies: Be careful in dealing with Turkey, which is sure to veer between friendship with Moscow and highly qualified support for Ukraine in its war with the Russians. Erdoğan’s victory was narrow — about [52 percent compared with 48 percent](https://finance.yahoo.com/news/turkish-president-recep-tayyip-erdogan-174546308.html) for the liberal Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu in a runoff election that challenged Erdoğan’s authoritarian rule. Erdoğan is likely to build on his reputation as a strongman while carving out almost a neutral position between Russia and the west. In his zeal to revive Turkey’s place as a great power and [bridge between Europe, the Middle East and the East bloc](https://www.newarab.com/analysis/erdogans-victory-implications-turkey-us-alliance), it would be risky ever to count on Turkey for the unreserved support expected of a NATO ally. The Americans will have to court Erdoğan carefully, trying not to offend him by too much criticism of his dictatorial tendencies but also showing a certain respect for his desire to pursue a middle line at the vortex of swirling political, diplomatic and military currents**.** American relations with Turkey are greatly complicated by the presence of about 5,000 American troops, American planes and even 50 nuclear bombs on bases in Turkey. The arrangement dates from Turkey’s once enthusiastic membership in NATO but now is at the center of ongoing difficulties between Turkey and the U.S. Problems range from Washington’s indirect ties with Kurdish forces that want to carve out their own independent Kurdistan, including bits of Turkey and Syria, to Turkey’s insistence on [importing Russia’s S-400 missile defense system](https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/13/europe/turkey-russia-missiles-nato-analysis-intl/index.html) [while also buying American F-16s](https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/biden-administration-advance-small-f-16-equipment-sale-turkey-sources-2023-04-17/). Erdoğan by now is a master at playing the game of non-alignment between Washington and Moscow, playing up to Russia’s President [Vladimir Putin](https://thehill.com/people/vladimir-putin/) while remaining on cordial terms with President Joe Biden. Both [Putin](https://www.cnbc.com/2023/05/29/putin-congratulates-dear-friend-erdogan-as-natos-turkey-challenge-looks-set-to-stay-.html) and [Biden](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-president-biden-congratulates-erdogan-election-win-2023-05-28/) were careful to congratulate him on his victory while Erdoğan [hesitates to hint at breaking away from NATO](https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/sorry-turkey-is-staying-in-nato). ADVERTISING In fact, Erdoğan, now that he is sure of another five years in office, is [expected to endorse](https://apnews.com/article/nato-turkey-sweden-stoltenberg-visits-istanbul-erdogan-eb0be1426e2e0d6549c6b8c169babca7) Sweden’s application for membership in NATO after having refused as a result of [Sweden’s soft policy](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-18/why-sweden-s-stance-on-kurds-riles-turkey-s-erdogan-quicktake) on Kurds seen as terrorists. Turkey has such a pivotal geographic position — it guards entry to the Black Sea and [maintains control](https://evnreport.com/politics/the-montreux-convention-and-the-turkish-gateway-to-the-black-sea/) over vessels moving to ports in Ukraine, including Russian-occupied Crimea, as well as to Russia — that it would be foolish for any NATO nation not to appreciate his desire to play both sides against the other. NATO should be thankful for his influence in [opening the way for Ukraine](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-suspends-participation-deal-ukraine-grain-exports-tass-2022-10-29/) to resume shipments of grain that are needed to sustain Ukraine’s embattled economy and to feed other countries. Nor should it be forgotten that [Turkey has exported drones](https://www.dailysabah.com/business/defense/turkish-made-drones-playing-huge-role-in-ukraine-says-senior-nato-official), armored personnel carriers and body armor to Ukraine while importing Russian food and other products, [notably iron and steel](https://tradingeconomics.com/turkey/imports/russia/iron-steel), that Moscow needs for its own shaky economy. Turkey under Erdoğan, however, cannot be an enthusiastic voice for U.S. policy in the region while Washington remains at odds with Iran. Erdoğan is restoring Turkey to its roots, courting Islamic support while countering modern Turkey’s long history of democratic reform. While sharply criticizing Israel in clashes with Palestinians, however, Erdoğan is also [restoring diplomatic relations with Israel](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-04-07/turkey-urges-israel-to-end-gaza-strikes-as-violence-tests-diplomatic-thaw#xj4y7vzkg). As in his dealings with NATO and Washington, he believes in a calculated move that will ensure a strong bargaining position for Turkey. That outlook, however, puts the United States in a somewhat precarious position. Steve Cook at the Council on Foreign Relations has written that the U.S. can [no longer be sure](https://www.cfr.org/news-releases/us-should-reassess-its-approach-toward-turkey-writes-steven-cook-new-cfr-report) of free and full use of the Incirlik base in defending NATO interests. “Because Erdogan’s domestic political needs can dictate Turkey’s foreign policy,” he said in a report for the Council, “use of the base to advance U.S. interests is no longer assured. American officials should never again be forced into a position that leaves U.S. security interests vulnerable to the changing interests of Turkish politicians.” Cook’s criticism was sweeping. “Unlike in previous eras, Washington and Ankara no longer share overarching threats or interests that bind them together,” he wrote. Moreover, “Erdogan’s consolidation of power and corresponding suppression of journalists, academics, civil society organizations, and minorities” was against the concept of democracy that NATO is committed to defending. No way, he said, should Washington break off with the Kurdish-dominated People’s Defense Units — that is, the YPG — that had proven to be “an effective force fighting the Islamic State and stabilizing northeastern Syria.” The Ukraine-Russian war, however, has obviously made it difficult for Washington to change the direction of its policy toward Turkey. Now that Erdoğan is sure to remain in power, it would be wrong for Washington to antagonize a long-time ally that can still play a useful role. It’s quite possible the U.S. and Turkey will remain allies, at least superficially, while Turkey acts as a buffer not only between Russia and the west but also between the west and diverse forces in the Middle East. For South Korea, the implications are clear. President Yoon Suk-yeol, [reluctant to provide military aid to Ukraine](https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/04/29/asia-pacific/politics-diplomacy-asia-pacific/yoon-suk-yeol-south-korea-weapons-ukraine/), should appreciate Erdoğan’s somewhat ambivalent position. While Korea imports vast quantities of oil from the Middle East, there is no reason to criticize Erdoğan for wanting to keep up relations with all sides in the contest for regional power. [Libertarianism is alive and dangerous](https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/4116398-libertarianism-is-alive-and-dangerous/)[Florida schools should not be trying to put any positive spin on slavery](https://thehill.com/opinion/education/4116074-florida-schools-should-not-be-trying-to-put-any-positive-spin-on-slavery/) Americans may have been disappointed to see Erdoğan cruise to another term in the run-off, but they can be thankful that Turkey is not radically changing course. As long as Turkey is not telling U.S. forces to go home, Washington is leaving them where they are in hopes that the status quo will not markedly change. The fact that American nuclear warheads are still stored inside Turkey underlines the importance of the relationship. America cannot think about disrupting the Turkish-American alliance while defending Turkey with nukes that may be needed to remind Russia’s President Putin of the risks inherent in his threats of nuclear war. Donald Kirk has been a journalist for more than 60 years, focusing much of his career on conflict in Asia and the Middle East, including as a correspondent for the Washington Star and Chicago Tribune. He currently is a freelance correspondent covering North and South Korea and is the author of several books about Asian affairs.

### 1NC – i/L – Consultation Key

#### **Consultation is the baseline for cooperation within NATO**

NATO ’23 [The North Atlantic Treaty Organization; My GOAT; “Consensus decision-making at NATO”; 6-30-2023; <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49178.htm>] TDI

All NATO decisions are made by consensus, after discussion and consultation among member countries.

A decision reached by consensus is an agreement reached by common consent.

When a “NATO decision” is announced, it is therefore the expression of the collective will of all the sovereign states that are members of the Alliance.

This principle of consensus is applied at every committee level, which means that all NATO decisions are collective decisions made by its member countries.

Consensus decision-making is a fundamental principle. It has been accepted as the sole basis for decision-making in NATO since the creation of the Alliance in 1949.

Consensus decision-making means that there is no voting at NATO. Consultations take place until a decision that is acceptable to all is reached. Sometimes member countries agree to disagree on an issue. In general, this negotiation process is rapid, since members consult each other on a regular basis and therefore often know and understand each other's positions in advance.

Facilitating the process of consultation and consensus decision-making is one of the NATO Secretary General's main tasks.

The principle of consensus decision-making applies throughout NATO – from the North Atlantic Council, the Alliance’s principal political decision-making body, all the way down through its subordinate committees and structures

#### It’s a key part of the organization

NATO ’23 [The North Atlantic Treaty Organization; My GOAT; “Consensus decision-making at NATO”; 7-18-2023; <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49178.htm>] TDI

All NATO decisions are made by consensus, after discussion and consultation among member countries. Consultation between member states is therefore at the heart of NATO, since Allies are able to exchange views and information, and discuss issues prior to reaching agreement and taking action.

Consultation is a key part of NATO’s decision-making process, since all decisions are made by consensus.

It takes place on all subjects of interest to the Alliance, including NATO’s day-to-day business, its core objectives and fundamental role.

Consultation reinforces NATO’s political dimension by giving members the opportunity to voice opinions and official positions. It also gives NATO an active role in preventive diplomacy by providing the means to help avoid military conflict.

Under Article 4 of NATO’s founding treaty, members can bring any issue of concern, especially related to the security of a member country, to the table for discussion within the North Atlantic Council.

Since the Alliance’s creation in 1949, Article 4 has been invoked seven times.

Different forms of consultation

Setting up a consultation system

The fora for political consultation

Different forms of consultation

Consultation takes many forms. At its most basic level, it involves simply the exchange of information and opinions. At another level, it covers the communication of actions or decisions that governments have already taken or may be about to take. Finally, it can encompass discussion with the aim of reaching consensus on policies to be adopted or actions to be taken.

In sum, consultation is continuous and takes place both on a formal and informal basis. It can happen quickly, because all member states have permanent delegations at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. Governments can come together at short notice whenever necessary, often with prior knowledge of their respective national points of view or areas of concern, in order to agree on common policies or take action on the basis of consensus. NATO’s network of committees facilitates consultation by enabling government officials, experts and administrators to come together on a daily basis to discuss a broad range of issues.

The principle of consensus decision-making is applied throughout NATO, which means that all “NATO decisions” are the expression of the collective will of all sovereign states that are members of this inter-governmental organisation. While consensus decision-making can help a member country preserve national sovereignty in the area of defence and security, Article 4 can be an invitation for member countries to concede this right to the group or it can simply lead to a request for NATO support.

Article 4

Under Article 4 of NATO’s founding treaty, member countries can bring an issue to the attention of the North Atlantic Council (often simply called “the Council” or “the NAC” – NATO’s principal political decision-making body) and discuss it with Allies. The article states:

“The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”

Any member country can formally invoke Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. As soon as it is invoked, the issue is discussed and can potentially lead to some form of joint decision or action on behalf of the Alliance. Whatever the scenario, fellow members sitting around the Council table are encouraged to react to a situation brought to their attention by a member country.

Since the Alliance’s creation in 1949, Article 4 has been invoked seven times:

On 10 February 2003, Türkiye formally invoked Article 4, asking for consultations in the NAC on defensive assistance from NATO in the event of a threat to its population or territory resulting from armed conflict in neighbouring Iraq. NATO agreed a package of defensive measures and conducted Operation Display Deterrence from the end of February to early May 2003.

On 22 June 2012, Türkiye requested a NAC meeting under Article 4 after one of its fighter jets was shot down by Syrian air defence forces.

On 3 October 2012, Türkiye requested Article 4 NAC consultations when five Turkish civilians were killed by Syrian shells. Following these incidents, on 21 November 2012, Türkiye requested the deployment of Patriot missiles. NATO agreed to this defensive measure to help Türkiye defend its population and territory, and to help de-escalate the crisis along the border.

On 3 March 2014, Poland invoked Article 4 following increasing tensions in neighbouring Ukraine, as a result of Russia’s aggressive actions.

On 26 July 2015, Türkiye requested that the NAC convene in view of the seriousness of the situation following terrorist attacks, and to inform Allies of the measures it was taking.

On 28 February 2020, Türkiye requested consultations following the death of Turkish soldiers in air strikes by the Syrian regime and its backer Russia in Idlib province.

On 24 February 2022, Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia requested to hold consultations under Article 4 following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Encouraging members of an inter-governmental organisation who have not given up their right of free and independent judgment in international affairs to consult more systematically on an issue is a challenge – be it today or in the 1950s.

In the early 1950s, the NAC recognised NATO’s consultative deficiency on international issues and recommended that measures be taken to improve the process. In April 1954, a resolution on political consultation was adopted:

“... all member governments should bear constantly in mind the desirability of bringing to the attention of the Council information on international political developments whenever they are of concern to other members of the Council or to the Organization as a whole; and (...) the Council in permanent session should from time to time consider what specific subject might be suitable for political consultation at one of its subsequent meetings when its members should be in a position to express the views of their governments on the subject.” (C-M(54)38)

The resolution, which was put forward by Canada and immediately approved, provoked nonetheless a reaction from the American representative:

“Mr. Dulles (United States) supported the Canadian resolution on the understanding that consultation would be limited within the bounds of common sense. Countries like his own with world-wide interests might find it difficult to consult other NATO governments in every case. For a sudden emergency, it was more important to take action than to discuss the emergency. In other words, consultation should be regarded as a means to an end, rather than an end in itself.” (C-R(54)18)

The reservations made by the United States, which no doubt were shared by other member countries, could still be voiced today. Building on this resolution, on 8 March 1956, the then Secretary General of NATO, Lord Ismay, made a statement that widened the debate by explaining the consequences of systemising political consultation within the Alliance:

“A direct method of bringing home to public opinion the importance of the habit of political consultation within NATO may be summed up in the proposition “NATO is a political as well as a military alliance”. The habitual use of this phraseology would be preferable to the current tendency to refer to NATO as a (purely) military alliance. It is also more accurate. To refer to NATO as a political alliance in no sense denies, depreciates or deprecates the fact that the alliance is also military.” (C-M(56)25-1956)

The same year, the “Three Wise Men” produced their report, which inter alia sought to improve consultation within the Alliance on issues of common concern (Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO). However, ironically, it was published as the Suez crisis emerged. This crisis severely divided the leading founding members of the Organization (France, the United Kingdom and the United States). The Suez crisis acted as a catalyst for NATO, leading it to put into practice something it knew was of vital importance for the unity and solidarity of the Alliance – political consultation.

“Animus in consulendo liber”

When NATO moved to its headquarters at the Porte Dauphine in Paris, in December 1959, the then Secretary General, M. Paul-Henri Spaak, enlisted the help of the Dean of the Council (the longest-serving national ambassador to NATO) in finding a suitable Latin maxim which would capture the spirit of consultation between Allies, to which he attached so much importance. The Dean, Belgian Ambassador André de Staercke, recalled a visit he had made to the Tuscan town of San Gimignano. There, in the Palazzo del Podestà, engraved on the back of the seat reserved for the man who presided over the destinies of the city, he had seen the motto: Animus in consulendo liber.

It seems that an entirely satisfactory translation of the phrase cannot be found, although a French version “l’esprit libre dans la consultation” comes close. Renderings in English have ranged from the cryptic “in discussion a free mind” to the more complex “Man’s mind ranges unrestrained in counsel”.

