# K Supplements 7/22 – Pat

## AFRICOM – 1AR – Kant

### 1AR – A2 Kant – L/T

#### Deontology requires rejection of African colonialism.

George ’21 [(Kizito Michael George, Department of Religious Studies and Philosophy, Kyambogo University.) “Kant’s deontology as a critique of Africa’s ideological ambiguity”, Estudos Kantianos, Marília. 2021. <https://philarchive.org/archive/GEOKDA>] pfox TDI

Kant therefore inspires African moral philosophers to boldly challenge the scientific pretexts of neo-liberalism on the African continent. Africans urgently need to articulate and defend the ethics of *obuntu-bulamu* as an endogenous moral philosophy that ought to jealously prioritise the inherent dignity of African people in the face of instrumental development interventions and policies. African philosophers need to reject the imperialism espoused by neo-liberalism. It must be noted although Africans were able to avert overt colonialism by becoming independent states, colonialism was re-invented through the imposition of neo-liberal development policies from International Financial Institutions. Kant’s deontology cannot be reconciled with moral evils associated with colonialism and this explains his condemnation of European conduct in the colonies in his magna opera, Toward Perpetual Peace (1795) and Metaphysics of Morals (1797).

According to Kleingeld (2014: 53, 54):

In the Doctrine of Right, Kant defines a ‘colony’ in a way that makes the colonial relation necessarily unjust. He describes a colony as a people under the imperial rule of a so-called ‘mother’ state and condemns the resulting relationship as a violation of right…. In the light of the rest of the doctrine of right of the Metaphysics of Morals, it is easy to understand why Kant would regard colonial status as objectionable. Only a republican state—that is, a political system of collective self-legislation by the citizens through their representatives, with the executive being subject to this law—is fully in accord with the innate human right to freedom. Being subject to the rule of another state—the defining feature of colonial status—is incompatible with his ideal of political autonomy. As Kant put it in ‘On the Common Saying’, a paternalistic government is the ‘greatest conceivable despotism’.

## AFRICOM – 1AR – Assurances

### 1AR – A2 Prolif ! – K

#### Fears of nuclear proliferation depicts countries as uncivilized, irrational, and immature which legitimates colonial power relations.

Mathur ’20 [Dr. Ritu; Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Texas. Her research and teaching interests are in the field of International Relations with a specialization in Security Studies. July 11, 2020; “The West and the Rest: A Civilizational Mantra”; *Civilizational Discourses in Weapons Control*, Chapter 2] TDI

This anger circulates as ‘the image of proliferation’ is constructed among ‘(particularly western) states and is invoked as a threat to international order and stability to further “strengthen controls on the spread of technology related to the research for or production” of weapons.’183 The metaphor of proliferation signifies ‘the “other”’ and is ‘grounded in biology.’184 Practices of proliferation entail that the supplier states ‘police the circulation of technology’ and the recipients accept these policing measures at the risk of being identified as ‘immature,’ ‘backward,’ ‘nuclear outlaw’ or ‘rogue state’ that is ‘unwilling to conform to the rules of civilized behaviour.’185 An outlaw, outlier or a rogue is deemed to be ‘hostile or seemingly hostile Third World states with large military forces and nascent Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) capabilities’ that exists outside ‘a larger, settled community’ or civilization ‘whose rules the outlaws refuse to follow.’186 It is argued that the West could only be persuaded to accept ‘legal proscriptions’ against these nuclear weapons based on the dreaded possibility that these weapons could be used as ‘powerful force multipliers’ by ‘poor and weak countries.’187

Security Culture and Decorative Savages

The Western powers completely failed to empathize with ‘multiple valences of atomic energy’ that had found resonance in postcolonial societies.188 The US, enamored with its exceptional status within the Western civilization as a responsible superpower, sought to contain the threat of communism and waged wars in Korea and Vietnam ‘to bring the light of civilization to Asia.’189 The new superpower was so preoccupied with building its own nuclear arsenal that it was unthinkable for it to envisage that any of the new sovereign postcolonial states ‘would be in a position to develop an independent atomic energy project — military or civil — for many decades to come.’190 Gusterson observes, ‘[C]olonial overtones’ in the ‘collective common sense’ of the West represented especially by the ‘US defense intellectuals, politicians and pundits — leaders of opinions on nuclear weapons.’191 This collective consciousness failed to take note that atomic energy signified ‘a source of cheap electrical energy to developmentalists, a means of overcoming neo-colonial domination to nationalists, a sign of masculinity and intellectual prowess to scientists, a resource for state power to socialists, and an instrument of foreign policy to realists and militarists.’192

The West persisted in its outlook of considering them as mere suppliers of raw materials such as thorium, monazite, beryllium and manganese. The efforts by these postcolonial countries to use the sale of these materials in exchange for expertise that could directly benefit their atomic energy programs were strongly resisted by the West. The acquisition of ‘modern technology’ and especially nuclear technology by the postcolonial states perturbed the West, which then resorted to claims that these technologies were ‘always marked with the trace of the foreign.’193 They questioned the ‘purely national origins of atomic energy’ in the postcolonial states that had benefitted from the detailed plant designs, drawings and advice that they had received from the West. These dangerous attempts by the West to represent the postcolonial states as ‘decorative savages’ depict how the West denounces the performative modernity of the other.194

The ‘decorative savages’ according to the West are capable of nothing more than a crude attempt at mimicry, a ‘savage aping’ at a superficial level of technological prowess that is ‘in fact in the service of deeper levels of “primitive”, “tribal,” or magical thinking.’195 Any Third World country’s desire to acquire nuclear weapons was condemned as an act of national chauvinism. It was further subject to ridicule and caricature. Said observes,

As momentous, generally important issues face the world — issues involving nuclear destruction… popular caricatures of the Orient are exploited by politicians whose source of ideological supply is not only the half-literate technocrat but the superliterate Orientalist.196

