# AFRICOM 1AC FINAL – TDI ’23

## 1AC

### 1AC – Imperialism

#### The United States ought to substantially reduce its military presence of the United States Africa Command in North Africa.

#### The contention is US imperialism.

#### The history of US military presence in North Africa is inseparable from its post-Cold War ascent as the primary global hegemon. Beginning with the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative providing the architecture of modern US neo-colonialism in the region, the War on Terror then established the pretense for military intervention in the region to secure American interests under explicitly false pretenses.

#### Now, AFRICOM’s presence actualizes the modern extension of American military terror across the North African region – strategic presence connects regional “counter-terror” efforts with imperialist looting and suppression of self-determination.

A-APRP ’21 [(All-African People’s Revolutionary Party, a permanent, independent, revolutionary, socialist, Pan-African Political Party based in Africa. Africa is the just homeland of African People all over the world. Our Party is an integral part of the Pan-African and World Socialist revolutionary movement. The A-APRP understands that “all people of African descent, whether they live in North or South America, the Caribbean, or in any other part of the world, are Africans and belong to the African Nation”.) “Say No To Africom!”, A-APRP, 12/01/2021. <https://aaprp-intl.org/say-no-to-africom/>] pfox TDI

In an arrogant assertion of their intention to own and militarily dominate the world, the United States of America has established eleven unified combatant commands across the globe, each with an “area of responsibility”. This “responsibility” represents the positioning of the U.S. to militarily protect its allies, to keep pressure on nations to maintain a relationship of subservience to the U.S., and to militarily ‘keep in check’ or attack nations that refuse to bow down to its demands. These demands force the incorporation of all nations into an economic and political system dominated by U.S. corporate imperialism, thus preventing any genuine self-determination.

Eritrea is the only country in Africa that is not a part of AFRICOM and continues steadfast resistance to U.S. military presence on our continent. Egypt is not in AFRICOM because it falls under the U.S. Central Command, or CENTCOM. The separating of Egypt from the rest of Africa in US military strategy is important because it connects Egypt to Israel under the umbrella of CENTCOM. This arrangement is designed to ensure U.S. Control of the Suez Canal and the strategic waterways of the Red and Mediterranean Seas. Egypt and Israel are two of the largest recipients of U.S. military and financial aid in the world.

AFRICOM’s stated mission is “anti-terrorism” and “promotion of democracy”, but AFRICOM’s true purpose is to thwart any attempts by African nations to achieve self-determination and emancipation from neo-colonialism. AFRICOM is one party of an international military machine designed to control humanity’s economic, social and political activities under the helm of US corporate and military power.

Thieves, Liars and Killers

The U.S. and its allies relentlessly seek to control the oil, coltan, bauxite and other vast mineral resources, fertile land, fresh water and labor power on the continent of Africa. This is achieved through the collaboration of several imperialist partners, including: Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) to manipulate labor, social and human resources. International finance institutions such as the IMF and World Bank control the economies through debt and dependency. Major corporate media distort and misinform the masses of the people. Multinational corporations maximize profits by extracting resources and processing them into commodities to be sold on the open market.

Government officials from capitalist nations and their client states set policy to ensure that capitalism makes profits. AFRICOM, with regional and national armed forces which they control, crush resistance to these sophisticated capitalist money making schemes. AFRICOM stands ready to serve imperialism by waging war, overthrowing legitimate governments, financing and supporting coups, or by militarily enforcing economic sanctions and blockades designed to destabilize nations, diminishing the nation’s ability to govern themselves and provide for their people.

Imperialism and all its international, national and local agencies are mighty enemies of Africa, African People and all humanity. They will be defeated, and the people will win. The people have always resisted oppression. We will continue to reject the militarization of our communities and the world. Anti-imperialist forces must stand together to smash capitalism and smash imperialism. The All-African People’s Revolutionary Party (A-APRP) uncompromisingly condemns imperialist militarization of Africa and the world. We recognize that only Pan-Africanism can empower African nations to stand-up against this imperialist menace, which is but a new, violent, grotesque form of colonialism, called neo-colonialism.

#### In 2007, the Bush Administration said the following at the inception of the US Africa Command, or AFRICOM: it “will strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa. Africa Command will enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy and economic growth in Africa.” In 2011, the established ruler of Libya, Muammar Gaddafi, was accused of mobilizing “African mercenaries” to murder his citizens. This is why AFRICOM’s very first mission was the overthrow of the Libyan government, Gaddafi’s assassination, and the installation of a puppet regime to decimate the development of what was, at the time, the most prosperous state in North Africa. AFRICOM’s operations provide political cover for deploying US-backed insurgents and counter-intelligence, all of which have massively deteriorated regional stability and cost tens of thousands of African lives.

Akizwe ’22 [(Abayomi Akizwe, editor of Pan-African News Wire, an international electronic press service designed to foster intelligent discussion on the affairs of African people throughout the continent and the world.) “Imperialist Militarism and the African Crisis”, Toward Freedom, 10/09/2022. <https://towardfreedom.org/story/archives/africa-archives/imperialist-militarism-and-the-african-crisis/>] pfox TDI

After 14 years, the AFRICOM project which was announced in 2007 by the administration of President George W. Bush, Jr. and became operational in 2008, has been a disaster for the AU member-states whether they have participated or not with this entity. Initially, the African states rejected the stationing of the AFRICOM headquarters on the continent.

Later after a reframing of the AFRICOM mission by the Pentagon, where the purpose was to assist African states by strengthening military cooperation and therefore enhancing security, numerous governments allowed the escalation of the presence of U.S. forces. In the Horn of Africa, the French military base at Camp Lemonnier, became the major outpost for Pentagon troops on the continent.

According to the AFRICOM website: “In response to our expanding partnerships and interests in Africa, the United States established U.S. Africa Command in 2007. For the past 14 years, U.S. Africa Command has worked with African partners for a secure, stable and prosperous Africa. The creation of U.S. Africa Command has advanced this vision through a whole-of-government, partner-centric lens by building partner capacity, disrupting violent extremists, and responding to crises. Through consistent engagement, we strengthen our partnerships and assure our allies. Only together can we realize security goals vital for global interests and free trade. Allies and partners are critical in realizing our shared vision while enabling contingency operations, maintaining superiority over competitors, monitoring and disrupting violent extremist organizations, and protecting U.S. interests.” (https://www.africom.mil/about-the-command/history-of-us-africa-command)

However, in reality the security situation in Africa has worsened since the creation of AFRICOM and the deployment of thousands of U.S. troops on the continent. These military forces have constructed drone stations and makeshift bases while engaging in purported trainings of local military units along with engaging in what is described as counter-insurgency operations.

By 2011, AFRICOM was prepared for a large-scale military operation on the continent resulting in regime change and the destruction of population groups. In Libya, beginning in February of 2011, a rebel insurgency was trained and turned loose in the northern city of Benghazi with the aim of overthrowing the government of Col. Muammar Gaddafi.

After the defeat of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)-sponsored rebels in several regions of Libya, the U.S. went to the United Nations Security Council where they engineered the passage of resolutions 1970 and 1973 as a cover for the blanket bombing of the oil-rich North African state, then the most prosperous of the AU member-states. On March 19, the bombing of Libya began by the U.S. Air Force accompanied by NATO and allied units.

The result of the war which lasted for nine months killed tens of thousands of Libyans, Africans from other states working in the country and guests from other geopolitical regions. With the installation of a puppet regime in Tripoli after the murder of Gaddafi in October 2011, the conditions in Libya only deteriorated further.

Since 2011, the situation inside the country has not stabilized. The Libyan counter-revolution was the first major combat operation of AFRICOM. The administration of President Barack Obama and his Secretary of State Hillary Clinton championed the war as a victory for “democracy.” In reality, the instability within Libya spread throughout other neighboring states in North and West Africa.

#### AFRICOM’s intervention into Libya reveals a crucial truth – the modern architecture of racial governance cannot be disentangled from the framing of “humanitarian” values that drive interventions as neutral, apolitical goods. American imperialism on the African continent requires a redefining of African realities as requiring Western intervention to resolve crises, positing a false choice between domestic collapse or colonial brutality, with AFRICOM representing a key piece of the puzzle.

Wai ’14 [(Zubaru Wai, Department of Political Science, Lakehead University, Thunder Bay, Canada.) “The empire's new clothes: Africa, liberal interventionism and contemporary world order”, Review of African Political Economy, 2014. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2014.928278>] pfox TDI

Although he appeared to have repaired relations with the West in the post-9/11 environment, Western suspicion of Gaddafi lingered: he was still too ‘dangerous’ and unpredictable to be trusted. For example, his vocal stance against the United States’ Africa Command (AFRICOM), the latest military front for projecting the power of the United States on the continent, made especially that state very uncomfortable, and confirmed to US officials that Gaddafi had not given up his old ways. Gaddafi's influence on the continent appeared to have, in part, put the future of the project in jeopardy, at least temporarily. As journalist Dan Glazebrook rightly notes in The Guardian:

Gaddafi ended his political life as a dedicated pan-Africanist and, whatever one thought of the man, it is clear that his vision for Africa was very different from that of the subordinate supplier of cheap labour and raw materials that Africom was created to maintain. He was not only the driving force behind the creation of the African Union in 2002, but had also served as its elected head, and made Libya its biggest financial donor. To the dismay of some of his African colleagues, he used his time as leader to push for a ‘United States of Africa,’ with a single currency, single army and single passport. More concretely, Gaddafi's Libya had an estimated $150bn worth of investment in Africa – often in social infrastructure and development projects, and this largesse bought him many friends, particularly in the smaller nations. As long as Gaddafi retained this level of influence in Africa, Africom was going to founder. (Glazebrook Citation2012)

Indeed, when AFRICOM was established by the Bush administration in 2007, it was headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany, in part because no African state would openly accept hosting its bases. However, AFRICOM's plans have greatly advanced since the murder of Gaddafi and the overthrow of his regime. What is more, post-Gaddafi Libya was the first state on the continent to openly express interest in hosting AFRICOM's headquarters. In getting rid of Gaddafi, AFRICOM had succeeded in eliminating its most vocal critic and, perhaps, most formidable opponent on the continent. Libya became AFRICOM's first major intervention, as it were, and has proved to be a significant moment for that organisation and its drive to recolonise the continent, and impose an American peace on it. Going after Gaddafi was significant for another reason: it gave AFRICOM the perfect opportunity to test its operational capability by engaging in its first major military operation on the continent, which, ‘coincidentally’, was targeted at its biggest opponent.

But perhaps the greatest significance of the NATO action in Libya is that it allowed the US (and its allies) to deal with anxieties that the Arab Spring was causing for Western, especially US, hegemony in the Arab world. It was Libya, and going after Gaddafi, that made it possible for the West to partially negotiate what appeared as a crisis of hegemony in the Arab world. While anxieties about a region slipping out of its control have always dominated Western, especially US, policy, this uneasiness acquired a new sense of urgency when popular mass agitation for democracy began to threaten client regimes (such as in Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, Jordan etc.) dependent on especially US patronage. Libya, however, was different: its leader, Muammar Gaddafi, was not exactly a Western client. While his longevity (having ruled Libya for over four decades) and authoritarian style of governing had won him many enemies, unlike Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak he could be targeted without threatening Western power in North Africa and the Middle East, where US-supported client regimes were struggling to hold on to power in the face of popular uprisings. If anything, going after him would allow the West to turn the tide, regain the initiative and gain control over a fluid situation which had arisen since stone-throwing youths took on the Tunisian state and won, and mass protests forced Egypt's Hosni Mubarak out of power. Supporting an uprising against a ‘dictator’ who was not exactly a Western client would achieve the long-term goal of regime change in Libya while presenting the West as champions of democracy and human rights in the region. Indeed, Libya presented an opportunity and became the moment that made it possible for the West to ‘credibly’ impose themselves on processes that had initially appeared beyond their control and position themselves, yet again, as defenders of human rights and democracy. Thus, that which had started as a counter-hegemonic moment of mass agitation for democratisation of social life in the region, and thus tended to threaten the hegemonic order of Western domination and the client regimes dependent on Western patronage, ended up becoming a moment for hegemonic articulation reinforcing that very order it was aimed at negating. The NATO military action in Libya was a significant event. However, it was neither new nor was it an accident. It was only perhaps the most visible and high-profile of the now increasing Western military interventionism on the continent. Incarnating the spirit of an imperial globalism that normalises warfare as the primary instrument for pursuing ethical and political agendas, it conforms to a now familiar pattern of the heightened militarisation of world politics, and advances the processes of rendering warfare banal, globalising violent interventions and normalising the processes of displacing violence to the South, especially Africa. It temporalises a state of emergency and state of exception (Agamben Citation2005), while conflating the political and moral registers of contemporary world politics by which concerns over ‘human rights’ and ‘humanitarian’ disasters are mobilised as alibis for pursuing parochial national interests and imperialistic vocations (Fassin and Pandolfi Citation2010). Operating through a violent totalitarian logic and its militaristic logics through which global relations are regulated, this oppressive imperial globalism and its regimes of violence that authorised the intervention in Libya have turned Africa into a major constitutive site for the production of its modalities, the enacting of its colonial fantasies and the furthering of its imperial vocations. Indeed, coinciding with the NATO campaign in Libya was a contemporaneous French military action in Côte d'Ivoire that would remove the sitting president, Laurent Gbagbo, from power following disputed presidential elections. The controversies over the results of the 2010 presidential elections provided the pretext for France to pursue its agenda of regime change in Côte d'Ivoire, taking sides in a civil war and militarising an electoral dispute that was rooted in real and imagined political contestations over the state of Côte d'Ivoire by multiple competing claimants. At the heart are questions about citizenship and membership of the Ivorian political community (Ivoirité); that is, who qualifies as Ivorian and therefore has rights to participate in politics in that state and who does not. This struggle itself results in part from the structural legacies of colonialism, the failures of the postcolonial state to create viable structures that unite its multiple constituent populations, and the realities of French neocolonial machinations that have since independence cast a suffocating shadow over its former colonies in the region. Indeed, this complex political and socio-historical reality was lost in the brazenly simplistic and problematic representations that fashioned a banal and all-too-familiar discourse about a typical power-hungry African ‘strongman’ refusing to relinquish power after losing an election, and thus subverting the democratic will of the people who have rejected him at the polls. Again, as in Libya, the protection of human rights and promotion of democracy provided a pretext for defining a violent interventionist impulse, orchestrated principally by France, in altruistic and humanitarian terms. This interventionist pattern would repeat itself in Mali, where France led a military intervention ostensibly to rid that country of Al-Qaeda-linked Islamists who had seized control of the north of the country. As in Libya and Côte d'Ivoire, its legitimating frame was partially mobilising the moral registers of rescuing Mali from violent and irrational Islamists driven by hatred for modern civilisation and harkening to primordial instincts of murderous villainy, as demonstrated by the wanton killing of innocent civilians and the pillaging of the library in Timbuktu housing valuable ancient and medieval manuscripts. While the Malian crisis, like that of Côte d'Ivoire, is rooted in the structural legacies of colonialism and the inability of the postcolonial state to manage conflicts around social identity and the everyday banality of existence in a state with limited resources claimed by multiple competing social groups, it also is both a blowback to the NATO action in Libya, which has destabilised the Sahel region and washed it with arms and armaments that Tuareg rebels and their Islamist allies would use to wage the latest phase of their rebellion in Mali, and the consequence of the activities of AFRICOM, which had trained and armed some of the officers of the Malian army that would overthrow the legitimate government as the Tuareg rebellion raged in the north of the country. But the UN-backed French intervention in Mali was important for another reason: it illustrates a fundamental shift to the African continent as the new theatre of the so-called global war on terror, as well as ‘the spatial-military logics’ (Escobar Citation2004, 209) of the contemporary liberal imperium, its oppressive power, regimes of violence, and drive to recolonise the continent. It thus points to a reality more insidious than is being acknowledged in studies purporting to explain the spike in ‘humanitarian’ interventions on the continent. What Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, the Central African Republic (CAR) and, before them, Somalia, Sierra Leone and Liberia, among others, represent is a significant attempt at transforming and reconstituting world order, and this can be seen in the increasing militarisation of global politics, the banalisation of war, the routinisation of intervention and their celebration as instruments for pursing ‘ethical’ goals. Above all, they indicate the centrality of Africa to that violent and militaristic order, its power-political inclinations, and overall strategic and geopolitical concerns and impulses. This paper is an attempt to think through these violent and interventionist dispositions and what they mean for Africa. Two images of contemporary world order In Global Governance and New Wars (Citation2001), British political scientist Mark Duffield tells the story of how, as a result of conflicts in the 1990s, and concerns in the West about their implications for global peace and security, a major political project was formulated, the expressed aim of which was to impose what he calls a ‘liberal peace’ on the areas in the South affected by incidents of political unrest, civil wars and armed conflicts. This liberal peace project, Duffield tells us, is produced and exerted through a strategic complex of actors and achieved through a set of practices among which is the radicalisation of development and the incorporation of conflicts and security in development discourse and practice. Discursively, underdevelopment, which was once understood as an economic condition, has now been redefined as a dangerous political condition that not only causes conflict, but also engenders a vicious circle of self-perpetrating and mutually reinforcing violence and impoverishment (38). As a result, a new politics of developmentalism, of which humanitarian interventionism is an integral part, has resulted from a fundamental shift in official aid policy towards both conflict resolution and the reconstruction and transformation of conflict societies along contemporary liberal ideologies of governance favoured by the West. The transformational aims of these policy prescriptions are thus embodied in this new global politics of development and humanitarian interventionism legislated and promoted by the major Western governments and their aid agencies, the United Nations and its specialised agencies, the International Financial Institutions, donor and aid organisations, international NGOs and so forth. Rather than merely being a technical system of support for Southern societies affected by political unrest, civil wars, armed conflicts, humanitarian disasters or ‘state failure’, these arrangements, Duffield tells us, are part of a larger system of global governance, the transformational aims of which are to pacify Southern societies and impose a liberal peace on their disorderly terrains. That is, a new politics of ‘humanitarianism that lays emphasis on such things as conflict resolution and prevention, reconstructing social networks, strengthening civil and representative institutions, promoting the rule of law, and security sector reform in the context of a functioning market economy’ (Citation2001, 11). From this perspective, ‘liberal peace’ is an altruistic political project born out of the West's desire to pacify the world by dealing with conflicts and humanitarian disasters which are now thought to not only constitute a development and humanitarian challenge for the societies in which they occur, but also constitute a security threat and challenge for the West. One would have expected that a scholar who has the good sense to recognise these processes along the lines he specifies would, at least, be alarmed by their political implications, if not critical of their ethos and the types of power relations they are embedded in and make possible. However, Duffield does not seem to be bothered by this liberal interventionist project. He defines it as a ‘shared system of moral responsibility’ (2001, 260) even though he argues that this new ethico-political reality represents a ‘moral rearming of the West’. He dismisses those, such as Noam Chomsky (Citation1999) and Frank Furedi (Citation1994) among others, who have drawn attention to the fact that this enhanced ability of the West to intervene and impose its will on Southern societies is a function of a new ideology of imperialism, as harking back to an outmoded thinking that is incapable of coming to terms with a form of power and authority that is radically different from imperialism. To Duffield, the new politics of humanitarian interventionism, and the system of global governance that potentiates it, does not represent ‘an unchanging reality’ or the reworking of old imperialist formulas. Rather it is based on ‘liberal power’, not ‘imperial power’ (which assumes that liberal power cannot in fact also be imperial power). He writes: The current concern of global governance is to establish a liberal peace on its troubled borders: to resolve conflicts, reconstruct societies and establish functioning market economies as a way of avoiding future wars. The ultimate goal of liberal peace is stability. In achieving this aim, liberal peace is different from imperial peace. The latter was based on, or at least aspired to, direct territorial control where populations were ruled through juridical and bureaucratic means of authority. The imperial power dealt with opposition using physical and juridical forms of pacification, sometimes in an extreme and violent manner. Liberal peace is different; it is a non-territorial, mutable and networked relation of governance. The aim of the strategic state–non-state complexes that embody global governance is not the direct control of territory. Ideally, liberal power is based on the management and regulation of economic, political and social processes. It is power through the control and management of non-territorial systems and networks. As a result, liberal strategic complexes are usually averse to the long-term costs and responsibilities that controlling territory implies. (Duffield Citation2001, 34) The implication of this argument is that the current militarisation of Africa through Western interventions in places such as Côte d'Ivoire, Libya, Mali, CAR, among others, should be seen as attempts by the West at pacifying a turbulent continent given to internecine conflicts, and establishing a liberal peace on the disorderly terrains of its ‘illiberal spaces’. They are not imperialistic because they do not thrive on direct territorial control, and other forms of juridical, bureaucratic and militaristic forms of rule exerted from an imperial centre of authority. What this means in turn is that, for Duffield (Citation2001), a system of domination can only be imperialistic if it is based on a territorial acquisitive logic that imposes or seeks to impose its rule spatially through physical, juridical and bureaucratic forms of power and control. This characterisation of contemporary world order converges with that of Hardt and Negri (Citation2000), who have suggested the passage of global power from an order based on the ascendancy of the nation-state to another based on the structural irrelevance of the nation-state. They write: The boundaries defined by the modern system of nation-states were fundamental to European colonial and economic expansion: the territorial boundaries of the nation delimited the centre of power from which rule was exerted over external foreign territories through a system of channels and barriers that alternately facilitated and obstructed the flows of production and circulation. Imperialism was really an extension of the sovereignty of the European nation-states beyond their own boundaries. Eventually nearly all the world's territories could be parcelled out and the entire world map could be coded in European colours: red for British territory, blue for French, green for Portuguese, and so forth. Wherever modern sovereignty took root, it constructed a Leviathan that overarched its social domain and imposed hierarchical territorial boundaries, both to police the purity of its own identity and to exclude all that was other. (xii) In contrast to imperialism is what Hardt and Negri call Empire, which they posit as the new order that has, since the end of the Cold War, been effectively regulating global relations. Empire, they tell us, does not establish any territorial centre of power, nor does it rely on fixed boundaries or barriers in exerting its authority. Rather, it is ‘a decentred and deterritorialising apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers’ (Citation2000, xii, emphasis in original). A geocentric order ‘composed of a series of national and supranational organisms united under a single logic of rule’, Empire is the political project that effectively regulates global exchanges and the new global sovereign power that governs the realm of global economic and social relations (Ibid.). The reluctance of many theorists to recognise these major shifts in global power, Hardt and Negri contend, owes largely to the fact that ‘they see that the dominant capitalist nation-states have continued to exercise imperialist domination over the other nations and regions of the globe’. While not underestimating ‘these real and important lines of continuity’, it is important, they counter, ‘that what used to be conflict or competition among several imperialist powers has in important respects been replaced by the idea of a single power that overdetermines them all, structures them in a unitary way, and treats them under one common notion of right’ (Citation2000, 9). The power thus involved is fundamentally new and therefore not merely a simple reformulation and perfecting of old imperialist practices, as most theorists of contemporary world order believe. It is ‘a new notion of right … a new inscription of authority and a new design of the production of norms and legal instruments of coercion that guarantee contracts and resolve conflicts’ (7). In this sense, Empire ‘marks a paradigm shift’ in global politics (Hardt and Negri Citation2000, 8, emphasis in original). The United States might occupy a privileged position in this new global reconstitution of imperial authority, Hardt and Negri tell us, and this is partially explained by the continuity of its importance from being the principal figure in the struggle against international socialism and the Soviet Union to being the central figure in the newly unified imperial world order. However, it is not the centre of a new imperialism nor the new imperialist power. And, even though the power of Empire ‘is born through the global expansion of the internal US constitutional project’, the United States ‘does not, and indeed no nation can today form the centre of an imperialist project’ (Citation2000, 182, xiv). Empire, thus, should be understood as imperial not imperialist, for in contrast with imperialism, which always seeks ‘to spread its power linearly in closed spaces and invade, destroy and subsume subject countries within its sovereignty’, Empire ‘is constructed on the model of rearticulating an open space and reinventing incessantly diverse and singular relations in networks across an unborn terrain’ (182). It therefore ‘can only be conceived as a universal republic, a network of powers and counterpowers structured in a boundless and inclusive architecture. This imperial expansion has nothing to do with imperialism, nor with those state organisms designed for conquest, pillage, genocide, colonisation, and slavery. Against such imperialisms, Empire expands and consolidates the model of network power’ (166). In this regard, those which were once ‘the distinct national colours of the imperialist map of the world have merged and blended in the imperial global rainbow’ (xiii). The relationship between Duffield's idea of liberal peace and Hardt and Negri's conception of Empire seems somewhat straightforward: liberal peace is a condition of Empire, which represents neither a new reality of imperialism nor a reworking of old imperialistic logic. What this in turn means is that for this, in fact any system to qualify as imperialistic, it would have to, inter alia, have a territorial acquisitive logic understood in terms of the annexation of territories and the exercise of direct political, juridical and administrative control over those acquired or annexed territories parcelled out within fixed boundaries and administered from an imperial centre of power. Liberal peace, Empire or postcolonial imperialism? It is not my intention to rehearse here the criticisms that have been levied against Duffield and, especially, Hardt and Negri, in part, because I believe that they offer compelling, even if ideologically ambivalent and depoliticised accounts of contemporary world order. What I want to do instead is call into question the problematic ways they have interpreted that order, the power which produces it, the system of domination it makes possible, and the logic that undergirds the ethos of its practice. Central to this is an origin-diffusion problem based on a ‘first in Europe then elsewhere’ structure of time (Chakrabarty Citation2000, 8); that is, a historicist evolutionist epistemology that posits the West as the only rational Hegelian historical subject capable of inscribing world-historical events and processes (Wai Citation2012). In this epistemological schema, and the Eurocentric accounts they construct, the non-west only features as areas or objects to be acted upon by a historically stalwart Western agency that for Duffield, is transforming the world in the quest for stability and thus is imposing a liberal peace on the illiberal spaces and turbulent terrain of the South; and for Hardt and Negri, has inscribed a transformational global system that originates in, and spreads outward from, the West to the rest, reconstituting world order and presiding over a number of transitions: from disciplinary society to society of control; from state-based sovereignty to geocentric sovereignty that has revealed the structural irrelevance of the nation-state, and from imperialism to Empire of capital. All of these processes are assumed to have their origins in the West, and then diffused outward to the rest of the World. Remaining faithful to epistemological schemas that construct hierarchies of power and knowledge and mobilise Eurocentric categories to colonise other ways of knowing and being, these analyses tell us very little about the role of the South, other than as areas acted upon by a historically dynamic Western agency. Coming from the dominant and dominating milieus, our authors' interpretations thus betray a fidelity to a positionality and privilege of location that is firmly ensconced in the traditions of their ethnos. This is, in part, what pushes them to theorise global processes from the certainty of Eurocentric perspectives that prevents them from seeing the form of power that the current liberal world order is: a violent and intrusive imperialistic power that hides its will to domination in tropes of altruism and facile concerns over human rights. Linked to this is the hasty rush to judgement about the nature of an emerging world order in the immediate post-Cold War environment. The old, as Gramsci (Citation1971) would say, was dying, but the new which was coming into being was not exactly known, so many began to speculate and, in some cases, rushed to hasty conclusions about the nature of political processes unfolding under concrete historical conditions. Disciplinary international relations scholars and globalisation theorists, for example, had a field day in trying to decipher this emerging global power-political landscape. In the ‘hysteria of naming’ (Stallybrass Citation1990) which followed, the race was on to coin the best phrase or come up with the best moniker and the next big idea to describe or capture the changing configurations in an emergent but still uncertain world order. Francis Fukuyama (Citation1989), for example, inscribed his ‘end of history’ thesis on a vulgar Hegelian historicist ideological landscape (Roth Citation1995). In crude cultural essentialist language, Samuel Huntington (Citation1993) warned of a ‘clash of civilisation’. An almost hysterical Robert Kaplan (Citation1994) claimed to have detected ‘a coming anarchy’ in West Africa, a nightmarish scenario of criminal violence, bloody conflicts and state implosion, demographic stress, environmental degradation and resource scarcity that he posited as the fate of the rest of the world, depicting it in the crassest sensational journalistic language. Some of the other epithets used were ‘Jihad vs. McWorld’ (Barber Citation1992), ‘Clash of Fundamentalisms’ (Ali Citation2003), ‘Clash of Globalisations’ (Gill Citation2003) and, for our present purpose, ‘Empire’ (Hardt and Negri Citation2000) and ‘Liberal Peace’ (Duffield Citation2001). The problem though was that the theories and concepts used were less suggestive of an emerging global power structure and more indicative of a supposedly definitive and extant world order; they were less speculative and more depictive of reality imagined as actually existing, as if the new landscape of global power were not a formative process forged out of multiple conjunctural agonistics, but one that had come into being fully formed and already crystallised into the world order imagined or speculated about. It is within this general atmosphere that Empire and Global Governance and New Wars emerged. Hardt and Negri, for example, admit to locating the conception of their project at the midpoint between the Persian Gulf War (1991) and the war in Kosovo (1999), which they understand as signal events in the construction of Empire (2000, xvii). The fact that the ‘world’ (through the United Nations) appeared to have acted in concert to militarily evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1990–91, and Western states, under the banner of NATO, intervened against Serbian forces in Kosovo in 1999, seemed to have signalled the emergence of a world order based on a single network of power that they would go on to theorise as Empire. Conveniently forgetting the numerous other cases even during this period (Bosnia, East Timor, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia etc.) that tended to suggest a world in flux, this rush to judgement about processes unfolding under concrete historical conditions now came to highlight the inadequacy of a theoretical enterprise which had been predicated on the rejection of imperialism as a reality of contemporary world order, once an angry United States began to explicitly reassert its power and tried to redefine the world in its image in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Imperialism that Hardt and Negri had told us was over now stood stark and manifested itself rather forcefully, as the US and its allies grappled with the uncertainties of a rapidly changing reality of world order, and sought to gain control over it. The second issue relates to our authors’ problematic and (even static) conception of imperialism, which they see primarily as a territorial acquisitive phenomenon. For Duffield as well as Hardt and Negri, and this has already been mentioned earlier, a system of domination only qualifies as imperialistic if it has a territorial acquisitive logic. Imperialism, however, is not, and has never been, a static and unchanging reality of power and domination. It does not have to function, and has never really functioned, only through a single logic of rule or method of operation. It does not have to be a territorial acquisitive phenomenon for it to be imperialist; and though it usually does, it does not even necessarily have to have an overtly economic logic for it to be imperialist. As Edward Said (Citation1993) often reminded us, imperialism is more than an economic or territorial acquisitive phenomenon. A system of domination, it is more than simple acts of accumulation and acquisition for it occurs on and ‘beyond the level of economic laws and political decisions’ to conquer, to annex, to dominate and to exploit. Rather, it also is an ideational phenomenon, usually ‘supported, and perhaps even impelled, by impressive ideological formations that include notions that certain territories and people require and beseech domination, as well as forms of knowledge affiliated with domination’ (9). These impressive ideological formations constitute a ‘structure of feeling’ about ‘empire’, which, in the words of Sherene Razack, designates a ‘deeply held belief in the need and the right to dominate others for their own good’ (Citation2004, 10). It is this structure of feeling that defines the self-conceptions of individuals living within the imperial centres ‘believing deeply in the “illusion of benevolence” and requiring, as before, grateful natives’ (Ibid.). Imperialism is a complex and multi-faceted reality of power. It covers, as Robert Young (Citation2001) reminds us, ‘a range of relationships of domination and dependence that can be characterised according to historical and theoretical or organisational differences’ (26). Originally used to designate ‘a political system of actual conquest and occupation’, and increasingly coming to be associated with the Marxist conception ‘as a general system of economic domination, with direct political domination being a possible but not necessary adjunct’ (Ibid.), imperialism today plays itself out more as a set of relationships (both formal and informal, direct and indirect) which involves the processes, policies and practices by which empire is established and maintained, and by which a state or group of states controls or seeks to control the effective political destinies of other states and societies, and this can be achieved by force of arms, political persuasion and collaboration, economic, social or cultural imposition, coercion and dependence (Doyle Citation1986, 45). It also involves ‘the practice, the theory and attitude of a dominating metropolitan centre in relation to the distant territories and peoples’ it directly or indirectly controls, dominates and exploits (Said Citation1993, 9). It thus can function perfectly without any formal colonisation or acquisition of territories. In fact, it can even also function against its own economic interests (Young Citation2001). From the preceding, I contend that that which has been conceptualised as Empire and liberal peace is in fact a neo-imperialist posture potentiated by a Western will to power and domination. It is a desire or an attempt at restructuring global power and imposing an imperial order on the world. However, this desire does not transform the violent and hierarchical form of power it is constitutive of into a decentred and deterritorialised phenomenon. Neither does it represent a disinterested reality of global do-goodism and benevolence, as is usually suggested in studies purporting to explain the current imperial moment we live in. Rather, it is a hierarchical notion of power that re-territorialises and re-centres global relations within blocks of power through spatial displacement and the redefinition of traditional notions of sovereignty, while reworking, and even perfecting, the violent and exploitative logics of imperial power that have historically violated the integrity of non-Western societies and still stand in the way of especially African self-determination into diffused networks of power and privilege. Empire and liberal peace are manifestations of this neo-imperialistic posture: a reality of imperial globality; imperialism without empire, or colonialism without colonies; in other words, postcolonial imperialism. Obviously, these relations of domination are not static and unchanging, neither are they unchallenged and haplessly absorbed, but constantly mutate and are reconstituted through hierarchical modes of power as well as through appropriating the concerns of anti-colonial forces aimed at the negation of such imperialistic orders. This imperial reality is both geopolitical, in that it aims to project the power and political, economic and ideological interests of the dominant states in the world through the production and domination of the global space; and geocentric, in projecting its power through the spatial politics of seeking to unite the entire global sphere under a single network of imperial authority. However, the fact that this notion of right is liberal, or that Western powers now broadly agree on how to approach their imperial politics of domination, does not make it post-imperialist. What this signifies instead is the intensification, or maybe even perfection, of an imperial politics of domination produced and impelled by a ‘liberal consensus’ in the West. By liberal consensus, I refer to the ideological convergence in the West about the need to remake the world and impose liberal governance mechanisms on global socio-economic and political relations (Harvey Citation2005). Just as nineteenth-century Europe used the occidental mantle of a ‘civilising mission’ to justify its imperial domination of the world, postcolonial imperialism has defined its political project on the basis of the need to pacify the world through the use of juridical and militaristic modes of interventions in order to structure the world in line with the ideological preferences of liberalism and Western ‘universal’ norms and cosmopolitan values. Among these are the trinity of democracy, human rights and good governance, and the imposition of neoliberal market mechanisms on global social relations: deregulation, liberalisation, privatisation and financialisation. While the principal Western imperial powers in the nineteenth century acted more clearly as individuated national actors competing with each other, today they tend to approach their politics of domination as a collectivist enterprise, as a network of power and privilege. And though brief territorial occupation could be a necessary adjunct, postcolonial imperialism, unlike its nineteenth-century forbear, frowns on long-term territorial occupation, preferring instead a system of ‘global indirect rule’ by which pliant regimes amenable to Western influence are cultivated and implanted. This has freed it from the inconveniencies of formal colonial occupation that are likely to attract anti-colonial backlash. Indeed, nineteenth-century imperialism was an exacting and expensive affair. It exerted itself through actual conquest, a commitment to long-term colonial occupation and the exercise of direct juridical and bureaucratic forms of control. This required resources, boots on the ground, skilled hands to oversee the administrative processes, and regimes of force to deal effectively with dissent and keep subject populations under control. Because of this, it attracted the resentment of the societies subjected to colonial occupation, who saw colonialism as a violent and exploitative imposition, held it culpable for the problems and crises it created for the colonised societies, and did much to resist its exploitative and dehumanising violence. The anti-colonial struggles in Africa and elsewhere in the South were in part about this reality, and they succeeded in part because of it. The authors of postcolonial imperialism know this. They are not only opposed to long-term territorial occupation because of the responsibilities it entails, but also because of the anti-colonial backlash it engenders. Not being in direct control of these states and societies, and not being in charge of their day-to-day administration, mean that they would not be held responsible for problems in these societies. This has in part helped in disguising the level of culpability and complicity of the West in generating crisis in Southern societies, which in turn has given them a leverage that direct control would not. This has allowed for the redefinition of Southern realities in ways that were, for example, not possible in the Cold War ideological climate. This in turn has allowed the West to reposition themselves as ‘strategic partners’ interested only in helping to find technical solutions to problems that are now defined as endogenously produced by the internal dysfunctions in these states and societies, problems that are now blamed solely on their corrupt and incompetent political classes. Changing the practice but not the logic of imperialism, thus, has a strategic ring to it: it has achieved outcomes similar to direct colonial control but without the exacting inconveniences and anti-colonial backlash. However, like past imperial projects, it is a specific imaginary of sovereignty, a system of power and domination, dependent on regimes of exploitation, violence and relations of force and coercion. Postcolonial imperialism and the African condition

V.Y. Mudimbe (2013) recently posited that every system of domination requires violence to impose its will and exert its power, a legitimating frame to validate its logic, a politics to define its authority and an ethics to assure its credibility; ultimately, such a system ‘always falls back on its own basic principles that allow it to qualify conducts as right or wrong’, good or bad, and legal or illegal (186). The liberal imperial order perfectly fits this mould: it is the power that adjudicates its own legality which in turn provides the basis for reproducing and maintaining its power and authority. It functions on a violent totalitarian logic that frowns on alternative modes of life, and a disciplinary power that disciplines anything or anybody that stands in its way or seeks to challenge its logic, ideological formations, and hierarchies of power and privilege. An oppressive and totalitarian power, it claims the right to intervene in Southern societies in the name of its constructed ethico-political project and this has led to the increasing militarisation of world politics and the routinisation of war through the constitution of regimes of violence and intervention by the more powerful Western states to secure compliance and pursue political agendas.

This right of intervention combines two models. First, is the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) model of humanitarian intervention, which became a UN initiative in 2005. It emerged out of the report by the Canadian government-sponsored International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), established in September 2000. The ICISS’s 2001 report of the same name articulated the principle of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ and led the campaign for the adoption of the R2P by the United Nations. The history of the R2P is however rooted in the triumphalism that developed in the immediate post-Cold War environment. President Bush had attempted to construct what he called a New World Order in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War (which suggested to many Western observers that the UN, which they previously thought was the bastion of Eastern political obstructionism and ideological rancour, could now finally get to work through consensus-building – part of the reason Hardt and Negri [2000] hastily conceptualised global power the way they did) and, as part of that new world order, led the UN mission in Somalia code-named ‘Operation Restore Hope’ in August 1992. About thesame time, UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, had released his Agenda for Peace (1992), his recommendation for dealing with conflicts in the post-Cold War environment.

However, the outbreak of conflicts in especially Eastern Europe and Africa, and the failure of Operation Restore Hope, which eventually led to the humiliating withdrawal of US forces in Somalia in March 1994, defeated the triumphalist disposition which produced it. Following the publication of Kaplan’s ‘The Coming Anarchy’ (1994), which tapped into Western anxieties about the intractability of Southern conflicts, the new barbarism and ethnic hatred thesis gained ascendancy and initially informed Western policy toward conflicts in Africa and Eastern Europe. It was not until the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide and the Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia that this liberal will to power would find the avenue to credibly inscribe itself. Years of trial and error in working out the philosophical framework for responding to Southern conflicts and humanitarian disaster produced the R2P. The UN resolution adopting the R2P specifies four grounds for intervention: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. However, the elasticity and imprecisions of these concepts mean that they could be, and have in fact been, stretched and manipulated to justify parochial motives that have little to do with humanitarian agendas. Libya was the first time that the UN Security Council officially mandated the use of military force in the name of the R2P. But, as we now know, the NATO action in Libya was driven by much larger geopolitical, economic and ideological impulses. Indeed, concerns about human rights and humanitarian disasters have now become a disciplinary mechanism for the dominant and more powerful Western states to intervene in the affairs of Southern societies in order to pursue their own imperialistic agendas.

Second, is the post-9/11 ‘war on terror’ model of pre-emptive war, which has globalized violence, banalised war and routinised intervention. An angry and paranoid United States had, in the aftermath of 9/11, used the attacks as an opportunity to embark on a destructive course of global militarism that has intensified mass surveillance, created a permanent state of siege and state of exception that suspends rights and freedoms (Agamben2005) and increased racial profiling as certain bodies (especially male Muslim bodies deemed dangerous and expendable) are evicted from protection under Western law and marked for death(Razack2008). In other words, unleashing the very terror it claims it intends to fight. The US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 initiated this moment; in 2003 it was complemented by the invasion of Iraq, where facile concerns over fictive weapons of mass destruction were used as an excuse for the invasion and occupation of a sovereign state by the United States and its allies. While both models constitute different moments in the rising militarisation of world politics, they are related and thus reinforce each other. Concerns about ‘terrorism’ have meant that conflicts and other forms of political unrest have come to be defined as a security challenge for the West. But these two models are not just responding to state failure or terrorism as it were, they are also responding to anxieties about a world slipping out of the control of the traditional centres of power. They therefore constitute a will to domination and narcissistic obsession with control over Southern societies. They also function as processes of appropriation and redefinition of anti-imperial articulations that aim to negate the very imperial order being recast through these models of intervention, and there-fore function as key moments of hegemonic (re)articulation (Laclau and Mouffe2001). Most of the recent interventions in Africa – Libya, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, CAR and so forth – combine both models.

Though protected by the armour of violence and coercion, the current liberal imperial order has also relied on the power-knowledge fields of Western intellectual production to fashion a discourse that justifies its will to domination. Indeed, no relations of power, certainly no imperial or hegemonic system, could thrive on the basis of force and coercion alone. Sooner or later, such systems will have to come to terms with the imperatives of the dominated groups or societies and their will to resist. Frantz Fanon shows in The Wretched of the Earth (1963) that every state of siege is also always a possible state of emergence, in that it always invites a response from forces articulating its negation, sometimes by militant action (Bhabha 1994). To blunt its negation, such a system must also be able to legitimate itself by defining its project as necessary in order to win the support of the dominated. This involves, as Gramsci (1971) notes, establishing a moral and ideological leadership, and presenting a definition of reality that speaks to, and thus is accepted by, the dominated groups or societies. This is not to suggest that there is a moral superiority of the ethico-political projects of imperial or hegemonic systems, but that systems of domination only really succeed insofar as they are able, in addition to their capacity for violence, to credibly present their definition or interpretation of reality as the accepted ‘truth’, thereby making sociality and politics unthinkable outside of their prescribed or preferred ideological parameters and normative systems (Gramsci 1971).

To the extent that Gramscian notions of hegemony could be stretched beyond their specific historical, national and class contexts, to include, as Fanon (1963) suggests in relation to Marxist categories, race and coloniality, one could, at least in the African case, argue that the liberal imperial system has been produced partially through the articulation of the definition of African realities by the West and the acceptance by the political and economic classes on the continent of the need for the West to intervene in African crises. This has involved recapturing and rearticulating anti-colonial sensibilities contesting imperial forces on the continent through a process of appropriation that redefines social and political reality in modes that absorb Western complicity, while holding internal conditions and, especially, the domestic political classes solely responsible for creating the conditions that liberal intervention purports to address. In other words, the West has, through the complicity of the African political and intellectual classes, been able to fashion a discourse that, in its stylised rendition, paradoxically casts itself as anti-imperial, while reinforcing its own will to domination. This discourse, which appeals to the African condition and the sensibilities of the African streets as well as its political and intellectual classes, defines social reality on the continent in terms of crisis and disorder endogenously produced by the internal dysfunction of African societies blamed solely on its corrupt political classes.

Reinforced by the fact that the global indirect rule which places pliant regimes beholden to external influence shields Western complicity in the crisis that liberal imperialism claims to respond to, these ideas have been successfully diffused and popularised so that they have become the way Africans have come to view themselves, as well as accept the implications of their practical conclusions. In many places on the continent, for example, questions about the impact of colonialism or contemporary imperialism do not carry much weight today. Indeed, there tends to be a widespread aversion to, if not outright rejection of, discourses that stress the relevance of colonialism and imperialism for the continent’s present-day condition. The dominant discourses on and about Africa tend to, by omission or design, gloss over the impact of colonialism on the continent and its experience with violent and exploitative forms of imperial power that have historically violated the integrity of African societies, and stand in the way of their self-determination. Popular discourses on and about the continent prefer to talk mainly about incompetent, greedy, corrupt and despotic rulers, who have usurped the popular will of the people, criminalised the state, entrenched poverty, obstructed development, and engendered civil and political unrest, armed conflicts and state failure (the neopatrimonialist and state failure literature, for example, attests to this). In a similar vein, democracy, human rights and good governance are uncritically posited as the continent’s saving graces, as if these are neutral and apolitical concepts. If the incompetent, greedy, corrupt and despotic rulers are responsible for the internal dysfunction in African societies, then the intervention of the external agency of the West would rescue Africans from these despotic rulers, and help them fight poverty, achieve economic growth and development, establish democratic regimes, and promote human rights and good governance.