### 1NC – UQ – Cred Low

#### NATO’s credibility has collapsed because of Ukraine --- that fosters support for populist groups that spillover

Fedosiuk 22 [Tetiana; editor, translator, and analyst. She speaks Ukrainian, Russian, English, Italian, and Polish. Tetiana specialises on Russia’s propaganda and disinformation in the US, Eastern European and post-Soviet nations, as well as on NATO related topics and defence policies in respective countries; “NATO May Have a Credibility Problem in Ukraine”; ICDS; 3-19-22; https://icds.ee/en/nato-may-have-a-credibility-problem-in-ukraine/] TDI

On the 35th day of war in Ukraine (30–31 March 2022), a national pollster, the Sociological Group ‘Rating’, conducted a survey— The Seventh National Poll: Ukraine during the War—that must serve as a wake-up call for the transatlantic community. The survey revealed that among Ukrainians support for NATO membership has declined after reaching an all-time high (76%) in the first days of the Russian invasion. In the following weeks, though, it trended downward and, by the end of March, at 68%, almost reaching the pre-war level of 62%. Just as President Zelensky’s rhetoric is becoming harsher and more uncompromising with each new speech to a Western parliaments and his cabinet officials no longer mince words when talking directly to allies, the Ukrainian public, it appears, is beginning to lose patience and faith in the organisation founded to defend freedom, peace and democracy in Europe (where there are 30 member states) and North America (with two member states). International Support of Ukraine An earlier survey by the same polling agency may help to explain this worrying tendency. At the time of that survey (March 8–9 2022), 63% of Ukrainians believed that military assistance should be NATO’s priority. Yet, only 29% rated the military aid received as sufficient, with 62% saying it was not enough and 9% finding it hard to tell. As to the most urgent issue for the country, 89% of respondents demanded the skies over Ukraine be closed, while 90% believed the government should keep up pressure on NATO to do so. Although half of the respondents (precisely 50%) expected that a no-fly zone would eventually happen, only 19% considered it likely in the near future. However, 43% were less optimistic, saying the West would not close the skies, with 79% attributing the delay to the paralysing fear of a direct military confrontation with Russia, and 12% asserting that the NATO countries simply did not want to damage relations with Russia. It is unlikely that such a clear-eyed assessment from the general public would be found in any Western European country or the US. Such well-defined priorities and expectations in terms of the military aid needed and expected should be the envy of any analytical journalist in the Western press or in any top-level policy debate. Repercussions for Wider Europe There is a risk that the sentiment, if not mitigated, might gradually spill over to neighbouring countries. Although not objectively justifiable, it is not impossible that a significant portion of the population in some NATO member countries, such as Romania and Bulgaria, the Balkans or even Turkey, may also soon begin to question the alliance’s ironclad resolve. The traditionally pro-NATO voters in these countries may be inclined to become more sceptical and, in turn, susceptible to propaganda. Absent a constant threat from Russia on their borders, the social dynamic in these countries may stand in stark contrast to the Baltic states, Poland, Finland or even Sweden, where the war in Ukraine has so far consolidated how each nation perceives matters of security and what guarantees security. If NATO’s response is now seen, at least by some, as inadequate and in the future is viewed as a precedent for inaction in the conflicts and challenges to come, Europe will probably see more damage from the hostile influence campaigns—both foreign and domestic. First, these seeds of doubt will inevitably be exploited by the home-grown populist forces to question their nation’s commitments—financial ones, in particular—to the NATO alliance. Many political actors will have to regroup and (at least temporarily) distance themselves from their Russia-leaning positions on which their identities may have previously relied. This distancing, temporary or not, will be a gateway to allow those on the Kremlin’s actual payroll to continue toeing the old line of undermining Western unity while avoiding a direct affiliation with Moscow. In fact, European voters losing faith and confidence in NATO and the whole idea of the transatlantic security architecture may currently be contributing to Marie Le Pen’s rise ahead of the presidential election in France. Second, there is no reason to expect that Russia will give up its usual information warfare tactics. The Kremlin propaganda and diversion strategy may not be as persuasive in 2022 as it was in 2014, at the time of the Russian annexation of Crimea, when many Europeans were persuaded to ‘question everything’. But there may be sleeper cells waiting for the right time to launch an offensive—and they may strike sooner than we expect. As the war in Ukraine drags on, the political and media establishments zoom out, and societies inevitably become exhausted by the grim news, a new window of opportunity for Russia will open. The many undeniable failures of leadership in the free world will be low-hanging fruit, regardless of whether criticism is deserved.

#### Ukraine has tanked NATO credibility, but it can recover

Hunter 22 [Robert; U.S. ambassador to NATO (1993-98) and on the National Security Council staff throughout the Carter administration, first as Director of West European Affairs and then as Director of Middle East Affairs. In that role, he was the White House representative at the Autonomy Talks for the West Bank and Gaza and developer of the Carter Doctrine for the Persian Gulf. He was Senior Advisor to the RAND Corporation from 1998 to 2011, and Director of the Center for Transatlantic Security Studies at the National Defense University, 2011-2012. He served on the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board and is a member of the American Academy of Diplomacy; “NATO has a serious credibility problem,” Responsible Statecraft; 7-24-2023; https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/03/24/natos-credibility-problem/] TDI

But something with even greater significance for the longer term needs to be on the agenda, even if only in secret session or in small groups: to start the effort to rebuild NATO’s credibility as an alliance and America’s as its leader. Make no mistake: their credibility has taken a hard knock from Putin’s decision to invade, and awareness of that weakening of credibility is so far being obscured only by the stiff fight being put up by Ukraine’s military forces, its people, and its amazing president, Volodymyr Zelensky. He is implicitly defying Putin to do his worst, and the Ukrainian nation and people will continue to resist. If nothing else, there is the national memory of Stalin’s starvation of nearly 4 million Ukrainians in the early 1930s, the Holodomor. Damage to US and NATO credibility over the matter of Ukraine can trace its history at least as far back as the 2008 Bucharest summit, when President G.W. Bush proposed that Ukraine (and Georgia) be enrolled in Membership Action Plans (MAPs), the next-to-last step before becoming allies. This was a decisive move beyond the 1997 NATO-Ukraine Charter and consultative Council, which provided no security guarantees. Most allies resisted, including because they were not prepared to take the risk of pushing NATO right up to Russia and straddling the traditional invasion route into the heart of Europe – in both directions and with long memories. How would Russia respond to such a step? But the European allies also recognised that, although moving Ukraine and Georgia toward NATO membership had to be ruled out, the US president could not be sent home empty-handed. So the summit declared that both countries “will become members” of the alliance. Those words were designed to put off consideration of NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia to the indefinite future (“never,” in the eyes of many European allies.) But in their haste, NATO’s leaders obviously did not understand the full import of that statement. It signaled that the two countries were geopolitically so important to the West that they would definitely be brought into the alliance, whatever Russia thought: in plain English, it was thus the actual moment of commitment. Soon thereafter, Georgia’s president, Mikheil Saakashvili, tested the proposition by using military force to try reclaiming occupied parts of South Ossetia, only to be defeated by Russian forces. Not a single NATO ally sent troops to defend Georgia. Finis, for any practical purposes, to “will become members” of NATO. Yet instead of putting the commitment into George Orwell’s Memory Hole, NATO has repeated the formulation at every summit and ministerial meeting, and, until just before Putin’s 2022 invasion, top leaders of the Biden administration were still harping on NATO’s “open door” to Ukraine’s membership, even though it is a fantasy. This last observation is based on two interrelated facts. First, NATO takes all decisions by consensus – a unit veto; and second, many allies have already made clear that would never be willing, in response to aggression against Ukraine (on Russia’s border), to invoke Article 5 of the NATO Treaty: that “…an armed attack against one or more [ally]….shall be considered an attack against them all…” Thus Ukraine will never be admitted to NATO. Nothing can justify what Putin has been doing, including what are clearly war crimes. And it is necessary, not just for Ukraine but also for the future of European security, that Russia not prevail and that any settlement of the conflict, even short-term, must include withdrawal of all Russian forces from Ukraine. Indeed, the “will become members” statement, repeated over and over, created a political and moral commitment to Ukraine (and to Georgia), raising legitimate expectations but with no honest intention of fulfilling them, while providing no deterrence of possible (now actual) Russian aggression: for these two countries the worst of all worlds. By extension, the failure of NATO, especially its leader, the United States, at least so far to honor the full meaning of the “will become members” pledge is creating a deep crisis of credibility for both NATO and the US. This is not to argue that the United States should have risked major escalation by Biden’s not declaring at the outset of Russia’s current invasion of Ukraine that the US would not become directly involved militarily. (He had valid reasons: both because the American people want no new wars where the United States is not itself attacked; and Biden could see that most allies would take time to step up to the mark, even on imposing sanctions, much less on providing military aid to Ukraine.) But even with these plausible arguments, thoughtful European leaders are beginning to ponder whether the US Article 5 commitment to the security of NATO countries remains sacrosanct. Reflecting on the war in Ukraine, even though it is not formally a member of NATO, would the United States really go to war for a European ally if the US itself were not under attack? Doubts fostered by President Donald Trump, because of his erratic behavior toward European security and relations with Russia, were supposedly redeemed by Biden’s becoming US president. But now doubts are reemerging. They have several sources. Most pertinent: if Putin were to get away with crushing Ukraine, would the three Baltic states feel safe if he moved militarily in their direction? Everyone knows that they are militarily indefensible, like West Berlin in the Cold War. But the “correlation of forces” and shared risks of escalation do not this time provide a basis for deterring the Russians as the Soviet Union was deterred then. Second, if Ukraine from 2008 onward was judged to be sufficiently important strategically to “will become” a member of NATO, what does that say for countries which, while having formal NATO membership, have less strategic value? On the Eastern edges of NATO, only Poland has first-line strategic importance. The European allies are dependent on the role of the United States in dealing with any challenge from Russia: this has been clear since the late 1940s. That mostly explains why the European allies invoked NATO’s Article 5 for the United States the day after 9/11 (Washington didn’t ask for it); and why they sent troops to Afghanistan: primarily so that the United States would not be heavily distracted from its critical role in dealing with Russia.

### 1NC – Impact – NATO good — Middle East War

#### NATO unity is key to world peace – specifically in the Middle East – turns case

Stavridis ’19 [James; Admiral Stavridis (Ret.) was the 16th Supreme Allied Commander at NATO and is Vice Chair, Global Affairs at The Carlyle Group and Chair of the Board of the Rockefeller Foundation; “Why NATO Is Essential For World Peace, According to Its Former Commander”; 4-4-2019; <https://time.com/5564171/why-nato-is-essential-world-peace/>] TDI

It is powerful. The 29 nations of NATO produce more than 50% of the world’s gross domestic product, have well over 3 million troops on duty, operate massive combined naval fleets and air forces and together spend over $1 trillion on defense. Indeed, even with all the frustration over European defense spending not hitting the 2% of GDP goal, the collective European defense budget is the second largest in the world after the U.S.’s and is ahead of China’s and Russia’s–combined.

It is smart. U.S. and European defense innovation and production provides a formidable military research and development capacity. Particularly in cybersecurity, unmanned vehicles, space operations, special-forces technologies, maritime and anti-submarine capability, and air and missile defense, NATO is a technology and education superpower.

It is capable. The alliance boasts a large command structure of highly qualified teams of military officers from all of the 29 nations. Throughout Europe and the East Coast of the U.S., those teams prepare war plans, conduct training exercises, monitor readiness of allied units, gather intelligence about potential adversaries and run complex operations centers that cover the entire geographic range of NATO. These standing staffs, which we rationalized by reducing them 35% while I was NATO commander, can conduct prompt and sustained combat operations in a coalition structure on short notice.

Just as important as NATO’s health is the fact that we still need it. Geography matters, and the European peninsula is particularly well located on the western edge of the Eurasian landmass. When I was the Supreme Allied Commander at NATO, people would say to me, “Why do we need all those useless Cold War bases?” My reply was simple: They are not Cold War bases but rather the forward operating stations of the U.S. in the 21st century. When necessary, they allow us to operate in the Middle East and Africa. But they primarily serve as a bulwark: NATO is not global in its scope, scale or ambition and will remain tightly focused on the North Atlantic.

Moreover, despite all the frustrations of coalition warfare, most observers would agree with Winston Churchill that “there is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them.” The greatest single advantage the U.S. has on the global stage is our network of allies, partners and friends. That network is under deliberate pressure: from China, with its “One Belt, One Road” competitive strategy, and from Russia, with its relentless attacks on coalition unity. A strong NATO means not only having allies in a fight, should it come to that, but also a powerful deterrent to the aggression of ambitious adversaries.

Perhaps NATO’s greatest accomplishment is not even its unblemished record of deterring attack against its members but rather the fact that no alliance nation has ever attacked another. NATO’s most fundamental deliverable has been peace among Europe’s major powers for 70 years after two millennia of unhesitating slaughter on the continent. The disasters of the 20th century alone pulled the U.S. into two world wars that killed more than half a million Americans.

History provides few achievements that compare to those seven decades of peace. They were built not on the ambitions of cold-eyed leaders but something more noble. NATO is a pool of partners who, despite some egregious outliers, by and large share fundamental values–democracy, liberty, freedom of speech, freedom of expression, gender equality, and racial equality. Admittedly we execute those values imperfectly, and they are stronger in some NATO countries than in others. But they are the right values, and there is no other place on earth where the U.S. could find such a significant number of like-minded nations that are willing to bind themselves with us in a defensive military treaty.

So what can NATO do to ensure the alliance continues to provide value for all the members in general, and for the U.S. in particular? What would a NATO 4.0 look like?

The alliance should up its game in cybersecurity, both defensively and in the collective development of new offensive cybertools. Geographically, the alliance needs more focus on the Arctic; as global warming opens shipping lanes and access to hydrocarbons, geopolitical competition will increase. We should taper off the Afghan mission, perhaps maintaining a small training cadre in country and continuing to help the Afghan security forces push the Taliban to negotiate peace.

There is work to do in consolidating the Balkans, where tensions among Serbs, Croats and Balkan Muslims threaten to erupt into war again. NATO can continue to have a small mission there to help continue the arc of reconciliation. The alliance will need to be forthright in dealing with Russia, confronting Putin where we must–in its invasion and continued occupation of Ukraine–but at the same time attempting to reduce operational tensions and find zones of cooperation.

Geographically, the biggest challenge ahead will be the Middle East. The NATO nations do not agree on an approach with Iran, which is an aggressive actor in the region with significant ambitions that will impact NATO. Developing better partnerships with the Arab world, which began in earnest with the Libyan campaign and continued into Syrian operations against the so-called Islamic State alongside various NATO allies in the U.S.-led coalition, makes sense. Working far more closely with Israel would pay dividends for the alliance.

### 1NC – Impact – NATO Good – Deterrence

#### NATO is the only way to assure US allies – without NATO prolif is inevitable

Fruhling and O’Neil 21 [Stephan and Andrew; Australian National University, Griffith University; “Alliances, Nuclear Weapons and Escalation: Managing Deterrence in the 21st Century”; 2021; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv25m8dp0/>] TDI

As great power competition once again assumes a central place in international relations, alliances have taken on renewed importance in the security calculations of Australia and other US allies in the Indo-Pacific and Europe. Deterrence of an attack on allies is a core function of US alliances, as are mechanisms through which states seek to manage the risk of escalation—the movement through increasing intensity of conflict up to, in the extreme, global nuclear war.1 Alliances seek to prevent escalation in the form of an attack on its members through strategies of deterrence and extended deterrence that are themselves predicated on credible threats of escalation. Nuclear weapons are central to deterrence and escalation considerations and form a key component of America’s strategic toolkit to reassure Japan, South Korea and Australia in the Indo-Pacific, as well as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies in the Euro-Atlantic. However, allies cannot afford to be passive actors in their interactions with Washington. They need to prepare for and seek to manage escalation in a broader geostrategic, technological and political context that shapes the ability of alliances to adapt to a new security environment. While the challenge of great power competition is acute at both ends of Eurasia, adversary threats, geography and the institutional context of US alliances differ. This volume brings together contributors from Europe, North-East Asia, the United States and Australia to better understand these challenges, identify commonalities and differences across regions, and pinpoint ways to collectively manage nuclear deterrence in twenty-first century alliances. It focuses on nuclear deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and strategic competition between the US and China; the role of non-nuclear US allies in the Indo-Pacific and Europe in supporting US extended nuclear deterrence; political-military challenges in alliance plans for escalation; allied perspectives on the consequences of new non-nuclear capabilities, including cyber and hypersonic weapons, for deterrence and strategic stability; and lessons on how the US and allied nations can better engage their respective publics on questions relating to nuclear deterrence. How to manage escalation is an inherently political question. The costs and benefits of support in case of attack and of achieving security against specific challenges will differ between allies. The credibility of extended deterrence threats rests on the commitment of certain allies, especially the US, to provide security to other allies who find themselves under more immediate threat. The asymmetric nature of an extended deterrence relationship thus creates anxieties of abandonment on the part of the threatened ally and fears of entrapment by all allies in conflicts in which they have little direct stake. For deterrence to be effective, allies nonetheless have to find ways to agree and credibly commit to what they are willing to do for each other. Nowhere is this more important than in relation to the role of US nuclear weapons in America’s alliances. While some US allies have previously expressed sympathy for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), none today is willing to sign it, as their focus has turned to the challenge of managing escalation in potential great power conflicts in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Moscow’s penchant for nuclear sabre-rattling in crises with NATO and Ukraine, Beijing’s ambitious nuclear force modernisation, North Korea’s development of a thermonuclear and intercontinental range arsenal, and the development of new capabilities— including hypersonic missiles designed to confer escalation advantage over the US and its allies in regional conflicts—have all roused nuclear strategy from its post–Cold War hibernation. From 2011, the Obama administration established extended deterrence dialogues with North-East Asian treaty allies, Japan and South Korea, in response to growing concerns about North Korea and China. Since 2014, the NATO alliance has paid far greater institutional and political attention to the strategic role of its nuclear forces, and to the possibilities of escalation more generally after the end of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Under the Trump administration, US nuclear policy was notable for how little controversy it attracted among US allies, despite the administration’s decision to introduce the first new (low-yield) warhead variants since the end of the Cold War. However, the existential dependence of US allies on decisions taken in Washington about US nuclear strategy has been a constant element in the history of US alliances, and key to grasping their inherent tensions: from US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s challenge to NATO’s nuclear strategy of massive retaliation in the early 1960s, to concerns about US– Soviet arms control undermining the security of Western Europe in the 1970s and the late 1980s, to President Obama’s declared commitment to reducing the role of nuclear weapons in US defence posture in the face of rising nuclear threats to North-East Asian allies. Throughout the Cold War, arguments about nuclear strategy were staple fare for official and academic debates, especially regarding the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence. How to interpret and implement the concept of flexible response after its adoption in 1967 was the subject of often acrimonious debate in NATO, as allies sought to balance fears of abandonment, entrapment and a Soviet Union that threatened them all, but in different ways depending on their geographical position. In Asia, forward-based US nuclear forces on the Korean Peninsula were a central element in deterring North Korea until their withdrawal in 1992, and Japan carefully balanced its public aversion to nuclear weapons with practical support for the operation of US nuclear forces as a deterrent against the Soviet Union and China. In Australia, the role of the ‘joint facilities’ in US nuclear operations was a central element of the alliance in the second half of the Cold War. At the 2021 Munich Security Conference, President Biden declared that ‘America is back’, and that ‘the United States is determined … to earn back our position of trusted leadership’.2 However, while it is clear that public division and disagreement among allies about how to manage escalation and deter threats are undesirable, the US and its allies still have a long way to go in either the Indo-Pacific or the Euro-Atlantic areas to develop viable and commonly accepted political-military strategies for the new era of great power competition.3 Significant differences remain between the challenges of escalation at either end of Eurasia, but the basic problem— how US allies can achieve political agreement on credible threats of military escalation, including through the use of nuclear weapons, to deter attacks by nuclear-armed powers—remains the same. Hence, the value of exchanging ideas between the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic areas is also far greater than it has been in the past.

