# K --- Liberal Militarism

## 1NC—Persian Gulf

#### The 1AC is a normalization of militarism – it’s a cold world politics that normalizes that war is always already occurring and the affs reduction of presence in the gulf is a means to securitize global supply chains that have yet to be militarized for the sanctity and the survivability of the empire

Howell 2018 [Allison. Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, Newark) . Forget “militarization”: Race, disability and the “martial politics” of the police and of the university. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 20(2), 117-136.] CSUF JmB TDI

While the terms “militarism” and “militarization” emerged to explain Cold War military build-up and its social, ideological and international consequences (Shaw 1991), there has been a significant resurgence of the concept recently (Stavrianakis and Selby 2013). “Militarization” is now deployed in numerous disciplines to describe an array of phenomena. The International Feminist Journal of Politics has been a hub for the publication of feminist “militarization” research, including on topics such as militarized masculinities (Enloe 2003; Masters 2005; Eichler 2006; Duncanson 2009; Welland 2015; Tidy 2015); the militarization of political leadership (Cannen 2014; Athanassiou 2014); women’s lives (Shigematsu 2009); spaces such as memorials (Szitanyi 2015), heritage sites (Demetriou 2012) and border zones (de Lacy 2014); gender relations (Cockburn 2010); and feminism itself (Wright 2015). Yet with remarkably few exceptions (Enloe 2000, 3; Lutz 2002, 723; Stavrianakis and Selby 2013) the concept of “militarization” is infrequently defined or analyzed. Perhaps it seems self-evident, but “militarization” is a concept. Like any concept it guides our attention in certain directions, but it also limits our scope. Arguably the most influential text on “militarization” in feminist thought is Cynthia Enloe’s classic book, Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives (2000). The book opens with a now-famous question: how do they militarize a can of soup? Enloe describes a can of soup containing pasta cut into the shape of Star Wars weapons, illustrating her central argument that “militarization” is a broad social and gendered process: In the Star Wars soup scenario a lot of people have become militarized – corporate marketers, dieticians, mothers, and children. They may not run out to enlist in the army as soon as they have finished their lunch, but militarization is progressing nonetheless. Militarization is never simply about joining a military. It is a far more subtle process. And it sprawls over far more of the gendered social landscape. (Enloe 2000, 2) In this account, all sorts of things can become “militarized”: people, values, cultures and products. Further, “militarization” is a gendered process best understood by examining women’s experiences of it (Enloe 2000, 3). This analysis enabled the study of hitherto-unexamined connections, shedding light on the labor performed by laundresses, sex workers, military wives, nurses, mothers and other women across the globe. Building on previous work (Enloe 1983; Enloe [1989] 2014), it highlighted that investment in the military and military values is not necessary or natural: they can be disinvested from and resisted. However, the “militarization” concept underestimates the extent to which we live with war: how marginalized people, those who are racialized, disabled or poor, are subject to war-like (martial) forms of politics. Returning to Enloe’s can of soup, in a blog post critiquing the concept of militarism, Cowen makes this intervention: “If, in one of the most incisive critiques of militarism, Enloe asks ‘how do they militarize a can of soup?’ and questions how the pasta within assumes the shape of “star wars satellites,” then we are also interested in the central fact of the can” (n.d.). Napoleon commissioned the design of canning to support the supply of far-flung battlefields; “thus, the can of soup was always already ‘militarized’, and bypassing the can for the noodles hides perhaps more than it reveals” (Cowen n.d.). Drawing on other scholarship that has dispensed with the concept of “militarization” (Amoore 2009), Cowen’s (2014) later work on logistics illustrates that global supply chains have not been “militarized” or “securitized”: rather the science of logistics emerged from war. Picking up from such interventions, we can say that the can of soup, as a material object, was always already “of war” and therefore cannot accurately be said to have been “militarized.” “Militarization” frameworks cannot adequately account for this imbrication of “war” and “society” (Kienscherf 2016). This may seem like a counterintuitive statement. Isn’t the concept of “militarization” precisely about drawing out how social (gendered) relations are permeated by military values and cultures? However, by holding the categories of the military and of the social (or, war and peace) as separate until “militarization” happens, the concept implicitly presumes a status prior to militarization. It underestimates war-like forms of politics because it blithely assumes that war is “naturally” separate from the “social landscape.” In this sense, the concept is much like that of securitization (Wæver 1995; Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998), which holds that security forms the exception to politics. “Politics” (or social relations) is implicitly treated as un-security or un-military until securitizing or militarizing processes occur, even if they occur pervasively. From this perspective, a reverse process can take place: desecuritization (Wæver 1995; Aradau 2004) or demilitarization. What “militarization” holds out is the hope that military encroachment on an otherwise unmilitarized past can be reversed; this drastically underestimates the extent to which warfare and military strategy are intrinsic to “political” or “social” relations. As with the can of soup, when we dig, we usually find that those “civilian” things that are claimed to be in danger of “militarization” have much deeper roots in warfare, and that the peaceful “domestic” political order for which we yearn has been fundamentally shaped from the outset by warfare and colonial violence. The concept of militarization ironically elides the fundamentally warlike history of liberal politics precisely through its critique of (supposedly exceptional) military encroachment or trespass on them. Relatedly, research conducted through the lens of “militarization” has tended to foreground gender analysis, for example, through the concept of “militarized masculinities,” or emulation of Enloe’s focus on women’s lives. Even if we are attentive to how this may play out differently for racialized or poor women, the analytical foregrounding of “women’s lives” positions systems of gender as primary in understanding “militarization.” Gathering considerations of race, disability, poverty and Indigeneity under gender by pursuing a methodology focused in the first instance on the lives of women (or on masculinities) risks subsuming varied systems of power, leaving us unable to capture how they might work differently than gender. When we also center race, Indigeneity and disability it immediately becomes clear that there is no natural peaceful order, and that the concept of “militarization” is pallid and half-hearted in its ignorance of the war-like relations that permeate “peaceful” domestic civil order (James 1996; Davis 2002, 2003). In IR, the work of |Richter-Montpetit (2007, 2014) is central to understanding race and the production of liberal violence. She argues that torture is not an aberration from liberal order but forms part of a lineage of anti-Black violence, from the institution of chattel slavery through contemporary law and criminal justice, demonstrating that violence against racialized bodies and the law have existed in mutual relation throughout US history. Thus, “racialized taxonomies and the larger racial formation they gave rise to were not simply manufactured by law. Rather, law was shaped by, and simultaneously enabled a wider set of processes and technologies of race-making” (RichterMontpetit 2014, 52). The concept of “militarization” cannot take stock of these histories because it assumes a peaceful order that has been breached by militarism. Only by eschewing forms of analysis that assume a (breached) separation between military and civilian spheres can we avoid this kind of dangerous oversight. For this reason I propose an alternate concept: “martial politics.” “Martial” denotes that a thing is war-like, or that it derives from battle, war, or the military – that it is “of war.” It describes the process by which war and peace are imbricated. Assessing “martial politics” involves evaluating the historical roots and present expressions of this imbrication. “Martial politics” dispenses with the before/after temporality of “militarization” and the assumed separation between military and civilian, war and peace. It denies any innocent domain of “normal” politics by pointing to the martial nature of contemporary and historical political formations. “Martial politics” is the liberal norm, not the exception. Illustrating the potential value of this concept, the following sections of this article apply it to two key empirical sites of supposed “militarization”: the police and the university. The empirical material in this article focuses primarily on the US as an avowedly liberal state, and on matters that traditional IR scholars would relegate to “domestic politics” (i.e., the study of race, disability, policing, education and universities). Contrary to such traditions, the article views the US as a site of ongoing settler colonialism, founded in and continually produced through the legacy of chattel slavery, and thus very much a “global” space. From this perspective, I argue that neither the police nor the university have been “militarized” and instead illustrate how contemporary forms of policing and knowledge production are vested in longer trajectories of martial politics.

#### You should be skeptical of their internal link claims Persian Gulf presence is not the end all be all of Iranian fear of US military presence – after Iraq the US shifted engagement where hard power resources of boots on the ground become obsolete and instead soft power resources or drone strikes and arm sales maintains the violence of US militarism

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The first level examined here is the international one, from which arguably all other changes flowed. IR scholarship is frequently criticized for its top-down, overly ‘systemic’ perspective, focusing on the agency of major states, which can occlude the effects of local influences and actors, but in this case such a perspective is inescapable. In contrast with other major regional events which had strong local as well as international origins (the Arab–Israel wars, Lebanon’s wars, the Iranian Revolution or the Iran–Iraq War, for example), this was a top-down decision: a war that ‘did not need to happen and certainly not when it did’,39 and one opposed by multiple regional and international actors. The US decision to go to war and remake the Iraqi state, and to refashion the Middle East, was critical in facilitating new international alignments, changing perceptions of US power, and opening the way to a new regional balance of power and institutions. The effects were greater because the Iraq War occurred at a time when US unipolarity was still at its height; the Middle East constituted one of the most important testing grounds of the ‘new world order’ articulated by President George W. Bush following the Gulf War of 1991, and the ‘Asia pivot’ was still a project in the making. If that new world order had been bruised by the events of the later 1990s, including the demise of the MEPP and the rise of anti-western Islamic extremism, it had not been broken, and in some ways the Iraq War decision was further confirmation of that. But the protracted nature, cost and ultimate failure of that war to achieve its stated goals had a significant impact on US influence in the region and the wider world, lessening its diplomatic reputation.40 In the words of Joseph Nye, it at once marked the end of the ‘unipolar moment’, the ‘fall of US hegemony’ and the failure of ‘democratic enlargement’41—large claims, but the message was not lost on either allies or rivals. None of this was intended. President Obama spoke of the war as one that should not have been authorized and waged, but he also spoke of moving ‘beyond Iraq’ and ‘renewing American leadership’.42 Any renewal of leadership, however, would not take place in the Middle East theatre, and not on the same terms. The Iraq War heralded a distinctive change in the nature of US involvement in the region, from high to low intensity—highlighted by the withdrawal from Iraq itself, and later Afghanistan, and its taking more measured roles in Libya and Syria. Lynch notes how three consecutive presidents effectively downgraded their security commitments to the region.43 True, this was not disengagement, but ‘shifting engagement’.44 In terms of military bases and arms exports, the US footprint in the region remains far larger than that of any other power, notwithstanding withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan.45 In this regard, the path dependence of US military commitment and overseas presence is striking.46 Still, after Iraq, the willingness to use traditional hard power resources has declined, with a preference for a light military presence, air power or ‘surrogate’ warfare, using proxy actors, drones and sanctions regimes with consequences that are unpredictable in terms of reputation and results.47 The assassination, in January 2020, of Iran’s General Soleimani by a US-ordered drone strike was illustrative of such a strategy, one designed to downgrade Iran as a regional power, visible also in the renewed sanctions regime after US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Alongside this reduced appetite for direct intervention, the soft power resources of the United States were evidently eroded, including its credibility and status as a leading regional power, with consequences for allies and enemies alike. This was not the ‘new beginning’ that Obama promised in his Cairo speech.48 Some of this could have happened anyway, or happened elsewhere, in the light of new global challenges and growing multipolarity, but events in Iraq were decisive in determining the new character of US involvement. Approving a new arms deal in July 2022, President Biden sought to reassure regional allies, but the wider lessons of US policy have not been lost on Arab states as they seek greater autonomy and new partners. Nor were those lessons lost on America’s competitors or allies further afield. Both Russia and China, which opposed the war, and helped to block the possibility of any favourable UN Security Council resolution, were ultimately beneficiaries, though in different ways. They shared US concerns about Iraqi pretensions and stability in the Gulf, and were not inclined, at that time, to mount a robust opposition to the US intervention, for reasons that had to do with domestic politics and their international standing. However, they stood to gain materially and strategically in distancing themselves from the conflict and its subsequent fallout. New opportunities arose for these two powers and their aspirations to global influence: in supporting a sovereignty-first and pro-UN position, they were on the ‘right side’ in the Iraq War. For China the opportunities in MENA were mostly economic— the region became central to China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, unveiled in 2013. By 2020 China had become a major trading partner of regional states and importer of Middle East oil, but was also at the forefront of nuclear energy cooperation.49 However, scholars have also noted that the war had another effect on China, encouraging it to ‘think globally’; to move away from isolationism and enjoy the benefits of membership in an expanded international society.50 For Russia, the opportunities were economic, strategic and political, hastening the opportunity, effectively seized by President Putin, to re-establish a regional foothold—one lost since the 1960s.51 After the Libyan intervention, which Putin opposed, that opportunity was provided decisively by the Syrian civil war, which also aligned with Russia’s more activist ‘counter-revolutionary’ foreign policy as reflected in the colour revolutions: ‘Russia’s response to the Arab Spring, most notably the diplomatic, political, and military support it provided for the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad, represented a major return of Russian power and influence in the region.’52 Russia’s growing influence in Syria was made possible not only by changes in its own foreign policy orientation, but also by the reduced US appetite for intervention after Iraq. For both Russia and China, therefore, the Iraq War helped to erode the myth of western omnipotence and open the Middle East as a competitive space for economic and strategic opportunity.

#### **Rightsizing is the software update for American imperialism – offshoring is the new liberal metric to redefine territoriality through extrajudicial means that justifies targeted killings – this is a self-fulfilling prophecy where under the threat of terrorist attack caused by the US drone program, the US can manipulate the real and the imaginary to expand the American drone program and justify interventionism**

Slaven 19 [James T. Department of History, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia Pseudoisolationism: the Neoimperialism of the State(s) June 27, 2019 [https://doi.org/10.11114/ijsss.v7i4.4353 Accessed 2-23-21](https://doi.org/10.11114/ijsss.v7i4.4353%20Accessed%202-23-21)] CSUF JmB NDT 2021 TDI