Said suggests that this period was ripe to produce ‘military-nationalsecurity possibilities of an alliance, say, between a specialist in “national character analysis” and an expert in Islamic institutions… for expediency’s sake if for nothing else.’197 Questions were raised, ‘how to reach a less culture-blind study of international relations (?)’ and ‘how to approach and represent otherness (?)’198 It was now claimed that the neglect of culture in international security studies needed to be remedied as ‘strategic culture’ gives meaning to ‘objective’ variables such as technology.199 It was further reinforced that ‘if strategic culture changes, it does so slowly, lagging behind changes in “objective” conditions.’200

The extremely technocratic and specialized discourse on ‘strategic analysis’ based on ‘extreme forms of certain generalizations’ is now to be complemented with an understanding of ‘security culture.’201 Security culture is to be understood as a ‘sub-set of political, diplomatic and strategic/military culture.’202 This simple yet carefully crafted scholarly maneuver facilitated‘[t]he return of culture and identity in IR theory,’ and scholars debated how to navigate this ‘cultural turn in IR’ with the avowed objective of redressing ‘some of the weaknesses inherent in the dominant realist literature.’203 A consensus definition of security culture in the context of weapons control was now proposed in the following terms:

Culture, as it refers to non-proliferation, arms control, disarmament and security-building issues, consists of those enduring and widely-shared beliefs, traditions, attitudes, and symbols that inform the ways in which a state’s/society’s interests and values with respect to security, stability and peace are perceived, articulated and advanced by political actors and elites.204

To study practices constitutive of ‘identity’ and ‘culture,’ scholars now promised to provide ‘coherent’ and ‘sensible’ accounts of ‘security culture’ to emphasize how ‘security culture can be expected to exercise a powerful influence on a state’s nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament policies and practices.’205 They sought to explore the differences in ‘language’ and ‘thought’ between different national security cultures to gauge their ‘orientations’ toward violence and gauge prospects for ‘development of the arms control and security-building dialogue’ in an effort to ameliorate ‘us-them’ differences.206

But Johnson admits there is ‘a great deal of confusion over what it is that strategic culture is supposed to explain, how it is supposed to explain, and how much it does explain.’207 Krause concurs to argue that culture is a ‘residual phenomena that do not seem at first glance to have a “rational” explanation.’208 This problem is compounded as a narrow focus on similarities among various actors may follow from a universalistic standpoint but be embedded in Eurocentric ethnocentrism.209 In practices of strategic culture there is great difficulty in ‘exporting or translating the fundamental concepts of the Western nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament experience to regional contexts.’210 By focusing excessively on the differences between cultures one produces a ‘narrow focus on how the Other is fundamentally different from (the perception of) oneself.’211 Thus, Walker cautions against the ‘seductive rhetoric’ of discourses that try to display their cultural ‘sensitivity to other civilizations.’212 Valbjorn insistson a ‘blind/blinded stalemate’ that makes scholars within the field of international relations (IR)

blind to the diversity of forms of international relations as well as blind to IR’s own peculiar cultural standpoint — the alternatives suggested have in different ways often replaced a problematic culture-blind position with approaches that in turn most of all appear as culture-blinded.213

Johnston cautions against practices of strategic analysis that seek to ‘reinforce stereotypes about strategic predispositions of other states’ and urges ‘care’ as ‘American policy attention shifts to, for instance, the Asia-Pacific region, an area where US images of the “other” have been rife with stereotyped generalizations about particular “strategic styles.”’214

Others caution against practices of revived ‘Occidentalism’ or ‘Orientalism in reverse,’ a sly strategy of redeploying ‘representations previously employed to legitimize Western imperialism’ that ‘were later on reversed and used by local groups calling for an end of Western interference by reference to an allegedly unique culture.’215 The seeds of this cultural strategy were sowed during the transition from colonial to postcolonial, independent status, when some Afro-Asian elites ‘internalized’ and ‘mimicked’ racially defined ‘civilizational’ thinking that ‘did not go beyond Western colonial thought.’216 To quote Abraham at length,

the reliance on civilizational categories for understanding global differences was not restricted to Europeans alone. Generations of local political elites in the colonies had grown up internalizing these categories and they remained potent means by which to understand the world.

This slippage should not come as a surprise. Modern Asian elites had long been steeped in the knowledge-systems of Europe; indeed, such expertise was a condition of having political voice and being taken seriously within colonial societies. Hence, that Asian elites would adopt and internalize the tacit and explicit conditions of distinction embedded in authoritative social and political institutions is to be expected. Asian articulations of their own differences worked by inverting the familiar hierarchy, but were not able to transcend it, as Gandhi among others would have hoped. This new articulation of difference did little more than relocate Asian civilization in global hierarchies, seeking to make it pre-eminent rather than subordinate; it did not go further and offer a critical appraisal of the idea of civilization. …Asian elites were not able to think outside the category of race and civilization as a way of thinking beyond colonial categories, we find Asian elites had internalized entirely the racial logics through which the world was seen and its hierarchy naturalized, a practice that would have important implications for foreign policy decision-making.217

This was foreseen by Gandhi and therefore his urgent insistence on the need for ‘the rewriting of “civilization” and its conversion from a source of domination to a means of political empowerment.’218 However, this rewriting of civilization is not an easy task.

Johnston notes the persistent dilemma faced by scholars regarding ‘how is strategic culture transmitted through time’ and ‘from what time periods should these sources be taken?’219 The problem of timelag is further explicated by understanding how particular ‘ideas long ago left within the “mother discipline” still reside within the receiving disciplines.’220 It is difficult to address these temporal questions as ‘the alleged homogeneity of a society’s strategic culture across time is problematic.’221 The problem of timelag persists and raises questions regarding continuity and interruption of strategic cultural practices. Furthermore, there is pervasive ambiguity as ‘much of the strategic culture literature does not really specify what exactly should be analyzed when looking for culturally-based ranked set of grand strategic preferences.’222 Nevertheless, studies have been pursued to investigate‘Western security culture’ and efforts made at critiquing the ‘universalizing’ cultural myths perpetuated by Western security practices that concealed ‘a diversity of culturally derived identities, aspiration and styles.’223