#### Absent credible US deterrence allies proliferate quickly which escalates

Bristow 22 [Alex Bristow; Deputy Director of the Australian National Policy Institute’s Defense, Strategy and National Security Program; “Why the US Nuclear Program Underpins Non-Proliferation”; 9/28/22; <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/why-the-us-nuclear-umbrella-underpins-non-proliferation/>] TDI

Confronting [the growing risk of nuclear war](https://thebulletin.org/doomsday-clock/current-time/), Australia is rightly working with Japan and others to rejuvenate global momentum on non-proliferation and disarmament. This is vital work. But such efforts can only succeed if the international community recognises the positive role that the US nuclear umbrella—more formally called extended deterrence—continues to play in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons and calls out destabilising conduct by China and Russia.

To appreciate the contribution to non-proliferation made by the US nuclear umbrella, we need to understand its purpose and form.

Early in the Cold War, forward-deployed nuclear weapons were focused on deterrence and warfighting, compensating for the numerical superiority of communist armies. As Soviet capabilities improved and more countries became nuclear powers, the purpose of the US nuclear umbrella expanded to include non-proliferation.

In essence, the US preferred to protect key allies like Japan rather than risk them developing their own arsenals. US and allied interests broadly aligned because all sides feared a multipolar arms race in which small, independent arsenals could be vulnerable to pre-emptive first strikes, while the custodial risks of accidental or unauthorised use were multiplied. Building independent nuclear capabilities would have also strained allies’ economic and financial resources. It would also have been unpalatable to the public in some countries, like Japan. The same logic applies now.

Australia is an interesting case in point. Having cooperated with Britain’s nuclear program, [Australia engaged in a renewed debate](https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/walsh51.pdf) about developing its own capability after China’s first nuclear test in 1964. In the end, the credibility of US security guarantees helped inform Canberra’s decision to eschew pursuit of nuclear weapons and ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1973.

The protection-for-abstinence bargain propping up the nuclear umbrella relies on allies and adversaries believing that the US has the will to risk nuclear retaliation against the homeland to defend distant friends. Even today, [a handful of NATO allies](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/2/pdf/220204-factsheet-nuclear-sharing-arrange.pdf) host small quantities of sharable US nuclear weapons on their territories to improve the credibility of deterrence.

But nuclear sharing is a European exception. In the Indo-Pacific, Bush’s announcement ended an era in which US [nuclear weapons had been present](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.2968/055006011) in allied territories for decades, either as deployments on land or in transit on US Navy vessels. Following earlier withdrawals in the 1970s from Okinawa (ahead of its full return to Japan), Taiwan and the Philippines, the US removed its last nuclear weapons from South Korea in 1991. Managing these forward deployments strained public trust and involved levels of secrecy and backroom dealings that are [still emerging in the archives](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13439006.2010.531111).

It’s possible that contingencies still exist for redeploying tactical nuclear weapons to forward locations in the Indo-Pacific. But, in the main, South Korea and Japan put their faith in [public proclamations](https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3158265/secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-remarks-welcoming-japanese-minister-of/) that the US has the means and will to project nuclear force from afar in their defence, illustrated by the periodic appearance in the region of US nuclear-capable bombers. Behind the scenes, [bilateral consultations](https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-extended-deterrence-strategy-and-consultation-group-meeting/) on extended deterrence thrash out details and align expectations.

Successive Australian [defence white papers](https://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/a-j-disarm/aust-japan-coop/extended-nuclear-deterrence-contemporary-theory-and-policy/extended-nuclear-deterrence-australia/) dating back to 1994 make clear that Australia also expects US nuclear protection, even if Canberra seems less concerned than Seoul or Tokyo about soliciting US assurances in public. Australia banned the stationing of nuclear weapons on its territory under the [Treaty of Raratonga](https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/security/non-proliferation-disarmament-arms-control/nuclear-weapons#rarotonga) in 1986. However, the periodic operation of US bombers from Royal Australian Air Force Base Darwin and longstanding shared access to intelligence and communication facilities in Australia, including Pine Gap and [North West Cape](https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/north-west-cape-the-joint-facility-that-changed-australian-politics/), attest to an implicit quid pro quo that the price of coverage by the US nuclear umbrella includes integration in nuclear planning and therefore the likelihood of being targeted. The same is true for Japan and South Korea.

Despite the implicit costs, the US nuclear umbrella has remained attractive to allies because the alternatives have seemed unpalatable, at least during the phase after the Cold War when the risk of nuclear war felt relatively low.

Japan and South Korea are among the countries sometimes called [latent nuclear powers](https://www.iiss.org/publications/adelphi/2015/asia39s-latent-nuclear-powers-japan-south-korea-and-taiwan) because they probably possess the means to develop nuclear capabilities relatively promptly. This would be [harder for Australia but not impossible](https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/should-australia-develop-its-own-nuclear-deterrent/), at least in theory. In practice, the economic, legal and political barriers to independently going nuclear remain prohibitive, and [the Australian public is set against it](https://poll.lowyinstitute.org/charts/nuclear-weapons-in-australia/). As [strategists like Hugh White have argued](https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-nuclear-weapons-and-americas-umbrella-business/), the main driver for Australia or other US allies in the Indo-Pacific to overcome these hurdles in pursuit of nuclear weapons would be a breakdown of trust in US protection.

In other words, the US nuclear umbrella remains a lynchpin of non-proliferation in our region. As Australia’s 2017 [foreign policy white paper says](https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/minisite/static/4ca0813c-585e-4fe1-86eb-de665e65001a/fpwhitepaper/foreign-policy-white-paper/chapter-six-global-cooperation/countering-proliferation-weapons-mass.html), ‘Without extended deterrence, more countries in the Indo-Pacific would need to re-assess their security and defence capabilities.’ That is official code for seeking weapons of mass destruction.

Unfortunately, allies will be watching Chinese and Russian actions and pondering whether the US nuclear umbrella remains credible.

#### A strong NATO is key to check back against a bold and militarized Russia– the next conflict will go nuclear

Fix and Keil 4/4 [Liana Fix is a fellow for Europe at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). She is a historian and political scientist, with expertise in German and European foreign and security policy, European security, transatlantic relations, Russia, and Eastern Europe. She is also the author of A New German Power? Germany’s Role in European Russia Policy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021). Dr. Fix’s work focuses on German domestic and foreign policy, the European Union, transatlantic relations, and Europe’s relations with Russia and China; Steven Keil was formerly Senior Fellow, Security and Defense Policy at GMF; “NATO and Russia after the Invasion of Ukraine”; GMF; 4/4/2022; <https://www.gmfus.org/news/nato-and-russia-after-invasion-ukraine/>] TDI

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the culmination of its increasingly militarized foreign policy centered around a small cast of decision-makers primarily in the military and security services close to the president. Its approach is aggressive, risk-tolerant, and deeply revisionist, spanning domains and leaning heavily on brutal tactics to achieve victory.

NATO is now forced to return to its original mission—to defend Europe against an aggressive and highly militarized Russian foreign policy. NATO-Russia relations relatively normalized in the immediate post-Cold War context, resulting in waning European investments in defense capabilities. NATO only began reversing this trajectory in 2014, when Russia first invaded Ukraine, and must now significantly speed up its efforts.

Key priorities include transitioning from forward deterrence to forward defense, augmenting NATO’s capabilities in Europe and creating a greater role for Europe, strengthening regional partnerships, reestablishing risk-reduction mechanisms to manage a potential escalation between NATO and Russia, and considering long-term stabilization scenarios.

Introduction

Over the past seven decades of NATO’s history, Russia has gone from the center of NATO strategy to the periphery, and back again. With Russia’s war in Ukraine, NATO must return to its original mission: defending its member states in Europe against a Russian adversary. In grand strategic terms, Russia and its relationship with NATO will remain highly consequential. But relations will become much more volatile as the war in Ukraine continues and Russia persists in its efforts to destabilize Euro-Atlantic security.

Allies preparing for the upcoming summit in Madrid and a new Strategic Concept must fundamentally rethink the security situation in Europe. This includes addressing shortfalls in capabilities and repositioning NATO along the eastern flank, while preventing escalation between NATO and Russia. At the same time, NATO must reconcile competing demands, especially those facing its largest member, the United States, which will continue to focus heavily on the challenge posed by China.

The question of how NATO deals with an aggressive, escalatory Russia alongside other competing demands is not new. Allies always had to adjust to the reality of having the United States as a lead power with commitments across multiple theaters. But this question is now more urgent as it interacts with the increasingly aggressive trajectory of Russian and Chinese foreign policy. Russia is the more immediate challenge and will therefore require the most significant attention in NATO’s short term. This must be reflected in the Strategic Concept.

How should NATO respond to Russia’s threat in Europe? This brief examines the development of Russian foreign and security policy with the Ukraine war as an inflection point and suggests a concrete action plan for NATO over the next five years. It addresses what kind of threat Russia poses to NATO specifically and what type of posture, policies, and capacities are needed to counter the threat and meet potential escalation risks. The militarization of Russian foreign policy will continue beyond the war in Ukraine. NATO’s mission has never been more relevant.

The Militarization of Russian Foreign Policy

The war in Ukraine is the consequence and culmination of a longer-term trend in Vladimir Putin’s Russia: the militarization and securitization of its foreign policy. This is evident in Russia’s ever-increasing militarized and aggressive approach that enabled it to play a major role in conflicts around the world in the last decade, such as Syria. But the war in Ukraine demonstrates the extent to which the military, security services, and defense ministry took control of Russian foreign policy making at the behest of the Russian president, completely sidelining more traditional institutions, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Those institutions were already weakened over the past decade with the increasing dominance of the siloviki [strongmen] in Russian foreign policy making. But the irrelevance of the traditional institutions reached new heights and became glaringly visible to the outside world during the Ukraine war, revealing an even more centralized decision-making in foreign and security policy than previously assumed.

The basis for Russia’s militarized foreign policy has been a continuous process of modernization of its armed forces, which rocketed after its successful but militarily weak campaign in Georgia in 2008. Since then, Russia has invested around $159 billion per year (based on purchasing power parity)11Jack Watling, “Russia’s callousness towards its own soldiers is undermining its combat power,” The Guardian, March 4, 2022. in preparedness, equipment, and mobility for its military. The Russian military doctrine from 2014 reflects this development and the offensive nature of Russia’s understanding of warfare, which seeks to “decisively engage and resolve conflicts on terms favorable to Russia.”22Congressional Research Service, “Russian Armed Forces: Military Doctrine and Strategy,” In Focus, August 20, 2022. The most important development in Russia’s military thinking after the war in Georgia—as well as Moscow’s increased obsession with color revolutions—is the widening of the concept of conflict to include non-military means, such as cyber, and political tools, emphasizing the information environment. As such, Russia’s approach grew across domains, and it placed a larger emphasis on non-military and asymmetric tools of warfare. Russia’s campaigns in Syria, Crimea, and eastern Ukraine are examples of this “cross-domain coercion” and warfare.33Dmitry Adamsky, “Cross-Domain Coercion: The Current Russian Art of Strategy,” Institut français des relations internationales November 2015. However, in Ukraine today, Russia continues to lean heavily and foremost on brutal conventional tactics and kinetic means, while still trying to fight across the information, political, and cyber domains, albeit unsuccessfully.

Russia has also developed and/or deployed several new weapons systems after their initial announcement in March 2018, such as the Avangard nuclear-capable hypersonic glide vehicle, the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile, the air-launched ballistic missile Kinzhal, the long-range, nuclear-powered underwater drone Poseidon, and the heavy intercontinental ballistic missile Sarmat. The strategic stability talks in July 2021 were designed to regulate some of these systems, but these efforts ended with Russia’s invasion. In addition, Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons arsenal is concerning particularly to NATO, as its reading of Russian strategy suggests that Moscow believes these capabilities can be deployed in conventional contexts to precipitate the end of a conflict—a scenario many observers of the war in Ukraine are worried about.

A document crucial to understanding Russia’s integrated conventional-nuclear approach is the Basic Principles of State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence from June 2020,44The President of the Russian Federation, Executive order on basic principles of state policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence, 2019. the counterpart to the US Nuclear Posture Review. The June 2020 document states that Russia’s nuclear forces are exclusively defensive and will only be used for deterrence purposes. However, it leaves ambiguity for the use in conventional contexts. In cases where the existence of the state is threatened from an outside “aggression,”55Ibid. the use of nuclear weapons could be considered. Another provision states that “nuclear deterrence should prevent the escalation of hostilities and allow their termination on conditions acceptable to Russia and its allies,”66Ibid. again reinforcing Western concerns about Russia’s willingness to employ tactical weapons to de-escalate conflict. This has sparked debate about a Russian “escalate to de-escalate” strategy, which would use Russian nuclear forces not only for deterrence, but also to coerce de-escalation by threatening to escalate to nuclear use. The worrisome nuclear signaling by Moscow in the first week of the Ukraine war underscored these concerns and demonstrated that Russia’s nuclear forces—and the threat of their use—are a fundamental element in Russia’s militarized foreign policy.

#### NATO deterrence has always relied on its credibility

Eijsvoogel 20 [Juurd; an editor at the NRC; “Is NATO Still Relevant Since It Has Lost Credibility?”; low countries; 8-5-2020; https://www.the-low-countries.com/article/is-nato-still-relevant-since-it-has-lost-credibility] TDI

Credibility has always been NATO’s most important asset: no deterrence without credibility. During the Cold War, the Western European member states found shelter under America’s nuclear umbrella. Large numbers of American troops were stationed in Europe. The Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Italy and Turkey even welcomed America’s tactical nuclear weapons to their territory. And the guarantee of Article 5 was a warning to the Soviet Union not to meddle in Western Europe, since that would mean immediately having to deal with America. But it was never a cast-iron guarantee. Would the United States truly be prepared to engage in a nuclear war with the Soviet Union to fulfil NATO commitments? Would a US president really respond to a nuclear attack on Berlin if that meant risking the destruction of Los Angeles? We could not be sure. Meeting2 North Atlantic Council meeting room in the new NATO headquarters in Brussels © NATO Moreover, for those who thought it through, it was even ‘perfectly obvious’, even for the Russians, that Washington would not risk the lives of millions of Americans for Berlin. At least, that is what elder statesman Dean Acheson wrote in 1961 as an advisor to President John F. Kennedy in a confidential memorandum. Credible deterrence, in his view, had to come from strengthening conventional troops in Europe. But such relativistic attitudes on NATO’s clause of mutual assistance were preferably not discussed out loud. Credibility is a vulnerable good.

### 1NC – Impact – NATO good – Climate Change

#### NATO is increasing their climate change policy where their leadership is key – their credibility is required for climate action to go through.

PSI 7-13 [Planetary Security Initiative; “NATO steps up work on climate change and security,”; Planetary Security Initiative; 7-11-2023; https://www.planetarysecurityinitiative.org/news/nato-steps-work-climate-change-and-security] TDI

NATO steps up work on climate change and security On Tuesday (11 July 2023), NATO released three major reports contributing to Allies’ increased understanding of the impact of climate change on NATO’s strategic environment, missions and operations, and the adaptation of their armed forces required to maintain operational effectiveness. Report 1: NATO Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment Climate change is a defining challenge of our time, with a profound impact on Allied security. At the 2021 Summit in Brussels, NATO Heads of State and Government (HOSG) endorsed a Climate Change and Security Action Plan (CCSAP) and agreed that NATO should aim to become the leading organization when it comes to understanding and adapting to the impact of climate change on security. The following second edition of NATO’s Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment (CCSIA) responds to the demand for increased Allied awareness of the impact of climate change on security. It sets out the effects of various climatic hazards on NATO’s strategic environment. Furthermore, it includes regional assessments and specific case studies, outlining the consequences of climate change on NATO installations and assets, as well as on its missions and operations. You can find the full report on NATO Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment here. Report 2: NATO Climate Change and Security Action Plan At the 2021 NATO Brussels Summit, Allied Heads of State and Government agreed a Climate Change and Security Action Plan with the aim of making NATO the leading international organisation when it comes to understanding and adapting to the impact of climate change on security. It provides a 360-degree approach, encompassing measures to increase Allied awareness of the impact of climate change on security. It outlines the need for clear adaptation and mitigation measures, and enhanced outreach, while ensuring a credible deterrence and defence posture. This document contains examples of how individual Allies are putting these measures into practice. They include government initiatives, public-private partnerships, military and dualuse technologies, has national and international efforts reflecting the different types of interventions required to meet the challenges posed by climate change. All examples were provided by Allied national authorities. You can find the full report on NATO Climate Change and Security Action Plan: Compendium of Best Practices here. Report 3: NATO Greenhouse Gases Emission Mapping and Analytical Methodology The NATO Green House Gases (GHG) Emissions Mapping and Analytical Methodology provides guidelines and tools to calculate the greenhouse gas emissions from the various civilian and military structures (installations and assets) of the NATO Enterprise. The methodology applies only to the various NATO bodies and structures (as identified in this paper) and not to NATO Allies. However, it may be useful to Allies in facilitating their own national plans. The data collected and analysed using this methodology serve as a basis for setting GHG reduction targets for the NATO Enterprise. This methodology will not set those targets and it will not forecast future emissions. Rather it will support the decision making process for NATO’s goal of assessing the feasibility of reaching net zero GHG emissions by 2050. The methodology has been independently validated with recommendations made for improvement; these are being taken into account as part of a continuous improvement cycle. Sensitive in-house data has not been included in this version.