In Calling 911: geopolitics, security and America's New War (2003), Simon Dalby outlined American imperialism after 9/11 and how it became the standard for a new kind of imperial warfare. He argued that in the aftermath of 9/11, the United States struggled to understand that classical European geopolitics, where "mutually exclusive spatial entities" conflicted with one another, were no longer predominant (Dalby, 2003, p. 74, 82). In other words, without a clearly defined (i.e. territorially defined) enemy to confront, the American military reaction was left searching for a target (Dalby, 2003, p. 72). Subsequently, the United States used its military to invade and occupy, or otherwise simply to garrison, foreign territory in an attempt to neutralize threats to its national security (i.e. under the guise of self-defence; Dalby, 2003, p. 80). As this essay will later argue and as Dalby argued, despite the United States neglecting to "conquer, annex, or fundamentally remake" these territories (as would be expected of true classical imperialism), it has and continues to colonize these territories via new technologies, and thus its anti-imperial national identity is only surface level deep (Dalby, 2003, p. 82). In From a View to Kill: Drones and Late Modern Warfare (2011), Derek Gregory described how modem warfare, conducted virtually through drones, has changed the very conception of battlespace, itself (p. 190). He argued that from the viewpoint of the American drone program modem battlespace has expanded across the world. This virtual, globalized battlespace results in a new version of (American) imperialism that can be remotely enforced (Gregory, 2011, pp. 189-90). In other words, the virtual application of violent force has caused "time-space compression" which means that the American military can theoretically exercise violence everywhere and at all times, as this essay will later elaborate (Gregory, 2011, p. 192). In Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy (1995), John Agnew similarly described how emerging technologies had the potential to change how states interact with space. Rather than colonizing space by controlling a place(s) "on the ground," new technologies allow states to colonize space by controlling it virtually, thereby controlling all places (Agnew, 1995, pp. 95-6). In other words, by controlling space virtually states can control space instantaneously, forgoing the traditional needs of an empire to establish and maintain physical control over a place via a physical presence. It is from the theoretical starting points of Dalby, Gregory, and Agnew that this essay will now begin. 3. Offshore Balancing Before exploring the neoimperialist reality of American offshore balancing, this essay will first briefly discuss what exactly offshore balancing as a foreign policy entails. By 2011, offshore balancing had been named by Newsweek as the Obama administration's foreign policy doctrine (Beinart, 2011). By 2016, John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt had published the definitive work on offshore balancing titled "The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy." Primarily evidenced by Obama's withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as his later infamous "Red Line" failure in Syria, offshore balancing (as the name suggests) is primarily characterized by, "eschewing social engineering and minimizing the United States' military footprint... The United States would maintain substantial naval and air assets and modest but capable ground forces" (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2016, p. 74, 80). The doctrine also advocates: (1) buckpassing regional defence to smaller allies in order to check the rise of a potential hegemon; (2) minimizing the threat of anti-American terrorism by "respecting the sovereignty of other states"; (3) strengthening the American economy by reducing its military expenditures as a result of, in turn, reducing the level of troops the United States garrisons abroad (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2016, pp. 83-4, 87-8). Subsequently, the former president's foreign policy doctrine was dubbed in newspaper headlines and book titles: "Retreating Ashore," or America in Retreat (Hoffman, 2016; Rose, 2015). Critics of offshore balancing warned that this "neoisolationist" doctrine threatened America's global hegemony (Roskin, 2016, p. 7). Rather than conserving American economic and military strength in order to maintain the current balance of power (i.e. Pax Americana) by "husbanding military strength," American armed forces would require massive re-expansion, and therefore massive expenditure, when the United States is inevitably pulled into a conflict to check the rise of a regional power (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2016, p. 82). Bret Stephens (2014), in America in Retreat, argues that: "Barack Obama offered a blueprint for a new foreign policy, demanding a smaller U.S. footprint in the world" (p. 67). However, these criticisms represent a flawed understanding of the doctrine and have misidentified it as some kind of "neoisolationism," when in fact there is no evidence of a global American retreat. Having discussed offshore balancing as a foreign policy, in theory, and its critiques, this essay will now examine the reality of offshore balancing. Neoisolationism, as has been discussed above, would mean a divergence from the Pax Americana status quo and therefore would entail some sort of global American 'retreat.' Although the world has indeed seen a gradual withdrawal of American troops from its vested regional interests, the American military presence has not withdrawn on a global scale. In other words, although there are literally fewer American "boots on the ground," the American military footprint has not changed-in fact, there's an argument to be made that it has actually increased. Shima Keene (2015) notes in Lethal and Legal: the Ethics of Drone Strikes, as of 2012, "the Pentagon was reported to have 7,000 drones under its control, representing approximately one-third of all U.S. military aircraft" (p. 1). Evidently, as the United States adopts offshore balancing more heartily, and the American military transitions to forces capable of exerting "over-the-horizon" pressure (i.e. air and naval forces), unmanned combat aerial vehicles play an increasingly large role (Allin & Jones, 2012, p. 89). Approximately 10 times more drone strikes were authorized under the Obama administration than under the George W. Bush administration-506 drone strikes compared to 50 drone strikes, respectively (Zenko, 2016). As Ian Shaw notes in Predator Empire: Drone Warfare and Full Spectrum Dominance: "by 2013, around 95 percent of the US non-battlefield targeted killings were conducted by drones" (Shaw, 2016, p. 113). Furthermore, as Medea Benjamin (2017) writes for The Guardian, by 2016 the United States maintained a military presence in "70% of the world's nations, 138 countries-a staggering jump of 130% since the days of the Bush administration." Clearly, there is no evidence of "America in Retreat," and instead it would be more accurate to conclude that there is evidence of a sustained (if not, increased) level of American presence and intervention abroad. Furthermore, Mearsheimer and Walt's "The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy" fails to mention UCAVs, even though it was written in 2016 (i.e. towards the end of the Obama administration years) when drone warfare had been well-established as both the new American modus operandi and as President Obama's legacy (Kaufman, 2018; Monbiot, 2012; Zenko, 2016). Although the authors of "The Case for Offshore Balancing" have apparently forgotten to mention the role of the drone program in contemporary foreign policy and military interventions, their critics are just as equally at fault for, by and large, having neglected to mention it. As Shaw clarifies: "as U.S. military technology has become more sophisticated, the significance of mass, force, and territoriality has shrunk (although by no means disappeared)" (Shaw, 2016, p. 132). So, as this essay has discussed thus far, despite the appearance of a "global American retreat" when measuring in terms of conventional military forces, the reality of the maintenance of a global, American military presence when measured in UCAVs is evident. Offshore balancing has been misdiagnosed as "neoisolationism," when in fact it merely appears that way, and it can therefore correctly be labelled pseudoneoisolationism. 4. The Drone Program: Redefining Territoriality This essay will now proceed to argue that the American, neoimperialist redefinition of territoriality can be examined, specifically, by looking at the targeting methods used in the drone program and the legality of drone warfare under international law. Strikes carried out under the American drone program are (theoretically) authorized using two sets of targeting methods: personality strikes and signature strikes. The targeted killing of individuals through both personality and signature strikes redefines the American state's understanding of territoriality, although signature strikes have much more profound implications, as will be discussed. As Shima Keene (2015) describes in "Lethal and Legal: The Ethics of Drone Strikes," personality strikes are situations wherein: "an individual whose identity is known is specifically targeted" (p. 24). However, signature strikes are situations wherein, as Keene (2015) once again clarifies: Unknown individuals often in groups are targeted... the precise identity of these individuals is unknown, [and therefore] the individuals targeted must match a pre-identified 'signature' of behaviour that the United States links to militant activity or association... patterns of behaviour are used to determine a target. (p. 25) Simply put, the United States does not know who it is killing in these signature strikes. However, as Keene emphasized in the quote above, it may be worth restating that: the United States does not know precisely who it is killing. So then, a more convincing argument might be made by investigating the "signatures" or patterns of behaviour that the United States sets out in signature strike targeting methods. However, upon investigation, what are considered signatures of terrorist behaviour have, as Keene (2015) puts it, "come under criticism" (p. 25). Greg Miller and Bob Woodward (2013) describe multiple strikes based on circumstantial evidence in "Secret memos reveal explicit nature of U.S., Pakistan agreement on drones": On March 23, 2010, the CIA launched missiles at a "person of interest" in a suspected al-Qaeda compound. The man caught the agency's attention after he had "held two in-car meetings, and swapped vehicles three times along the way." Other accounts describe militants targeted because of the extent of "deference" they were shown when arriving at a suspect site. Keene (2015) cites in her own work one instance when: "on February 21, 2010, 23 Afghan civilians were wrongly identified by a U.S. operated drone as enemy combatants and killed in airstrikes" (p. 27). Clearly then, it is not an oversimplification, after all, to say that the United States does not know who it is killing in these strikes. Shaw (2016) starkly notes: "if the pattern of life [emphasis added] is marked as a threat to national security, it can be eliminated" (p. 128). By examining drone strike targeting methods and their consequences, it becomes clear that the United States is engaged in a new kind of neoimperialist exercise. Specifically, by extrajudiciously killing individuals or groups of individuals through signature strike targeting methods the American state is exercising legal authority over non-citizens. Furthermore, the American state is exercising legal authority over a specific demographic (theoretically, this is military-age males) of a non-citizen population within a bounded geographic space (i.e. another state), rather than exercising legal authority over the whole population. On top of that, the individuals that belong to that particular demographic have no notice that they are under American law, unlike classical, imperialist occupations, because the American state subjectively determines whether or not certain "patterns of life" are a threat to national security (Keene, 2015, p. 27; Shaw, 2016, p. 128). At that point, whether or not the targeted individual(s) is known for certain to be a threat to national security (i.e. a terrorist), the individual is killed, and the right to surrender and defend themselves in a court of law is withheld (also known as extrajudicial killing; Keene, 2015, p. 12). So, by continuing to authorize drone strikes based on signature strike targeting methods, the American state is claiming and exercising legal authority over a specific demographic of non-citizens within a separate bounded geographic space (i.e. another state). Similar to the targeting methods used for authorizing drone strikes, the legality of drone strikes under international law has equally profound implications for territoriality. The United States has consistently harkened back to the September 11th terrorist attacks as the justification needed for targeted killings carried out under the drone program, and within the context of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) more generally. On September 12, 2001 the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1368 which, while denouncing the September 11 terrorist attacks, recognized, "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter [of the United Nations]," referring to the right to self-defence as laid out in Article 51 of the Charter (United Nations Security Council, 2001; Anghie, 1996, 276). The United States specifically cites this right to self-defence as the legal basis for targeted killings (Keene, 2015, p. 16; see also Vavrichek, 2014, p. 32). However, the the legal basis for targeted killings also lies in equal part within International Human Rights Law (IHRL). As Diane Vavrichek (2014) notes in "The Future of Drone Strikes: A Framework for Analyzing Policy Options," IHRL states that lethal force may only be used against individuals who pose an "imminent [emphasis added] and substantial threat to life" (pp. 34-5). However, Vavrichek (2014) then goes on to cite a Department of Justice legal memo which, "concludes that, 'the condition that an operational leader present an "imminent" threat of violent attack against the United States does not require the United States to have clear evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take place in the immediate future' "(p. 37). This legal basis, grounded in the UNSC Resolution 1368 as well as IHRL, is precisely where the United States redefines its definition of territoriality. This neoimperialist redefinition relies on two concepts which it borrows from the UNSC Resolution 1368 and IHRL, respectively: self-defence and imminence. As Vavrichek (2014) notes: This usage is at odds with the definition of the word "imminent" and signals a departure from the historical criteria for a nation to act preemptively in self-defence only when the "necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation." (p. 37) Similarly, Antony Anghie (1996), in Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law, argues that "the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence... appears to extend the concept of self-defence well beyond traditionally understood boundaries of Article 51 of the UN Charter" (p. 276). This "historical departure" also signals a departure from traditional understandings of territoriality. By preemptively defending itself against individuals using signature strike targeting methods and therefore by understanding that those individuals pose an imminent threat to national security regardless of whether or not those individuals can practically reach American territory (i.e. the continental United States) in the immediate future, the United States is implying that American territory is no longer restricted by linear boundaries and traditional notions of territoriality, but instead has spread across the globe. It is only through this understanding that the American drone program is legally authorized to strike anywhere in the world since an individual in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Yemen, to offer up historical examples, can pose an imminent threat to American national security and therefore require preemptive actions in the name of self-defence. 5. Connecting the Dots This essay will now discuss the importance of discussing offshore balancing and the American, neoimperialist redefinition of territoriality in an effort to make it clear that not only is offshore balancing pseudoneoisolationist, but it is actually neoimperialist. In summary, it is important to discuss offshore balancing in tandem with the American drone program and its implications for territoriality because it becomes clear that it constitutes a dangerously attractive foreign policy option for politicians, and yet it still has not been properly identified as a neoimperialist doctrine. It would not be enough to discuss offshore balancing as a foreign policy and the neoimperialist redefinition of territoriality occurring under the American drone program, separately because that would be a failure to realize the neoimperialist reality of the current American foreign policy doctrine. By adhering to offshore balancing as a doctrine, the American military will suffer fewer casualties by relying more on UCAVs, which results in minimal domestic backlash, while maintaining American global hegemony (Bahador & Walker, 2012, pp. 248-9). Furthermore, it is a self-perpetuating foreign policy: public perception of the United States worsens inside the state(s) that the American drone program operates in, resentment builds among the populace, and, conversely, support for terrorist organizations grows (albeit, amongst a small percentage of the populace; Shah, 2010, pp. 86-7). Eventually this leads to a terrorist attack abroad, perhaps even within the United States (although it is difficult to discern how many terrorist attacks have occurred within the continental United States since 2001 since there is little consensus about what constitutes a terrorist attack), at which point there is a public outcry of support for military action and, potentially, support from the heads of allied states. As a result, the United States then has all the justification and support it needs to continue its drone program, and the self-perpetuating cycle begins, as Robert Kaplan (2015), in Imperial Grunts, puts it in his own words: "terrorism was both a cause and a symptom [of the GWOT]" (p. 7). Hall Gardner (2005) describes the same process in American Global Strategy and the "War on Terrorism ": State leaderships additionally use the threat of external terror (threats coming from outside the state) in order to obtain and sustain both allegiance and obedience, and to repress dissent. In The Politics, Aristotle argued that "the distant fear must be brought home"-in that [political] elites seek to preserve their power and influence and obtain both domestic and international allegiance to their goals by manipulating real and imagined (or exaggerated) fears that their 'constitutions' and basic freedoms might be subverted by enemies abroad. (p. 54) This dangerous, violent, cyclical misunderstanding is in part driven by a discourse based in the dichotomy of good and evil, as Bret Stephens (2014), himself, writes in America in Retreat (which was mentioned at the beginning of this paper): America needs to be the world's policeman... Cops merely walk the beat, reassuring the good, deterring the tempted, punishing the wicked... It is done because it has to be and there's no one else to do it, and because the benefits of doing it accrue not only to those we protect but also, indeed mainly, to ourselves. (pp. xv-i) This, of course, is a vast over-simplification of American foreign policy and ignores entirely the cyclical violence that is perpetuated by American foreign policy particularly within the context of the GWOT, as discussed above. However, to elaborate further would verge on overextending this essay's core argument. Rather, it should simply be stated that: the connection must be made between offshore balancing as a foreign policy and the implications of the drone program for American territoriality so that the present, neoimperialist reality of American foreign policy can be properly identified and understood as neoimperialist. 6. What Now? In conclusion, this essay has discussed offshore balancing as a foreign policy doctrine, how it has incorrectly been labeled "neoisolationist," and why pseudoneoisolationist would be a more suitable label. Then, the American drone program and its neoimperialist redefinition of territoriality through two aspects-targeting methods and legal justification-was discussed. Finally, it has been argued that these two subjects need to be examined together so that the neoimperialist reality of American foreign policy, perpetuated by the American drone program, can be properly identified as such. So, what now? Various scholars, such as Anghie (1996), are describing the emergence of a "new imperialism" (p. 274). Some, such as Robert Cooper, are even advocating for a kind of " 'defensive imperialism... a new kind of imperialism, one acceptable to a world of human rights and cosmopolitan values.' " (as cited in Anghie, 1996, p. 274). Nevertheless, it has become increasingly clear that contemporary understandings of neoimperialism also need to be broadened in the wake of this new military technology-UCAVs-because, as this essay has discussed, they allow the United States to carry out a foreign policy that cannot be correctly labeled as imperialist nor neoimperialist (at least, not by the current parameters of either definition). Therefore, this essay suggests a new definition of neoimperialism be outlined to include the territorial implications created by the American drone program. With this expanded definition of neoimperialism, then offshore balancing, as a foreign policy, may correctly be identified by its true nature-not neoisolationist, but neoimperialist.

#### The alternative is a critical history of US military presence in the Arab States of the Persian Gulf. The linear narrative of the 1AC articulates existence as a field of endemic violence that requires Pastoral State action; exposing the historical production of this current moment is the only way to reanimate pedagogies oriented around producing better futures

Giroux and Evans 15 [Henry, Distinguished Visiting Professorship @ Ryerson University and Chair in English and Cultural Studies Department @ McMaster University, and Brad, senior lecturer in the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies @ University of Bristol, “Disposable Futures: The Seduction of Violence in the Age of the Spectacle,”] CSUF JmB TDI

There is an important point to stress here regarding the logics of brutality. **Violence is easily condemned when it appears exceptional. This** also unfortunately **precludes more searching and uncomfortable questions**. Normalized violence, by contrast, represents a more formidable challenge, requiring a more sophisticated and learned response. **Exposing more fully how these normalized cultures of cruelty shape the historic moment** is the main purpose of this work, as it **is integral to** the critical imagination and **those forms of political agency necessary for successfully living in a nonviolent** and civilian **future**. Our motivation for writing this book is driven by a commitment to the value of critical pedagogy in countering mechanisms of dehumanization and domination at play in neoliberal societies and beyond. We have no time whatsoever for those who reason that violence may be studied in an “objective” or “rational” way. **There are no neutral pedagogies indifferent to matters of politics, power, and ideology. Pedagogy is**, **in part, always about** both struggle and vision—**struggles over identities, modes of agency, values, desires, and visions of the possible**. Not only does **the apologetics of neutrality** lead to the most remiss intellectualism when the personal experience of violence is reduced to emotionless inquiry, but it also **announces complicity in the rationalizations of violence that depend upon the degradation of** those qualities that constitute what is essential to **the human condition**. Thus, **education** is by definition a form of political intervention. It **is always disentangling itself from particular regimes of power that attempt to authenticate and disqualify certain ways of perceiving and thinking about the world**. The larger issue is that not only is education central to politics, but the educative nature of politics begins with the assumption that how people think, critically engage the world, and are self-reflective about the shaping of their own experiences and relations to others marks the beginning with a viable and oppositional politics. We dare to perceive and think differently from both neoliberal rule and the increasingly stagnant and redundant left, which does little to counter it. **The world that we inhabit is systematically oppressive and tolerates the most banal and ritualistic forms of violence. It educates us of the need for warfare**; it prizes, above all, the values of militarism and its conceptual apparatus of “civic soldierology.” It sanctions and openly celebrates killings as if they are necessary to prove our civilization’s credentials. **It takes pride, if not pleasure, in punishing peoples of distinct racial and class profiles, all in the name of better securing society**. It promotes those within that order with characteristics that in other situations would be both criminalized and deemed pathological. **And it invests significantly in all manner of cultural productions so that we** develop a taste for violence, and even **learn to appreciate aesthetics of violence, as the normal and necessary price of being entertained.** This book inevitably draws upon a number of critical visionaries whose fight for dignity cannot be divorced from their intellectual concerns. The spirit of the late Paulo Freire in particular is impressed upon each of these pages. His critical pedagogy was unashamedly tasked with liberating both the oppressed and their oppressors from the self-perpetuating dynamics of subjugation. Freire’s prose echoed the humanizing call for a more just, literate, and tolerant world. He remains a strong influence in the field of education and in other areas of practice that require thinking about the possibility of an ethics of difference that resists violence in all its forms. The power and forcefulness of Freire’s works are to be found in the tensions, conflicts, poetry, and politics that make it a project for thinking about (non)violence meaningfully. Siding with the disempowered of history—those at the raw ends of tyranny—Freire’s work calls for a more poetic image of thought that is a way of reclaiming power by reimagining the space and practice of cultural and political resistance. His work thus represents a textual borderland where poetry slips into liberation politics, and solidarity becomes a song for the present begun in the past while waiting to be heard in the future. Freire, no less trenchant in his critique of illegitimate rule, refuses to dwell in hopelessness. His resistance is empowering because it is infused with a fearless belief in people’s abilities and finds reasons to rejoice in the transformative possibilities of living: The more radical the person is, the more fully he or she enters into reality so that, knowing it better, he or she can transform it. This individual is not afraid to confront, to listen, to see the world unveiled. This person is not afraid to meet the people or to enter into a dialogue with them. This person does not consider himself or herself the proprietor of history or of all people, or the liberator of the oppressed; but he or she does commit himself or herself, within history, to fight at their side. Freire is not our only source of inspiration. Nearly a century ago Walter Benjamin responded to the tyranny of his times by writing his famous “Critique of Violence.” Ours is a different age. And yet **the need for a critique adequate to our times is as pressing as ever. We are not lacking in knowledge of our own oppression**. Let’s be sure of that. **Oppressive power reveals enough of its violent traces for even a casual cartographer to expose its deceptions** or else retreat into conspiracy. **What we do lack is a rigorous critique of the historical moment and its varied modes of imaginative resistance**. Such modes of artistic imagination are as important as contemporary sources of oppression are in mediating suffering in the service of established contemporary power. **This requires a critique of violence that once again encourages us to think beyond its necessity**, so as to make clear that in a world in which violence is normalized, it once again becomes possible to imagine the unimaginable, **particularly the notion that collective resistance not only is possible but can transform the world with confidence**. Hence, **while authors like** Steven **Pinker cloud our perception by claiming the current era is the least violent era in human history**, relying upon credo per capita human death rates etc., **it takes only a slightly different angle of vision to see the current social order’s full range of preventable violence: impoverishment, financial predation, malnutrition, mass incarceration, and rapidly accelerating deforestation, ecological degradation, and irreversible biocide. Pinker would do well to acknowledge that political violence is poorly understood if it simply refers to a failure of liberal modernity**. Political violence cannot be reduced to such a crude and reductionist metric. Indeed, **conventional demarcations between times of war and times of peace, zones of security and zones of crises, friends and enemies, have long since evaporated. We live in complex and radically interconnected societies, whose social morphology has radically altered our sense of the world such that we are taught to accept insecurity as the natural order of things**. This is fully in keeping with the proliferation of media output, factual and fictional, that bombards us continuously with images of violence and catastrophe for subtle political gain. Indeed, what is new about the current historical conjuncture is not only a commodified popular culture of entertainment, but the emergence of a predatory society in which the suffering and death of others becomes a reason to rejoice rather than mourn. Extreme violence has become not only a commodified spectacle, but one of the few popular resources available through which people can bump up their pleasure quotient. **Our critique begins from the realization that violence has become ubiquitous, “settling like some all-enveloping excremental mist** … **that has permeated every nook of any institution or being** that has real influence on the way we live now. **We cannot escape its spectre.** Its presence is everywhere. It is hardwired into the fabric of our digital DNA. **Capitalism in fact has always thrived on its consumption. There is, after all, no profit in peace. We are not calling here for the censoring of all representations of violence as if we could retreat into some sheltered protectorate**. That would be foolish and intellectually dangerous. **Our claim is both that the violence we are exposed to is heavily mediated, and that as such we are witness to various spectacles that serve a distinct political function, especially as they either work to demonize political resistance or simply extract from its occurrence** (fictional and actual) **any sense of political context and critical insight. Moving beyond the spectacle by making visible the reality of violence in all of its modes is both necessary and politically important. What we need then is an ethical approach to the problem of violence such that its occurrence is intolerable to witness. Exposing violence is not the same as being exposed to it**, though the former too often comes as a result of the latter. **The corrupting and punishing forms taken by violence today must be addressed by all people as both the most important element of power and the most vital of forces shaping social relationships under the predatory formation of neoliberalism. Violence is both symbolic and material in its effects and its assaults on all social relations, whereas the mediation of violence coupled with its aesthetic regimes of suffering is a form of violence that takes as its object both memory and thought. It purges the historical record, denying access to** the **history** of a more dignified present, purposefully **destroying the ability to connect forms of struggle across the ages**. Memory as such is fundamental to any ethics of responsibility. Our critique of violence begins, then, as an ethical imperative. **It demands a rigorous questioning of the normalized culture of violence in which we are now immersed. It looks to the past so that we may understand the violence of our present. It looks to the ways that ideas about the future shape the present such that we learn to accept a world that is deemed to be violent by design. This requires a proper critical reading of the way violence is mediated in our contemporary moment; how skewed power relations and propagators of violence are absolved of any wider blame in a pedagogical and political game that permits only winners and losers; how any act of injustice is made permissible in a world that enshrines systemic cruelty.**

## 1NC—Generic

#### The 1ACs project of demilitarization as a strategy splits between the peaceful and wartime efforts that makes the violence mystified under debasing practices meant to transform into a martial form of politics

Howell 2018 [Allison. Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, Newark) . Forget “militarization”: Race, disability and the “martial politics” of the police and of the university. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 20(2), 117-136.] CSUF JmB TDI