There are studies that bring attention to ‘unique security culture’ of particular non-Western countries and claim how often they are ‘at odds with the principles and norms underpinning Western approaches to nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament.’224 This problem is compounded by an awareness that recourse to discourses on strategic culture is constitutive of master-slave maneuvers in ‘instruction or imitation’ to ‘obscure or mask strategic choices’ and can be deployed in an effort to ‘pre-empt challenges to the status-quo.’225 It is argued that ‘the principle of cultural diversity does not necessarily ensure better understanding of the specific Other’ and such practices of strategic culture ‘appear to be about “positioning” rather than “uncovering.”’226 This carries the ‘risk of giving rise to a less internationalized than renationalized discipline,’ reinforcing the state-centric dynamic of difference and produce productive myths idealizing the past.227 This reinforces the message that the ‘most profound legacy’ with which Western leaders and promoters of nuclear arms control and disarmament agenda have to address is that of colonialism, discrimination, dependence and subordination.228

It is suggested that it would therefore be more feasible to engage in multilateral and regional practices of confidence building measures and weapons control to ‘mute’ cultural specificities and inter-civilizational rhetoric that ~~cripple~~ forums such as the Conference on Disarmament.229But any effort at addressing ‘ethnocentric standpoint’ is further ~~crippled~~ as ‘most analysts of arms control and disarmament issues are people who are steeped in the European history of arms control and security-building, and who wish to make the best use of this expertise in other regional or multilateral security building projects.’230 These studies on strategic culture often try to articulate ‘ideal types’ of strategic ‘dyads’ constituted in terms of democratic security community and those outside it.231 They seek to demonstrate to varying degrees how ‘a wide variety of disparate societies may share a similar realpolitik strategic culture.’232 Some studies try to showcase at length a hybridization of particular non-Western cultural security scripts with the ‘universalized and globally institutionalized’ security script articulated through the ‘mechanism of imperialism’ by the West.233

These diverse tactics to ameliorate ‘hegemonic monologues’ with ‘hybrid dialogues’ can ‘mute’ but do not necessarily address the dangers associated with practices of strategic culture as indicated above.234 There is an emphatic insistence ‘that cultural realpolitik is a hardy norm in international relations’ and ‘that in addition to focusing on “needs, interests and objectives”, attention should be paid to “norms, accounts and social definitions.”’235 This atmosphere of cultivated scholarly ambivalence about the significance of culture in security studies is compounded with Huntington’s infamous prediction about a ‘clash of civilization’ based on an essentialized understanding of cultural differences. It is these differences in culture of different civilizations that are considered to be the premise of failure to control horizontal nuclear weapons proliferation. An urgent intervention to mitigate this prophetic apocalypse is made by Krause,who suggests that ‘cultural factors can be used to explain the origins of and (different reactions to) chemical and nuclear weapons taboos.’236

Taboos and Norms of Civilization

There is a growing awareness of the difficulties experienced in universalizing particular norms such as ‘equality’ in nuclear arms control and disarmament negotiations.237 In the existing security studies literature on diffusion of norms there are references to a growing ‘arms control community’ of experts that can provide ‘clarification and education’ in a ‘technical’ and ‘apolitical’ manner to policymakers representing the superpowers.238 But at the same time there is an understanding that ‘complex ideas that may have strong cultural or social roots mattered, and could be shared or learned — a lesson that should not be lost on those locked in seemingly intractable confrontations in other regional contexts.’239 Thus, there is a sense of advocacy of superpower model exchanges during the Cold War that can now be deployed in attempts at socialization, in other regional contexts such as South Asia.

While there is much advocacy of nuclear weapons taboo, it is interesting to note how social constructivist scholars such as Price and Tannenwald observe and acknowledge the interplay of different ‘standards of civilization’ in the use and non-use of chemical and nuclear weapons, respectively. Tannenwald observes but does not question the significance of ‘taken-for-granted norms such as “civilization”’ in her study of the nuclear weapons taboo.She is more interested in how the emergence of a nuclear taboo has an effect on US policy and how ‘new interpretations of hegemony could give rise to a discourse that seeks to legitimize the use of nuclear weapons by the United States to enforce norms against so-called barbarians.’240 The circulation of racist arguments preceded the institutionalization of the nuclear weapons taboo in treaty texts such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). But Tannenwald does not explore the possibilities of ‘racial’ contestation of the nuclear taboo and its institutionalization in the NPT as an ‘unequal treaty’ among sovereign states at length.

There is marginalization of studying possibilities of enforcement of nuclear norms to maintain the ‘standards of civilization’ against the ‘barbarians’ and their effects. There is a need for more reflexivity to question whether by expounding norms against weapons of mass destruction this scholarship is in fact subscribing and reinforcing a particular set of civilizational practices. Their interest in the problem of weapons can be ascribed as ‘thematic,’ confined to ‘epistemological as well as ethical system which provides a framework of elements and rules for establishing relations between elements’ but does not go further in investigating the ‘problematic’ of possibilities for transformation.241 There is an element of disinterest in investigating how the emphasis on internalization of norms by the subalterns is another deliberate attempt to eliminate any consciousness of the subaltern ‘developing an insight into reduction’ and question the conditions of servility to the West.242 This is in keeping with the practices of maintaining ideological supremacy of the West vis-à-vis others in the field of arms control and disarmament. There is a failure to explicitly acknowledge that ‘racism is the parade ground where the civilized rehearse this love-hate relation’ against the savages that ‘spill out, escape the grid of the normative, and therefore conceptuality itself.’243

On the contrary, postcolonial scholars such as Abraham and Gusterson argue that the NPT’s grounding of 1964 as the dividing time-line between proliferators and non-proliferators suggests the possibility that ‘there is something altogether different about post-1964 proliferators: somehow they are seen to embody a distinct threat to the prevailing order.’244 They are conceived as a threat because of their ‘unwillingness to play by the “rules of the game.”’245 These allegations are made with scarcely any engagement or scrutiny about the ‘nuclear pasts of most states other than the pre-1964 proliferators.’246 There is, however, a degree of caution to the possibility that the ‘rhetoric of progress’ can be deployed to ‘subvert the cultures of societies’ that have experienced ‘external colonialism’ and that can encourage the growing forces of nationalism within these societies to argue for acquisition of weapons themselves, claiming the existence of an ‘external threat to legitimize and perpetuate’ their own presence.247Gusterson notes,