The pervasiveness of these ideas and their diffusion even on the African streets mean that Western imperialism has succeeded in reinventing itself as an acceptable alternative to the crises and dysfunction it has helped in creating, but which are now blamed solely on brutal and corrupt dictators. Rather than something to run from, or something to resist and defeat, it has reinvented itself as something to embrace, for it has defined itself as the bulwark against corrupt and dictatorial governments and as the panacea to African problems since it stands for the promotion of democracy, good governance and development, and the protection of human rights. On the continent, the popular discourses which have emerged agree with this assessment: African problems are simple, they are reducible to a choice between despotic rulers and imperial domination, and the cards have come in favour of the latter. Never mind that these so-called despotic rulers are produced within the same systems that make the imperialist domination of the continent possible. In the late 1990s, during the height of the Sierra Leonean civil war, for example, there were popular calls for Britain to recolonise the country. So has the idea of US colonization remained popular in Liberia. Indeed, this colonial nostalgia is widespread on the continent, as in the recent cases of Cote d’Ivoire and Mali, where the French intervention was actively supported by the intellectual and political classes.

#### This is why AFRICOM’s continued presence in Libya serves as a proxy conflict between the US and geopolitical adversaries like Russia and China – continued supply of munitions and mercenaries in the region ramps up competition over access to resources, which makes agitating against the use of Libya as a battleground imperative.

Shupak ’20 [(Greg Shupak writes fiction, non-fiction and book reviews. His most recent book is *The Wrong Story: Palestine, Israel, and The Media*. He teaches Media Studies at the University of Guelph.) “The Last Thing Libya Needs Is an Intensification of a U.S. Proxy War”, In These Times, 08/18/2020. <https://inthesetimes.com/article/the-last-thing-libya-needs-is-an-intensification-of-the-u-s-proxy-war>] pfox TDI

Antagonism between the United States and Russia is deepening over Libya’s natural resources. Libya has long had two competing seats of government: the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA), which is led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj and recognized by the UN Security Council, and the eastern-based House of Representatives, an ally of the Libyan National Army (LNA). The LNA is led by commander Khalifa Haftar, a U.S. citizen and one-time C.I.A asset who owns properties in Virginia. Russian contractors have taken control of two of Libya’s largest oil facilities, giving the contractors sway over crucial export flows to Europe, as well as over assets partly owned by major Western oil companies. Haftar, who Russia supports, is blocking much of Libya’s oil production. In July, the U.S. Treasury Department levied new sanctions against Russia, citing in part Russian involvement in Libya, while the State Department says the United States is incensed by Russia’s support for Haftar’s obstruction of the oil industry.

The last thing that Libya needs is intensification of the proxy war in the country. Americans should agitate to prevent their government from using Libya as a battleground against Russia. After all, the United States and its allies are answerable for the litany of horrors through which Libyans have lived for most of the last decade because these unfolded under the conditions left by NATO’s overthrow of Gaddafi’s government.

When NATO first attacked Libya in 2011, the alliance did so citing a highly dubious ​“humanitarian” rationale. During that operation, NATO carried out several serious crimes. These include its aircraft firing two missiles at jeeps belonging to pro-Gaddafi forces and, roughly five minutes later when a crowd of civilians rushed to the vehicles, firing a third missile that killed approximately 47 civilians. Furthermore, the anti-Gaddafi fighters, on whose side NATO intervened, ethnically cleansed 48,000 people from Tawergha, a town mostly made up of Black Libyans. NATO can’t claim ignorance about the fact that the Libyan factions it was supporting had the bigoted inclinations that led to such measures, as well as to many killings targeting Black people — and later to slavery and to the appalling treatment of African migrants. After all, when NATO decided to intervene, it was public knowledge that many of the anti-Gaddafi fighters were engaging in racist violence.

Nine years of violence

For the nearly 10 years since NATO bombed Libya and facilitated the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi, the country has been beset by all manner of violence and brutality.

An ISIS franchise emerged in Libya in 2014. It beheaded 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians and, after Egypt responded with deadly air raids, the organization carried out a series of bombings that killed 40. Subsequently, Libya-based ISIS released a video apparently showing the group murdering 30 Ethiopian Christians, one of a long list of crimes the group carried out, including a pair of bombings that reportedly killed more than 56 Libyans. In addition, the group has crucified people for violating religious codes of dress and conduct.

A coalition including the United States, France, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and three Libyan factions killed between 242 and 395 civilians in over 2,000 airstrikes and drone strikes between 2012 and 2018. The coalition acknowledges none of these casualties and most of the attacks have been conducted in secret. This campaign was ostensibly aimed at unseating ISIS and other militants. The coalition, it seems, is of the view that it’s better that it kill Libyans than leave them to be killed by someone else.

In 2017, video captured migrants being auctioned off in open-air slave markets. Under policies endorsed by the European Union, refugees and migrants attempting to reach Europe from African countries have been forcibly sent to Libya and held in detention centers. In these facilities, children and newborns are kept without adequate nourishment, healthcare ranges from insufficient to non-existent, and conditions are overcrowded and unsanitary. The detainees, Amnesty International reports, are subject to rape and torture. A migrant detention center in Libya was bombed last July, killing at least 44 people and leaving more than 130 severely injured. A UN report found that the airstrikes were carried out by a foreign state, which the report suggests may have been ​“under the command of the LNA” or ​“operated under the command of that foreign State in support of the LNA.” The GNA, meanwhile, has subjected Libyans to widespread torture. Amnesty International says that the GNA carried out an artillery attack on a densely populated civilian neighbourhood, ​“killing at least five civilians and injuring more than a dozen,” and that there is evidence that the GNA and the LNA have committed war crimes. In June, mass graves were discovered in in Tarhouna, which is roughly 100 kilometres southeast of Tripoli, and the UN is calling for an investigation.

A proxy war

The bloodletting in Libya is — and has been since NATO decided to intervene in 2011 — most accurately understood as an international proxy war driven by a thirst for resources. Libya has Africa’s largest oil reserves, mineral deposits, and more than a thousand miles of coastline on the Mediterranean, all of which, as the Los Angeles Times put it, are ​“at the heart of the international conflict” in the country.

Horace Campbell, a professor of African American Studies and Political Science at Syracuse University, points out that between 2007 and 2008, Gaddafi’s government compelled Western oil companies such as the American firm Occidental to ​“sign new deals with [Libya’s] National Oil Company, on significantly less favorable terms than they had previously enjoyed.” In the final stages of NATO’s war, the U.S. ambassador in Tripoli, Gene A. Cretz, was, according to the New York Times ​“already trying to help American companies exploit business opportunities,” having taken part in a State Department conference call with about 150 American firms hoping to do business in Libya. Cretz was quoted in the same article as saying that ​“If we can get American companies here on a fairly big scale, which we will try to do everything we can to do that, then this will redound to improve the situation in the United States with respect to our own jobs.” As NATO was in the process of bringing a new provisional Libyan government to power, that provisional government said it is ​“eager to welcome Western businesses.” Mustafa Abdel-Jalil, chairman of Libya’s National Transitional Council (NTC), the main political body of the anti-Gaddafi fighters, said the new Libyan government ​“would even give its Western backers some ​‘priority’ in access to Libyan business.” A month later, British Defense Secretary Philip Hammond said that British companies should ​“pack their suitcases” for Libya as it is ​“a relatively wealthy country with oil reserves, and I expect there will be opportunities for British and other companies to get involved in the reconstruction.”

The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), which is responsible for U.S. military operations in Africa, has outposts across the continent and is also part of the story of the Libyan tragedy. Among AFRICOM’s aims, American Vice Admiral Robert Moeller said three years before Gaddafi’s ouster, is to ensure ​“the free flow of resources from Africa to the global market.” Eight months prior to the bombing of Libya, Moeller wrote that one of AFRICOM’s purposes is to ​“promote American interests.” Cables from the U.S. embassy in Tripoli demonstrate American frustration with African governments reluctant to have AFRICOM installations on their soil.

Once Gaddafi’s government had been removed, AFRICOM announced — before a Libyan election took place — that a new military relationship had been established between AFRICOM and a government appointed by the NTC. There are presently two AFRICOM bases in Libya, even as American troops left the country in 2019 in what the United States views as a temporary measure until there’s a ceasefire in the war.

U.S. allies fighting on all sides

The more AFRICOM bases there are, the greater the capacity the U.S. government and business interests have to try to assert its will over Africa’s vast resource wealth amid U.S.-Chinese competition for access to these: Not only is the continent rich with oil, it is also a source of valuable minerals, such as columbium, chromium, and cobalt, which are strategically important to the U.S. military because it needs these for weapons manufacturing.

Thus, the U.S. empire benefits from having as much purchase as it can with as many governments in Africa as possible. That could explain why the U.S. is working with allied governments that are involved in both sides of the conflict.

The GNA’s most enthusiastic sponsor is Turkey, which sent military forces and mercenaries from the Free Syrian Army to bolster the GNA, leading to the latter making major gains. Turkey is a U.S. partner in NATO with, in the words of a U.S. government spokesperson, ​“a largely U.S. equipped and supplied military.” Turkey has resource excavation projects in the Mediterranean, and last year it signed an agreement with the GNA that would block Greek and Cypriot energy drilling in the Eastern Mediterranean. Qatar is another purchaser of U.S. weapons that arms and finances the GNA. Following the Saudi-led boycott of Qatar, the latter has grown closer to Turkey, as both back the Muslim Brotherhood — who the Saudis see as an enemy. Libya represents an opportunity for Qatar to frustrate Saudi designs.

In February of this year, Saudi Arabia — long a central node in the U.S. empire—increased its funding of forces associated with the LNA in an effort to counter Riyadh’s adversaries in Ankara. Egypt, which received $1.3 billion in U.S. military aid last year, has supported Haftar because the Egyptian government is a bitter opponent of the Brotherhood, and because Egypt has made plans to jointly control recently discovered gas fields in the eastern Mediterranean with Israel, Greece and Cyprus to the exclusion of Turkey. Israel, another crucial U.S. proxy, provides the LNA with arms, intelligence and training in view of the possibility that Turkey — with whom Israel has a sometimes rocky relationship — could use a pro-Ankara GNA to disrupt Israeli-Cypriot plans to build gas pipelines to Greece and Italy. Absurdly, some of the drones that Turkey has sent to the GNA were made by Israel and sold to Turkey’s ally, Azerbaijan.

Though Russia presently supports the LNA, it has, at times, worked with all sides in the war. Russia has sent mercenaries to bolster the LNA and is pushing to build a military base on Libya’s Mediterranean coast: American and British diplomats are encouraging the GNA to prevent that. Western-Russian antipathy notwithstanding, U.S.-made Javelin missiles were uncovered in an area under LNA control. The United States said it had sold these to France, and France — an ally of the LNA — said it lost track of them. Haftar’s fighters have used U.S.-made Caiman mine-resistant vehicles provided by the UAE, a country seeking to expand its economic interests in Africa. An Emirati base in eastern Libya was home to Chinese-made drones, to combat planes operated by a company associated with Erik Prince, founder of the American mercenary firm Blackwater, and to French special forces. The U.S also blocked a UN Security Council statement condemning Haftar following the July 2019 attack on the migrant center.

Whichever side wins the war, therefore, the Unites States will likely have influence over them, either directly or through one of its regional deputies.

Stephanie Williams, Deputy Special Representative for Political Affairs in Libya, UN Mission in Libya, attributed the terror Libya is going through to the outside powers who are fueling it, stating: ​“From what we are witnessing in terms of the massive influx of weaponry, equipment and mercenaries to the two sides, the only conclusion that we can draw is that this war will intensify, broaden and deepen — with devastating consequences for the Libyan people.”

These dynamics will get even worse if U.S.-Russian enmity in Libya is allowed to spiral.

#### Ultimately, the core interest of AFRICOM is not regional stability, but mirrors other global engagements of the US military in securing the interests of American capital, establishing proxy governments, and securing strategic advantages for allies against possible competitors – the aff represents the beginning of the reversal of colonialism’s devastating impact on African peoples, which requires those of us in the US left take up demands for the total withdraw of AFRICOM.

Carliner ’22 [(Sam Carliner, socialist with a background in journalism. He mainly writes for Left Voice about US imperialism.) “U.S. Military in Africa Fuels Political Violence Across the Continent”, Left Voice, 02/12/2022. <https://www.leftvoice.org/u-s-military-in-africa-fuels-political-violence-across-the-continent/>] pfox TDI

Much like South and Central America, imperialist nations have long viewed the African continent as a place for stealing valuable assets. The continent has 30 percent of the world’s remaining mineral wealth and is home to five of the top 30 oil producing countries in the world. That is why the European powers carved up the continent during the “Scramble for Africa,” and it is why the United States now seeks to control the military operations of African countries in key regions like the Sahel (along with French imperialism) and The Horn, as well as maintain a broader military presence throughout the continent.

The best-known example of AFRICOM’s impact is the regime change mission in Libya in 2011. This operation was enacted by a multi-state “coalition,” led by the United States, to impose United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 — which established the basis for a foreign military intervention in Libya’s civil war. It is an example of just how much damage U.S.-led intervention can do to a country without the United States ever having to put boots on the ground or act unilaterally — both recurring aspects of AFRICOM’s operations.

Hillary Clinton, then U.S. Secretary of State, bragged at the time about how the U.S. intervention in Libya’s civil war resulted in the death of Muammar Qaddafi, joking to a reporter, “We came, we saw, he died.” While Qaddafi subjected the people of Libya to political suppression and violence, the U.S. intervention was one of the most devastating moments in Libya’s history. It further fueled the country’s civil war, opened the floodgates for greater corruption, and led to the creation of slave markets.

AFRICOM has been around for little more than a decade, but the tactics used in Libya were tested decades earlier when U.S. proxy warfare was used to suppress the Pan-Africanist movement that once provided inspiration to colonized Black people throughout the continent and in Black communities of the United States. This was the case in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where the United States used its international connections to strengthen opposition to Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, a leading Pan-Africanist figure. The CIA. even had a plan to assassinate Lumumba with poison toothpaste, though the organization was unsuccessful at recruiting an asset to do the deed.

The United States was successful at sabotaging many of the African independence movements that erupted during the Cold War. However, once the Soviet Union collapsed, the United States could no longer use the supposed threat of communism to justify its domination of the African continent and other parts of the world. The “War on Terror” became the new excuse.

Operation Enduring Freedom is best known as the beginning of the “War on Terror.” While it was centered in Afghanistan, it also included operations in many other countries. Operation Enduring Freedom — Horn of Africa placed U.S. troops in Kenya, Liberia, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Tanzania, Somalia, Uganda, and Rwanda. In Operation Enduring Freedom — Trans-Sahara, U.S. troops were deployed to Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal. Through the guise of “counter-terrorism,” Operation Enduring Freedom continued the history of Western imperialist powers controlling the affairs of primarily Black countries throughout Africa.

Investigative journalist Nick Turse has been leading efforts to uncover the extent of AFRICOM’s operations, many of which remain withheld from the public and the press. In 2019, he reported that from 2008 to 2019, the number of U.S. troops, bases, and drone strikes across the continent all spiked considerably — most with counter-terrorism as the stated mission. Rather than curbing terrorism, the growing U.S. military presence actually led to increases in activity by the very actors the United States claimed to be there to suppress.

While much of the bourgeois press claimed that President Biden ended the “War on Terror” with his withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, AFRICOM has continued its activities in Africa, often in partnership with France’s imperialist presence that Africans strongly oppose.

Along with aiding the imperialist French military, the United States uses its forces in Africa to train the armies of various African countries. These training initiatives most directly reveal the U.S. roots of the wave of coups in Africa. Since 2008, at least nine West African military figures trained by AFRICOM have led coups in their countries. The Burkina Faso coup, the most recent military coup in Africa as of this writing, was led by Lt. Col. Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, who participated in at least half a dozen AFRICOM training exercises.

AFRICOM’s operations are covert and enable the United States to influence Africa through proxy control of various countries’ militaries rather than explicit U.S. military occupation. However, some African countries are subjected to the more overt tactic of U.S. airstrikes. In Somalia, for example, the United States conducted 42 airstrikes from 2007 to 2017, and then under the Trump administration rapidly increased those strikes launching another 43 just between January and August 2020. Though it is well established that U.S. airstrikes create a high rate of civilian casualties, many of which often go undereported by the military, the Biden Administration has continued bombing Somalia.

As the recent wave of coups throughout West Africa shows, the training that AFRICOM provides to brutal national armies is not really about “counter-terrorism.” Thanks to the United States, these armies are skilled at putting down uprisings of African people fighting for independence from neocolonialist imperialism and control of their own resources for their own development.

It is long past time that Africans were able to determine their futures free of the violence and undevelopment to which they are subjected by the imperialist powers. It will be up to us in the United States — the heart of imperialism — to end what the U.S. military has been doing throughout Africa. That will require that we understand it and mobilize against it.

Abolish AFRICOM now!

#### The aff’s demand for demilitarization is not a concession to the legitimacy of the US military apparatus, but rather explicitly connects the history of anti-militarism at home and abroad. Situating our critique of international relations in the context of material moves to end military presence does not lead to the capture of the academy by empire, but reclaims it – that requires explicit commitment to the particular study of social movements on the ground and demands like the plan, but you should refuse claims of the “inevitability” of elite capture!

Brewer et al ’23 [(Rose Brewer, PhD, is an activist-scholar specializing in political economy, social movements, and studies in Africa and the African diaspora. She is a professor of African-American and African Studies at the University of Minnesota, where she is the Morse Alumni Distinguished Teaching Professor and previous chairperson of the Department of African American and African Studies. Interviewed by T.A. Tran and Leanne Loo.) “Resisting AFRICOM and Beyond: An Interview with Rose Brewer of Black Alliance for Peace”, Science for the People, Winter 2022/2023. <https://magazine.scienceforthepeople.org/vol25-3-killing-in-the-name-of/resisting-africom-and-beyond/>] pfox TDI

SftP: Can you tell us about the work you do around resistance against militarism and United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) through the Black Alliance for Peace?

Brewer: Black Alliance for Peace is just a little bit over five years old, and the AFRICOM initiative is one of the most sturdy and significant pieces of work done by BAP. The idea of having military bases on the continent has really gathered steam since the Bush administration, and from the idea that was presented by the Defense Department in 2007.3 It didn’t really get catalyzed until 2008. There’s always been, or for quite a while, pushback against having those bases by the countries on the continent. More recently under the mantra of “fighting the war on poverty,” more and more of the African countries have allowed military bases to come in. Our work in BAP has really been a tremendous pushback against this for a number of reasons. BAP is an anti-imperialist, anti-colonial formation, concerned with the persistence of the neocolonial realities of not only Africa, but other parts of the world, and indeed on the tremendous negative impact by the US empire and its alliance with what we call “comprador class”—the governing structures of those societies. Basically that means the [African] elites who are in relationship with the Defense Department for those bases. Their public message is to provide “military training” to those various nations on the continent for protection to “secure democracy.” But of course none of that has really happened.

SftP: What are the roles of science and technology, including social science, in neocolonialism and militarism on the African continent?

Brewer: I really had to sit with that, because it’s very significant in a lot of ways. I want to generate a longer history, because this has been a very significant aspect of militarism in this country for quite a while. We have members who say from the very first time that Africans were stolen, militarism played a significant role. If we fast forward to the Imperialist World Wars and the post-World War II period, this really ratcheted up quite a bit in relation to the question that you’re asking. The RAND Corporation was put into effect in 1948 and they recruited both natural sciences and social sciences into their think tank. A lot of that conversation was around nuclear arms, and the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States in that post–World War II period—the beginning of the Cold War. Another key arena was around 1956 when American University created something called the Special Operations Research Office, and they got money from the Defense Department. Here you really did see quite a number of political scientists, psychologists, and sociologists in relationship to military experts. Again, it’s the Cold War—the tension around communism and so-called democracy—and they brought the social scientists in to look at the nature of communism, political organizations, mobilizations, and the nature of social change.

However, it’s my understanding that the American War in Vietnam led to a level of critique against social scientists being involved in research funded by the Defense Department for military purposes. But it’s never gone away, and we can fast forward to the current period. A lot of the military funding that flows into the academy goes to political science. There’s always been a big coterie of engineers, physicists, and the natural sciences that have always gotten a lot of funding from the Defense Department, given the interest in weapons. But there’s also this social science aspect of it, which really looks at the human component of war and militarism. And international relations (IR) studies have also received quite a bit of funding from the Defense Department. We’re talking about millions of dollars and social scientists who get big grants of more than a million dollars to do research and writing. So there’s definitely an interplay and intermeshing between these scholarly entities. I call it the corporate university, to place more emphasis on the relationship between the security state and the university. They’re reading everything we’re reading, and more. That’s the logic, or illogic, of how they move.

But there was pushback by the late 1960s, because everything was blowing up here from the Black Power movement to resistance on college campuses, and to the pushback against universities who capitalize on defense funding. As a matter of fact, down the road from me, there was an explosion that was at the University of Wisconsin–Madison regarding this very matter,4 as well as the pushback to eliminate the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC). As a matter of fact, as I was getting into this whole issue of the corporate university, even more funding has been funneled into the sciences without a set of critical questions. What are we doing carrying out this research for the military? And of course there are people who push back. But the corporate university looks a lot like corporations in the twenty-first century with a top-down strategy where elites really push a particular agenda. The humanistic areas have really been given short shift, like ethnic studies. So the academy reflects a lot about what this society represents as it carries out the needs and interests of the war machine. And the budgets that could go to human needs are not going there.

SftP: What has been done with all of this war research produced from the academy? How has it been used?

Brewer: It’s published. It was produced as materials for those think tanks. We think of war, or how the media looks at it, [through] simply the technical aspect of it: the machinery, the bombs, the actual folks who are fighting. But war is not simply this. There is a psychology. There is a sociology that practitioners, generals, those decision-making entities are drawing upon to understand what is the nature of the sites. Who are the people? How do they move? So they’re using this material in a very harsh and nefarious way, but it isn’t as much hand-in-glove as the use of the military equipment. And it doesn’t get as much attention.

So that’s a social science question, but it’s being deployed as a security question and as a US-interest question, in terms of that interrelationship among the social psychology, the social science of it, and the hardware aspect.

SftP: Does AFRICOM play a role in this story, and specifically on how science and technology is leveraged for military purposes?

Brewer: We haven’t really explored that as much as we’ve looked at the number of coups that have happened on the continent—two in Burkina Faso in 2022 alone. These are often fighters who have been trained by AFRICOM. It also trains militaries in Africa, to the extent that the various nations don’t have their independent military anymore in most instances. So they’re selecting out potential military commanders, leaders, and using the tools of the US military to position them in relation to the interests of the United States. Mali, for example, has gold and other tremendous resources that are needed and utilized in other parts of the world, but especially in terms of the mining interest of the United States. The political economy of militarism on the African continent has everything to do with the resources that the multinational corporations depend on. A disproportionate number of them, of course, are seeded here in the United States. So it’s that convergence of politically understanding the economic terrain on which AFRICOM is seated and understanding the political dynamics in those places.

SftP: Would you say that the use of science and technology for neocolonialism and militarism is inevitable?

Brewer: Let me put that in a slightly different context. Inevitability, in the sense that time, place, and condition has situated the most capitalist society in the world (which is the United States) to articulate its own full-spectrum dominance—that is, it being the leading force in the world—while the majority of the world is pushing for multi-polarity. And when the Second World War (the Second Imperialist War) ended, the United States was the leading force. The complexity of where we are now means that in order for this empire to continue what we call its full-scale dominance, the status-quo of science and technology are necessary. [But] if we have a world that is catalyzed toward peace, that’s a different kind of question. So I’m making a distinction. If we are holding onto our position of dominance, then yes: science and militarism will be convergent. If we are fighting and resisting, and articulating a vision where the possibility of peace, the disarmament of nuclear arms, the possibility of the people and the planet living in good relationships, then no: they are not an inevitability, though it requires particular political demands.

SftP: Is there a relationship between how science and technology are used for domestic repression in the United States versus how they are used for warring abroad?

Brewer: BAP makes that connection between here and across the world. There’s the 1033 program where military hardware can be acquired by police departments and are used predominantly against communities of color.5 For example, here in Minneapolis, the city is debating a proposal by the police department to employ drones for policing.6 I live in the city where the George Floyd murder happened, and all that military hardware was out in full effect. The militaristic training of the police is comparable. As a matter of fact, you remember the warrior training that Derek Chauvin received, using the knee on the neck.

This is also not disconnected with what’s happening on the African continent. The defense budget in this country is tremendous, and the extent to which these resources are deployed is just beyond the pale, and that connection between police departments and the military has been solidified even more deeply. So, 1033 allowed that to happen.

SftP: What would a science that’s leveraged for anti-imperialist struggle look like?

Brewer: Science for the people! That’s what it would look like. The idea of science for the good of humanity, which does not deploy resources to exploit and expropriate. To build a just and fair world, and use information, knowledge, and expertise to that end.

We’re in a tremendous period of climate catastrophe. Hundreds of scientists signed a document just a few weeks ago saying that we cannot continue the way we are. The planet is on fire. Here, scientists can leverage their position for the social good, for peace. Like technology–what is it used for? Who controls it? In whose interests? Those are the questions that I think matter and move us toward the kind of science for the people that you all are lifting up.

SftP: Do you see ways in which communities living throughout Africa have done what you’re saying—reclaiming science for anti-imperialist struggle for antiwar struggle, or otherwise resisting its use for militarism?

Brewer: There’s a lot of resistance going on. I think one of the less well-known things is who are the allies and collaborators with BAP. Many of those collaborators are doing everything that you’re saying. We have a number of organizations that are not here, but are rooted on the continent that work with the Africa team, with the United States Out of Africa,7 engaging in political resistance and organizing the people with the kind of political education and knowledge that’s needed. For example, on October 1, 2022, we had a webinar composed entirely of activists from the continent who spoke to militarism, AFRICOM, and the comprador class on the continent. So, that kind of solidarity to dismantle it, to take it out of the continent, is a big piece of what organizations there are doing. And that continues to weigh in not only on the continent. You might have seen the media releases on Haiti and the pushback against sending US troops there.8 A lot of this is about self-determination. If you do have a civilian military, that’s one thing. If you have a military that’s trained by an empire, that’s a very different thing.

SftP: What are the demographics and geographies of these movements that have been popping up throughout Africa? How are women playing a role? How are young people playing a role? Are there particular types of resistance seen more in the rural areas versus the urban areas? Is it arising out of folks who have also been impacted by climate change and how it interacts with militarism?

Brewer: There are a lot of layers to what you just put on the table. As I mentioned before, the continent is very young, so a lot of the resistors are our young people. The people who have been most harmed by the neocolonial order are young people, women, and folk who have traditionally made a living by farming. This catalyzes folks to respond, to rise up.

If we look at South Africa, which I would say is most connected to the political economy of capitalism, where the economy has resided in the hands of the minority white population. Here even getting access to housing and potable water is contested. Much of the protests and resistance in South Africa is against land grabs.9 The people who are most harmed are those who have contributed least to climate change.

SftP: And what should liberation movements that we’re building here in the United States or anywhere else learn from the struggles of African peoples against AFRICOM, militarism, and imperialism?

Brewer: That brings us full circle back to the role of an organization like BAP. There’s such an insularity in this society about the depth and breadth about what this country does in the name of the people, all wrapped in security issues and terrorism issues, which are really façades to what’s beneath it. When you get into the left in this country, you can’t deal with domestic issues in isolation. They are inextricably linked to the global questions. You can’t resolve the issues of imperialism domestically, without knowing that this is an imperial nation with an empire that is all over the world, with eight hundred military bases all over the world. That’s what we’re dealing with: that’s how power is deployed. That’s how it’s maintained. That’s how it’s threatened.

#### You should invert your normal standards of risk calculus and prioritize the ongoing threats to colonized people over “existential” crises, because any other impact framing only secures white humanity – whenever the 1NC says to vote neg to save the world, ask yourself whose world they’re saving.

Mitchell and Chaudhury ’20 [Audra Mitchell, Balsillie School of International Affairs @ Wilfrid Laurier University, and Aadita Chaudhury, York University. “Worlding beyond ‘the’ ‘end’ of ‘the world’: white apocalyptic visions and BIPOC futurisms”, September 2020. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117820948936>] pfox TDI

It is often said that the ‘end of the world’ is approaching – but *whose* world, exactly, is expected to end? Over the last several decades, a popular and increasingly influential literature on ‘human extinction’, ‘global catastrophic risks’, and eco-apocalypse has emerged in the social sciences and popular culture. This rapidly growing body of knowledge is produced by scientists, science journalists, policy-analysts, and scholars of global affairs, all seeking to reach broad audiences and influence international policy-making. Their central aim is to diagnose the gravest global threats and to offer strategies to protect the future of what they regard as ‘humanity’. Yet, despite their claims to universality, we argue that these ‘end of the world’ discourses are more specifically concerned about protecting the future of *whiteness.* Although our primary aim in this article is to diagnose these potentially destructive narratives, we also engage with the rich and varied sphere of BIPOC (Black, Indigenous, and People of Color) futurisms. These contributions challenge the perception that there is no alternative to the apocalyptic futures imagined by white scholars. They work to create plural worlds that vastly exceed white visions of ‘the’ end of ‘the world’, embodying much wider, diverse, and transformative concepts of, and beyond, ‘humanity’, ‘nature’, and ‘the planet’. We view this article as a call for IR scholars to recognize and engage these plural imaginaries, which contest and perforate the boundaries of mainstream IR concepts such as ‘humanity’, ‘agency’, ‘governance’, ‘threat’, and ‘harm’. As Amy Niang’s contribution to this special issue shows, those concepts are too often constructed through forms of power that negate, oppress, and super-exploit particular human bodies, societies, and ways of being.

Our analysis takes seriously this special issue’s efforts toward ‘thinking IR into the future’, but with several important caveats. First, we reject the Euro-centric notion that there is ‘a’ or ‘the’ single future – just as we reject the notion of a single world, now or ever. Such assumptions are at the core of the mainstream apocalyptic visions (and their linear temporalities) that are increasing integral to IR imaginaries at the ‘turn’ of the discipline’s ‘first century’. We contend that the foundational and generative role of such imaginaries in global power structures does not receive adequate attention in the field of IR or in the broader social and natural sciences. As a result, their tendency to narrow and homogenize the future*s* of world*s*, plural, goes largely unchecked within the discipline and its discourses. Yet the white futurist discourses we discuss are influential: they aim to bring about major shifts in global public consciousness and policy-making and strategy. They are often accorded validation by the scientific credentials of their authors and their embeddedness in large-scale data and modeling processes. Through these means of public persuasion, such discourses have the potential to shape concepts that are, and will likely continue to be, foundational to IR: how threats are understood; the boundaries of ‘humanity’ and ‘nonhumanity’, and the distributions of harm across and beyond these structures; and the forms of agency and governance demanded by, and deemed acceptable within, a context of global crises. An interdisciplinary IR concerned with interconnected global challenges – the aspiration of this special issue – needs to attend to how dominant narratives and futural imaginaries cut off and sideline the concrete presents and possible futures of plural Others. Second, where this special issue asks ‘how *we* should hold things together, conceptually, empirically and disciplinarily’ (see introduction, italics ours), we ask what possibilities arise when current structures fall apart – or, indeed, are actively dismantled by the resurgence of worlds they seek to oppress or erase. Far from seeing this scenario solely in terms of catastrophe, as many of the narratives discussed in this article do, we want to open up more conversation in IR about its emancipatory, creative potential for the global connection between and amongst plural worlds.

With these aims in mind, we start by examining a number of salient and influential works in the field addressing global crises, including ‘global catastrophic risks’ and ‘human extinction’, demonstrating how they express anxiety for, and seek to protect whiteness. The second section points to BIPOC futurisms that directly challenge the futures circumscribed by whiteness and offer distinct forms of subjectivity, temporality, and mobilities for responding to ongoing disaster. Throughout, we focus on how futures are imagined, who imagines them and with whose flourishing in mind in competing struggles for survival and thriving in (post-) catastrophic worlds.

White subjectivities

Discourses that predict the imminent ‘end of the world’ are not as universal as they often claim to be. The futures they fear for, seek to protect and work to construct are rooted in a particular set of global social structures and subjectivities: whiteness. Whiteness is not reducible to skin pigmentation, genetics or genealogy. It is a set of cultural, political, economic, normative, and subjective structures derived from Euro-centric societies and propagated through global formations such as colonization and capitalism. These multi-scalar structures work by segregating bodies through the inscription of racial difference, privileging those they *recognize or construct* as ‘white’ and unequally distributing harms to those that they do not. Whiteness is also a form of property that accrues benefits – including material, physical, and other forms of security – and pervasive forms of power, across space, time, and social structures. Due in part to its trans-formation through long-duration, global patterns of violence and conquest, whiteness takes unique forms wherever and whenever it coalesces, so it should not be treated as universal – despite its own internal claims to this status. Most of the leading contributors to mainstream ‘end of the world’ discourses discussed in this article are rooted in Euro-American cultural contexts, and in particular in settler colonial and/or imperial states such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom. As such, the forms of whiteness they embody are linked to particular histories of settlement, frontier cultures, resource-based imperialisms, genocides of Indigenous communities, histories of slavery, and modes of anti-Blackness.

Whiteness is remarkable in its ability to render itself invisible to those who possess and benefit from it. Many, if not most, of the (often liberal humanitarian) authors of ‘end of the world’ discourses seem unaware of its integral influence on their thinking, and would almost certainly be horrified at the thought of their work entrenching racialized injustices. We are not suggesting that these authors espouse explicit, intentional and/or extreme racist ideals, on which much public discussion by white people of racism tends to focus. Nor do we wish to homogenize or present as equivalent all of the viewpoints discussed in this paper, which display a range of expressions of whiteness and levels of awareness thereof. On the contrary, we work to center broad, everyday, structural ways in which underlying *logics* of whiteness and white supremacy frame and permeate *mainstream* paradigms and discourses, including those identified as liberal, humanitarian, or progressive. Even amongst white people who consciously and explicitly disavow racism, unconscious, habitual, normalized, structurally-embedded assumptions circulate, and are reproduced in ways that perpetuate race as a global power structure. This includes one of the authors of this paper (Mitchell), who, as a white settler, continues to benefit from and participate – and thus ‘invest’ – in structures of whiteness, and therefore has a continual responsibility to confront them (although total divestment is not possible).

The ‘habits’ of racism are reflected strongly in the way that contemporary ‘end of the world’ narratives frame their protagonists: those attributed with meaningful agency and ethical status in the face of global threats; those whose survival or flourishing is prioritized or treated as a bottom line when tradeoffs are imagined and planned; and, crucially, those deemed capable of and entitled to ‘save the world’ and determine its future. This is expressed in several key features of the genre, including its domination by white thinkers; the forms of subjectivity and agency it embraces; and the ways it contrasts its subjects against BIPOC communities.

First, contributors to fast-growing fields like the study of ‘existential risk’ or ‘global catastrophic risk’ are overwhelmingly white. As we will see, almost all of the authors identified by the literature review on which this paper is based, and certainly the most influential thinkers in the field, are white. For example, the seminal collection *Global Existential Risk*, which claims to offer a comprehensive snapshot of this field, is edited by two white male Europeans (Nick Bostrom and Milan Circovic) and authored by an almost entirely white (and all-male) group of scholars. Likewise, the most senior positions within influential think tanks promoting the study of ‘existential risk’, such as the Future of Humanity Institute, the Cambridge Center for the Study of Existential Risk and [Humanprogress.org](http://Humanprogress.org), are dominated by white men, with few exceptions. Another expression of this tendency toward epistemic whiteness is found in the habit, prominent amongst white academics, of citing all or mostly-white scholars, which entrenches a politics of citation that privileges whiteness and acknowledges only *some* intersectionalities as relevant. As mentioned above, Mitchell’s (2017) work offers an example of this tendency: while it engages critical, feminist, and queer post-apocalyptic visions written by white authors, it does not center BIPOC perspectives or knowledge systems.

These examples do not simply raise issues of numerical representation, nor can whiteness necessarily be dismantled simply by altering these ratios. More importantly, all-white or majority white spaces create epistemes in which most contributors share cultural backgrounds, assumptions, and biases that are rarely challenged by alternative worldviews, knowledge systems or registers of experience. In such epistemes the perceived boundaries of ‘human thought’ are often elided with those of Euro-centric knowledge. For example, influential American settler journalist David Wallace-Wells contends that there exists no framework for grasping climate change besides ‘mythology and theology’. In so doing, he ignores centuries of ongoing, systematic observation and explicit articulations of concern by BIPOC knowledge keepers about climactic change. The bracketing of BIPOC knowledges not only severely limits the rigor of discourses on global crises, but also, as bi-racial organizer and thinker adrienne maree brown argues, it produces distorted outcomes. For instance, it smuggles normative judgments that ‘turn Brown bombers into terrorists and white bombers into mentally ill victims’ into apparently ‘objective’ claims. Similarly, the influential work of Black American criminologist Ruth Wilson Gilmore demonstrates how white imaginaries of the threat posed by BIPOC bodies has produced the massive global penal complex and the radically unequal distribution of life chances. In short, imaginaries create worlds, so it matters greatly whose are privileged, and whose are excluded.

Further, emerging narratives of the ‘end of the world’ explicitly center figures of whiteness as their protagonists – as the survivors of apocalypse, the subjects capable of saving the world from it, and as those most threatened. In these discourses, ‘survivors’ are framed as saviors able to protect and/or regenerate and even improve Western forms of governance and social order by leveraging resilience, scientific prowess, and technological genius. For example, the cover of American settler scientists Tony Barnosky and Elizabeth Hadley’s book *Tipping Points for Planet Earth* features a stylized male ‘human’ whom they identify as former California governor Jerry Brown (a powerful white settler politician) holding the earth back from rolling over a cliff. Similarly, presenting a thought experiment about the planet’s future, Homer-Dixon asks his readers to imagine ‘an average male – call him John’ (in fact, the most popular male name globally at the time of writing was Mohammed). This is followed by images of a Caucasian male dressed in safari or hiking gear – both emblematic of symbols colonial conquest – tasked with choosing from two forks on a path, as imagined by white American poet Robert Frost. This image of rugged masculine whiteness, embodied in physical strength, colonial prowess, and the ability to dominate difficult landscapes is mirrored in his framing of his former co-workers on oil rigs in the Canadian prairies as models of resilience. Similarly, American settler science writer Annalee Newitz proposes the Canadian province of Saskatchewan as a ‘model for human survival’, based on her perceptions of the resilience, persistence and collaborative frontier attitudes of its people. Saskatchewan is a notoriously racist part of Canada, in which violence against Indigenous people continues to be integral to its white-dominated culture – yet this polity and its culture are held up by Newitz as a model of ‘human’ resilience. By imagining subjects in whom whiteness is elided with resilience and survival, these discourses not only normalize and obscure the modes of violence and oppression through which perceived ‘resilience’ – or, in blunt terms, preferential access to survival – is achieved. They also work to displace the threat of total destruction ‘onto others who are seen as lacking the resourcefulness of the survivor’.

In addition, many ‘end of the world’ narratives interpellate subjects of white privilege by assuming that readers are not (currently) affected by the harms distributed unequally by global structures of environmental racism. For instance, Barnosky and Hadley (italics ours) state, ‘if you are *anything like we are*, you probably think of pollution as somebody else’s problem. . . you probably don’t live near a tannery, mine dump or any other source of pollution’. For many people of color, living near a source of pollution may be nearly inescapable as a result of structural-material discrimination, including zoning practices and the accessibility of housing. Viewing ecological harms as ‘someone else’s problem’ is a privilege afforded to those who have never been forced contemplate the destruction of their communities or worlds. At the same time, these authors – along with many others working in the genre – invoke narratives akin to ‘all lives matter’ or ‘colour-blindness’ that erase unequal distributions of harm and threat. For instance, during their international travels for scientific research and leisure, Barnosky and Hadley (italics ours) describe a dawning awareness that ‘the problems we were writing about. . .were everybody’s problems. . .no one was escaping the impacts. . . *including us*’. They go on to frame as equivalent flooding in Pakistan that displaced 20 million people and killed 2000 with the inconveniences caused by the temporary flooding of the New York subway system in 2012. In addition, they cite evidence of endocrine disruption in American girls caused by pollution, stating that the youngest of the cohort are African American and Latina but that ‘the most dramatic *increase* is in Caucasian girls’ (italics ours). In this framing, even though BIPOC children remain most adversely affected, white children are pushed to the foreground and framed as more urgently threatened in relative terms. These comparisons background the disproportionate burden of ecological harm born by BIPOC, and reflect a stark calculus of the relative value of white and BIPOC lives. The ‘all lives matter’ logic employed here constructs ‘a universal human frailty’ in which *responsibility* for ecological threats is attributed to ‘humans’ in general, and the assignment of specific culpability is avoided. While Newitz avers that ‘assigning blame [for ecological harm] is less important *than figuring out how to. . .survive*’, we argue that accurately attributing *responsibility* is crucial to opening up futures in which it is possible to dismantle the structural oppressions that unequally distribute harms and *chances* for collective survival.

Preoccupation with the subjects of whiteness in ‘end of the world’ discourses is also reflected in the framing of BIPOC communities as threats to the survival of ‘humanity’. These fears are perhaps most simply and starkly expressed in anxieties over population decline within predominantly white countries, paired with palpable fear of rising birth rates amongst BIPOC communities. Chillingly, such fears are often connected to the mere biological *survival* of BIPOC, and the reproductive capacities of Black and Brown bodies – especially those coded as ‘female’, and therefore ‘fertile’ within colonial gender binaries. For instance, in his treatise on ‘over’-population, American settler science writer Alan Weisman addresses the ‘problem’ raised by the likely significant increase of survival rates (especially amongst children) as a result of widely-available cures for illnesses such as malaria or HIV. Since, he avers, it would be ‘unconscionable’ to withhold these vaccines, Weisman suggests that malaria and HIV research funding should also promote family planning – that is, control of BIPOC fertility – since ‘there’s no vaccine against extinction’. Here, BIPOC survival and reproductivity is literally – even if not strictly intentionally – framed as an incurable disease that could culminate in ‘extinction’. Although some of these discussions examine total growth in human populations globally, much of this research focuses on relative population sizes, usually of BIPOC-majority places to those inscribed as white. For instance, British doctor John Guillebaud predicts a ‘birth dearth’ in Europe while likening ‘unremitting population growth’ in other parts of the world to ‘the doctrine of the cancer cell’. Although these regions are described in various ways throughout the genre – for instance, as ‘poor’ or ‘developing’, the areas slated for growth are almost always BIPOC-majority. For example, Hungarian demographer Paul Demeny (italics ours) argues that Europe’s population is steadily shrinking ‘while nearby populations *explode*’. Drawing on Demeny’s work, Homer-Dixon warns of a future 3:1 demographic ratio between North Africa/West Asia and Europe, along with 70% growth in Bangladesh, 140% growth in Kenya, and a doubling of the populations of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Nigeria. Directly after sharing these statistics, he appends a list of international news reports referring to, for example, clashes between Indigenous communities in Kenya, riots in Shanghai, and murder rates in Mexico. In so doing, he directly juxtaposes BIPOC population growth with stereotypes of violence and ‘incivility’.

BIPOC are often represented in these narratives as embodiments of ecological collapse and threat, embedding the assumption that ‘black people don’t care about the environment’, and that the global ‘poor’ will always prioritize short-term economic needs above ecological concerns. This belief is reflected in travelogue-style descriptions of ecological devastation, including Barnosky and Hadley’s musings, while on holiday in Utah, that the ancient Puebloan society collapsed because they had run out of water – a situation which they project onto future Sudan, Somalia, and Gaza. In addition, they diagnose the fall of what they call the ‘extinct’ Mayan community to overpopulation and over-exploitation of resources – despite the survivance of over 6 million Mayan people in their Ancestral lands and other places at the time of writing. These descriptions chime with the common refrain on the part of settler states that BIPOC are unable to care properly for their land, even in the absence of conflicting data. This constructed ignorance allows those states to frame BIPOC territories as ‘wasteland’ awaiting annexation or improvement, or as dumping grounds for the externalities of capitalism. What’s more, the use of BIPOC communities as cautionary tales for planetary destruction strongly suggests that the redistribution of global power, land ownership, and other forms of agency toward BIPOC structures would result in ecological disaster.