While the terms “militarism” and “militarization” emerged to explain Cold War military build-up and its social, ideological and international consequences (Shaw 1991), there has been a significant resurgence of the concept recently (Stavrianakis and Selby 2013). “Militarization” is now deployed in numerous disciplines to describe an array of phenomena. The International Feminist Journal of Politics has been a hub for the publication of feminist “militarization” research, including on topics such as militarized masculinities (Enloe 2003; Masters 2005; Eichler 2006; Duncanson 2009; Welland 2015; Tidy 2015); the militarization of political leadership (Cannen 2014; Athanassiou 2014); women’s lives (Shigematsu 2009); spaces such as memorials (Szitanyi 2015), heritage sites (Demetriou 2012) and border zones (de Lacy 2014); gender relations (Cockburn 2010); and feminism itself (Wright 2015). Yet with remarkably few exceptions (Enloe 2000, 3; Lutz 2002, 723; Stavrianakis and Selby 2013) the concept of “militarization” is infrequently defined or analyzed. Perhaps it seems self-evident, but “militarization” is a concept. Like any concept it guides our attention in certain directions, but it also limits our scope. Arguably the most influential text on “militarization” in feminist thought is Cynthia Enloe’s classic book, Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives (2000). The book opens with a now-famous question: how do they militarize a can of soup? Enloe describes a can of soup containing pasta cut into the shape of Star Wars weapons, illustrating her central argument that “militarization” is a broad social and gendered process: In the Star Wars soup scenario a lot of people have become militarized – corporate marketers, dieticians, mothers, and children. They may not run out to enlist in the army as soon as they have finished their lunch, but militarization is progressing nonetheless. Militarization is never simply about joining a military. It is a far more subtle process. And it sprawls over far more of the gendered social landscape. (Enloe 2000, 2) In this account, all sorts of things can become “militarized”: people, values, cultures and products. Further, “militarization” is a gendered process best understood by examining women’s experiences of it (Enloe 2000, 3). This analysis enabled the study of hitherto-unexamined connections, shedding light on the labor performed by laundresses, sex workers, military wives, nurses, mothers and other women across the globe. Building on previous work (Enloe 1983; Enloe [1989] 2014), it highlighted that investment in the military and military values is not necessary or natural: they can be disinvested from and resisted. However, the “militarization” concept underestimates the extent to which we live with war: how marginalized people, those who are racialized, disabled or poor, are subject to war-like (martial) forms of politics. Returning to Enloe’s can of soup, in a blog post critiquing the concept of militarism, Cowen makes this intervention: “If, in one of the most incisive critiques of militarism, Enloe asks ‘how do they militarize a can of soup?’ and questions how the pasta within assumes the shape of “star wars satellites,” then we are also interested in the central fact of the can” (n.d.). Napoleon commissioned the design of canning to support the supply of far-flung battlefields; “thus, the can of soup was always already ‘militarized’, and bypassing the can for the noodles hides perhaps more than it reveals” (Cowen n.d.). Drawing on other scholarship that has dispensed with the concept of “militarization” (Amoore 2009), Cowen’s (2014) later work on logistics illustrates that global supply chains have not been “militarized” or “securitized”: rather the science of logistics emerged from war. Picking up from such interventions, we can say that the can of soup, as a material object, was always already “of war” and therefore cannot accurately be said to have been “militarized.” “Militarization” frameworks cannot adequately account for this imbrication of “war” and “society” (Kienscherf 2016). This may seem like a counterintuitive statement. Isn’t the concept of “militarization” precisely about drawing out how social (gendered) relations are permeated by military values and cultures? However, by holding the categories of the military and of the social (or, war and peace) as separate until “militarization” happens, the concept implicitly presumes a status prior to militarization. It underestimates war-like forms of politics because it blithely assumes that war is “naturally” separate from the “social landscape.” In this sense, the concept is much like that of securitization (Wæver 1995; Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998), which holds that security forms the exception to politics. “Politics” (or social relations) is implicitly treated as un-security or un-military until securitizing or militarizing processes occur, even if they occur pervasively. From this perspective, a reverse process can take place: desecuritization (Wæver 1995; Aradau 2004) or demilitarization. What “militarization” holds out is the hope that military encroachment on an otherwise unmilitarized past can be reversed; this drastically underestimates the extent to which warfare and military strategy are intrinsic to “political” or “social” relations. As with the can of soup, when we dig, we usually find that those “civilian” things that are claimed to be in danger of “militarization” have much deeper roots in warfare, and that the peaceful “domestic” political order for which we yearn has been fundamentally shaped from the outset by warfare and colonial violence. The concept of militarization ironically elides the fundamentally warlike history of liberal politics precisely through its critique of (supposedly exceptional) military encroachment or trespass on them. Relatedly, research conducted through the lens of “militarization” has tended to foreground gender analysis, for example, through the concept of “militarized masculinities,” or emulation of Enloe’s focus on women’s lives. Even if we are attentive to how this may play out differently for racialized or poor women, the analytical foregrounding of “women’s lives” positions systems of gender as primary in understanding “militarization.” Gathering considerations of race, disability, poverty and Indigeneity under gender by pursuing a methodology focused in the first instance on the lives of women (or on masculinities) risks subsuming varied systems of power, leaving us unable to capture how they might work differently than gender. When we also center race, Indigeneity and disability it immediately becomes clear that there is no natural peaceful order, and that the concept of “militarization” is pallid and half-hearted in its ignorance of the war-like relations that permeate “peaceful” domestic civil order (James 1996; Davis 2002, 2003). In IR, the work of |Richter-Montpetit (2007, 2014) is central to understanding race and the production of liberal violence. She argues that torture is not an aberration from liberal order but forms part of a lineage of anti-Black violence, from the institution of chattel slavery through contemporary law and criminal justice, demonstrating that violence against racialized bodies and the law have existed in mutual relation throughout US history. Thus, “racialized taxonomies and the larger racial formation they gave rise to were not simply manufactured by law. Rather, law was shaped by, and simultaneously enabled a wider set of processes and technologies of race-making” (RichterMontpetit 2014, 52). The concept of “militarization” cannot take stock of these histories because it assumes a peaceful order that has been breached by militarism. Only by eschewing forms of analysis that assume a (breached) separation between military and civilian spheres can we avoid this kind of dangerous oversight. For this reason I propose an alternate concept: “martial politics.” “Martial” denotes that a thing is war-like, or that it derives from battle, war, or the military – that it is “of war.” It describes the process by which war and peace are imbricated. Assessing “martial politics” involves evaluating the historical roots and present expressions of this imbrication. “Martial politics” dispenses with the before/after temporality of “militarization” and the assumed separation between military and civilian, war and peace. It denies any innocent domain of “normal” politics by pointing to the martial nature of contemporary and historical political formations. “Martial politics” is the liberal norm, not the exception. Illustrating the potential value of this concept, the following sections of this article apply it to two key empirical sites of supposed “militarization”: the police and the university. The empirical material in this article focuses primarily on the US as an avowedly liberal state, and on matters that traditional IR scholars would relegate to “domestic politics” (i.e., the study of race, disability, policing, education and universities). Contrary to such traditions, the article views the US as a site of ongoing settler colonialism, founded in and continually produced through the legacy of chattel slavery, and thus very much a “global” space. From this perspective, I argue that neither the police nor the university have been “militarized” and instead illustrate how contemporary forms of policing and knowledge production are vested in longer trajectories of martial politics.

#### Liberal militarism outweighs – it causes a permanent war economy, that plays on maintaining existential threats where the US can justify actions to maintain the violence of military actions without physical presence

Hedges, 22 [Chris, former Middle East bureau chief @ New York Times, Pulitzer Prize winner, M.Div @ Harvard: “A return to permanent war is here: First it will bankrupt America, then destroy it,” published by Salon on 5-26-2022, DOA 6-24-2022, <https://www.salon.com/2022/05/26/a-return-to-permanent-is-here-first-it-will-bankrupt-america-then-destroy-it/>]CSUF JmB TDI

Democrat or Republican. It does not matter. War is the raison d'être of the state. Extravagant military expenditures are justified in the name of "national security." The nearly $40 billion allocated for Ukraine, most of it going into the hands of weapons manufacturers such as Raytheon Technologies, General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, BAE Systems, Lockheed Martin and Boeing, is only the beginning. Military strategists, who say the war will be long and protracted, are talking about infusions of $4 or $5 billion in military aid a month to Ukraine. We face existential threats. But these do not count. The proposed budget for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in fiscal year 2023 is $10.675 billion. The proposed budget for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is $11.881 billion. Ukraine alone gets more than double that amount. Pandemics and the climate emergency are afterthoughts. War is all that matters. This is a recipe for collective suicide.There were three restraints to the avarice and bloodlust of the permanent war economy that no longer exist. The first was the old liberal wing of the Democratic Party, led by politicians such as Sen. George McGovern, Sen. Eugene McCarthy and Sen. J. William Fulbright, who wrote "The Pentagon Propaganda Machine." The self-identified progressives, a pitiful minority, in Congress today, from Rep. Barbara Lee —who was the single vote in the House and the Senate opposing an open-ended authorization allowing the president to wage war in Afghanistan or anywhere else — to Rep. Ilhan Omar are now dutifully lining up to fund the latest proxy war. The second restraint was an independent media and academia, including journalists such as I.F Stone and Neil Sheehan along with scholars such as Seymour Melman, author of "The Permanent War Economy" and "Pentagon Capitalism: The Political Economy of War." Third, and perhaps most important, was an organized antiwar movement led by religious leaders such as Dorothy Day, Martin Luther King Jr. and Phil and Dan Berrigan, as well as groups such as Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). They understood that unchecked militarism was a fatal disease.None of these opposition forces, which did not reverse the permanent war economy but curbed its excesses, now exist. The two ruling parties have been bought by corporations, especially military contractors. The press is ~~anemic~~ and obsequious to the war industry. Propagandists for permanent war, largely from right-wing think tanks lavishly funded by the war industry, along with former military and intelligence officials, are exclusively quoted or interviewed as military experts. NBC's "Meet the Press" aired a segment May 13 where officials from Center for a New American Security (CNAS) simulated what a war with China over Taiwan might look like. The co-founder of CNAS, Michèle Flournoy, who appeared in the "Meet the Press" war games segment and was considered by Biden to run the Pentagon, wrote in 2020 in Foreign Affairs that the U.S. needs to develop "the capability to credibly threaten to sink all of China's military vessels, submarines and merchant ships in the South China Sea within 72 hours." The handful of anti-militarists and critics of empire from the left, such as Noam Chomsky, and the right, such as Ron Paul, have been declared persona non grata by a compliant media. The liberal class has retreated into boutique activism where issues of class, capitalism and militarism are jettisoned for "cancel culture," multiculturalism and identity politics. Liberals are cheerleading the war in Ukraine. At least the inception of the war with Iraq saw them join significant street protests. Ukraine is embraced as the latest crusade for freedom and democracy against the new Hitler. There is little hope, I fear, of rolling back or restraining the disasters being orchestrated on a national and global level. The neoconservatives and liberal interventionists chant in unison for war. Joe Biden has appointed these warmongers, whose attitude to nuclear war is terrifyingly cavalier, to run the Pentagon, the National Security Council and the State Department.Since all we do is war, all proposed solutions are military. This military adventurism accelerates the decline, as the defeat in Vietnam and the squandering of $8 trillion in the futile wars in the Middle East illustrate. War and sanctions, it is believed, will ~~cripple~~ [debilitate] Russia, rich in gas and natural resources. War, or the threat of war, will curb the growing economic and military clout of China.These are demented and dangerous fantasies, perpetrated by a ruling class that has severed itself from reality. No longer able to salvage their own society and economy, they seek to destroy those of their global competitors, especially Russia and China. Once the militarists ~~cripple~~ [incapacitate] Russia, the plan goes, they will focus military aggression on the Indo-Pacific, dominating what Hillary Clinton as secretary of state, referring to the Pacific, called "the American Sea." You cannot talk about war without talking about markets. The U.S., whose growth rate has fallen to below 2%, while China's is 8.1%, has turned to military aggression to bolster its sagging economy. If the U.S. can sever Russian gas supplies to Europe, it will force Europeans to buy from the United States. U.S. firms, at the same time, would be happy to replace the Chinese Communist Party, even if they must do it through the threat of war, to open unfettered access to Chinese markets. War, if it did break out with China, would devastate the Chinese, American and global economies, destroying free trade between countries as in World War I. But that doesn't mean it won't happen.

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## Links

### Africa

#### The US debasing project in Africa is nothing new but is an integral part that justifies the United State’s drone program which creates a territoriality of violence in which the US can maintain its military posture without physical presence

Kindervater 2017 [Katharine Hall, postdoctoral fellow in the Society of Fellows and the Department of Geography at Dartmouth College. Drone strikes, ephemeral sovereignty, and changing conceptions of territory. Territory, Politics, Governance, 5(2), 207-221.] CSUF JmB TDI