Although the Non-Proliferation Treaty divided the countries of the world into nuclear and nonnuclear by means of a purely temporal metric — designating only those who had tested nuclear weapons by 1970 as nuclear powers — the treaty had become the legal anchor for a global nuclear regime that is increasingly legitimated in Western public discourse in racialized terms.248

In a further attempt to explicate this observation, Gusterson suggests the deployment of ‘subtle orientalist ideologies’ by the West in an effort to essentialize the Otherness of the Third World vis-à-vis the West.249 This is facilitated by the efforts of the West to represent itself as a collective ideological front that

(1) makes the simultaneous ownership of nuclear weapons by the major powers and the absence of nuclear weapons in the Third World seem natural and reasonable while problematizing attempts by such countries as India, Pakistan, and Iraq to acquire these weapons; (2) it presents the security needs of the established nuclear powers as if they were everybody’s; (3) it effaces the continuity between Third World countries’ nuclear deprivation and other systematic patterns of deprivation in the underdeveloped world in order to inhibit a massive North-South confrontation; and (4) it legitimates the nuclear monopoly of the recognized nuclear powers.250

The struggle for legitimacy to acquire nuclear weapons is fought further on the grounds that

(1) Third World countries are too poor to afford nuclear weapons; (2) deterrence will be unstable in the Third World; (3) Third World regimes lack the technical maturity to be trusted with nuclear weapons; and (4) Third World regimes lack the political maturity to be trusted with nuclear weapons.251

In this struggle for legitimacy ‘the claim to rational decision-making is frequently used by great powers to justify the possession of nuclear weapons. Conversely, the purported lack of rationality, on the part of other states, particularly revolutionary regimes like Cuba or Iran, is routinely invoked to explain why they cannot be trusted with nuclear weapons.’252 These countries are time and again hectored by the West and complain of ‘being tired of being lectured to by American officials on the priority of Iran’s economic progress over the development of its military potential.’253

The existing literature on arms control and disarmament is replete with rhetorical polarizations that depict the West as the trustworthy and responsible actor that needs to police the rebellious and recalcitrant Third World that is not up to the task, whose science and technology is not even capable of addressing their basic population and food problems and is constantly seeking attention. All these ‘recurrent images and metaphors…pertain in some way to disorder.’ 254 The West persists with ‘a broadly paternalistic approach’ of ‘Papa knows best’ and resists the idea of ‘political maturation’ of postcolonial states.255 But these representations heighten subaltern ‘sensitivities about any restrictions that might perpetuate or increase the technological gap’ that already exists between the West and the Rest.256 These representations awaken fear of ‘atomic colonialism’ and ‘space age colonialism.’257 There is an unwillingness among the developing countries to merely ‘become a nuclear market comparable to the old-semi-colonial markets, in the sense that those countries would supply raw materials to advanced States, from which they would acquire finished industrial products.’258 The postcolonial states are cognizant of nuclear weapons as the currency of power and ‘differential standards of national security — a sort of nuclear apartheid.’259

## K – LibMil

### 1NC – Link – Humanist Ethics

#### The 1AC’s universal basis for ethics cedes the human to the racialized figure of Man – that naturalizes the sociogenic processes of colonial violence as beyond the reach of the human while policing Man’s limit at the color line.

Weheliye ‘14 [(Alexander, Northwestern University.) 2014. “Habeus Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human”.] pfox TDI

Wynter’s large-scale intellectual project, which she has been pursuing in one form or another for the last thirty years, disentangles Man from the human in order to use the space of subjects placed beyond the grasp of this domain as a vital point from which to invent hitherto unavailable genres of the human. According to this scheme in western modernity the religious conception of the self gave way to two modes of secularized being: first, the Cartesian “Rational Man,” or homo politicus, and then beginning at the end of the eighteenth century, “Man as a selected being and natural organism . . . as the universal human, ‘man as man.’” The move from a supernatural conception of world and the self ’s place within this cosmos, however, does not signal the supersession of a primitive axiomatic with an enlightened and rarefied type of the human. Rather, one genre of the human (Judeo-Christian, religious) yields to another, just as provincial, version of the human, and, although both claim universality, neither genre fully represents the multiplicity of human life forms. In the context of the secular human, black subjects, along with indigenous populations, the colonized, the insane, the poor, the disabled, and so on serve as limit cases by which Man can demarcate himself as the universal human. Thus, race, rather than representing accessory, comes to define the very essence of the modern human as “the code through which one not simply knows what human being is, but experiences being.” Accordingly, race makes its mark in the dominion of the ideological and physiological, or rather race scripts the elision of the former with the latter in the flesh.

In her latest writings, Wynter identifies homo politicus’s successor in the long road from “theodicy” to “biodicy” as the liberal “bio-economic man.” The idea of “bio-economic man” marks the assumed naturalness that positions economic inequities, white supremacy, genocide, economic exploitation, gendered subjugation, colonialism, “natural selection,” and concepts such as the free market not in the realm of divine design, as in previous religious orders of things, but beyond the reach of human intervention all the same. In both cases, this ensures that a particular humanly devised model of humanity remains isomorphic with the Homo sapiens species. Wynter’s approach differs markedly from arguments that seek to include the oppressed within the already existing strictures of liberal humanism or, conversely, abolish humanism because of its racio-colonial baggage; instead Wynter views black studies and minority discourse as liminal spaces, simultaneously ensconced in and outside the world of Man, from which to construct new objects of knowledge and launch the reinvention of the human at the juncture of the culture and biology feedback loop.