Unidirectional time

One of the hallmarks of emerging ‘end of the world’ discourses is profound anxiety about disruptions to – or reversals of – the linear concept of time that underpins European post-Enlightenment sciences. At stake, these discourses claim, is the ‘progress’ of humans and other life forms toward greater complexity and perfection. Frequently, lifestyles, forms of governance, conditions and structures associated with whiteness are presented as the current pinnacle of this movement under threat by global crises. For example, in *The Collapse of Western Civilization: A View from the Future*, in which they assess the *global* effects of climate change, American settler scholars Naomi Oreskes and Eric Conway issue ‘a call to protect the *American way of life* before it’s too late’ (italics ours). Similarly, in the context of global population dynamics, Weisman worries about the collapse of modern Western urban infrastructure and the loss of a ‘European standard of living’. Similarly, Barnosky and Hadley reminisce about recreational family trips to ‘Africa’ to see ‘the last remnants of big game’. These texts express profound anxiety over the loss of what Quandamooka scholar Aileen Moreton-Robinson calls white possessions, including empire, territory, and the biological and cultural capital of whiteness. They also enact a form of pre-emptive possessive mourning which frames particular animals and geographical features as the birthright of Western children.

In addition, many authors working in this genre worry about the interruption of the perceived stadial progression of ‘humanity’, a narrative that celebrates the emergence of whiteness through the elimination of ‘inferior’ races or cultures. For example, Canadian settler scholar Elizabeth Finneron-Burns (italics ours) warns that the extinction of ‘humanity’, which she associates with ‘rational life’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘civilization’ (terms all deeply linked to Euro-centric and colonial subjectivities) would be ethically wrong ‘if the advances made by humans over the past few millennia were lost or *prevented from progressing*’. In this vein, Bostrom idealizes a future in which the continued evolution of ‘(post)humanity’ culminates in a form of ‘technological maturity’ that adheres to mainstream norms of white maleness: deeply disembodied, unattached to place, and dominant over, or independent from, ‘nature’.

Closely-linked to worries about the loss of potential ‘human progression’ is the fear of *de-volution* or back-sliding. In some cases, fears of demographic decline in ‘white-majority’ regions (see above) extend to worries about the biological ‘extinction’ of white people. For instance, a recent report asserts that there has been 59.3% decline in total sperm count in men from North America, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand, but no comparable or significant decline in South America, Asia, and Africa, despite a paucity of studies in the latter regions (Ghosh 2017). While warning of a biological decline of whiteness, the articulation of these fears and the funding of research to address them undergirds a resurgence of whiteness formed in the perceived face of its destruction.

Indeed, many contributors to ‘end of the world’ discourses offer strategies for the reconstruction and ‘improvement’ of existing power structures after a global catastrophe. For example, American settler economist Robin Hanson calculates that if 100 humans survived a global catastrophic disaster that killed all others, they could eventually move back through the ‘stages’ of ‘human’ development, returning to the ‘hunter-gatherer stage’ within 20,000 years and then ‘progressing’ from there to a condition equivalent to contemporary society (defined in Euro-centric terms). Other authors focus on social, political, and economic forms of regeneration through simplification, which Homer-Dixon calls ‘catagenesis’. ‘*Western civilization* is not a lost cause’, he insists,

‘using reason and science to guide decisions, paired with extraordinary leadership and exceptional goodwill, *human society* can progress to higher and higher levels of well-being and development. . . But that requires resisting the very natural urge. . .to become less cooperative, less generous and less open to reason’ (italics ours).

In this vision, *Western* civilization – which, is elided here with ‘human society’ – can salvage the future using some of its trademark claims: the possession of reason, science, and cooperativeness. However, this requires assimilating all human communities into a Western liberal-cosmopolitan mode of civility and suppressing forms of resistance that threaten to knock this goal off course. If ‘humanity’ is able to achieve this goal and develop a ‘prospective mind’ capable of seeing opportunity in destruction, Homer-Dixon argues it will be able to ‘turn breakdown to *our* advantage’ (italics ours). Recalling that the ‘us’ in this discourse actively interpellates whiteness, this discourse frames global catastrophe as an opportunity to consolidate white structures of domination, assimilate resistors, and ultimately increase their power. Other authors who foresee post-apocalyptic movement toward a dazzling future (for whiteness) are clear about its costs. In his seminal book on human extinction, Canadian settler philosopher John Leslie states that ‘misery and death for billions [caused by an ecological crisis] would be immensely tragic, but might be followed by slow recovery and then a glittering future for a human race which had learned its lesson’. Similarly, Bostrom argues even the fractional reduction of threats to the possibility of posthuman, techno-infused subjectivities, by any means, would be worth ‘at least a hundred times the value of a million [contemporary] human lives’. Although rarely explicitly stated, it is not difficult to discern *whose* lives these authors believe might be sacrificed for the ‘greater good’ of ‘learning lessons’ and rescuing ‘humanity’ as they see it. This can be gleaned from these authors’ assessments of the ‘winners and losers’ of previous global upheavals. For example, in assessing the tumult of the twentieth century, Homer-Dixon states that Western capitalist societies were amongst the ‘most adaptive’ – and therefore closest to his ideal of the ‘prospective mind’ – while

‘at the other end of the spectrum, we find societies, including many in sub-Saharan Africa and some in Asia and Latin America, that have much lower ability to manage or adapt. . . a few, like Haiti and Somalia, have completely succumbed.’

While this statement refers historical patterns, it is presented as part of an analysis that explicitly analyzes historical trends as indicators of future scenarios. As such, it inscribes ongoing racial inequalities and stereotypes far into the future.

Despite these strategies for re-vitalization and post-apocalyptic resurgence, some white futurists express concerns about the ‘de-volution’ of ‘humanity’ from its perceived pinnacle in Euro-centric societies. For example, American settler economist Hanson describes the emergence of ‘humanity’ in terms of four ‘progressions’: from animals with enlarged brains to ‘hunter-gatherers’, then to agricultural societies and finally technology-driven industrial models. From his perspective, the ‘return’ to a ‘hunter-gatherer’ society would constitute the reversal of ‘human progress’. This scheme echoes a twentieth century scientific paradigm that holds that ‘humanity’, ‘human nature’, and liberal values emerged from the transcendence of hunter-gatherer brains and social structures. In this vein, Homer-Dixon (italics ours) states that without the emergence of modern petro-capitalism, ‘*we* would still be hunter-gatherers, surviving on grubs, roots and local game’, and that moving ‘back’ to this state would involve the crushing of ‘engineering marvels, political institutions and *our* culture and great art. . .into dust’ (italics ours). He and others, including Oreskes and Conway (2014) predict that this ‘reversal’ would also destroy democracy and liberal cosmopolitanism, producing highly-authoritarian forms of governance. In the face of this feared ‘de-volution’, some authors worry that ‘it is not even clear how much longer our descendants would remain distinctively “human”’. These accounts explicitly denigrate ‘hunter-gatherers’ – including many contemporary Indigenous societies – as ‘pre-human’, authoritarian and a degraded form of (pre-)humanity, while effacing the technological, political, and other forms of modernity and futurism embraced by BIPOC communities (see below).

Following this logic, proposed efforts to safeguard ‘human’ achievements or ‘progress’ often focus on controlling, directly instrumentalizing or even eliminating BIPOC bodies. According to Bostrom and his colleagues, reducing existential risk would require invasive, assimilative forms of government, including the creation of a ‘singleton’ – a form of governance that encompasses the entire planet and beyond, and in which every aspect of existence is merged into a collective intelligence. Less ambitious strategies for securing an ‘improved’ future for whiteness involve intensive control, surveillance, and policing. According to Newitz (italics ours) ‘if we want our species to be around for another million years, . . . *we* must take control of the earth’ through geo-engineering, bio-engineering, or the colonization of other planets. In many cases, these strategies involve the intensification of control over BIPOC bodies, relationships, and ways of life. Homer-Dixon (italics ours), outlines an ‘aggressively proactive’ strategy that includes, amongst other measures, family planning in countries that ‘*still* have high fertility rates’; conservation of ‘resources’, transitions to cleaner energy globally, post-conflict reconstruction, efforts to boost resilience of governments in ‘poor’ countries to reduce the ‘spillover’ of immigrants and disease; and targeted efforts to destroy ‘extremist groups’.[71](javascript:void(0)) Barnosky and Hadley also focus on education, particularly of girls, in BIPOC-majority places – including the use of explicitly colonial educational traditions, as in Mauritius – as a means of suppressing birth rates. They argue that it may be necessary to devote 50% of earth’s land to feed a growing ‘human’ population, including ‘switching from traditional crops to high-yield crops’ and ‘consolidating small farms into large, mainly monocultural operations, including the use of genetically modified organisms’. In so doing, they influential American settler conservationist E.O. Wilson’s (2016) proposal to annex 50% of earth’s surface as ‘inviolable nature reserves’ governed by the norms of Western conservation.

These plans for ‘saving humanity’ and the planet involve the re-enactment and innovation of key techniques used by European colonizers to annex land, displace communities and undermine the sovereignty of BIPOC peoples across the planet. Similarly, Weisman considers possible strategies of social control designed to reverse-engineer ‘liveable’ conditions. To this end, he defines

‘the optimum population as the number of humans who can enjoy a standard of living that the *majority of us* would find acceptable. . .roughly equivalent to a European level, pre-[2008 financial] crisis’.

## 1AR – Case

### 1AR – A2 AFRICOM Good

#### Best data indicates AFRICOM sucks – Pentagon’s own reports!

Turse ’19 [(Nick Turse, contributing writer for The Intercept, reporting on national security and foreign policy. He is the author, most recently, of "Next Time They’ll Come to Count the Dead: War and Survival in South Sudan," as well as "Tomorrow's Battlefield: U.S. Proxy Wars and Secret Ops in Africa," and "Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam." He has written for the New York Times, Los Angeles Times, San Francisco Chronicle, The Nation, and Village Voice, among other publications. He has received a Ridenhour Prize for Investigative Reporting, a James Aronson Award for Social Justice Journalism, and a Guggenheim Fellowship. Turse is a fellow at The Nation Institute and the managing editor of TomDispatch.com) “Violence Has Spiked in Africa Since the Military Founded AFRICOM, Pentagon Study Finds”, The Intercept, 07/29/2019. <https://theintercept.com/2019/07/29/pentagon-study-africom-africa-violence/>] pfox TDI

AFRICOM “disrupts and neutralizes transnational threats” in order to “promote regional security, stability and prosperity,” according to its mission statement. But since AFRICOM began, key indicators of security and stability in Africa have plummeted according to the Defense Department’s Africa Center for Strategic Studies, a Pentagon research institution. “Overall, militant Islamist group activity in Africa has doubled since 2012,” according to a recent analysis by the Africa Center.

There are now roughly 24 “active militant Islamist groups” operating on the continent, up from just five in 2010, the analysis found. Today, 13 African countries face attacks from these groups — a 160 percent increase over that same time span. In fact, the number of “violent events” across the continent has jumped 960 percent, from 288 in 2009 to 3,050 in 2018, according to the Africa Center’s analysis.

While a variety of factors have likely contributed to the rise in violence, some experts say that the overlap between the command’s existence and growing unrest is not a coincidence.

“The sharp increase in terrorist incidents in Africa underscores the fact that the Pentagon’s overly militarized approach to the problem has been a dismal failure,” said William Hartung, the director of the arms and security project at the Center for International Policy. “If anything, attempting to eradicate terrorism by force may be exacerbating the problem, provoking a terrorist backlash and serving as a recruiting tool for extremist groups.”

### 1AR – A2 Shift

#### North Africa is the key lynchpin of AFRICOM ops.

Queally ‘12 [(Jon, senior editor and staff writer – Common Dreams.) “A Retort to US Military Expansion in Africa: 'Dismantle AFRICOM', As US makes plans to blanket continent with soldiers and drones, an alternative: Don't”,m Common Dreams, 12/24/2012. <http://www.commondreams.org/news/2012/12/24/retort-us-military-expansion-africa-dismantle-africom>] pfox TDI

The sharper focus on Africa by the U.S. comes against a backdrop of widespread insurgent violence across North Africa, and as the African Union and other nations discuss military intervention in northern Mali.

In his speech at Brown, Ham explained that the expansion is designed to protect the 'national security interests of the United States'. However, in his remarks—in which he acknowledged the audience included "ambassadors and scholars, former ambassadors and practitioners, members of various governments and civil society"—he admitted that he lacked the "depth of knowledge and background and experience in Africa" that was widely represented by others.

It was many of these members of the audience who subsequently argued that if the United States and its government were serious about improving "security for Africans" and the international community more broadly, "then the present dominance of the military over aid and education ventures would be reversed."

Giving voice to the wide consensus against AFRICOM's push for increased militarization, Prof. Horace Campbell of Syracuse University and other experts who attended the talk at Brown, challenged the conventional wisdom Ham offered regarding US involvement on the continent. In fact, Campbell argues that General Ham's own statements provided the best case against deeper military involvement in Mali, Nigeria, Sudan and other countries.

As Campbell concludes in a lengthy but insightful piece published at Pambazuka News:

In the final analysis of the intended benefits versus consequences of the establishment of AFRICOM, the balance sheet weighs heavily against Africa’s continental good. The current instability in Libya and Mali are directly related to the military planning and activities of AFRICOM. It has been documented by a number of books that US Africa Command has increased resource exploitation, imperial expansion, instigated more violence, intensified regional conflicts, undermined the authority of regional organizations like IGAD, SADC, EAC, and eventually the African Union. As such, AFRICOM as a formal vehicle of US imperialism is a disaster. Although the Resist Africom formation no longer exists in a formal sense, their platform for the resistance fertilized and offered another way to get beyond the arguments of the military information operations of AFRICOM.

Of the three areas of ‘terrorist’ activities in Africa, the case can be made that military engagement by Britain, France and the United States will only provide the rationale for increasing militarization. It should be of the highest importance for activists and scholars to push back from the argument that associated Al Queda groups in Africa ‘present significant threats to the United States.’ This is an exaggeration. Second, the issues of reducing militarism and insecurity in Nigeria cannot be separated from the exploitation and oppression of the Nigerian people. Third, after 20 years, the situation of peace in Somalia can only be solved in a regional context where there is cooperation among democratic states. The peoples of Africa need international partners but Africans cannot accept partnership from a society where the military industrial-complex abroad fortifies the prison-industrial complex at home where African descendants are warehoused.

AFRICOM is not what the people of Africa need and it is not what will achieve long-term stability on the continent. The struggles against militarism and exploitation in the United States cannot be advanced by a military command that serves the interests of oil companies and private military contractors. Mo Ibrahim spoke for many Africans at the colloquium when he said that it was time that US oil companies were as aggressive in cleaning up the African oil spills as they were in opening new oil platforms. The call for resistance can now bring up to date the concrete experiences of the US military and mobilize for the dismantling of the US Africa Command. General Carter Ham sought to use the space of a scholarly platform to justify the need for the existence of the US Africa Command. Instead the content of his message provided some of the clearest reasons why the war on terror has passed the tipping point.

## 1AR – DA – Deterrence

### 1AR – Core – IR K

#### x. The disad advances an ethnonationalist understanding of IR. Revisionism and balance of power concerns are driven by fears of eroding US cultural imposition on the globe.

Reus-Smit ’19 [Christian; Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland, in Brisbane Australia. March 21, 2019; "International Relations Theory Doesn’t Understand Culture"; *Foreign Policy*; https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/21/international-relations-theory-doesnt-understand-culture/] TDI

Realists are materialists at heart, yet they frequently make arguments that rest on cultural assumptions. They describe themselves as studying conflict groups, and when we probe the nature of these groups, they commonly appear as cultural units: nation-states with national characters, identities, and interests. The anarchic international system gives states certain primary interests — principally survival — but national culture is commonly seen as a key source of other interests.

Many realists admit that today’s international order rests on legitimacy as much as material might. And when explaining such legitimacy, they join others in emphasizing Western civilization, which is said to provide the norms and values that inform and sustain modern institutions. For former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and others, the erosion of this cultural foundation poses a fundamental threat. How can “regions with such divergent cultures, histories, and traditional theories of order vindicate the legitimacy of any common system?” Kissinger asked in his book World Order.

On the surface, it might seem like rational choice theory would have even less to say about culture than realism. Yet culture enters rationalist arguments, too, in three ways: when adherents explain the rational choice of norms, when they accommodate cultural preferences, and in their argument that common knowledge is essential to solving coordination problems. The last of these is particularly interesting, as it is here that rationalists express a version of IR’s default conception of culture. Coordination problems exist when actors have common interests but can only realize as much if they coordinate their choices, usually without direct communication.

To overcome such problems, actors rely on mutual expectations, and such expectations come from common knowledge: things I know, and you know, and we both know that we both know. Rationalists see cultural norms, values, and practices as a major source of such knowledge, and thus common culture is important to solving the variety of coordination problems actors navigate every day. Most rationalists focus on specific collaboration problems and localized common knowledge, but others make larger claims about social order. Here the claim is a familiar one: Culturally homogeneous societies, which they take as their baseline, are more conducive to the solution of coordination problems than diverse societies.

### 1AR – Core – Topshelf

#### x. Neocolonialism makes their impacts terminally nonunique. US presence in the region drives Africa away from the US and towards adversaries, as our military plays them as chesspieces.

Gbadamosi ’22 [Nosmot; multimedia journalist and the writer of Foreign Policy’s weekly Africa Brief. May 25, 2022; “How the West Lost Africa”; *Foreign Policy*; https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/25/west-africa-russia-ukraine-war-us-congress/] TDI

Both stories focused on the U.S. Congress’s debate in April of a bill that would seek to “counter the malign influence and activities” of Russia and its proxies in Africa. The headlines offered great insight into how some African journalists and citizens view U.S. foreign policy in Africa as being primarily driven by geopolitical concerns about rivals Russia and China rather than the prosperity of Africans.

The proposed act, sponsored by Democratic Rep. Gregory Meeks, would allow Congress to assess the scope of Russian engagement on the continent, as well as monitor disinformation operations and the activities of Russian private military contractors. It passed the House of Representatives on April 27, with 415 members voting in favor and just nine against.

However, the bill is just one of many pieces of legislation, and the broader picture is worrying for African observers who fear the escalation of a “new Cold War.”

Even before details of the Meeks bill emerged, some had envisaged reprisals over African countries’ nonalignment. The United States “expects other countries to fall in line,” Nontobeko Hlela wrote in the Kenya-based Elephant, despite being “systematically excluded from any decision-making.”

The bill exists alongside the Strategic Competition Act, seeking to bolster the United States as it vies with China for influence, and the 2,900-page U.S. Innovation and Competition Act, also aimed at countering China — both of which foreign-policy researchers Odilile Ayodele and Mikatekiso Kubayi have characterized as “arguably Cold War-esque.” That these large-scale projects prioritize China and Russia as a key focus “speaks more about power … than a genuine partnership with Africa,” they wrote.

The bill does address real threats — and the relationship between Moscow and military governments in Sudan and Mali should not be overlooked. In Mali, suspected Russian mercenaries, alongside Malian soldiers, are accused of massacring an estimated 300 civilians in March — “the worst single atrocity reported in Mali’s decade-long armed conflict,” according to Human Rights Watch.

While the bill addresses Russia’s playbook of unfair extractive resource deals in exchange for weapons, it also requires the regular identification of African governments and officials “that have facilitated payments and other prohibited activities that benefit United States-sanctioned individuals and entities tied to Russia” — raising the question of whether a poorer African nation buying Russian oil from a sanctioned entity, for example, could then face sanctions.

Part of the problem, argue Zainab Usman and Katie Auth of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, is that the United States and its allies have engaged with Africa for decades only on humanitarian and security concerns. On a continent that has the largest number of foreign military operations and outposts, Africa’s young and increasingly cynical population perceives U.S. policies focused on China and Russia, in which African countries are merely pawns in a so-called great-power game, as an objectionable way to build partnerships.

U.S.-Africa trade has continued to slide from $142 billion in 2008 to just $64 billion in 2021. While Africa’s relationship with China is highly unbalanced and has sparked repeated regional protests, U.S. diplomats often fail to acknowledge the infrastructural benefits it has brought to democratic countries such as Senegal — where China’s Belt and Road projects have funded highways and cultural centers — and in the Seychelles, which actively courts Chinese investment as part of the country’s ambitions to be a financial hub.

In some countries, the Russia-Ukraine war has compounded the economic problems caused by the pandemic, China’s economic slowdown, and climate change-induced drought. Egypt, the world’s largest importer of wheat, relied on Russia for around 50 percent and Ukraine for 25 percent of its grain supply. “We will feel shame if we find that millions of people are dying because of food insecurity. They are not responsible for that. They didn’t do anything wrong,” Egyptian Finance Minister Mohamed Maait told the Financial Times.

Last week, as India banned exports of most of its wheat, Egypt asked to be exempt. A Russian blockade of Black Sea ports has stopped the export of some 25 million metric tons of Ukrainian grain that now cannot leave the country, according to the United Nations.

Some Western writers have sought to use food supply challenges as an argument for why African governments should condemn Russia, failing to understand the position that sanctions on Russia are the main driver for their economic turmoil. As Nic Cheeseman wrote in the Africa Report, the idea that economic injustices in “the world’s most economically exploited regions” should be used as “a stick with which African governments can be hit to force them back into line, is equal parts perplexing and offensive.”

Certain African governments have condemned Russia’s actions in Ukraine in strong terms. Kenya’s U.N. ambassador, Martin Kimani, affirmed to the U.N. Security Council just days before Russia’s invasion that “we must complete our recovery from the embers of dead empires in a way that does not plunge us back into new forms of domination and oppression.”

Therefore, it would be a mistake to view Kenya and many other nations’ abstentions as being “pro-Russia.” Kimani said Kenya abstained on votes to avoid being dragged into global power rivalry, stating that the Security Council in the future may appear “weaponized.”

Responding to questions about African neutrality, the United States’ ambassador to the U.N., Linda Thomas-Greenfield, said that “we have to do additional work to help these countries to understand the impact of Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine”—a comment that implied African leaders required education on their own sovereign decision-making.

As Ghanaian historian Samuel Adu-Gyamfi tells it, Western-imposed forms of democracy have failed the continent. In his view, economic reforms required by institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank have led to underdevelopment in African countries, “as have more recent imports like lockdowns, travel bans and vaccine mandates — pushed on Africa by Western-dominated institutions,” he wrote in NewsAfrica.

Resentment of neocolonialism is also driving opposition to Western demands. France’s policies toward its former colonies have prompted growing backlash against the French government. A nine-year military engagement in Mali that failed to subdue violent extremists has brought frustration and accusations of civilian killings in drone attacks, while in Chad France’s support for the military regime has angered the Chadian people, who overwhelmingly want a democratically elected leader.

Africa, like much of the world, is not aligned with Washington’s framing of the war. As FP columnist Howard French wrote, “America’s concern with containing the spread of Chinese or Soviet influence overrode considerations of governance and democracy” for decades in Washington’s Africa policy.

### 1AR – North Africa – No War

#### x. No Africa wars.

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Africa is often presented as a war-ridden continent, but this depiction is becoming outdated. In the 21st century, the amount of warfare in Africa has declined dramatically, and today most Africans are more secure than ever.

Displaced by war

“Somalilandsun — Africa” and “conflict” are words all too often linked in Western minds. From Cold War proxy wars, to what Robert Kaplan saw as “the coming anarchy” in the 1990s, to Boko Haram massacres today, news from Africa may seem dominated by never-ending conflict. That image is out of date. In 2002 Tony Blair was justified in describing the state of Africa as a “scar on the conscience of humanity”, but in the years since there has been an underappreciated success story in Africa. The amount of warfare in Africa has declined dramatically, and today most Africans are more secure than ever. Troubled areas remain, unfortunately, but the larger picture of receding conflict has implications for how we think about African security needs. Outside actors can help reinforce positive external and internal trends that mitigate conflict, can avoid creating new conflict zones like Libya or South Sudan, and should recognize emerging human security needs that are becoming relatively more important as armed conflict declines.

Africa’s waning wars

Quietly over the last 15 years, many African wars did end, to paraphrase Scott Strauss. Lingering Cold War struggles like the Angolan civil war burned out. West African nations including Liberia and Sierra Leone ceased being playgrounds for warlords and regained their status as functional, if weak, states. Eastern Congo is still violent, but far less so than during the 1990s “African World War”. Overall, 21st century Africa has seen more wars end or abate than ignite.

The trend towards peace in Africa can be seen by using various datasets on armed conflict (for more on data sources, tabulation, and trend analysis, see Burbach and Fettweis 2014). The Center for Systemic Peace (CSP), for example, tracks conflicts from 1946 to the present, scoring each for the intensity of its societal impact. Figure 1 shows the yearly sum of conflict intensity assessed by CSP, for both Africa and the rest of the world. The end of the Cold War brought peace to much of the world, but African conflicts increased in the 1990s. States like Somalia and Sierra Leone collapsed into warlordism, for example. Central Africa was hit by the Rwanda genocide and bloody chaos in Eastern Congo, killing one to five million people. At least three-fourths of the world’s total war deaths in the late 1990s took place in Africa (Burbach and Fettweis 2014, Figure 4).

After the year 2000, the tide of war receded. Africa’s total conflict intensity as measured by CSP fell by approximately half. A similar pattern is shown by the Uppsala Conflict Data Project. Using somewhat different definitions, the Uppsala data shows that the number of conflicts in Africa resulting in 1,000 or more “battle deaths” per year declined from an average of 12 in the late 1990s to an average of 3.5 from 2010-2013. Some decades-long wars ended with formal peace accords, as with Angola in 2002; elsewhere, states gradually gained the upper hand on armed disorder. Given the unfortunate rise of warfare in the Middle East, Africa is no longer the most violent region of the world.

The decline of warfare in Africa is even more dramatic in terms of individual risks. Africa’s population is growing rapidly, up 150% since 1980. Declining conflict despite a much larger population means the mortality risk from war has fallen substantially. An average of 32 people per 100,000 population were killed per year in the 1980s and 45 per 100,000 in the 1990s. In 2013, though the rate was only 8 per 100,000 (Burbach & Fettweis 2014, Figure 5). World Health Organization data shows an astonishing 95% decline in African conflict deaths from 2000 to 2012. In the 1980s, warfare killed more Africans than vehicle accidents. Today, perhaps three to six times as many Africans die in road crashes than from conflict. Many more Africans are harmed by crime or domestic violence than by warfare. Africa is still afflicted by more conflict than most ofthe world and the suffering of those involved is very real. Nevertheless, a greater proportion of Africans live free of war today than ever in the post-independence period.

Celebrating African peace may seem premature given the civil war in South Sudan or the ravages of Boko Haram. Conflict has increased since 2011, but the level of armed conflict still remains lower than any time from 1970 — 2000. The most tragic development is the civil war in South Sudan, which the U.N. estimated had killed 50,000 as of spring 2016. Fortunately, South Sudan’s case is nearly unique: a newly created nation, devoid of physical or administrative infrastructure, with ethnically divided, soon-to-be-unemployed armed factions eyeing the lucrative oil revenues awaiting whomever could seize power. As academic panelists noted in 2011 — two years before the civil war — predictors of conflict were flashing red in South Sudan. Few African countries contain such a combustible mix of problems anymore.

Accounting for the decline

There are several factors behind the ebbing of conflict in Africa. One important change is the geopolitical environment. During the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviets armed and funded rival factions in civil wars, allowing bloody wars to fester for decades in countries like Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia. Then, 1990s Africa fell into turmoil as superpower-sponsored regimes collapsed. A disinterested world mostly left Africa to its fate, but continued trade in weapons and resources with warlords. In the last decade, however, the U.S., Europe, and China have all become more active in diplomacy, security assistance, and peacekeeping. The US and China are together pressing the South Sudanese factions to stop fighting, rather than choosing sides. The world has become somewhat less willing to sell arms or purchase minerals that directly fuel conflicts, admittedly with a long way to go.

Africans themselves deserve great credit for ending the wars that plagued their continent. Economic growth, improvements in governance, and greater space for peaceful political participation have all made ~~state failure~~ and internal conflict less likely. As Paul Collier among others has noted, civil wars tend to create vicious cycles that spread insecurity to whole regions. Many regions of Africa have climbed out of the conflict trap; political, security, and economic improvements are reinforcing each other. The nations of Africa increasingly work together through the institutions of the African Union to head off or resolve conflict, and to deploy peacekeepers to conflict zones. Needs still outpace available resources, but that cooperation is a marked change from 20th century Africa.

### 1AR – China – K

#### x. The DA’s narrative of China’s rise is rooted in the logic of Yellow Peril that relies on constructing East Asia as an existential threat to the white Western international order and culminates in genocide.

Barder ’21 [Alexander, International Relations @ Florida International University. 2021. “The ‘Yellow Peril’ and the Asia-Pacific War”, Chapter 6 in *Global Race War: International Politics and Racial Hierarchy*.] pfox TDI

The salience of anti-Japanese racism in the United States did not emerge willy-nilly out of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor or the need to induce pro-war sentiment in an American public largely content with its aloofness from global geopolitics. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, anti-Asian racism proliferated in American society and politics. Recall from [Chapter 2](javascript:void(0)) Alfred Mahan’s concern about the nascent conflicts with Asiatic civilizations and the potential for racial conflict in the twentieth century that would come to constitute global politics. As America became a global power, the notion of the “yellow peril” dominated American ideas about the Pacific as much as those of economic expansion. From the Chinese-Exclusion Act of 1882 to the denial by the United States of Japan’s request for enshrining a covenant on racial equality at Versailles for the League of Nations in 1919, this period in the United States marked a certain fear of and contempt for the Japanese and Chinese in particular. The famous American writer Jack London, in his 1910 short story “The Unparalleled Invasion,” imagines a resurgent China bursting beyond the Pacific as a result of population growth to challenge Western civilization. Only, London writes, as a result of biological warfare leading to outright genocide of the Chinese is Western civilization saved. Indeed, London’s message in the story is not only that racial genocide *avant la lettre* is warranted but that such techniques should be used only against non-Western populations as a way of maintaining racial hierarchy. In much of the “yellow peril” literature, fictional and otherwise, a persistent theme is the need for a broad alliance of European/Western powers to counteract the threat posed by a rising Asia.

This particular theme of presenting Asian races as inherently threatening in terms of an almost unstoppable mass of people was ubiquitous in late nineteenth-century Western literature and political discourse. Its anxiety reimagines the Mongolian invasions of the thirteenth century as a specter haunting Europe and the West as a whole. Indeed, it was not just in the United States that such racist views proliferated; European intellectuals and politicians voiced outright hostility toward what they saw as an inferior, yet potentially dangerous, set of East Asian “hordes.” The term itself, “yellow peril,” came into widespread circulation with Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany pronouncing it in the 1890s; it evoked this specter of a global threat that challenged the very notion of a European state system. “The East” thus came to signify this almost limitless territorial expanse populated by racially inferior people, which would cultivate particularly German fantasies of empire and colonization, a theme that the Nazis would base their geopolitical imaginary on ([Chapter 5](javascript:void(0))). Moreover, this racial notion of the East or Asiatic would continue to structure Western imaginations after the Second World War; it would come to play an important role during the Cold War, with the Soviet Union being seen as an “Asiatic” power and the Chinese as a monolithic communist threat to American interests in the Pacific. George Kennan, in his famous essay “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” argued that the Soviet Union emerged out of the “Russian-Asiatic world,” which implied that its “particular brand of fanaticism, unmodified by any of the Anglo-Saxon traditions of compromise, was too fierce and too jealous to envisage any permanent sharing of power.” The fear of “Asia” in American discourse never entirely goes away. Throughout the Cold War, China becomes the Asiatic (communist) enemy whose machinations aim to subvert American influence and power in the region. In the 1980s, the nominally pliant Japanese ally takes on more ominous characterizations with the intensity of economic competition. By the turn of the twentieth-first century, China returns as the main culprit in future threats to American global hegemony.

This chapter explores the history of such racialized threats and fears of Asia in the Western imagination. What I wish to show is that the discourse of the “yellow peril” can be understood as a process of world-making in which “Asian” alterity is heightened through ideas of threat and insecurity; it is a discourse of anxiety wherein the global racial imaginary is seen as being in crisis and what potentially replaces it is seen as a world of disorder and violence. To be sure, this idea of yellow peril was certainly not accepted ubiquitously in the West; it was also contested and debated among a wide range of writers, policymakers, and diplomats, many of whom did not necessarily accept its conclusions even if they were accepting of its racial premises. The Anglo-Japanese alliance beginning in 1902 is emblematic of the tensions between negotiating the racial views of purported Japanese inferiority and the necessity of developing a strategic Pacific partnership with a rising power. Many diplomats also recognized the complexity of Asian politics and the incredibly facile claims of an inherent aggregate that is called “Asian”—much like criticisms of discourses of civilizations about the “Islamic” world ([Chapter 8](javascript:void(0))).

Nonetheless the racial premises of the yellow peril form an integral part of how the globe was rendered intelligible on the basis of racial difference and hierarchy. The first section of the chapter explores this form of world-making of the yellow peril through the work of Arthur de Gobineau. Gobineau was an important French writer (and diplomat) whose book *Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines* (*Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races*), published between 1853 and 1855, became an important part of the canon of race-thinking. In a posthumous publication in 1885 entitled “Ce qui se passe en Asie” (“What Is Happening in Asia”), Gobineau articulates in clearest terms the threat posed by a resurgent Asia for a Europe wracked by (for him) racial degeneracy due to miscegenation and thus unable to meet the growing challenge emanating from the East. This nexus between a discourse of threat posed by China, and then Japan after 1905 and its defeat of the Russian Empire, and the fear of race-mixing at home became a salient issue in the United States. It animated a politics of racial retrenchment by barring Asian immigrants (the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and culminating in the Immigration Act of 1917) and by placing increasingly onerous restrictions on Japanese and Chinese Americans. Furthermore, it structured a geopolitical imaginary in which the Pacific becomes a crucial area of American, but also Canadian, British, and Australian, geopolitical interests, leading to clashes with Japan. This, in other words, is the construction of a racial order in the Pacific, what Erika Lee terms a “White Pacific.” The second section of the chapter then examines how both the Japanese and the Americans engaged in the racialization of each other: first, in terms of how the Japanese empire itself internalized its own version of racial order in response to the global racial imaginary; second, for the United States, as a way of intensifying the violence against a racial other, which can be traced back to the settler colonial plans of the nineteenth century ([Chapter 4](javascript:void(0))). I conclude the chapter by showing how the global racial imaginary functioned within the United States during the early Cold War period by representing the Soviet Union as the Asiatic other.

The “Yellow Peril”: World-Making and the Global Crisis of White Supremacy

The crystallization of the global racial imaginary during the nineteenth century defined a world in terms of racial difference. The global racial imaginary provided a way of ordering the world hierarchically in a way that ensures a faith in the innate superiority of the West relative to other races. It assumed the natural demise of races unfit to survive in a world comprised of predatory empires mercilessly deploying the latest military technologies and displacing the native inhabitants through settler colonialism. As a consequence, the nature of global order was based on a notion of the incommensurability of races in which each was violently competing against the others. This is in contrast with the juridical-political community that comprises Western states on the basis of norms and rules that more or less govern violence between them and are defined by a “standard of civilization.” However, this idea of a wider political or juridical community is deemed to be entirely absent when it comes to racial conflict: such conflicts are assumed to be existential in the biological sense, in which the biological fate of a race or people ultimately determines the viability of the nation-state itself.

What I call the global racial imaginary is described by Jürgen Osterhammel as a “bleak and fatalistic worldview” that dominated at the end of the nineteenth century. Expansion was seen as the key to survival in a brutal international order, which itself was predicated on developing a significant industrial and scientific base. The globe was increasingly closed off, intensifying competition between different powers—and under the Darwinian assumption this would imply the inevitable demise of the weak on the fringes of the global expansion of settler colonial empires. The realization, however, that a whole variety of races, particularly Asiatic races, would continue to inhabit the planet indefinitely provoked consternation and anxiety, particularly in American intellectuals. Writers such as Charles Pearson and Lothrop Stoddard were profoundly pessimistic about Western relations with Asia. What if these races, in the mind of a coterie of racial thinkers of this time, were able to effectively modernize and catch up to the West? Would their advances challenge white supremacy and the global order upon which it rested? Indeed, as Osterhammel characterizes this worldview, “Special caution was needed with regard to the ‘yellow race.’ It was demographically stronger than the others, characterized by an aggressive business sense and, in the Japanese case, a feudal warrior ethic. If the West did not watch out, it would be threatened by a ‘yellow peril.’” Moreover, as Osterhammel adds, there was a widespread recognition that the “global sharpening of the struggle between the races meant that the militarized nation-state could not remain the only, all-embracing entity for the resolution of conflicts.” There would need to be wider cooperation between “Anglo-Saxon” nations to mitigate the threats posed by these different races.

To a degree, the discourse of the yellow peril and its salience in popular imagination were rooted in the perception that the global racial imaginary founded on white supremacy was in crisis. It was rooted in a fear that its racial, hierarchical ordering of the global system was inevitably going to change and that there would come a time when non-European races were going to begin to assert themselves on the global stage. In other words, the “yellow peril thematic,” Stanford Lyman writes, “presents itself as a coded ethnomethodological discourse, under the cover of a guarded defense of the Occident-under-siege.” It is a discourse that amalgamates political differences into racial differences and renders them intelligible for the purposes of disciplinary control for internal populations and as a way of defining geopolitical threats. For, as Lyman continues, the great issue with respect to the yellow peril discourse is that it reveals the extent to which Western

spokespersons, leaders, officials, intellectuals, opinion makers, etc., believe[] that it, i.e., the particular element of the Asian aggregate under discussion, “is not keeping to its [appropriately subordinated] place but threatens to claim the opportunities and privileges from which it has been excluded”; even more fearsome is the belief “felt [that the Asian aggregate or its subset is] . . . a threat to the status, security, and welfare of the dominant ethnic group.”

Fears of a rising “Asia” became prevalent in Western discourse in the late nineteenth century. This followed a period in which perceptions of China, especially, vacillated between awe-inspiring recognition of its wealth and power following Marco Polo’s account during medieval times, and a respect for its “longevity, its stability, its system of government, its philosophy and its toleration of diverse faiths and ideas.” But as Ji points out, that discourse radically began to change in the early nineteenth century as a consequence of modernization and industrialization; China appeared increasingly static in that it “lacked any internal dynamic promoting change.” The initial crux of the critique was based on cultural factors that restrained its development, which, over the course of the nineteenth century, gave way to a racial/biological explanation for Chinese backwardness and inferiority.