As the FBI Director’s comments about shrinking the world made at a Minneapolis press conference indicate, space is an important figure in today’s discourse surrounding the US government’s use of drones and the ever-evolving war on terror. Proponents and critics alike stress that the drone allows for shrinking space or distance and overcoming territorial limits, enabling targeting at increasingly large distances and extending the spatial reach of the military with limited risk to US soldiers. Further, perhaps in part because of these characteristics, the drone has become a weapon and surveillance tool (Kindervater, 2016) that is increasingly deployed in territories outside of war zones and met with relatively little resistance – examples of which can be found in Libya, Somalia, Pakistan, and Yemen. If the contemporary global drone wars raise questions about the changing space of war, they also produce related questions about the meaning of territory, and more specifically the relationship between territory and the projection of force. For example, as drone strikes exceed the “traditional” limits of the battlefield, does the relevance or salience of the territory of the nation-state fall away, especially as it relates to sovereignty and sovereign jurisdiction? Have new or different conceptions of territory emerged in the war on terror and contemporary drone wars? This article examines the role of territory in the United States’ deployment of lethal drones, and does so by looking at two publicly available documents that provide legal justifications for drone targeting operations. Focusing on these legal justifications throws into relief the malleable, dynamic, and multiplicitious character of territory, as well as how territory and authority are mobilized and constructed in relation to the law and the projection of force. I argue that territory is mobilized in these documents to legally justify the use of force and the reach of US sovereign power. By drawing on conceptions of territory that are dynamic and malleable, the Obama Administration attempts to place drone strikes squarely within the law, effecting a new landscape of mobile and ephemeral sovereignty that stands in contrast to conventions of state sovereignty that are fixed to static demarcations of territory. The first section of the article is devoted to a close reading of a Department of Justice memorandum and white paper, which outline the US government’s justification for drone strikes outside war zones as well as against US citizens. In these documents, how the space of war is characterized becomes important for determining the legality of a strike. Here, law/legal justification and territory work together to produce a shape-shifting field of state violence and the use of force. Territory and the space of the battlefield become important bolsters to the United States’ authority to strike, yet the concept of territory that underpins these documents is far from fixed and static. Thus, the second section turns to recent efforts by critical geographers to develop dynamic and networked concepts of territory and how this might help us to think through the significance of territory to the execution of drone strikes, leading to the emergence of a more ephemeral and fluid form of sovereignty. The article concludes by revisiting the concept of territorial design advanced in this special issue in light of this engagement with US drone strikes. As I discuss, looking at territory through the lens of the contemporary drone strike allows us to see the tensions and connections between the constitution and demarcation processes of territory as well as the multiplicity of state territory. Drone strikes, law, and territory Since September 11, 2001, two public government documents provide the most comprehensive account of the government’s justification of the use of drone strikes outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, extending state power and the projection of force outside of delineated battle spaces. The 2010 Memorandum for the Attorney General from the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (“Memorandum”) and the 2011 draft of a Department of Justice White Paper (“White Paper”) each outline a legal argument in support of drone strikes, with particular focus on the lawfulness of targeting American citizens abroad. Together, the documents reveal not so much the rationales for drone strikes, but the – sometimes contradictory and conflicting – frameworks of authority and power that the Obama administration places these strikes within. Territory is a central figure in these frameworks. In what follows, I introduce the arguments made in these documents and then look more closely at the roles of territory and the law in producing the spaces of contemporary drone wars. The 2010 Memorandum specifically focuses on affirming the legality of a drone strike targeting Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen in Yemen, by assessing whether or not the strike would violate federal criminal laws or the Constitution of the United States. The conclusion of the document –that these strikes are legal –is supported by three main arguments, which the Memorandum moves through in order, yet also keeps fairly distinct from one another. This has the effect of making it difficult for the reader to distinguish exactly what the legality of the strikes hinges on – a difficulty compounded by redacted portions of the text. The first consideration of the Memorandum is whether, in the case of targeting al-Awlaki, the actions of the government would fall under a public authority justification for the criminal codes it would otherwise violate. If the targeting of Awlaki fell under the public authority justification, it would not be considered an “unlawful killing” or murder by the state. The Memorandum argues that this justification would apply for either DoD or CIA drone strikes because it would constitute a “lawful conduct of war” (Office of Legal Counsel, 2010, p. 20). To make this argument, which is the most detailed section in the Memorandum, the authors argue that al-Awlaki as an individual falls within the scope of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). The Memorandum authors argue, “…the AUMF itself does not set forth an express geographic limitation…” (Office of Legal Counsel, 2010, p. 24). What is important, therefore, is the status of those involved in the conflict, not the location of the conflict, which is seen to extend globally and to move with the individuals involved. Following this, and in what begins to feel like circular reasoning to the reader, the Memorandum concludes that because the military would follow the rules of International Humanitarian Law in its targeting procedures, these actions would be under the conduct of war and thus fall under the public authority justification. The second and third major justifications put forward in the Memorandum rely on evidence that al-Awlaki is actively taking part (or planning to take part) in hostile actions directed against the United States. It first determines that the United States would not fall subject to the War Crimes Act because of al-Awlaki’s legitimate status as a target. Second, the Memorandum demonstrates that there are no constitutional limitations placed on killing Awlaki as a US citizen because the threat he poses is greater than the violation of his constitutional rights. The argument that the US government would prefer to capture him, but deems it infeasible, is used to bolster this claim. Any evidence presented that the United States had tried to capture him, if it exists, has been redacted. Focused also on the targeted killing of a US citizen more generally, and not directly referencing al-Awlaki, the 2011 Department of Justice White Paper parallels many of the arguments and conclusions outlined in the 2010 Memorandum, with sections focused on Constitutional limitations, the public authority justification, and war crimes. The 2011 White Paper, however, adds a more specific legal framework for when lethal force is justified. It states that: …where the following three conditions are met, a U.S. operation using lethal force in a foreign country against a U.S. citizen who is a senior operational leader of al-Qa’ida or an associated force would be lawful: (1) an informed, high-level official of the U.S. government has determined that the targeted individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States; (2) capture is infeasible, and the United States continues to monitor whether capture becomes feasible; and (3) the operation would be conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of war principles (Department of Justice, 2011, p. 1). These three stipulations represent the most concise guidelines across available government documents for the authority to strike, and they center on an official within the US government making the determination of a threat. Once this determination is made, and the individual target in question is associated with a terrorist group, killing this individual is deemed lawful as long as capturing him/her is seen as difficult and the “laws of war” are followed. Focusing on the first stipulation, a central component of the target determination is whether or not the individual poses an imminent threat. Much of the justification for this stipulation that follows in the White Paper deals with what constitutes an imminent threat and how norms of sovereignty and territory are taken into consideration. According to its authors, the possibility of an imminent threat authorizes the United States to target an individual under the justification of self-defense (Department of Justice, 2011, p. 1). This targeting practice also does not violate another state’s sovereignty, such as Yemen or Pakistan’s sovereignty; either the lethal action is undertaken with the consent of that state, or that state is unwilling to accept or take action on its own, rendering US action justified by the immediacy of the threat. In other words, imminent threat trumps other states’ control of their own territories. In addition to self-defense, the White Paper also draws on the AUMF for justification of targeted killing outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, arguing that under the AUMF the United States is involved in a “non-international conflict” with terrorist groups whose nature (as per the AUMF remit) has no geographical limitation. The categorization here of “non-international conflict” is a legal term found in the laws of armed conflict and refers to a conflict between a state and non-state organized armed groups. This is contrasted to an “international” conflict between two states. The White Paper thus essentially defines the drone strike as an act of war in two ways, or from two angles. The first is through the AUMF – that these strikes fit within the scope of this authorization of force. The second is through the definition of a non-international conflict – that the nature of the US engagement against terrorist groups puts it within this type of conflict, and therefore expands it globally. While this might be redundant (the 2011 White Paper is no more clear and no less circular than the 2010 Memorandum), the authors clearly seek to emphasize the lack of geographical limits and territorial boundaries to the potential scope of drone strikes and US projection of force and authority. The self-defense and AUMF/non-international conflict justifications come together in a peculiar way around the idea of a threat’s imminence. In the White Paper the authors are working with a general and fairly broader concept of imminence, one that is tied more to the longer temporality of the war on terror (Department of Justice, 2011, p. 7). An imminent threat is not a “ticking time bomb” scenario, but rather signaled by participation in a terrorist group that is continuously planning attacks. At first glance, it is unclear why the argument of imminent threat is necessary to the legal framework if, as the 2010 Memorandum (along with parts of the 2011 White Paper) makes clear, attacks against Al-Qaeda members and affiliates are justified globally under the AUMF and the existence of a “non-international conflict.” The broad concept of imminence seems unnecessary and redundant, perhaps even adding further confusion. Yet the emphasis on imminence reflects the importance of temporality to the justification of lethal force. This is not a long-standing or permanent justification, but rather one that is temporary, ephemeral, and must be repeatedly renewed for the individual/threat in question, wherever they are located. Connected to this particular understanding of imminent threat, in both the Memorandum and the White Paper the drone strike is also justified spatially. The interpretation of the AUMF as having no geographical limits and the definition of “non-international conflict” as not tied to states gives the legal framework of drone strikes global reach. Indeed, the landscape of force projection that emerges out of these documents renders “non-international conflict” sort of a misnomer: it might be better described as a hyper-international or global conflict. In this understanding of conflict, “traditional” or “fixed” international boundaries do not matter in the way they seem to have in the past (as containers or delimiters of violence, reach of power, etc), at least when it comes to determining where force can or cannot be used. In this legal view, drones strikes outside of Afghanistan and Iraq are not beyond the battlefield; they rather are incorporated in a redefined battlefield. Furthermore, this is a battlefield tied less to territorial space and more to the individual who produces that battlefield through his/her associations or actions. Recent critical scholarship in geography seeks to make sense of this redefined battlefield or battle space as it relates to the use of drones, and a common theme in this scholarship is the role that law plays in justifying and extending the use of force: it is through law that geographies of war are expanding and changing. This emphasis on law seems to fit with the US government’s selection of the law as the avenue through which to justify strikes, even if the legal arguments themselves are incomplete, fuzzy, or debatable. While there is a rich and growing set of literature on war and law, here I focus on three prominent examples from this scholarship in geography that address drone strikes and the space of contemporary war specifically and demonstrate how law and violence are intertwined in different ways: (1) Derek Gregory’s writings on the geography of drones strikes, particularly as it relates to his concept of the “everywhere war,” (2) Ian Shaw and Majed Akhter’s exploration of the relationship between law and technology, and (3) John Morrissey’s mobilization of the term “lawfare.” Taken together, these scholars help us to think about the role of law in producing contemporary geographies of war, but also point the way forward from the analysis of the Memorandum and White Paper above to understanding the role of territory as a political technology (Elden, 2010) in shaping the Obama administration’s legal justifications for drone strikes. In “Drone Geographies,” Derek Gregory argues that drones must be understood within a matrix of military violence that is connected to and producing new visualities and experiences of the battlefield (Gregory, 2014, p. 7). Running through his discussion of various components of this matrix (which includes the development of homeland security, techniques of viewing at a distancing, and the emergence of global threats) is a sense that a new spatiality of war is emerging. War is no longer “over there” or contained within a defined geographical area; rather the “there” of war is “everywhere.” The concept of everywhere war captures not only the endless nature of war today – its persistent temporality – but also its spatial scope, where it is increasingly difficult to delineate spaces of war from spaces of peace (Gregory, 2011, p. 238-239). In everywhere war, the global spatiality of war is tied to its temporality, which has become increasingly “event-ful.” Violence can now happen anywhere, at any time: Violence can erupt on a commuter train in Madrid, a house in Gaza City, a poppy field in Helmand or a street in Ciudad Juarez: such is the contrapuntal geography of the everywhere war. It is also to claim that, as cartographic reason falters and military violence is loosed from its frames, the conventional ties between war and geography have come undone… (Gregory, 2011, p. 239) Gregory explores three cases of the everywhere war: US drone attacks in Pakistan, the drug war between the United States and Mexico, and cyberwar. These examples show the blurring of the boundaries of war and violence more generally. Furthermore, Gregory finds that the question of legality features prominently in each case. It “runs like a red ribbon throughout the prosecution of late modern war” (Gregory, 2011, p. 247). For Gregory, the everywhere war spreads largely because war is framed in a seemingly neutral and objective legal language. For example, when drone strikes, even those carried out by the CIA, are justified through an urgent and legal language of “self-defense” – as we saw for example in the Memorandum and White Paper – little attention is given to civilian casualties or to the strikes’ ever-expanding nature. The legal framework thus serves to mask the effects of its violence, at least from a Western point of view. For Gregory, framing this violence within a legal apparatus is key to enabling the everywhere war, and involves an intensifying relationship between legality, security, and war. As Gregory concludes: The invocation of legality works to marginalize ethics and politics by making available a seemingly neutral, objective language: disagreement and debate then become purely technical issues that involve matters of opinion, certainly, but not values. The appeal to legality – and to the quasi-judicial process it invokes – thus helps to authorize a widespread and widening militarism of our world. (Gregory, 2011, p. 247) Ian Shaw and Majed Akhter take up how this legal apparatus works more explicitly in their investigation of the relationship between law and technology in drone strikes in the FATA region of Pakistan. Looking at the increase of drone strikes in FATA as well as the history of the region, Shaw and Akhter argue that FATA is produced as an exceptional place – justifying continuing violence and violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty – through the region’s legal status and through the object of the drone itself. FATA has been an exception within Pakistani law (here they draw on Agamben’s concept of the space of exception) since at least the 1901 Frontier Crimes Regulation, which rendered the area outside of the reach of the law. The Pakistani government has continued this designation in one form or another up to the present. While FATA long has been a frontier region where law is suspended, what is significant about contemporary drone strikes in FATA is how law (as the suspension of law) works along with the object of the drone to create FATA also as a space of exception for the United States (Shaw and Akhter, 2012, p. 1497). They suggest that the drone itself acts as an exception of sorts, making certain actions inside FATA acceptable. As Shaw and Akhter argue, the drone is an object that has been fetishized by the military so that its human element or relations are rendered invisible (Shaw and Akhter, 2012, p. 1492). It is, in other words, the drone that can be used in FATA, not other military technologies: …the legal-historical geography of the terrain acts in concert with the object itself to produce drone warfare in FATA: it is not simply a matter of drones operating over an undifferentiated enemy landscape. Rather, uneven geo-legalities of war, state, and exception make drone warfare a reality in certain spaces and not others. (Shaw and Akhter, 2012, p. 1500) In examining the intersections of law, geography, and technology in FATA, Shaw and Akhter provide insight into the specificities of the FATA region, yet it is not clear how their argument holds up when other kinds of incursions into Pakistan are considered, such as the Navy Seal raid that killed Osama bin Laden, or when the lens is turned to other drone strikes around the globe, such as those in Yemen or Somalia. Something more fundamental seems to be happening in the relationship between law, territory, and expanding spaces of killing. Trying to understand the more general relationship between war, space, and law (Jones and Smith, 2015), some geographers have turned to the concept of “lawfare” –a term describing the waging of war through law or the weaponization of law. John Morrissey argues that the United States has deployed two forms of lawfare in waging the war on terror. The first is through detention and rendition, creating exceptional spaces where individuals lose their legal status. The second is through the protection of military personnel in forward deployed areas, where soldiers and individuals connected to the military are granted legal status in expanding new spaces of war. Both of these ways that law is extended or negated are biopolitical, Morrissey argues, and involve the regulation of life and management of populations (Morrissey, 2011, p. 285). In other words, war and violence expand through lawfare, understood by Morrissey as a technique of biopolitics, implying that biopolitics merges with geopolitics (Morrissey, 2011, p. 290). As Morrissey writes, “The US military’s liberal lawfare reveals how the rule of law is simply another securitization tactic in liberalism’s ‘pursuit of security’; a pursuit that paradoxically eliminates fundamental rights and freedoms in the ‘name of security’” (Morrissey, 2011, p. 297). Morrissey and others thus provide a way to understand how law functions as a fundamental component of contemporary war. Law is central across this scholarship, albeit in different ways, to understanding the expanding deployment of drones. Drone strikes are not exceptions to the law, but rather the law is an important factor in the production of contemporary drone wars. A chief way that this works in the Obama administration’s legal justifications is through a reimagining of territory. The mobilization of territory in these legal texts, and in particular a reworking of state power in relation to territory, is a key aspect supporting the use of drone strikes. Bringing a more dynamic concept of territory to bear on this legal framework reveals not just that war and state violence are expanding through lawfare, but that both the meaning of state sovereignty and the spatiality of the projection of force is changing similarly as well.

### Debasing Movements

#### Securitizing of political revolutions cedes power to fascists that make conflict more likely

Saliba 15 [Ilyas Saliba](http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2015/03/18/the-securitisation-of-stability-and-the-demise-of-the-arab-uprisings/www.ilyas-saliba.com) is a PhD student at the Humboldt University zu Berlin and research fellow at the Berlin Social Science Center (WZB) Department for Democracy & Democratization “The Securitisation of Stability and the Demise of the Arab Uprisings” CSUF JmB TDI

The uprisings that swept across the Arab World in 2011 were remarkable in many ways. They constituted a serious challenge to the authority of the most coherent bloc of authoritarian regimes. During spring that year, the streets across Arab capitals were filled with people expressing their grievances and demanding change. The protests broke with the orientalist and paternalistic perception of ‘respected’ authoritarian leaders. The Arab uprisings also taught us that demography matters. It was the disenfranchised youth that initiated the protests in most places, a faction of society that never before appeared on the stage as a relevant political actor. Young Arabs assembled and screamed the same slogans towards the parliaments and palaces from Sanaa to Rabat. Despite all that, four years on – except for Tunisia – we are left with consolidated dictatorship,[and] outright civil war or failed states, recently illustrated by the coup of the Houthi militia in Yemen and the violent fourth anniversary of the revolution in Egypt. Although the phenomena of state disintegration and the reinstatement of strongmen such as Al-Sisi in Cairo seem to be at opposite ends of a spectrum, they are closely related. The revival of authoritarianism after popular uprisings against these regimes can partly be explained by the failure to consolidate stability, in Libya, Egypt and Yemen. Consequently, fellow despots the region legitimised their crack down of protests with increasing instability in the neighbourhood and the deteriorating regional security situation. Thus beyond specific domestic drivers the restoration of authoritarian rule can be seen as a response to increasing uncertainty about the outcomes of the Arab revolutions. Popular support for mass protests throughout the region dramatically declined over the course of 2011. In some instances, this was due to the coercive response by the regimes (as in Syria or Bahrain). In others, the decline can partly be explained by fear of instability (Morocco, Jordan and Algeria). An activist from the protest movement in Morocco summed up: ‘the aftermath of the popular uprisings in Syria, Libya and Egypt scared the people from the street. They preferred stability over the possibility of chaos’.[\*](http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2015/03/18/the-securitisation-of-stability-and-the-demise-of-the-arab-uprisings/#link) Many regimes credibly established the importance of security and stability as an effective counter narrative to the expression of grievances under authoritarian rule. The former general and new Egyptian president Al-Sisi drew on the longing for security and stability in parts of the population setting out his[candidacy for the presidential office](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/26/sisi-resigns-egypt-military-run-for-presidency) saying: ‘We are threatened by the terrorist […] who seek the destruction of our life, safety and security’. This emphasis on law-and-order in the face of spreading instability and crumbling statehood went hand in hand with denying any legitimate alternative to the politics of an iron fist. In fact, demonising political opponents as anarchists or fundamentalists is part of the winning strategy. Such rhetoric can increasingly be found in speeches of autocrats across the region from Bashar Al Assad to Mohammed VI of Morocco: [‘There are no degrees of patriotism or of treason. For either one is a patriot, or one is a traitor.’](http://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2014/11/143369/full-text-of-king-mohammed-vis-speech-on-39th-anniversary-of-green-march/) The construction of a threat in the face of a popular uprising is not a new strategy and has proven effective for those states that were able to avoid a regime breakdown. It has a similarity with what the [Carl Schmitt once described as the friend-enemy distinction](https://www.toqonline.com/blog/carl-schmitts-concept-of-the-political/). However, even in Tunisia – the lighthouse of the Arab Uprisings – threat scenarios are constantly [used by parts of the old elite](http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/issue-briefs/reforming-tunisia-s-troubled-security-sector) to prevent substantial reform of the interior ministry and the related security forces. Amine Khali a Tunisian researcher working on transitional justice said: ‘The window for security sector reform is closing. The interior ministry successfully pacted with old and new elites in the face of growing security concerns in order to avoid substantial reform and accountability’.[\*](http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2015/03/18/the-securitisation-of-stability-and-the-demise-of-the-arab-uprisings/#link) What is so worrying about this development? The answer boils down to the fact that the authoritarian elements have prevented change by successfully creating a threat and imposing themselves as the only alternative. They have instrumentalised fear in their favour and ultimately [securitised](http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0091.xml) the regimes themselves. After this rather pessimistic account one question remains: What lessons can we draw from this? As mentioned in the beginning of the article, an entire generation, which constitutes the majority of the population in the Arab World, has risen up against oppression. Although they might become disillusioned and fall back into political apathy, their grievances will not fade as long as despotism reigns in the region. For as long as the underlying reasons are not addressed the new stability of the iron fist might only be short-lived. The next time the young generation makes their voices heard the West should be prepared to stand by their side. To help them overcome the fear of chaos and anarchy.Pressing for an inclusive and open transition process in which less institutionalised civil society groups have a real say in the political negotiations that determine the rules of the game can ensure the participation of oftentimes-sidelined groups. Empowering less institutionalised groups through capacity building and resources provides another option.Most importantly, the acceptance of the rules that apply for a smooth political transition process has to be ensured. Compliance with such rules should be monitored and insisted upon by foreign governments as well as activists and politicians in transitioning countries alike. Installing credible independent arbitration mechanisms domestically and regional or even international ones to intermediate in times of crisis between actors in negotiations might help to avoid one-sided escalations of politicised debates in crucial areas.A rush to fast elections not only marginalises less institutionalised groups (such as the youth) but also introduces competition for political power and thus makes consensual decision-making amongst actors less likely. The balance between inclusion, consensus and universal suffrage at the ballot box is crucial for transition processes and has to align legal as well as democratic standards to avoid alienation amongst actors during a first transition phase.All the three aforementioned points: inclusive and consensual decision-making, limited politicisation and competition and the respect of the rules and the transition roadmap are crucial in order to avoid sliding from uncertainty into violence, conflict or even disintegration.

### Demilitarization

#### The affirmatives articulation of demilitarization as a benign anti-imperial action plays into a system of global governance that seeks to integrate all opposition into the liberal order. Imperialism isn’t about territorial acquisition; it is a structure of feeling that requires the narrative of the grateful native to sustain itself, like how the insidiousness of the aff is hidden by tropes of altruism. They actually advance and streamline the development of new counter-insurgent tactics facilitated by spatial peace-making.

Wai 14 [Zubairu Wai is an associate professor of Political Science at Lakehead University. Professor Wai*'s* research focuses on questions about power, knowledge, identity, and representation in the discourses, and political economy of violence, conflicts, state formation, development, and international interventionism, as well as on epistemological questions regarding the conditions of Africanist knowledge, and disciplinary practices in African Studies and International Relations. “The empire's new clothes: Africa, liberal interventionism and contemporary world order,” *Review of African Political Economy*, 42: 142, 2014) CSUF JmB TDI