Even though the genre of the human we currently inhabit in the west is intimately tied to the somatic order of things, for Wynter, the human cannot be understood in purely biological terms, whether this applies to the history of an individual organism (ontogenesis) or the development at the level of a species (phylogeny). This is where Fanon’s important concept of sociogeny comes into play, offering Wynter an approach of thinking of the human — the “science in the social text,” to echo Spillers’s phrase — where culture and biology are not only not opposed to each other but in which their chemistry discharges mutually beneficial insights. In this scenario, a symbolic register, consisting of discourse, language, culture, and so on (sociogeny) always already accompanies the genetic dimension of human action (ontogeny), and it is only in the imbrication of these two registers that we can understand the full scope of our being-in-the-world. Fanon’s concept of sociogeny, arising from the inadequacy of traditional psychoanalytic models in the analysis of racialized colonialism, builds on Freud’s appropriation of recapitulation theory. Thus, according to Fanon, Freud breaks with the strict codes of Darwinism and social Darwinism (phylogenetic theory) in order to analyze the psyche of the modern individualized subject from an ontogenetic vantage point. While the ontogenetic technique yields, depending on your general sympathy for the now very antiquated protocols of Freudian psychoanalysis, abundant results when evaluating white subjects ensconced in the liberal nuclear family, it encounters a roadblock when transplanted to the colonial settlement, which is why “the alienation of the black man is not an individual question. Alongside phylogeny and ontogeny, there is also sociogeny. . . . Society, unlike biochemical processes, does not escape human influence. Man is what brings society into being.” Why does the colonial situation specifically necessitate a reformulation of Freud’s and Darwinism’s procedural frame of reference?

Since colonial policies and discourse are frequently grounded in racial distinctions, the colonized subject cannot experience her or his nonbeing outside the particular ideology of western Man as synonymous with human, or, as Fanon writes, “not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man.” The colonial encounter determines not just the black colonial subject’s familial structure or social and physical mobility and such, but colors his or her [their] very being as he-or-she-which-is-not-quite-human, as always already tardy in the rigged match of the survival of the fittest. Conversely, in this ontological face-off, the white colonial subject encounters herself or himself as the “fullness and genericity of being human.” However, he or she only does so in relation to the deficiency of the black subject and indigenous (Wynter, 40). To be precise, Fanon and Wynter locate racializing assemblages in the domain of being rather than the realm of epiphenomena, showing how humans create race for the benefit of some and the detriment of other humans. Yet because race is thought to rest in biology, it necessitates different analytic protocols than bare life and biopolitics, namely ones that draw on both ontogeny and sociogeny.

Whereas Fanon’s mobilization of ontogeny remains rooted in the Freudian paradigm as pertaining to the individual subject, Wynter summons the explanatory apparatus of neurobiology to elucidate how racialization, despite its origins in sociogeny, is converted to the stuff of ontogenesis; this is what Wynter refers to as “sociogenetic.” Although human life has a biochemical core defined by a species-specific adaptive reward and punishment mechanism (poison = bad and food = good) that “determines the way in which each organism will perceive, classify, and categorize the world,” it is “only through the mediation of the organism’s experience of what feels good to the organism and what feels bad to it, and thereby of what it feels like to be that organism” that a repertoire of behaviors, which ensure the continued existence of the species, develops (Wynter, 50). For the human species, because it is defined by both organic and symbolic registers, this is complicated by the way culturally specific sociogenic principles such as what is good or bad work to trigger neurochemical reward and punishment processes, in the process “institut[ing] the human subject as a culture-specific and thereby verbally defined, if physiologically implemented, mode of being and sense of self. One, therefore, whose phenomenology . . . is as objectively, constructed as its physiology” (Wynter, 54). Phenomenological perception must consequently don the extravagant drag of physiology in order to “turn theory into flesh, . . . [into] codings in the nervous system,” so as to signal the extrahuman instantiation of humanity.

Wynter’s description of the autopoiesis of the human stretches Fanon’s concept of sociogeny by grounding it in an, albeit false or artificial, physiological reality. In other words, Wynter summons neurobiology not in order to take refuge in a prelapsarian field anterior to the registers of culture and ideology, but to provide a transdisciplinary global approach to the study of human life that explains how sociogenic phenomena, particularly race, become anchored in the ontogenic flesh. Also, in contrast to treatments of racialization more squarely articulated from the disciplinary perspective of sociobiology, Wynter does not focus on the origins and adaptive evolution of race itself but rather on how sociogenic principles are anchored in the human neurochemical system, thus counteracting sociobiological explanations of race, which retrospectively project racial categories onto an evolutionary screen. That is to say, Wynter interrogates the ontogenic functioning of race — the ways it serves as a physiologically resonant nominal and conceptual pseudonym for the specific genre of the human: Man — and not its role in human phylogeny.

Consequently, racialization figures as a master code within the genre of the human represented by western Man, because its law-like operations are yoked to species-sustaining physiological mechanisms in the form of a global color line — instituted by cultural laws so as to register in human neural networks — that clearly distinguishes the good/life/fully-human from the bad/death/not-quite-human. This, in turn, authorizes the conflation of racialization with mere biological life, which, on the one hand, enables white subjects to “see” themselves as transcending racialization due to their full embodiment of this particular genre of the human while responding antipathetically to nonwhite subjects as bearers of ontological cum biological lack, and, on the other hand, in those subjects on the other side of the color line, it creates sociogenically instituted physiological reactions against their own existence and reality. Since the being of nonwhite subjects has been coded by the cultural laws in the world of Man as pure negativity, their subjectivity impresses punishment on the neurochemical reward system of all humans, or in the words of Frantz Fanon: “My body was returned to me spread-eagled, disjointed, redone, draped in mourning on this white winter’s day. The Negro is an animal, the Negro is bad, the Negro is wicked, the Negro is ugly.” Political violence plays a crucial part in the baroque techniques of modern humanity, since it simultaneously serves to create not-quite-humans in specific acts of violence and supplies the symbolic source material for racialization.

## Sovereignty Aff – 1AR – LibMil

### 1AR – Permutation

#### Tracing the world-making power of self-determination builds solidarity in the face of environmental injustice, global hierarchy, and exploitation – that requires commitment to the political and ethical principles of sovereignty.

* This is also *really* good for the AFRICOM aff tbh

Mehgji ‘21 [(Ali Meghji, Lecturer @ Cambridge). August 2021. “What can the sociology of race learn from the histories of anti-colonialism?”, Ethnicities Online First p. SAGE p. 7-13 <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1468796820963968>] TDI

Getachew’s (2019: 2) book holds that while decolonization is seen as a moment of ‘nation-building [. . .] and the formation of nation-states’, instead, we ought to see anticolonial nationalism itself as an exercise in ‘worldmaking’. In other words, Getachew recasts anticolonial nationalism itself as a transnational process, seeking an equitable remaking of the world to overcome the injustices of colonialism and neo-colonialism. Getachew’s (2019: 5) book thus signals a gestalt shift in the way that she envisages anticolonial nationalism not as ‘marking the collapse of internationalism and the closure of alternative conceptions of a world after empire’, but instead as a direct, transnational confrontation to ‘the legacies of imperial hierarchy with a demand for the radical reconstitution of the international order’.