But if the racialization of Chinese cultural attributes—essentially a proxy for “Asia”—reifies this tendency to see it in ahistorical terms, incapable of modernizing itself as Europe has done, then what accounts for the emergence and prevalence of a discourse of fear of China/Asia in the latter part of the century? Gobineau’s work here is instructive: fear of China and of a rising “yellow peril” reflects the twofold fear of the degeneracy of European civilization to the level of other races as a result of representative democracy and, as a consequence, the lack of ability to resist the inevitable—for him—horde of Asians invading Europe. Gobineau’s work on China is part of a larger framework for uncovering the patterns of history on the basis of racial mélange and conflict; racial differences, for Gobineau, stem from the primordial difference between three biologically singular races, the white, yellow, and black races. Unsurprisingly, Gobineau stipulates the innate superiority of an unadulterated white race (Aryan), originating in Siberia, and responsible for creating a superior culture. For Gobineau, understanding human history involves understanding the patterns of racial intermixing and the manner in which races (i.e., civilizations) degenerate. The geopolitics of nations or empires only matters over the long run insofar as it reflects such racial trajectories. Thus China’s emergence as a civilization owes itself to the conquering migration of whites (“Aryans”) emanating from India and subjugating the native Malay or “yellow” race. However, the problem was precisely the fact that this supposedly Aryan minority lost itself through miscegenation, and in the reign of Qin Shi Huang (246 BC), the feudal system gave way to a broadly meritocratic imperial system. This broad polemic against not only racial miscegenation but the leveling effects of meritocracy that defined the mandarinate served Gobineau as a means to contrast the East with the liberalization of European politics. Gobineau saw any retreat from the entrenched rights of a nobility—which he derives from Henri de Boulainvilliers, a seventeenth-century French aristocrat—as indicative of the political and racial degeneracy that is enervating European civilization. Gobineau’s racial polemics not only are important for understanding a particular reaction to the internal (i.e., European) crisis but are in fact constitutive of world history and his present. Gobineau’s turn to China at the end of his life was not just a way of contrasting it with Europe; rather, “There were practical applications for international politics to be derived from his reading of history.” In one of his last essays, entitled “Ce qui ce fait en Asie” (“What Is Occurring in Asia”), written in 1880–81 and originally published in Richard Wagner’s journal *Bayreuther Blätter*, Gobineau situates the West’s predicament in a broader world history of racial miscegenation and its relation to the political fates of empires, kingdoms, and nation-states. When Gobineau turns to the Asia of the nineteenth century, he begins with the early conflicts between European powers and China in the First Opium War; even as the former were victorious, they realized that “the Chinese fight well and could make excellent soldiers.” However, what Gobineau emphasizes is not so much the Chinese or Asiatic military capabilities that threaten Europe; rather, it is the increasing prevalence of Chinese labor that immigrates throughout the world. Gobineau makes reference to the American initiatives restricting Chinese immigration out of concern for falling wages. As Gobineau writes, “Fear of the Chinese has reached such proportions that it has been suggested that they should be driven from California by force, there being no other way to overcome the *invasion*.” This Chinese migration under the coolie system of labor is happening across the Pacific world and the Indian subcontinent, according to Gobineau, and results in increasing “hatreds” and conflict between races. For instance, Gobineau claims that the Chinese are actively working to exterminate “Moslems” across Central Asia and that it would be in the interest of European powers to align themselves with “Moslems” as a counterweight to Chinese expansionary ambitions. Furthermore, Russian plans to develop Central Asia present risks: “The result of these developments will necessarily be to restore to their former fertility regions which have become artificially sterile, and consequently to reopen the old invasion routes which successfully brought into Europe every race which rushed head long from Central or Western Asia.” To put it in other terms, Gobineau was writing at the height of the “great game” of geopolitical intrigues between the Russian and British Empires. Such continental imperial rivalries, however, did not appear to interest him much because they were ephemeral to the more fundamental question of the global racial dynamics that hold the fate of such empires to begin with. Thus Gobineau writes, I am [not] stimulated by the question of whether the Russian Empire will take over the whole of Asia and India. But my attention *is* seized by the rapidly growing dangers in Asia, which are certainly going to explode on Europe. I am struck by the amazing speed with which these dangers grow and develop; I think it is quite possible that within ten years the face of the world will be on the point of changing. Add to that the belief in “the rapid decline and spreading torpor in the whole Western world . . . [due] to the advanced state of the intermixture of races” and you have, for Gobineau, the inevitable demise of the West. Gobineau creates a historical and contemporary representation of what the world is in terms of racial difference, intermixture, and conflict. It is a representation that draws a map entirely different from that of the nation-state system or of imperial geopolitics. Flows of races across space matter much more than the realpolitik of imperial geopolitics. Hence, for Gobineau the question of immigration—he describes Chinese immigration in the United States, for example, as a form of “invasion”—appears much more crucial in discerning the futures contours of global order and politics. Thus from the late nineteenth century to their apogee in the Second World War, such global racial dynamics increasingly become fused to the manner in which imperial states (particularly Germany, as I discuss in the previous chapter) begin to define the necessities of deploying violence and war-making. However, it is also in the United States where we see the importance of this discourse of the yellow peril in defining a world on the basis of racial threats that cut across geopolitical boundaries. By the Second World War, the racialization of the Japanese enemy would unleash the extraordinary capabilities of the American warfare state. “White Pacific”: The Yellow Peril and the Racial Geopolitics of the Pacific American interests in the Pacific predate the completion of its continental expansion to the West Coast in the middle of the nineteenth century. Pacific trade was of obvious concern in the early republic, with American merchants and whalers seeing the Chinese market as key to their success. However, the shifting geopolitical landscape in China as a result of the Opium Wars in the late 1830s posed fundamental issues for American strategic interests in the region. For, as Michael Green argues, American interests began to shift from a purely commercial calculus to one involving great power politics over mastery of Asia.[34](javascript:void(0)) European territorial machinations in the region would increasingly become of concern for American officials and would subsequently pave the way for the establishment of the Open Door Policy by Secretary of State John Hay in 1899. Green sees the historical arc of American foreign policy in the region through the turn of the twentieth century in terms of the accumulation of power and concerns about the relative power of America’s geopolitical rivals in the region. As he writes, Ultimately, while the architects of America’s Pacific power at the end of the nineteenth century were surely motivated by the economic opportunities they saw and were shaped by the racial attitudes of their day, their primary focus was on power—specifically the distribution of power among their potential adversaries, the power of geography, and the instruments and limits of *American power* in the Pacific. Green draws an explicit distinction here between an understanding of American power in terms of its material “instruments” and its geopolitical interstate rivalries versus the “racial attitudes” that, nonetheless, would seem to be immaterial to the calculus of such geopolitical imperatives. However, this division between state power and race is problematic; by reducing racial effects to the manifestation of an “attitude,” Green minimizes the constitutive role that race plays in forming a world on the basis of hierarchy, difference, and, ultimately, fear and insecurity. It also elides the geopolitical alliances between settler colonial powers of the Pacific that revolved around maintaining racial barriers to Asian immigration conjoined with fear of rising Japanese power. As Erika Lee notes, “Transnational debates over the new ‘problem’ of Japanese immigration, in particular, including characterization of Japan and Japanese as the ‘Yellow Peril,’ intensified by the early 1990s.” The result, Lee continues, was “actual cooperation and policy coordination, promoting what I call the ‘White Pacific,’ a racial and geographic imaginary in which Orientalism and anti-Asian policies were shared and replicated among white settler societies in the region.” Racial imaginaries were instrumental in constituting the Pacific as a geopolitical region in the late nineteenth and early to mid-twentieth century. Such racial imaginaries linked imperial geopolitics over China, the emergence of an independent Japan asserting itself in the region, and especially the beginning of Chinese (and later Japanese) migration to the Americas. To be sure, the crystallization of such racial imaginaries did not necessarily predetermine state policies in Asia; nor did it necessarily predetermine the geopolitical contours of imperial competition by automatically generating racial conflicts. A case in point is the history of the Anglo-Japanese alliance signed in 1905. On the one hand, British strategic interests in forming an alliance with Japan revolved around restraining Russian power in East Asia and China, reducing naval expenditures in the region, and acting as a counterweight to other European powers in the region. But as Cees Heere argues, the British pursuit of the alliance was itself predicated on a reframing of “contemporary estimations of Japan’s ‘civilization’ ” as a result of Japan’s military prowess in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–95). Indeed, as Heere shows, the formation of the British alliance with Japan was necessarily filtered through this language of “Japan’s capacity for modernity” and its integration within “international society on terms favorable to London.” In other words, what constituted the alliance was certainty a racialized discourse about the Japanese and their capacity for certain norms of conduct within a racialized global order and not simply reflective of an objective raison d’état derived from the condition of global anarchy. On the other hand, such racialized language actively worked to undermine the prospect of such an alliance by drawing attention the fundamental racial chasm at the heart of the late nineteenth-century global order. The emergence of Japanese power, especially after the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, could become a source of inspiration for colonized peoples across the world and fundamentally undermine the Western imperial order. It could rouse East Asian peoples in a way that would radically undermine global white supremacy. As Heere writes, “This fear of an Eastern awakening, shaking the foundations of the white man’s world, gained additional significance in the settler states of the British Pacific, where it merged with standing preoccupations over Asian migration to produce a new incarnation of the ‘yellow peril.’”Put differently, the emergence of Japanese geopolitical power called into question the fundamental constitutive role that race played in cementing a global hierarchical order. Fear of the unraveling of this order with Japanese imperial revisionism of this order would ultimately provoke intense violence over the first half of the twentieth century. The racialized geopolitical evolution of the Pacific was co-constituted with the transnational development of Asian migration. This proved to be a significant contribution to the development of anti-Asian sentiment in the United States. Chinese migration began in earnest in the 1850s with the construction of the transcontinental railway and the California gold rush. The middle of the nineteenth century saw the increasingly transnational circulation of Chinese labor across the Pacific Rim and even in Latin America and the Caribbean. It reflected the beginnings of a global industrial economy, which required continuous low-cost labor. Chinese immigration, particularly in California and the Pacific Northwest, however also came with a significant racial backlash by white laborers who saw the Chinese as undercutting the price of labor. Chinese Americans, moreover, were seen as embodying the social calamities of an increasingly industrialized America and especially were seen as representing a much starker threat to its foundational character as a “white Christian nation” versus other immigrant communities. By the 1880s, enough support had accumulated in Congress to pass the infamous Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which not only proscribed further Chinese immigration into the United States, but became the impetus for a policy of racial retrenchment until the end of the Second World War. A crucial point, however, is that the exclusion of Chinese immigration became coterminous, as Erika Lee notes, with “the growth of the federal government at the turn of the twentieth century. This new level of expansion, centralization, and bureaucratization, or ‘state-building,’ came in the form of regulating both foreigners arriving into the United States and foreigners and citizens already residing there.”[42](javascript:void(0)) American state-building was instrumentalized on the basis of racial administration “at home,” and the state’s necessary ability to discern and securitize against the possibilities of domestic racial conflicts. Such an expansive federal state became crucial in the development of the United States as a global power in the late nineteenth century with the Spanish-American War (1898). Restricting the movement of “racially inferior” minorities thus became an important political project not only within the United States, but also throughout other settler colonial states, such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. With the increase of Japanese immigration (not subject to the Chinese Exclusion Act) in the late nineteenth century, fears of Asian displacement of the white population became increasingly prevalent. As Lee shows, during the early twentieth century, domestic concerns with unassimilable “Oriental” populations became more pressing as a consequence of racial riots on the West Coast and in Canada. The Pacific Coast race riots of 1907 took place in San Francisco and Vancouver, Canada, and involved the deliberate targeting of Asian, primarily Japanese, communities. As a consequence, the US and Canadian governments worked with Japan to curb Japanese immigration, what became known as the “Gentleman’s Agreement.” But importantly, Lee writes, the outcome of the riots “was that Canada, the United States, and the British Empire all focused attention squarely on the international aspect of the ‘Asiatic issue,’ thereby uniting ‘white men’s countries’ together against the ‘Yellow Peril.’ ”[44](javascript:void(0)) British and American newspapers were warning about the transnational threat that Asia and Asians posed. More specifically, Japan was targeted for particular calumny given its increasingly obvious political presence on the global stage. When it specifically came to denouncing the strategic alliance between Britain and Japan, John Strachey, the editor of the newspaper *The Spectator*, wrote in 1904 that Japan would eventually seize China and establish a “yellow power which would in many respects be the strongest in Asia” and would then jeopardize “the safety of every white power . . . which has grave interests or broad territories on the Asiatic continent.”[45](javascript:void(0)) In other words, after the 1905 Russo-Japanese War ending in Japanese victory and the Pacific Coast race riots in 1907, Japan increasingly became discerned as a potential rival or even enemy not just to the particular interests of Western powers in the region. Japan was also seen as an ontological or racial threat to the very essence of a particular order premised on white supremacy. The nexus between the transnational migration of Asians into settler colonial polities and the emergence of Japan as a pole of East Asian power would be increasingly seen as questioning the global racial imaginary and would be assumed to invariably lead to a cataclysmic racial conflict. The early twentieth-century American writer Homer Lea perhaps gave clearest expression to the racial and geostrategic threat that Japan posed to the United States. Lea, a relatively unknown writer, dreamed of a military career, only to see himself stymied because of medical issues that would claim his life at the young age of thirty-five. Nonetheless, his 1909 book *The Valor of Ignorance*, which was widely read within both the American and the Japanese militaries, forcefully argued that a clash between the United States and Japan was inevitable. Lea’s starting point is rooted in a racialized view of the world crucially based on the necessity of expansion and war. “National existence,” Lea writes, “is governed by this invariable law: that the boundaries of political units are never, other than for a moment in time, stationary—they must either expand or shrink. It is by this law of national expansion and shrinkage that we mark the rise and decline of nations.” As Lea writes, “War is but a composite exemplification of the struggle of man upward: the multiplication of his individual efforts into one, and the aspirations of his diurnal strife turned toward a greater and nobler end, not of himself but of his race.”[48](javascript:void(0)) For Lea, as a result of modern transportation and communication technologies the spatial distance that separated nations was no longer a buffer: “No longer, therefore, can nations consider themselves safe behind their moats of space.” Thus Lea continues, The peoples of the whole world are now elbowed together with all their racial antipathies and convergent ambitions to struggle and war in a theatre of action no greater than that in which European nations only a few years ago sweated and strove for supremacy. On the other hand, while the causes of war have diminished by the elimination and unification of innumerable smaller nations, on the other, the shrinkage of the world by man’s inventions has brought the remaining nations, different not only in race, but in civilization, ideals and purposes, so closely together and with so little hope of amalgamation that we cannot say that the possibilities of war have in the sum total decreased. The pace of the future must be, as in the past, an armed peace. The implication for the United States is clear. The United States is increasingly faced (in 1909) with a rising Japan, after its recent victory against the Russian Empire, that is asserting itself in the Pacific region and challenging American interests. Importantly, for Lea, the Japanese display a racial homogeneity that underlies their political and military strength. By contrast, the United States is increasingly enervated due to its racial heterogeneity as a result of repeated (Asian) migration—particularly to Hawaii, which will become the launch pad of a Japanese attack. Thus the United States is ill-prepared to meet the challenge of a rising power in what will be a cataclysmic struggle against Japan’s relentless imperial ambitions. Lea saw in the emergent conflict the profound importance of racial and cultural antagonism as the crucial immutable factor in the relationship. Thus he writes, “Neither now nor at any time in the distant future will these nations coalesce to the extent that the sociological or religious phases of their national life will have a deterrent effect on war, or will alter in any way, other than accentuate their racial ambitions, their perverse activities, their hates and their cries.” The implacability of racial difference is inescapable and confirms for Lea the unyielding Japanese attempt at conquest and supremacy. As Lea writes, “To this ambition of Japan there shall be no end—and rightly there should not be—until her islands have been razed as bare rocks upon which fisherman spread their nets, or until the Japanese become the samurai of the human race and the remainder of man shall toil and trade for them and their greatness.” In other words, the stakes in the nascent conflict between Japan and the United States are such that only the genocidal elimination of the Japanese—“until her islands have been razed”—will ensure American independence and supremacy over the Pacific; short of that, Americans will find themselves under the Japanese “samurai” yoke. It is important to recognize that while Lea’s writings were certainly marginal in terms of their influence on the American political class (among whom he enjoyed a revival, obviously, after Pearl Harbor), he did leave a lasting legacy on the American military. Lea was also widely read in Japan and not only fixed in the minds of many Japanese military and political officials the foreseeable conflict with the United States over supremacy over the Pacific, but confirmed the fundamental nature of an international order based on racial hierarchy and antagonism. As Sidney Xu Lu argues in *The Making of Japanese Settler Colonialism*, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, Japanese officials were aware of the exclusion of Chinese immigration into the United States “as an ominous warning to get ready for the destined battle between white and yellow races.” The Japanese themselves internalized a conceptualization of race derived from Darwin’s and Spencer’s idea about survival of the fittest. They devised numerous justifications for their own racial difference and hierarchy relative to other Asia races. As Japan expanded its colonial reach in Korea and Manchuria, it combined scientific racism with Confusion and Shinto ideas to justify its colonial rule. Importantly, as the Japanese empire modernized and increasingly became an important geopolitical actor in the region, Japanese ideas about expansion were premised on the idea of “biological struggle for limited space and resources among the races.” Nonetheless, while the Japanese did internalize some Western ideas connecting geopolitical expansionism with biology and race, Japan aspired to become a great power recognized by the West. This would certainly have legitimized Japan’s own regional hegemonic aspirations, much like the Western powers. To be sure, the Japanese saw racial discrimination as an immutable feature of the international order, notwithstanding their crucial victory in 1905. By the time of the Versailles negotiations, the Japanese foreign minister, Uchida Kōsai, famously proposed the racial equality clause, which would recognize the “equal and just treatment [of League members] in every respect making no distinction, either in law or in fact, on account of their race or nationality.” However, this was vehemently opposed by the Australian delegation and later by Woodrow Wilson himself. Indeed, American and Australian opposition to the Japanese initiative for racial equality was initially rooted in fear that it would permit massive Japanese immigration by subverting American sovereignty over such questions. At the same time, opposition to it reflected what Naoka Shimazu argues was Wilson’s attempt to juggle a complex set of geopolitical factors involving Japanese interests in China, while trying to coax Japan into maintaining its membership in the League. Nonetheless, the defeat of the racial equality clause cemented growing suspicion among Japanese elites that international institutions mainly reflected Western interests and would not recognize Japan as a great power. By the 1930s, a Japanese newspaper reported, “From the first to the last the League did not flinch from its anti-Japanese stance. . . . This is the predictable outcome of the current control of the League by the white race.”[66](javascript:void(0)) Thus, as Young argues, the manner in which Japanese actions in Asia were denounced by Western powers in the League evoked “gloomy scenarios of economic blackmail and worse.” Throughout the 1930s, Young shows, Japanese literature and press ramped up the theme of the inevitable conflict with the United States—the main proxy for the white race—while emphasizing the importance of self-sufficiency and autarky.[68](javascript:void(0)) Between the late 1930s and the 1940s, the Japanese internalized racial ideas about world politics and about their own colonizing mission. As John Dower explains, a Japanese governmental report published in 1943 demonstrates that the creation of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere—Japan’s attempt to create its own version of Lebensraum in the Far East—was by no means a way of challenging global white supremacy, but rather a way of affirming Japanese racial domination in and of itself. Furthermore, Dower writes, the document entitled *An Investigation of Global Policy with the Yamato Race as Nucleus*, argued that “island nations must expand to ensure their security and survival. . . . Indeed, [as Dower characterizes the Japanese official perspective] it was predictable that any race or people whose vital powers were not energized by such external challenges would eventually decline.” The Japanese mission then was the establishment of a regional racial hierarchy that would ultimately protect its own race against the economic and violent predations of other (white) races. By the late 1930s, the geopolitical situation between the Western powers and Japan reached a critical crisis. Japanese imperial officials felt the necessity of continued southern expansion to the oil fields of Indonesia and of access to the raw materials of Indochina—taking advantage of the opportunity in 1940 to occupy the latter while France lay prostrate to Japan’s German ally. The occupation of China (ex-Manchuria) plus the continued expansion of Japanese control southward proved to be the trigger for greater American confrontation with Japan in bilateral negotiations. But for John Toland, in his classic work *The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire*, there was nothing inevitable in the confrontation. As he writes, “A war that need not have been fought was about to be fought because of mutual misunderstanding, language difficulties, and mistranslations as well as Japanese opportunism, *gekokujo* [the Japanese idea of overthrowing the stronger power], irrationality, honor, pride, and fear—and American racial prejudice, distrust, ignorance of the Orient, rigidity, self-righteousness, honor, national pride and fear.”[70](javascript:void(0)) But while there was certainly nothing deterministic in terms of the inevitability of such a cataclysmic conflict in the Pacific, the importance of racial antagonism and the perceived indisputable fact that the world is composed of incommensurable races simply cannot be overlooked: the crisis of a global racial imaginary in Asia with the emergence of Japanese power gave credence to and propelled the fear of the dismantlement of such an order based on white Western supremacy. In essence, the very idea of the yellow peril is an expression of apprehension at the wavering of the racial hierarchies that had underpinned the global order since its emergence in the nineteenth-century Western imaginaries. After the Deluge: The Ontology of the Yellow Peril Reconfigured The image of the yellow peril and the fear of a world transformed did not die in the fiery inferno of a defeated Japan. The terms simply changed to reflect the evolving geopolitical picture of the nascent Cold War. On the one hand, as I will explore in greater detail in the next chapter, the representation of Asian or Asiatic fear was tied to the nexus between processes of decolonization and fears in the West of communist proliferation. Communist China then takes the place of imperial Japan as the preeminent Asian threat to a Western world order embodied by United States and the creation of a wide-ranging international and capitalist institutional infrastructure. At the heart of American geopolitical concerns is then Chinese communist machinations in league with the Soviet Union: the defeat and dismantlement of French rule in Indochina crystalizes an “Asiatic” Cold War front pulling the United States into a calamitous intervention resulting in its humiliation in 1975. On the other hand, the Soviet Union comes to be portrayed as an Asiatic power, implying that it has attributes fundamentally different from those belonging to Western civilization. In other words, the nascent conflict with the Soviet Union, for a wide coterie of American writers in the late 1940s and 1950s, did not just reflect political or strategic differences; rather it emerged out of fundamental civilizational/racial cleavages that were perceived to be unbridgeable. The Soviet Union, for James Burnham, echoing Huntington decades before, was part of an entirely different civilization, which, alongside its communist system of government, created an irreconcilable threat to the very essence of the United States. Kennan, in the 1950s, imagined the Soviet United as the “single greatest enemy of western civilization . . . since [the] Turks were at the walls of Vienna” and also described it a “semi-oriental country.” Perhaps most extreme among the participants in this discourse was Admiral Leslie C. Stevens, who was the naval attaché to Moscow between 1947 and 1950. His book *Russian Assignment* how, “Russia is so far removed from our normal experience that life there is like what it must be on an alien planet. . . . The standards by which judgments are validated in Europe and America simply do not obtain in Russia.” For some in the United States, then, the Cold War was, at its core, a metaphysical struggle between two irreconcilable political-economic systems that was translated into an Orientalized racial/civilizational struggle. The irony, however, is that if we fast-forward to 2019, the director of Policy Planning at the Department of State, Kiron Skinner, articulated a strategy against China in civilizational terms. At a security forum in Washington, DC, Skinner was quoted as saying, “This is a fight with a really different civilization and a different ideology and the United States hadn’t had that before.” Moreover, as she goes on, “The Soviet Union and that competition, in a way it was a fight within the Western family. . . . It’s the first time that we will have a great power competitor that is not Caucasian.” The discursive integration of the Soviet Union is largely now predicated on the fact that it no longer exists and threatens the United States, whereas China now becomes the racialized threat, the “yellow” racial peril anew. It should come as no surprise, then, that the modern self-understanding of the West over the past two centuries relies on a conceptualization of a menacing East and that during moments of acute geopolitical crises the “othering” of the East becomes ever more politically salient. In particular, the yellow peril as world-making practice is something that is profoundly embedded in the idea of the West itself, continuously molded to activate forms of self-awareness and autoimmunity. This becomes even more crucial at the beginning of the Cold War and influences a wide range of important thinkers in a wide range of disciplines. Martin Heidegger infamously referred to Russia (alongside America) as the metaphysical other to German-rooted (i.e., European) Being. [Heidegger’s *Introduction to Metaphysics*](javascript:void(0)), published in 1953 but originally from a 1935 lecture, properly reflects a time of existential and political peril during the Cold War. But more evidently, as Emmanuel Faye shows, the very notion of the “Asiatic” for Heidegger in the 1930s is crucial in determining the enemy in the Schmittian sense. For example, in a lecture in Rome in 1936, Heidegger speaks of the “preservation of the European peoples against the Asiatic.” Such sentiments, which for Faye pervade Heidegger’s seminars of the 1930s, blend into a general nexus between the Asiatic as the radical other and the explosion of anti-Semitism (see Chapter Five). Hannah Arendt’s famous *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, published in 1951, was not just a genealogy of Nazi totalitarianism in terms of anti-Semitism and imperialism; it was widely read at the time as a way of insulating the West from the totalitarian experiments of total domination that really connected Nazim and Stalinism. What is remarkable in Arendt, however, is that this notion of total domination appears to gain much more fertile ground in what she calls “the lands of traditional Oriental despotism.” As she writes, The chances for totalitarian rule are frighteningly good in the lands of traditional Oriental despotism, in India and China, where there is almost *inexhaustible material* to feed the power-accumulating and man-destroying machinery of total domination, and where, moreover, the mass man’s typical feeling of superfluousness—*an entirely new phenomenon in Europe*, the concomitant of mass unemployment and the population growth of the last 150 years—*has been prevalent for centuries in the contempt for the value of human life*.

We may note the stark dehumanization of Asians, as “inexhaustible material,” but also how Arendt imagines that totalitarianism appears to be something deeply embedded in the “Orient,” whereas it is a “new phenomenon” in Europe. If the Cold War is the distinction between totalitarian and non-totalitarian worlds, then Asia becomes imagined at the ever-present threat to the West’s ontological security, if not its physical security. But perhaps the clearest expression of this gulf or distance between East and West was infamously expressed by Emmanuel Levinas, known as the philosopher of alterity par excellence. Levinas infamously wrote in an essay entitled “The Russo-Chinese Debate and the Dialectic,” written and published in 1960,

The exclusive community with the Asiatic world, itself a stranger to European history to which Russia, in spite of all its strategic and tactical denials, has belonged for almost a thousand years, would this not be disturbing even to a society without classes? . . . In abandoning the West, does Russia not fear to drown itself in an Asiatic civilization. . . ?

Levinas goes on to explicitly draw attention to the very peril that such a radical alterity as the “Asiatic civilization” poses to the West:

The Yellow Peril! It is not racial, it is spiritual. It does not involve inferior values; it involves a radical strangeness, a stranger to the weight of its past, from where there does not filter any familiar voice or inflection, a lunar or Martian past.

Much like Arendt, Levinas implicitly dehumanizes Asians through a “racial strangeness” that appears extraterrestrial. He seems to revel in such a radical alterity as a way of delineating the profound threat that Asia and the “Asiatic” poses to Western universality—“to drown itself in an Asiatic civilization.”

What emerges here is a sense of a world marked by irreconcilable differences, racial, spiritual, civilizational, a way of internalizing fear and insecurity at a profound and fundamental level. It merges itself with the ontological constitution of enmity in the early part of the Cold War, with the Soviet Union as a racialized “Asiatic” power that represents a form of absolute alterity. As Perry Anderson explains, “Communism was an enemy far more radical than fascism had ever been: not an aberrant member of the family of polities respecting private ownership of the means of production, but an alien force dedicated to destroying it.”

The history of the yellow peril is a history of how the global racial imaginary constructs a relation between Western and Eastern worlds that is always perceived to be in crisis, and within which the undoing of the former is always, in a sense, potentially happening as a result of the latter. It is a recognition that a world ultimately built on white Western supremacy cannot last indefinitely.

### 1AR – China – No Africa !

#### x. China posture in Africa isn’t offensive and pulling out is good – multilat is inevitable, but security competition is a losing game.

Eland ’23 [Ivan; senior fellow with the Independent Institute and author of War and the Rogue Presidency. January 11, 2023; “Does the U.S. Need to Contain China in Africa?”; *National Interest;* https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/does-us-need-contain-china-africa-206097] TDI

Last month’s U.S.-African Leaders Summit aimed to compete with China, Russia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and other nations for “influence” in Africa, a continent that is growing in prominence. According to the New York Times, China, which recently gave a whopping $60 billion in aid and loans to African nations, is leading the race for influence on the rising continent, with the United States falling behind in the giveaways. Really, that’s just fine.

After World War II, during the Cold War, and 150 years after the Constitutional Convention, the United States deviated from its traditional foreign policy of being a reluctant and late participant in overseas wars. President Harry Truman, in choosing to help the autocratic governments of Turkey and Greece fend off Communist influence in 1947, pledged the United States to compete for influence in a global Cold War with the Soviet Union. In that forty-two-year Cold War, the United States spent huge amounts of blood and treasure reflexively competing all over the world to contain, and in a few cases roll back, Communism. This established a muscle memory for gaining ever more ethereal “influence” in far reaches of the planet. When the East Bloc and Soviet Union suddenly collapsed and the United States was perceived to have “won” the Cold War, such uncharacteristic American interventionism appeared to have validation. (In reality, the Soviet Empire collapsed because its creaking economy could no longer support its overextended empire. If the United States had not contested the then-basket cases of South Korea, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and instead let the Soviets bear the cost of conquering and administering them, perhaps the Soviet Union would have collapsed faster than it did.)

Now that China is rising, U.S. media and foreign policy circles are wringing their hands about the United States losing out to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which garners influence by state-driven lending to developing countries to build boondoggle infrastructure projects that they cannot afford, thereby accumulating dangerously high debt for their economies to bear. Africa has been one of the prime targets of the BRI influence project.

As China got involved on the continent, other actors, such as Russia, Japan, the European Union, Turkey, and the UAE, wanted to get in on the action as well. For example, Turkey and the UAE have built infrastructure projects on the continent, and the Russians and Emiratis have sold weapons to a number of African nations. Many nations are after Africa’s earth minerals for electric cars and see Africa’s expanding population—which will double by 2050 to account for 25 percent of the world’s population—as a huge market for their exports.

The Trump administration, with its chaotic self-interested foreign policy, didn’t join the party in Africa. But the Biden administration, with a president who well remembers the Cold War competition, wants to catch up with the rest of the herd. Biden held a U.S.-African Leaders Summit at the White House in December to distribute some goodies of his own. To start, Biden will join the wooing of African leaders by supporting the African Union’s representation at G-20 summits, in organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, and more. Also, Biden has pledged $55 billion in new spending for Africa, including initiatives on computer coding education, cybersecurity, and rare earth minerals, which will be mined to build electric vehicle batteries.

Giving African nations and organizations more representation in international forums is fine, but should the U.S. government join the crowd of nations by slathering more government largesse on the continent? American companies competing for a growing African market will help both Africa and the United States. In contrast, any U.S. government infrastructure or subsidy programs would likely be counterproductive for both sides, as the record of the BRI has already shown.

On the security side, the United States should let the Europeans do more to provide security on the continent if requested. More generally, the United States needs to emphasize African self-reliance in the security realm. The United States must finally accept the reality that the multipolar world is already here by pushing for the expansion of the UN Security Council, adding not only the African Union but also India, Japan, Germany, and Brazil as permanent members. Each of these great powers could manage exclusively their own sphere of influence in the world, as President Franklin D. Roosevelt originally envisioned in his “Four Policemen” vision for post-World War II security. The new permanent members of the Security Council could handle any boundary conflicts or trans-sphere issues—for example, climate change—that arose in their sphere.

Such a framework would allow U.S economic rejuvenation by permitting the United States to substantially cut security spending, thus retiring some of its monstrous $30 trillion in national debt and reducing U.S. imperial overextension caused by the economic burden of policing the entire world for other wealthy nations, which allows free-riders to divert resources toward attaining a competitive edge in commercial markets. The United States now only accounts for 13.6 percent of global GDP but a whopping 38 percent of the world’s defense spending, which has created a competitive drag on the U.S. economy that must be reduced. Washington can do so by refusing to serve as the unilateral global policeman or pursue a zero-sum competition with China for military, political, and economic dominance.

### 1AR – China – No Threat

#### x. No China impact.

Pei ’21 [Minxin; professor of government at Claremont McKenna College. May 27, 2021; “The China Threat Is Being Overhyped”; *Bloomberg*; [edited for ableist language]; https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-05-27/u-s-shouldn-t-treat-china-as-an-existential-threat] TDI

Republicans across the political spectrum, from moderate Senator Mitt Romney to fire-breathing former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, have decreed that China poses an existential threat to the United States. While President Joe Biden hasn’t gone that far yet, his national-security team has maintained the previous administration’s hardline policies toward Beijing. Any other stance would risk a political backlash: The latest Gallup poll shows nearly 80% of Americans hold unfavorable views of China — a number that will only rise if U.S. intelligence agencies conclude that the new coronavirus leaked from a Chinese lab.

Biden should think carefully before he commits himself further. Countries facing an existential threat must mobilize and deploy all their resources to confront, if not remove, that threat and ensure their survival. How the Biden administration assesses the threat China poses will effectively determine war and peace in the 21st century.

The fact is, those throwing around the charge most liberally don’t seem to have thought through what it would really mean for China to threaten the existence of the world’s most powerful nation. In reality, China has neither the destructive capability nor the geopolitical motivation to destroy the U.S.

Most obviously, unlike the former Soviet Union, China does not possess a nuclear arsenal large and powerful enough to obliterate the U.S. And, while its conventional power has grown to the point where it could inflict serious losses on U.S. forces in a conflict over Taiwan, China’s military significantly lags the U.S. in technological sophistication and warfighting experience.

In any wider clash, the U.S. would also be able to count on the support of its allies and China’s regional rivals, including Japan and India, which themselves have potent militaries. China will be alone and face enemies on many sides.

As for motivation, China is deeply resentful of the American security presence in Asia. Its leaders see the U.S. as the principal obstacle to their country’s global ambitions. But there is no evidence that they are bent on regime change in the U.S. or seek its physical destruction.

China has no real ideological appeal outside its borders, despite assiduously promoting its “ China Model” of rapid economic development under one-party rule; most other countries know that China’s economic success would be hard to replicate. During the height of the Cold War in the 1950s and 1960s, Soviet communism inspired revolutions around the world. Today, the few countries that pay lip service to the China Model do so to win economic favors from Beijing. The real ideological threat to the U.S. — the political authoritarianism embodied by former President Donald Trump and his followers — lies within its own borders.

What about the prospect of China becoming the world’s largest economy in dollar terms? Measured in real terms (or purchasing power parity), the Chinese economy surpassed America’s in 2014 without eroding U.S. leadership in global finance and technology, or undermining U.S. prosperity.

Judging the Chinese threat by the size of China’s economy (the amount of goods and services it produces) is also misleading because its population is more than four times larger than that of the U.S. Aggregate wealth and technological capabilities are far more meaningful yardsticks of power.

Compared with China, the U.S. remains a solid leader in both. U.S. households held $130 trillion in wealth at the end of 2020, while Credit Suisse estimates that Chinese household wealth in mid-2020 stood at $82 trillion.

Technologically, while China has made impressive strides in recent years, the U.S. continues to lead in key areas. The recent tech trade war between the two countries exposed just how vulnerable China — not the U.S. — is. U.S. sanctions have ~~crippled~~ [annihilated] China’s telecom giant Huawei Technologies Co. and cast a shadow over the entire Chinese tech sector. Even China’s impressive recent Mars landing depended on technology comparable to what NASA was using in 2003.

None of this even takes into account China’s manifold internal weaknesses, which range from rapid demographic deterioration to social unrest, ethnic tensions and an inefficient state-capitalist system. All will limit the growth of Chinese power.

### 1AR – China – Status

#### China’s status-seeking, not revisionist.

Murray ’19 [Michelle; Associate Professor of Political Studies; Director of Global Initiatives at Bard College. PhD in International Relations at University of Chicago. 2019; “Identity, Insecurity, and China’s Place in the World”; *The Struggle for Recognition in International Relations: Status, Revisionism, and Rising Powers*; Accessed Online via University of Michigan Libraries] TDI

China’s view of, and future place in, the international order are importantly connected to its experiences during the Century of Humiliation and the dual concepts of national humiliation and national rejuvenation that constitute its self-understanding. The Century of Humiliation began with the first Opium War in 1839, when Britain forced China to open its ports to the opium trade, and did not end until the success of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the civil war of 1949. During this time, China was the target of repeated international interventions, lost large pieces of its territory to Western powers and Japan, saw the collapse of its millennia old imperial system, and was torn apart by internal uprisings.44 According to the national humiliation narrative, the first Opium War represents a distinct turning point in Chinese history, when a powerful and successful ancient civilization was forced into a semi-colonial position at the hands of foreign interventions. National humiliation is an active part of contemporary Chinese collective identity. It serves as an important resource for those cultivating Chinese nationalism, unifying the Chinese people against foreign others who perpetrated these past humiliations and legitimating the CCP, the party seen as leading China’s reemergence as a major power.

The Century of Humiliation, however, is not just about recounting a particular interpretation of the past. Rather, it actively informs beliefs about how the world works and is used to interpret the dynamics of international relations today.45 Specifically, the national humiliation narrative constructs China’s self-understanding and its place in the international system, shaping its interests and aspirations as a rising power. First, the narrative of national humiliation represents China as a victim of Western subjugation. When articulated in the context of current international relations, this representation works to breed suspicion of outside actors, including the United States, and gives an emotional valence to seemingly inconsequential interactions. For example, in 2001 a US spy plane collided with a Chinese fighter jet over the South China Sea, sparking an international incident and inflaming tensions between China and the United States. As the incident played itself out, it became apparent that “resolving this problem did not involve military retaliation or economic reparations so much as symbolic recognition: China demanded a public apology from the United States.”46 Thus, understood through the prism of national humiliation, interactions with the West are always contextualized in a history where China suffered humiliating losses at the hands of Western expansion, and where Western power is, in and of itself, the instrument of that subjugation.

Second, the narrative of national humiliation constructs Chinese understandings of its military power and that of the United States by imposing a moral subtext to power politics. Building from its treatment during the Century of Humiliation, the international community’s actions toward China are viewed as unjust, reinforcing suspicion of foreign powers’ intentions.47 Within this frame, a self–Other dynamic is created, whereby Chinese history is reimagined as one of benevolent hegemony, when China governed and projected its influence in peaceful ways. This is positioned in contrast to the use of force and coercion common to Western hegemony. Today these self–Other representations guide Chinese understandings about the purpose and meaning of Chinese and American power. In China’s eyes, its burgeoning military power is consistent with its history and thus is not threatening. These representations are at work in Chinese rhetoric that characterizes its growing power as its “peaceful rise.” As Zheng Bijan argued, China’s rise will be different than that of previous major powers, as “China will transcend ideological differences to strive for peace, development, and cooperation with all countries of the world.”48 At the same time, US foreign policy is contextualized within this narrative by reference to Western aggression during the Century of Humiliation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has more forcefully criticized China’s human rights record, undermined its bid to host the 2000 Olympics, increased arms sales to Taiwan, and strengthened its presence in the region.49 While US foreign policy has been couched in the language of engagement, many in China view this as a simple euphemism for containment.50 This is especially the case with the Obama administration’s recent “strategic rebalancing,” known popularly as the “pivot to Asia.” As a consequence, any attempt by the United States to contain or limit Chinese power is seen as an act of misrecognition and an unjust and aggressive attempt to subjugate China once again.

Finally, the narrative of national humiliation highlights China’s “historical experience with territorial loss and intrusion,” thus placing the maintenance of sovereignty at the center of China’s national identity.51 The Century of Humiliation is understood to be representative of a loss of sovereignty, where outside forces were able to expose the state’s weakness and delegitimize its institutions. Therefore, any perceived infringement of China’s sovereignty is read through the lens of national humiliation and understood to be an existential threat to China’s security. Importantly, these threats are not material in nature, for China’s physical security is not in doubt. Rather, they represent a symbolic threat, suggesting that China continues to be vulnerable to outside influence. Moreover, sovereignty is the cornerstone of the current international order. Thus any perceived violation of sovereignty is understood to be another subjugation of China, refusing it the rights and privileges that other states in the system enjoy.

This narrative of national humiliation operates alongside the goal of national rejuvenation, which provides the motivation for China’s contemporary foreign policy interests. If national humiliation recounts the losses China suffered at the hands of the West and Japan, national rejuvenation promises to restore for China the status it lost during the Century of Humiliation. In articulating China’s self-understanding in these terms, China’s major power status is understood as a right: respect that China should regain by virtue of its former status as a great nation.52 Thus, China’s rise to major power status is not about obtaining something new or a gaining an advantage over others, but rather as a “restoration of fairness.”53 These discourses of humiliation and rejuvenation infuse Chinese foreign policy, shaping a range of behaviors from its voting record in the United Nations Security Council to its regional relationships to its burgeoning leadership role in the global economy.

Constructing China’s (Un)Peaceful Rise

China’s rise, guided by the twin narratives of national humiliation and rejuvenation, is likely inevitable. What this means for the international order will be a function of China’s interactions with the United States and the representations that animate that relationship. US foreign policy toward a rising China is often cast as a choice between engagement and containment. So-called “optimists” call for increased engagement by integrating China deeply into the global economy and institutional architecture of the international order, whereas “pessimists” see future security competition as an inevitable outgrowth of Chinese power and advocate a policy of containment.54 Both containment and engagement strategies, however, are built off of assumptions about China’s material needs and do not pay sufficient attention to China’s distinct identity needs. Thus, both approaches risk exacerbating China’s dilemma of social insecurity, and constructing China’s unpeaceful rise.

Proponents of containment do not have a sanguine view of China’s rise and argue that as China grows more powerful it is likely to lead to an intense security competition with the United States.55 Containment is a straightforward application of realist understandings of international politics, and presumes that under all conditions China will seek to overturn the international order and thus its power must be preemptively checked. China is motivated, as are all emerging major powers, by security and the related desire for power. In this view, the anarchic structure of international system forces states seeking only security to behave aggressively toward one another in an attempt to gain more power and alter the international status quo. Rising powers are revisionist powers.56 China’s economic power and influence will be the springboard for military dominance in the region because economic power is the basis of military power. China is building a blue-water navy that will allow it to project naval power well beyond the Chinese coast “from the oil ports of the Middle East to the shipping lanes of the Pacific, where the United States Navy has long reigned as the dominant force.”57 Moreover, China’s integration in regional politics is indicative of its growing influence. As it becomes less susceptible to American economic pressure, China will have increasing leverage over weaker Asian countries and the United States.58 In short, while China is not in a position to militarily challenge the United States at the present, a much more powerful China should be expected to take increasing steps to push the United States out of the Asia–Pacific region and challenge the terms of the US-led international order.59 Therefore, US foreign policy must be reoriented to contain the impending threat that China poses to the United States’ security and economic interests.

Containment, however, is based on the faulty assumption that China harbors revisionist intentions. It is not an impartial assessment of actual Chinese objectives and therefore runs a real risk of producing a self-fulfilling prophecy.60 The more militarily aggressively the United States behaves, the more threatened China will feel and thus the more likely it will be to respond aggressively to the United States. A potentially severe security dilemma is almost certain to emerge and intensify through a containment strategy, therefore reproducing international relations’ fraught history with power transitions. Moreover, containment is a deterrent strategy, designed to raise the costs of Chinese expansionism and in doing so to limit Chinese power. Deterrent strategies assume that revisionist intentions emerge within states — not from their interactions with other states, and thus ignore China’s recognition-needs. But, as the struggle for recognition highlights, treating a socially insecure state as if it were greedy will only exacerbate its insecurity, fuel its interest in revisionism, and construct China’s unpeaceful rise.

### 1AR – Russia – K

#### x. Narratives of Russian revisionism strategically invest in Russophobia to uphold neocolonialism.

Roberts ’16 [(Kari Roberts, PhD, Political Science at Mount Royal University, Senior Fellow at the Canadian International Council.) “Why a Normal Relationship With Russia Is So Hard: Russophobia in Clinton-era American Foreign Policy Discourse and The Decision to Expand NATO”, May 2016. <https://cpsa-acsp.ca/documents/conference/2016/Roberts.pdf>] pfox TDI

Andrei Tsygankov accurately identifies anti-Russianism, or Russophobia, in American decision making, defined as “a fear of Russia’s political system on the grounds that it is incompatible with the interests and values of the West in general and the United States in particular. This fear finds expression in various forms of criticism of Russia that are unbalanced and distorted. No matter which independent actions Moscow may pursue, they are sure to be perceived… as reflecting Russia’s expansionist interests, not as a legitimate pursuit of national interests.” 19 Russophobia transcends ideological and partisan lines, as both neo-conservative and liberal minded groups demonize Russia in fairly equal measure. These attitudes are more than simply a cultural animosity toward Russians; rather, they reflect “a very real fear of Russia’s political influence” that finds expression in a distorted critique of Russia and its politics. This animosity results in a persistent need to contain Russia’s influence, even in times of relative peace and cooperation between the two nations. This is evidenced by the impulse to expand NATO just a few short years after the end of the Cold War and before the reversal of early expectations for Russia’s democratic consolidation. This will be discussed later in the paper.

For Tsygankov, Russia is viewed as an expansionist state that refuses to abide by “acceptable rules of international behavior,” owing either to its political culture or its questionable leadership; either way, it must be “contained or fundamentally transformed.” Russophobia is informed by a misinterpretation of Russia’s history, one in which Russia has been forced to respond to the actions of the West, rather than represent some sort of ingrained need to conquer and dominate. Russia is viewed as an autocratic empire that perpetually oppresses nationalities, denies its citizens basic rights, “concentrates economic and military resources in the hands of the state,” and doggedly pursues its inherent and illegitimate expansionist national interests. This last point bears re-stating: Russia is not accorded the courtesy of being seen to possess legitimate national interests, owing to the above assumptions about its nature and motivations. Tsygankov notes that, “even during the 1990s, when Russia looked more like a failing state than one capable of projecting power, some members of the American political class were worried about the future revival of the Eurasian giant as a revisionist power.” He attributes the rampant triumphalism in the US at the end of the Cold War to this fear of Russia, noting it reached its zenith in the mid-1990s. In fact, it was actually the Clinton administration that “entrenched the rhetoric of victorious thinking by drawing the analogy between Russia and the defeat of Germany and Japan in World War II.” This triumphalism implied something inherently superior, and therefore inferior, about the US and Russia, respectively.

Tsygankov is quick to label American Russophobia as a political phenomenon rather than a cultural phenomenon, leaving open the possibility for its willful reversal. While it may be the case that Russophobia’s presence in American foreign policy making may not be a fait accompli, its presence in the American discourse may reflect more of a cultural presence of anti-Russianism that is self-reinforcing. In fact, Tsygankov himself notes that public opinion followed elite opinion and policy,28 which testifies to its presence in the popular discourse. Tsygankov claims that the infusion of Russophobia into elite and popular attitudes about Russia is the result of a willful construction of an anti-Russian lobby in order to advance a particular foreign policy agenda. “The Lobby,” is a deliberate cabal of anti-Russian military hawks, or those who presume American geopolitical hegemony can best be achieved by the military defeat of Russia, as well as those who assertively presume the hegemony of so-called liberal values of democracy, rule of law and human rights.29 This Lobby allegedly dates back to the early 20th Century, its views solidified by the Cold War, to which members of Congress and policy makers in the White House have been sympathetic. While Tsygankov acknowledges that some of the Lobby’s success could be attributed to the absence of a pro-Russia lobby in the US, his attention is trained on the Lobby’s political goal of fostering anti-Russian sentiment in the West in support of a “global power struggle” against a potential “resurgent” Russia, rife wih what Zbigniew Brzezinski once labeled “neo-colonial thinkers.”

Tsygankov seeks to explain the construction and persistence of an anti-Russian lobby that is purposefully distorting Russia’s role in the world, its history and its interests to advance an anti-Russia agenda; however, this is not the precise case made herein. Tsygankov’s premise is not fundamentally rejected here, but it is not fully embraced either. There does seem to be a culture of anti-Russianism present in Washington that has influenced foreign policy elites, but it may not necessarily be the result of an intentional drive to keep Russia down. What this paper shares with Tsygankov is the conviction that Russophobia exists, has a significant influence on American foreign policy concerning Russia, and therefore must be better identified and understood. The goal here is not to reveal malevolence toward Russia, but rather to name this Russophobia, discuss its genesis, and connect it with foreign policy outcomes in the hope of illuminating what remains a significant impediment to a more constructive Russia-US relationship.

In his writing on Russophobia, Anatol Lieven suggests that anti-Russianism is derived in part from the myth of America’s own exceptionalism. This mythology sees the US standing taller than other nations, able to make objective observations about other states’ motives, and thereby construct appropriate policy in response. Lieven warns of the dangers of such assumptions, because they render US policy makers “incapable of understanding the opposition of other nations” to its own policies. Lieven takes on NATO expansion directly, noting that, among the many reasons Russia opposes it, is the US’ failure to appreciate what it means for Russia. US policy makers have been genuinely puzzled by Russia’s failure to perceive its enlargement as benign, which is due in part to the American rhetoric that exists alongside the policy decision itself. It is not only the physical expansion of NATO that is problematic, but the corresponding failure to bother understanding Russia’s interests. This unwillingness to understand Russia, combined with the embrace of longstanding and outworn stereotypes about Russia, assumptions about the pattern of history in Russia, as well as a Cold War “hangover” of sorts, which cannot shake the image of Russia-as-threat, all contribute to define Russophobia and the discourse within which American foreign policy is made.

Lieven speculates that the intellectual basis for this Russophobia may stem from 19th Century British propaganda regarding Russian expansionism and its inherent wickedness. Lieven notes that this demonization of other peoples, sometimes taking on a racist tone, has long been present within Western, and American, foreign policy making. Moreover, there is a tendency to assume that what was once assumed about a nation and its peoples shall forever be true about them, even in the absence of supporting evidence. This sort of historical determinism denies a nuanced appreciation for cultural evolution and very much denies the potential for American leaders to view post-Soviet Russia’s disappointing struggles with democracy for what they are. Instead, they have been viewed against the backdrop of Russia’s Tsarist and Communist experiences and are therefore “wicked.” This is evidenced by Henry Kissinger’s 2000 remark that Russian imperialism has continued for centuries, characterized by subjugation of its neighbours and “overawing those not under its direct control” and in Zbigniew Brzezinski’s assigning of blame for Stalinist-era policies to present day Russians. For Lieven, to view past conduct as less a product of history and more a product of culture or “national DNA” of sorts, comes perilously close to racism. There is a certain essentialism in the American discourse on Russia that equates these acts with “Russianness.” Perhaps, as Tsygankov suggests, demonizing Russia continued to help justify US strategy toward the USSR in the Cold War. For Lieven, this legitimized the military buildup, the containment, the worldview and actions that stemmed from the need to balance Soviet power. Yet, as Lieven importantly notes, even those who demonize Russia for its past seem to have little problem embracing Communist China, so perhaps it is not communism in Russia’s past the Western leaders fear, but rather something cultural, something innately “Russian.”