**In Global Governance and New Wars** (2001)**, British political scientist Mark Duffield tells the story of how, as a result of conflicts in the 1990s, and concerns in the West about their implications for global peace and security, a major political project was formulated, the expressed aim of which was to impose what he calls a ‘liberal peace’ on the areas in the South affected by incidents of political unrest, civil wars and armed conflicts.** This liberal peace project, Duffield tells us, is produced and exerted through a strategic complex of actors and achieved through a set of practices among which is the radicalisation of development and the incorporation of conflicts and security in development discourse and practice. **Discursively, underdevelopment, which was once understood as an economic condition, has now been redefined as a dangerous political condition that not only causes conflict, but also engenders a vicious circle of self-perpetrating and mutually reinforcing violence and impoverishment** (38)**.** As a result, a new politics of developmentalism, of which humanitarian interventionism is an integral part, has resulted from a fundamental shift in official aid policy towards both conflict resolution and the reconstruction and transformation of conflict societies along contemporary liberal ideologies of governance favoured by the West. The transformational aims of these policy prescriptions are thus embodied in this new global politics of development and humanitarian interventionism legislated and promoted by the major Western governments and their aid agencies, the United Nations and its specialised agencies, the International Financial Institutions, donor and aid organisations, international NGOs and so forth. Rather than merely being a technical system of support for Southern societies affected by political unrest, civil wars, armed conflicts, humanitarian disasters or ‘state failure’, these arrangements, Duffield tells us, are part of a larger system of global governance, the transformational aims of which are to pacify Southern societies and impose a liberal peace on their disorderly terrains. That is, a new politics of ‘humanitarianism that lays emphasis on such things as conflict resolution and prevention, reconstructing social networks, strengthening civil and representative institutions, promoting the rule of law, and security sector reform in the context of a functioning market economy’ (2001, 11). From this per- spective, ‘liberal peace’ is an altruistic political project born out of the West’s desire to pacify the world by dealing with conflicts and humanitarian disasters which are now thought to not only constitute a development and humanitarian challenge for the societies in which they occur, but also constitute a security threat and challenge for the West. One would have expected that a scholar who has the good sense to recognise these pro- cesses along the lines he specifies would, at least, be alarmed by their political implications, if not critical of their ethos and the types of power relations they are embedded in and make possible. **However, Duffield does not seem to be bothered by this liberal interventionist project. He defines it as a ‘shared system of moral responsibility’** (2001, 260) **even though he argues that this new ethico-political reality represents a ‘moral rearming of the West’.** He dismisses those, such as Noam Chomsky (1999) and Frank Furedi (1994) among others, who have drawn attention to the fact that this enhanced ability of the West to intervene and impose its will on Southern societies is a function of a new ideology of imperialism, as harking back to an outmoded thinking that is incapable of coming to terms with a form of power and authority that is radically different from imperialism. To Duffield, the new politics of humanitarian interventionism, and the system of global gov- ernance that potentiates it, does not represent ‘an unchanging reality’ or the reworking of old imperialist formulas. Rather it is based on ‘liberal power’, not ‘imperial power’ (which assumes that liberal power cannot in fact also be imperial power). He writes: The current concern of global governance is to establish a liberal peace on its troubled borders: to resolve conflicts, reconstruct societies and establish functioning market economies as a way of avoiding future wars. The ultimate goal of liberal peace is stability. In achieving this aim, liberal peace is different from imperial peace. The latter was based on, or at least aspired to, direct territorial control where populations were ruled through juridical and bureaucratic means of authority. The imperial power dealt with opposition using physical and juridical forms of pacification, sometimes in an extreme and violent manner. Liberal peace is different; it is a non-territorial, mutable and networked relation of governance. The aim of the strategic state – non-state complexes that embody global governance is not the direct control of territory. Ideally, liberal power is based on the management and regulation of economic, political and social processes. It is power through the control and management of non-territorial systems and networks. As a result, liberal strategic complexes are usually averse to the long-term costs and responsibilities that controlling territory implies. (Duffield 2001, 34) The implication of this argument is that the current militarisation of Africa through Western interventions in places such as Coˆte d’Ivoire, Libya, Mali, CAR, among others, should be seen as attempts by the West at pacifying a turbulent continent given to internecine conflicts, and establishing a liberal peace on the disorderly terrains of its ‘illiberal spaces’. They are not imperialistic because they do not thrive on direct territorial control, and other forms of juridical, bureaucratic and militaristic forms of rule exerted from an imperial centre of authority. What this means in turn is that, for Duffield (2001), a system of dom- ination can only be imperialistic if it is based on a territorial acquisitive logic that imposes or seeks to impose its rule spatially through physical, juridical and bureaucratic forms of power and control. This characterisation of contemporary world order converges with that of Hardt and Negri (2000), who have suggested the passage of global power from an order based on the ascendancy of the nation-state to another based on the structural irrelevance of the nation-state. They write: The boundaries defined by the modern system of nation-states were fundamental to European colonial and economic expansion: the territorial boundaries of the nation delimited the centre of power from which rule was exerted over external foreign territories through a system of chan- nels and barriers that alternately facilitated and obstructed the flows of production and circula- tion. Imperialism was really an extension of the sovereignty of the European nation-states beyond their own boundaries. Eventually nearly all the world’s territories could be parcelled out and the entire world map could be coded in European colours: red for British territory, blue for French, green for Portuguese, and so forth. Wherever modern sovereignty took root, it constructed a Leviathan that overarched its social domain and imposed hierarchical territorial boundaries, both to police the purity of its own identity and to exclude all that was other. (xii) In contrast to imperialism is what Hardt and Negri call Empire, which they posit as the new order that has, since the end of the Cold War, been effectively regulating global relations. Empire, they tell us, does not establish any territorial centre of power, nor does it rely on fixed boundaries or barriers in exerting its authority. Rather, it is ‘a decentred and deterritorialising apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers’ (2000, xii, emphasis in original). A geocentric order ‘com- posed of a series of national and supranational organisms united under a single logic of rule’, Empire is the political project that effectively regulates global exchanges and the new global sovereign power that governs the realm of global economic and social relations (Ibid.). The reluctance of many theorists to recognise these major shifts in global power, Hardt and Negri contend, owes largely to the fact that ‘they see that the dominant capitalist nation- states have continued to exercise imperialist domination over the other nations and regions of the globe’. While not underestimating ‘these real and important lines of continuity’, it is important, they counter, ‘that what used to be conflict or competition among several imperi- alist powers has in important respects been replaced by the idea of a single power that over- determines them all, structures them in a unitary way, and treats them under one common notion of right’ (2000, 9). The power thus involved is fundamentally new and therefore not merely a simple reformulation and perfecting of old imperialist practices, as most theorists of contemporary world order believe. It is ‘a new notion of right . . . a new inscription of authority and a new design of the production of norms and legal instruments of coercion that guarantee contracts and resolve conflicts’ (7). In this sense, Empire ‘marks a paradigm shift’ in global politics (Hardt and Negri 2000, 8, emphasis in original). The United States might occupy a privileged position in this new global reconstitution of imperial authority, Hardt and Negri tell us, and this is partially explained by the continuity of its importance from being the principal figure in the struggle against international socialism and the Soviet Union to being the central figure in the newly unified imperial world order.However, it is not the centre of a new imperialism nor the new imperialist power. And, even though the power of Empire ‘is born through the global expansion of the internal US constitutional project’, the United States ‘does not, and indeed no nation can today form the centre of an imperialist project’ (2000, 182, xiv). Empire, thus, should be understood as imperial not imperialist, for in contrast with imperialism, which always seeks ‘to spread its power linearly in closed spaces and invade, destroy and subsume subject countries within its sovereignty’, Empire ‘is constructed on the model of rearticulating an open space and reinventing incessantly diverse and singular relations in networks across an unborn terrain’ (182). It therefore ‘can only be conceived as a univer- sal republic, a network of powers and counterpowers structured in a boundless and inclusive architecture. This imperial expansion has nothing to do with imperialism, nor with those state organisms designed for conquest, pillage, genocide, colonisation, and slavery. Against such imperialisms, Empire expands and consolidates the model of network power’ (166). In this regard, those which were once ‘the distinct national colours of the imperialist map of the world have merged and blended in the imperial global rainbow’ (xiii). Liberal peace, Empire or postcolonial imperialism? It is not my intention to rehearse here the criticisms that have been levied against Duffield and, especially, Hardt and Negri, in part, because I believe that they offer compelling, even if ideologically ambivalent and depoliticised accounts of contemporary world order. What I want to do instead is call into question the problematic ways they have interpreted that order, the power which produces it, the system of domination it makes possible, and the logic that undergirds the ethos of its practice. Central to this is an origin-diffusion problem based on a ‘first in Europe then elsewhere’ structure of time (Chakrabarty 2000, 8); that is, a historicist evolutionist epistemology that posits the West as the only rational Hegelian historical subject capable of inscribing world-historical events and processes (Wai 2012). **In this epistemological schema, and the Eurocentric accounts they construct, the non-west only features as areas or objects to be acted upon by a historically stalwart Western agency that for Duffield, is transforming the world in the quest for stability and thus is imposing a liberal peace on the illiberal spaces and turbulent terrain of the South; and for Hardt and Negri, has inscribed a transformational global system that originates in, and spreads outward from, the West to the rest, reconstituting world order and presiding over a number of transitions: from disciplinary society to society of control; from state- based sovereignty to geocentric sovereignty that has revealed the structural irrelevance of the nation-state, and from imperialism to Empire of capital. All of these processes are assumed to have their origins in the West, and then diffused outward to the rest of the World.** Remaining faithful to epistemological schemas that construct hierarchies of power and knowledge and mobilise Eurocentric categories to colonise other ways of knowing and being, these analyses tell us very little about the role of the South, other than as areas acted upon by a historically dynamic Western agency. **Coming from the dominant and dominating milieus, our authors’ interpretations thus betray a fidelity to a positionality and privilege of location that is firmly ensconced in the traditions of their ethnos.** This is, in part, what pushes them to theorise global processes from the certainty of Eurocentric perspectives that prevents them from seeing the form of power that the current liberal world order is: a violent and intrusive imperialistic power that hides its will to domination in tropes of altruism and facile concerns over human rights. **Linked to this is the hasty rush to judgement about the nature of an emerging world order in the immediate post-Cold War environment.** The old, as Gramsci (1971) would say, was dying, but the new which was coming into being was not exactly known, so many began to speculate and, in some cases, rushed to hasty conclusions about the nature of political processes unfolding under concrete historical conditions. **Disciplinary international relations scholars and globalisation theorists, for example, had a field day in trying to decipher this emerging global power-political landscape.** In the ‘hysteria of naming’ (Stallybrass 1990) which followed, the race was on to coin the best phrase or come up with the best moniker and the next big idea to describe or capture the changing configurations in an emergent but still uncertain world order. Francis Fukuyama (1989), for example, inscribed his ‘end of history’ thesis on a vulgar Hegelian historicist ideological landscape (Roth 1995). **In crude cultural essentialist language, Samuel Huntington** (1993) **warned of a ‘clash of civilisation’.** **An almost hysterical Robert Kaplan** (1994) **claimed to have detected ‘a coming anarchy’ in West Africa, a nightmarish scenario of criminal violence, bloody conflicts and state implosion, demographic stress, environmental degradation and resource scarcity that he posited as the fate of the rest of the world, depicting it in the crassest sensational journalistic language.** Some of the other epithets used were ‘Jihad vs. McWorld’ (Barber 1992), ‘Clash of Fundamentalisms’ (Ali 2003), ‘Clash of Globalisa- tions’ (Gill 2003) and, for our present purpose, ‘Empire’ (Hardt and Negri 2000) and ‘Liberal Peace’ (Duffield 2001). The problem though was that the theories and concepts used were less suggestive of an emerging global power structure and more indicative of a supposedly definitive and extant world order; they were less speculative and more depictive of reality imagined as actually existing, as if the new landscape of global power were not a formative process forged out of multiple conjunctural agonistics, but one that had come into being fully formed and already crystallised into the world order imagined or speculated about. It is within this general atmosphere that Empire and Global Governance and New Wars emerged. Hardt and Negri, for example, admit to locating the conception of their project at the midpoint between the Persian Gulf War (1991) and the war in Kosovo (1999), which they understand as signal events in the construction of Empire (2000, xvii). The fact that the ‘world’ (through the United Nations) appeared to have acted in concert to militarily evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1990 – 91, and Western states, under the banner of NATO, intervened against Serbian forces in Kosovo in 1999, seemed to have signalled the emergence of a world order based on a single network of power that they would go on to theorise as Empire. Conveniently forgetting the numerous other cases even during this period (Bosnia, East Timor, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia etc.) that tended to suggest a world in flux, this rush to judgement about processes unfolding under concrete historical conditions now came to highlight the inadequacy of a theoretical enterprise which had been predicated on the rejection of imperialism as a reality of contemporary world order, once an angry United States began to explicitly reassert its power and tried to redefine the world in its image in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Imperialism that Hardt and Negri had told us was over now stood stark and manifested itself rather forcefully, as the US and its allies grappled with the uncertainties of a rapidly changing reality of world order, and sought to gain control over it. The second issue relates to our authors’ problematic and (even static) conception of imperialism, which they see primarily as a territorial acquisitive phenomenon. For Duffield as well as Hardt and Negri, and this has already been mentioned earlier, a system of dom- ination only qualifies as imperialistic if it has a territorial acquisitive logic. **Imperialism, however, is not, and has never been, a static and unchanging reality of power and domination.** It does not have to function, and has never really functioned, only through a single logic of rule or method of operation. It does not have to be a territorial acquisitive phenom- enon for it to be imperialist; and though it usually does, it does not even necessarily have to have an overtly economic logic for it to be imperialist. **As Edward Said** (1993) **often reminded us, imperialism is more than an economic or territorial acquisitive phenomenon.** A system of domination, it is more than simple acts of accumulation and acquisition for it occurs on and ‘beyond the level of economic laws and political decisions’ to conquer, to annex, to dominate and to exploit. Rather, it also is an ideational phenomenon, usually ‘supported, and perhaps even impelled, by impressive ideological formations that include notions that certain territories and people require and beseech domination, as well as forms of knowledge affiliated with domination’ (9). **These impressive ideological formations constitute a ‘structure of feeling’ about ‘empire’, which, in the words of Sherene Razack, designates a ‘deeply held belief in the need and the right to dominate others for their own good’** (2004, 10)**.** It is this structure of feeling that defines the self-conceptions of individuals living within the imperial centres ‘believing deeply in the “illusion of benevolence” and requiring, as before, grateful natives’ (Ibid.). Imperialism is a complex and multi-faceted reality of power. It covers, as Robert Young (2001) reminds us, ‘a range of relationships of domination and dependence that can be characterised according to historical and theoretical or organisational differences’ (26). **Originally used to designate ‘a political system of actual conquest and occupation’, and increasingly coming to be associated with the Marxist conception ‘as a general system of economic domination, with direct political domination being a possible but not necessary adjunct’** (Ibid.)**,** imperialism today plays itself out more as a set of relationships (both formal and informal, direct and indirect) which involves the processes, policies and practices by which empire is established and maintained, and by which a state or group of states controls or seeks to control the effective political destinies of other states and societies, and this can be achieved by force of arms, political persuasion and collaboration, economic, social or cultural imposition, coercion and dependence (Doyle 1986, 45). It also involves ‘the practice, the theory and attitude of a dominating metropolitan centre in relation to the distant territories and peoples’ it directly or indirectly controls, dominates and exploits (Said 1993, 9). **It thus can function perfectly without any formal colonisation or acquisition of territories. In fact, it can even also function against its own economic interests** (Young 2001)**.** From the preceding, I contend that that which has been conceptualised as Empire and liberal peace is in fact a neo-imperialist posture potentiated by a Western will to power and domination. **It is a desire or an attempt at restructuring global power and imposing an imperial order on the world.** However, this desire does not transform the violent and hierarchical form of power it is constitutive of into a decentred and deterritorialised phenomenon. Neither does it represent a disinterested reality of global do-goodism and benevolence, as is usually suggested in studies purporting to explain the current imperial moment we live in. Rather, it is a hierarchical notion of power that re-territorialises and re-centres global relations within blocks of power through spatial displacement and the redefinition of traditional notions of sovereignty, while reworking, and even perfecting, the violent and exploitative logics of imperial power that have historically violated the integrity of non-Western societies and still stand in the way of especially African self-determination into diffused networks of power and privilege. **Empire and liberal peace are manifestations of this neo-imperialistic posture: a reality of imperial globality; imperialism without empire, or colonialism without colonies; in other words, postcolonial imperialism.** Obviously, these relations of domination are not static and unchanging, neither are they unchallenged and haplessly absorbed, but constantly mutate and are reconstituted through hierarchical modes of power as well as through appropriating the concerns of anti-colonial forces aimed at the negation of such imperialistic orders**.** This imperial reality is both geopolitical, in that it aims to project the power and political, economic and ideological interests of the dominant states in the world through the production and domination of the global space; and geocentric, in projecting its power through the spatial politics of seeking to unite the entire global sphere under a single network of imperial authority. **However, the fact that this notion of right is liberal, or that Western powers now broadly agree on how to approach their imperial politics of domination, does not make it post-imperialist.** What this signifies instead is the intensification, or maybe even perfection, of an imperial politics of domination produced and impelled by a ‘liberal consensus’ in the West. By liberal consensus, I refer to the ideological convergence in the West about the need to remake the world and impose liberal governance mechanisms on global socio-economic and political relations (Harvey 2005). Just as nineteenth-century Europe used the occidental mantle of a ‘civilising mission’ to justify its imperial domination of the world, **postcolonial imperialism has defined its political project on the basis of the need to pacify the world through the use of juridical and militaristic modes of interventions in order to structure the world in line with the ideological preferences of liberalism and Western ‘universal’ norms and cosmopolitan values. Among these are the trinity of democracy, human rights and good governance, and the imposition of neoliberal market mechanisms on global social relations: deregulation, liberalisation, privatisation and financialisation.**

### Hegemony

#### America’s unipolar moment is over, American hegemony is in retreat – from the undemocratic wars of regime change to liberal guise of transforming armies against armies to armies against humanity – you should take a risk on the collapse of US unipolarity because the sustainment of US hegemony is a paradigm of ongoing transition wars, violent imperial wars, and the coercive policies against other powers that make war inevitable – the 2AC will be a bunch of Ben Shapiro deflection tactics of China/Russia is a worse global hegemon to justify their “humane” approach to deter China/Russia all this to say that they detach from the ongoing structure of violence that is maintained through the current hegemonic structure

Morefield 21 (Jeanne is Associate Professor of Political Theory and Fellow at New College Jacobin How Liberalism Justifies the Forever Wars [https://www.jacobinmag.com/2021/10/samuel-moyn-humane-review-liberalism-imperialism-war-human-rights Accessed 1-20-2022](https://www.jacobinmag.com/2021/10/samuel-moyn-humane-review-liberalism-imperialism-war-human-rights%20Accessed%201-20-2022)) CSUF JmB TDI