Through focusing explicitly on Nnamdi Azikiwe, W.E.B. Du Bois, Michael Manley, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, George Padmore, and Eric Williams, Getachew focuses on three forms of anticolonial worldmaking. Firstly, Getachew explores the anticolonial demand for the right to selfdetermination. Central to Getachew’s (2019: 75) argument is that anticolonial nationalists did not simply ‘take up’ the West’s discourse of self-determination and use it to secure their own independence, but – similarly to how Gopal (2019) looks at anticolonial iterations of liberty, freedom, and justice – through an ‘anticolonial appropriation’ such nationalists radically reconceptualised the meaning of self-determination. Thus, as it was first articulated by the League of Nations, self-determination involved ‘the consent of the governed and consultation with subject people’; however, this definition still allowed for colonialism given that ‘racially backwards people’ were said to not yet be capable of self-governance (Getachew, 2019: 42). Years after the League of Nations, the United Nations (UN) Charter of 1945 again evoked ‘human rights and equality of nations [. . .] as founding principles of a new world order’ despite the continuity of colonial rule (Getachew, 2019: 71). By contrast, anticolonial radicals – through forming organisations and conferences such as the League against Imperialism, and the Pan-African Congresses – directly highlighted the hypocrisy of the Westernized definition of self-determination. For instance, Nkrumah and Padmore organised the fifth Pan-African Congress in Manchester, 1945, where the epistemic roots were planted for self-determination to be reconceptualised as a universalist issue of human rights. Through showing how colonialism itself was a violation of human rights, the work of anticolonial nationalists radically shifted the discourse of selfdetermination such that by 1960, when Nkrumah spoke to the UN as the president of Ghana, he was able to use the principle of self-determination to show how colonialism was directly against the UN’s principles, thus leading to the Article 1514 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Peoples and Countries.

Secondly, Getachew looks at anticolonial nationalist worldmaking through focusing on the formation of regional federations. As Getachew (2019: 113) shows, to such anticolonial nationalists, sovereignty granted through the right to self-determination was ‘meaningless in the context of international hierarchy and economic dependence’. This relates to Nkrumah’s critique of neo-imperialism, described as ‘the disjuncture between formal independence and de facto dependence’ (Getachew, 2019: 108), whereby nation states have ‘nominal freedom’ yet remain economically dependent on the Global North and thus vulnerable to political domination through financial control. In response to this neo-imperialism, radicals like Nkrumah and Eric Williams saw federations – such as the Union of African States or the West Indian Federation – as providing the potential for economic trade and development that did not require foreign intervention and reliance on the Global North. This is why, for instance, upon Ghana becoming a republic in 1960, Nkrumah’s nationalism also involved successfully advocating for a clause in the constitution that conferred on the parliament ‘the power to provide for the surrender of the whole or any part of the sovereignty of Ghana’ once a Union of African States was formed (Getachew, 2019: 107): national independence was thus connected to an embracing of anticolonial internationalism.

Connected to such building of federations, which ultimately failed, Getachew explores the final form of anticolonial nationalist worldmaking: the demand for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). Getachew thus shows how ‘second wave’ anticolonial nationalists, such as Michael Manley and Julius Nyerere, developed Nkrumah’s critique of neo-imperialism to show how formerly colonized nations were still vulnerable and exploited in an unequal global political economy – if not by other nations, then by private corporations. This meant that not only were the newly independent nations unequally integrated into the world economic system, but that their efforts of state building were also much more susceptible to the fluctuations of the international markets and private, corporate interests. Thus emerged the demands for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The Declaration for the Establishment of an NIEO, put to the UN in 1974, challenged the way that the UN’s General Assembly – where each member has one vote – has the power to issue legally binding international economic policy. Anticolonial nationalists, such as Nyerere, pointed out that such formal, legislative equality that was granted to formerly colonized nations was not translated into a substantive equality – as Getachew (2019: 93) summaries: ‘to say that Jamaica or Tanzania and the United States were equal members of the international order obfuscated the outsized economic dominance that the United States exercised and could deploy to compel dependent states’. Thus, Nyerere argued that an NIEO was needed such that newly independent states could have the freedom to pursue their own economic programmes, including the ability to nationalize industries under private control. To such nationalists, this NIEO was in fact a necessary prerequisite to achieve the UN’s founding principle for international order: that of sovereign equality. In other words, anticolonial radicals used the principle of national sovereignty, and economic control over one’s own nation, again as a process through which we could achieve an anti-imperial world order.

At the heart of Getachew’s (2019: 2) book, therefore, is the principle that ‘decolonization was a project of reordering the world that sought to create a domination free and egalitarian international order’. Anticolonial nationalism, read through this lens, despite evoking principles of self-determination and national sovereignty, was always concerned with the grander transnational project of remaking the world in an equitable fashion.

Stretching the sociology of race across time and space

While my review of these three books’ arguments is fairly brief, I hope it is already apparent that despite making discrete arguments and contributions, they each share some fundamental similarities. Throughout the books, we see recurrent figures mentioned – from Du Bois, Padmore and Nkrumah, through to Gandhi, Churchill, and Woodrow Wilson – as well as analysis of key institutions and conferences – from the Gadar Party, based on the West Coast of the United States campaigning for Indian anti-colonialism, through to the League against Imperialism and the Pan-African Congresses. I want to now develop this review by focusing on three particular ways that these three books’ transnational and historical scopes push forward the sociology of race.