Lieven concurs about the self-reinforcing nature of Russophobia, noting the US’ “need for enemies” as an instrumental component of its own narrative of exceptionalism. Perhaps the result of viewing Russia as the enemy for so long is the reason it has become one. Russophobia has enabled the judging of Russia “by utterly different standards than those applied to other countries.” Tsygankov and Lieven are correct to suggest a linkage between Russophobia and America’s own mythologies about its place in the world. America’s destiny is to be a cultural hegemon atop the global hierarchy of nations. The perception of American superiority seems to require an “other” to assume a position of inferiority. Russia has long represented a new cultural frontier and a divergent history, one that was assumed to be far less “exceptional” than the American experience. Challenges to the presumption of American hegemony have often been met with not simply disagreement, but a de-legitimizing of the very existence of the ‘other.’ Russia is not immune from ideas of exceptionalism and the two nations have perpetuated a soft rivalry that possesses “nationalist phobias” that can be mutually reinforcing.

Gertan Dijkink acknowledges that this “gross distinction between East and West as opposite cultures” is part of the US discourse on Russia. For Dijkink, this does not have to be addressed directly, or be part of a public discussion, because it has become “naturalized,” or considered to be common sense. He notes that experience and discourse create an imaginative geography of the outside world, which contributes to the construction of visions of the world.” Dijkink notes that, after all, “American foreign policy aims to perpetuate, serve and affirm the American way of life,” thus helping to explain why Russia’s alternative to “the American way,” presents a challenge. Georg Lofflman confirms the impact of mythology on discourse and the influence on foreign policy outcomes.45 Myths shape identity, become themselves part of identity, and influence action. It is reasonable to suggest that American exceptionalism influences Russophobia. If the US is unique, its values superior, and therefore its preeminence in the international system assumed, and if Russia fundamentally challenges these values – America’s very identity – in some way, then fear of what Russia represents may be a consequence. Putin himself famously warned Americans in 2013 of the dangers of seeing themselves as exceptional.

Richard Sakwa notes the difficult time US leaders have had accepting Russia as an equal. Russia did not see itself as a defeated power after the Cold War and conducted itself as such, a view in opposition to the prevailing Washington narrative. Sakwa notes that Russia as a democratic state was no less revisionist than Russia as a communist state and that this was threatening to the existing world order that presumed the hegemony of western liberal ideas.48 Even though Russian foreign policy was actually fairly unthreatening, and could even be characterized as collaborative for many years, it was not universally viewed this way because of the geopolitical threat it was perceived to represent.49 Sakwa also claims that some of the anti-Russianism has a strong basis in history, as Russia has never really been considered to be a part of Europe. Its very presence has motivated European integration; post WWII European identity was constructed on the basis of Russian exclusion, a reality that was confirmed by decades of the Cold War. That the fear of Russia and the exclusionary attitude toward Russia persist, driven largely by the United States and the derivative suspicion of Russia from the Cold War period, is problematic but not surprising.

Russophobia in Western discourse has been written about, by Russians themselves - poets and writers - for nearly two centuries. Some have suggested that Russian fears of American Russophobia fuel a siege mentality present within Moscow since the end of the Cold War. Russophobia has had an impact; it has influenced the manner in which Russia approaches its own relations with the West. Valentina Feklyunina confirms that the assumption of American Russophobia by Russians themselves has shaped Russia’s self perception, and more importantly it has shaped Russia’s expectations for how foreign nations will engage with them. Russian leaders anticipate anti-Russianism in their dealings with the West, which shapes and perpetuate an “us vs. them” discourse among Russian decision makers that may be reinforcing the narrative of fear in Washington.

Russophobia ought not be confused with criticism of Russia. Heikki Luostarinen cautions that Finland, for example, no longer exhibits Russophobia, but that it remains free to offer social and political criticism. Russophobia is more than a disagreement or even competing values; in fact, during the Cold War, Russophobia took on what Luostarinen identifies as racist tones reflected in movies about the evils of the Soviet empire. The USSR was often cast not simply as the enemy, but as an evil villain, which justified its complete evisceration and for which no action taken toward this goal could be considered illegitimate. This demonization of the enemy may have parallels with the post 9/11 discourse about terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS). During the Cold War, hostilities with the Soviet Union gave way to “fear, moral disgust and ignorance,” which were coupled with a lack of knowledge about the Soviet Union. Luostarinen explains that this enemy imaging involves the belief, by a cultural or political group and even a nation state itself, that one’s very security and fundamental values are purposefully and meaningfully threatened by the other. This enemy becomes essential to identity construction and may even serve some collective psychological need to perceive a threat for which a harsh response is justified. Externalizing a common threat can be essential to legitimizing a collective identity and historical experience. This “us vs. them” narrative can feed a powerful nationalism, which can provide a context for behaviors that might otherwise be difficult to legitimize. This enemy construction can become ingrained as mythology among members of a society. The “enemy image may strengthen integration within a given group and moderate internal conflicts; it may help to bring the rank and file behind the group leaders; it may be used (scapegoat) to explain any injustices within the group.”

Luostarinen is careful to note that the construction of an enemy image does not mean that the so-called enemy itself is not guilty of actions that contribute to its demonization. The construction of an enemy image of Russia stems largely from the very real fact that, for centuries, Russia has stood for much of what Western values opposed: “autocracy, national repression, and conservatism” and later “radicalism and social revolution.” Fear of Russian aggression has been in place since the 16th Century, blossoming alongside the growth of Russian power. But this fear was coupled with the racist view of Russians as an inferior, inherently violent race that could not be trusted, thereby necessitating the conclusion that peaceful coexistence could not be countenanced; mistrust of the Russian leadership transformed into a cultural loathing of Russians themselves. John Gleason describes as deep seated fear or dislike of Russia, which is the result of misunderstanding of Russian history and culture, rooted in “competitive imperial ambitions.” Gleason notes that it may be a natural inclination to fear that which we know the least, which could help to explain the presence of Russophobia in earlier periods when connection with cultures across the globe was a rare occurrence. It does far less to explain the persistence of Russophobia in a time in which, notwithstanding the warnings of Samuel Huntington and others for whom cultural difference is a basis for conflict, contemporary access to a diversity of cultures can prompt cultural awareness, acceptance, and even fusion. This does not appear to be the case with American views of Russia, which remain imbued with an air of repugnance in which even minor differences take on elevated significance.

### 1AR – Russia – Wagner Thumps

#### x. Russia pulling support from Wagner zeroes projection.

Pilling et al. ’23 [David; Africa editor of the Financial Times. Andres Schipani, Aanu Adeoye, Samer Al-Atrush. June 27, 2023; “Wagner’s future in Africa in question after Russian mutiny”; Financial Times; https://www.ft.com/content/93381925-9b2e-4c57-b669-7c592536cffc] TDI

For years Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner Group has been the main vehicle of Russia’s power projection in Africa, engaging in military, mining and propaganda activities across the continent from Libya and Sudan to Mali and Mozambique.

If Moscow is able to follow through on its threat to disband Wagner after Prigozhin’s aborted mutiny in Russia, the question now is what will happen to the mercenary group’s extensive African operations.

For one leader, Central African Republic President Faustin-Archange Touadéra — who owes his urvival to Wagner mercenaries after they put down an attempted rebellion in 2020 — that is down to Moscow. Fidèle Gouandjika, a top adviser to Touadéra, said Wagner’s “instructors” came with Russia’s blessing.

“If Moscow decides to withdraw them and send us the Beethovens or the Mozarts rather than Wagners, we will have them,” he said.

Wagner has played a pivotal role in some of the continent’s recent conflicts and has drawn its own funding from a mix of sources, but remains heavily dependent on Russian state backing, not least for logistical support.

“The monster will evolve, but it will not die,” said Nathalia Dukhan, senior author of a report, Architects of Terror, published on Tuesday by The Sentry, an investigative group, on Wagner’s activities in CAR.

The Kremlin has said Wagner’s activities in Africa will continue, but while it is seeking to take control of the mercenary group in Russia and Ukraine — including pushing Wagner to hand over its weapons — it has not indicated how it wishes to deal with the group’s African operations.

In at least five years of African activity, Wagner has provided Moscow with quick and cheap influence, experts said. It has also given the Kremlin plausible deniability for Wagner’s actions, which have included election interference and disinformation campaigns in several countries as well as alleged massacres in CAR and Mali.

Despite Vladimir Putin’s claim on Tuesday that the Russian state “completely financed” Wagner, in Africa — where it has thousands of personnel — the mercenary company has developed funding sources beyond Moscow.

In CAR and other countries Wagner has established a ruthless, self-financing “business model”, involving military violence and control of gold and diamond mines, Dukhan said. She said that model was too effective to easily dismantle: “A virus survives. It will adapt to the new environment.”

In Libya, Wagner’s deployment was previously financed by the United Arab Emirates, according to the Pentagon, and also by Khalifa Haftar, the warlord who contracted the mercenaries to fight alongside his forces in 2019. Western officials said the UAE funding dried up in 2021.

One western official said Wagner could continue its operations on the ground while looking for other means to arm itself, but that Russian logistical backing would be hard to replace. Wagner has used Russian military bases and aircraft to transport everything from arms to personnel.

Charles Bouessel, a senior consultant with Crisis Group on CAR, said he could not see how Wagner could continue its African operations, which employ thousands of people, without Moscow’s approval.

“Wagner relies heavily on Russian ministry of defence logistics for the delivery of military equipment,” he said. “Wagner will have trouble operating in the long term without this support.”

Samuel Ramani, a fellow at think-tank Rusi and author of the book Russia in Africa, said one possibility was that Prigozhin could use his African operations as a bolt-hole if he is unable to stay in Belarus as stipulated in his truce with Putin. “He could pop up in Sudan or pop up in CAR as a medium-term destination.”

“Prigozhin wanted to become the face and driver of Russia’s policy in Africa,” Ramani said. But Wagner’s Africa operations could survive even if Prigozhin were removed or killed, he added, since Wagner had ties to the GRU intelligence services and was run by military veterans.

### 1AR – A2 Non-Alignment Turn

#### End of article concludes building anti-imperial militancy is key, which means aff solves this impact!

1NC Shoki ’23 [(William Shoki, deputy editor of Africa Is a Country. He is based in Johannesburg.) “Anti-imperialism for the ruling class”, Africa is a Country, 05/12/2023. <https://africasacountry.com/2023/05/anti-imperialism-for-the-ruling-class>] pfox TDI

And so, creating a viable society at home is a necessary step towards creating a viable international solidarity. This demands a confrontation with capital, which requires building the economic and political power of the working class.

The contemporary realities of scarcity, economic decline, and effective “de-development” make the task daunting. But meaningful internationalism must be grounded in real efforts to build a mass, international movement in opposition to capital. To do that, we have to organize ourselves first.

### 1AR – Terror – K

#### x. Securitizing terrorism is racist & wrong.

Patel ’17 [Tina; Patel completed her degree in Criminal Justice at Liverpool John Moores University, the qualification of PhD. She was appointed as a research fellow at Nottingham Trent University. She is currently Senior Lecturer in Criminology at the University of Salford Manchester. May 2, 2017; “It’s not about security, it’s about racism: counter-terror strategies, civilizing processes and the post-race fiction”; *Palgrave Communications*] TDI

Counter-terror measures have been criticized for their over-focus on all Muslims, and for their simplistic, generic and one-dimensional notions of Islam (Kundnani, 2009; Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009; Bonino, 2013; Patel, 2017). This has presented the commonsensical view that extremism and radicalization is inherent within Muslim culture. It is a logic that presents all Muslims as extremists, rather than problematising the extremist mind-set of individuals themselves. Anti-Muslim racism has seen the state and its allied services construct Muslims through a language of disobedience, deviance and criminality, which is itself considered to be built on anti-Western hostility and a history of Orientalism (Said, 1979). Within the “war on terror” context, this means that there is an easy acceptance in lay society of “the dangerous brown man” — an adaptation of earlier racist mythologies around the “dangerous black man” (Bhattacharyya, 2008: 96), which is used to both represent and sustain racialized anxieties. Rooted in these anxieties is the idea that Muslims are uncivil, inferior and inhumane. This logic not only helps to justify their unequal treatment in society, but also helps to ensure that accusations of abuse and torture by the state are viewed with relatively little sympathy. As Kundnani (2007: 126) notes, “to be a “Muslim” in the “war on terror” is to belong to a group with common origins, a shared culture and a monolithic identity that can be held collectively responsible for terrorism, segregation and the failure of multicultural Britain”. Muslims are not just seen to be deviant or even criminal, but they are considered to be the worse type of criminal — the fundamentalist terrorist, different to comparatively humanistic terrorists of yester-year. The “Islamic terrorist” indiscriminately targets all Western-civilians, including it most vulnerable and precious: women and children.

Underpinned by older (immigration) concerns of “civilizing” Muslim populations, newer counter-terror measures have allowed for a wider-reaching remit of control of Muslims. It has done so though, in a way that exudes a sense of urgency for extreme deprivation measures and the enhanced surveillance of Muslims. A number of legal measures have been introduced, which by capitalizing on popular anti-Muslim sentiment, have over-focused on Islamic terrorism. For instance, in the United Kingdom, there was the extending of the 2000 Terrorism Act (Home Office, 2000), which actively designated Muslims as dangerous, suspect and in need of control (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009: 652). The 2000 Act criminalised a range of activities associated with a number of proscribed organizations, which included supporting or attending meetings of said organizations. Subsequent amendments to the 2000 Act increased the number of proscribed organizations, with most newly added organizations being associated with countries where Islam is the main faith. There was also an extension of stop and search powers under sections 44 and 45, allowing for practice to be undertaken without the need for reasonable suspicion. Unlike the 1984 Police and Criminal Evidence Act (Home Office, 1984), the police officer did not need to have “reasonable suspicion” for the stop and search2. The Act was later followed by the anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (Home Office, 2001); the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (Home Office, 2005); the Terrorism Act 2006 (Home Office, 2006); the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (Home Office, 2008); and, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (Home Office, 2015a). In combination, these Acts have over-criminalized Muslim populations, and have made “legal” their enhanced status as sources of risk and consequently their vulnerability to victimization by the state, especially in relation to police stop and search practices (Medina Ariza, 2013).

However, counter-terror measures allow for the criminalization of Muslims to occur more widely and at a much earlier age. For instance, consider the UK’s CONTEST strategy (Home Office, 2011). Launched in 2003, and since revised, CONTEST claims to work with “mainstream Islam” to “undermine extremist ideologies, identify and support individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment, increase the capacity of communities to resist violent extremists, and understand real and perceived grievances” (McLaughlin, 2010: 105). CONTEST is split into four workstreams: (i) Prevent — to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism; (ii) Pursue — to stop terrorist attacks; (iii) Protect — to strengthen our overall protection against terrorist attacks; and (iv) Prepare — to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack (Home Office, 2011: 6). This article argues that CONTEST, and other measures like it, are underpinned by a “civilizing” narrative, for example, in its commitment to British values and national security. This civilizing narrative draws on anti-Muslim racism to perpetuate the idea of Muslims as a “suspect” community — even in these post-race times! For instance, in theory, CONTEST is directed at tackling all forms of radicalisation and extremism, including far-right activity, but in practice it has heavily over-focused on the Muslim population (Coppock and McGovern, 2014: 245).

This is most clearly illustrated under CONTEST’s Prevent workstream. In consideration of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (Home Office, 2015a), the Revised Prevent Duty Guidance (Home Office, 2015b) states that educational settings in the United Kingdom have a legal duty to prevent young people from being drawn into terrorism. Part of this involves an expectation that educational settings will promote the “fundamental British values”, which are “… values of democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs … Actively promoting the values means challenging opinions or behaviour in school that are contrary to fundamental British values” (Department for Education, 2014: 5). The problem here is that there is an over-emphasis on national and cultural supremacy, which brings with it the danger of a biased and inaccurate education. The teaching of “values” is not the point of contention, rather it is the packaging of “democracy, rule of law, individual liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance” as being essentially British (white Western European) values. In addition, it reinforces the perception of young Muslims being susceptible to extremism, which counter-terror approaches then equate with susceptibility to radicalization and terrorist activity, meaning that young Muslims are “constituted as “vulnerable” in politically powerful ways, as the “would-be terrorist” (Coppock and McGovern, 2014: 242). Their “Islamic” and “child” selves are both dangerous and in need of saving, and they become marked as “appropriate objects for state intervention and surveillance” (Coppock and McGovern, 2014: 242).

Rights Watch UK (2016) argues that Prevent’s effect on education and the human rights of students, especially young children, raises serious concernsFootnote2. This is because a by-product of Prevent has been to create a generation of young British Muslims who are fearful of exercising their rights to freedom of expression and belief, which in turn impacts on the risk of forcing children to discuss issues related to identity, religion and terrorism in unsafe and problematic spaces, that is, the internet (Rights Watch UK, 2016: 4). Worse still, in the classroom and on campus, those with very little training or background in crime prevention work, let alone counter-terrorism work, have be tasked with the duty of identifying and reporting on students expressing so-called extremist views (Rights Watch UK, 2016: 4). It is not surprising then that there have been claims that teachers have been “over-enthusiastic” with this duty, leaving some children feeling as if they have been targeted because of their faith and treated unfairly in comparison to their white peers4. For example, data on Prevent school referrals shows that between 2012 and 2013, 57.4% referrals involved Muslims, despite the fact that (according to the 2011 Census) they make up only 5% of the national population (Qurashi, 2016). Those educators who openly criticize Prevent’s counter-terror measures come to be presented as problematic and unhelpful to the national security agenda — for instance, consider the backlash against the National Union of Teachers (NUT) and Universities and Colleges Union’s (UCU) criticisms of Prevent (NUT 2016; UCU, 2016).

In combination, these and other counter-terror measures draw on somewhat normalized notions of the “Islamic terrorist” to justify and gather support for discriminatory practices. They continue to construct Muslims as suspicious bodies with criminal tendencies, in need of increased surveillance, control and regulation, and thus “legitimise a pre-emptive, interventionist and securitizing approach” (Coppock and McGovern, 2014: 242). As Ansari (2004: 31) notes, this then serves to “terrorize the Muslim community in Britain”. Each day, the Muslim community have their social, religious and political activities observed, interrogated and stigmatized, presented as suspect terror networks (Ansari, 2004: 31). Having “relegitimised state racism” (Bhattacharyya, 2008: 75), counter-terror measures have also “involved derogation from human rights provisions and established elements of due process” (Rowe, 2012: 160). Any negative impact that they may have on the Muslim population is considered to be relatively justified, almost as collateral damage in comparison to the perceived wider threat. In this sense, Muslims are not considered worthy of human rights, they are after all goes the civilizing logic, rejecting attempts to assimilate and be part of Western civil society. This logic is not unique or new to Muslims in post-colonial Britain. Recall for instance the use of this logic in the treatment of other BMEs around the world, for instance, Australia’s Aborigines, Native Americans, New Zealand’s Maori, and the African Slaves transported across the Atlantic. In all these cases, attempts were made to excuse and justify exploitative behaviour on the basis that the (exploited) subjects were naturally positioned, either biologically, intellectually or in accordance to (the Christian) God’s plan, as inferior. Thus, legitimized, morally at least, that the control of BME bodies was necessary and good for society as a whole.

Civilizing, consuming and controlling brown bodies

Surveillance and control measures under counter-terror strategies have without doubt drastically redefined the lives and experiences of Muslims. Under counter-terror measures, Muslims in particular are presented as posing a crime and security threat. In addition, the anti-Muslim rhetoric that underpins the counter-terror logic presents Muslims, and brown bodies more generally as incompatible and a threat to civil society, both morally and legally. Consider for instance, the popularity of Donald Trump’s Presidential campaign (illustrated not least with his win) in the United States, which ran with the tagline of “Make America great again” — a sentence which forces the voter to feel shame at having lost a status of greatness, seemingly awakening them from their zombie-like acceptance of overly liberal policies, and finally delivering a rallying-cry for them to take action and regain their status of greatness (by voting for Trump, in the first instance). Key parts of the campaign were delivered with such enflamed anti-Muslim rhetoric that was never before seen in American politics, not even in George W. Bush’s style of “cautious Islamophobia”, or Barack Obama’s reference to Muslims within a national security context. For example, Trump called for “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims” entering the country (Trump, 7 December 2015)Footnote3 and fought publicly with the Gold Star Khan family (whose son Captain Humayun Khan died while serving in Iraq in 2004), suggesting that Mrs Ghazala Khan was not “allowed to speak” by her husband at the Democratic convention because of their Muslim faith.

Within the counter-terror narrative runs a logic that presents brown bodies as unable or unwilling in the least, to attain a civilized state. They are seen as a threat to the social, moral, religious and political order of Western society. This is the basis of anti-Muslim ideology. This logic remains steadfast in the wider imagination due to the persistence of a “post-colonial fantasy”. This fantasy was created during imperial and colonial encounters, and remains long in its de-colonized aftermath. During this time, the “black Other” was seen as savage, sub-human and uncivilized. Presenting the colonized subjects in this way, reaffirmed the colonizers’ self-perception as morally and intellectually superior — God-like almost, which allowed them to embark on rescue missions to lift colonized subjects, usually through forced removal and re-allocation of subjects, as in the case of Australia’s Aboriginal children (the “Stolen Generations”) or African slavery in America and its colonies. Of course, the “lifting” was never to an equal or higher state, and always resulted in advancing the economic position of the colonizers.

The post-colonial fantasy remains a form of institutionalized power and systematic control over subjects of ex-colonies. Some have argued that the fantasy, taken from a scholarly and artistic perspective, evidenced an evolutionary movement because it signified the West’s positive interest in other countries and cultures. However, this form of exoticism has been critiqued given that the interest was in reality superficial and selective, not least because it focused on the female colonial subject (Gindro, 2003: 112‒113). Therefore, there remained a selective othering of the post-colonial subject which was filtered through a Western Imperialist gaze and misrepresented for its own satisfaction. Hooks (1992) argues that such exoticism was especially applied to lighter-skinned BMEs who are seen as being able to more safely satisfy the Western male’ sexual desire and colonial fantasy, in comparison to their darker-skinned, and thus animalistic and savage counterparts. Unsurprisingly, male BME bodies, especially the darker-skinned ones, have been constant victims of colonial rule.

This article argues that male BME post-colonial subjects are consumed in far less favourable ways. For instance, Boskin (1986, cited in Moody-Ramirez and Dates, 2014: 17) notes how the use of the “Coon”, “Jim Crow” and “Sambo” images in America, especially as objects of laughter, sought to strip the black African American male of his masculinity, dignity and self-respect—qualities that would otherwise present him as a sexual competitor, warrior and economic adversary. Similarly, consider the use of sexual stereotypes about “the black man and his mythical penis” which not only served to ridicule, but more actually indicated “the insecurities of the powerful” (Bhattacharayya, 2008: 87–88). Still, today there remains other examples of race-consuming which highlights the persistence of the post-colonial mindset, for instance, consider the “Black Pete” (Zwarte Piet) celebration in the Netherlands, which despite criticisms have remained a core celebration of Dutch culture (see van der Pijl and Goulordava, 2014). Indeed, artist and political activist, Spike Lee (quoted in Ebert, 16 October 2000) argued that elements of “gangsta rap” music videos, with their reference to “my ho’s” and “my bitches”, can be held up as contemporary popularized examples of race-consumption performance, namely minstrel performance, despite their BME/black African-American artists and producers, because there is an over-exaggerated, stereotypical, crude and ignorant performance of blackness for the purpose of entertainment and socio-political commentary.

Specifically, under the counter-terror pre-occupation, the post-colonial mind-set re-uses established practices of “race-consumption” to control brown bodies. Race-consumption within counter-terror strategies occur in very much the same way, by stripping the brown body of its human qualities. They are presented by the media, politicians and news outlets as sexually deviant, insular and intellectually limited. This representation permits brown bodies to be consumed, that is for them to be stripped in the white (Western European) imagination of their threatening status, and for hierarchies of inferiority/superiority to remain in place. The consuming of race in this sense then remains focused on alleviating white fears and presenting BME populations as (physically, intellectually and morally) inferior. As pre-colonized subjects, brown bodies are rendered powerless through a continued colonial narrative, that is a representation and a forced performance of colonial ideas about a supposed passive, immature and animal-like character, and a “backwards” and “oppressive” culture (Patel, 2017). For instance, consider the presentation and discussion around brown families and communities, with presentations of them as abusive fathers/husbands and subservient daughters/wives who come from insular and backward cultures supposedly steeped in anti-Western views (see Sian, 2012). Now, they have come to be represented as Muslim radicals, Islamic extremists and terrorists, or at least sympathizers of this ideology. Brown bodies are once again openly popularized as unruly. Within the terrorist narrative, brown bodies are seen as more dangerous, given that they are presented as an even more dangerous type of terrorist, in comparison with the terrorist of previous eras (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009). According to this logic, Muslims need to be more closely watched, scrutinized and controlled, even if this is at the sacrifice of their fundamental human rights.

The race-consumption practice and post-colonial fantasy are important features of the counter-terror narrative. In her analysis of Muslim men and processes of deviant labelling within the “war on terror” context, Bhattacharayya (2008) argues that popularized racialized mythologies about “the dangerous Muslim man” have come to embody “a dangerous hypermasculinity and a mutilated deviation from proper manhood…portrayed as impenetrable, secretive, enmeshed in an alien culture that inhabits the secret places of an unsuspecting host society” (89). A variety of outlets are used to construct the brown body in these ways. For instance, the entertainment industry has a long history of locating the brown body (or brown space) as villainous, who threatens national security, freedom and civilization itself — a space only to be neutralized by the white saviour/hero, for example, consider the popular (1998) American film, “The Siege” which relies heavily on Muslim/Arab stereotypes of them as violent and ready for martyrdom, and presents Islamic ritual practices within close context of violent (terrorist) behaviour (Ameli et al., 2007: 36). These images are found in more recent films, whether it be subtly such as in “Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles” (2014) with the evil Foot Clans’ wearing of the Palestinian Keffiyeh scarf as part of their military uniform, despite their original Japanese heritage and non-Muslim/Arab connection, or more openly as in “American Sniper” (2014) where not only are the American soldiers the glorified heroes, but all the Iraqis are militant fighters, with the only non-militant civilian Iraqi being one family … who are killed by Iraqi militants. Various news outlets, especially those located in the centre-right of the political spectrum, have delivered a constant barrage of “news stories” that have situated the brown body in a dangerous position. Consider for example the “Asian sex gangs” and “Asian groomer” stories that dominated the British press in 2015 and 2016 (Patel, 2017), where rather than presenting the abuse as an interplay between gender and power, stories focused on the “Asian-ness” of the abusers: “Vulnerable schoolgirl raped by at least 60 men after being preyed upon by Asian grooming gang”, reported one tabloid newspaper (Mirror, 18 May 2015), and “‘All white girls are s\*\*gs’: Asian sex gang found guilty of raping and sexually assaulting three teenage girls in Rotherham”, reported another (The Sun, 17 October 2016). These headlines were typical of references made throughout the reporting of the child sexual exploitation cases. More recently, social media has been used to host anti-Muslim racism to a scale unimagined only 10 years ago, for example, consider the volumous anti-Muslim rage that dominated social media during Britain’s “Brexit” vote and America’s presidential elections. This character-construction (or, character-assassination) of the post-colonial subject has ultimately justified the heightened surveillance and restrictions on the human rights of those marked out brown. Society has gone full-circle (again): having had a state of multiculturalism and equality of opportunity, the narrative presented is that these have been thrown back in our generous faces — we (by which I mean white bodies) are the ones who have been exploited, and the result is a state where the enemy lies within, unable to devoid itself of its inherent and/or cultural dark traits, waiting to strike at the heart of (Western and thus, natural) civilized order. Although conceptually basic and proven to be problematic by a volume of scholarly work, this narrative remains constant and dangerously powerful.

### 1AR – Terror - !D

#### No nuke terror.

Fettweis ’19 [Christopher; associate professor of political science at Tulane University in New Orleans. He holds a doctorate degree from the University of Maryland–College Park specializing in political psychology and US foreign policy. Spring 2019; “Pessimism and Nostalgia in the Second Nuclear Age”; *Strategic Studies* *Quarterly*, Volume 13, Issue 1; https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-13\_Issue-1/Fettweis.pdf] TDI

Finally, despite the string of bleak and terrifying projections from a variety of experts, nuclear weapons have remained well beyond the capabilities of the modern apocalyptic terrorist. The great fear of the SNA literature, that scientific knowledge and technology would gradually become more accessible to nonstate actors, has remained only a dream. Nor does there appear to be a great reservoir of fissile material in the world’s various black markets waiting to be weaponized.58

Just because something has not yet occurred does not mean that it cannot or will not occur eventually. However, it is worth noting that the world has not experienced any close calls regarding nuclear terrorism. Forecasting future unique events is a necessarily dicey enterprise, but one way to improve accuracy is to examine events that have already or almost happened. Given the many complexities involved with nuclear weapons, especially for amateurs as any terrorists would almost certainly be, it is not unreasonable to expect a few failures, or near misses, to precede success. While it is possible that we might not know about all the plots disrupted by international law enforcement, keeping the lid on nuclear near misses would presumably be no small task. As of this writing, the public is aware of no serious attempts to construct, steal, or purchase nuclear weapons, much less smuggle and detonate one. “Leakage” does not seem to be a problem, yet.59

The uniformly pessimistic projections about the second nuclear era have not, at least thus far, been borne out by events. Post–Cold War trends have instead been generally moving in directions opposite to these expectations, with fewer nuclear weapons in the hands of the same number of countries and none pursuing more. Why, then, does nuclear pessimism persist? What are the roots of the current fashionable unwillingness—or even inability—to detect positive patterns in nuclear security?

### 1AR – A2 Revisionism Generic

#### Reject either-or revisionism. Only status-based explanations can account for inconsistencies in state behavior.

Simon ’17 [John Lugo; PhD in Political Sciences from Lingnan University. August 16, 2017; “Status, revisionism, and great power strategy: US-China positional competition and the struggle for leadership in Asia-Pacific”; *Lingnan University Digital Commons*; https://commons.ln.edu.hk/pol\_etd/19/] TDI

Starting with China, previous studies claim that China is either a status quo power13 or a revisionist power,14 and proponents of the different standpoints have their daggers drawn about whose account is the most accurate one.15 Yet we need to escape the trap of the either/or logic and open up to the possibility that China simultaneously can be a status quo power and a revisionist power. This becomes obvious when we consult primary official Chinese sources as well as secondary academic exegesis of Chinese foreign policy. As Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress Fu Ying makes clear, China has indeed “chosen to integrate itself into the international order,” yet at the same time, it seeks to “improve…its representation.”16 Similarly, Yong Deng, in his groundbreaking study on China’s struggle for status, accentuates that “the CCP leaders have sought to engineer China’s great power emergence within the world order,” but in doing so “they have geared their diplomacy toward changing the international hierarchy to facilitate China’s great-power ascent.” 17 Here we notice a tension between integrating and accepting the rules of the game and changing the status order, as evidenced by China’s admission to the WTO and its acceptance of global trade rules, while simultaneously struggling to gain a greater position within the WTO hierarchy. 18

If we turn to the United States, we can observe a comparable puzzle. For sure, logically the United States cannot be a revisionist power in relation to the positional status dimension of the international order. If it desires to maintain its preeminent position, this unequivocally means preservation of the status-quo. Yet whereas Barack Obama stresses the desire to maintain global leadership, he at the same time emphasizes the need to write new regional rules to ensure leadership in the Asia-Pacific.19 In their respective studies on the Bush administration’s “transformational diplomacy,” Robert Jervis and Ian Hurd highlight that the United States, in that it wants to preserve its dominant position in the international order, simultaneously “seeks to change the rules of that order.”20 In this way, the United States is taking active part in a “process of changing and remaking the social foundations of the international system.”21 I hash out this problem at length in the conceptual section of the literature view.

Status quo and revisionism are best conceptualized in relation to a struggle between “alternative international orders,” 22 which makes the definition of international order fundamental to the scientific enterprise of investigating preservation and change in the international system. What is at stake, however, does not fit a unidimensional conceptual framework. On the one hand, we are grappling with a social-relational, positional dimension of the international order that concerns status; on the other hand, we are dealing with a social-systemic dimension of the international order that concerns institutions. Yet apart from a conceptual framework that takes into account both the positional and the institutional dimensions of the international order, we must also demonstrate how they relate to the two core domains of the international order — the economic domain and the security domain. My conceptual framework addresses this problem and makes a significant contribution to the definitional parameters of international order, necessary to improve our understanding of status quo-seeking and revisionism and the ongoing struggle between alternative regional orders in the Asia-Pacific.

The second scientific component of the dissertation concerns theoretical innovation. Even though the underpinnings of my theoretical framework to a large extent build on structural realist insights, there are certain theoretical problems that call for theoretical remodeling in order to enable the analysis of status quo-seeking and revisionism to pierce both ways — towards explaining the policies of preservation and change of both the rising great power and the declining superpower.

Various structural realist theories essentially view the dominant state as “always satisfied” and the rising power as dissatisfied and revisionist by definition.23 The theories can therefore not fathom that the US is a deeply conservative power in that it wants to maintain its preeminence atop the global hierarchy, yet at the same time, in both its neoconservative and liberal internationalist guises, a deeply revisionist power that wants to rewrite the rules of the game.24 The theories can neither conceive of China as simultaneously being dissatisfied with the international status order dominated by the United States while being satisfied, in part, with the institutional foundation of the international order, which serves its interests, incurs great benefits, and largely underpins its rise. Yet despite their shortcomings, the major structural realist theories all elucidate that the dominant power will take preventive measures to block the ascendance of the rising state.25 As Mearsheimer states: “the United States can be expected to go to great lengths to contain China and ultimately weaken it to the point where it is no longer capable of ruling the roost in Asia.”26 These preventive measures to maintain dominant status are revisionist.

In essence, we need to shift the theoretical focus from security to status. The explanatory focus of structural realist theories relates status quo-seeking and revisionism to issues of security and conquest, or rather insecurity and territorial aggrandizement, with the analytical focus on either status quo or revisionism depending on what structural logic one adheres to; whether defensive realism or offensive realism, whether theorized as part of security-maximizing or powermaximizing behavior. 27 Various IR scholars have convincingly demonstrated that states want status, and have accentuated the importance of status, rather than security, in explaining revisionism and dissatisfaction with the status quo.28 However, their theoretical focus repeats the flaws of the various structural realist theories by only focusing on rising states and the link between status enhancement and revisionism, leaving the link between status maintenance and revisionism unexplored. This is problematic since “none of the principal power-wielders in world affairs is happy with the status quo,” as Samuel Huntington succinctly points out. 29 Hence, status concerns relates to both rising and declining powers.

Offensive realism explains revisionism in terms of power, hegemonic stability theory incorporates the hierarchy of prestige and the rules of the system in addition to power, and power-transition theory adds that power parity must be combined with dissatisfaction. In contrast to offensive realism, change in the balance of power is not the only explanatory factor, we also have to include change in the balance of prestige; in contrast to hegemonic stability theory, prestige is not a mere reflection military power, nor are the rules of the system always tilted in favor of the hegemonic state; and in contrast to power-transition theory, dissatisfaction is not an autonomous domestic-level variable, but is structurally induced. Since status, which I define as social position, is composed of both power and prestige, we have to take into account change in both the balance of power and the balance of prestige in explaining revisionism, which then cause dissatisfaction in the form of status anxiety in the dominant state, not the rising state. This leads to the hegemonic power to revise the international order in order to maintain its dominant status. In doing this, it attempts to block the ascendance of the rising challenger, which frustrates the status aspirations of the rising state who responds by carving out an alternative international order that can satisfy its status ambitions. Hence, my theoretical innovation makes a contribution by providing an explanation for when and why revisionism relates to both the status maintenance strategies of the relatively declining superpower and the status enhancement strategies of the rising great power. My theoretical contribution then also addresses the temporal problem of structural realist theories — namely, that the rising great power acts to revise, whereas the declining dominant power reacts to preserve — by turning it on its head. The rising power is not the first-moving revisionist; instead, the relatively declining dominant power moves first and revises to maintain, whereas the declining dominant power reacts and revises to enhance.

One of the great contributions of liberal theories is that they bring to the fore the increasingly expansive institutional mechanisms that “bind” and “lock in” states to certain international orders.30 However, the logic of path-dependency of the liberal historical institutionalist perspective has a status-quo bias that disregards active choice at critical junctures; neither does institutional path-dependency have to favor the dominant state, nor is the rules-based international order as open as liberals assume. The central problem liberals fail to take into account is that the logical corollary of a “lock in”-mechanism is a “lock out”-mechanism. Security provision by whom, and for whom? A regional trade regime including whom? Whereas realists need to put emphasis on the importance of rules for positional appropriation within systems of monopolistic competition,31 liberals fail to theorize the positional, social-relational insider-outsider logic that perpetuates all form of politics; namely, that institutions work in tandem with exclusionary social closure.32

### 1AR – A2 Deterrence Generic

#### Deterrence fails.

Walt ’22 [Stephen; columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. June 2, 2022; "Will Teaching Aggressors a Lesson Deter Future Wars?"; *Foreign Policy*; https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/02/will-teaching-aggressors-a-lesson-deter-future-wars/] TDI

Arguments of this sort have been a staple of hard-line (and especially neoconservative) discourse for decades. Like the domino theory, which refuses to die no matter how often it is disproved, such claims transform the outcome of a single conflict into a struggle for the fate of the entire planet. The choice we are said to face is stark. Down one path: a revitalized liberal order led by a unified alliance of powerful, peace-loving democracies, and a future where war is rare and prosperity reigns. Down the other path: a world of rising autocracy, eroding human rights, and more war. According to this view, Ukraine must win big, or all is lost.

Framing the issue in this way stacks the deck in favor of always doing more and rejecting any sort of compromise, but is the choice as stark as hard-liners make out? Does defeating an aggressor really teach others to behave better? It would be a more benign world if this were the case, but a quick glance at the past century or so suggests otherwise.

Start with World War I. Although all the major European powers played a role in the outbreak of war, Germany was the driving force during the July Crisis of 1914. Overly fearful of rising Russian power, German leaders used the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and the confrontation between Austria-Hungary and Serbia as the occasion for a preventive war for hegemony in Europe. The result was four horrific years of war, a total German defeat at the hands of the Allies, the end of the Hohenzollern monarchy and its Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman allies, and the imposition of a highly punitive peace treaty.

The stark reality of Germany’s World War I defeat didn’t teach Adolf Hitler not to make his own bid for European hegemony 20 years later; indeed, the myth that Germany had been stabbed in the back and the harsh peace imposed at Versailles helped fuel the rise of Nazism and set the stage for another round of war. Nor did the carnage of the First World War teach Imperial Japan that trying to carve out its own empire in Asia was a bad idea.

The chief aggressors were also soundly punished in World War II. Japan was firebombed repeatedly, and two of its cities were destroyed by atomic bombs; Germany was occupied and subsequently divided into two separate states; and Hitler and Italian leader Benito Mussolini both ended up dead. A clearer demonstration that “aggression does not pay” would be hard to imagine, and a good case can be made that both Germany and Japan learned that lesson well. But this lesson didn’t stop Kim Il Sung from attacking South Korea in 1950 (with Joseph Stalin’s full support) or convince various leaders elsewhere in Asia or the Middle East that going to war was always unwise.

Similarly, one might have thought the French and American experiences in Vietnam would offer a vivid and enduring reminder of the dangers of hubris and the limits of military power, not to mention the futility of trying to nation-build in a deeply divided society without a competent local partner. Yet the George W. Bush administration paid no heed to this lesson when it invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003.

Mind you, it’s not just great powers that get taught harsh lessons after launching an aggressive war. Back in 1982, Argentina’s military junta decided that the British Falkland Islands (which they call the Malvinas) were theirs and decided to take the territory by force. Britain sank the flagship of the Argentine navy and successfully retook the islands, and popular protests in Argentina eventually swept the generals from power.

Iraq’s Saddam Hussein eventually suffered a similar fate. His decision to attack revolutionary Iran in 1980 led to nearly eight years of war in which hundreds of thousands of Iraqis lost their lives and Iraq’s economy cratered. Two years later, he decided to solve the economic problems the first war had created by seizing neighboring Kuwait, only to be ignominiously expelled by a U.S.-led coalition and placed under highly intrusive United Nations sanctions. Aggression didn’t pay in either case, but Saddam’s failures didn’t stop some other countries — including some prominent democracies — from starting new wars themselves.

If painful defeats really sent clear warnings to others, the Soviet and American experiences in Afghanistan and the U.S. experience in Iraq after 2003 would have taught Putin and his associates that invading Ukraine was likely to trigger a powerful nationalist reaction and encourage outside powers to do what they could to thwart his aims. Surely he knew that the United States had helped defeat the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan by supplying the mujahideen, just as Syria and Iran had each helped the Iraqi insurgents defeat the U.S. effort in Iraq. The lesson of these two conflicts seems all too obvious, but Putin seems to have convinced himself it didn’t apply to Ukraine.

Not every aggressive war ends in defeat, of course, but there seems to be no shortage of cases where aggressors were badly beaten and more than a few where the people who started the war paid a large personal price for their folly. Yet the lesson that “aggression does not pay” is typically ignored or forgotten. Why?

One reason is that the lessons of any given war aren’t always clear-cut, and reasonable people can draw different conclusions from a defeat. Was going to war a bad idea from the start, or was defeat due to poor implementation or just bad luck? The lessons from a failed war will also be discarded if policymakers believe that this time is different, and that new knowledge, new technology, a clever new strategy, or a uniquely favorable set of political circumstances will bring success this time around. One should never underestimate what elites can talk themselves into if they really want to go to war.

Leaders may be intimately familiar with their own national histories, but they know and care less about what happened to other nations in similar circumstances.

A second problem — one highlighted in the work of the late scholar Robert Jervis — is that humans tend to place more weight on their own experiences than on the experiences of others. Leaders in one country may be intimately familiar with their own national history (though they have probably absorbed a self-serving version of it), but they will know and care less about what happened to other nations in similar circumstances.

And it’s easy to dismiss another country’s failure by claiming their cause was not as just, their resolve not as great, and their military not as competent as one’s own. Moreover, because decisions for war typically reflect a complex weighing of threats, opportunities, expected costs, and alternatives, what happened to another country in a wholly different conflict may not loom large in their calculations.

Furthermore, leaders who start wars are often aware that there are risks involved, and they sometimes recognize that the odds of victory are slim. Even so, they will “roll the iron dice” if they believe the alternative is even worse. To take an obvious example, Japan’s leaders in 1941 understood that the United States was vastly stronger and that attacking Pearl Harbor was a huge gamble that would probably fail. Nonetheless, they believed the alternative was bowing to U.S. pressure and giving up their quest for great-power status and Asian dominance — an outcome they regarded as infinitely worse.

The bottom line is that U.S. policymakers should not base their actions today on the belief that victory in Ukraine (or Yemen or Ethiopia or Libya) is going to tilt the arc of history decisively in the directions they favor. Nor will the outcome of today’s conflicts have much effect on how future leaders think about their own prospects when they are deciding whether to launch a war.

# 1NC

## 1NC – Case

### 1NC – Framing – IR Debates Good

#### Critiques don’t make the disad presumptively false. You have to debate our internal links---anything else slides into the politics they’ve criticized.

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The reality is that foreign policy has always been contested — and, more often than not, linked to questions of identity and ideology. But debates about war are so interwoven with our larger culture-war politics now that most questions of how to handle military conflict have been largely reduced to partisan scoring. And that’s a problem — not because we need to get back to some bygone bipartisan era, but because real dissension is vital in a democracy, especially in matters of foreign policy.

The seeds of war politics’ merging with culture-war politics arguably date back to the late 1960s, when anti-Vietnam War protests overlapped with civil rights protests and other social movements that challenged the existing social order. Over time, conservatives and liberals diverged in their attitudes toward the war, especially as liberal elites began to criticize it. Starting with the 1968 presidential election, being anti-war became more closely associated with being a liberal Democrat. And the accusation that George McGovern, the 1972 Democratic presidential nominee, was all for “acid, amnesty1 and abortion” helped solidify this cultural connection.

And this larger cultural split between the two parties came to a head during the Iraq War. In many ways, it’s connected to the political discourse we’re seeing with Russia and Ukraine now. Unlike now, though, the discourse during the Iraq War — in the beginning at least — exemplified the idea that politics stops at the water’s edge. Critics of then-President George W. Bush rallied behind him after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and public opinion on the war was initially quite favorable, even though Democrats were far more split than Republicans.