Samuel Moyn’s Humane: How the United States Abandoned Peace and Reinvented War follows the historical ascendance of the idea that war should be fought “humanely.” The book is an important extension of themes he has been developing since his critical account of “human rights” in 2010’s The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History. Over the last half-century, according to Moyn, liberal activists, organizations, states, and (most notably) international lawyers, have thrown their weight behind the development of international norms grounded in our shared, universal “humanity.” In The Last Utopia, Moyn described how the world’s great powers weaponized these norms against anti-colonial and Third Worldist movements in the 1970s and ’80s. His latest book similarly highlights the way “humane war” serves as a conceptual Trojan Horse for a dystopic new reality: a deterritorialized form of American endless-war-making, carried out by drones and special forces, in which one side has “complete immunity from harm” but takes “unprecedented care when it comes to killing people on the other.” To explore the emergence of “humane war” as a now hegemonic idea in US foreign policy, Moyn begins the book with a rhetorical question: “Is it good enough — is it good at all — that American war could someday become as humane as advocates both within and outside government can make it?” His answer to this question is clear: No, it isn’t good at all. In the process of fighting war crimes, he insists, we have “forgotten the crime of war.” The humanization of war has normalized war itself, transforming it from an episodic to a prolix phenomenon. This has meant mutating violence into something more disciplinary and traumatizing for men and women in the “war-on-terror” zones, ensuring their experiences are even less visible to the self-satisfied denizens of “liberal democracies” than they already were. And yet, the way Moyn engages the rhetorical question is important. To fully understand the implications of “humane war,” he argues, it is necessary to combine two histories that are usually kept apart. One is a story about the development of expectations and rules for peace instead of war. The other is a story about the development of rules for conducting war humanely. As a whole, Humane is situated in the pincer grip between these narratives. Moyn’s turn of art in the book is to spin a braided, historical yarn that brings these stories together, illuminating both how we got to this particularly salient point in history while highlighting those moments when things could have been different. Moral Reckoning The story begins with Leo Tolstoy — a touchstone for Moyn — who observed (somewhat dyspeptically) that the move to make war more humane could ultimately have the effect of dragging it out indefinitely. It then tells the story of the intellectual figures behind the first Geneva Convention before pivoting to a discussion of peace movements in Europe and the United States from the late nineteenth century through World War II. Chapters three and four circle back to follow the arc of US imperial violence, from continental encounters with native peoples, to the explicitly imperialist objectives of the Philippines occupation, through the Cold War and the mass death, disappearance, and torture associated with maintaining American hegemony and the postwar order. For Moyn, the important thing to understand about this period is that Abraham Lincoln’s general order to limit the torture and abuse of prisoners (the “Lieber Code”) was never meant to limit the torture and abuse of people in the colonized and postcolonized zones of the world (including “Indian Country”), since, within these zones, “the people were the enemy.” This insouciant attitude toward the violent excesses of war (at least when aimed at non-Europeans) begins to change, Moyn argues, during the “period of clarity” following revelations about the My Lai massacre, a time in which many people “were prepared to see government officials and US citizens themselves as potential and actual evildoers.” Gradually, international lawyers began focusing their interventions less on the legality of war itself and more on holding states and individuals legally accountable for the inhumanity of war crimes. The results were enhanced supplements to the Geneva Conventions in 1977 and the 1985 United Nations Convention Against Torture. Delegates from formerly colonized, recently liberated states in the Global South, Moyn argues, were successful in getting language into these protocols to acknowledge struggles for “national liberation.” But their greater objective — to establish “a more peaceful world with less great-power intervention” — was ignored entirely. Instead, the international order that had taken shape over three hundred years of European imperialism — what that master of euphemisms John Ikenberry calls “a hierarchical order with liberal characteristics” — shifted its moral orientation, away from concern with “armies against armies” toward a fixation with “armies against humanity.” This shift, Moyn argues, gave “unprecedented power and responsibility alike to military lawyers” who, throughout the 1990s, would help lock in a new cultural imperative for “humane war” within the military. Once George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton had abandoned any possibility that the end of the Cold War might bring about a reconsideration of US military hegemony, these lawyers — and the discourse of “international humanitarian law” they concocted — rapidly became the lingua franca of American domination. September 11, therefore, did not “change everything.” Rather, the ineradicable quality of the war on terror simply extended the time horizon of war, a war whose now explicitly endless quality could be squared with “humane” parameters of engagement. As Moyn deftly illustrates, the claim that torture was illegal swiftly overcame claims about the illegality of the Afghan and Iraq wars. An obsession to end “cruelty,” rather than war itself, settled in, sucking all the legal and activist oxygen from the room. Moyn’s chapter on Barack Obama — and the way his signature technocratic approach cut the legs from under the peace movement and installed drone strikes as a permanent feature of United States’ military landscape — is perhaps the most powerful in the book. Obama, Moyn insists, who ran as an anti-war candidate, “expanded the War on Terror to an awesome extent, while making it sustainable for a domestic audience in a way his predecessor never did.” Moyn is absolutely unforgiving in his critique of Obama’s “lawyerly” style and his savant-like ability to perform moral reckoning (e.g., “We tortured some folks”) while overseeing a new, abusive stage in the expansion of US power. For Moyn, Donald Trump is merely the logical outcome of the catastrophic failures of the war on terror: a racist, xenophobic, unhinged populist who, nonetheless, came to power on the promise of ending endless wars. That he did no such thing — that he merely increased reliance on special forces and drone strikes — should come as no surprise. Through three presidents, “the shambolic last one included,” Moyn argues, the United States has made strides to minimize the cruelty, violence, and harm of war while expanding its ambit. The result has been an entrenchment of disciplining, surveillance-oriented militarism on a global scale and a Republican Party increasingly in love with full-blown authoritarianism at home. And all of these changes have taken place against the ever-more-invisible backdrop of people’s actual lives — the daily routines of men, women, and children coping with instability, insecurity, and trauma under skies transformed by the relentless roar of drones thrumming “humanely” overhead. One of Moyn’s greatest gifts as a scholar and a writer is his capacity to combine a carefully crafted historical narrative with both an analysis of political and legal discourse and a righteous anger at the abuses this discourse enables. He is particularly attuned, for instance, to the way the rhetorically slippery language of “humane war” allowed liberal internationalist supporters of US hegemony to distance themselves from neoconservatives during the George W. Bush Administration by professing shock — shock! — at America’s torture program. “It was honest and right,” Moyn asserts in perhaps the most arresting passage of the book, to decry John Yoo’s “cavalier attitudes toward the Geneva Conventions.” “It was false and strategic,” he continues, “to imply that . . . humane war under the law had long been central to American ideals before a cabal of neoconservative radicals came along.” In moments like this, one feels Moyn’s anger at the unrelenting hypocrisy of international lawyers and the United States’ foreign policy establishment like a punch in the gut. My one sympathetic dissatisfaction is that the book doesn’t go far enough in amplifying and historicizing that hypocrisy itself. In other words, Humane is incredibly good at following the twinned ideas of peace and “humane war” from the nineteenth century to today and incredibly good at illuminating the twisted moral and political landscape of a contemporary moment in which “swords have not been beaten into ploughshares,” but rather, “melted down for drones.” It is less good, however, at linking the ascendence of “humane war” to the larger ideological universe that has sustained US hegemony for so long. It is less good, in other words, at interrogating the way politicians, public intellectuals, and international lawyers have historically relied on a common sense about the American character as inherently liberal to deflect criticism from all the ways it is not. Moyn is fully aware of this rhetorical sleight of hand, as his damning critique of Obama demonstrates. “Over and over again,” Moyn notes, “Obama’s characteristic reaction to the inhumanity he was editing out of endless warfare became: ‘That’s not us. That’s not who we are.’” He argues that this negative formulation — not us — made the United States’ forays into empire and torture seem “out of character” because we know ourselves to be upstanding people with good, humanitarian values. What isn’t as obvious, from Moyn’s critique, is the historical tenacity of this “not who we are” framing and the extent to which it has persisted throughout the historical period the book covers. We see it, for instance, in Moyn’s own retelling of that history. In 1899, he explains, the liberal editors of the Nation may have been quick to call the genocidal military campaign in the Philippines a form of “cruelty worthy of savages,” but they also insisted that “to the credit of our soldiers,” even in the midst of battle and as “they carry out the orders to take no prisoners, most of them inwardly revolt at the idea of such barbarism.” Yes, Americans may have done terrible things in the Philippines, says the Nation, but they never felt good about them. Moyn notes the oddity of this disclaimer but doesn’t pursue it further. And yet, rhetorical turns like this are incredibly common in the history of international discourse. Since the emergence of international institutions at the turn of the last century, and particularly since the end of formal imperialism, liberal internationalist supporters of both the British and US empires have described the unsavory actions of those empires in the same language that the Nation used in 1899 and Obama in 2014: “That’s not who we are.” They have couched this denial in both racist and nonracist terms. They have used both civilizational and egalitarian logic. Most importantly, they have insisted that “who we are not” trumps “what we do” even in the face of violence and cruelty, even in the absence of laws about “humane war.” Within liberal theory itself, there is a robust, recent tradition of such negatively framed identity claims. For instance, when Judith Shklar, Richard Rorty, and Annette Baier argued in the 1980s and ’90s that “cruelty is the worst thing we can do” (the title of Moyn’s sixth chapter), they were making affirmative statements about what it means to be a liberal by describing what it cannot tolerate. Within the realm of foreign policy, liberal internationalists have been at the forefront of making similar assertions about identity, insisting that violence and cruelty are exceptional to “our” values and the principles of the US-led liberal world order. Yes, Ikenberry and Daniel Deudney argued reluctantly in 2018, global liberalism may have been associated historically with “imperialism, slavery, and racism.” But, they continue, that isn’t really us. Rather, they insist, to the extent “that the long arc of history does bend toward justice, it does so thanks to the activism and moral commitment of liberals and their allies.” Liberalism and liberals, in this equation, are always the perennial answer to any question, because “we” are not imperial people. Moyn is absolutely familiar with this liberal legerdemain, and at times in the book — as with his cutting critique of the way liberal internationalists joined forces with neocons after 1989 to slam shut any possibility of “a more peaceful era” — he is explicit about how it works. These criticisms, however, are not conjoined across the time period the book covers, and, as a result, the reemerging quality of the rhetorical theme itself is more muted than it could be. As I read Humane, my nagging sense that this might be the case was confirmed when I flipped to the back cover and saw that former Princeton University professor and director of policy planning for the State Department during the Obama administration Anne-Marie Slaughter had endorsed the book. Even more perversely, she had done so by explicitly comparing it to Michael Walzer’s 1977 philosophical treatise, Just and Unjust Wars. To be clear, Slaughter’s commitment to a rigidly blind US exceptionalism makes her one of the most deflective liberal internationalists writing today. Walzer’s own brand of liberal exceptionalism was fully on display in his support for the war in Afghanistan and his tepid refusal to condemn the Iraq War outright, while his long-standing advocacy of just war theory has recently come under criticism for its imperialist applications. That Slaughter could read Moyn’s book (assuming she did) and not only endorse it but compare it to Just and Unjust War suggests, I think, that Moyn’s frequent observations about liberal internationalist hypocrisy are sufficiently low-key enough to escape Slaughter’s notice. In other words, somewhere in the story of “humane” war’s triumph, liberal complicity fades slightly into the background. High Stakes Why is this important? Moyn has, after all, written a book to explain the emergence and triumph of “humane war” as a concept in international law that justifies and enables endless war. He has done that exceptionally well. Moyn himself, however, knows that the political problem and the political stakes of our current moment are bigger and more complicated than the story of “international humanitarian law” can capture, and this troubles him. “The bitter truth,” he argues, “is that exposing America’s illicit violence, and showing that humanity is just a cover for it, has not worked.” It has not slowed down the war on terror or changed the minds of a foreign policy establishment who continue to take US military hegemony as an article of faith. “Humane war,” in this sense, is the latest in series of legitimating narratives that allow liberals to square the circle between what “we” are not and global domination, a shell game with horrific consequences for both foreign and domestic policy. We must, to my mind, take Humane as a call to arms — she says, fully aware of the irony — to begin talking more explicitly about liberal complicity with empire in a way that will make embedded public intellectuals like Slaughter deeply uncomfortable. This is not, I freely admit, an easy thing to do. The language of “not who we are” is an identity-driven rhetorical filter that instantly transforms even the mildest criticism about the US-led liberal world order into an existential crisis and a personal attack.

### Offshoring

#### **The 1AC is the software update for American imperialism – pragmatic restraint is the new liberal metric to redefine territoriality through extrajudicial means that justifies targeted killings – this is a self-fulfilling prophecy where under the threat of terrorist attack caused by the US drone program, the US can manipulate the real and the imaginary to expand the American drone program and justify interventionism**

Slaven 19 [James T. Department of History, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia Pseudoisolationism: the Neoimperialism of the State(s) June 27, 2019 [https://doi.org/10.11114/ijsss.v7i4.4353 Accessed 2-23-21](https://doi.org/10.11114/ijsss.v7i4.4353%20Accessed%202-23-21)] CSUF JmB NDT 2021 TDI

In Calling 911: geopolitics, security and America's New War (2003), Simon Dalby outlined American imperialism after 9/11 and how it became the standard for a new kind of imperial warfare. He argued that in the aftermath of 9/11, the United States struggled to understand that classical European geopolitics, where "mutually exclusive spatial entities" conflicted with one another, were no longer predominant (Dalby, 2003, p. 74, 82). In other words, without a clearly defined (i.e. territorially defined) enemy to confront, the American military reaction was left searching for a target (Dalby, 2003, p. 72). Subsequently, the United States used its military to invade and occupy, or otherwise simply to garrison, foreign territory in an attempt to neutralize threats to its national security (i.e. under the guise of self-defence; Dalby, 2003, p. 80). As this essay will later argue and as Dalby argued, despite the United States neglecting to "conquer, annex, or fundamentally remake" these territories (as would be expected of true classical imperialism), it has and continues to colonize these territories via new technologies, and thus its anti-imperial national identity is only surface level deep (Dalby, 2003, p. 82). In From a View to Kill: Drones and Late Modern Warfare (2011), Derek Gregory described how modem warfare, conducted virtually through drones, has changed the very conception of battlespace, itself (p. 190). He argued that from the viewpoint of the American drone program modem battlespace has expanded across the world. This virtual, globalized battlespace results in a new version of (American) imperialism that can be remotely enforced (Gregory, 2011, pp. 189-90). In other words, the virtual application of violent force has caused "time-space compression" which means that the American military can theoretically exercise violence everywhere and at all times, as this essay will later elaborate (Gregory, 2011, p. 192). In Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy (1995), John Agnew similarly described how emerging technologies had the potential to change how states interact with space. Rather than colonizing space by controlling a place(s) "on the ground," new technologies allow states to colonize space by controlling it virtually, thereby controlling all places (Agnew, 1995, pp. 95-6). In other words, by controlling space virtually states can control space instantaneously, forgoing the traditional needs of an empire to establish and maintain physical control over a place via a physical presence. It is from the theoretical starting points of Dalby, Gregory, and Agnew that this essay will now begin. 3. Offshore Balancing Before exploring the neoimperialist reality of American offshore balancing, this essay will first briefly discuss what exactly offshore balancing as a foreign policy entails. By 2011, offshore balancing had been named by Newsweek as the Obama administration's foreign policy doctrine (Beinart, 2011). By 2016, John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt had published the definitive work on offshore balancing titled "The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy." Primarily evidenced by Obama's withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as his later infamous "Red Line" failure in Syria, offshore balancing (as the name suggests) is primarily characterized by, "eschewing social engineering and minimizing the United States' military footprint... The United States would maintain substantial naval and air assets and modest but capable ground forces" (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2016, p. 74, 80). The doctrine also advocates: (1) buckpassing regional defence to smaller allies in order to check the rise of a potential hegemon; (2) minimizing the threat of anti-American terrorism by "respecting the sovereignty of other states"; (3) strengthening the American economy by reducing its military expenditures as a result of, in turn, reducing the level of troops the United States garrisons abroad (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2016, pp. 83-4, 87-8). Subsequently, the former president's foreign policy doctrine was dubbed in newspaper headlines and book titles: "Retreating Ashore," or America in Retreat (Hoffman, 2016; Rose, 2015). Critics of offshore balancing warned that this "neoisolationist" doctrine threatened America's global hegemony (Roskin, 2016, p. 7). Rather than conserving American economic and military strength in order to maintain the current balance of power (i.e. Pax Americana) by "husbanding military strength," American armed forces would require massive re-expansion, and therefore massive expenditure, when the United States is inevitably pulled into a conflict to check the rise of a regional power (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2016, p. 82). Bret Stephens (2014), in America in Retreat, argues that: "Barack Obama offered a blueprint for a new foreign policy, demanding a smaller U.S. footprint in the world" (p. 67). However, these criticisms represent a flawed understanding of the doctrine and have misidentified it as some kind of "neoisolationism," when in fact there is no evidence of a global American retreat. Having discussed offshore balancing as a foreign policy, in theory, and its critiques, this essay will now examine the reality of offshore balancing. Neoisolationism, as has been discussed above, would mean a divergence from the Pax Americana status quo and therefore would entail some sort of global American 'retreat.' Although the world has indeed seen a gradual withdrawal of American troops from its vested regional interests, the American military presence has not withdrawn on a global scale. In other words, although there are literally fewer American "boots on the ground," the American military footprint has not changed-in fact, there's an argument to be made that it has actually increased. Shima Keene (2015) notes in Lethal and Legal: the Ethics of Drone Strikes, as of 2012, "the Pentagon was reported to have 7,000 drones under its control, representing approximately one-third of all U.S. military aircraft" (p. 1). Evidently, as the United States adopts offshore balancing more heartily, and the American military transitions to forces capable of exerting "over-the-horizon" pressure (i.e. air and naval forces), unmanned combat aerial vehicles play an increasingly large role (Allin & Jones, 2012, p. 89). Approximately 10 times more drone strikes were authorized under the Obama administration than under the George W. Bush administration-506 drone strikes compared to 50 drone strikes, respectively (Zenko, 2016). As Ian Shaw notes in Predator Empire: Drone Warfare and Full Spectrum Dominance: "by 2013, around 95 percent of the US non-battlefield targeted killings were conducted by drones" (Shaw, 2016, p. 113). Furthermore, as Medea Benjamin (2017) writes for The Guardian, by 2016 the United States maintained a military presence in "70% of the world's nations, 138 countries-a staggering jump of 130% since the days of the Bush administration." Clearly, there is no evidence of "America in Retreat," and instead it would be more accurate to conclude that there is evidence of a sustained (if not, increased) level of American presence and intervention abroad. Furthermore, Mearsheimer and Walt's "The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy" fails to mention UCAVs, even though it was written in 2016 (i.e. towards the end of the Obama administration years) when drone warfare had been well-established as both the new American modus operandi and as President Obama's legacy (Kaufman, 2018; Monbiot, 2012; Zenko, 2016). Although the authors of "The Case for Offshore Balancing" have apparently forgotten to mention the role of the drone program in contemporary foreign policy and military interventions, their critics are just as equally at fault for, by and large, having neglected to mention it. As Shaw clarifies: "as U.S. military technology has become more sophisticated, the significance of mass, force, and territoriality has shrunk (although by no means disappeared)" (Shaw, 2016, p. 132). So, as this essay has discussed thus far, despite the appearance of a "global American retreat" when measuring in terms of conventional military forces, the reality of the maintenance of a global, American military presence when measured in UCAVs is evident. Offshore balancing has been misdiagnosed as "neoisolationism," when in fact it merely appears that way, and it can therefore correctly be labelled pseudoneoisolationism. 4. The Drone Program: Redefining Territoriality This essay will now proceed to argue that the American, neoimperialist redefinition of territoriality can be examined, specifically, by looking at the targeting methods used in the drone program and the legality of drone warfare under international law. Strikes carried out under the American drone program are (theoretically) authorized using two sets of targeting methods: personality strikes and signature strikes. The targeted killing of individuals through both personality and signature strikes redefines the American state's understanding of territoriality, although signature strikes have much more profound implications, as will be discussed. As Shima Keene (2015) describes in "Lethal and Legal: The Ethics of Drone Strikes," personality strikes are situations wherein: "an individual whose identity is known is specifically targeted" (p. 24). However, signature strikes are situations wherein, as Keene (2015) once again clarifies: Unknown individuals often in groups are targeted... the precise identity of these individuals is unknown, [and therefore] the individuals targeted must match a pre-identified 'signature' of behaviour that the United States links to militant activity or association... patterns of behaviour are used to determine a target. (p. 25) Simply put, the United States does not know who it is killing in these signature strikes. However, as Keene emphasized in the quote above, it may be worth restating that: the United States does not know precisely who it is killing. So then, a more convincing argument might be made by investigating the "signatures" or patterns of behaviour that the United States sets out in signature strike targeting methods. However, upon investigation, what are considered signatures of terrorist behaviour have, as Keene (2015) puts it, "come under criticism" (p. 25). Greg Miller and Bob Woodward (2013) describe multiple strikes based on circumstantial evidence in "Secret memos reveal explicit nature of U.S., Pakistan agreement on drones": On March 23, 2010, the CIA launched missiles at a "person of interest" in a suspected al-Qaeda compound. The man caught the agency's attention after he had "held two in-car meetings, and swapped vehicles three times along the way." Other accounts describe militants targeted because of the extent of "deference" they were shown when arriving at a suspect site. Keene (2015) cites in her own work one instance when: "on February 21, 2010, 23 Afghan civilians were wrongly identified by a U.S. operated drone as enemy combatants and killed in airstrikes" (p. 27). Clearly then, it is not an oversimplification, after all, to say that the United States does not know who it is killing in these strikes. Shaw (2016) starkly notes: "if the pattern of life [emphasis added] is marked as a threat to national security, it can be eliminated" (p. 128). By examining drone strike targeting methods and their consequences, it becomes clear that the United States is engaged in a new kind of neoimperialist exercise. Specifically, by extrajudiciously killing individuals or groups of individuals through signature strike targeting methods the American state is exercising legal authority over non-citizens. Furthermore, the American state is exercising legal authority over a specific demographic (theoretically, this is military-age males) of a non-citizen population within a bounded geographic space (i.e. another state), rather than exercising legal authority over the whole population. On top of that, the individuals that belong to that particular demographic have no notice that they are under American law, unlike classical, imperialist occupations, because the American state subjectively determines whether or not certain "patterns of life" are a threat to national security (Keene, 2015, p. 27; Shaw, 2016, p. 128). At that point, whether or not the targeted individual(s) is known for certain to be a threat to national security (i.e. a terrorist), the individual is killed, and the right to surrender and defend themselves in a court of law is withheld (also known as extrajudicial killing; Keene, 2015, p. 12). So, by continuing to authorize drone strikes based on signature strike targeting methods, the American state is claiming and exercising legal authority over a specific demographic of non-citizens within a separate bounded geographic space (i.e. another state). Similar to the targeting methods used for authorizing drone strikes, the legality of drone strikes under international law has equally profound implications for territoriality. The United States has consistently harkened back to the September 11th terrorist attacks as the justification needed for targeted killings carried out under the drone program, and within the context of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) more generally. On September 12, 2001 the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1368 which, while denouncing the September 11 terrorist attacks, recognized, "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter [of the United Nations]," referring to the right to self-defence as laid out in Article 51 of the Charter (United Nations Security Council, 2001; Anghie, 1996, 276). The United States specifically cites this right to self-defence as the legal basis for targeted killings (Keene, 2015, p. 16; see also Vavrichek, 2014, p. 32). However, the the legal basis for targeted killings also lies in equal part within International Human Rights Law (IHRL). As Diane Vavrichek (2014) notes in "The Future of Drone Strikes: A Framework for Analyzing Policy Options," IHRL states that lethal force may only be used against individuals who pose an "imminent [emphasis added] and substantial threat to life" (pp. 34-5). However, Vavrichek (2014) then goes on to cite a Department of Justice legal memo which, "concludes that, 'the condition that an operational leader present an "imminent" threat of violent attack against the United States does not require the United States to have clear evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take place in the immediate future' "(p. 37). This legal basis, grounded in the UNSC Resolution 1368 as well as IHRL, is precisely where the United States redefines its definition of territoriality. This neoimperialist redefinition relies on two concepts which it borrows from the UNSC Resolution 1368 and IHRL, respectively: self-defence and imminence. As Vavrichek (2014) notes: This usage is at odds with the definition of the word "imminent" and signals a departure from the historical criteria for a nation to act preemptively in self-defence only when the "necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation." (p. 37) Similarly, Antony Anghie (1996), in Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law, argues that "the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence... appears to extend the concept of self-defence well beyond traditionally understood boundaries of Article 51 of the UN Charter" (p. 276). This "historical departure" also signals a departure from traditional understandings of territoriality. By preemptively defending itself against individuals using signature strike targeting methods and therefore by understanding that those individuals pose an imminent threat to national security regardless of whether or not those individuals can practically reach American territory (i.e. the continental United States) in the immediate future, the United States is implying that American territory is no longer restricted by linear boundaries and traditional notions of territoriality, but instead has spread across the globe. It is only through this understanding that the American drone program is legally authorized to strike anywhere in the world since an individual in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Yemen, to offer up historical examples, can pose an imminent threat to American national security and therefore require preemptive actions in the name of self-defence. 5. Connecting the Dots This essay will now discuss the importance of discussing offshore balancing and the American, neoimperialist redefinition of territoriality in an effort to make it clear that not only is offshore balancing pseudoneoisolationist, but it is actually neoimperialist. In summary, it is important to discuss offshore balancing in tandem with the American drone program and its implications for territoriality because it becomes clear that it constitutes a dangerously attractive foreign policy option for politicians, and yet it still has not been properly identified as a neoimperialist doctrine. It would not be enough to discuss offshore balancing as a foreign policy and the neoimperialist redefinition of territoriality occurring under the American drone program, separately because that would be a failure to realize the neoimperialist reality of the current American foreign policy doctrine. By adhering to offshore balancing as a doctrine, the American military will suffer fewer casualties by relying more on UCAVs, which results in minimal domestic backlash, while maintaining American global hegemony (Bahador & Walker, 2012, pp. 248-9). Furthermore, it is a self-perpetuating foreign policy: public perception of the United States worsens inside the state(s) that the American drone program operates in, resentment builds among the populace, and, conversely, support for terrorist organizations grows (albeit, amongst a small percentage of the populace; Shah, 2010, pp. 86-7). Eventually this leads to a terrorist attack abroad, perhaps even within the United States (although it is difficult to discern how many terrorist attacks have occurred within the continental United States since 2001 since there is little consensus about what constitutes a terrorist attack), at which point there is a public outcry of support for military action and, potentially, support from the heads of allied states. As a result, the United States then has all the justification and support it needs to continue its drone program, and the self-perpetuating cycle begins, as Robert Kaplan (2015), in Imperial Grunts, puts it in his own words: "terrorism was both a cause and a symptom [of the GWOT]" (p. 7). Hall Gardner (2005) describes the same process in American Global Strategy and the "War on Terrorism ": State leaderships additionally use the threat of external terror (threats coming from outside the state) in order to obtain and sustain both allegiance and obedience, and to repress dissent. In The Politics, Aristotle argued that "the distant fear must be brought home"-in that [political] elites seek to preserve their power and influence and obtain both domestic and international allegiance to their goals by manipulating real and imagined (or exaggerated) fears that their 'constitutions' and basic freedoms might be subverted by enemies abroad. (p. 54) This dangerous, violent, cyclical misunderstanding is in part driven by a discourse based in the dichotomy of good and evil, as Bret Stephens (2014), himself, writes in America in Retreat (which was mentioned at the beginning of this paper): America needs to be the world's policeman... Cops merely walk the beat, reassuring the good, deterring the tempted, punishing the wicked... It is done because it has to be and there's no one else to do it, and because the benefits of doing it accrue not only to those we protect but also, indeed mainly, to ourselves. (pp. xv-i) This, of course, is a vast over-simplification of American foreign policy and ignores entirely the cyclical violence that is perpetuated by American foreign policy particularly within the context of the GWOT, as discussed above. However, to elaborate further would verge on overextending this essay's core argument. Rather, it should simply be stated that: the connection must be made between offshore balancing as a foreign policy and the implications of the drone program for American territoriality so that the present, neoimperialist reality of American foreign policy can be properly identified and understood as neoimperialist. 6. What Now? In conclusion, this essay has discussed offshore balancing as a foreign policy doctrine, how it has incorrectly been labeled "neoisolationist," and why pseudoneoisolationist would be a more suitable label. Then, the American drone program and its neoimperialist redefinition of territoriality through two aspects-targeting methods and legal justification-was discussed. Finally, it has been argued that these two subjects need to be examined together so that the neoimperialist reality of American foreign policy, perpetuated by the American drone program, can be properly identified as such. So, what now? Various scholars, such as Anghie (1996), are describing the emergence of a "new imperialism" (p. 274). Some, such as Robert Cooper, are even advocating for a kind of " 'defensive imperialism... a new kind of imperialism, one acceptable to a world of human rights and cosmopolitan values.' " (as cited in Anghie, 1996, p. 274). Nevertheless, it has become increasingly clear that contemporary understandings of neoimperialism also need to be broadened in the wake of this new military technology-UCAVs-because, as this essay has discussed, they allow the United States to carry out a foreign policy that cannot be correctly labeled as imperialist nor neoimperialist (at least, not by the current parameters of either definition). Therefore, this essay suggests a new definition of neoimperialism be outlined to include the territorial implications created by the American drone program. With this expanded definition of neoimperialism, then offshore balancing, as a foreign policy, may correctly be identified by its true nature-not neoisolationist, but neoimperialist.