### 1NC – Definitions

#### Resolved means the removal of doubt

American Heritage Dictionary, 5th Edition 18

(Copyright 2018, <https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=resolved> ) TDI

4. To remove or dispel (doubts).

#### It’s firm and decisive

Parcher ‘01 [Jeff; Feb 2001; Former Debate Coach at Georgetown University; <https://web.archive.org/web/20020622002707/http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html>] brett TDI

(1) Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Frimness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statemnt of a deciion, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconcievable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desireablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committtee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the prelimanary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not.

#### Ought means immediate.

Prichard 12 [H.A. Former Professor of Philosophy at Oxford University, Mind, N.S., Vol. 21, <http://www.ditext.com/prichard/mistake.html>] TDI

The sense of obligation to do, or of the rightness of, an action of a particular kind is absolutely underivative or immediate. The rightness of an action consists in its being the origination of something of a certain kind A in a situation of a certain kind, a situation in a certain relation B of the agent to others or to his own nature. To appreciate its rightness two preliminaries may be necessary. We may have to follow out the consequences of the proposed action more fully than we have hitherto done, in order to realise that in the action we should originate A. Thus we may not appreciate the wrongness of telling a certain story until we realise that we should thereby be hurting the feelings of one of our audience. Again, we may have to take into account the relation B involved in the situation, which we had hitherto failed to notice. For instance, we may not appreciate the obligation to give X a present, until we remember that he has done us an act of kindness. But, given that by a process which is, of course, merely a process of general and not of moral thinking we come to recognise that the proposed act is one by which we shall originate A in a relation B, then we appreciate the obligation immediately or directly, the appreciation being an activity of *moral* thinking. We recognise, for instance, that this performance of a service to X, who has done us a service, just in virtue of its being the performance of a service to one who has rendered a service to the would-be agent, ought to be done by us. This apprehension is immediate, in precisely the sense in which a mathematical apprehension is immediate, *e.g.,*the apprehension that this three-sided figure, in virtue of its being three-sided, must have three angles. Both apprehensions are immediate in the sense that in both insight into the nature of the subject directly leads us to recognise its possession of the predicate; and it is only stating this fact from the other side to say that in both cases the fact apprehended is self-evident.

#### “Substantial” is certain

Words and Phrases 64 (40W&P 759)

The words" outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive," in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially the same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential, apparent, constructive, and imaginary; veritable; genuine; certain: absolute: real at present time, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; opposed to form; actually existing; true; not including, admitting, or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive.

## AFF

### 1AR – Say No – General/Persian Gulf

#### NATO says no— it aspires to create a new cooperative framework to engage the MENA region.

Tardy 22 [Thierry; (FR) is Director of the Research Division at the NATO Defence College in Rome. Previously, he held senior research and management positions at the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) in Paris, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), and the Foundation for Strategic Research(FRS) in Paris.His fields of expertise include the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), NATO’s policy and adaptation, NATO-EU relations, the politics of crisis management, UN peace operations, and French security and defense policy; “NATO’s sub-strategic Role in the Middle East and North Africa” <https://www.gmfus.org/news/natos-sub-strategic-role-middle-east-and-north-africa> ] TDI

NATO’s role in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is politically and operationally complex.1 That a security and defense organization would play an important role in a contiguous region from which numerous security threats emanate makes intuitive sense. As NATO seeks to adapt to the evolving security environment while revisiting its Strategic Concept, its ambition and role in the MENA need to be factored in. The security environment on NATO’s southern periphery is challenging. From Libya to the Near East and the Persian Gulf, the MENA concentrates a fair number of threats that range from regional conflicts to state fragility, terrorism, and transnational organized crime. These also pose direct and indirect risks to the security of NATO members and their societies, including those related to uncontrolled migration, human insecurity, and climate change. More recently, the reemergence of Russia and the emergence of China in the MENA have made a NATO role there even more pertinent. If Russia is in Libya and Syria, both countries that generate insecurity for the alliance, then there is an additional rationale for some sort of presence in the region. The reality is, however, different as NATO has for long struggled to assert itself as a security provider on its southern periphery. Not that it has abstained from intervening. From Libya to the Mediterranean Sea and the Gulf of Aden it has been very present, but the coherence and impact of its interventions have been fragile. Three factors can explain the difficulties that NATO is encountering in the MENA. First, the broad range and diffuse nature of the threats and risks in the region make it difficult to come up with a response that is coherent yet sufficiently targeted. Simply understanding what and where the problems are is daunting. Second, it follows from the nature of the threats that NATO might not be the best-suited institution to tackle them. Many of the risks relate to political or socioeconomic factors for which a military alliance brings little added value. Third, NATO’s role is hindered by the diverging agendas of its members. Not only do allies disagree about how central the region should be for NATO but some are also openly confronting one another in some of the sensitive southern theatres. This brief looks at NATO’s agenda in the MENA, the challenges it faces, and the way forward. It analyzes the complexity of the region and how this impacts NATO’s positioning, and it presents the mixed record of NATO’s involvement there. The brief then offers three sets of recommendations. First, it is difficult to see how NATO could play any meaningful role in the region without developing some sort of strategic framework that would lay out its level of ambition and reflect a certain degree of political cohesion. Second, such a strategy will have to consider the type of division of tasks that NATO should consider with other international actors, starting with the European Union. This should be guided by the comparative advantages of all the security actors involved. Third, any purposeful role for NATO in the region will have to take a fresh look at the type of relationship that the alliance needs to have with its local partners, be it through its traditional partnership programs, or in interaction with other international organizations, such as the African Union, the League of Arab States, or the G5 Sahel. The State of Play The Middle East and North Africa is characterized by structural instability: from Libya to the Persian Gulf, from Syria and Iraq to Yemen, not forgetting the long-lasting Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the region has gone through a series of crises and conflicts over the last 20 years that have largely shaped its political, economic, and human development. Insecurity in the region is driven by three categories of interrelated issues. First, threats that produce direct violence, such as internal or international conflicts, terrorism, or organized crime. The second category consists of issues that relate to the deficiencies of governing bodies such as state fragility, bad governance, or the porosity of borders. In the third category are the more diffuse human-security issues that result from underdevelopment, uncontrolled demographics or migration, or climate change. This typology is useful when looking at NATO’s role in the MENA as it helps identify where it could possibly intervene (see below). Another way to look at security dynamics in the region is to distinguish between interstate competition and related foreign military interventions on the one hand, and internal conflicts or violent processes on the other hand, while acknowledging that the two levels are intertwined and often difficult to disentangle. The US-Iran confrontation, the tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the conflicts in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, as well as the more recent Russian activities in several countries of the region are at the interstate level. At the internal level are phenomena such as terrorism, violent extremism, political violence, and transnational organized crime. Another way to look at security dynamics in the region is to distinguish between interstate competition and related foreign military interventions on the one hand, and internal conflicts or violent processes on the other hand, while acknowledging that the two levels are intertwined and often difficult to disentangle. This said, all these conflicts or violent processes are at least partially international and to a degree multidimensional.2 They all have ramifications outside of the territory where most of the violence takes place. The conflicts in Israel-Palestine, Libya, or Yemen, though different from one another, provide examples of the international linkages that make it impossible to analyze them in isolation. And they are all multidimensional in the sense that they are driven by a wide range of issues, from the political and socioeconomic to cultural, and beyond. The combination of these two patterns makes it difficult to comprehend the challenges fully, let alone manage them. Conflicts and Terrorism The Middle East and North Africa counts six conflicts currently (in Egypt, Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Libya, Syria, and Yemen) as well as three situations of socioeconomic instability and uprisings (in Algeria, Iran, and Lebanon). Terrorist groups operate in most of the conflict areas, and even more MENA countries are involved in what began as intrastate conflicts (like Iran in Syria, the United Arab Emirates in Libya, or Saudi Arabia in Yemen). Indeed, conflicts in the region have long ceased to be politically and practically confined to a geographically limited area, and most involve international interference. Such interference can be a response to existing conflicts, in particular in the broad domain of multilateral crisis management, but it can also add to existing insecurity or even create new conflicts. This was the case with the US-led intervention in Iraq in 2003, the NATO operation in Libya in 2011, and the Turkish and Russian presence in Libya and Syria over the last few years. Russia’s policy in the region has been of particular concern from a NATO perspective. Not only does the recent Russian interference in these spaces—directly or through mercenary groups—contribute to the deterioration of the security environment, it also constrains the Western political agenda by altering the nature of the relationship between the West and local interlocutors, be they governments or non-state actors.3 The Russian presence in the region further tests NATO’s deterrence and defense agenda, and its current focus on its eastern flank. Furthermore, the MENA remains one of the regions most affected by terrorist attacks (although their number has decreased since 2016).4 Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and its affiliated groups have been instrumental in this since 2014. The group has been weakened in Iraq and Syria, yet it and its affiliates have been resurgent in these two countries in 2020 and 2021. ISIS has also become active in North Africa (in Libya) and sub-Saharan Africa (in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and the Lake Chad region), where other jihadist groups (like Boko Haram) operate.5 Countries such as Egypt and Lebanon are also confronted with internal terrorist groups, some of which act as proxies for third parties (such as Lebanon’s Hezbollah being backed by Iran). Beyond their jihadist agendas, many of these groups also attract part of the disillusioned and socially/economically excluded youth who are not necessarily religious. These groups are also linked to criminal activities (cross-border trafficking) and take advantage of ungoverned spaces while contributing to further social disintegration and state collapse. Human Security and Governance Human-security concerns feature prominently in the analysis of the region’s evolution. Dysfunctional economies (with the exception of Israel and the Saudi peninsula, bar Yemen), the effect of climate change (regarding access to water in particular), social inequalities, and violations of political rights are systemic sources of insecurity and conflict. These issues triggered the Arab Spring a decade ago and the situation has hardly improved since,6 with the possible exception of Tunisia. More recently, the coronavirus pandemic has challenged the region’s health systems and resilience. Nonetheless, between 2011 and 2019, the performance of most MENA countries in the Human Development Index has improved (with progress in particular in Iraq, Mauritania, Morocco, and Oman), while it has stagnated in Lebanon, Qatar, and Yemen, and decreased in Libya and Syria.7 The impact on human capital is direct, with indicators not showing much improvement over time. Faced with these multi-dimensional challenges, states and other governing bodies of the region present manifest deficiencies. Fourteen countries of the MENA (out of 20) are characterized as “not free” (in political rights and civil liberties) by Freedom House,8 and quite a few are plain authoritarian regimes. High levels of corruption, inefficiency of public policies and bureaucratic abuses, and weak or non-existing accountability mechanisms are rampant. The impact on human capital is direct, with indicators not showing much improvement over time.9 Most states also lack functioning and legitimate security structures. Overall, this leaves a large part of the region chronically challenged in the public-policy domain, including in terms of security governance. And there appears to be little reason to believe that the situation will significantly improve in the coming years; instead, insecurity will likely continue to be a major issue at all above-described levels. NATO’s Response to Insecurity on Its Southern Periphery NATO has been involved in the Middle East and North Africa at different levels over the last decade, in activities that fall within its two core tasks of crisis management and cooperative security.10 The overall objective has been to address what NATO calls “pervasive instability”11 on its southern flank through a broad “projection stability” agenda. The June 2021 NATO summit reiterated the alliance’s commitment to “enhancing our long-standing engagement in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region” and to “build stronger security and defence institutions and capacities, promote interoperability, and help to counter terrorism.”12 Cooperative Security In the cooperative-security domain, NATO’s activities have taken the form of training and defense capacity-building for partner countries, and there has also been a socialization endeavor through the establishment of staff-to-staff relations and including partners’ officials in NATO’s education programs.13 In doing so, NATO has mainly operated in the frameworks of the Mediterranean Dialogue and to a lesser degree the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI).14 It has also developed bilateral activities through the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Program agreements, and more specifically through the Partnership Interoperability Initiative, with agreements with Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia;15 and through the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative, with agreements with Iraq, Jordan and Tunisia.16 These initiatives aim at developing interoperability of partners’ forces with NATO’s and at strengthening their defense capacities through advising on defense and security-sector reform, institution-building, development of local forces through education and training, or advice and assistance in specialized areas. In 2016, a Framework for the South was adopted to give some political cohesion to NATO’s activities on its southern periphery. The ICI Regional Centre in Kuwait was established in 2017 as an education institution targeting officials of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. The following year, NATO created its Strategic Direction South (“Hub”) within the Joint Force Command in Naples, mandated to produce open-source analysis on various south-related security issues. The NATO Defense College in Rome also offers courses for officials of the MENA. A Package for the south was subsequently adopted at the 2018 NATO summit. Crisis Management In the crisis-management domain, NATO has run six operations in the MENA since 2011, including Operation Unified Protector in Libya (in 2011) and two training missions in Iraq (from 2004 to 2011 and then since 2018). It was also involved in maritime security, with Operation Ocean Shield in the Gulf of Aden (2008–2015) and Operation Sea Guardian in the Mediterranean (since 2016). Finally, NATO provides support, mainly through its AWACS planes, to the Global Coalition against ISIS. All these activities were encapsulated in the concept of Projecting Stability, introduced in the mid-2010s.17 Projecting Stability operated a merger of crisis management and cooperative security, with a range of military and non-military activities aiming at shaping “the strategic environment in order to make neighbouring regions more stable and secure.”18 NATO’s Mixed Record Within this broad arena of activities, questions persist about NATO’s record and added value there. How much has it contributed to regional security? What are its comparative advantages? How much allies converge on policy in the region and how much they want NATO to be involved there as opposed to the eastern flank or elsewhere? And how much do local actors want or are willing to request NATO’s involvement? NATO’s record is uneasy to assess holistically as its activities vary from one place to the other and over time. In general, though, it is difficult to see any tangible impact in the various areas where NATO has deployed assets. Most importantly, NATO’s overall crisis-management record has been tarnished by the operation in Libya and its medium-term consequences for the region. To start, resources allocated to the operationalization of partnerships in the region have been scarce, and observers often note the mismatch between the ambition of official statements and the reality of implementation.19 Most importantly, NATO’s overall crisis-management record has been tarnished by the operation in Libya and its medium-term consequences for the region. What NATO has achieved in Iraq through its two successive capacity-building operations is also unclear. Paradoxically, it can even be argued that its operation in Libya and the non-NATO-led operation in Iraq have contributed more to the region’s insecurity than to its stability. What is more, it is the impact of third-party interventions in general that is dubious, as illustrated by the 20 years of US and NATO presence in Afghanistan. Second is the issue of prioritization. In general terms, NATO’s engagement with the region has been significantly lower than the attention paid to its eastern flank. In the aftermath of the 2014 Ukraine crisis, the alliance’s focus turned back to Russia and how to deter it, at the expense of the southern flank. And initiatives such as Projecting Stability or the establishment of the Strategic Direction South “Hub” in Naples were to an extent aimed at covering over the alliance’s weak commitment to the south. In fact, even the notion of Projecting Stability seems to have lost relevance in 2021—it is barely mentioned in the June 2021 summit communiqué, partly as a result of the debacle of the withdrawal from Afghanistan. Such prioritization also takes place in the context of the United States’ pivot to Asia, which further complicates NATO’s involvement in the South. If the United States’ disengagement from the region is confirmed in the coming years, the vacuum this will leave is more likely to be filled by other external powers such as Russia or Turkey than by NATO as an organization. Third, NATO’s comparative advantages are at stake. A major issue for the alliance is how it can, as a military organization, respond to problems that are largely of a non-military nature, furthermore in countries where it is not necessarily welcome. The intersecting nature of security in the MENA, as described above, leads to two related considerations. First, there are limits to what a military-focused actor can achieve or solve when the military aspects of the problem are peripheral. This explains NATO’s difficulties in countering migration or radicalization, for which social or economic explanatory factors are central. Second, any attempt to address only one aspect of the problem without considering the whole picture is unlikely to produce long-term achievements, and it can even be counterproductive.20 In other words, the narrow NATO answer to a much larger problem may simply not produce anything tangible or sustainable. The European Union and the United Nations are confronted with a similar range of challenges in the MENA and their record over the last two decades is not always solid, either. Yet the multifaceted nature of the security issues combined with the general mandate and comparative advantages of these two institutions tend to place them in a better position than NATO in quite a few non-military domains. It may also be the case that the EU and the UN will be better accepted by local actors. A fourth level of issues relates to political divergences among NATO’s member states when it comes to the MENA. Be it in the Mediterranean Sea, in Libya, in Syria, or in relations with countries such as Egypt or Israel, the allies do not present a united front while some diverge in terms of priorities or policy options. For example, in 2019, France and the United States on one hand and Turkey on the other ended up on opposing sides in the fighting in northeastern Syria.21 The incident between France and Turkey in the Mediterranean Sea in 2020 also illustrated intra-alliance friction, even while both were contributing to the NATO-led Sea Guardian maritime operation. The long-lasting Greek-Turkish tensions provide another example of deleterious dissent. This negatively impacts NATO’s ability to come up with a cohesive policy in the region and may even hinder such commitment in the future. Finally, NATO is confronted with the question of acceptance by local actors. In theory, any NATO security role in the region is conditioned on the consent of the recipient country (Libya in 2011 was an exception in this respect.) Yet the last 30 years of third-party crisis management have shown how this can be resisted by local actors. And NATO is far from being a benevolent intervener. One 2018 study noted that, while “partner attitudes toward NATO [were] not uniformly positive,” local resistance was “far less of a constraint than sometimes assumed,” with ambivalence being often “overshadowed by security interest.”22 This might well be what is observed on the ground, especially when NATO provides a really needed service or when its long-term commitment allows for some trust to emerge. Yet reconciling the alliance’s interests with the needs of the recipient states or societies will remain no easy task. The Way Forward There is a consensus on the fact that the security challenges in the Middle East and North Africa can create instability in NATO member states, which therefore ought to do something about it. Whether there exists a consensus on what to do and whether NATO should be a central component of the response is less obvious. With these reservations in mind, below are three steps that NATO ought to take were it be willing to shape the security environment in the MENA. Strategy The ongoing Ukraine crisis has given NATO a new direction in the sense that it has provided it with a relatively straightforward task: to deter and defend against Russia on the eastern flank. The alliance has adopted doctrinal documents and taken measures aimed at operationalizing this agenda. Nothing like this really exists with regard to the southern flank.23 Policy documents like the Framework for the South or the Package for the South are not strategic texts nor do they define a level of ambition for NATO in the region. This is partly a sign that the allies want to concentrate on the eastern flank (and maybe then on China) and that the attention and energy that they are ready to dedicate to the MENA is limited as a consequence. If, on the contrary, NATO wishes to upgrade its presence and impact in the MENA, then a significant effort is to be made at the strategic level. The alliance could not by itself address the root causes of instability in the region, which is clearly beyond its remit, but it could at least give more purposefulness to what it has done so far. A strategic narrative laying down a “renewed cooperative security” ambition for the region would also help articulate such ambition with NATO’s deterrence and defense agenda. This first implies a comprehensive analysis of the security situation in the MENA and of the issues that are likely to spill over into NATO in the near future. This does not need to be carried out by NATO itself. It could rely on national input or a mix of open-source and classified information. On this basis, a strategic reflection and document, as part of the current Strategic Concept process, defining the objectives, methods, and resources of NATO’s presence in the region is of the essence. A dedicated document or a section in the Strategic Concept would not only give visibility to a policy that has suffered from a lack of strategy, it would also clarify the level of ambition of the allies. A strategic narrative laying down a “renewed cooperative security” ambition for the region would also help articulate such ambition with NATO’s deterrence and defense agenda. Resources and political commitment would have to follow suit and be sustained over time. No quick fix will do. Furthermore, a “renewed cooperative security” plan should be accompanied by strategic communication (in English, French, and Arabic) on what NATO intends to do, how, and why it matters to the recipient entities. Any strategic-communications or public-diplomacy effort should also include a counter-disinformation component. Ideally such communication would be paired with a similar exercise carried out by the EU. Realistically, the chance that such a strategic framework will be adopted is not high; conversely, the chance that NATO would achieve anything meaningful in the region absent a strategic vision is equally low. Division of Tasks and Concentration of Efforts Second, any purposeful NATO presence in the MENA will have to be the result of a well thought-through partnership with the EU. The two institutions must capitalize on what they do best and refrain from developing activities that are better covered by the other.24 This also applies to cooperation with the UN and its development and humanitarian agencies. The typology of security issues in the region presented above is useful in this respect. Distinguishing between conflicts, terrorism, or organized crime; between state fragility, bad governance, or the porosity of borders; and the more diffuse human-security issues makes it possible to identify areas where a military alliance can add value and others where it most likely will not. NATO can play a role in response to open conflicts or terrorism, and it can contribute to the strengthening of military and security institutions, but it is unlikely to be able to bring anything tangible in human-security domains. This prioritization matters to the definition of where the alliance should go, but it also calls for partnerships insofar as any NATO activity on a narrow segment will only produce an effect if complemented by parallel actions on the other (economic, political, etc.) segments, by other entities. With this logic in mind, if NATO and the EU are engaged in capacity-building and training in the region, NATO must concentrate on the defense segment for which it offers the best know-how or resources. This includes tasks such as defense-sector reform, capacity-building on operations in high-temperature environments, military counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, assisting in building interoperability between allies and partner countries, and handling improvised explosive devices.25 But NATO should probably refrain from investing in security areas where the EU or the UN are better placed or only embrace these tasks in places where the others cannot go. Focus on the defense segment suggests that NATO alone is unlikely to play a strategic role, in the sense that its limited presence will in most cases be insufficient to be transformative. Hence the importance of inter-institutional cooperation. Beyond cooperative security, NATO must retain the capacity to conduct military operations in a crisis-management mode in the region. This goes against the current post-Afghanistan mood, yet the nature of the environment makes it impossible to rule out a major military operation one day. (There was similar intervention fatigue in 2010 while NATO was drafting its Strategic Concept and a year later it got involved in Libya.) This carries implications for NATO planning and exercises as well as for the projection capabilities of European states, at a time when the collective-defense agenda tends to concentrate on territorial defense. Revisiting Partnerships When it comes to NATO’s partnerships, there is a broad consensus advocating an overhaul so that they better reflect evolving needs and NATO interests, while recognizing the limited appetite of allies to do so.26 Whether the process leading to the new Strategic Concept will allow for such a revision is uncertain. One consideration here is to move away from the geographical feature of the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, and to approach partnerships more functionally and/or politically. The connections between North Africa and the Sahel, or between the Near East and the Arabian peninsula, attest to the narrowness of existing partnerships, especially as some of the most problematic countries (such as Lebanon, Libya, or Syria) are not partner countries. The “30+1” or “30+7” Mediterranean Dialogue formats27 can prove ill-adapted in this respect as they do not allow for third countries or organization like the African Union or the G5 Sahel among other to take part. Not only would a sustained political dialogue help socialize MENA officials with their NATO counterparts at different levels, it could also be part of broader diplomatic processes in which NATO sits together with some of the allies. NATO’s political role could also be improved within and outside formal partnerships. The political dialogue with partners in the region so far has been often criticized as too formal and superficial, and it has not been held sufficiently regularly.28 At a time when NATO seeks to develop its political profile, engaging MENA partners as well as other countries of the region in a more flexible and strategic dialogue is to be considered; for example, with more regular meetings with various levels of participation.29 Not only would a sustained political dialogue help socialize MENA officials with their NATO counterparts at different levels, it could also be part of broader diplomatic processes in which NATO sits together with some of the allies. By doing so NATO would become a more natural interlocutor and therefore a potential partner. In this process, other levels of governance such as international organizations (the African Union, the League of Arab States, the G5 Sahel) will have to be included. In 2019, NATO and the African Union signed a cooperation agreement to enhance their relationship. The alliance has also established contact with the G5 Sahel and started to explore avenues for cooperation. These exchanges are useful insofar as they help establish trust among entities whose cultures and mandates can be very different. Yet the level of ambition has remained low and in practice only few activities have taken place. Conclusion NATO’s presence and impact in the Middle East and North Africa have so far been constrained by issues that pertain to prioritization and feasibility. Not only have its members diverged on whether the alliance should be engaged in its southern flank, but its ability to bring responses to the broad range of problems in the region has also been restricted. NATO’s role in the MENA has remained sub-strategic as a consequence.Bearing in mind the forthcoming Strategic Concept, a renewed cooperative-security ambition is imperative if NATO wants to weigh on the region’s overall stability so that its own security is also preserved. Whether the best moment to do that is when the United States says it pivots to the Indo-Pacific is not sure, but while other external powers seem to have clear ideas about what they want in the MENA, any disengagement or light presence by NATO or Western powers would likely carry enormous risks.