Racism at home, imperialism abroad

Firstly, each of these three books makes the point that there is an inherent connection between racism ‘at home’ in the West, with Western practices of colonialism, imperialism, and neo-colonialism ‘abroad’. Desai’s (2020) discussion, for instance, interrogates how Du Bois saw racialised capitalism as the binding factor between the United States’ exploitation of Black Americans with the British empire’s colonial apparatus, and how ‘whiteness’ offered a symbolic space of purity – a material and psychological wage – that impeded the white workers across the West to endorse an anti-imperialism. In his critique of racial capitalism, therefore, Du Bois argues that ‘the English working classes are exploiting India [. . .] and the working classes of America are subjugating Santo Domingo and Haiti [. . .] He is a co-worker in the miserable modern subjugation of over half the world’ (quoted in Desai 2020: 144). Similarly, Gopal (2019: 284) questions: ‘How could the problem of race in the context of global imperialism be addressed in its specificity and as it intersected with the question of class and the exploitation of labour?’ In exploring this question through the lens of dissent against the British empire, Gopal (2019: 441) presents the work of anticolonial Marxists – such as C. L.R James, Padmore, and Eric Williams – each of whom stressed that ‘if empire was to be left behind, then the buccaneering capitalism that it had propagated would also need to be replaced with a more radically egalitarian system’. In advocating for a new ‘radically egalitarian’ alternative to global capitalism, these radicals sought to not just free those newly independent nations from the Global North’s economic control, but also those ‘postcolonial citizens’ exploited in the metropoles itself. Lastly, Getachew (2019: 20–21) discusses the notion of a ‘global Jim Crow’, highlighting how rather than being an idiosyncrasy of the US South, ‘the color line was an international phenomenon of which segregation and racial domination in the United States were only a domestic iteration’.

Indeed, it may seem almost too obvious of a point to make that racism is connected to the processes of colonialism and neo-colonialism. After all, ‘the concept of race was thus the glue that stuck the colonial world order together, as it became common-sense knowledge that there was a global racial hierarchy which permitted the colonization of the “lesser” races by the dominant white Europeans’ (Meghji, 2020a: 4). Nevertheless, if we look at dominant approaches in the sociology of race, then such transnational connections tend to be elided. Instead, much sociology of race tends to be characterised by a methodological nationalism in which it becomes sociologically viable – and advisable – to study racism within the confines of particular, discrete nation states (Meghji, Forthcoming). However, such methodological nationalism is not analytically useful for our current predicaments. It is the same social system that exploits the labour of children in China to make electronic goods, that exploits the (disproportionately Black and Brown) zero-hour contracted truck driver who delivers this product to its eventual owner in the West; it is the same imperialised-racialised principle that Islam is opposed to modernity that justifies the state surveillance of Muslims under the Patriot Act in the United States and the Prevent counter-terrorism programme in Britain, that justifies Western military intervention in the Middle East under the guise of civilizing the backwards world. While neither Getachew, Desai, or Gopal’s books are explicitly about the links between racism and imperialism, they each highlight that there is a radical tradition of thought which has always analysed these two processes in tandem with one another. The fact that this tradition already exists pushes me to my next point, as I argue that the sociology of race needs to adopt a more historical approach.

Looking backwards to move forwards

While each of the three reviewed books use historical methods, each of them also reflects on our present conjunctures. Getachew (2019: 181) points out that the ‘worldmakers of decolonization’ offer an intellectual tradition through which to think about contemporary transnational movements such as ‘the Movement for Black Lives, the Caribbean demand for reparations for slavery and genocide, and South African calls for a social and economic decolonization’. Similarly, Gopal (2019: 448) argues the dispelling the myth of British colonial benevolence, and centering anticolonial agency, allows us to both move beyond the idea that Britain is a global superpower that has the legitimacy to intervene across the globe, as well as allowing ‘Britons to lay claim to a different, more challenging history [. . .] which can draw on multiple historical and cultural resources’. Lastly, Desai (2020) argues that his book highlights historical themes that still shape the present day, such as the United States’ claim of being the champion of liberalism and democracy while it still routinely kills many of its citizens (and those around the world).

In short, therefore, each of the three authors stress the necessity of having a historical sensibility to comprehend current situations and social processes. At the very same time as they are developing such temporal linkages, however, we are seeing increased attempts within the sociology of race to bifurcate the study of racism away from its historical roots in colonialism (and consequently, its contemporary basis in neo-colonialism). If we take critical race theory, for instance, Bonilla-Silva (2015: 74) even goes as far as to say that this paradigm ought to move beyond ‘the sins [of the] past (e.g., slavery, colonization, and genocide)’ in studying the ‘contemporary foundation’ of racism. Of course, Bonilla-Silva has apt reasons for his methodological scope – by reducing racism to being a consequence of past events, we lose sight of how racism continues because it still benefits people in the present day, who consequently maintain an interest in reproducing it. Nevertheless, we have to question whether being captured in a methodological ‘presentism’, which explicitly attempts to bifurcate the study of the present from its past, is analytically viable when it comes to the processes of racialisation and racism.

Very often, for instance, what we immediately think of as a social process specific to our present racialised social structure in fact has a much longer history informed by the logics of coloniality. For instance, consider the case of the militarisation of the police in the United States – a key issue in contemporary racism. As Go (2020) shows, such militarisation of the United States’ police started in the early 20th century primarily as a means of punitively surveying and controlling the racially subdominant. However, the tactics used by this police – such as the creation of mobile squads and intelligence divisions – derived from the United States’ military practices in their colonies (Go, 2020). In this regard, Go creates a temporal link between a contemporary issue of police militarisation with its historical origins, and also a transnational link between ‘racism at home’ with the US’ ‘imperialism abroad’ in a way that transcends bifurcated understandings of racialized processes.

Without necessarily having it as their primary focus, therefore, Getachew, Gopal, and Desai each show the possibilities for social analysis that can be opened up if we retain a historical focus when looking at contemporary society. Through appreciating the historical linkages with contemporary racism, we become better placed to connect with the various intellectual paradigms which dedicated themselves to dismantling this system in the fight for social justice. It is this theme of social justice that we now turn to.