### Presence Generic

#### There is no new war or modern war but war as a product of territoriality and virtuality – the software update of US imperialism doesn’t require boots on the ground but rather the decolonization of military presence has produced nationalization and legal colonization for spaces that cannot be decolonized – this translates that the 1ACs reduction in military presence is deemed necessary because US militarism has already exerted its force of psychological warfare to be in propagandized as proxies for the US

Grove 2019 [Jairus Victor. Jairus Victor Grove is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai‘i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa. Savage Ecology : War and Geopolitics at the End of the World : War and Geopolitics at the End of the World, Duke University Press. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/fullerton/detail.action?docID=5826044.] CSUF JmB TDI

From the beginning of European expansion, war was neither interior nor exterior, as the territory was in some sense a smooth space in that it had not been nationalized, much less internationalized. War took place, but it lacked the political quality that makes Foucault’s inversion possible. As such, the laws of war found in Hugo Grotius and early discussions of Christian traditions of just war were ­ flagrantly disregarded, just as they had been in the Eu­ ro­ pean Crusades. And furthermore, decolonization does not return us to the romantic image of international politics either. In the aftermath of formal-­ legal colonization, every­ thing is nationalized but virtually none of the new national spaces resembles what could be called a sovereign territory except for those spaces that cannot be fully decolonized ­ because they are settler colonies. This is similar to the period in Eu­ rope before Westphalia in which sovereignty was claimed by the Catholic Church and some kings but had little ­ bearing on the organ­ ization of war in regard to questions like territorial integrity or “balancing.” The postcolonial period following World War II is one in which sovereignty is unequally distributed to the point of needing to describe the behavior of states, like the U.S. as supersovereign. There ­ is a further anachronism in Tiqqun and other Agamben-­ influenced extensions of Foucault’s war thesis. In almost all cases of the global war ­ t heses, and more generally the revival of Carl Schmitt’s work on liberal international order, the loss of the classical state system is a result of the exceptional politics following the American state of emergency in 2001 or a component of a lateness in capitalism generally starting after ­ World War II. Others ­ peg the creeping national security state to Cold War politics following the ideological struggle also after World War II. In the American case, the slippage between war, state making, and security begins long before September 11, 2001, and the rapid securitization of life that takes place during the Cold War. Such presentist accounts require a selective forgetting of how indebted Cold War and war on terrorism practices and politics follow traditions of counterinsurgency and nation building throughout the settlement and expansion of the American colonies, before and after ­ the modern republic. Put simply, the classical mode of warfare between isomorphic, mutually recognized sovereign states occurred at best provincially within the continent of Europe for a very short time. This period from which Foucault draws his logic describes neither the brutal and deterriorialized wars of religion that raged in Eu­ rope before the Treaty of Westphalia, nor the wars exported beyond the shores of Europe thereafter. Therefore, the attempt by Foucault and others to draw a distinction, even temporarily, between security’s project of policing and the sovereign state’s external application of war, while historically significant for a fleeting moment, is not helpful for understanding war before and after ­ the eigh­ teenth century. ­ The simple ­ distinction between internal war (security) and external war (war/international relations) is consumed in the empirical forge of the actual ­ history of warfare. On this point, I concur with Antonio Negri conceptually despite our differences of origin and periodization: “War has always pretended to have an ordering finality in postmodern capitalism. . . . ​ Ontologically, re­ sis­ tance immediately denies that claim. Modernity’s order can no longer suppress postmodern disorder; Hobbes crumbles before Guernica and Fallujah.” 99 Negri’s formulation would be quite accurate if instead of postmodern capitalism it was the longue durée from 1492 to the pre­ sent. The fight is not between a once great ­ and constraining modern order and a new reckless “postmodern order” but modernity itself as a global project in the operationalization of the planet for war. This does not mean we should forget Foucault’s inversion of the Clausewitzian formula between war and politics. It is usefully provocative, even if misleading. I think it is better instead to read Foucault as an amplification of rather than an inversion of Clausewitz. To say that politics is war by other means still requires the affirmation of Clausewitz’s original formulation of “politics as war by other means,” without which Foucault’s war as politics would have no object. For Foucault, of course, modern war has the population— its ­ survival, productivity, and health— as its object, both as a target and as a site of mobilization. 100 If there is a concept to be developed, it is one of war as a force that complicates, forms, and deforms the po­ liti­ cal landscape of the planet. Therefore, there ­ ought ­ not be an escalating number of concepts called war’s ­others. Security is as intimately a part of colonial, postcolonial, and precolonial warfare as policing is a formative ele­ ment of international politics. The difference, at best, is one of intensity. Instead, as I try to develop in the previous section, particularly in the Amer­ i­ cas, state making and politics more generally in the settlement context is a martial art and inseparable from practices of vio­ lence. So in this sense, despite a kind of Foucauldian or biopo­ liti­ cal turn in international relations scholarship, there is little ­ if any historical evidence to support a con­ temporary “liberal way of war” or some more insidious humanitarian version of warfare that came about in the aftermath of 9/11, or as part of the civilizing mission of the Cold War, as those ­ seduced by Carl Schmitt’s romantic vision of “real war” or Agamben’s post-9/11 state of exception have suggested. 101 War in the five-­ hundred-­ year epoch of the Eurocene has always thrived in the interregnum of definitions, national bound­ aries, racial classifications, humanizing missions, settlement practices, and economizing proj­ ects, or even entrepreneurial efforts at reordering the planet. War did not fall from grace. The Eurocene has never known grace, only war. Therefore, while war is not timeless, it has axiomatic tendencies that run through at least the last five hundred years rather than the last twenty or the last one hundred, and war has a semiautonomous trajectory of change that proceeds and exceeds the rise and fall of ideologies and changes in modes of production— many ­ of the most supposedly outmoded like primitive accumulation still thriving in the form of resource extraction, particularly in obvious states of war. And nowhere has this transideological consistency been more true than in the colonies and subsequent postcolonies in which the continuity of war overshadows the changes in justificatory discourse. The Eurocene as a martial geology has proceeded and exceeded mercantilism, vari­ ous stages of capitalism, and communism, and ­ w ill likely continue through the “postideological” throes of our new authoritarianism. Rather than pointing to ­ e ither a mode of production or a par­ tic­ u­ lar mode of destruction, the bits and pieces of quantity theories of war, annihilation over exhaustion, capital drives, desires for order and settlement, and the technics of Eu­ rope as well as the innovations of the Amer­ i­ cas and elsewhere have found new assemblages in new environments. The Eurocene, like Sloterdijk’s “extended operational space . . . ​ of Eu­ ro­ pean earth-­users,” takes place in the creative and formative collision between the never fully exogenous refinement and expansion of war on the Eu­ ro­ pean continent and the radically brutal laboratory of free-­ fire innovation in the periphery. 102 Unlike Hannah Arendt’s description of a boomerang where ­ there is a point of origin and a return, the ecological history of the Eurocene is one of attraction and vitality, renewal and mutation, experiment and habituation. 103 The distance and difference between the continents, technics, enmities, and habitats w ­ ere for the martial assemblage of the Eurocene the “­free energy” of Schrödinger’s voracious systems devouring negative entropy. What emerged from this habitat was then leveraged and refined to create what can now be called a global order. However, what is, I think, apparent is that such an order from an ecological perspective has amplified par­ tic­ u­ lar attributes and forms of life over ­ o thers rather than equally consuming bodies and nations.

#### The aff’s sanitized restriction on the supposed excesses of militarism naturalizes exceptional violence—the impact is endless intervention and WMD warfare

Morrissey 11 (John Morrissey ', Lecturer in Political and Cultural Geography, National University of Ireland, Galway; has held visiting research fellowships at University College Cork, City University of New York, Virginia Tech and the University of Cambridge. 2011, “Liberal Lawfare and Biopolitics: US Juridical Warfare in the War on Terror,” Geopolitics, Volume 16, Issue 2, 2011) CSUF JmB TDI

In the ‘biopolitical nomos’ of camps and prisons in the Middle East and elsewhere, managing detainees is an important element of the US military project. As CENTCOM Commander General John Abizaid made clear to the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2006, “An essential part of our combat operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan entails the need to detain enemy combatants and terrorists”.115 However, it is a mistake to characterise as ‘exceptional’ the US military’s broader biopolitical project in the war on terror. Both Minca’s and Agamben’s emphasis on the notion of ‘exception’ is most convincing when elucidating how the US military has dealt with the ‘threat’ of enemy combatants, rather than how it has planned for, legally securitized and enacted, its ‘own’ aggression against them. It does not account for the proactive juridical warfare of the US military in its forward deployment throughout the globe, which rigorously secures classified SOFAs with host nations and protects its armed personnel from transfer to the International Criminal Court. Far from designating a ‘space of exception’, the US does this to establish normative parameters in its exercise of legally sanctioned military violence and to maximise its ‘operational capacities of securitization’. A bigger question, of course, is what the US military practices of lawfare and juridical securitization say about our contemporary moment. Are they essentially ‘exceptional’ in character, prompted by the so-called exceptional character of global terrorism today? Are they therefore enacted in ‘spaces of exceptions’ or are they, in fact, simply contemporary examples of Foucault’s ‘spaces of security’ that are neither exceptional nor indeed a departure from, or perversion of, liberal democracy? As Mark Neocleous so aptly puts it, has the “liberal project of ‘liberty”’ not always been, in fact, a “project of security”?116 This ‘project of security’ has long invoked a powerful political dispositif of ‘executive powers’, typically registered as ‘emergency powers’, but, as Neocleous makes clear, of the permanent kind.117 For Neocleous, the pursuit of ‘security’ – and more specifically ‘capitalist security’ – marked the very emergence of liberal democracies, and continues to frame our contemporary world. In the West at least, that world may be endlessly registered as a liberal democracy defined by the ‘rule of law’, but, as Neocleous reminds us, the assumption that the law, decoupled from politics, acts as the ultimate safeguard of democracy is simply false – a key point affirmed by considering the US military’s extensive waging of liberal lawfare. As David Kennedy observes, the military lawyer who “carries the briefcase of rules and restrictions” has long been replaced by the lawyer who “participate[s] in discussions of strategy and tactics”.118 The US military’s liberal lawfare reveals how the rule of law is simply another securitization tactic in liberalism’s ‘pursuit of security’; a pursuit that paradoxically eliminates fundamental rights and freedoms in the ‘name of security’.119 This is a ‘liberalism’ defined by what Michael Dillon and Julian Reid see as a commitment to waging ‘biopolitical war’ for the securitization of life – ‘killing to make live’.120 And for Mark Neocleous, (neo)liberalism’s fetishisation of ‘security’ – as both a discourse and a technique of government – has resulted in a world defined by anti-democratic technologies of power.121 In the case of the US military’s forward deployment on the frontiers of the war on terror – and its juridical tactics to secure biopolitical power thereat – this has been made possible by constant reference to a neoliberal ‘project of security’ registered in a language of ‘endless emergency’ to ‘secure’ the geopolitical and geoeconomic goals of US foreign policy.122 The US military’s continuous and indeed growing military footprint in the Middle East and elsewhere can be read as a ‘permanent emergency’,123 the new ‘normal’ in which geopolitical military interventionism and its concomitant biopolitical technologies of power are necessitated by the perennial political economic ‘need’ to securitize volatility and threat. Can a focus on lawfare and biopolitics help us to critique our contemporary moment’s proliferation of practices of securitization – practices that appear to be primarily concerned with coding, quantifying, governing and anticipating life itself? In the context of the US military’s war on terror, I have argued above that it can. If, as David Kennedy points out, the “emergence of a global economic and commercial order has amplified the role of background legal regulations as the strategic terrain for transnational activities of all sorts”, this also includes, of course, ‘warfare’; and for some time, the US military has recognised the “opportunities for creative strategy” made possible by proactively waging lawfare beyond the battlefield.125 As Walter Benjamin observed nearly a century ago, at the very heart of military violence is a “lawmaking character”.126 And it is this ‘lawmaking character’ that is integral to the biopolitical technologies of power that secure US geopolitics in our contemporary moment. US lawfare focuses “the attention of the world on this or that excess” whilst simultaneously arming “the most heinous human suffering in legal privilege”, redefining horrific violence as “collateral damage, self-defense, proportionality, or necessity”.127 It involves a mobilisation of the law that is precisely channelled towards “evasion”, securing classified Status of Forces Agreements and “offering at once the experience of safe ethical distance and careful pragmatic assessment, while parcelling out responsibility, attributing it, denying it – even sometimes embracing it – as a tactic of statecraft and war”.128 Since the inception of the war on terror, the US military has waged incessant lawfare to legally securitize, regulate and empower its ‘operational capacities’ in its multiples ‘spaces of security’ across the globe – whether that be at a US base in the Kyrgyz Republic or in combat in Iraq. I have sought to highlight here these tactics by demonstrating how the execution of US geopolitics relies upon a proactive legal-biopolitical securitization of US troops at the frontiers of the American ‘leasehold empire’. For the US military, legal-biopolitical apparatuses of security enable its geopolitical and geoeconomic projects of security on the ground; they plan for and legally condition the ‘milieux’ of military commanders; and in so doing they render operational the pivotal spaces of overseas intervention of contemporary US national security conceived in terms of ‘global governmentality’.129 In the US global war on terror, it is lawfare that facilitates what Foucault calls the “biopolitics of security” – when life itself becomes the “object of security”.130 For the US military, this involves the eliminating of threats to ‘life’, the creating of operational capabilities to ‘make live’ and the anticipating and management of life’s uncertain ‘future’. Some of the most key contributions across the social sciences and humanities in recent years have divulged how discourses of ‘security’, ‘precarity’ and ‘risk’ function centrally in the governing dispositifs of our contemporary world.131 In a society of (in)security, such discourses have a profound power to invoke danger as “requiring extraordinary action”.132 In the ongoing war on terror, registers of emergency play pivotal roles in the justification of military securitization strategies, where ‘risk’, it seems, has become permanently binded to ‘securitization’. As Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster point out, the “perspective of risk management” seductively effects practices of military securitization to be seen as necessary, legitimate and indeed therapeutic.133 US tactics of liberal lawfare in the long war – the conditioning of the battlefield, the sanctioning of the privilege of violence, the regulating of the conduct of troops, the interpreting, negating and utilising of international law, and the securing of SOFAs – are vital security dispositifs of a broader ‘risk-securitization’ strategy involving the deployment of liberal technologies of biopower to “manage dangerous irruptions in the future”.134 It may well be fought beyond the battlefield in “a war of the pentagon rather than a war of the spear”,135 but it is lawfare that ultimately enables the ‘toxic combination’ of US geopolitics and biopolitics defining the current age of securitization.

#### Their Fordist strategy for military reduction leaves colonial power intact – the potential for redeployment is always present as long constant threats remain on the horizon – that makes intervention and miscalculation inevitable as presence is always shifting to address crises.