That national unity turned out to be short-lived, though. As political communications scholar Mary Stuckey has observed, it was during the Iraq War that the two parties began to make very distinct arguments about what it meant to be an American in relation to the war. Bush, for instance, often framed the war on terror, including the U.S. invasion of Iraq, in terms of good and evil as he tried to establish the GOP as the party of faith and strength. Democrats, meanwhile, in their 2004 party platform accused Bush and the Republicans of having an “insufficient understanding of our enemy” and a failure to comprehend the complexity of the situation in the Middle East.

While the Iraq War was not directly related to Bush’s religious faith, both supporters and opponents alike depicted his approach to war as reflective of his overall philosophical approach: The president relied on gut and instinct, not expertise, to make decisions. Likewise, Bush’s 2004 presidential campaign portrayed his Democratic opponent, then-Sen. John Kerry of Massachusetts, as a waffling intellectual who lacked conviction and patriotic dedication.

In other words, the debate over the Iraq War quickly became an extension of the debates Democrats and Republicans were already having in the 2000 presidential election — and even earlier — about religion, culture and Bush’s intellect and qualifications.

Ultimately, the Bush administration’s justification for the Iraq War became the subject of widespread criticism across the ideological spectrum since the rationale for invasion was shaky at best. But the narratives Democrats and Republicans employed during the invasion of Iraq and the war on terror were still powerful for the ways in which they preyed on domestic and cultural disagreements and anxieties.

These arguments also had important implications for debates over presidential war powers. While many Republicans embraced an expansive role for the president — a strong leader asserting U.S. dominance on the world stage — Democrats said in their 2008 presidential platform that they “reject[ed] the sweeping claims of ‘inherent’ presidential power,” and that their candidate, then-Sen. Barack Obama of Illinois, would better grasp intercultural nuance and policy detail.

But as president, Obama struggled with questions of war and war powers as well. Although his administration was committed to a less interventionist approach, world events still demanded attention. There were new questions to answer about American intervention in the Middle East and North Africa, as civil wars broke out in Libya and Syria. And like Bush, Obama often found himself the subject of criticism — first for going too far in Libya and then for not going far enough in Syria.

In other words, the debate around the Iraq War didn’t help either Democrats or Republicans create a coherent set of ideas about how to engage with foreign conflict, how to prepare for the aftermath of one, or when it makes the most sense to avoid getting involved at all. Obama was different from Bush, but the foreign-policy questions he faced were still difficult — and domestic culture-war disputes were not especially useful in resolving them. Yet, because of the Iraq War, the country was now set on a political course that undermined the goal of meaningful, reasoned dissent on foreign policy.

Figuring out the role the U.S. should play following the Russian invasion of Ukraine requires answering a completely different set of questions than the global war on terror or the U.S. response to the war in Syria required, but as we saw in Vietnam, Iraq and elsewhere, culture-war politics are once again overshadowing the discussion of what to do. Instead of debating the extent to which Americans should intervene in Ukraine, Republicans have attacked Biden as a weak leader — and that’s the PG-rated stuff: Many attacks from the far right have veered into even uglier culture-war territory and praise for the Russian president.

So far, most rank-and-file Republicans have unfavorable views of the Russian invasion, not sympathy toward Putin. (Instead, a partisan divide is emerging over whether the U.S. should be “doing more.”) Still, it’s not hard to figure out why the discussion of whether and how America gets involved in armed conflict has devolved into partisan point-scoring. Nearly everything has. But this has a real cost, and the answer isn’t for politics to stop at the water’s edge.

Dissenting viewpoints and serious debate are crucial in a democracy, and foreign policy is not an exception. Politics can and should be a place for real debate and multiple viewpoints. It is imperative to hold public officials accountable for their decisions. When we treat foreign policy as an extension of domestic cultural politics, we lose almost as much as we do when we act as though it’s not up for debate at all.

### – A2 “Hacks”

#### The blob is fake and restraint doesn’t solve.

**Mazarr ’20** [Michael; senior political scientist at the RAND corporation. Summer 2020; “Rethinking Restraint: Why It Fails in Practice”; *The Washington Quarterly*, Volume 32, Article 2] TDI

There is No Sinister National Security Elite

Many restraint proponents use a second major claim to buttress their argument that US strategy is fundamentally invalid and should be radically scaled back: US overreach reflects the malign influence of a devious national security elite fired with dangerous visions of primacy and liberal hegemony. Not all restraint advocates make this argument, but it is a dominant theme in some of the literature’s most important works. Stephen Walt’s 2018 book The Hell of Good Intentions, for example, is an extended indictment of this group—including current and former US officials, congressional staff, think tank experts, and others—which he describes as a “dysfunctional elite of privileged insiders who are frequently disdainful of alternative perspectives.” 35 According to Walt, promoting an interventionist foreign policy provides jobs, status, and access to high-paid consultancies and political power to this group, which comprises an exclusive clique of insiders who attend the same schools and clubs and believe, for the most part, the same things about US power.

The historian and writer Andrew Bacevich denounces the same alleged cabal, agreeing that “the ideology of national security … serves the interests of those who created the national security state and those who still benefit from its continued existence”—interests that include “status, influence, and considerable wealth.” 36 The result is an addiction to global hegemony and military force, a tendency to seek out unnecessary enemies and commitments, and a ~~crippling~~ conformism that quashes dissent.37 US national security elites at the end of the Cold War, he argues in his most recent book, coalesced around primacy with “something close to unanimity.” 38

It is not clear how to treat such sprawling assertions when the reality—the jumble of motivations, views, relationships, and ambitions of the tens of thousands of people who comprise the national security community—is obviously so much more complex. Do all US foreign policy officials or experts support global engagement because it grants them jobs or speaking opportunities? How many actually attended the same schools or even know one another, and what effect does this have on their views? Do all of them embrace primacy, and to the same degree? Apart from collections of anecdotes, those convinced of the existence of such a homogenous elite offer no objective evidence—such as surveys, interviews, or comprehensive literature reviews—to back up these sweeping claims. “By and large,” Bacevich insists in just one example, “members of the national security elite hold the public in remarkably low regard,” citing as proof a single, dated quote from Dean Acheson.39

The real “national security elite,” of course, comprises individuals with starkly opposing opinions. Some favor nuclear arms control, some oppose it; some want more US forces in Europe, some fewer; some continue to support humanitarian interventions, whereas most are now skeptical of them. As a result, profound arguments have erupted within this group over every major foreign policy issue of the last half-century. The scholars and former government officials Hal Brands, Peter Feaver, and William Inboden explain that “intense disputes over the Korean War, the Vietnam War, détente and arms control, the opening to China, and policies in Central America and the Middle East were followed by battles over the Gulf War, NATO expansion, military interventions in Haiti, Somalia, and the Balkans, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq—not to mention heated arguments over positions toward China, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and other issues today.” 40 Few officials or experts may rail against the broad principle of US global engagement. But on specific policy questions—whether to go to war or conduct a humanitarian intervention, or what policy to adopt toward China or Cuba or Russia or Iran— debates in Washington are deep, intense, and sometimes bitter.

To take just a single example from recent history, the Obama administration’s decision to endorse a surge in Afghanistan came only after extended deliberation and soul-searching, and it included a major, and highly controversial, element of restraint—a very public deadline to begin a graduated withdrawal.41 If one were to choose the less aggressive or interventionist side of this and a dozen other recent debates, in fact, one could assemble a reasonable facsimile of the more circumscribed foreign policy that proponents of restraint themselves suggest.

It is true that groupthink often grips tighter, and dissent ebbs, during times of crisis or war— during the crucial escalation years in Vietnam, for example, or in the weeks after 9/11. The national security community has closed ranks to an unhealthy degree at such moments. But these are exceptions, and they deeply complicate the argument for restraint: if US foreign policy excesses tend to emerge during emotionally charged crises or periods of rabid threat perception, the problem is not a relentless hegemonic impulse. It is overreaction at specific, desperate moments—something a general commitment to restraint is unlikely to cure.

### 1NC – Framing – Extinction

#### Preventing existential risk and framing it as a “we” claim is good.

Coles and Susen 18—Research Professor at the Institute for Social Justice at Australian Catholic University AND Reader in Sociology at the School of Arts and Social Sciences of City, University of London (Romand and Simon, “The Pragmatic Vision of Visionary Pragmatism: The Challenge of Radical Democracy in a Neoliberal World Order,” Contemporary Political Theory May 2018, Volume 17, Issue 2, pp 250–262) TDI

Visionary pragmatism is driven by a political ethos that accents radical receptivity and a sense that a greater degree of wildness in our efforts is indispensable for transformative democratic movements. While some of my earlier works accented the ethical character of receptive generosity in political life, Visionary Pragmatism argues that receptivity is indispensable for generating democratic power – precisely because receptivity involves vulnerability, relationship formation, capacities to modulate, and learning in unexpected ways amidst difficult differences. Drawing on my engagements with the movement for democratic action research in Northern Arizona, I argue that receptive practices engender remarkable capacities for fostering grassroots critique and alternatives, powerful political assemblages across differences, and transformative dynamics in the face of what otherwise appear to be intractable problems. Our best and most powerful possibilities for co-creating urgent democratic change almost always advance along pathways engendered partly through relationships of careful attentiveness to what we initially took to be oblique, unintelligible – or, perhaps, even odious.

For these reasons, my political, theoretical, and pedagogical engagements move across many different configurations and a wider range of situations, ideologies, modes, and commitments than most. Eschewing a single subject position, in Visionary Pragmatism, I experiment with first-person plurals in which the ‘we’ morphs in relation to the different loci of initiative that animate my reflections. Sometimes ‘we’ refers to proponents of radical and ecological democracy very broadly, sometimes to scholars in higher education, sometimes to political theorists, sometimes to the action research movement that formed among people at Northern Arizona University and its community partners, sometimes to a specific action research team, sometimes to all people facing the possibility of planetary ecological collapse. Among the many things I find compelling about the writing of James Baldwin is how he shifts his pronouns without notice – for example, sometimes using ‘we’ to represent black people, sometimes as an uncanny member of the white-majority United States. This rhetorical shiftiness encroaches upon and pulls his readers – especially white readers – beyond the ‘innocence that constitutes the crime’ of their assumed individual and collective white subjectivities in ways that work in visceral, relational, and conceptual registers (Baldwin, 1992, p. 6). Such uncertainty has significant capacity to erode habits and defences, as one finds oneself unexpectedly drawn into perspectives, locations, energies, and tendencies that unsettle and reorient one’s own subjectivity. Much of my work has theorized ‘moving democracy’, and my rhetorical shifting of the first-person plural is a textual practice that aims to enhance this in ways that facilitate reflection.

Throughout Visionary Pragmatism, I argue that there are powerful reasons for active hope. At the same time, we do not live far from tipping points beyond which planetary ecological collapse, globalizing neoliberal fascism, and violent chaos may overwhelm our efforts. I do not think so much in terms of pessimism or optimism as I do about seizing and co-creating opportunities for catalysing dynamic changes in theory and practice that foster a powerful movement of receptive democracy, for complex democratic commonwealth and ecological flourishing. In one sense, as Walter Benjamin’s discussion of Paul Klee’s ‘Angelus Novus’ makes poignantly clear, it is always ‘too late’ for so much and so many, as catastrophic history keeps piling wreckage at our feet. At the same time, there are what Benjamin (1968) calls ‘weak messianic powers’ that emerge as the retroactive force of salvaged aspects of past struggles ignite sparks with emerging struggles to explode the continuum of progress. In this sense, up to our day, it is never altogether too late. With the language of ‘game-transformative practice’, I argue that a visionary-pragmatic movement of radical democracy must do something analogous in response to the fierce urgency of now, to avoid a sixth extinction in which this possibility could well become a casualty.

#### Anticipating nuclear extinction breeds empathy and entangled care. Distancing ourselves from considering extinction reifies detached elitism.

Offord, 17—Faculty of Humanities, School of Humanities Research and Graduate Studies, Bentley Campus (Baden, “BEYOND OUR NUCLEAR ENTANGLEMENT,” Angelaki, 22:3, 17-25) TDI

You are steered towards overwhelming and inexplicable pain when you consider the nuclear entanglement that the species Homo sapiens finds itself in. This is because the fact of living in the nuclear age presents an existential, aesthetic, ethical and psychological challenge that defines human consciousness. Although an immanent threat and ever-present danger to the very existence of the human species, living with the possibility of nuclear war has infiltrated the matrix of modernity so profoundly as to paralyse [shut down] our mind-set to respond adequately. We have chosen to ignore the facts at the heart of the nuclear program with its dangerous algorithm; we have chosen to live with the capacity and possibility of a collective, pervasive and even planetary-scale suicide; and the techno-industrial-national powers that claim there is “no immediate danger” ad infinitum.8

This has led to one of the key logics of modernity's insanity. As Harari writes: “Nuclear weapons have turned war between superpowers into a mad act of collective suicide, and therefore forced the most powerful nations on earth to find alternative and peaceful ways to resolve conflicts.”9 This is the nuclear algorithm at work, a methodology of madness. In revisiting Jacques Derrida in “No Apocalypse, Not Now (Full Speed Ahead, Seven Missiles, Seven Missives),”10 who described nuclear war as a “non-event,” it is clear that the pathology of the “non-event” remains as active as ever even in the time of Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un with their stichomythic nuclear posturing.

The question of our times is whether we have an equal or more compelling capacity and willingness to end this impoverished but ever-present logic of pain and uncertainty. How not simply to bring about disarmament, but to go beyond this politically charged, as well as mythological and psychological nuclear algorithm? How to find love amidst the nuclear entanglement; the antidote to this entanglement? Is it possible to end the pathology of power that exists with nuclear capacity? Sadly, the last lines of Nitin Sawhney's “Broken Skin” underscore this entanglement:

Just 5 miles from India's nuclear test site

Children play in the shade of the village water tank

Here in the Rajasthan desert people say

They're proud their country showed their nuclear capability.11

As an activist scholar working in the fields of human rights and cultural studies, responding to the nuclear algorithm is an imperative. Your politics, ethics and scholarship are indivisible in this cause. An acute sense of care for the world, informed by pacifist and non-violent, de-colonialist approaches to knowledge and practice, pervades your concern. You are aware that there are other ways of knowing than those you are familiar and credentialed with. You are aware that you are complicit in the prisons that you choose to live inside,12 and that there is no such thing as an innocent bystander. You use your scholarship to shake up the world from its paralysis, abjection and amnesia; to unsettle the epistemic and structural violence that is ubiquitous to neoliberalism and its machinery; to create dialogic and learning spaces for the work of critical human rights and critical justice to take place. All this, and to enable an ethics of intervention through understanding what is at the very heart of the critical human rights impulse, creating a “dialogue for being, because I am not without the other.”13

Furthermore, as a critical human rights advocate living in a nuclear armed world, your challenge is to reconceptualise the human community as Ashis Nandy has argued, to see how we can learn to co-exist with others in conviviality and also learn to co-survive with the non-human, even to flourish. A dialogue for being requires a leap into a human rights frame that includes a deep ecological dimension, where the planet itself is inherently involved as a participant in its future. This requires scholarship that “thinks like a mountain.”14 A critical human rights approach understands that it cannot be simply human-centric. It requires a nuanced and arresting clarity to present perspectives on co-existence and co-survival that are from human and non-human viewpoints.15

Ultimately, you realise that your struggle is not confined to declarations, treaties, legislation, and law, though they have their role. It must go further to produce “creative intellectual exchange that might release new ethical energies for mutually assured survival.”16 Taking an anti-nuclear stance and enabling a post-nuclear activism demands a revolution within the field of human rights work. Recognising the entanglement of nuclearism with the Anthropocene, for one thing, requires a profound shift in focus from the human-centric to a more-than-human co-survival. It also requires a fundamental shift in understanding our human culture, in which the very epistemic and rational acts of sundering from co-survival with the planet and environment takes place. In the end, you realise, as Raimon Panikkar has articulated, “it is not realistic to toil for peace if we do not proceed to a disarmament of the bellicose culture in which we live.”17 Or, as Geshe Lhakdor suggests, there must be “inner disarmament for external disarmament.”18 In this sense, it is within the cultural arena, our human society, where the entanglement of subjective meaning making, nature and politics occurs, that we need to disarm.

It is 1982, and you are reading Jonathan Schell's The Fate of the Earth on a Sydney bus. Sleeping has not been easy over the past few nights as you reluctantly but compulsively read about the consequences of nuclear war. For some critics, Schell's account is high polemic, but for you it is more like Rabindranath Tagore: it expresses the suffering we make for ourselves. What you find noteworthy is that although Schell's scenario of widespread destruction of the planet through nuclear weaponry, of immeasurable harm to the bio-sphere through radiation, is powerfully laid out, the horror and scale of nuclear obliteration also seems surreal and far away as the bus makes its way through the suburban streets.

A few years later, you read a statement from an interview with Paul Tibbets, the pilot of “Enola Gay,” the plane that bombed Hiroshima. He says, “The morality of dropping that bomb was not my business.”19 This abstraction from moral responsibility – the denial of the implications on human life and the consequences of engagement through the machinery of war – together with the sweeping amnesia that came afterwards from thinking about the bombing of Hiroshima, are what make you become an environmental and human rights activist. You realise that what makes the nuclear algorithm work involves a politically engineered and deeply embedded insecurity-based recipe to elide the nuclear threat from everyday life. The spectre of nuclear obliteration, like the idea of human rights, can appear abstract and distant, not our everyday business. You realise that within this recipe is the creation of a moral tyranny of distance, an abnegation of myself with the other. One of modernity's greatest and earliest achievements was the mediation of the self with the world. How this became a project assisted and shaped through the military-industrial-technological-capitalist complex is fraught and hard to untangle. But as a critical human rights scholar you have come to see through that complex, and you put energies into challenging that tyranny of distance, to activate a politics, ethics and scholarship that recognises the other as integral to yourself. Ultimately, even, to see that the other is also within.20

### 1NC – AFRICOM Good

#### Reducing AFRICOM to solely counterterror is misleading – tons of their humanitarian and security work is massively beneficial.

Devermond and Steadman ’20 [(Judd Devermont is the director of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He previously served as the national intelligence officer for Africa, the Central Intelligence Agency’s senior political analyst on sub-Saharan Africa, and the National Security Council director for Somalia, Nigeria, the Sahel, and the African Union. Leanne Erdberg Steadman is the director of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) at the U.S. Institute of Peace, where she manages USIP’s CVE work, including serving as the interim director of the RESOLVE Network, as well as a senior advisor to the Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States. Prior to joining the Institute, Leanne spent almost a decade in the U.S. government serving at the National Security Council staff at the White House, the Department of State, and at the Department of Homeland Security. Leanne comes to USIP most recently from Accenture Federal Services; and she began her public service career with positions at the state level and with international organizations. Before her work in foreign and public policy, Leanne co-founded an independent record label. Leanne holds a J.D. with honors in the concentration of international law and a B.S., magna cum laude in mass communication studies, both from Boston University.) “Defending the U.S. Military Presence in Africa for Reasons Beyond Counterterrorism”, Lawfare, 05/18/2020. <https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/defending-us-military-presence-africa-reasons-beyond-counterterrorism>] pfox TDI

Since Defense Secretary Mark Esper announced a potential drawdown of U.S. troops in Africa, U.S. congressional leaders, military officers, and various commentators have defended the importance of the military in Africa. But they’ve focused almost exclusively on the fight against terrorism. This is not surprising, since the public has for decades really only heard about the U.S. military in Africa when drone strikes hit terrorists in Somalia, when Navy SEALs raid pirate ships in the Gulf of Aden, and when Army Rangers hunt down genocidaires in the jungle.

But the overwhelming focus on terrorist threats oversells the military’s role and undersells Washington’s comprehensive investments in Africa. If advocates want to dissuade the Pentagon from cutting some of its 6,000 troops stationed in Africa, they need to stop valorizing its counterterrorism missions while disregarding the U.S. military’s more lasting contributions. The real selling point is that, every day, the U.S. military forges closer ties with African governments, promotes U.S. values and interests, and responds to humanitarian and health crises—including the coronavirus pandemic.

It is time to rethink the U.S. military’s contributions to peace and security in sub-Saharan Africa. Secretary Esper’s mulling of a scale-back of U.S. troops while the coronavirus spreads demands a reckoning. It is imperative for the U.S. military to reaffirm its non-counterterrorism missions in the region and to reform how it executes its counterterrorism programs to ensure that the United States continues to preserve and protect its national security interests.

A Reevaluation of the U.S. Military’s Role beyond Counterterrorism

The most profound benefits to American national security from U.S. military engagement on the African continent have little to do with the headlines. Since the 1990s and notably after 9/11 and the establishment of Africa Command (AFRICOM), the U.S. military has often been the most visible and concrete symbol of U.S. commitment to the region.

U.S. global leadership is predicated on its networks of alliances and partners, including in Africa. These relations are essential to opening markets for the U.S. private sector; countering malign behavior by China and Russia; and shaping decisions at international forums, including the UN Security Council.

While U.S. embassies in Africa have been woefully understaffed for decades, the U.S. military presence has increased, serving as a crucial signal to African partners that the United States is a steadfast ally. For example, most African countries rarely receive visits from the president, vice president, secretary of state, or even senior officials from other departments. In fact, U.S. presidents have visited only 16 out of the 54 countries in Africa, making repeated stops in a handful of countries. In contrast, AFRICOM’s senior leaders travel to the continent more often and to more countries than anyone else in the U.S. government. Interactions with U.S. military officials are the key diplomatic relationships in Africa outside of the embassy. Such interactions are often an African leader’s highest-level connection to the U.S. government, and they are what many African governments view as the most reliable form of U.S. engagement.

It is through the U.S. military that the U.S. government promotes values such as civilian oversight of the military and rule of law. According to a recent RAND Corporation study, U.S. security sector assistance, when conducted in conjunction with UN peacekeeping, decreases the likelihood of political violence in a given African country. And senior African military officers, with close ties to the United States, have defended civilian rule during turbulent political transitions. In Malawi, for example, Gen. Henry Odillo, who often engaged with AFRICOM, refused to permit politicians from preventing then-vice president Joyce Banda from ascending to the presidency in 2012.

In any given year, AFRICOM co-leads seminars with regional military and defense officials on military justice and the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse. It also stops providing military support when African forces commit human rights abuses—sending a signal that the rule of law matters and, in theory, deterring security forces from committing future abuses. The U.S. military, which has a far from perfect record itself, also leads by example, confronting its past mistakes and launching investigations when U.S. forces have committed crimes or lost their lives in ambushes. In response to legitimate criticism from journalists and human rights organizations, the U.S. military recently started reporting civilian casualties from its Somalia operations and adjusted its assistance programs following a coup led by a U.S-trained army captain in Mali in 2012.

When natural disasters strike and viruses spread, the U.S. military’s presence in several African nations has enabled quick and decisive support. In response to Cyclone Idai in 2019, U.S. military aircraft helped deliver food and other humanitarian assistance to communities in Malawi, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe just days after the storm submerged hundreds of thousands of miles of land. And the U.S. military’s presence in several African nations has been an essential part of the fight against the coronavirus, providing mobile hospital capacity in Ghana, Senegal, and Uganda. The capabilities and partnerships created through U.S. military engagement are helping African nations including Benin, Nigeria, and Senegal to deal with the coronavirus and contain future pandemics.

These non-counterterrorism missions are not mere charity or ideological niceties. Building partnerships, promoting U.S. values and interests, and acknowledging past mistakes to reinforce U.S. leadership distinguishes the United States from its adversaries. China, for instance, has been unwilling to take responsibility for racist treatment of Africans in Guangzhou during the coronavirus outbreak. Moreover, the coronavirus proves that diseases do not respect borders. Like terrorism, trafficking, and organized crime, what happens in one country does not necessarily stay there. Future African security and health challenges will not only implicate the continent but also affect the United States and the international community.

A Smarter Approach to Counterterrorism for the U.S. Military

As terrorism continues to afflict communities across Africa, the need to counter threats has not abated. However, when it comes to counterterrorism, instead of doubling down on existing efforts, the proposed drawdown should be a time to reconsider the military’s role beyond operations. To date, the biggest investments in countering terrorism—underscrutinized security assistance and targeted strikes—have not proved effective at stemming the growth of terror networks across Africa.

Instead, investing in prevention should be the long game for strategic gains measured by reductions in violence and sustainable partnerships with security sectors and citizens alike. As military personnel who have served in Africa know well, important stabilization activities make the hard work of governing possible, and the dividends of this approach accrue based on years of engagement.

In places like Burkina Faso, Mali, Nigeria, and Somalia, U.S. forces and partner militaries can support longer-term efforts to prevent violent extremism from taking hold in the first place. The United States can help partners set up joint operations centers where, in real time, the U.S. military can showcase how intelligence-driven operations reduce accidents, lower civilian casualties, and foster information sharing (including with gendarmes and police) that saves lives. And it can do more to promote open dialogues with communities on threats and prevention strategies.

If the United States wants to reduce the threat of terrorism in Africa, partnerships need to mean much more than just limited counterterrorism objectives. In too many African contexts, terrorists easily step in to establish themselves as a viable alternative to the government when those in power are corrupt, venal, and direct security forces to kill and abuse civilians for political gain. In those cases, the U.S. military’s most effective intervention is assisting partner nations to improve their behavior and rebuild trust. Because when U.S. forces support efforts to repair the broken bonds of governance and positively impact the behavior of African security forces, it reinforces the idea that the state’s job is to protect people, instead of going after them. And that might end up being the most potent type of counterterrorism the United States can ever help with.

U.S. officials, Congress, and the public need to understand that there is more benefit to the U.S. military engagement in Africa than just combating terrorism. The proposed cuts to the U.S. military presence, even if well intentioned, will undercut the missions that are doing well—security partnerships and responses to health and humanitarian crises—and constrain innovative policy responses to address twenty-first-century security challenges. If the United States learns anything from the horrors of the coronavirus pandemic, let it be that American priorities have been misaligned and off-kilter for some time. Let’s not throw away gains for shortsighted reasons nor waste this opportunity to renew and deepen U.S. investments in Africa. If the United States wants to advance its objectives in the region, the government needs to focus on the most impactful missions, fix its counterterrorism programming, and favor early interventions and enduring partnerships with African counterparts.

#### AFRICOM assistance is effective – not a colonialist Trojan horse.

Erickson ’14 [(Dane and Alice, Lecturer in IR – U Colorado Denver and Friend, PhD candidate – American U “The U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit: Security Initiatives Are Critical to Cementing Africa’s Gains,” August 14, 2014, Brookings Institution. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-u-s-africa-leaders-summit-security-initiatives-are-critical-to-cementing-africas-gains/>] TDI

But security threats must be dealt with head on for economies and societies to thrive, and weak, disorganized and unprofessional security forces are unable to meet current challenges. As National Security Advisor Susan Rice clearly stated in advance of the summit, the U.S. is “not looking to militarize Africa.” Rather, as President Obama explained in his May speech at West Point, the U.S. is interested in building the capacity of local partners to prevent and resolve conflicts; and in Africa, for example, ministries of defense value the enhanced capacity AFRICOM provides to peacekeeping and counter-terrorism missions.

As last week’s summit highlighted, Africa’s economic rise is becoming more conspicuous in the U.S. and around the world. But without strategic investments in the security sector by Africans and the international community, instability can destroy communities, destabilize nascent institutions, retard growth and discourage potential investors. And given the growing multitude of stakeholders on the continent and the complexity of former colonial relationships, the U.S. remains a trusted broker in Africa. In fact, many African leaders explicitly requested peace and security issues to be included on the summit agenda. With the right approach and increases in resources, the Obama administration’s proposed initiatives can provide the requisite momentum for a renewed agenda to enhance security cooperation and reinforce both American and African goals for peace and mutual prosperity.

### 1NC – Solvency – Lilypads

#### The US just moves the base to undemocratic regimes and establishes lily pad bases.

Vine ‘19 (David, professor of anthropology at American University, “No Bases? Assessing the Impact of Social Movements Challenging US Foreign Military Bases”, published in Current Anthropology volume 60, supplement 19, in February 2019) // Postman TDI

The clearest indication of the impact of antibase movements is found in the US military’s reaction to antibase opposition. Since early in the post–World War II era, US military and civilian planners have shaped the geography of the global base network because of their fears of the kinds of protest that have led to losing access to bases abroad (Vine 2009). This has resulted in a marked preference for bases in countries ruled by dictators and other undemocratic regimes. From the perspective of US policy makers, Calder explains, dictatorships are preferable to democracies because “base politics operate most smoothly when the mass public is not involved” (2007:116– 117). For decades, the fear of antibase protest has also resulted in a geographic shift: the general movement of bases from populated urban areas to isolated sites insulated from any significant opposition. This shift has come to fruition most visibly in the lily pad basing strategy, which emerged around the turn of the century. Under this strategy, the Pentagon has been creating small, secretive bases far from population centers and potentially antagonistic locals. The military’s aim has been to acquire a collection of dozens of easily expandable lily pad bases in places with little or no US military presence (Vine 2015:299–319). “The presence and activities of our forces grate on local populations and have become an irritant for host governments,” former George W. Bush administration Pentagon Secretary Donald Rumsfeld acknowledged (Brown 2006:28). “Wherever possible,” the administration aimed to move bases and troops to “lessen the real and perceived burdens of such situations” (US Department of Defense 2004:7). In other words, the military is well aware of what officials see as the “problem” of antibase movements and is “taking measures to address it” (Davis 2011:219). In addition to creating lily pads, US officials have responded to antibase organizing by further segregating US forces from locals at a consolidated number of very large, increasingly insular bases to avoid the crimes, accidents, and other tensions that have fueled protest movements. The motivation for these changes is not generally protecting the well-being of locals; instead, it is “the quest for operational unilateralism.” Military leaders want to be able “to strike quickly without any need for consultation with anyone, even the government of the territory from which they are launching the strike” (Davis 2011:220). The military has been particularly focused on overcoming antibase resistance by moving operations to locations where inhabitants possess fewer democratic rights, offering the military “greater freedom to operate” (Davis 2011:216). Major buildups have taken place in two of the remaining US and UK colonies, Guam and Diego Garcia; in Africa and Central and Eastern Europe there are now dozens of “lily pads” (Vine 2015:299–313). Amid a major buildup on Guam, Major General Dennis Larsen told a reporter, “This is not Okinawa,” clearly referencing its antibase opposition. “This is American soil in the midst of the Pacific. Guam is a US territory. We can do what we want here, and make huge investments without fear of being thrown out” (Kaplan 2008:60–61). In the shift of bases and forces to locations like Guam, one sees how the geography of the US military base network has been “shaped not only by global military priorities, but also by an increasingly globalized network of local social movements resisting militarization” (Davis 2011:215).

### 1NC – Solvency – Alt Causes

#### French weapon sales to Libya, the UAE, and Egypt sustain the Libya conflict

Di Santo 1/29 – Daniel; (“France Fuels Conflict in Libya” The Trumpet. January 29, 2020. <https://www.thetrumpet.com/21849-france-fuels-conflict-in-libya> TFDI

EU Observer warned on January 24 that French weapons sent to the **United Arab Emirates and Egypt risk adding fuel to the ongoing Libyan civil war.** The ongoing conflict between Army Cmdr. Khalifa Haftar and United Nations-backed Fayez al-Sarraj makes such shipments **illegal under UN sanctions**. So why is France getting involved? The European Union published data in November 2019 for France’s 2018 arms exports. It found that France has exported nonlethal electronics and **weapons systems to Libya directly**, while sending other Arab nations lethal weapons, which are **filtering into the conflict-ridden country.** France is taking advantage of a loophole in the wording of UN sanctions, which only outlaws the delivery of lethal weapons. However, “nonlethal” weapons, such as fire-control systems and radars, **provide a technological edge to Haftar’s forces**, which would otherwise be much harder to obtain. In 2018, France sent €295 million (us$325 million) worth of this equipment directly to Libya. Meanwhile, lethal weapons are able to flow into Libya via Arab nations that trade with France. This includes everything from small arms to mortar rounds to **jet fighters**. French Mirage fighter jets were seen conducting air strikes in 2019. In June 2019, three Javelin anti-tank missiles were found at a base formerly used by Haftar’s forces. While they had come from the United Arab Emirates and were assumed to be of American origin, the Pentagon investigated and proved them to be from France.

## 1NC – K – LibMil

There is a LOT that applies to this aff that’s already in the K file, experiment with it in addition to this car!

### 1NC – L – Speed Elitism

#### The aff’s attempt to bring movements into the university as objects of study falls prey to speed elitism – that redeploys the 1AC as a development narrative which is coopted by militarism to intervene on colonial Others.

Hoofd ’15 [(Ingrid, communication at National University of Singapore. Promise she’s not a cop.) “The Financialization of the Communicative Ideal in the Activist Social Sciences”, Global Media Journal, 2015. <https://www.globalmediajournal.com/open-access/the-financialization-of-the-communicative-ideal-in-the-activist-social-sciences.pdf>] pfox TDI

The enactment of the university’s ideals of justice, community, and equality then exceedingly takes to the new technologies of communication, as these have always been mistakenly perceived as the straightforward embodiment or incarnation of these ideals. Logically then, we can see that many academic and non-academic research centers around social change have taken the Internet by storm. This is also unsurprising because it was the intimate collaboration during the Cold War period between American universities and the United States military that led to the birth of the early Internet (the ArpaNet) in the first place. This means that academia on a fundamental level shares with the military its ideals of transparency, connectivity, and communication, as well as a general tendency to incorporate more and more people and places under its regime. In “Becoming-Media” Joseph Vogl for this reason argues that the new media intensify the fact that any medium, in “the very act of communication simultaneously communicates the specific event-character of the media themselves,” (628) so that these new technologies with their militaristic logic of targeting, as he in turn claims in “On Hesitation,” translate the “global world [into] a world of universal addressability.” (144) Since the prime logic of new media technologies, as I also discussed via the work of Baudrillard earlier, consists therefore of a combination simulation and dissimulation, we can expect to find that the websites of those research centers in important ways obscure the ways in which their use of new media are implicated in an increasingly dire economic and social situation for many globally. One more obvious example of this consists in how the prefix ‘social’ in social media in fact hides its complicity in social fragmentation; the ‘social’ media pretend to be about a sociality that actually erases the possibility of coming into contact with radical otherness (that what or those who do not gel with or abide by the Lyotardian ‘communicationalist ideology.’) Another example is how many websites of those research centers display the domain name suffix ‘.edu’ or ‘.org’ in their online addresses, as if they are unrelated or in opposition to capitalist entities that carry the ‘.com’ or ‘.gov’ suffix. A case in point is for instance the Amherst-based center for Communication for Sustainable Social Change (CSSC, http://csschange.org), the University of Queensland Centre for Communication and Social Change (CfCSC, http://uq.edu.au/ccsc/), or the non-governmental Communication for Social Change Consortium (CFSC, http://www.communicationforsocialchange.org) which has head offices in New Jersey and in London. All the traffic to and from these websites nonetheless flows via ISPs and IXPs that, as I mentioned before, are by and large owned by a handful of mostly North-American companies.

Now I want to stress that no doubt a lot of good work is done under the umbrella of these centers and organizations, and that I by no means wish to dissociate myself from the general left-wing spirit of justice and equality that these entities stand for. But I do think that especially the recourse of these entities to new communication and visualization technologies illustrates how the acceleration and subsequent displacement of these ideals has reached its apex today. This is because the usage of the new media naturalizes for its audiences – who are anyway already foremost the privileged sections of society for whom such techniques work to their advantage – the paradigm of transformation, communication, and innovation, both via the websites’ content and their design. The CSSC website for instance proclaims as one of their key objectives the creation of awareness among policy-makers and administrators of “innovative applied communication and technology processes” for community development in so-called ‘developing’ countries. It also professes to the creation of interdisciplinary and international alliances for the purposes of communication and social change. The CFSC website meanwhile claims that “within marginalized communities, there is tremendous untapped potential to use communication for collective good,” since “communication has been an essential tool for development since early in the 20th century.” Part of their mission is “to help people living in poor communities communicate effectively.” The website also, much in line with the neoliberal obsession with technological change, strongly emphasizes the role of “nurturing innovation, research and scholarship in communication.” It displays many photographs of African peoples and communities going about their daily business, like fishing, preparing food, and dancing, so as to imply a link between the dissemination of communication tools and the supposed ‘improvement’ in efficiency around these daily activities. Once more, there is a distinct sense of condescension present in these developmental narratives that claim to help people help themselves, which shows that these organizations still operate much in line with its colonialist and messianistic heritage of ‘good works’ for the purposes of the ‘enlightenment of the natives.’

Similar to the CFSC website, the CfCSC website is profusely laced with images of Australian aboriginal, Indian, and other Asian rural communities, together with a smattering of white faces. The showcasing of these photographs appears to be functioning as ‘proof’ of the overall positivity of the imperative of communication and the joys of using the media. This ‘proving’ is similar to the case of for instance the protesters in Egypt during the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ holding up signs with “Facebook” and “Twitter,” not because these are at all intrinsically revolutionary, but because these protests’ spectacular imagery was set up for consumption by a largely Western and privileged global audience in dire need of a re-affirmation of the emancipatory promise of technological innovation as such. The ‘other’ is in the case of the CfCSC and CFSC website namely portrayed as ‘authentically’ desiring ommunication and collaboration with these centers, where in fact such a ‘need’ is conjured up or produced by the unequal relations of power globally that the new media tools are implicated in, as well as between the facilitators and such ‘others.’ Again, true radicality is erased by way of displaying an ‘other’ who apparently posits no challenge to this global financial regime of development and innovation, and who can be ‘coddled’ and ‘liberated’ by the well-meaning academic and activist. As Vogl astutely remarks in “On Hesitation,” such images and stories of happy collaboration render an impression that “friend and foe are just as close, almost indistinguishable from one another.” (144) They therefore obscure the manifold ways in which organizers and researchers are not in any way in some kind of ‘horizontal’ dialogue with these peoples, whose entire ways of being in the world is challenged at a fundamental level in favor of a capitalist logic of mere survival. It may be for example of interest here that Australian aboriginal culture traditionally emphasizes the vital non-communicability and secrecy that is part and parcel of earthly existence; a worldview that is bound to perish in a global world obsessed with universal communicability and transparency. The general conceptual and opportunistic error that these academics, researchers, and activists therefore make, is to rely on an analogy between technologically improved communications – again, much in the vein of Shannon and Weaver – and the general democratization, perfection, or emancipation of communities under threat. In some socially engaged humanities scholarship of the 1990s, a very similar slippage concerned the misplaced overlapping of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s rhetoric of ‘assemblages’ and ‘rhizomes’ in Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, with the supposedly ‘horizontal’ structure of the Internet. This misconception of the function of new media is due to the confluence of the semiotic realm with the capitalist acceleration of information flows; under such conditions, ‘radical’ content comes to render opaque and legitimize the actual function of new media in the ongoing financialization of the globe. Once more then, the true purpose of these new and social media lies on their operational, and no longer the representational, level.

## 1NC – DA – Deterrence

### 1NC – North Africa

#### Biden’s stepping up military presence in Africa now to deter adversaries. Perception & influence are key.

Gardner ’23 [Akayla; White House Correspondent at Bloomberg News. B.A. in Public Affairs Journalism from Ohio State University. March 24, 2023; “US Fights for Influence in Africa Where China, Russia Loom Large”; *Bloomberg*; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-24/us-fights-for-influence-in-africa-where-china-russia-loom-large] TDI

President Joe Biden’s administration is stepping up a campaign to build American influence in Africa, where the US has lost ground to its main rivals in what’s starting to look like a new Cold War.

Vice President Kamala Harris next week becomes the latest top official to visit, with stops scheduled in Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia. She’s following Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who’ve both been in the region recently. At a December summit with the continent’s leaders, Biden pledged a $55 billion support package for Africa.

The push to engage with the mineral-rich continent comes as Russia’s war in Ukraine – and the escalating standoff between the US and China – shake up global diplomacy. Both sides are seeking to win over non-aligned countries in places like Africa.

American officials have raised the Ukraine war with African leaders, and encouraged them to support Kyiv — though many African governments have opted to stay neutral, and some have longstanding ties with Russia that include arms purchases.

Likely of greater concern for Harris and her administration colleagues is the economic contest with China, by far Africa’s biggest partner, with trade set to exceed $260 billion this year.

The US-China rivalry includes a race to secure minerals that are critical to green energy — Africa has some of the world’s biggest supplies — and a dispute over debt relief, as burdens for poor countries rise along with interest rates. Chinese lending to Africa helped countries develop and build infrastructure. US leaders are calling attention to the steep price for borrowers, and the difficulty they face in paying Beijing back.

‘Bad Things’

US officials “won’t say that they are in competition with either China or Russia in Africa,” said Cameron Hudson, a senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Africa program. Still, he said, “it’s clear that they are using these visits to draw a vivid distinction between Washington’s approach” and that of its rivals.

One example is the US focus on democracy promotion – it recently promised $165 million to support fair elections in Africa – combined with warnings about the destabilizing role of Russia’s Wagner Group, which is active in countries including Mali and the Central African Republic.

“Bad things inevitably follow” when the mercenary outfit gets involved, Blinken said this month in Niger.

The US campaign is pushing up against deep-rooted ties. Countries like Egypt and Morocco have close trade relations with Russia. South Africa has permitted Russian and Chinese warships to carry out exercises in its waters.

Another case in point is the debt diplomacy. Harris’s itinerary includes Zambia and Ghana, which have both defaulted since the pandemic hit and are seeking to restructure debt.

For months, the US and allies have voiced frustration over Beijing’s stance on debt-relief agreements for some of the world’s poorest countries. China, the largest creditor to developing countries worldwide, has held up the process in several countries, fearing it would set a precedent by taking direct haircuts on its loans.

Zambia, which has debt exceeding $17 billion – more than one-third owed to Chinese lenders – is a crucial test case for what’s known as the Common Framework, a program designed by the Group of 20 major economies to bring Western and Chinese creditors around the same negotiating table. The concern is that a prolonged standoff in Zambia will discourage other nations from applying for relief under the program.

Still, US officials have often shied away from publicly drawing direct contrasts with China.

That’s probably because African countries, like many other emerging nations in the Middle East, Asia or Latin America, aren’t receptive to a “with-us-or-against-us” approach. Having to pick sides could set back efforts to develop their economies, and they prefer to do business with both great-power camps.

‘Maintain All Ties’

“Our relationship with the US does not affect our relationship with China, and vice-versa,” says Jito Kayumba, special assistant for finance and investment to Zambia’s president. “We want to maintain all ties. It’s a legacy that we’re keeping since independence.”

African leaders are aware of the downside of borrowing from China and receptive to what the US has to offer, according to a Biden administration official who asked not to be identified discussing confidential diplomacy. The official said it’s not just the US and China seeking to build influence in Africa — pointing to other powers such as India, Turkey and Saudi Arabia that want to step up engagement there.

‘Set Us Back’

The US is backing more Western lending to Africa. The commitment of $55 billion over three years that Biden made at the US-Africa Summit in December, the first such conference since 2014, included $21 billion in lending to low and middle-income nations via the International Monetary Fund.

The administration has also flagged the importance of US business getting more involved, too. At the summit in Washington, Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo said she’s eager to see investment in Africa by the private sector.

The US is pushing for a transition to clean energy, and African countries hold some of the minerals that are vital to emerging technologies, like lithium and cobalt, which are used to make batteries for electric cars. Officials have suggested that the Wagner Group may play a role in channeling some of those key commodities to Russia.

China is well ahead of the rest of the world in securing a fully-vertical supply chain for electric vehicle production. But it’s still hungry for metals like copper and cobalt, of which China, the US and Europe produce very little, while Africa dominates.

Humanitarian aid to Africa has also increased since Biden took office, notably to countries battling food insecurity that got worse after the price of wheat and other exports from Ukraine and Russia skyrocketed during the war.

#### Russia and China fill in in the absence of American military leadership.

Bruhl ’22 [Joe; colonel in the U.S. Army with seven years’ experience living and working in Africa, Chief of Future Plans for the U.S. Army’s Southern European Task Force — AFRICA., Master’s degree from Harvard. June 14, 2022; “AMERICA IGNORES AFRICA AT ITS OWN PERIL”; *War on the Rocks*; https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/america-ignores-africa-at-its-own-peril/] TDI

America’s ambivalence toward Africa puts it at a dangerous disadvantage there — and impacts U.S. leadership around the globe. While Washington focuses on the Russian military threat in Eastern Europe and Chinese expansionism in the Pacific, Russia and China are outcompeting the United States in Africa in ways that could fundamentally alter the global balance of power.

To restore momentum to its work in Africa, Washington should develop an integrated strategy that does three things: establishes continent-wide objectives with tailored regional strategies, dramatically expands mutually beneficial economic investment, and leverages areas in which the United States holds comparative advantage over its competitors.