### 1AR – Say No – AFRICOM

#### NATO says no— it was a core member in Africom’s creation

Tricontinental 22’ [Tricontienental is an institute for research. They were founded after the Tricontinental Conference of 1966. The magazine is the official publication of the Organization of Solidarity with the People of Asia, Africa and Latin America. “Africa Does Not Want To Be a Breeding Ground for the New Cold War”https://thetricontinental.org/newsletterissue/africa-new-cold-war] TDI

Dear friends, Greetings from the desk of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research. On 17 October, the head of US Africa Command (AFRICOM), US Marine Corps General Michael Langley visited Morocco. Langley met with senior Moroccan military leaders, including Inspector General of the Moroccan Armed Forces Belkhir El Farouk. Since 2004, AFRICOM has held its ‘largest and premier annual exercise’, African Lion, partly on Moroccan soil. This past June, ten countries participated in the African Lion 2022, with observers from Israel (for the first time) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Salah Elmur (Sudan), The Green Room, 2019. Langley’s visit is part of a broader US push onto the African continent, which we documented in our dossier no. 42 (July 2021), Defending Our Sovereignty: US Military Bases in Africa and the Future of African Unity, a joint publication with The Socialist Movement of Ghana’s Research Group. In that text, we wrote that the two important principles of Pan-Africanism are political unity and territorial sovereignty and argued that ‘[t]he enduring presence of foreign military bases not only symbolises the lack of unity and sovereignty; it also equally enforces the fragmentation and subordination of the continent’s peoples and governments’. In August, US Ambassador to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield travelled to Ghana, Uganda, and Cape Verde. ‘We’re not asking Africans to make any choices between the United States and Russia’, she said ahead of her visit, but, she added, ‘for me, that choice would be simple’. That choice is nonetheless being impelled by the US Congress as it deliberates the Countering Malign Russian Activities in Africa Act, a bill that would sanction African states if they do business with Russia (and could possibly extend to China in the future). To understand this unfolding situation, our friends at No Cold War have prepared their briefing no. 5, NATO Claims Africa as Its ‘Southern Neighbourhood’, which looks at how NATO has begun to develop a proprietary view of Africa and how the US government considers Africa to be a frontline in its Global Monroe Doctrine. That briefing can be read in full below and downloaded here: In August 2022, the United States published a new foreign policy strategy aimed at Africa. The 17-page document featured 10 mentions of China and Russia combined, including a pledge to ‘counter harmful activities by the [People’s Republic of China], Russia, and other foreign actors’ on the continent, but did not once mention the term ‘sovereignty’. Although US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has stated that Washington ‘will not dictate Africa’s choices’, African governments have reported facing ‘patronising bullying’ from NATO member states to take their side in the war in Ukraine. As global tensions rise, the US and its allies have signalled that they view the continent as a battleground to wage their New Cold War against China and Russia. Richard Mudariki (Zimbabwe), The Passover, 2011. Richard Mudariki (Zimbabwe), The Passover, 2011. A New Monroe Doctrine? At its annual summit in June, NATO named Africa along with the Middle East ‘NATO’s southern neighbourhood’. On top of this, NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg ominously referred to ‘Russia and China’s increasing influence in our southern neighbourhood’ as a ‘challenge’. The following month, the outgoing commander of AFRICOM, General Stephen J Townsend, referred to Africa as ‘NATO’s southern flank’. These comments are disturbingly reminiscent of the neocolonial attitude espoused by the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, in which the US claimed Latin America as its ‘backyard’. This paternalistic view of Africa appears to be widely held in Washington. In April, the US House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed the Countering Malign Russian Influence Activities in Africa Act by a vote of 415-9. The bill, which aims to punish African governments for not aligning with US foreign policy on Russia, has been widely condemned across the continent for disrespecting the sovereignty of African nations, with South African Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor calling it ‘absolutely disgraceful’. The efforts by the US and Western countries to draw Africa into their geopolitical conflicts raise serious concerns: namely, will the US and NATO weaponise their vast military presence on the continent to achieve their aims? Amani Bodo (DRC), Masque à gaz (‘Gas Mask’), 2020. AFRICOM: Protecting US and NATO’s Hegemony In 2007, the United States established its Africa Command (AFRICOM) ‘in response to our expanding partnerships and interests in Africa’. In just 15 years, AFRICOM has established at least 29 military bases on the continent as part of an extensive network which includes more than 60 outposts and access points in at least 34 countries – over 60 percent of the nations on the continent. Despite Washington’s rhetoric of promoting democracy and human rights in Africa, in reality, AFRICOM aims to secure US hegemony over the continent. AFRICOM’s stated objectives include ‘protecting US interests’ and ‘maintaining superiority over competitors’ in Africa. In fact, the creation of AFRICOM was motivated by the concerns of ‘those alarmed by China’s expanding presence and influence in the region’. From the outset, NATO was involved in the endeavour, with the original proposal put forward by then Supreme Allied Commander of NATO James L Jones, Jr. On an annual basis, AFRICOM conducts training exercises focused on enhancing the ‘interoperability’ between African militaries and ‘US and NATO special operations forces’. The destructive nature of the US and NATO’s military presence in Africa was exemplified in 2011 when – ignoring the African Union’s opposition – the US and NATO launched their catastrophic military intervention in Libya to remove the government of Muammar Gaddafi. This regime change war destroyed the country, which had previously scored the highest among African nations on the UN Human Development Index. Over a decade later, the principal achievements of the intervention in Libya have been the return of slave markets to the country, the entry of thousands of foreign fighters, and unending violence. In the future, will the US and NATO invoke the ‘malign influence’ of China and Russia as a justification for military interventions and regime change in Africa? Zemba Luzamba (DRC), Parlementaires debout (‘Parliamentarians Standing’), 2019. Zemba Luzamba (DRC), Parlementaires debout (‘Parliamentarians Standing’), 2019. Africa Rejects a New Cold War At this year’s UN General Assembly, the African Union firmly rejected the coercive efforts of the US and Western countries to use the continent as a pawn in their geopolitical agenda. ‘Africa has suffered enough of the burden of history’, stated Chairman of the African Union and President of Senegal Macky Sall; ‘it does not want to be the breeding ground of a new Cold War, but rather a pole of stability and opportunity open to all its partners, on a mutually beneficial basis’. Indeed, the drive for war offers nothing to the peoples of Africa in their pursuit of peace, climate change adaptation, and development. At the inauguration of the European Diplomatic Academy on 13 October, the European Union’s chief diplomat, Josep Borrell, said, ‘Europe is a garden… The rest of the world… is a jungle, and the jungle could invade the garden’. As if the metaphor were not clear enough, he added, ‘Europeans have to be much more engaged with the rest of the world. Otherwise, the rest of the world will invade us’. Borrell’s racist comments were pilloried on social media and eviscerated in the European Parliament by Marc Botenga of the Belgian Workers’ Party, and a petition by the Democracy in Europe Movement (DiEM25) calling for Borrell’s resignation has received over 10,000 signatures. Borrell’s lack of historical knowledge is significant: it is Europe and North America that continue to invade the African continent, and it is those military and economic invasions that cause African people migrate. As President Sall said, Africa does not want to be a ‘breeding ground of a new Cold War’, but a sovereign place of dignity. Warmly, Vijay

### 1AR – Say No – Israel

#### NATO says no— it welcomes military investment to maintain it’s relationship.

NATO 23 [North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, January 26 2023, “Secretary General welcomes Israeli President to NATO HQ” <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_211209.htm?selectedLocale=en#:~:text=NATO%20and%20Israel%20have%20worked,and%20women%2C%20peace%20and%20security>] TDI

On Thursday (26 January 2023) Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg welcomed Israeli President Isaac Herzog to NATO Headquarters. For the first time, a President of Israel addressed NATO Allies in the North Atlantic Council, demonstrating the deepening partnership between the Alliance and the State of Israel. Statements by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the President of Israel, Isaac Herzog The Secretary General highlighted NATO and Israel’s close and long standing partnership, noting that strengthened cooperation was planned in areas such as climate change, innovation, and new technologies. Speaking about Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine, the Secretary General underlined the help that NATO Allies and partners were providing for Ukraine to uphold its right to self-defence. Mr Stoltenberg emphasised the growing cooperation between Russia and authoritarian states such as Iran, China and North Korea and noted that it is more important than ever to stand up for freedom and democracy. He said “Iran is delivering military support to Russia. Including drones that are used to attack civilian infrastructure, homes and hospitals in Ukraine. In return, Russia is stepping up its support to Iran.” The Secretary General also said that NATO will mark International Holocaust Remembrance Day on 27 January “to remember the unspeakable horror of the millions who suffered and died during World War Two. We will never forget them.” NATO and Israel have worked together for almost 30 years, cooperating in domains such as science and technology, counter terrorism, civil preparedness, countering weapons of mass destruction and women, peace and security. Over the last year cooperation has grown, with NATO welcoming Israel’s intention to strengthen the naval interoperability by recognising Israel as a partner for NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian, and Israel’s Defence Force military medical academy now serving as a unique asset for NATO’s Partnership Training and Education Centres community.