Towards anti-racist, anti-colonial solidarities

A recurrent theme runs through each of the reviewed books: the importance of forging transnational solidarities. Gopal (2019) shows how anticolonial radicals in Britain centred solidarity – in the sense of multicultural, transnational, crossorganisational coalitions – in their struggles against the British empire, meaning that thinkers in the metropoles, such as Frederic Harrison and Arthur Ballard, came to argue that the British ruling class’ fascism in the colonies, in the name of capital accumulation, could be connected with their exploitation of white British workers. Similarly, Desai’s (2020: 45) concept of ‘transnational refraction’ was built around the premise that anti-imperialists thought about colonialism and racism through the sense of shared struggle and solidarity, citing, for instance Saint Nihal Singh’s argument that there was a fundamental ‘link between the Asian migrant laborer [in the United States], the African American subject, and the colonized Indian, each connected the other by the sheer fact of being on the wrong side of the color line’. Desai (2020: 199) even concludes his book with the assertion that such transnational refraction is a prerequisite for solidarity, when he comments that: ‘solidarity emerges only out of a wilful act of seeing through the eyes of another, whose life we can only understand in glimpses’. Lastly, Getachew (2019: 145) too notes that anticolonial nationalists ‘fashioned Third World solidarity as a form of international class politics, and demanded redistribution on the basis that postcolonial states had in fact produced the wealth the West enjoyed’.

Each of these authors focuses on transnational, multicultural, multiorganisational forms of solidarity not because it is historically interesting, but because history has shown us that these forms of solidarity are successful and necessary in the struggles for social justice. I make this point not because the sociology of race is wilfully ignoring the importance of such solidarity, but because the issues of racism facing us in the contemporary and future world need to replicate these forms of solidarity fostered by the anticolonial radicals recounted in these three books. When we think of the climate crisis, for instance, a solidarity needs to be forged between the poor workers across the West (many of whom areracialised as Black and Brown) who are disproportionately exposed to air pollution, with the environmental destruction faced by indigenous people across Latin America, Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand in the name of capital accumulation, who also in turn need to form a solidarity with those in South Asia facing starvation due to droughts, who in turn need to form solidarities with those in the Caribbean, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, where cyclones and hurricanes have been creating humanitarian crises. When we think of Islamophobia, we need to form a solidarity between those campaigning against the punitive surveillance of, and state violence towards, Muslims in the West, with those campaigning against the Uyghur detention camps in China, and the Hindutva violence towards Muslims in Kashmir. When it comes to race and racism, we are always talking about transnational, historically, epistemically, and spatially connected social processes, and – as Getachew rightfully highlights – ‘worldmaking’ processes of inequality require equally global solidarities and projects of resistance.

### 1AR – A2 Colonialism

#### Their critique is too sweeping – don’t confine the theory to Kant’s bad takes from his earliest works.

Eberl ’19 [(Oliver Eberl, Leibniz Universität Hannover.) “Kant on Race and Barbarism: Towards a More Complex View on Racism and Anti-Colonialism in Kant”, Kantian Review, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415419000189>] pfox TDI – all of the  are numbers from citations and years, don’t ask me why it pasted like that, but I cannot and will not be bothered to fix it.

Kant’s concept of race undergoes a transformation. It begins with the climate-theoretic categorization of extremes and a hierarchy of the origins of different races, moves on to a non-hierarchical concept of race, and ultimately arrives at a notion that identifies activity teleologically as a characteristic and uses it to confirm power relations and differences in the political world. As problematic as the third and final version may be, it does not amount to an affirmation of those relations.

The final stage serves as the new point of departure for Kant’s thought as he realizes the globalization of the violent potential of European, ‘barbarian’, states. Accordingly – and thematically fitting with his  writings on race, albeit without using the term ‘race’ – Kant writes in the Physical Geography: ‘The inhabitant of the temperate zone, especially in its central part, is more beautiful in body, harder working, more witty, more moderate in his passions, and more sensible than any other kind of people in the world. Consequently, these people have always taught the rest [of the world] and vanquished them by the use of weapons’ (PG, : ). The point of this article is not to deny that Kant expressed prejudices against non-Europeans. He did, without a doubt, repeatedly and more or less uncritically. The point is also not to argue for any concept of ‘race’. The point has been to show that Kant’s use of the concept of ‘race’ is consistent with his anti-colonial legal theory. Kant underwent a gradual change of opinion concerning non-European peoples that can also be identified in his essays on race and is consistent with his late anti-colonialism. One problem that could not be covered up here is his contribution to theorizing a type of superiority based on the image of the state of nature in the theory of the state: Kant follows Hobbes in equating it with the ‘lawless condition’ of the ‘savage’ and thus comes to be convinced of the inferiority of non-state forms of social life vis-à-vis state-building ones.

Traditionally, we have taken Kant’s change of heart to consist in having given up his racist views (views on racial hierarchy) and embracing egalitarian global law and anti-colonialism in his late writings. This article has shown that Kant’s change of heart lay in moving from uncritical repetition of European prejudices to a non-racist theory of race in  that is determined to reject the assumptions of different human species. His anti-colonialism and the development of his race theory can be understood as consistently motivated and not distinguished by racist motives for the race theory and anti-colonial intentions for the legal theory. In his engagement with travel reports and the prejudices against non-European peoples that have their foundation in the barbarism discourse, Kant increasingly enlightened his own judgements to the point where he no longer trusted those reports at all and instead relied on a biological determination of ‘races’.

The racial hierarchy contained in his concept of race corresponds to the colonial reality of a world currently reordered through European expansion without affirming it. Kant was aware that the reason for the success of European expansion was rooted in state-based organization, a positive work ethic and technological advantage. He does not condemn this development in his writings on race but investigates the reason for those differences. He finds them in the Europeans’ industry and the ‘idleness’ (Trägheit) of Africans, understood in both cases as a race’s adaptation to climatic condition that can no longer be changed.

Kant does not seek to ground moral judgements in his writings on race. Conversely, the moral evaluation of European expansion can be found in Perpetual Peace and The Metaphysics of Morals. The anti-colonial thrust of these writings is not inconsistent with the writings on race but provides a loose unity. But if such a consistency between Kant’s writings on rights and those on race is possible, it also changes our interpretation of his position on colonialism. Kant did not start condemning colonialism only with his essay on peace but had criticized its conceptual foundations much earlier. Anti-colonialism is a feature of his writings on race as well as his legal theory.