A Continent-Wide Blind Spot

The legacy of U.S. policy in Africa is checkered. Throughout its history, the United States lacked clear objectives on the continent and, as a result, its policies were largely reactionary, vacillating between exploitation, benign neglect, and half-hearted attempts at democratization and humanitarian assistance. In the 18th and 19th centuries, U.S. engagement with Africa came principally through the slave trade. For the next century, Washington paid little attention to the continent until de-colonization coincided with Cold War competition in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. In this context, the United States focused on bringing newly independent African countries into its sphere of influence — often ignoring (or enabling) leaders with appalling records of violence and corruption. After the Cold War, U.S. policy shifted to humanitarian objectives, intervening in Somalia to stop a famine and initiating the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief — and investment of more than $100 billion to combat HIV/AIDS. After the attacks of 9/11, however, the preponderance of U.S. diplomatic and military energy has focused on countering violent extremist organizations as part of the Global War on Terror.

Today, Washington still primarily views the continent as a problem to be managed rather than as a partner in shaping the next century. Promising economic and demographic trends have driven Africa’s emergence as a significant player on the world stage. But the United States has been slow to establish a clear, proactive policy for Africa. This is a strategic ~~blind~~ spot that most U.S. policymakers can’t seem to shake — and one that their competitors don’t have.

Instead of a problem to be solved, China and Russia view Africa as an opportunity to be seized. From 2007 to 2017, U.S. trade with Africa dropped by 54 percent as China’s grew by 220 percent. While Russia’s total investment in Africa pales in comparison to the United States and China, it has grown by 40 percent since 2015. China supports 46 port projects in Africa — financing more than half and operating 11. The United States supports zero.

In 2006, China launched the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, bringing together heads of state from across the continent every three years. Russia began a similar junket in 2019, holding the first Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi. The United States hosted something similar in 2014 — but hasn’t since. The Biden administration has recognized Washington’s error and announced plans to host a second event in 2022, but in this diplomatic game the United States is still playing from behind.

In a savvy soft-power move, China launched a 2015 initiative to put satellite televisions in 10,000 African villages. No surprise — the television sets come with free, pre-loaded access to Chinese stations, pumping state-sponsored content into homes across the continent. Today, Russia embeds a former intelligence agent as a senior defense advisor in the Central African Republic, employs the Wagner Group in Libya and elsewhere, and has deals with seven Sub-Saharan countries to build their nuclear energy infrastructure.

Each competitor’s strategy has its flaws — and there are certainly seams for the United States to exploit — but the contrast between Russia and China’s involvement in Africa and Washington’s neglect is stark.

Africa Rising

However, investing in Africa is not just about competing with China and Russia: Africa is an epicenter of tremendous opportunity. If human capital truly is the greatest asset to economic growth, Africa has unappreciated potential. In the next 35 years, Africa’s population is expected to double — comprising nearly 30 percent of the world’s population by 2050. By 2025, an additional 90 million African households will enter the consumer class — contributing purchasing power of $2.1 trillion to the global economy.

Africa also has the potential to become the world’s next manufacturing epicenter. As the cost of labor in China increases, experts project that 100 million labor-intensive jobs will leave the country by 2030 — with Africa as a likely landing spot. The Brookings Institution estimates that manufacturing spending in Africa will grow by over 50 percent — reaching more than $660 billion by 2030. In 2021, 54 of 55 African nations initiated the African Continental Free Trade Area — a free trade agreement that eliminates tariffs on 90 percent of goods, enabling the free flow of the raw materials essential for manufacturing to thrive.

There are also more immediate economic interests at play. Africa holds vast repositories of rare earth elements, vital to the production of everything from cell phones and LED screens to energy infrastructure and defense technologies. More than two-thirds of the world’s cobalt — an essential ingredient in lithium-ion batteries — is in Congo. Around 35 percent of the world’s bauxite — a key component of aluminum production — is found in Guinea. However, China currently holds a virtual monopoly on the world’s rare earth elements production — putting America’s economy and national security at risk. If the United States wants to secure access to the raw materials required to build the future, it’s going to have to do it in Africa.

Politically, African nations wield surprisingly significant, yet subtle, influence on a host of global issues. At the United Nations, African countries comprise nearly 28 percent of member states — providing a powerful voting bloc capable of channeling resources to initiatives aligned to its interests. Unity among the A3 — the three rotating African members of the U.N. Security Council — increases Africa’s voice on council resolutions, even ones that don’t relate to Africa. What’s more, the way in which African leaders choose to implement the African Continental Free Trade Agreement will determine which global powers have greatest access to continent-wide markets worth more than $3.4 trillion. Early indications are that China is the big winner.

No doubt, there are challenges to progress in Africa. But progress is being made and the truth is that Africa will play a central role in the next century — demographically, economically, and politically — whether the United States likes it or not.

A New Approach

To account for the strategic importance of Africa, the United States needs to develop a coherent, compelling, and competitive strategy. Inevitably, with such a large and diverse continent, experts disagree on the best approach. Some complain that the military plays too large a role while others suggest military-first diplomacy is necessary in a continent where security and governance are frequently lacking. Some suggest devising multiple strategies, tailored for the unique geopolitical interests in North Africa, East Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Others suggest a unified strategy, focused on countering Chinese influence or advancing U.S. economic interests with initiatives like the 2019 Prosper Africa program. Still others argue that the current de facto country-by-country approach, with limited top-down guidance, provides strategic flexibility in a diverse and often volatile continent.

Instead of adopting an “either/or” approach to the question of continent-wide versus regional strategies, an effective U.S. strategy for Africa should employ a “both/and” approach, establishing continent-wide priorities and objectives for everything from trade to military investments, with tailored regional strategies that support detailed execution across the continent. Beneath continent-wide objectives — established by the assistant secretary in the Bureau of African Affairs — should be distinct regional agendas that translate the “what” of strategy into the “how” of execution. Development of regional strategies should be led by special envoys with the power to convene key stakeholders from across the U.S. government. Special envoys already exist for the Great Lakes Region and the Sahel — additional ones are needed to create and oversee a truly integrated U.S. approach in other regions as well.

Economically, a successful Africa strategy would dramatically increase mutually beneficial economic investment across the continent. Both Prosper Africa and the United States’ African Growth and Opportunity Act provide a good foundation, but neither are ambitious or effective enough. Since 2019, the United States has invested $22 billion with 80 companies in 30 African countries through Prosper Africa. In 2020, China had deals with 623 businesses for a total investment of $735 billion. And, under the African Growth and Opportunity Act, only 18 out of the 39 eligible countries have utilization strategies and most are one-dimensional. For a strategy to be effective, the United States should be willing to invest dramatically more — both economically and politically — into exchange with Africa.

The first step is to improve U.S. policies that buttress American companies taking risks in often volatile African markets. It is unfair — and unhelpful to American foreign policy — to make American companies shoulder risks that their competitors do not. China offers massive development loans for African governments — creating incentives for them to partner with Chinese businesses. And, as state-owned enterprises, many Chinese businesses have their risk underwritten by their government. U.S. commerce simply doesn’t get that kind of assistance. If Washington intends to substantially increase investment in Africa, it should ameliorate the risk to U.S. businesses seeking to operate there.

And, as it engages economically, the United States should focus on initiatives in sectors where it has unique advantages: education, the creative industries, artificial intelligence, and robotics. Investments in these sectors place the United States at the leading edge of “what’s next” in Africa rather than trying to wedge its way into already crowded, more traditional sectors.

America’s greatest comparative advantage is its values — when it lives up to them. A fascinating study published last year shows that, despite China massively outspending the United States in Africa, positive impressions of the two countries remain largely unchanged since 2015 and are neck-and-neck across a range of indicators. A 2020 report by Afrobarometer, the authoritative African survey organization, shows that in 18 countries over the previous year, 32 percent of Africans preferred a U.S. development model, compared to 23 percent who preferred the Chinese model. These aren’t mind-blowing gaps — but they do suggest that there is something inherently attractive about the American way of doing things. The United States should continue to champion its current programs and double down on its public diplomacy in Africa. This would press the advantage that Washington still enjoys in certain forms of soft power.

To support an effective strategy for Africa, the United States should also reexamine fundamental assumptions about how military forces are apportioned around the globe — and give serious thought to how it secures and advances its interests in Africa. The United States has deep and meaningful military relationships across the continent. The U.S. military has trained African armies, helped to fight violent extremists, and improved the effectiveness of troops deploying to U.N. operations. A successful U.S. strategy would shift the current downward trajectory by increasing military investment in Africa. The U.S. Army’s employment of a Security Force Assistance Brigade in Africa is a good step, but to sufficiently support U.S. policy objectives, the Department of Defense needs to reverse its drawdown and include more than one paragraph about Africa in the next National Defense Strategy.

Finally, the United States should be willing to act boldly and take strategic risks. Its competitors understand this. Today, China operates nearly one in five ports in Sub-Saharan Africa — providing them with economic, diplomatic, and military clout. China’s approach is not a new one. For 95 years, the United States underwrote the construction, operation, and security of the Panama Canal — giving it similar regional and global clout to that China has in Africa today. It’s time for the United States to dust off that old playbook (with the full cooperation and mutual benefit of African partners) and look for ways to boldly layer the effects of all elements of national power in Africa.

While the United States is playing catch-up in many areas, all is not lost. The United States still holds comparative advantages over Russia and China. Developing a strategy that leverages these advantages — by focusing on what it does best — will enable the United States to make up ground quickly and emerge as a leading partner with Africa in building the next century.

#### Empirics prove. Link turns are wrong.

Hicks et al. ’21 [Marcus; retired Air Force Major General who served as Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, Africa, from 2017 to 2019. He previously was Chief of Staff at the U.S. Special Operations Command and a career AC-130 pilot. Kyle; active-duty U.S. Army Officer, a Ph.D. student at the School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, and a cohost of the Irregular Warfare Podcast. Dan; active-duty U.S. Army Officer and a Joint Chiefs of Staff Fellow. March 4, 2021; ”Great-Power Competition Is Coming to Africa”; *Foreign Affairs*; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2021-03-04/great-power-competition-coming-africa] TDI

Under President Donald Trump, the United States withdrew troops and resources from Africa as part of a broader national security shift from counterterrorism to great-power competition. The Trump administration used the euphemism “optimization” to describe the pivot away from Africa that began around 2018, but a more accurate term would be disengagement. It pared back efforts to fight jihadis in Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria, downsizing the U.S. military footprint in some of the continent’s most volatile regions. And in the final months of Trump’s presidency, his administration withdrew nearly all U.S. troops from Somalia.

The shift in U.S. strategy toward Africa reflects an assumption — shared by many in Washington — that counterterrorism and other long-standing U.S. priorities in Africa will diminish in importance as competition between the United States, China, and other significant powers intensifies. But that assumption is wrong. In fact, far from being a distraction from great-power competition, Africa promises to become one of its important theaters. And if anything, great-power competition will increase the need for the United States to battle terrorists and safeguard democracy, trade, and free enterprise in Africa — but to do so with particular attention to limiting the malign influence of Russia and China.

President Joe Biden’s administration needs a new strategy that pursues these ends together, sustainably, and at an acceptable cost. For as long as the United States has had an Africa policy, it has run day-to-day operations through its ambassadors, tailoring its approach to each of the continent’s 54 countries individually. But today’s most pressing issues — terrorism, climate change, pandemics, and irregular migration, for instance — would be better served by regional coordinators whose authority transcends national borders. To safeguard its interests on the continent and to limit the influence of its rivals, the United States must start thinking regionally instead of nationally.

Devising such a policy is a matter of some urgency. As current and former military officers, one of whom led the U.S. Special Operations Command for Africa from 2017 to 2019, we believe that the United States must position itself as the partner of choice for African countries in the era of great-power competition. Failure to do so will imperil U.S. interests on the continent — and possibly U.S. security at home.

PARTNER OF CHOICE

Like it or not, a twenty-first century “scramble for Africa” is underway. Russia and China in particular are ramping up economic and military activity on the continent at the same time as the United States is scaling back. Both countries see opportunities to build economic relationships, secure access to natural resources and rapidly growing markets, forge political alliances, and promote their own illiberal models of government.

Russia has dramatically expanded its footprint in Africa in recent years, signing military deals with at least 19 countries since 2014 and becoming the top arms supplier to the continent. Just days after the United States announced its plans to withdraw from Somalia in December 2020, Russia said it had reached an agreement to establish a new naval base in Port Sudan. Its mercenary companies, including the Wagner Group, which fought a deadly firefight against U.S. Special Operations Forces in Syria in 2018, now operate across the continent, from Libya to the Central African Republic to Mozambique.

China, too, is angling for influence in Africa. It established its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017 and spends vast sums on infrastructure projects to secure access to resources and to buy goodwill and votes in international organizations such as the United Nations. China’s leaders have promoted their country’s authoritarian bureaucratic system as a model for African leaders seeking to expand their economies without allowing democratic reforms. Their attractive lending practices and noninterference policy regarding human rights, market liberalization, and corruption give them additional influence over poor African governments.

Increased Russian and Chinese activity is already transforming Africa into a theater of competition with the United States — just as Soviet and U.S. jockeying made the continent a venue for Cold War rivalry. In the second half of the twentieth century, the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Iran, and North Korea provided military assistance to governments and rebels across Africa. These countries became embroiled in proxy wars, sometimes even sending their own troops into combat. Russia and Cuba, for instance, sent tens of thousands of soldiers to fight in the Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia and in the Angolan civil war.

The United States might prefer to avoid becoming embroiled in African proxy wars during this new era of great-power competition, but it must be prepared for such conflicts nonetheless. Already, Libya has become a theater for proxy warfare between Russia, Turkey, and other countries backing opposite sides in an increasingly bloody civil-turned-proxy war. The United States has played a peripheral role in that conflict, but that did not stop Russia from allegedly shooting down a U.S. drone over Libya in 2019.

The United States cannot simply withdraw from Africa without leaving its interests exposed. Salafi jihadi insurgencies, political instability, and authoritarianism still threaten U.S. businesses and commercial interests as well as the security of U.S. partners. Like the Afghan Taliban in the 1990s, insurgent groups in Africa are mostly motivated by local and regional concerns. These groups draw recruits from the continent’s large and rapidly growing population, which is particularly vulnerable to radicalization due to persistent poverty, environmental degradation, and all too often, poor governance. But many of the groups’ leaders have links to al Qaeda and the Islamic State, also known as ISIS, and are increasingly aligned with transnational Salafi jihadi causes. At the direction of al Qaeda’s senior leadership, al Qaeda franchises in the Sahel have conducted attacks against high-profile Western targets in Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger in recent years. And the Somali insurgent group al Shabab has attacked Western targets in Kenya and Somalia and even plotted to hijack a commercial airplane and fly it into a building in the United States, as the U.S. Justice Department revealed in a recent indictment. Moreover, Salafi jihadi groups create political instability that in turn degrades governance, depresses economic activity, allows transnational crime to flourish, unleashes refugee flows, and invites health crises such as the 2014-16 Ebola pandemic in West Africa. In an interconnected world, what happens in Africa does not stay in Africa.

Fortunately, the United States and African countries share a common interest in countering Salafi jihadi groups. By offering sustained and effective counterterrorism assistance, the United States can become the partner of choice for African countries, encouraging them to develop their economies and political systems in accordance with Western norms. Successful great-power competition in Africa hinges on the United States’ ability to win over African governments with a holistic counterinsurgency strategy, one that addresses the root causes of terrorism and lays the political, economic, and developmental groundwork for future stability and prosperity.

FOCUS ON THE STATE

The standard U.S. approach to Africa relies on ambassadors to be the primary decision-makers. The Department of State’s regional bureaus give ambassadors varying degrees of support and direction, but the individual chiefs of mission coordinate most closely with their host governments. This approach has the advantage of putting career diplomatic professionals in the driver’s seat—a clear benefit when dealing with country-specific issues and crises. Unfortunately, ambassadors have neither the staff nor the incentive to look beyond the borders of their host countries to engage with regional organizations or address transnational problems, such as Salafi jihadi insurgencies.

The al Qaeda­ and ISIS-affiliated groups in Africa are not confined to any one state. Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin and ISIS-Greater Sahara, two of the most potent jihadi groups in the Sahel, move freely across the region to carry out attacks. Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa do the same across four countries in the Lake Chad region, while al Shabab ranges far outside Somalia’s borders into Kenya and Uganda. Population growth, environmental degradation, and tensions between nomadic and settled populations fuel conflicts that these groups can exploit. As a result, any U.S. strategy to degrade jihadi insurgent groups and address the root causes of the instability that drives them must be transnational in nature.

The United States must also address the interstate coordination issues that allow insurgents to escape military pressure simply by crossing international boundaries. Rather than seeking sanctuary in rough or difficult-to-access geographical terrain, insurgent groups simply exploit interstate coordination problems to roam freely in border regions. Often, they do so along borders between states that have tense diplomatic or military relations. For instance, Boko Haram operates on the border between Cameroon and Nigeria, which have a history of conflict.

The country-by-country approach to Africa not only fails to address coordination issues but can also serve to entrench them. For instance, Congress approves funds for military activities based on its assessment of individual partner countries—not based on the regional dynamics of the threat. As a result, lawmakers may approve a program to train and equip a partner force in one country to address a regional threat but restrict the use of U.S. equipment and the activities of U.S. advisers to within that country’s borders. Such inconsistency not only hampers counterinsurgency efforts but fuels the perception that the U.S. military is an unreliable partner.

THINKING REGIONALLY

Critics of the current country-by-country approach have called for an overarching continental strategy. And indeed, both the Obama and Trump administrations published strategies for continent-level engagement, but neither spelled out specific ends or means. As a result, various levels of government were free to interpret the strategies as they saw fit, and the country-by-country approach endured in practice. The Obama and Trump documents were useful insofar as they offered broad frameworks for engagement, but the truth is that Africa’s needs are too diverse and too complex to be addressed by a single strategy, except at a very superficial level.

What the United States needs is not an overarching continental strategy but one tailored to specific regions. African countries have begun to take such an approach themselves. For instance, in response to al Qaeda- and ISIS-affiliated jihadi activities across the Sahel, five African countries established the G5 Sahel group to coordinate military activities, enable cross-border joint operations, and solicit aid from international backers. Similarly, the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad basin coordinates military activities between Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria to counter Boko Haram. The African Union Mission in Somalia likewise coordinates the efforts of Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and other nations to battle al Shabab.

France has taken a similar approach to insecurity in West Africa and the Sahel. In 2014, it established Task Force Barkhane, a roughly 5,000-soldier operation centralizing security policy and administrative functions across Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger.

Governance failures in these countries and abuses by their security forces have undercut Barkhane’s effectiveness, as has France’s overreliance on counterterrorism tactics at the expense of population-centric counterinsurgency efforts. But the regional approach has clearly eliminated cumbersome bureaucratic hurdles and helped maintain pressure on the militants.

The United States should articulate similar regional strategies for the Sahel, the Lake Chad region, the Horn of Africa, and southeastern Africa — each with clearly defined goals, however generational the timelines for achieving them might be. The strategies should draw on mostly nonmilitary means and aim to improve governance and security, thereby addressing the root causes of radicalization. For example, the United States should reinvigorate USAID, along with other developmental and governance initiatives, so as to better position itself as the partner of choice to African nations. But it must also make the necessary military investments, in particular in synchronizing its advising, training, and equipping activities as well as its tactical and operational support for partner militaries. Military and nonmilitary support alike must be coordinated regionally and aligned against regional threats. Each regional strategy must also be developed with input from Congress and clearly explained to the American people, so as to ensure popular as well as bipartisan support.

To implement its regional strategies, the United States will need empowered regional officials who are authorized to coordinate activities within their areas of responsibility. Regional coordinators, or envoys, have been used to coordinate responses to transnational issues in the past, but they have typically answered to the secretary of state rather than to the president. As a result, they have lacked the authority to compel cooperation from the U.S. military or from individual U.S. embassies or to adjudicate their divergent priorities. Regardless of their exact title, or whether they are civilian or military, the officials in charge of regional strategies for Africa must have the president’s support in order to effectively coordinate the various instruments of American power at their disposal.

The return of great-power competition does not mean that the United States can turn its attention away from Africa. On the contrary, increased Russian and Chinese activity on the continent will necessitate deeper U.S. engagement. To promote stability, good governance, and economic openness in Africa while countering the illiberal influence of competing powers, the United States will need a regional strategy that is capable of addressing transnational threats. Anything short of that will cede the advantage to the United States’ adversaries on a continent where opportunities and risks are set to grow in the coming decades.

#### African instability causes and exacerbates numerous existential threats.

Ray ’22 [Charles; US Army (ret.), chair of the Africa Program of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. Former US Foreign Service officer who served as ambassador to Cambodia and Zimbabwe and was deputy assistant secretary of defense for POW/Missing Personnel Affairs. May 2022; “America, You Better Believe That Africa Matters”; *American Diplomacy*; https://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/2022/05/america-you-better-believe-that-africa-matters/] TDI

In the minds of most Americans and Europeans, the continent of Africa has long been seen as peripheral to world affairs, looked at either as a source of natural resources ripe for extraction or a place of poverty and violence requiring massive amounts of aid. This is a shortsighted and distorted view of a diverse continent and is long overdue for a reset.

The truth is that Africa is home to some of the planet’s most strategic minerals and other resources, and that natural and manmade disasters plague the continent. It is far more diverse and dynamic than popular culture, mainstream media, and even many foreign policy makers portray it. For a lot of reasons, some of them existential, it is far from peripheral; it matters.

Rich in Resources, but Mired in Poverty

Africa’s resources, its strategic minerals such as gold, copper, diamonds, cobalt, and oil, as well as its human resources during the height of the global slave trade, have always been as much a curse as a blessing to the continent. With a significant percentage of global reserves of some of the world’s most strategic minerals, Africa has often been, and in some places still is, a pawn in the struggles between powerful nations out to gain access to and/or control over minerals that are vital to modern industry. To name just two examples, Africa is thought to have 21 percent of the world’s total gold reserves and 85 percent of its platinum.

The competition to obtain these minerals is often waged with complete disregard to the impact it has on the countries or upon the lives of the average Africans who get little or no benefit from their extraction.

While living standards and wages vary from country to country, and often from region to region within individual countries, the average salary across the continent is less than US $400 per month; one in three Africans (more than 400 million people) subsist on less than US $2 per day, representing 70 percent of the world’s poorest people.

Troubles — Natural and Man-made

Across the continent, but particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, climate change causes significant environmental problems. In addition, overfishing, deforestation, mining, and intense climate-unfriendly agriculture compound an already serious situation. Addressing Africa’s climate problems is hampered by lack of resources, poor governance, corruption, and lack of respect for the rule of law by the governing elites. All this combines to exacerbate a dire situation. While the lion’s share of the blame for this dire situation rests with Africa’s rulers, the devastating impact of European exploitive colonization, the Atlantic slave trade, and the US-USSR Cold War competition that used African surrogates against each other’s interests must not be ignored.

In 2020, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of State provided $8.5 billion of assistance to 47 countries and 8 regional programs in sub-Saharan Africa. And yet, far too many foreign assistance programs, as well meaning as they are, create dependence on foreign aid, prop up autocratic rulers, and feed into corruption, failing to alleviate the pervasive poverty. Despite US and European efforts to put conditions on use of assistance, funds are still misused; unrestricted aid from countries like China and Russia, to name but two, contributes to abuse. Corruption and poor governance are often considered the leading causes of poverty in Africa, and despite decades and millions of foreign aid, it often seems that little has changed.

Africa is a Continent not a Country

When the aforementioned problems are considered, along with the increasing number of military coups and attempted coups, it’s understandable, though incorrect, that many outsiders think this represents the entire continent. Too often, Africa is perceived and presented as a global basket case that comes to our notice only when the next disaster strikes.

Africa, however, is not a monolith. It is as diverse as any other continent, more diverse than some. With 54 countries it is the second largest and second most populous continent with 1.3 billion inhabitants, over 1,500 languages and is home to every major religion and hundreds of different ethnic groups. By 2050, the population of the continent is expected to nearly double to 2.4 billion and will account for nearly fifty percent of the world’s population growth. In addition, Africa is on average a young continent. Approximately 40 percent of its populations is under 15, and in some countries over half the populations is under 25.

The Numbers Matter

The demographics outlined in the previous paragraphs should be enough to cause the world to reevaluate its views on the African continent. Africa’s growing young population will have an impact on the world —whether good or bad depends on how Africans and the world act in the present.

Because wars have destroyed so much of the colonial infrastructure, many young Africans have, for instance, never experienced analog telephones. They’ve grown up entirely in the digital age and represent a huge potential market for technological products and services as well as an immense work force. On the other hand, if their economic needs are not met, they represent a large potential source of recruits for extremist movements.

The African continent is also urbanizing at a breakneck pace. In 1960, 80 percent of Africa’s people lived in rural areas. That number is currently 60 percent and by 2050 will drop to 40 percent. Urbanization has been caused by underperforming economies in rural areas, wars, and climate-fueled crises. The move from countryside to city, which in many places leads to people being lifted out of poverty, has not had that effect in much of Africa. Africa’s large cities are not designed or equipped to deal with the negative impacts of climate change, and many of the rural migrants, in fact 70 percent of Africa’s urban population, live in slum conditions without access to economic opportunity, health care, or education. Slums are prone to flooding; because of the construction materials used in the slum housing, during the hot season they became urban heat islands leading to illness and death from heat.

While Africa has about 17 percent of the world’s population, it only accounts for a single-digit percentage of global greenhouse gas emissions. It nonetheless suffers more from climate change than any other populated continent, with droughts, floods, climate-caused storms and heat waves that reduce food production, increase health problems, and contribute to population displacement.

While this alone should be of concern to the rest of the world, of equal concern is the impact that Africa has on climate change, notwithstanding its low level of carbon emissions. The Congo rainforest is the world’s second largest carbon sink after the Amazon rainforest. With the degradation of the Amazon rainforest, which now emits more CO2 than it absorbs, it is vitally important to stemming the rise of global warming caused by excess carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. The Congo rainforest, though, is currently also under threat from deforestation caused mainly by local agricultural practices.

The Congo basin could also be the origin of the world’s next pandemic. With human populations increasingly encroaching on wildlife habitats, the chance of animal-to-human transmission of dangerous viruses is increased; one shudders to imagine a viral disease that is an infectious as Covid-19 but as deadly as Ebola. Absent a concerted African and international effort to identify and isolate the zoonotic diseases of the region, such a scenario is just a matter of time.

While extremist and terrorist groups in Africa have not to date played a major role in global terrorism, most of the major international terrorist organizations, al-Qaeda and IS primarily, have a presence there and have established relationships with many of the continent’s domestic extremist groups. Terrorist activity has increased significantly in Africa over the past decade; if not dealt with it could become an international threat.

A Renewed Cold War, or a Continuation of the Old War?

The competition between the US and the USSR, which used African (and sometimes Cuban) forces as proxies for the two great powers in their struggle over influence in Africa, ostensibly ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia, though its presence was diminished, never completely abandoned the continent and now, with the deployment of the Wagner Group mercenaries across Africa, appears to be reviving its presence. In addition, the global competition between the US and China, though mainly economic and influence competition, seems like the Cold War redux.

China is now sub-Saharan Africa’s largest trading partner in mostly import-driven trade. China is also a major investor in Africa, with its firms dominating infrastructure projects. China has established a military presence in Africa, with a support base in Djibouti and reportedly has plans to establish a naval base in Equatorial Guinea on Africa’s Atlantic coast.

On the economic front, China’s largest import from Africa is oil, but it also imports a number of vital minerals to fuel its rapidly growing economy including iron ore and cobalt. In 2011, the Chinese imported almost all of Zimbabwe’s tobacco crop, undercutting American and European buyers who had previously been the main customers. Africa is also a growing market for cheap Chinese manufactured goods.

Chinese investments in Africa don’t come with the governance, rule of law, and human rights conditions of American and European government assistance, or the legal restrictions that come with American private investment. Because of this, Chinese investment is popular with the ruling elites and has contributed to a degree to economic development in some countries. But China’s lack of governance conditions, its support for some of the continent’s most authoritarian leaders and the debt burden its loans have imposed on some of the world’s poorest countries has generated controversy both on the continent and internationally. With Chinese firms — some state-controlled and others ostensibly privately owned but still influenced by the government — becoming increasingly dominant in African economies, US and European policymakers view the situation with an understandable degree of concern.

The Good, the Bad, and the Inevitable

Africa will have a significant impact on the world over the coming decades in several areas. Whether that impact is positive or negative will depend in large part on the actions of Africans themselves. But the impact will also be affected by the policy choices of countries like China and the United States.

If Africa’s economies are structured to provide adequate wages and living standards, it will be a lucrative customer base, a profitable investment destination, and a source of a young, tech-savvy labor force. It could, if economic and governance conditions are improved, contribute to a solution of the supply chain issues that were highlighted during the Covid pandemic.

On the other hand, if conditions do not improve, Africa could become the world’s worst nightmare; a densely populated continent of disaffected young people who are ripe for recruitment by extremist movements and at a minimum become part of a massive population relocation to areas of greater economic opportunity.

If methods are not developed and deployed to mitigate the negative impacts of climate change, such as developing climate-friendly agriculture and building more resilient cities, food production will not keep pace with population growth, increasing Africa’s dependence on foreign assistance just to feed its people. This will perpetuate the cycle of poverty and suffering and further add to the destabilizing impact of population displacement. Relocation of populations caused by famine, war, or other disasters will put more pressure on already overburdened cities, with increased flows of people northward. These flows will put increased pressure on southern Europe and the Mediterranean and ultimately impact the rest of western Europe and the United States.

Africa and the world, working collectively, must implement measures to protect and preserve the Congo rainforest. If it continues to degrade, it will lead to reduced rainfall, affecting agricultural production in regions where agriculture depends on it. The precipitous and dangerous rise in global temperatures that is likely to result will mean more frequent and violent tropical storms and rising sea levels. Destruction of wildlife habitats and increased human-animal contact could lead to the emergence of new viruses that could quickly become pandemic. These are not just African problems. They are global problems.

Implications for US Policy

The 54 countries of Africa make up the largest single regional voting bloc in the UN General Assembly, ensuring that if they band together they constitute a majority in the UNGA. Should the Africa Union’s initiative to develop an African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA\_ become reality, it would create the world’s largest free trade area. This could promote significant reforms in political and economic governance, contribute to the long-term development of Africa’s economies, and turn Africa into a global economic kingmaker.

The United States, using mechanisms such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA),which expires in 2025, could play a positive role in Africa’s long-term economic development. US policymakers should explore ways to incentivize US private investment in Africa, through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) for instance, to help American firms compete more favorably with Chinese firms.

More emphasis needs to be on education and health of Africa’s most vulnerable populations, particularly women and girls. This is key to sustainable development.

Both China and the United States, the world’s two largest economies, should take a more pragmatic approach to their competition in Africa by focusing on areas of common interest, such as climate change mitigation, counterterrorism, anti-piracy, and encouraging good governance, anti-corruption, and stability. This would not only benefit China and the US, but Africa and the rest of the world as well.

US Africa policy needs to be focused on the priorities and needs of the US and the individual African countries and regions rather than on foreign presence on the continent. For better or worse, in the coming decades, Africa will matter, and we had better believe it will. The health of the world could depend on it.

### 1NC – China

#### The US is countering China in Africa now.

Kenyette ’22 [Patrick; author for Military Africa. August 31, 2022; “US determined to stop China’s new base in Africa”; *Military Africa*; https://www.military.africa/2022/08/us-determined-to-stop-chinas-new-base-in-africa/] TDI

“As a first priority, we need to prevent or deter a Chinese space on the Atlantic coast of Africa,” Townsend stated. The U.S. has recently sent an interagency delegation to that country to discuss U.S. security concerns, he added.

“Modest investments today can yield a continent of partners tomorrow. We are most effective when we synchronize diplomacy, development, and defense.” Townsend stated referring to the 0.3% of the DOD operating budget and manpower being spent on United States Africa Command.

For the past few months, US authorities have been speculating that the Chinese Peoples’ Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) building a military base at the Equato-Guinean mainland port of Bata, according to classified intelligence reports revealed by The Wall Street Journal in December 2021.

“They’re looking for a place where they can rearm and repair warships. That becomes militarily useful in conflict,” said Townsend.

He added that a Chinese naval base in the Atlantic would be unsettling for US military interests, considering the relatively short distance between Africa’s West Coast and the U.S East Coast. A Chinese base on Africa’s northern Atlantic Coast could be its closest to U.S national waters.

China holds a large percentage of foreign debt and also has extended leases on critical infrastructure, including ports and airports in other parts of Africa, Townsend said.

The PLAN already has a naval base in strategically located Djibouti, next to the United States military’s Camo Lemonnier.

As strategically vital as Djibouti is, the US appears even more concerned about the potential for a Chinese military base on Africa’s western coastline. Dr. Freedom Onuoha, a senior lecturer at the Department of Political Science at the University of Nigeria–Nsukka, told Nigerian media that “A Chinese base in the Atlantic Ocean can play a decisive role in cutting off US access to strategic resources from many African states if conflict breaks out in the future. In a situation of intense hostility or great power confrontation in the future, it makes it a lot easier for China’s naval forces to stroll up and down Africa’s Atlantic coastline”.

#### The past century proves.

French ’23 [Howard; columnist at Foreign Policy, a professor at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism, and a longtime foreign correspondent. May 22, 2023; “U.S. Apathy Paved the Way for China in Africa”; *Foreign Policy*; https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/05/22/congo-mining-batteries-china-biden-climate-change-us-africa-policy/] TDI

A lot can happen in a quarter of a century, though — especially when you’re not paying attention, as has largely been the case with the United States regarding Africa. Back then, there was so much talk about the enormous profits that lay ahead for Western companies in the business of extraction, once the corruption and chaos of the Mobutu era was put in the past, that many people in Zaire (now renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and throughout Central Africa thought the United States had sponsored Kabila’s takeover of the country in order to dominate its mineral wealth into the indefinite future.

Just how utterly differently reality has played out was brought home to me in recent days by an article in the New York Times asking whether the United States could ever compete with China in the economically strategic area of battery production, which will unavoidably serve as the foundation for a transition to electric vehicles and is key to any hope of meeting the Biden administration’s ambitious goals for limiting climate change.

Although Congo’s portfolio of valuable minerals is broader and deeper than that of almost any country, two sentences in particular from the story stood out for me: “China owns most of the cobalt mines in Congo, which has the majority of the world’s supply of this scarce material needed for the most common type of battery. American companies failed to keep up and even sold their mines to Chinese counterparts.”

This column should not be read as boosterism for mining or any other of the extractive businesses that have traditionally dominated U.S. economic activity in Africa, much less as nostalgia for an era when Western firms were dominant, as was true only recently in Congo. It is hard to find examples in Africa where extraction-centered economic engagement has produced anything resembling sustainable development.

Rather, this retelling of Congo’s recent political history is a cautionary tale that applies to much of sub-Saharan Africa, about the heavy wages that come from an unimaginative foreign policy toward a continent that has long seemed content to rest on humanitarian aid, military cooperation, and lectures about democratic values — which Western countries are the first to ignore when it comes to dealing with cherished client states.

My African assignment for the Times ended in 1998, and after a five-year spell in Japan I found myself in China, where this history picked up again, seeming to follow me in a serendipitous way. Living in Shanghai, I witnessed and reported on some of the first bold steps that China took to place engagement with Africa high on its economic and political foreign policy agenda, and Congo was a centerpiece. From today’s perspective, that looks like an act of tremendous foresight on Beijing’s part.

The top of a piece I wrote from Shanghai in September 2007 hints strongly at major changes not just in foreign economic engagement with Africa but also in geopolitics:

The entire world may not have sat up and taken notice in the last week, and that is probably just fine with China, which has just made a major move into central Africa.

With its agreement to lend $5 billion to Congo, what might have often looked like a grab-bag approach to the African continent by a country with only sporadic involvement there has finally taken on a distinct outline.

It turns out that China, which since the time of Deng Xiaoping has discouraged talk about its rise or its might, has a blueprint for Africa, and with the Congo deal, what we are witnessing is the shift of the Chinese embrace into high gear.

What will $5 billion buy? Quite a lot, should all of the projects in the announced deal materialize. Imagine Western Europe without practicable roads or functioning trains and you will begin to get a sense of Congo and its realities.

For half of the year, when the rains are heavy, the grandly named Route Nationale 1, which follows a path of about 260 kilometers, or 160 miles, between the capital, Kinshasa, and the country’s sole ocean port, Matadi, cannot be said to connect the two cities.

With the deals it was signing, China was not just vacuuming up as much of Congo’s vast mineral supply as it could. It was also making real a new way of engaging with Africa: one that could help the continent remedy some of its enormous historical shortfalls in physical infrastructure in exchange for shoveling huge amounts of metals — cobalt, copper, nickel, and others — out of the ground for embarkation on ships and processing in faraway plants.

Just as this is not an argument for extraction, this column is not about elevating China into some benevolent power, nor for that matter even a particularly original actor. During those days of covering the civil war in Zaire, late in the conflict someone slipped into my hands an impressive, bound briefing book that purported to show elaborate and ambitious plans drawn up by the American Bechtel Corporation, a well-connected civil engineering giant, for the wholesale transformation of the country. Bechtel would shepherd in the construction of roads, dams, airports, and other projects on a massive scale, all of which would be collateralized or paid for by Congo’s mineral wealth.

Other Western companies had circulated similar, if less detailed, programs to transform the country in exchange for access to its wealth. For reasons that have to do with the erratic policies of the Kabila government but also with the United States’ chronic inability to invest much focus on Africa, they all came to naught, and China, with a greater appetite for risk and a longer-term vision about the continent, ran with the ball.

#### Lack of US military competition with China spills over globally. Diplomacy fails.

Coté ’23 [Mike; writer and historian focusing on great-power rivalry and geopolitics. April 10, 2023; “Africa Shows How Biden Is Losing the World to China”; *National Review*; https://www.nationalreview.com/2023/04/africa-shows-how-biden-is-losing-the-world-to-china/] TDI

On the other hand, Chinese diplomacy under Xi Jinping has been aggressive, even coercive. But it has also been successful. Since 2012, China has relentlessly promoted its interests abroad, gaining greater economic and military influence. This is especially clear in Africa, where China is the continent’s biggest trade partner and has its first overseas naval base. It has also gotten far more involved in mediating internal African issues, working to limit the civil war in Ethiopia and promoting China’s form of one-party governance as a shortcut to success. Another Chinese geopolitical goal is to raise its influence on international organizations. This was most notable in its co-opting of the World Health Organization to stifle any investigation of Covid’s origins. That process ran directly through Africa, where Beijing leveraged its ties to promote Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus as its favored candidate for the directorship of the World Health Organization in 2017. Tedros won that contentious election with strong Chinese support, and returned the favor with his complicity in China’s Covid deception.

Perhaps the most serious example of China’s diplomatic expansionism relates to a traditional staple of American foreign policy: development aid. Under Xi, Chinese outflows of foreign direct investment have more than doubled, rising from $65 billion in 2012 to a peak of $216 billion in 2016. In 2020, as other nations retrenched during the pandemic, China became the largest global investor for the first time. China has been the largest source of foreign direct investment to Africa since 2013, displacing the U.S. as the continent’s primary development partner. The massive Belt and Road infrastructure project, Xi’s diplomatic baby, has attracted the bulk of those funds, making inroads into many African countries, funding bridges, dams, railways, and more.

These investments, primarily in the form of loans, are often used as debt traps that China leverages to its advantage. It uses its influence to coerce recipient nations into privileging its trade, derecognizing Taiwan, or allowing Chinese military use of civilian infrastructure. Still, China is able to sell these lopsided deals as “win-win” because they ostensibly benefit the host society and are values-neutral. Plus, China usually either is the only nation that will finance the projects or offers the most superficially appealing terms, irrespective of whether they are achievable. Winning the contracts allows China to further rope African nations into its economic and geopolitical orbit, and costs can be dealt with later.

Even with those profound negatives, China has been able to succeed in its diplomatic aims, increasing its regional influence and, throughout Africa, displacing the U.S. as a reliable partner in meeting local needs. The failures of American diplomacy under the Biden administration have contributed to our own relative decline. An exemplar of these divergent approaches is Ghana, where Vice President Kamala launched her African diplomatic campaign.

Ghana has long been an American security and trade partner. It is our largest bilateral development-aid recipient, with about $145 million invested annually — much of it in education, governance, and environmental programs. Vice President Harris’s trip began in Ghana for this precise reason, as that American predominance is under siege. China has invested enormous amounts in Africa generally, and Ghana is no exception, inking a $2 billion infrastructure deal with China in exchange for 5 percent of its bauxite reserves — an ore used to produce gallium, a key strategic material. America has failed to compete on this front, instead prioritizing democracy promotion on Harris’s visit and offering only part of a relatively meager $100 million regional security package. This approach has not won over African countries before, and it does not look to be doing so now. It turns out that ephemeral platitudes pale in comparison with concrete projects.

To counter this rising Chinese influence, American diplomacy needs to reprioritize national interests over progressive values. This does not mean discarding our respect for human rights, our commitment to free markets, or our belief in democracy. Those values are crucial to America’s positive image in the world, but they must take a supporting role in an age of great-power conflict. To oppose the serious threats to the U.S.-led world order, we will have to hold our nose and work with imperfect allies who share our interests, even if only regionally. Those values gaps are not make-or-break issues when weighed against the strategic and economic interests we share.

The best way of reorienting our diplomacy to contend with China’s African influence is by competing with it directly. That means, on a small scale, ensuring that our funding of aid is not obscured by routing it through international bodies or nongovernmental organizations. We must directly promote the fact that the U.S. government and U.S. companies are the ones providing material benefits for African nations and their people. Although charity should be anonymous, aid should not; it serves a key diplomatic purpose, and American contributions should be obviously marked as such. Locals know that China is present in Africa, and American presence should be just as well known.

In Africa, China has gained much of its diplomatic purchase through direct investment in infrastructure projects that benefit local economies, ease living conditions, and contribute to national pride. Their dominance in this sector is despite their weaknesses: Chinese infrastructure is typically of shoddy quality, uses only Chinese labor and materials, and often comes with abusive financial burdens. America can, with partners including Japan and the European Union, outcompete China. Leveraging the private sector and our comparative advantages — Japan in high-speed rail, for example — can give the edge to our proposals. We are also far more interested in using local labor and skills on these projects and in providing training and durable investment that China cannot match, as well as in building the person-to-person relationships that stronger bonds rely on.

Another factor in our favor is the goodwill that America has built up over the decades. Since our founding, the United States has served as a beacon of hope to billions around the globe and has, since at least World War II, been emblematic of liberty and prosperity. Our cultural power is unmatched, we promote the rule of law, and our technological innovations lead the world. We are correctly seen as the foremost nation in the international system, one that smaller countries want to befriend. These are natural advantages we would do well not to squander.

China is on a diplomatic warpath, seeking to displace American influence wherever it appears. The policies of the past three administrations have, intentionally or not, cleared the way for that push, particularly in Africa. The Biden administration’s focus on ideology over interests has alienated current allies and potential partners alike. China is not satisfied waiting for us to decline and is actively pushing its coercive diplomatic agenda. Without the ability to choose a better development partner, African countries are settling for a less than ideal option. If America wants to retain its primacy in the diplomatic sphere, it needs to compete with China across the continent, on neutral terms. That means sidelining the proselytizing and focusing on much-desired infrastructure projects. We can beat China at its own game, but we need to step up to the plate.

#### Turns case. China’s worse.

Hung ’20 [Ho Fung; Henry M. and Elizabeth P. Wiesenfeld Professor in Political Economy at the Sociology Department and the Paul H Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University. They received their bachelor degree from the Chinese University of Hong Kong, MA degree from SUNY-Binghamton, and PhD degree in Sociology from Johns Hopkins. June 5, 2020; “As U.S. Injustices Rage, China’s Condemnation Reeks of Cynicism”; *Foreign Policy*; https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/05/us-injustice-protests-china-condemnation-cynical/] TDI

Beijing’s criticism of the United States, however, differs from that seen around the globe. China’s critique does not stem from a genuine concern for universal human rights and the well-being of African Americans. The Chinese people have not been given any opportunity to protest in solidarity with Americans — or against the abuses of black residents in China itself. Anti-black racism remains rampant on the Chinese internet, untouched by censors who seek to crush opinions the government dislikes. Its motivation is simply to tell the United States, and everybody else, to stop criticizing China over its own human rights abuses. Underneath Beijing’s commentary on the U.S. unrest is a deeply cynical voice that asks: If the U.S. authorities can do it, why shouldn’t we?