### 1AR – Say No – Turkey

#### NATO says no— it values strong security commitments in Turkey.

Bayer 23 [(Lili Bayer), 7-24-2023, "Turkey is the headache NATO needs," POLITICO, https://www.politico.eu/article/turkey-nato-sweden-finland-is-the-headache-nato-needs/] TDI

Turkey may have finally let Finland into NATO, but it’s not budging — yet — on Sweden. And NATO just has to live with that. The unyielding blockade is the latest in a string of Turkish actions that have left the military alliance’s allies grumbling and eye rolling. In 2017, Turkey controversially decided to buy a Russian missile system. It has repeatedly attacked the very same Kurdish militia the U.S. had supported in Syria. And to this day, Turkey’s leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, still chats regularly with Vladimir Putin. And, until late Thursday, Turkey had also [blocked](https://www.politico.eu/article/finland-join-nato-memeber-turkey-parliament-vote/) Finland from joining the alliance for months, even as war raged nearby. Privately, some officials are bristling at Turkey’s obstructionist approach, its Russia-engaging foreign policies and democratic backsliding. In a symbolic move, the White House didn’t invite Turkish officials to its Summit for Democracy. And some observers are openly wondering how Turkey, a NATO member since 1952, even fits in the Western defense club. You may like Increased turnout in Spanish elections By Aitor Hernández-Morales Ukrainian offensive was delayed by lack of munitions, Zelenskyy says By Kelly Garrity Netanyahu stuck in hospital as contentious vote nears in Israel By Varg Folkman Yet NATO officials and allies have evinced no desire to engage the issue. They insist NATO and Turkey are locked in a marriage of mutual convenience — and allies, as they’ve done for years, just have to figure out how to make it work. Turkey, they note, brings the second-largest NATO army to the table. It actively contributes to alliance missions and operations — not a sure thing for all members. And critically, it sits on prime geopolitical real estate between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, controlling who passes through. Turkey’s Russian links could even make it a useful interlocutor in potential peace talks with Ukraine. “Türkiye is an important NATO ally — and for many reasons,” NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg told POLITICO in an interview, ticking through a laundry list: geographic location, fighting the Islamic State, supporting Ukraine, keeping the world’s grain flowing. “They’ve closed the Bosphorus Strait for naval ships,” he added, “which has reduced Russia’s capabilities to reinforce their presence in the Black Sea and around Crimea.” NATO, in other words, needs Turkey, headaches and all. And it is willing to make compromises and play down disagreements to keep Turkey in the fold, illustrating the value the alliance is placing on harmony amid a destabilizing world. And Turkey, for its part, also wants to stay in the fold, even if it regularly goes rogue. It needs NATO’s protective assurances as the country eyes threats from countries such as Iran and even Russia. “Turkey provides a security cushion to NATO,” said Sinan Ülgen, a senior fellow at Carnegie Europe. “And definitely,” he said, “NATO provides a security umbrella to Turkey.” A European diplomat was even blunter: “Of course Turkey needs NATO,” the diplomat said. But, the diplomat added, it is also “the elephant in the room.” Ankara’s balancing act Turkey’s foreign policy sets it apart from most NATO allies. The country has condemned Russia’s invasion and provided aid to Ukraine, but is also refusing to sanction the industries fueling Moscow’s war. And since the war began, Erdoğan has met in person with Putin multiple times — in addition to their regular phone chats. He even accused the West of provoking Russia. Turkey’s Russian links could even make it a useful interlocutor in potential peace talks with Ukraine | Anastasia Vlasova/Getty Images The country “has adopted an approach of balancing everything so pragmatically in order to maximize their own interests,” said another senior European diplomat, who, like other diplomats, spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal alliance dynamics. Turkish officials, however, see their country as a facilitator. In their view, Turkey is a NATO ally that can take on bridge-building roles Western capitals struggle to fill. “Despite our strong disagreements on certain issues, we do have a functional communication channel with Russia,” said one Turkish official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak publicly. Turkey, the official noted, helped broker the delicate deal between Russia and Ukraine to get landlocked piles of grain out through the Black Sea. The agreement “prevented a new food crisis,” the official stressed, adding that Turkey is also playing an active role in prisoner exchanges between Russia and Ukraine. A second Turkish official insisted that “nobody can reasonably claim that we are an outlier in the alliance in any way” but said that “there are some allies that are insensitive to our vital and existential security concerns.” For more polling data from across Europe visit [POLITICO Poll of Polls](https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/). Whether viewed as a disruptor or a facilitator, Turkey has been able to pull off its renegade role within NATO, a consensus-based organization, and even win concessions and influence. In 2010, the alliance appointed a Turkish civil servant as assistant secretary general for defense policy and planning. NATO documents routinely underline the terror threat to the alliance — a nod to Ankara’s concerns. Most other allies “wouldn’t want to be isolated, they wouldn’t want to be the bad guy,” said Jamie Shea, a former senior NATO official. Turkey, however, “doesn’t mind,” he added — it “gives Turkey enormous leverage and enormous power.” The Sweden gambit Ankara’s willingness to go it alone is now on full display as it holds up Sweden’s NATO bid. Finland and Sweden applied for NATO membership together in May 2022. But Ankara raised concerns about the countries’ support for Kurdish groups and arms export restrictions. Finland and Sweden applied for NATO membership together in May 2022 | Pool photo by Johanna Geron/AFP via Getty Images In June, all three [signed](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/220628-trilat-memo.pdf) a deal committing Finland and Sweden to tighten their anti-terror laws, address Turkish extradition requests for terror suspects and clamp down on the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a militant group that has fought the Turkish authorities. But as the months passed and NATO officials began insisting the two countries had met their end of the deal, Turkey didn’t budge — arguing the progress was insufficient. Experts say the delay is in part linked to domestic politics — Turkey will hold [elections](https://www.politico.eu/article/turkey-2023-election-erdogan-close-call-republican-peoples-party-turkey-sweden-akp-chp-kilicdaroglu-fahrettin-altun/) in May and tensions with Stockholm [escalated](https://www.politico.eu/article/quran-burning-in-sweden-exacerbates-tensions-with-turkey-over-nato-bid/) after a Quran burning at a protest earlier this year. Turkey is also, they added, likely trying to squeeze the United States on issues like the blocked export of F-16 jets. Earlier this month, Erdoğan finally [said](https://www.politico.eu/article/turkey-approve-finland-nato-membership-sweden-edrogan/) his country would move ahead with Finland’s ratification — while leaving Sweden behind, at least for now. “The Turkish idea of splitting the membership, and approving Finland was very smart,” said Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution who specializes in Turkish domestic and foreign policy. “I think it’s helped Turkey immensely to make a case that their opposition to Sweden isn’t done at Russia’s request, but it is to do with Turkey’s own interests and demands.” There is widespread speculation within NATO that the Turkish parliament could sign off on Sweden’s bid after the country’s election. Ankara, Western officials and experts say, has no interest in dragging its feet forever. And Hungary — which has similarly yet to approve Swedish membership — is unlikely to block accession on its own. In public, NATO officials had stressed for months that Turkey has legitimate concerns but that Sweden and Finland have done their part and deserve approval. In private, however, some officials have expressed annoyance — and not just at the Turkish leadership. Stoltenberg’s “appeasement policy towards Erdoğan has failed,” said the first European diplomat. But the NATO chief insists the alliance must take Turkish concerns seriously — and that he still [hopes](https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-sweden-jens-stoltenberg-turkey-finland-elections/) Sweden could become a member after Turkey’s planned May elections and before the alliance’s annual summit on July 11. Turkish officials, meanwhile, say that their record shows they support NATO enlargement. “The moment we see Sweden fulfilling their commitments,” said the first Turkish official, “we will start the ratification process as we did with Finland.” And there is a sense that despite qualms about Ankara’s behavior, its maverick foreign policy could come in handy down the road. Peace talks in Ukraine are “not on the cards at the moment,” said Shea, the former senior NATO official. “But you know, when they come back, who’s gonna play the mediator? Is it going to be China or Turkey? I put my money on Turkey.”

### 1AR – UQ – Cred High

#### Ukraine has boosted NATOs purpose and credibility and sets up further NATO growth

Rogers 22 [(Paul Rogers, Paul Rogers is professor emeritus of peace studies in the Department of Peace Studies and International Relations at Bradford University and an honorary fellow at the UK Joint Service Command and Staff College.) “The Ukraine war and NATO’s renewed credibility,” Social Europe, 05-25-2022, https://www.socialeurope.eu/the-ukraine-war-and-natos-renewed-credibility] TDI

So far, the greatest of Vladimir Putin’s many failures in the Ukraine war has been in his aim of seriously weakening the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Far from creating greater disunity between member states, the Russian president has given NATO a new purpose, just as its role was starting to be questioned. Its unity has even been enhanced, and Sweden and Finland have now applied to join. This may have drastic global consequences. Rapid transition Russia’s view was, and is, that after the collapse of the Soviet Union there was a clear understanding that NATO would not expand. This is disputed by NATO states, which say there was never a formal agreement. That may be, but for Putin what made it worse was that the expansion came at the end of a decade (when he was appointed president) in which Russia had been treated with near contempt as a basket case. Even more galling was that the economic collapse had stemmed from the rapid transition to US-style market fundamentalism. The current war would redress all of this, Putin thought, righting an historical wrong. The weakening of NATO also looked good to Beijing, almost certainly influencing the fulsome support for Russia of the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, just before the war. So, while Putin may have started with a ‘special military operation’—even the term ‘war’ being taboo—he now presents the Ukraine war as a direct confrontation with NATO. That means nuclear escalation remains a risk unless and until the war is settled by negotiation, however long that might take. Abject failure If such a peace is achieved, what will it mean for a post-war NATO? Given their existing military links with the alliance, once entry is agreed by member states, Finland and Sweden’s integration to the bloc will follow in a matter of months. Then, the assumption will be that, post-war, a strengthened and confident NATO will dominate European security for the good of everyone west of Russia and Belarus. It is assumed that good times will continue to roll for the military-industrial complexes of Europe, as countries rush to grow their arsenals with the latest kit, even if the abject failure of Russia’s armed forces hardly suggests that bigger budgets are needed.

### 1AR – Impact – NATO Bad – Internal Problems

#### Nato is a dead weight when it comes to immediate issues. Empirics proves.

Shea 21 [(Jamie, former Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges at the NATO), “NATO withdraws from Afghanistan: short-term and long-term consequences for the Western alliance” Friends of Europe; Sep 3rd 2021; <https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/nato-withdraws-from-afghanistan-short-term-and-long-term-consequences-for-the-western-alliance/> ] TDI

The first is why the intelligence failure? Both the Biden administration and NATO’s Secretary-General stressed repeatedly that they were surprised by the speed of the Taliban advance and the collapse of the Afghan state. Napoleon famously said that “it is forgivable to lose a battle but not to be taken by surprise”. Stoltenberg has insisted that NATO will conduct a ‘lessons learned’ exercise once the evacuations had halted. This will pose many searching questions for the alliance as one of its priorities over the last decade has been to enhance its strategic awareness and intelligence sharing. A whole new division has been set up at NATO Headquarters for this purpose. Both the US and NATO had considerable intelligence assets in Afghanistan. They had been there for 20 years and knew all there was to know about the government, the Afghan security forces, and the Taliban. The US had been negotiating with the Taliban in Doha for over a year. This abundance of knowledge and experience of conditions inside Afghanistan makes the intelligence failure all the more inexplicable. NATO will need to take a fresh look at its forecasting and assessment mechanisms and the ability of its civilian and military experts to challenge conventional wisdom, which tends to veer on the side of optimism, and speak truth to power.

The second immediate concern is in the area of political consultation and proper strategic planning. Back in 2019, **French President Macron proclaimed that NATO was politically “brain dead”.** This remark provoked a lot of outrage within NATO at the time, but Afghanistan shows that Macron had a point about the alliance’s ability to go beyond day-to-day crisis response and engage in robust long-term thinking and scenario planning. The allies followed the US line without serious debate, notwithstanding the likely consequences. European views, for instance a French proposal backed by the UK to set up a diplomatic protection zone inside Kabul, were never seriously considered, nor was the idea of extending the evacuation air bridge beyond 31 August.

Given **NATO’s leading role** in Afghanistan, the organization **should have managed** and coordinated evacuation operations at Kabul International Airport, but each ally seemed to be running its own purely national operation. As a result, almost empty aircraft were departing Kabul when thousands were waiting on the tarmac to be evacuated. At one stage, US troops blocked a group of Dutch citizens trying to reach the airport. With more advance and joint planning, aircraft seats could have been shared, the processing of flights and documents better coordinated, and more people evacuated before the deadline. As a result, making sure that NATO adequately consults and coordinates in a crisis, that the NATO crisis management machinery really works and that allies don’t immediately revert to national responses will be a core task of NATO’s new Strategic Concept exercise which kicks off this autumn.

Third, NATO has made a great deal of its role as a military trainer and capacity builder of local armed forces, as seen in Ukraine, Georgia, and Iraq, as well as Afghanistan, in recent years. The NATO Secretary-General has constantly trumpeted this role as one of the core pillars of the new NATO 2030 initiative. Yet, the debacle in Kabul demonstrates that throwing resources at a problem doesn’t necessarily solve it. NATO began its training mission for the Afghan security forces 12 years ago. The US alone has pumped over $170bn into this effort. The bitter result is that the US and NATO have not so much equipped and modernised the Afghan army but rather their Taliban adversaries. These are now driving around Kabul in US Humvees, sporting US uniforms and M16 rifles. They have taken over large amounts of US equipment including helicopters, aircraft, and artillery, although the US was able to dismantle some of this equipment before leaving.

#### NATO is old-fashioned and is just a powerless bureaucracy without the decision making and military of the US, involvement of NATO in pressing issues weakens the US’s ability to stop threats and run successful missions. The US would be better off making decisions unilaterally.

Logan 22’ [(Justin, the director of defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute), “NATO Is a Luxury Good the United States Doesn’t Need” CATO institute; JULY 23, 2022; <https://www.cato.org/commentary/nato-luxury-good-united-states-doesnt-need> ] TDI

Some of us might argue that lubricating U.S. operations in the greater Middle East after 9/11 was a bad thing—given that the missions themselves were mostly bad. The United States squandered $8 trillion, thousands of lives, and almost two decades of attention in Iraq and Afghanistan. Anything that made that easier should be tallied as a debit, not a credit.

**But there’s a bigger problem**. NATO isn’t about pandemic response or anti‐ piracy. It has no capabilities, no authority, and no fitness for these purposes. **NATO is an old‐ fashioned military alliance.** However big a problem migration or disinformation may be, the alliance wasn’t designed and still isn’t tailored for dealing with them.

These problems aren’t just missing from the North Atlantic Treaty; they appear only as marketing in more recent official documents, including NATO’s just‐ issued Strategic Concept. NATO is sold—and sells itself—as many things, but it is, by treaty and by the structure of its bureaucracy, a military alliance dedicated to the security of its members.

Given NATO’s origins as a military alliance aimed at deterring Soviet aggression, we should ask ourselves: With the Soviets out and the Germans down, why did the United States struggle so mightily to stay in after the Cold War? The answer is simple: **NATO is, and always has been, a vehicle for maintaining the United States as the dominant security player in Europe.** That there were sharper disagreements about this idea in the 1950s than there are today speaks volumes about the lack of debate in today’s Washington.

Even the Rand Corp. report that McInnis cites in support of the idea of “defense in depth” in Europe remarks that U.S. leaders only adopted the concept grudgingly out of fear that “U.S. allies were too weak to contain the Soviet Union on their own.” As that report observes, the four divisions Congress agreed to send to Germany in 1950 “were not intended to remain there indefinitely; instead, the U.S. troops were to be withdrawn when Western Europe had recovered sufficiently to field its own conventional deterrent.

In 2022, U.S. allies are not too weak to contain Russia on their own. They simply refuse to do so out of the well‐ founded belief that the United States will do so for them, and accordingly their people would benefit from spending their own tax dollars on domestic priorities.

The United States cannot maintain its role as the cornerstone of European security while successfully competing with a growing China forever. And the cheap‐ riding that afflicts the U.S. alliance in Europe also addles its alliances in Asia.

Panegyrics to the trans‐ Atlantic community are still in vogue in Washington because they are seen as cheap. They aren’t. Resource constraints are beginning to bite. The defense budget, already bloated at $847 billion, is not headed to $1 trillion and above anytime soon. Maintaining **U.S. domination of the European security scene is a luxury good the United States doesn’t need in 2022.** The United States fought two wars to prevent a European hegemon from emerging in the 20th century. There is no potential European hegemon on or even over the horizon at the present. For all Russia’s bluster, it’s struggling to take even part of a much smaller, poorer neighbor—let alone hold it. It’s time to take the win.

For those reasons, advocates of NATO as a permanent alliance should probably start thinking about Plan B, **not advertising the alliance as a cure‐ all for problems** including climate change, piracy, and disinformation. Europe is rich and strong enough to defend itself. But the Europeans won’t do so unless the United States stops doing it for them.

#### NATO’s voting system is outdated and dangerously slow. A quicker alternative is preferred.

Dial 22 [(Nathan, 13-year Active-Duty Air Force Officer, Combat Pilot, with a Political Science Ph.D. concentrating on NATO in the 21st Century and Master of Public Policy focusing on Political and Economic Development.), “To Protect the Pledge - NATO Should Tweak Its Consensus Decision Making Process ” Colambia ; Nov 4, 2022; <https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/online-articles/protect-pledge-nato-should-tweak-its-consensus-decision-making-process>] TDI

Although NATO’s charter never established a voting procedure, the keystone of the institution, Article 5, led to the adoption of a consensus model. As a result, policy decisions from NATO are consequential because they express the collective will of the transatlantic region’s governments. **By offering each country the option to veto any significant policy, NATO allows each ally to protect its national sovereignty.** Although each country has a veto, NATO does not require an affirmative vote because it uses an institutional norm called the silence procedure. This procedure, used throughout NATO, allows an ally to voice concern about a proposal anonymously or consent to the community’s will within a specified time. The subtle difference between a decision-making method that allows a nation to acquiesce (despite its public or private reservations) and a method that obligates a state to cast an official vote gives countries a save face feature, improving the probability of consensus and minimizing direct conflict between countries.

While sticking steadfastly to the consensus rule creates a unique level of standing internationally, many experts and critics argue **the need to reconsider and adjust the use of this decision-making tool.** In a January 2008 interview, a former Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) NATO's military leader, General James Jones, explained the critiques of NATO's consensus rule land in one of three broad buckets. First, the size of NATO creates a diverse set of interests which is often too challenging to coalesce unless the organization takes a lowest-common-denominator approach. Second, **the consensus rules restrict the agility of the alliance to make quick decisions.** Third, the number of security concerns is significantly larger today than during the Cold War.

#### NATO allies were useless in the pullout of troops from Afghanistan no evidence to why the Gulf would be any different. US is the only actor that matters.

Shea 21’ [(Jamie, former Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges at the NATO), “NATO withdraws from Afghanistan: short-term and long-term consequences for the Western alliance” Friends of Europe; Sep 3rd 2021; <https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/nato-withdraws-from-afghanistan-short-term-and-long-term-consequences-for-the-western-alliance/> ] TDI

Back in March, when NATO’s foreign and defence ministers held their first meetings with United States Secretary of State Tony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, they announced that they would follow President Biden’s decision to withdraw the international forces from Afghanistan by the end of August. In reality, **they had no other option**. ‘In together, out together’ had always been the alliance’s mantra since NATO first took over the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission from the United Nations in August 2003.

At the same time, the **NATO presence in Afghanistan had been so dependent on US** air power, logistics, medical and contractor support, and intelligence that no ally believed that they could realistically remain with a military presence in Afghanistan if the US decided on a total pull-out. Even Turkey, the ally running Kabul International Airport and the one most committed to a long-term presence and role in Afghanistan, insisted on major US financial and logistics support if it was to operate the airport on behalf of the Western diplomatic community **once the NATO troops had departed.**

Yet, it was no secret, even back in March, that many NATO allies were unhappy with Biden’s withdrawal decision. Some, such as the United Kingdom and Germany, even made their unease public. The German Bundestag had only recently agreed to extend the mandate of the German troops in Mazar-i-Sharif in northern Afghanistan into 2022. Many of the allies recognised the painfully slow progress in Afghan security and reconstruction, but they had come to accept that there was no viable alternative to staying in Afghanistan, given the persistence of the Taliban and ISIL threat and the obvious weaknesses of the Afghan government in Kabul.

At the same time, the price of staying on seemed to be tolerable. No NATO soldier had been killed for the past 18 months. The Afghan security forces were doing the lion’s share of the fighting and taking the casualties, with 70,000 deaths over the past three years, as the NATO mission transitioned to a rear training role known as Resolute Support in 2014. At 9,000 non-US and around 4,000 US troops, this ongoing presence did not make Afghanistan a contentious issue for public opinion in NATO countries. Certainly, opinion polling in the US showed that a majority would like to end the mission and supported the president’s withdrawal decision, but there was no pressure from Congress or the media for this troop withdrawal to be immediate or unconditional.

Allies were concerned that Biden’s withdrawal decision gave the Taliban little incentive to negotiate a power sharing deal with the Afghan government in Doha and every reason to believe that they could gain absolute power by winning on the battlefield. At the same time, a demoralised Afghan army would have little reason to fight and sacrifice if it felt abandoned by its international partners and sponsors. Although allies were clearly frustrated by the corruption and venality of the Afghan government and elites, they recognised that international assistance to Afghanistan over 20 years had brought many benefits to the country in terms of rising life expectancy, the emancipation of women, girls’ education, as well as many individual, political and media freedoms. Not to speak of sparing NATO countries further terrorist attacks originating from Afghan territory for 20 years.

For this reason, the ‘endless war’ slogan used by Trump and Biden struck many allies as wrong and unhelpful as it implied that there is something bad about open-ended and long-term US military commitments overseas, even at a sustainable cost. This is the principle on which NATO is based. Thus, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, without suffering a military defeat, has inevitably raised questions about the solidity of the US commitment to its international security role. Biden has contributed to this unease **by framing the US withdrawal from Afghanistan as the US turning its back** on overseas nation-building and stabilisation roles in general. Yet, failure in Afghanistan does not mean that US-led nation-building always fails, nor that nation-building and stabilisation missions are by definition never in the US national interest.

A second reason for the allies’ disquiet with the Biden administration was that once the withdrawal decision had been made, little was done to prepare for the aftermath. Afghanistan was not even discussed at the NATO summit in June. The US assumed that because the Afghan security forces were 300,000 large and equipped and trained by the Pentagon, they would be able to resist the Taliban onslaught. There was little analysis of key issues such as poor military leadership, weak command and control, inadequate logistics supply, insufficient air support and medical evacuation, poor motivation and corruption. These factors would induce the Afghan troops to desert rather than fight, as this was an army that was designed to operate only in conjunction with the NATO international forces.

### 1AR – Impact – NATO bad – China & Russia

#### NATO expansion leads to war with China.

Hedges ’22 [Chris; former Middle East bureau chief of the New York Times, a Pulitzer Prize winner and a columnist at ScheerPost; 2023b, May 1). The giant sucking sound of war and US militarism. Common Dreams. <https://www.commondreams.org/opinion/us-militarism-is-like-a-vampire>] TDI

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the arms industry that depends on it for billions in profits, has become the most aggressive and dangerous military alliance on the planet. Created in 1949 to thwart Soviet expansion into Eastern and Central Europe, it has evolved into a global war machine in Europe, the Middle East, Latin America, Africa and Asia.

NATO expanded its footprint, violating promises to Moscow, once the Cold War ended, to incorporate 14 countries in Eastern and Central Europe into the alliance. It will soon add Finland and Sweden. It bombed Bosnia, Serbia and Kosovo. It launched wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Libya, resulting in close to a million deaths and some 38 million people driven from their homes. It is building a military footprint in Africa and Asia. It invited Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea, the so-called "Asia Pacific Four," to its recent summit in Madrid at the end of June. It has expanded its reach into the Southern Hemisphere, signing a military training partnership agreement with Colombia, in December 2021. It has backed Turkey, with NATO's second largest military, which has illegally invaded and occupied parts of Syria as well as Iraq. Turkish-backed militias are engaged in the ethnic cleansing of Syrian Kurds and other inhabitants of north and east Syria. The Turkish military has been accused of war crimes — including multiple airstrikes against a refugee camp and chemical weapons use — in northern Iraq. In exchange for President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's permission for Finland and Sweden to join the alliance, the two Nordic countries have agreed to expand their domestic terror laws making it easier to crack down on Kurdish and other activists, lift their restrictions on selling arms to Turkey and deny support to the Kurdish-led movement for democratic autonomy in Syria.

The Four Horsemen of the 21st century: War, capitalism, fascism and mass death

It is quite a record for a military alliance that with the collapse of the Soviet Union was rendered obsolete and should have been dismantled. NATO and the militarists had no intention of embracing the "peace dividend," fostering a world based on diplomacy, a respect of spheres of influence and mutual cooperation. It was determined to stay in business. Its business is war. That meant expanding its war machine far beyond the border of Europe and engaging in ceaseless antagonism toward China and Russia.

NATO sees the future, as detailed in its "NATO 2030: Unified for a New Era," as a battle for hegemony with rival states, especially China, and calls for the preparation of prolonged global conflict.

"China has an increasingly global strategic agenda, supported by its economic and military heft," the NATO 2030 initiative warned. "It has proven its willingness to use force against its neighbors, as well as economic coercion and intimidatory diplomacy well beyond the Indo-Pacific region. Over the coming decade, China will likely also challenge NATO's ability to build collective resilience, safeguard critical infrastructure, address new and emerging technologies such as 5G and protect sensitive sectors of the economy including supply chains. Longer term, China is increasingly likely to project military power globally, including potentially in the Euro-Atlantic area."

U.S. and NATO antagonism have turned Russia — rich in natural resources — and China — a manufacturing and tech behemoth — into close allies. That was a potentially disastrous error.

The alliance has spurned the Cold War strategy that made sure Washington was closer to Moscow and Beijing than Moscow and Beijing were to each other. U.S. and NATO antagonism have turned Russia and China into close allies. Russia, rich in natural resources, including energy, minerals and grains, and China, a manufacturing and technological behemoth, are a potent combination. NATO no longer distinguishes between the two, announcing in its most recent mission statement that the "deepening strategic partnership" between Russian and China has resulted in "mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order that run counter to our values and interests."

On July 6, Christopher Wray, director of the FBI, and Ken McCallum, director general of Britain's MI5, held a joint news conference in London to announce that China was the "biggest long-term threat to our economic and national security." They accused China, like Russia, of interfering in U.S. and U.K. elections. Wray warned the business leaders they addressed that the Chinese government was "set on stealing your technology, whatever it is that makes your industry tick, and using it to undercut your business and dominate your market."

This inflammatory rhetoric presages an ominous future.

One cannot talk about war without talking about markets. The political and social turmoil in the U.S., coupled with its diminishing economic power, has led it to embrace NATO and its war machine as the antidote to its decline.

Washington and its European allies are terrified of China's trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) meant to connect an economic bloc of roughly 70 nations outside U.S. control. The initiative includes the construction of rail lines, roads and gas pipelines that will be integrated with Russia. Beijing is expected to commit $1.3 trillion to the BRI by 2027. China, which is on track to become the world's largest economy within a decade, has organized the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the world's largest trade pact of 15 East Asian and Pacific nations representing 30 percent of global trade. It already accounts for 28.7 percent of the Global Manufacturing Output, nearly double the 16.8 percent of the U.S.

China's rate of growth last year was an impressive 8.1 percent, although slowing to around 5 percent this year. By contrast, the U.S. growth rate in 2021 was 5.7 percent — its highest since 1984 — but is predicted to fall below 1 percent this year, by the New York Federal Reserve.

If China, Russia, Iran, India and other nations free themselves from the tyranny of the U.S. dollar as the world's reserve currency and the international Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), a messaging network financial institutions use to send and receive information such as money transfer instructions, it will trigger a dramatic decline in the value of the dollar and a financial collapse in the U.S. The huge military expenditures, which have driven the U.S. debt to $30 trillion, $6 trillion more than the entire U.S. GDP, will become untenable. Servicing this debt costs $300 billion a year. We spent more on the military in 2021 — $801 billion, which amounted to 38 percent of total world expenditure on the military — than the next nine countries, including China and Russia, combined. The loss of the dollar as the world's reserve currency will force the U.S. to slash spending, shutter many of its 800 military bases overseas and cope with the inevitable social and political upheavals triggered by economic collapse. It is darkly ironic that NATO has accelerated this possibility.

:

Russia, in the eyes of NATO and U.S. strategists, is the appetizer. Its military, NATO hopes, will get bogged down and degraded in Ukraine. Sanctions and diplomatic isolation, the plan goes, will thrust Vladimir Putin from power. A client regime that will do U.S. bidding will be installed in Moscow.

NATO has provided more than $8 billion in military aid to Ukraine, while the U.S. has committed nearly $54 billion in military and humanitarian assistance to the country.

China, however, is the main course. Unable to compete economically, the U.S. and NATO have turned to the blunt instrument of war to cripple their global competitor.

The provocation of China replicates the NATO baiting of Russia.

NATO expansion and the 2014 U.S.-backed coup in Kyiv led Russia to first occupy Crimea, in eastern Ukraine, with its large ethnic Russian population, and then to invade all of Ukraine to thwart the country's efforts to join NATO.

The same dance of death is being played with China over Taiwan, which China considers part of Chinese territory, and with NATO expansion in the Asia Pacific. China flies warplanes into Taiwan's air defense zone and the U.S. sends naval ships through the Taiwan Strait which connects the South and East China seas. Secretary of State Antony Blinken in May called China the most serious long-term challenge to the international order, citing its claims to Taiwan and efforts to dominate the South China Sea. Taiwan's president, in a Zelenskyy-like publicity stunt, recently posed with an anti-tank rocket launcher in a government handout photo.

#### NATO expansion leads to war with Russia

Doug Bandow 04-04-22 [Senior fellow at the Cato Institute, The Cato Institute, “Russia’s Aggressive War Illustrates Importance of US Foreign Policy: Ukrainians Are Latest Victims,” https://www.cato.org/commentary/russias-aggressive-war-illustrates-importance-us-foreign-policy-ukrainians-are-latest//ZW]