Last Friday afternoon, Trump held a press conference to denounce China’s plan to devise a national security law to crack down on Hong Kong’s dissents. He threatened to end U.S. recognition of Hong Kong’s special trading status and to sanction Chinese officials hurting Hong Kong’s freedom. It is going to bring real damage to Chinese companies and wealthy elites who have been using Hong Kong as a back door to gain access to foreign capital, sensitive technology, and channels to relocate their wealth overseas.

That night, after Trump’s speech, major cities across the United States were engulfed in flames, National Guards were mobilized, and protesters clashed with riot police near the White House. The president reportedly hid briefly in a bunker. The Chinese authorities have been heavily criticized for their crackdown on Hong Kong protests, for the Uighur concentration camps, and for the arrests of rights lawyers. Beijing must be delighted to see the U.S. global reputation tarnished as its problems of racism and police brutality are brought into the spotlight. It would be surprising if Beijing did not seize the moment to criticize the double standards of the White House. This cynicism underlines Beijing’s response to criticism of its bullying behavior in the international arena. When an international tribunal in The Hague ruled in favor of the Philippines against Chinese claims of sovereignty over the South China Sea in 2016, Beijing made it clear it would not abide by the ruling. It pointed out that the United States violated international law all the time and, hypocritically, hadn’t even acceded to the relevant U.N. convention itself.

Such rhetoric has grown common over the last few decades, as the Chinese Communist Party gradually abandoned its appeal for a more just social system and world order. Instead, the party has become increasingly explicit in referring to the global domination by Western powers as a license for its own imperial ambition. Jiang Shigong, an influential official scholar who advises the Chinese government on Hong Kong policy and global governance, even wrote recently that China should “absorb the skills and achievements” of the British and American empires to construct its own “world empire” for the sake of the Chinese people and the world.

For those in the United States and elsewhere who aspire for more equality, justice, and liberty, it is a mistake to see Beijing as an exotic progressive force with which to ally. Beijing points to the violence and injustice of the United States to exonerate itself from its own egregious violence and injustices. Police brutality and racism in the United States are unimaginably horrific. But U.S. authorities today are not using these protests as an excuse to arrest dissenting legislators and professors, to wholly outlaw peaceful assembly and rights organizations, to pressure companies and universities to fire employees sympathetic with the protesters, to arrest people for criticizing the government on social media, or to lock up 1 million minorities in reeducation camps. These abuses are routine in China and becoming routine in Hong Kong.

### 1NC – Russia

#### Only deterrence via military intelligence prevents regional instability and global implications of Russian military presence in Africa.

Banco & Carrier ’23 [Erin; national security reporter for POLITICO. Anastasiia; Freelance Journalist, Master’s in Journalism from Columbia University. May 7, 2023; “To counter Russia in Africa, Biden deploys a favored strategy”; *POLITICO*; https://www.politico.com/news/2023/05/07/wagner-russia-africa-00095572] TDI

As Russia’s paramilitary organization, the Wagner Group, expands its presence in African countries, the Biden administration is pushing back with one of its prized tactics: sharing sensitive intelligence with allies in Africa in an attempt to dissuade countries from partnering with the group.

The administration has used this tactic with increasing frequency, including in the months leading up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It serves the dual function of alerting allies to looming threats and placing adversaries on notice that the U.S. knows what they’re doing.

Now, those tactics are being deployed as part of a broader push to prevent Moscow from gaining an economic and military foothold in countries in Africa, including those that have previously worked with Washington, according to interviews with four U.S. officials with knowledge of the effort.

The U.S. has in recent months shared intelligence related to an alleged Wagner plan to assassinate the president of Chad as well as its attempts to access and control key natural resource extraction sites in countries such as Sudan and the Central African Republic, among other initiatives.

The aim is to highlight for African officials how working with Wagner is likely to sow chaos in the long term despite its promises to bring peace and security to countries facing political turmoil and violence, the officials said.

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency declined to comment on the administration’s strategy. The National Security Council also declined to comment.

Russian officials did not respond to POLITICO’s request for comment about Wagner’s connection to the state or its activities in Africa.

The escalation of the administration’s information sharing comes after more than a year of heightened tensions between Washington and Moscow. The war in Ukraine has pitted the two countries against each other, with the U.S. providing billions in weapons to Kyiv and Russia continuing to launch attacks on Ukrainian soldiers and civilians.

The recent sharing of intelligence on Wagner highlights how the standoff between the U.S. and Russia extends beyond the battlefield in Ukraine to Africa, where Biden officials say Russia is using Wagner as a proxy to strike deals and help make inroads on behalf of the Kremlin. And it underscores the degree to which the Biden administration believes Wagner — and the Kremlin — pose a long term threat to U.S. interests on the continent.

“The best way to fight Wagner is with the truth,” said one of the U.S. officials. “Where we can find credible information that undermines Wagner’s malign influence, of course, we want more people to know about it, and that includes our partners, and the public.”

Information as a weapon

The Wagner Group is increasingly involved in countries across Central Africa as a security and propaganda force protecting and promoting local political leaders.

The four American officials, all of whom were granted anonymity to speak freely about a sensitive ongoing intelligence and diplomatic effort, described a growing sense of alarm about Wagner’s inroads in those countries.

Wagner’s activities in Africa were further detailed in several documents obtained from inside the business empire of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of Wagner. POLITICO previously reported on some of the details of those documents, including how Prigozhin spread his forces and media network to Africa.

POLITICO accessed the documents via an international journalism collaboration with outlets in the U.S. and Europe. The German news outlet WELT first obtained the documents and shared them with other media organizations overseen by Axel Springer, which also owns POLITICO. The documents span several years — from 2017 to 2021. POLITICO has only included information from the documents in this report that it could verify with other sources, including open-source reporting.

The U.S. concerns and assessments about Wagner, including its operations in Africa, were also reflected in the highly classified intelligence allegedly leaked by 21-year-old Massachusetts Air National Guard member Jack Teixiera, according to more than 50 documents reviewed by POLITICO. Teixiera disseminated the materials on Discord, a social media messaging site, in recent months.

Over the past year, the U.S. has shared with allies sensitive intelligence about Wagner’s battlefield movements and operations in Ukraine. National security and State Department officials have also denounced Wagner publicly from the podium. As recently as this spring, officials have spoken about Wagner’s atrocities in Ukraine, including its brutality in the eastern city of Bakhmut, and its purchasing of weapons from North Korea.

But the move to share intelligence about Wagner in Africa — and the diplomatic endeavor to deliver that information — has played out much more quietly.

Although the U.S. often shares intelligence — particularly with long-standing allies in Europe — it has historically fostered a somewhat careful approach to divulging intelligence in an effort to protect sources and methods. The current intelligence-sharing on Wagner is widespread — spanning multiple countries and continents — including with countries the U.S. does not traditionally hold robust relations in the intelligence arena.

U.S. officials have in recent months engaged in talks with officials in Central African Republic, Chad, Rwanda, Burkina Faso and the Democratic Republic of Congo to share U.S. intelligence related to Wagner. Diplomats have pressed officials in some of those countries to avoid working with Wagner or to help persuade other neighboring nations to cease interacting with the group.

Representatives from the countries with which the U.S. has shared the Wagner intelligence did not respond to requests for comment.

The administration is also using the intelligence-sharing strategy as a way of highlighting how Wagner’s presence in some countries — and its inability to restore security there — is bad for business. The idea is that if Wagner is seen as disrupting the flow of trade and investment, it could drive a wedge between Beijing, a long-time investor in Africa, and Moscow — an alliance that has only strengthened in recent months and continues to concern Washington.

Washington has urged officials in countries not to partner with Wagner not only because of the potential long-term security concerns it could present the U.S. but also because of the impact that the paramilitary group’s actions in Africa could have on the battlefield in Ukraine.

U.S. officials fear Wagner could use profits it reaps from mining concessions and other business contracts in Africa to help aid Russia’s war efforts. Some experts have said Wagner’s access to minerals and its ability to export them to market is overblown — and that its profits are marginal and not likely to make an impact on the battlefield in Ukraine. But U.S. officials have in recent weeks gathered specific intelligence related to Wagner’s attempts to use its international connections, including those in Africa, to help support its fight in Ukraine.

In February, Wagner personnel met with Turkish contacts to purchase weapons and equipment from Turkey for Wagner’s efforts in Mali and Ukraine, according to a signals intelligence report included in one of the documents allegedly leaked by Teixeira. Another section of that document says the U.S. has gathered intelligence that shows the transition president in Mali has also considered acquiring weapons from Turkey on Wagner’s behalf.

Representatives for Mali and Turkey declined to comment on the documents.

Despite its support from the Kremlin and its ability to secure lucrative contracts in Africa, some experts who study Wagner maintain that the U.S. and its allies have historically held far greater sway among African government officials than Prigozhin and his fighters.

“There’s no question Wagner has a strategy in Africa … to connect neighboring states under Wagner influence. Washington is trying to disrupt that for a host of reasons,” said Cameron Hudson, analyst and consultant at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “But let’s not put Wagner on par with the United States government. These are not equals — the United States doesn’t see them as equals. What we have seen is Wagner doesn’t have an ability — by itself — to create winners and losers in these countries.”

Making inroads

Wagner is helmed by Prigozhin, a former caterer for Russian President Vladimir Putin. Since 2017, Prigozhin has expanded the group into an international military and influence force with tentacles that span the globe.

The organization, which has strong ties to the Russian state, including its security services, is known for its work helping prop up regimes in the Middle East, in countries such as Syria. And its forces are leading the fight in parts of Ukraine, especially in the eastern city of Bakhmut, where Russians and Ukrainian soldiers are locked in a bloody battle. Wagner is viewed by U.S. officials as having gained newfound prominence in the wake of Moscow’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

In recent years, Prigozhin has expanded Wagner’s operations to Africa, helping foster relationships for the Kremlin in countries such as Libya, Sudan, Central African Republic, Chad and Mali. The group’s work includes securing critical mineral and oil sites in Africa as well as protecting government officials.

Its presence in those countries has prompted senior officials in the Biden administration to draft a new road map for routing the group out of the region, the U.S. officials said.

Although Wagner has worked on the continent for years, the Biden administration is newly worried about the extent to which the group’s activities there are not only threatening regional stability but are also being used by the Kremlin as a way to develop long-term influential relationships — relationships that could potentially sideline Washington for years to come.

#### Russia’s continuing its operations in Africa despite the coup.

Calcutt & Kayali ’23 [Clea; Senior Correspondent, France for POLITICO. Laura; technology correspondent for POLITICO. June 26, 2023; “Wagner and Russia are here to stay in Africa, says Kremlin’s top diplomat”; *POLITICO*; https://www.politico.eu/article/wagner-africa-mali-operations-will-continue-russia-sergey-lavrov-vows/] TDI

PARIS — Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has vowed Wagner Group’s operations in Mali and the Central African Republic “will continue” despite the failed rebellion led by Yevgeny Prigozhin, leader of the mercenaries, against Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The paramilitary group has expanded its reach across Latin America, the Middle East and Africa in recent years and is seen by Western governments as Russia’s armed foreign policy apparatus. Prigozhin’s mutiny raised questions about the future of its overseas operations.

Prigozhin led an uprising against Putin’s army beginning Friday night, first seizing the major southern city of Rostov-on-Don and sending his mercenary forces on a march to Moscow before abruptly standing down his men Saturday night.

In Africa, where the group exercises influence in the Central African Republic, Mali and Burkina Faso, Wagner offers its services and help to prop up anti-Western governments in exchange for access to natural resources.

And Lavrov was bullish on the group’s future prospects in the region.

“At their request, several hundred servicemen are working in the CAR as instructors — this work, of course, will continue … Both the CAR and Mali appealed to the Wagner PMCs [Private Military Contractors] with a request to ensure the safety of their leadership,” Lavrov said in an interview with RT.

Lavrov said the recent events in Russia would not affect its relations with “partners and friends.”

#### Turns case. Russia’s worse.

Siegle & Smith ’22 [Joseph Siegle; the director of research at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies. Jeffrey Smith; the founding director of the pro-democracy nonprofit organization Vanguard Africa. May 30, 2022; "Putin’s World Order Would Be Devastating for Africa"; Foreign Policy; https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/30/russia-war-africa/] TDI

But African leaders should have a more fundamental concern than these — at least, those who are committed to advancing peace and democracy. Putin is attempting to undermine the global order that has guided international relations for the better part of the last century. Building on Russia’s previous annexation of Crimea and parts of northern Georgia as well as its prior occupation of Ukraine’s Donbas region, Putin is taking a sledgehammer to the foundation of the once stable post-World War II order.

This attempt to normalize expansionist ambitions will have profound consequences for Africa. Would-be tsars across the continent — who, like Putin, have evaded term limits to stay in power indefinitely while eliminating their political opposition — are watching closely, asking if Putin can get away with this brazen overreach and flout the rules-based order, then why can’t they. It is a reasonable question to ask. At stake are established notions of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the independence of member states, which suddenly become more temporal, arbitrary, and open to violent contestation.

Perhaps the most eloquent defense of the existing order, premised on these foundational principles, came from Kenya’s permanent representative to the United Nations: ambassador Martin Kimani, who warned Putin and the Russian military to respect its border with Ukraine, using Africa’s own colonial past to highlight the dangers of stoking the “embers of dead empires.”

So what does a Russian-shaped international order look like for Africa?

A primary feature is the challenge to the inviolability of established boundaries. There are currently some 100 contested borders on the continent, most of them stemming from arbitrarily drawn colonial boundaries. These have, for the most part, been managed peacefully by successive African governments, rooted in a respect for the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity that were enshrined in the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963 and later reaffirmed in the Constitutive Act of the African Union in 2001. Established during the postcolonial independence period, many African states were born out of a commitment to self-determination. Ironically, this is the central issue being contested today by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

If the lesson from Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is that might makes right, then Africa’s political geography could be perpetually in dispute. In other words, if the overlapping security guarantees provided by both the U.N. and AU charters can be violated with impunity, then what is to stop African leaders who envy Putin’s aggressive brand of authoritarianism from following suit?

Already, we see this happening in some parts of Africa.

The volatile African Great Lakes region stands out for the fragility of its borders. The eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, has become a target for exploitation by authoritarian leaders in neighboring Rwanda and Uganda. Rwandan President Paul Kagame, officially in power since 2000, and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, in power since 1986, have routinely marched their troops and proxies as well as directed their allied rebel groups to seize Congolese territory, loot natural resources, and kill citizens with alarming impunity. In October 2021, Congolese authorities reported clashing with Rwandan troops, who allegedly occupied several villages before retreating. And as recently as March, the Congolese army presented evidence that the Kagame regime was actively backing a rebellion in eastern Congo. Disregarding borders is particularly precarious in the Great Lakes region because it carries with it the potential to reignite one of the most cataclysmic conflicts in recent history.

Similarly, Moscow has played a destabilizing role in Africa. Recent years have illuminated a “new scramble for Africa” as external actors seek to aggressively plant their politics, governance, and economic flags across the continent. Russia has been at the forefront of this predatory behavior by repeatedly propping up isolated and authoritarian leaders — most notably in Libya, Central African Republic, Mali, and Sudan — to advance Moscow’s patently anti-democratic influence.

Through the deployment of shadowy and unaccountable mercenary groups, polarizing disinformation campaigns, election interference, and arms-for-resource deals, Russia has gained influence while fostering instability and the increased human rights abuses that ultimately result from it.

Russia has also fomented — both covertly and overtly — and been quick to support the many unconstitutional seizures of power recently witnessed in Africa. The spate of coups and increasing instances of African leaders scrapping term limits, for example, better suit Moscow’s vision of remaking the international order in its autocratic mold.

That a Russian-shaped order in Africa would be more oppressive is crucial to note since most of the 16 ongoing internal conflicts on the continent have deep roots in authoritarian forms of governance. None of Africa’s established democracies, in contrast, are in conflict. More authoritarianism, then, can be expected to yield more conflict.

Tolerance for predatory interstate behavior globally, moreover, will embolden elevated forms of repression domestically in African states. After all, if the enshrined principles of self-determination and popular participation are not respected in a high-profile instance, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, then what international actors can be compelled to penalize the intimidation or jailing of opposition leaders, the shuttering of independent media outlets, and the brazen rigging of elections in Africa? Growing autocracy would do a grave injustice to the 75 percent of Africans who regularly state that democracy is their preferred form of government. The inevitable repression that will result from an unfettered international order would also lead to a spike in refugee flows and internally displaced populations.

It took the trauma of World War II to compel the international community to unite, recognize, and sign onto the principles outlined in the U.N. Charter. Intrinsic to this global system — forged from hard-learned and costly experiences — was the importance of collective security to deter and push back against authoritarian bullies in Europe and elsewhere.

The Organisation of African Unity and later the AU adopted many of these core values. Indeed, drawing on its own hard-earned lessons from colonialism, the challenges of securing peace following the brutal wars of the 1990s, and the aftermath of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsis, the AU rightly recognized the importance of action when faced with violations of such universal principles.

While often underappreciated and unevenly applied, the U.N. and AU frameworks provide a layer of international accountability against extralegal actions as well as a critical starting point to build the solidarity that is needed to address the challenges that the global community faces.

As Africans grapple with the more present and disastrous aftershocks of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it is important to recognize the threat this form of authoritarian expansion will have on the continent if it is normalized. History shows us that impunity is contagious. And apathy in the face of imminent threat is foolhardy. The clear threats emanating from Putin’s worldview defy the principles that are central to an international order that both the U.N. and AU helped foster.

### – Turns Case – Non-Alignment

#### Non-alignment is worse in a world of fill-in – Russian and Chinese pivots are not gains for Africans, but worsen corruption and exploitation because it leads to ruling class capture of anti-imperialism – South Africa proves!

Shoki ’23 [(William Shoki, deputy editor of Africa Is a Country. He is based in Johannesburg.) “Anti-imperialism for the ruling class”, Africa is a Country, 05/12/2023. <https://africasacountry.com/2023/05/anti-imperialism-for-the-ruling-class>] pfox TDI

A question arises here: how does non-alignment today become so disjointed from its conception in the mid-20th century? Although non-alignment, at its best, aspired to world-making, it also expressed more conservative ambitions shaped by global circumstances. According to Immanuel Wallerstein, by 1967, non-aligned states already “wanted entry into the world community as equals but did not seek to transform the nature of this world.” Non-alignment encompassed a heady mix of competing ideas of postcolonial modernization and development. As historian Frank Gerits explains in his new book The Ideological Scramble for Africa: “The wide range of ideological options also made diplomacy within the Global South more convoluted.”

Non-aligned internationalism could never crystallize into a fully coherent program because it lacked a mass character. It was coordinated by esteemed statesmen like Nkrumah, Nyerere, Senghor, and Nasser, but as a politics lacked expression in durable working-class institutions and labor movements. However, working-class institutions were underdeveloped in the first place because the sociological conditions for mass society and associational life—industrialization and collective provision through a strong state—never came to pass.

The aporia of non-aligned internationalism is, thus, that states were mainly fighting for more equitable conditions abroad to pursue development at home, but it is that development which could have helped furnish the base to make non-alignment more robust. Still, the vision of non-alignment offered a reservoir of hope and the sense of an emancipatory horizon. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, that has disappeared from view. For the ANC, the commitment to non-alignment may reflect less nostalgia, and more saudade (in Portuguese, a bittersweet yearning) for a simpler time. By the time the ANC was governing South Africa, the USSR had collapsed, and history had ended. Rather than a world animated by a spirit of possibility, as in the first wave of decolonization, the ANC entered a world resigned, leaving it with the unbecoming task of presiding over neoliberal immiseration.

To be sure, the material basis for a non-alignment movement today is borne from the constraints imposed on the developing world by US economic primacy manifested through dollar hegemony. Counterbalancing Western encirclement is a goal few on the left would disagree with. But whether a pivot East along the lines that the ANC is chasing would be advantageous is doubtful.

Non-alignment at the level of state diplomacy that is not subject to bottom-up pressure from popular forces is bound to project only the interests of the domestic bourgeoisie. In South Africa, the ANC’s post-apartheid development model has been premised on propping up the local black elite, an effort to complete the first stage of the national democratic revolution.

The war in Ukraine, then, expresses a conflict between two competing factions of capital in South Africa. One side, loosely classified as advocating for ‘Radical Economic Transformation’ (RET), seeks to transform capital by transforming the economy so that wealth is less concentrated in the hands of white and foreign capital, by transferring ownership of the commanding heights of the economy to politically connected black elites. The RET’s record in power was connected to what is called state capture: the transfer of sovereign decision-making power over public policy to private interests—most infamously, the exiled Indian business clan, the Gupta family.

During his tenure, former president Jacob Zuma, the poster boy for RET, came close to covertly concluding a $76-billion deal with the Russian state energy corporation Rosatom to build a nuclear power plant in South Africa. The ANC has also been the beneficiary of a nearly $1-million donation from a company linked to a sanctioned Russian oligarch in the third quarter of the 2022-23 financial year.

What South Africa and Russia share is a political economy based on patronage, rent-seeking, and accumulation through state-owned enterprises. At the height of social discontent against Zuma, one of the ANC’s most prominent ideologues, Gwede Mantashe (who then served as secretary-general, and is now its national chairperson), characterized significant protests during Zuma’s tenure—including the Marikana miners’ strike, Fees Must Fall, and the Zuma Must Fall marches—as evidence that the party was under threat from a “color revolution” driven by “nefarious NGOs.” (Years later, Mantashe described frontline mining communities’ opposition to Shell seismic surveys as “apartheid and colonialism of a special type”). Mantashe added that, unlike the party of Mandela, the ANC was not “the darling of everybody in the world.”

Non-alignment today cannot be coherent, and it can only articulate the ideology of national elites, as an anti-imperialism for the ruling class. The dream of national sovereignty is ultimately a longing for the completion of a bourgeois revolution in the postcolonial context—one that consolidates the economic dominance of the domestic bourgeoisie, retains their role as political stewards, and ends their dependence on foreign investment. This is what it would actually mean to resolve the “national question.”

Claims to non-alignment are driven by the moralizing power of geopolitical ressentiment; not an objection to an unequal power structure per se, but a bitterness about being at the wrong end of it—a desire not to overcome such inequality, but to jockey for a better seat at the table.

This complicates the meaning of internationalism for the left in South Africa and for the Global South more generally. Firstly, it is unclear what internationalism can mean beyond stated and abstract commitments to universal principles of emancipation. So far, Volodymyr Zelensky’s gravitation to the West has cast the war on the unhelpful, civilizational, East-versus-West terms that obscure cleavages within Ukraine itself. But this itself is unsurprising—we are no longer operating on the ideological terrain of the 20th century, where such vocabulary would have been easily available to the struggle.

Ahead of the 15th BRICS Summit due to take place in Durban, members have been publicly touting plans for the formation of a new joint currency. At present, the New Development Bank is an initiative that seeks to de-dollarize development finance, but this currency, if successful, would help create a new reserve currency by acting as a vehicle for trade settlement between participating countries.

Although BRICS still projects an image of a collective of rising superpowers, it is far from it. China is the dominant partner, with India the only other to exhibit strong economic growth. The rest (Russia, South Africa, and Brazil) are stagnant commodity exporters. Any de-dollarisation strategy pursued by the coalition will only reinforce dependence on China, owing to its substantially larger economy and stronger currency. The widespread enthusiasm for the currency as a potentially game-changing move—which, to be sure, will certainly give wiggle room to the economies of the South—reflects the truncated horizon of the political moment.

### 1NC – Terror

#### Terror is still a threat but counterterror is effective now –continued operations and coop is key.

UNSC ’23 [(United Nations Security Council, the security council of the United Nations.) “Speakers Warn Security Council Terrorism Spreading across Africa at Alarming Rate, Call for Greater Support, Enhanced International, Regional Cooperation”, UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, 03/28/2023. <https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15245.doc.htm>] pfox TDI

With terrorism and violent extremism spreading across Africa at an alarming rate, counter-efforts must take into account the socioeconomic drivers of terrorist recruitment, challenges posed by climate change and terrorist Internet propaganda, the Security Council heard today, as speakers called for greater support in the fight against the evolving threat, as well as enhanced cooperation among the United Nations, African Union and African subregional organizations.

“No age, no culture, no religion, no nationality and no region are immune” to terrorism, said António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations, voicing particular concern over the situation in Africa. Across the continent, despair, poverty, hunger, lack of basic services, unemployment and unconstitutional changes in government continue to lay fertile ground for the expansion of terrorist groups and the flow of fighters, funds and weapons. In addition, the online world provides a global platform to spread violent ideologies even further.

However, “just as terrorism drives people apart, countering it can bring countries together,” he pointed out, spotlighting regional counter-terrorism initiatives — from joint efforts in the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin and Mozambique to the recent Extraordinary Summit of the African Union on terrorism and unconstitutional changes of government. Highlighting United Nations-tailored assistance to African Member States, including prevention, prosecutions and rehabilitation, he also stressed that the fight against terrorism will never succeed if the denial and destruction of human rights is perpetuated.

Azali Assoumani, President of Comoros and Chairperson of the African Union, also briefed the 15-nation organ, reporting that terrorism and violent extremism “really exploded in Africa” in recent years. Driving fear and human displacement on a massive scale, those phenomena are seriously impacting the socioeconomic conditions of entire regions. In this regard, he drew attention to the African Union’s project “Silence the Guns by 2030”, its Ministerial Committee on Terrorism, as well as the deployment of several successful peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the African Union, including the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Multinational Joint Force in the Lake Chad Basin. Despite positive impacts of such initiatives, greater support is needed, he stressed, calling for predictable funds for African Union-led missions to prevent and fight terrorism.

In the ensuing debate, speakers highlighted the critical importance of cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional groups in the fight against the transnational threat of terrorism. As well, root causes, such as poverty and inequality, must be addressed, many noted, emphasizing the need to promote the rule of law and human rights and calling for a multilateral counter-terrorism strategy that is fit for the digital age.

Filipe Jacinto Nyusi, President of Mozambique and Council President for March, speaking in his national capacity, emphasized that, while terrorism is a global threat, the situation in Africa remains more critical, with the continent representing 48 per cent of terrorism-related deaths and the Sahel region becoming the new epicentre of terrorist attacks. Terrorist groups are trafficking mineral resources and illicit drugs to fund their activities through money-laundering, he noted, calling for more support to be lent to his country and Rwanda, among others, to eradicate terrorism in the region.

Along similar lines, Rose Christiane Raponda, Vice-President of Gabon, describing 2022 as a particularly blood-thirsty year in Africa, said that terrorist acts resulted in 7,816 deaths across all five regions. The Sahel, Lake Chad region and Southern Africa are particularly affected, she said, expressing concern about the ability of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also known as Da’esh, to mobilize resources. As terrorism tests the capacity of States and destabilizes entire regions, the current polarization of the world must not result in the weakening of multilateralism, she said, spotlighting regional initiatives, such as the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel) and the Accra initiative.

#### AFRICOM Libyan ops specifically suppress ISIS.

Garamone ‘16 [(Jim, DoD News, Defense Media Activity.) “Africom Campaign Plan Targets Terror Groups”, Department of Defense, 01/05/2016. <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/639919/africom-campaign-plan-targets-terror-groups/>] pfox TDI

STUTTGART, Germany, January 5, 2016 — In the face of growing threats from the African continent, U.S. Africa Command has spelled out its theater campaign plan, officials said here yesterday.

The plan is built upon the foundation of the strategy promulgated last year by Africom commander Army Gen. David M. Rodriguez, officials speaking on background told reporters traveling with Marine Corps Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Yesterday, the chairman visited Africom’s headquarters at Kelly Barracks here.

Five-Year Plan

Officials said Africom’s campaign blueprint is a five-year plan with five lines of effort.

The first is neutralizing the terror group al-Shabab in Somalia, officials said, and transitioning this effort from a mission led by the African Union Mission in Somalia to one in which the Somali government secures its own territory.

The second line of effort centers around the failed state of Libya, officials said, adding that the effort focuses on containing the instability in the country.

Officials said the third line of effort is to contain Boko Haram in West Africa.

Fourth, officials said, Africom will focus on disrupting illicit activity in the Gulf of Guinea and in Central Africa.

Fifth, the command looks to build African partners’ peacekeeping and disaster assistance capabilities, officials said.

This is a large job for a small command, an Africom official said. “The only permanent location we have is Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti,” he said. “Everything else is a very light footprint.”

The command does have cooperative security and contingency locations across the continent, officials said, noting these are essentially “cold bases” that would only be used in the event of an emergency.

In West Africa, Dakar, Senegal, is one of the cooperative security locations and U.S. forces used it during the Ebola crisis last year, officials said.

Officials said the bases also allow the command to protect American lives and property in the high-risk, high-threat posts. There are 15 of those posts in Africa, officials said.

Assisting Somalia

The theater campaign plan starts with neutralizing al-Shabab, officials said. U.S. forces have helped to train, equip and supply AMISOM forces that have played a central role in bringing stability to Somalia, officials said.

“Al-Shabab has been pushed out of most of the major population centers and is only a power in the Juba River Valley,” an official said. However, the official added, al-Shabab “is not a spent force” and it remains a threat -- particularly in terms of targeted attacks against neighboring AMISOM contributors.

Africom continues to monitor the al-Shabab threats to Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda in particular, officials said.

“The emerging issue we’ve seen in al-Shabab over the past six months is the movement at the lower levels of individuals toward [the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant],” an official said. “Pro-ISIL sentiment is increasing in Somalia and we’ve seen some efforts by al-Shabab leaders to strike down these efforts. Al-Shabab leaders remain firmly allied to al-Qaida.”

ISIL ‘Brand’ Makes Gains

Officials said this is an indication of the power of the ISIL “brand” in the extremist world. ISIL, especially after its success in Iraq and Syria, is viewed by extremists as a winning team, while al-Qaida is viewed as having waning operational capabilities. Al-Shabab has been manhandled by the AMISOM troops and the mid-level and lower extremists see ISIL as its savior, officials said.

Core-ISIL has not accepted the al-Shabab splinters as members of the caliphate, officials said.

“From our viewpoint, ISIL probably has very strict criteria for what groups they want to let into the fold,” the official said. “[They] want to make sure the groups coming in can sustain themselves, that they have a plan and have an ability to move.”

The Islamic State affiliates in Libya and Boko Haram in Nigeria have been connected with the extremists in Syria and Iraq for a number of years, the officials said. Boko Haram “officially” joined the terror network last year, officials said.

“Since then, what we’ve seen is an enhancement of Boko Haram’s propaganda and messaging efforts,” an official said. “That has been the most apparent result of the ISIL-Boko Haram ties. Their videos are more professional and tighter. They speak like an ISIL affiliate.”

But there has not been a significant shift of resources, people or even tactics, techniques and procedures to Boko Haram, officials said. The Nigerian-based terror group “is a self-sustaining entity,” an official said.

“We would expect that enhanced affiliation in the Horn of Africa would probably follow the same path,” the official said. “We would see improved propaganda and messaging, but not a shift of resources.”

ISIL Gets Battered

Terrorists in East Africa need material and resources from ISIL, but they are not going to get it, officials said. Core ISIL is hurting itself -- the Islamic State has lost Beiji and Ramadi in Iraq, it is under assault from the Kurdish peshmerga and the Syrian anti-ISIL coalition is making progress, officials said.

The coalition oil campaign is also having an effect on ISIL’s source of wealth, officials said.

Strengthening the AMISOM force and its capabilities will also serve to strengthen the Somalian government, officials said.

Containing Boko Haram is another factor, officials said, noting that Africom is working with local partners -- including Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger -- to contain the terror group. French and British officials are also working with local allies and the command, the officials said.

Challenge in Libya

Libya is a challenge, officials said, noting “increasing bifurcation between moderates and hardliners.” The weak central government allows the space for ISIL to build a safe haven that acts as a nexus for terrorist operations in northern Libya, officials said. This has quickly become more than a simple problem within Libya, as the group has launched attacks in neighboring Tunisia, officials said. Africom has also seen some foreign fighters going into ISIL in Libya, officials said.

Africom is looking to contain ISIL in Libya and degrade it, said officials, who estimate there are roughly 3,500 ISIL terrorists in Libya.

#### ISIS resurgence is existential.

Target ’23 [Target Media Platform; independent communication platform emphasizing Middle East issues. May 2, 2023; “Leaked documents reveal ISIS resurgence attempts”; https://targetplatform.net/en/?p=2133] TDI

Confidential US documents shared by a reserve Air Force technician in online chat groups reveal the efforts of ISIS to resurrect. According to classified documents leaked by young Air Force technician Jack Teixera, ISIS is using Afghanistan to plan its attacks. At the same time, it continues to carry out its most wicked acts, such as planning terrorist attacks, especially in Europe, while trying to regain its chemical weapons capacity. In its report on the leaked documents, the Washington Post also states that Afghanistan has become a coordination zone for the Islamic State to plan attacks in Europe and Asia.

According to intelligence, ISIS had the intention to attack places such as embassies, churches, business centers, and the FIFA World Cup tournament that took place in Qatar last summer. The report of the Washington Post also marks that the documents reveal ISIS’ persistent efforts to gain expertise in creating chemical weapons. Last year, the United Nations Investigative Team for Accountability of ISIS (UNITAD) revealed that the Islamic State used chemical weapons in Iraq. It filed the findings that ISIS used chemical weapons in the areas it controlled in Iraq and Syria between 2014 and 2019. The newly leaked assessments indicate that the terrorist organization is aiming to provide specialty again.

The top-secret statement reads: “ISIS has been developing a cost-effective model for external operations that relies on resources from outside Afghanistan, operatives in target countries, and extensive facilitation networks. The model will likely enable ISIS to overcome obstacles – such as competent security services – and reduce some plot timelines, minimizing disruption opportunities.” Last month, the commander of US Central Command (CENTCOM), General Michael “Erik” Kurilla, also publicly announced that the Islamic State Khorasan (ISIS-K), the Afghan branch of the Islamic State, could launch attacks against US interests outside Afghanistan in less than six months.

## 1NC – DA – Assurances

### 1NC – Assurances

#### The aff eviscerates allied confidence and kills regional coop.

Andelman ‘16 [David A. Andelman, formerly a correspondent for The New York Times and CBS News in Europe and Asia, is executive director of The RedLines Project, a multidisciplinary study of the nature and origin of political, military, social and cultural red lines around the world. He wrote "A Red Line in the Sand: Diplomacy, Strategy, and the History of Wars That Might Still Happen" and blogs at Andelman Unleashed. He was awarded France’s Légion d’Honneur in 2021. 1-7-2016 Opinion NBC News https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/trump-s-possible-africa-withdrawal-sends-wrong-signal-exact-wrong-ncna1140026] 7-17-2023 TDI

Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham was quite right when he told Secretary of Defense Mark Esper last weekend that there would be consequences if the Trump administration withdrew American forces from some of the most dangerous territories of Africa. NBC News reported that Graham told Esper he could “make your life hell” if President Donald Trump went through with his plan to effectively eviscerate Africom, the U.S. joint command for Africa, and effectively shutter the world’s largest drone base in the nation of Niger. Rapidly spiraling events on the ground would likely make life hell in very short order not only for the United States, but also for most of its allies as well. But frankly, Graham wouldn’t have to do very much at all to make good on his threats. Instead, rapidly spiraling events on the ground would likely make life hell in very short order not only for the United States, but also for most of its allies as well. The principal mission for American forces in West Africa these days is preventing the arrival and expansion of terrorist organizations that are increasingly taking root, from Niger and Mali to Burkina Faso and Chad, as well as in the continent’s most populous nation, Nigeria. Plenty of these terrorists are imported from the Middle East, a trend that has accelerated after successes in eradicating or suppressing the Islamic State militant group in Syria and Iraq, and al Qaeda operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. “ISIS is now a threat to the entire African continent, from north to south and east to west,” Nathan Sales, acting U.S. undersecretary of state for civilian security, democracy and human rights, said at a conference last July. “While the world has understandably been focused on ISIS, al Qaeda has [also] quietly reconstituted itself,” adding that “it is active here in Africa … and it aims to establish an Islamic state in Mali, while targeting Western and local interests in West Africa and the Sahel.” At the same time, homegrown terrorist groups like the fearsome Boko Haram in Nigeria continue their horrifying attacks. (Of the 276 schoolgirls famously kidnapped from a government secondary school in 2014, at least 100 are still missing.) The United Nations estimates there were at least 4,000 terrorist-related deaths last year in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger alone, while half a million refugees fled what the U.N. labels “unprecedented violence.” Clearly the American terrorism mission remains unfinished. But while Trump says he cares about terrorism, he also cares deeply about confronting the challenges posed by Russia and China, as spelled out in his 2021 military budget released this month. But Russian and Chinese influence are expanding all but unchecked across this region. As the U.S. departs, these two countries will be more than willing to step in to fill an expanding and lucrative vacuum. While Trump says he cares about terrorism, he also cares deeply about confronting the challenges posed by Russia and China. In October, Russian President Vladimir Putin invited some 40 African heads of state to the Black Sea resort of Sochi to preview military hardware that would be available for a simple exchange of oil, gas, diamonds and a host of precious minerals, not to mention treaties of friendship and cooperation. Not to be outdone, Chinese leader Xi Jinping has paid a number of personal visits to strategic African nations, seeking to enlist them in China’s Belt and Road Initiative designed to help Africa industrialize and become a major trading partner. And he invited a host of high-ranking military officials from 50 African nations to Beijing for the first China-African Defense and Security Forum in 2018. The extra burden on European forces, especially the French, is another immediate and dangerous consequence of any sudden American pullout. In December, French President Emmanuel Macron and his wife pried themselves away from the strikes that were paralyzing France and paid a visit to the Ivory Coast and nearby Mali. “We will keep up the fight against jihadist terrorists. We will continue to do so with our African partners and with our European and international partners,” Macron told French troops. “Because if we let the threat flourish, it will impact us too.” At least 4,500 French troops are based in the Sahel region and form a backbone of the 13,000-strong U.N. peacekeeping force in Mali. The concern is that France and other European nations will be unable to fill any vacuum left by an American departure — and maintain their commitments to assist the U.S. in the Middle East, Afghanistan or Asia. “This level of sustained commitment for many years is unprecedented and it will not decline in the years to come,” Gen. François Lecointre, chief of staff of the French armed forces, warned. In 1884 and 1885, a “scramble for Africa” at the West African Conference of Berlin divided up the continent as the major powers of the day — France, Britain, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands and even Russia — dashed to establish colonies and kingdoms. At that time, the United States was the only major power that did not enter into the agreement. For decades after, the U.S. has played a far less hands-on role in the region, especially as compared to Europe. But this changed once the U.S. government realized the strategic importance of West Africa. The establishment in 2007 of the United States Africa Command (Africom) by President George W. Bush cemented this new policy strategy. Pulling out of Africa, even just West Africa, sends the wrong signal at the exact wrong time. As terrorists build increasingly strong roots there, we leave. How does this make anyone safer? America’s enemies — large powers and small terrorist groups alike — want nothing more than our withdrawal, of course. In December 2018, then national security adviser John Bolton revealed Trump’s new Africa policy, all but unhinged from today’s realities: “Every decision we make, every policy we pursue, and every dollar of aid we spend will further U.S. priorities.” But such nationalism and blatant self-interest does not work when we are perceived as the principal enemy of globalists and terrorists alike.

#### NATO allies are specifically fearful of Russian presence.

Wilson ‘22 Joseph 6-26-2022 PBS NewsHour Spain warns NATO of Russian threat in Africa [https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/spain-warns-nato-of-russian-threat-in-africa 7-17-2023](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/spain-warns-nato-of-russian-threat-in-africa%207-17-2023) TDI

BARCELONA, Spain (AP) — While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is certain to dominate an upcoming NATO summit in Madrid, Spain and other member nations are quietly pushing the Western alliance to consider how mercenaries aligned with Russian President Vladimir Putin are spreading Moscow’s influence to Africa. As the host of the summit taking place from Tuesday to Thursday, Spain wants to emphasize its proximity to Africa as it lobbies for a greater focus on Europe’s southern flank in a new document outlining NATO’s vision of its security challenges and tasks. The Strategic Concept is NATO’s most important working document after the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, which contained the key provision holding that an attack on one member is viewed as an attack upon all. The security assessment is updated roughly every decade to reset the West’s security agenda. The current version, approved in Lisbon in 2010, stated the risk of a conventional war on NATO territory was “low.” It did not explicitly mention concerns about instability in Africa. At the time, the alliance viewed apathy as its biggest military threat; U.S. complaints that some European members were not paying their due featured heavily in summit talks. Fast forward a dozen years, and the view looks very different from NATO headquarters in Brussels. After Russia brought war close to NATO’s eastern borders, the alliance has worked to provide Ukraine with an assortment of more powerful weapons and to avoid the very real risk of getting drawn into the fighting. But there appears to be a consensus among NATO members heading into the Madrid summit that while Russia remains concern No. 1, the alliance must continue to widen its view globally. Spain’s position for an increased focus on “the South” is shared by Britain, France and Italy. In their view, the security challenges in Africa arise from a Putin apparently dead-set on restoring the imperial glories of Russia as well as from an expansive China. Russia has gained traction thanks to the presence of its mercenaries in the Sahel region, a semiarid expanse stretching from Senegal to Sudan that suffers from political strife, terrorism and drought. “Each time I meet with NATO ministers, the support of the allies is total due to the instability that we see on the alliance’s southern frontier and especially the situation in the Sahel region right now,” Spanish Foreign Minister José Albares said. The Kremlin denies links to the Wagner Group, a mercenary force with an increasing presence in central and North Africa and the Middle East. The private military company, which has also participated in the war in Ukraine, has developed footholds in Libya, Mali, Sudan and Central African Republic. In Mali, Wagner soldiers are filling a void created by the exit of former colonial power France. In Sudan, Russia’s offer of an economic alliance earned it the promise of a naval base on the Red Sea. In Central African Republic, Wagner fighters protect the country’s gold and diamond mines. In return, Putin gets diplomatic allies and resources. French President Emmanuel Macron has long called for a “greater involvement” from NATO in the Sahel region. Now that Wagner has moved into Mali, French authorities underlined that Wagner mercenaries were accused of human right abuses in the Central African Republic, Libya and Syria. Former NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana said that Russia’s brutal military campaign in support of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad during his country’s long civil war left it emboldened. “Syria gave (the Russians) the sentiment that they could be more active in that part of the world,” Solana told The Associated Press. “They have very good relations with Algeria and they have (…) the Wagner type of people in the Sahel, which is delicate.” With the Sahel, Morocco and Algeria at risk of worsening instability, “the southern part of NATO, for Portugal, Spain, Greece, etc., they would like to have an eye open to that part of the world,” he said. Italy is another NATO member attuned to the political climate across the Mediterranean Sea. The country hosts NATO’s Joint Force Command base in Naples, which in 2017 opened a south hub focusing on terrorism, radicalization, migration and other issues emanating from North Africa and the Middle East. The Italian ambassador to NATO, Francesco Maria Talo, said in a May interview with Italian news agency ANSA that humanitarian crises in Africa must concern all NATO allies. “Near us there’s Africa, with a billion inhabitants at risk of poverty, aggravated by food insecurity, terrorism and climate change, all factors that combine to create insecurity,” Talo said. “And Russia is present there, too.” The importance of the other side of the Mediterranean became painfully evident to Spain over the past year due to a series of diplomatic crises involving Morocco and Algeria and their rivalry over the fate of Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony. Amid the disputes, reduced border security allowed migrants to enter Spanish territory, and there were perceived threats to energy supplies. Analysts consider both to be tactics of “hybrid warfare” when governments use them against other countries. Speaking in Madrid last month, British Defense Minister Ben Wallace noted the problems caused last year when Belarus, a Putin ally, allegedly encouraged migrants to cross its borders into Poland and other neighboring countries. “If the likes of Wagner get the control they have or they’d like to have in places like Libya or indeed what we see they’re already doing in Mali, do not think that Spain will be untouched by that,” Wallace said. NATO is also expected to include in the new Strategic Document a reference to China’s growing military reach both in and beyond the Pacific theater. U.S. Army Gen. Stephen J. Townsend, commander of U.S. Africa Command, warned last month that China was trying to build a military naval base on Africa’s Atlantic coast. He said Beijing “has most traction” toward establishing the base in Equatorial Guinea, a tiny oil-rich dictatorship that was once Spain’s only sub-Saharan African colony. China only operates one acknowledged foreign military base, located in Djibouti in East Africa, But many believe its People’s Liberation Army is busy establishing an overseas military network, even if it doesn’t use the term “base.” NATO has invited the leaders of Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand to the summit to demonstrate its interest in the Asian-Pacific. The foreign minister of Mauritania, a former French colony in West Africa, is also invited to attend a working dinner of fellow foreign ministers at the NATO summit. NATO said the country, which borders Western Sahara, Algeria, Mali and Senegal, was “closely associated with the preparatory work” for the new Strategic Concept.