Russia’s attack on Ukraine turns uglier by the day. Moscow’s forces have compounded aggression with attacks on civilians, and apparently personal atrocities as well, conduct which will make an eventual peace settlement, as well as reintegration of Russia into the international system, much more difficult. Vladimir Putin and his ruling coterie are responsible for the unjustified and illegal invasion of Ukraine. Western policy toward Moscow since the Soviet collapse was foolish, even reckless, but that in no way justified the Russian attack. The Putin regime is responsible, and its crime will prove disastrous for the Russian as well as Ukrainian people. Yet blame for the tragedy now befalling Ukraine — thousands of dead, millions of refugees, major cities bombarded, economy disrupted, society ravaged — is shared by the U.S. Washington again has demonstrated that its policies matter to the world. Usually in a horrifically negative way. As has been oft [detailed in recent days](https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/we-poked-the-bear/), the U.S. and European states blithely ignored multiple assurances made to both the Soviet Union and Russia that NATO would not be expanded up to their borders. The allies also demonstrated their willingness to ignore Moscow’s expressed security interests with the coercive dismemberment of Serbia, “color revolutions” in Tbilisi and Kyiv, and especially support for the 2014 street putsch against Ukraine’s elected, Russo‐​friendly president. Whether such actions should have bothered Moscow isn’t important. They did, and perceptions are what matter. In this case, perception was reality. Indeed, Washington would never have accepted equivalent behavior by Russia in the Western hemisphere — marching the Warsaw Pact or Collective Security Treaty Organization up to America’s borders, backing a coup in Mexico City or Ontario, and inviting the new government to join the military alliance. The response in Washington would have been explosive hysteria followed by a tsunami of demands and threats. There would have been no sweet talk about the right of other nations to decide their own destinies. True, this might not be the only factor influencing Putin’s decision on war. He has articulated strong, though distorted, views of Ukrainian nationhood and Kyiv’s proper relations to Russia. However, security concerns have always loomed largest. He and other officials criticized NATO expansion early, when the alliance began its move eastward. Most famously, he raised the issue in his talk to the 2007 Munich Security Conference. His position reflected Russia’s perspective but was serious both in substance and delivery. [Putin said](https://russialist.org/transcript-putin-speech-and-the-following-discussion-at-the-munich-conference-on-security-policy/) the U.S. had “overstepped its national borders in every way,” that its “almost uncontained hyper use of force” was “plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts.” This was after America’s endless war in Afghanistan and disastrous invasion of Iraq; Libya, Syria, and Yemen were yet to come. He also observed that “NATO has put its frontline forces on our borders, and we…do not react to these actions at all.” He continued: “I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernization of the alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact? Where are those declarations today? No one even remembers them. But I will allow myself to remind this audience what was said. I would like to quote the speech of NATO General Secretary Mr. Woerner in Brussels on 17 May 1990. He said at the time that: ‘the fact that we are ready not to place a NATO army outside of German territory gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantee.’ Where are these guarantees?” If allied behavior was not a sufficient cause for Moscow’s invasion, it certainly was a necessary cause. Putin might believe Ukraine should be part of Russia, but for the last 22 years did not attempt to conquer the country. His more limited attacks in 2014 were triggered by the Western‐​backed ouster of a friendly government. Whatever Putin’s view of reconstituting the Soviet Union, after two decades all he has managed to do is retake Crimea and extend Russian influence over the Donbass, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. A repeat of Adolf Hitler he certainly is not. Again, this does not excuse Moscow’s latest conduct, which is grotesque, criminal, and immoral. However, it offers a terrible reminder that U.S. intervention has consequences. Consider Iran. Tehran is a repressive dictatorship and plays a malign role in the region. Fear of Iran now consumes much of the U.S. foreign policy community, which seems to imagine Tehran as an intimidating superpower and America as a threatened middling power. Response to Iran now dramatically distorts Washington’s Mideast policy. Most tragically, Washington has made Tehran the excuse for backing the mass murder of Yemeni civilians by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. However, Iran did not come by its malicious role naturally. Washington famously promoted the 1953 coup that ousted the elected government of Mohammad Mosaddegh and for a quarter century supported Iran’s shah, who created a brutal police state which was justifiably overthrown by his own people. Tragically, the new regime proved equally tyrannical, while also determined to spread Islamic revolution. The war in Yemen has consumed almost 400,000 civilian lives. Internal strife always has been common in that relatively new nation, but Saudi and Emirati intervention in what was just another internal fight expanded and intensified the conflict. Although they could continue the war without U.S. consent, they could not do so effectively without U.S. support. American companies not only provided the planes but service them today. The U.S. also provides munitions and intelligence, and in the war’s early days refueled Saudi and Emirati planes as well. This backing has been vital for the operation of the royal air forces and has contributed to many thousand Yemeni deaths. Nor is America a favored target of terrorism because of random selection or its virtuous reputation. Washington has routinely interfered in the affairs of other nations — backing dictatorships, supporting oppressive occupations, meddling in elections, and intervening militarily. A vivid example was Lebanon in 1983, in which the U.S. joined the latter’s bitter civil war. An American highlight over the last two decades has been droning, bombing, invading, and occupying other lands. Michael Scheuer, onetime CIA counter‐​terrorism analyst, cited aid to authoritarian Arab governments, support for Israeli occupation over Palestinians, Washington’s long economic and military campaign against Iraq, and U.S. military units based in Saudi Arabia as grievances. Osama bin Laden [said](https://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=215913&page=1) after 9/11: “it entered my mind that we should punish the oppressor in kind — and that we should destroy the towers in America in order that they taste some of what we tasted, and so that they be deterred from killing our women and children.” The would‐​be Times Square bomber, Faisal Shahzad, thought similarly. [His sentencing judge](https://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/times-square-bomber-faisal-shahzad-sentenced-life/story?id=11802740) asked Shahzad about his reasoning, reported ABC News: “Shahzad said the judge needed to understand his role. ‘I consider myself to be a Muslim soldier,’ he said. When [Judge Miriam] Cedarbaum asked whether he considered the people in Times Square to be innocent, he said they had elected the U.S. government. ‘Even children?’ said Cedarbaum. ‘When the drones [in Pakistan] hit, they don’t see children,’ answered Shahzad. He then said, ‘I am part of the answer to the US killing the Muslim people’.” Bad, even criminally aggressive, U.S. policies don’t justify attacks on civilians, but they help explain terrorism. For peoples and states without missiles, air wings, and carrier groups, terrorism is the most effective and perhaps only method of responding. That is, terrorism is war by other means, which is why it also has been waged in Sri Lanka (by separatist Tamils against the Sinhalese‐​dominated government), Israel (over its maltreatment of Palestinians), Spain (by Basque separatists), and many other nations, including the old empires of Russia and Austro‐​Hungary. In the latter an assassination by a Serbian terrorist triggered World War I. Perhaps the most pernicious U.S. intervention [was entering that conflict](https://spectator.org/how-woodrow-wilsons-vanity-destroyed-the-old-world/). Washington had no stake in the imperial slugfest and Woodrow Wilson’s formal justification for intervening, to defend the right of Americans to book passage on a belligerent power’s reserve cruisers carrying munitions through a war zone, was eloquent nonsense. Alas, America’s entry allowed the imposition of [the infamous Versailles Treaty Diktat](https://spectator.org/after-a-century-of-chaos-totalitarianism-and-war-versailles-treaty-still-haunts-the-world/), which became one of the grievances that aided Adolf Hitler’s rise to power. Whatever the details of the compromise peace that otherwise likely would have resulted, it could hardly have yielded a worse result than World War II. Now the Russo‐​Ukraine war adds another example to Uncle Sam’s history of foreign policy malpractice. The conflict is not strictly America’s fault, since Moscow made an independent decision to attack its neighbor. For that, the Putin government bears responsibility. However, the U.S. and its European allies set the stage for the war, engaging in behavior that clearly yet needlessly antagonized Russia. For contributing to the horror now engulfing Ukraine, Washington should be held responsible and its officials held accountable. Otherwise more people will keep dying because of Uncle Sam’s foolish hubris.

#### NATO militarism threatening global peace and fueling conflicts, not Russia.

Swanson 19 [Swanson, D. (2019, January 18). Top 10 reasons not to love NATO - CounterPunch.org. CounterPunch.org. <https://www.counterpunch.org/2019/01/18/top-10-reasons-not-to-love-nato/>] TDI

**1. NATO is not a war-legalizing body, quite the opposite.** NATO, like the United Nations, is an international institution that has something or other to do with war, but transferring the UN’s claimed authority to legalize a war to NATO has no support whatsoever in reality. The crime of attacking another nation maintains an absolutely unaltered legal status whether or not NATO is involved. Yet NATO is used within the U.S. and by other NATO members as cover to wage wars under the pretense that they are somehow more legal or acceptable. This misconception is not the only way in which NATO works against the rule of law. Placing a primarily-U.S. war under the banner of NATO also helps to prevent Congressional oversight of that war. Placing nuclear weapons in “non-nuclear” nations, in violation of the Nonproliferation Treaty, is also excused with the claim that the nations are NATO members (so what?). And NATO, of course, assigns nations the responsibility to go to war if other nations go to war — a responsibility that requires them to be prepared for war, with all the [damage](https://worldbeyondwar.org/) such preparation does. **2. NATO is not a defensive institution.** According to the New York Times, NATO has “deterred Soviet and Russian aggression for 70 years.” This is an article of faith, based on the unsubstantiated belief that Soviet and Russian aggression toward NATO members has existed for 70 years and that NATO has deterred it rather than provoked it. In violation of a [promise](https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early) made, NATO has expanded eastward, right up to the border of Russia, and installed missiles there. Russia has not done the reverse. The Soviet Union has, of course, ended. NATO has waged aggressive wars far from the North Atlantic, bombing Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Libya. NATO has added a partnership with Colombia, abandoning all pretense of its purpose being in the North Atlantic. No NATO member has been attacked or credibly threatened with attack, apart from small-scale non-state blowback from NATO’s wars of aggression. **3. Trump is not trying to destroy NATO.** Donald Trump, as a candidate and as U.S. President, has wondered aloud and even promised all kinds of things and, in many cases, the exact opposite as well. When it comes to actions, Trump has not taken any actions to limit or end or withdraw from NATO. He has demanded that NATO members buy more weapons, which is of course a horrible idea. Even in the realm of rhetoric, when European officials have discussed creating a European military, independent of the United States, Trump has replied by demanding that they instead support NATO. **4. If Trump were trying to destroy NATO, that would tell us nothing about NATO.** Trump has claimed to want to destroy lots of things, good and bad. Should I support NAFTA or corporate media or the Cold War or the F35 or anything at all, simply because some negative comment about it escapes Trump’s mouth? Should I cheer for every abuse ever committed by the CIA or the FBI because they investigate Trump? Should I long for hostility between nuclear-armed governments because Democrats claim Trump is a Russian agent? When Trump defies Russia to expand NATO, or to withdraw from a disarmament treaty or from an agreement with Iran, or to ship weapons to Ukraine, or to try to block Russian energy deals in Europe, or to oppose Russian initiatives on banning cyber-war or weapons in space, should I cheer for such consistent defiance of Trump’s Russian master, and do so simply because Russia is, so implausibly, his so-inept master? Or should I form my own opinion of things, including of NATO? **5. Trump is not working for, and was not elected by, Russia.**According to the New York Times, “Russia’s meddling in American elections and its efforts to prevent former satellite states from joining the alliance have aimed to weaken what it views as an enemy next door, the American officials said.” But are anonymous “American officials” really needed to acquire Russia’s openly expressed opinion that NATO is a threatening military alliance that has moved weapons and troops to states on Russia’s border? And has anyone produced the slightest documentation of the Russian government’s aims in an activity it has never admitted to, namely “meddling in American elections,” — an activity the United States has of course openly admitted to in regard to Russian elections? We have yet to see any evidence that Russia stole or otherwise acquired any of the Democratic Party emails that documented that party’s rigging of its primary elections in favor of Clinton over Sanders, or even any claim that the tiny amount of weird Facebook ads purchased by Russians could possibly have influenced the outcome of anything. Supposedly Trump is even serving Russia by demanding that Turkey not attack Kurds. But is using non-military means to discourage Turkish war-making necessarily the worst thing? Would it be if your favorite party or politician did it? If Trump encouraged a Turkish war, would that also be a bad thing because Trump did it, or would it be a bad thing for substantive reasons? **6. If Trump were elected by and working for Russia, that would tell us nothing about NATO.** Imagine if Boris Yeltsin were indebted to the United States and ended the Soviet Union. Would that tell us whether ending the Soviet Union was a good thing, or whether the Soviet Union was obsolete for serious reasons? If Trump were a Russian pawn and began reversing all of his policies on Russia to match that status, including restoring his support for the INF Treaty and engaging in major disarmament negotiations, and we ended up with a world of dramatically reduced military spending and nuclear armaments, with the possibility of all dying in a nuclear apocalypse significantly lowered, would that too simply be a bad thing because Trump? **7. Russia is not a military threat to the world.** That Russia would cheer NATO’s demise tells us nothing about whether we should cheer too. Numerous individuals and entities who indisputably helped to put Trump in the White House would dramatically oppose and others support NATO’s demise. We can’t go by their opinions either, since they don’t all agree. We really are obliged to think for ourselves. Russia is a heavily armed militarized nation that commits the crime of war not infrequently. Russia is a top weapons supplier to the world. All of that should be denounced for what it is, not because of who Russia is or who Trump is. But Russia spends a tiny fraction of what the United States does on militarism. Russia has been reducing its military spending each year, while the United States has been increasing its military spending. U.S. annual increases have sometimes exceeded Russia’s entire military budget. The United States has bombed nine nations in the past year, Russia one. The United States has troops in 175 nations, Russia in 3. Gallup and Pew [find](http://davidswanson.org/warlist/) populations around the world viewing the United States, not Russia, as the top threat to peace in the world. Russia has asked to join NATO and the EU and been [rejected](http://davidswanson.org/russia-is-our-friend/), NATO members placing more value on Russia as an enemy. Anonymous U.S. military officials [describe](http://davidswanson.org/united-states-wants-war-with-russia/) the current cold war as driven by weapons profits. Those profits are massive, and NATO now accounts for about three-quarters of military spending and weapons dealing on the globe.

#### Military action without NATO consultation creates tensions in the alliance – Afghan proves

Seligman 21 [(Lara, s an award-winning journalist who covers the Pentagon for POLITICO. Her reporting on the military and the defense industry has taken her around the world, from the Middle East to Mongolia to the backseat of an Air Force Thunderbird.) “Biden heads to NATO amid friction over Afghanistan withdrawal” Politico, 6/13/21. <https://www.politico.com/news/2021/06/13/biden-nato-afghanistan-withdrawal-493580>] TDI

NATO allies have made no secret of their frustration with President Joe Biden’s decision to withdraw forces from Afghanistan unconditionally by Sept. 11. Now as he arrives in Brussels this week for his first NATO summit as president, Biden must confront allies’ lingering resentment over the drawdown and tackle the thorny issues involved in securing the country’s future.

European officials say they are frustrated by what they saw as the Biden administration’s failure to sufficiently consult with allies ahead of the announcement, and the decision to move from a conditions-based withdrawal to one based on the calendar. U.K. Secretary of State for Defense Ben Wallace echoed those sentiments last month, telling parliament that he “regrets” the decision to withdraw forces without setting conditions on the Taliban.

That disappointment will likely color the discussions this week in Brussels, where officials must begin to tackle a series of unanswered questions about the future of Afghanistan — from securing critical infrastructure such as embassies and aircraft to ensuring that the country does not once again become a haven for terrorists.

“It’s not a surprise that you’ve seen some countries express, pretty straightforwardly, their dissatisfaction with the way things were done,” said one European official, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive topic. “This is another example of one of the issues where within NATO, we should be more substantially discussing and consulting with one another before making decisions.”

Left with little choice but to go along with the withdrawal, NATO allies have since gotten on board, European officials say. The last Western troops will likely leave Afghanistan weeks before the Sept. 11 deadline, possibly as soon as July; as of Tuesday, the U.S. withdrawal was more than 50 percent complete, according to U.S. Central Command. As of 2021, NATO countries had nearly 10,000 troops in Afghanistan, from countries including Germany, the U.K., Turkey, Georgia, Romania and Italy.

A senior Biden administration official pushed back on the characterization that NATO was out of the loop, noting that in early February, U.S. officials set up a “listening session” with allies “to hear their perspectives and priorities,” which was “widely appreciated by allies.”

“This set the stage for an improved tempo of consultation with NATO, during which several scenarios and possible outcomes were discussed,” the official said. The official declined to say whether the proposal to move to a time-based withdrawal was discussed.

### 1AR – Definitions

#### “Resolved” doesn’t require certainty

Webster’s 9 – Merriam Webster 2009

(http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolved)

# Main Entry: 1re·solve # Pronunciation: \ri-ˈzälv, -ˈzȯlv also -ˈzäv or -ˈzȯv\ # Function: verb # Inflected Form(s): re·solved; re·solv·ing 1 : to become separated into component parts; also : to become reduced by dissolving or analysis 2 : to form a resolution : determine 3 : consult, deliberate

#### Resolved doesn’t require immediacy

PTE 9 – Online Plain Text English Dictionary 2009

(http://www.onelook.com/?other=web1913&w=Resolve)

Resolve: “To form a purpose; to make a decision; especially, to determine after reflection; as, to resolve on a better course of life.”

#### “Ought” does not imply certainty or immediacy

Vranas ’18 [Peter B. M., 10-1-2018. Professor (MIT, Sc.D. 1992; Michigan, Ph.D. 2001). Professor Vranas’s research in philosophical logic focuses on imperative and deontic logic. He is also currently working on moral dilemmas, time travel, and the implications of situationist psychology for ethics. His recent publications include “‘Ought’ implies ‘can’ but does not imply ‘must’: An asymmetry between becoming infeasible and becoming overridden” The Philosophical Review (2018), “I ought, therefore I can obey” Philosophers’ Imprint (2018), “Informative aboutness” Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2017), and “New foundations for imperative logic III: A general definition of argument validity” Synthese (2016). “Ought” Implies “Can” but Does Not Imply “Must”: An Asymmetry between Becoming Infeasible and Becoming Overridden. https://read.dukeupress.edu/the-philosophical-review/article/127/4/487/136099/Ought-Implies-Can-but-Does-Not-Imply-Must-An] TDI

There is an apparent—and, to my knowledge, unnoticed—tension between two central ideas in moral philosophy. One of these ideas is that people never have obligations that they cannot obey; in other words, “ought” implies “can”. The other idea is that some obligations are merely pro tanto, not all-things-considered; in other words, “ought” (understood as corresponding to pro tanto obligations)1 does not imply “must” (understood as corresponding to all-things-considered obligations). Taken together, these two ideas yield the following slogan: “ought” implies “can” but does not imply “must”.2 To see the apparent tension related to this slogan, consider first the following way of explaining the pro tanto/all-things-considered distinction:

You have a job at a military base. You have the evening off today, and you have promised to meet your sister at a restaurant for dinner at 7 p.m. At 4 p.m., as you are preparing to go home, your commanding officer unexpectedly orders you to stay in the base until tomorrow to work on an urgent and top-secret project. You are now prevented from communicating with the outside world, so you have no way to inform your sister if you stay in the base. You can still sneak out of the base if you want, but then you might be court-martialed. Now you have two incompatible obligations: an obligation to meet your sister, and an obligation to stay in the base. Both obligations are pro tanto (or, in an older terminology, prima facie),3 but your weaker obligation—namely, to meet your sister—is merely pro tanto. Your all-things-considered obligation is your stronger obligation—namely, to stay in the base.

#### Substantial is not certain

**Wollman ’93** (Circuit Judge, US Court of Appeals – 8th Circuit, Kansas City Power & Light Company, a Missouri corporation, Appellee, v. Ford Motor Credit Company, a Delaware corporation; McDonnell Douglas Finance Corporation, a Delaware corporation; HEI Investment Corp., a Hawaii corporation, Appellants, 995 F.2d 1422; 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 13755,) TDI

Instruction No. 10 was not given in isolation, however. The district court's instructions also contained a definition of "substantial." Instruction No. 11 defined "substantial" as meaning "true, real or likely to materialize" and as not meaning "imaginary or unlikely to materialize." This instruction properly limited the potential bases for the jury's decision, which is the essential function of jury instructions. When combined with the contract and the verdict-directing instructions, [\*1432] which tracked the operative language of the contract, Instruction No. 11 required the jury to find that KCPL had determined a real risk, not some imaginary hypothetical risk premised solely on a reduction in the DRD. Because the contract provided only one means of creating a risk of making an indemnity payment--a demand notice from an Investor--the jury's discretion was properly channelled into deciding whether KCPL had sufficiently studied and honestly considered the likelihood of receiving such a demand notice. That determination is all that the contract required.