Davis 2011 Sasha Davis, Department of Geography and Environmental Science, University of Hawaii at Hilo, The US Military Base Network and Contemporary Colonialism: Power Projection, Resistance, and the Quest for Operational Unilateralism, Political Geography, 2011 CSUF JmB TDI

The world-wide stretch of American military power arises from particular places and is deployed unevenly across space (Enloe, 2007). It has become taken as a given in studies of economics, geography and cultural studies to point out that processes commonly referred to as “globalization” operate in this manner (Harvey, 1990; Massey, 1994). Military power functions in much the same way. The global network of American military power is controlled from key locales (White House, Pentagon, regional command centers, bases) and affects different places around the world in different ways. Military bases and training areas are only two key nodes in this network, but they are excellent sites to examine the places where the apparatus of military power touches the ground (Woodward, 2005). Although there are some excellent analyses of global military operations (see for instance Gerson & Birchard, 1991; Johnson, 2004, 2007; Lutz, 2009; Sandars, 2000) the base network is an ever-shifting mosaic that is difficult to pin down precisely. For instance, a seemingly simple question like “How many foreign US military bases are there in 2011?” has answers ranging from 34 to 737, to 850, to well over a thousand depending on a host of factors. These factors include how one defines “military”, how one defines a “base”, how one defines “foreign”, and how one defines whether a base is a “US” base (Critchlow, 2005; Johnson, 2004, 2007). For example, some communications and spy bases are not directly under the Department of Defense (DOD) and are not technically “military”. Some “bases” do not permanently house many US troops, but are essentially empty until needed. Some US bases are hard to define as “foreign” because they have been placed in parts of the world with current or recent colonial statuses like Guam, Hawaii, the Marshall Islands, the British Indian Ocean Territory, and Puerto Rico. Lastly, some foreign bases used by US military personnel are not officially “US” bases because they are technically under the jurisdiction of the host nation or are run by private security contractors that support US military objectives. Because of these multiple difficulties of definition it is hard to show a detailed list or map of the US base network. Despite this it is possible to trace its general shifting geography. Intellectual frameworks such as the Project for a New American Century’s 2000 Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategies, Forces, and Resources For A New Century and government documents such as the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy in 2004, the 2005 US Global Defense Posture Review and the Quadrennial Defense Reviews (the latest in DOD, 2010), give some detailed strategies for the ways in which the network of US bases should be organized. Without glossing over the important regional differences in the kind of attention the American government directs at different parts of the world e such as the “containment” of China, providing access to petroleum in Central Asia, and maintaining the surveillance of areas with large Muslim populations e it suffices to say that there are very few places left on the globe (or in its orbit) that are deemed to be outside the interest and vision of American power. Consequently, the network of bases is global as well. Increasingly it is designed to be a permanent infrastructure that allows military power to be shifted with post-Fordist efficiency from some sites in the network to other places “just-in-time” and according to perceived crises that challenge US hegemony. For instance in 2004 both former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Deputy Undersecretary Ryan Henry discussed the new base network side-by-side with a refusal to pinpoint geographically where they thought threats to the United States might be located. Henry only commented that the US “strove to base forces in locations that supported flexibility and speed of response to anywhere in an unpredictable environment” (Critchlow, 2005, 8 emphasis added). The DOD’s geographical imagination is one where presumably the whole world is an “unpredictable environment” and the US military must be able to act everywhere. Bases outside the continental United States are no longer for defending the regions or territory of the ally where the base is located. Instead, bases are now conceptualized as jumping off points for offensive operations or counterattacks. The 2004 Global Defense Posture Review was quite explicit about this fundamental shift. The report states, “The United States can no longer expect our forward forces to fight in place; rather, for most forward-stationed U.S. forces, their purpose is to undertake operations on short notice by deploying rapidly into near or distant theaters” (p. 6, emphasis in original). Based on this view of the world the DOD envisions constructing a flexible network of existing bases that can swell or contract based on shifting threats. Ideally, the nodes of the network (bases) would not be created or decommissioned through time. Instead the network would be stable and the amount of personnel and material at any given base would respond to the geography of the threat. The general tripartite architecture of this emerging network consists of Main Operating Bases (MOBs), Forward perating Sites (FOSs), and Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs). Main Operating Bases, as the name implies, would permanently have large numbers of personnel, solid infrastructure, and training areas. These bases are scattered around the globe to give ample general coverage of the major regions of the world. For other operations, however, the US must have access to bases closer to the sites of conflict. ForwardOperating Sites (FOSs) have small rotating staffs and pre-positioned materials that are ready to increase in size if necessary. Sometimes these are referred to as “light-switch operations” because large numbers of troops can arrive and all they have to do it “turn on the lights” to start operating (Garamone, 2005). Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo, which hosts thousands of American military personnel, is an example of an expanded FOS. Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs) are facilities with very small numbers of personnel (or none) that can be made usable on short notice. Also, these are often not technically “American” facilities which gives them political cover in localities and countries where there may be resistance to an American presence. Commentator Robert Kaplan described CSLs this way: Often the key role in managing a CSL is played by a private contractor. In Asia, for example, the private contractor is usually a retired American noncom, either Navy or Air Force, quite likely a maintenance expert, who is living in, say, Thailand or the Philippines, speaks the language fluently, perhaps has married locally after a divorce back home, and is generally much liked by the locals. He rents his facilities at the base from the hostcountry military, and then charges a fee to the U.S. Air Force pilots transiting the base. Officially he is in business for himself, which the host country likes because it can then claim it is not really working with the American military. Of course no one, including the local media, believes this. But the very fact that a relationship with the U.S. armed forces is indirect rather than direct eases tensions. (Kaplan, 2005) This is not only Kaplan’s view of CSLs. Former Undersecretary of Defense Henry (2006) also approvingly quotes the passage of Kaplan at length in his analysis of the contemporary global base network. Within this three-level structure of bases the decision of which bases are to be enlarged and which are shrunk depends, ideally, on the whim of the Pentagon and White House according to American grand political-economic strategies and their geopolitical vision de jure. There is, however, another important factor that shapes the US base network: resistance. This resistance comes in the form of popular protests against these bases as well as in the form of political restrictions the US military feels it may be subjected to in foreign territory. These locales hosting US bases are places that the global projection of military power “touches the ground” and are therefore critical sites for both enabling it and resisting it.

### Shifts to the Local

#### The marital form of politics has always been at home from the war on drugs to the post 9/11 security apparatus captures a militarization framework that in the aftermath of debasing military equipment come home to the militarized police

Howell 2018 [Allison. Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, Newark) . Forget “militarization”: Race, disability and the “martial politics” of the police and of the university. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 20(2), 117-136.] CSUF JmB TDI

In June 2014, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) released a report entitled, War Comes Home: The Excessive Militarization of American Policing (ACLU 2014). The report’s launch received initial press attention, focused on accounts of police forces’ possession of military equipment such as tanks and mine-resistant ambush protected vehicles (MRAPs). Then, in August 2014, White police officer Darren Wilson killed unarmed African American teenager Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. The shooting was one amongst many across the US, becoming emblematic of the racism of policing. It sparked ongoing protests and the Black Lives Matter movement, which builds on existing civil rights, Black liberation, anti-racist, queer, women’s and prison abolition activism. Suddenly, the ACLU report seemed prescient. Images of armored vehicles and police wearing camouflage fatigues circulated widely. Media outlets across the political spectrum framed Ferguson in terms of the “militarization” of police forces sent to restore social order. I focus here on the ACLU report not only because of its influence on journalistic reporting, but because it stands as an example of the best kind of analysis that can be conducted via the (faulty) concept of “militarization,” which it adopts from scholarly work on policing (see Kraska 2007). My aim is to take seriously what the report offers but also to reveal what it obscures. The ACLU report provides excellent reporting on the changing tactics, training methods and uses of technology of contemporary US police forces. Following the before-and-after logic of “militarization,” the report identifies the origin point of the problem as the 1980s, drawing our attention to the racial inequities of the War on Drugs, and the increasing post-9/11 use of SWAT teams to conduct search warrants. It exposes federal government programs that have transferred military equipment to police forces, including bomb suits, drones, facial recognition technology, armored vehicles and personal protective armor. Finally, it examines the training of police officers into a “warrior mentality.” Much of this research is valuable, but the report relies throughout on two false assumptions: first, that if police forces are militaristic, this is an aberration that can be dated to the 1980s, and thus that there is a latent, more positive form of policing to which we can retreat; second, and relatedly, that the raison d’être of American police forces is itself not worthy of questioning. The critical point is not that “war comes home” as the title of the report would have it: war has always been at home in America. The concept of “martial politics” can capture what the “militarization” framework elides: the historical context out of which the use of MRAPs against Black activism develops. To claim an origin point for “militarization” in the 1980s is to ignore the ways that warfare against Indigenous people and chattel slavery were foundational to the American criminal justice system (Grenier 2008; Dunbar-Ortiz 2014; Davis 2003). As Black studies scholars and anti-racist activists have illustrated, American law and practices of policing can be traced from slave patrols and Indian War militias, through the Jim Crow era, to contemporary mass incarceration (Davis 2002, 2003; Muhammad 2010; Alexander 2010; Hinton 2016). Disability scholars and activists have drawn out a parallel history of disability incarceration (Ben-Moshe, Chapman, and Carey 2014; Erevelles 2014). For instance, psychiatric incarceration has moved from a system of forced institutionalization to one of compulsory chemical incarceration through enforced medicating in community treatment orders (Fabris 2011). Just as emancipation from slavery gave way to renewed forms of racism perpetrated through law, so has deinstitutionalization given way to renewed forms of ableism perpetrated through medicine and law. These are not separate processes: policing systemically criminalizes racialized, Indigenous, disabled and queer people (Mogul, Ritchie, and Whitlock 2011, 45–68; Amar 2013, 73–78, 209–210; Steele 2016, 331, 340–341). Understanding this history requires acknowledgement that police are not a natural fact. Organized police forces are relatively recent inventions, developing especially in the nineteenth century. They emerged as (and remain) a means of imposing social order. Their precise nature differs in important ways across national contexts and forms of government, depending on which populations were perceived to be threats to social order. For example, British police were formed to quell Irish nationalism and Chartist demonstrations in the interests of wealthy Victorians, fearful that London was growing rapidly in size and impoverishment. The London Metropolitan Police was modelled both on the Bow Street Runners, originators of the concept of regular uniformed police patrols, and on the London Marine Police Force, initially funded by the West India Merchants and the West India Planters Committee for the purposes of securing cargo from the colonies. Techniques of policing were also derived from colonial governance (Brogden 1987). Through the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, British police forces increasingly took on the role of ensuring public order against the threat of rioting (Harris 2004). In nineteenth-century Canada and Australia, national “mounted” police forces were established to control Indigenous populations, serving as security forces for settler colonialism (Nettelbeck and Smandych 2010; Monaghan 2013). These histories are important for understanding not only the criminalization of Indigeneity (Ross 1998), and the continued regularity of the murder of Indigenous people in police custody (Razack 2015), but also the ways that war and police have been inextricably entwined for centuries (Bachman, Bell, and Holmqvist 2014). Policing is not a matter of “domestic” politics that can be shuttered from IR inquiry: it is precisely a matter of martial politics, of war-like relations within so-called “domestic” and “international” politics alike. Likewise, in the US, describing police as “militarized” ignores that the establishment of police forces was tied directly to the trans-Atlantic slave trade, and in particular the institution of slave patrols. While in northern US cities like Boston and New York, as in London, policing developed mainly as a means for the social control of the poor and immigrants, in the US south, it emerged precisely as a means for ensuring White social and economic order in relation to (freed) slaves – dynamics that migrated northward alongside those same freed slaves. In the antebellum South, Blacks outnumbered Whites, and slave-owners lived in fear not only of slave rebellions, but also of the enticement of slaves to join opposing Spanish forces (Hadden 2001). First germinated in the colonial Caribbean, slave patrols were created in the early eighteenth century to enforce slave law (a separate code of law governing slaves). Intended to replace the system of private bounties, slave patrols complemented militias that protected colonists from “external” threats (Indigenous and Spanish). The idea that policing is different from warfare (and requires different forces) is based on the positioning of threats as either internal (slaves) or external (“Indians” and Spanish), but both served the same purpose: securing a White supremacist social and economic order. To this end, slave patrols not only tracked down runaways, but also broke up slave meetings to quash rebellions. They were officially appointed and indemnified by courts of law, operating not only in rural areas but also in cities (Hadden 2001). After the Civil War, and the official abandonment of the slavery system, police forces filled the role previously played by slave patrols (Reichel 1988; Hadden 2001; Davis 2003). While the American Civil War is traditionally cast as a victory for emancipation, the Jim Crow system of local and state laws soon arose to enforce racial segregation and ensure inequality in everything from housing to public transportation, education and voting rights. Vagrancy laws punishing unemployment were selectively applied, criminalizing freed slaves but not unemployed Whites, resulting in the imprisonment of African Americans who were then put to hard labor – reproducing White supremacism through criminal law (Davis 2003; Alexander 2010). This state of affairs was produced not just by the apparatus of the state. For example, scientific thought also supported White supremacy by creating bogus “proof” of the propensity for criminality in African Americans (Muhammad 2010, 2). The mid-twentieth century Civil Rights era, like the Civil War before it, is often cast as a triumph of liberal emancipation from Jim Crow – but just as slavery gave way to Jim Crow, segregation gave way to new forms of racist civil order. Much as slave owners feared Black organizing in the antebellum South, so did White urbanites in the Civil Rights era. So-called “riots” in Birmingham, Newark, Detroit and other cities – uprisings against police brutality and inequality – as well as organized resistance movements like the Black Panthers became a “problem” of social order like the slave rebellions of a prior period. The relationship between the military and the police is perhaps clearest in the subjugation of Black organizing in this period: not only was the National Guard called in to “restore order” in Watts, Newark and elsewhere (much as it has recently been activated in Ferguson), but the FBI also created its own counterinsurgency campaign, COINTELPRO, which surveilled, infiltrated and disrupted anti-war and Black power organizations (Browne 2015). This illustrates the martial nature of political formations aimed at suppressing anti-racist activism, from slave patrols through COINTELPRO. The War on Drugs was then-President Richard Nixon’s own innovation for quashing Black resistance in the name of “law and order.” The ongoing War on Drugs involves strict penalties for drug crimes, which are enforced and punished disproportionately in Black communities. It produced the mass conviction of African Americans, leading not only to imprisonment and forced labor, but also to a substantial diminishment of rights including access to employment, education and voting through the status of so many African Americans as felons (Provine 2007). If the War on Drugs has failed in its stated aim of reducing the drug trade, it has succeeded in enforcing a new racial order based on mass incarceration. A lineage persists here: police forces, whether antebellum slave patrols, or enforcers of Jim Crow segregation or the War on Drugs, have been central to a form of “martial politics” waged for the purposes of maintaining renewed forms of White social and economic order. Contemporary policing and mass incarceration can thus best be understood not in terms of “militarization,” as the ACLU and others suggest, but as a new expression of the “martial politics” of policing. Through an analysis grounded in “martial politics” we can grasp the presence of military vehicles and uniforms in Ferguson as a matter of continuity in the US state’s war-like relations with slaves and their descendants. This does not mean that modern policing is entirely the same as, for instance, slave patrols. Racism is highly adaptable (Bonilla-Silva 2006). “Martial politics” denotes a continuous framework of war-like relations with people of color, and allows for tracing different systems of racism within it. It is not that “war” happens elsewhere and is then brought home through “militarization.” This idea relies on a false distinction between what kinds of politics happen at “home” versus in “war.” It positions “domestic” violence as an aberration or inward leakiness of war. On the contrary, like the can of soup, policing does not merely now contain obvious military symbols – it is always already “of war” and war-like in its very form. Policing cannot be said to have been “militarized,” but rather forms part of a broader “martial politics” directed against racialized, Indigenous, disabled and queer people with the aim of reproducing liberal order.

### West Asia

#### After the fall of Iraq the product of reducing presence in the (X region) is a farce – lack of US presence in Iraq shifted engagement where hard power resources of boots on the ground become obsolete and instead soft power resources or drone strikes and arm sales maintains the violence of US militarism

Fawcett 2023 [Louise, Professor of International Relations and Wilfrid Knapp Fellow and Tutor in Politics. The Iraq War 20 years on: towards a new regional architecture. International Affairs, 99(2), 567-585.] CSUF JmB TDI

The first level examined here is the international one, from which arguably all other changes flowed. IR scholarship is frequently criticized for its top-down, overly ‘systemic’ perspective, focusing on the agency of major states, which can occlude the effects of local influences and actors, but in this case such a perspective is inescapable. In contrast with other major regional events which had strong local as well as international origins (the Arab–Israel wars, Lebanon’s wars, the Iranian Revolution or the Iran–Iraq War, for example), this was a top-down decision: a war that ‘did not need to happen and certainly not when it did’,39 and one opposed by multiple regional and international actors. The US decision to go to war and remake the Iraqi state, and to refashion the Middle East, was critical in facilitating new international alignments, changing perceptions of US power, and opening the way to a new regional balance of power and institutions. The effects were greater because the Iraq War occurred at a time when US unipolarity was still at its height; the Middle East constituted one of the most important testing grounds of the ‘new world order’ articulated by President George W. Bush following the Gulf War of 1991, and the ‘Asia pivot’ was still a project in the making. If that new world order had been bruised by the events of the later 1990s, including the demise of the MEPP and the rise of anti-western Islamic extremism, it had not been broken, and in some ways the Iraq War decision was further confirmation of that. But the protracted nature, cost and ultimate failure of that war to achieve its stated goals had a significant impact on US influence in the region and the wider world, lessening its diplomatic reputation.40 In the words of Joseph Nye, it at once marked the end of the ‘unipolar moment’, the ‘fall of US hegemony’ and the failure of ‘democratic enlargement’41—large claims, but the message was not lost on either allies or rivals. None of this was intended. President Obama spoke of the war as one that should not have been authorized and waged, but he also spoke of moving ‘beyond Iraq’ and ‘renewing American leadership’.42 Any renewal of leadership, however, would not take place in the Middle East theatre, and not on the same terms. The Iraq War heralded a distinctive change in the nature of US involvement in the region, from high to low intensity—highlighted by the withdrawal from Iraq itself, and later Afghanistan, and its taking more measured roles in Libya and Syria. Lynch notes how three consecutive presidents effectively downgraded their security commitments to the region.43 True, this was not disengagement, but ‘shifting engagement’.44 In terms of military bases and arms exports, the US footprint in the region remains far larger than that of any other power, notwithstanding withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan.45 In this regard, the path dependence of US military commitment and overseas presence is striking.46 Still, after Iraq, the willingness to use traditional hard power resources has declined, with a preference for a light military presence, air power or ‘surrogate’ warfare, using proxy actors, drones and sanctions regimes with consequences that are unpredictable in terms of reputation and results.47 The assassination, in January 2020, of Iran’s General Soleimani by a US-ordered drone strike was illustrative of such a strategy, one designed to downgrade Iran as a regional power, visible also in the renewed sanctions regime after US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Alongside this reduced appetite for direct intervention, the soft power resources of the United States were evidently eroded, including its credibility and status as a leading regional power, with consequences for allies and enemies alike. This was not the ‘new beginning’ that Obama promised in his Cairo speech.48 Some of this could have happened anyway, or happened elsewhere, in the light of new global challenges and growing multipolarity, but events in Iraq were decisive in determining the new character of US involvement. Approving a new arms deal in July 2022, President Biden sought to reassure regional allies, but the wider lessons of US policy have not been lost on Arab states as they seek greater autonomy and new partners. Nor were those lessons lost on America’s competitors or allies further afield. Both Russia and China, which opposed the war, and helped to block the possibility of any favourable UN Security Council resolution, were ultimately beneficiaries, though in different ways. They shared US concerns about Iraqi pretensions and stability in the Gulf, and were not inclined, at that time, to mount a robust opposition to the US intervention, for reasons that had to do with domestic politics and their international standing. However, they stood to gain materially and strategically in distancing themselves from the conflict and its subsequent fallout. New opportunities arose for these two powers and their aspirations to global influence: in supporting a sovereignty-first and pro-UN position, they were on the ‘right side’ in the Iraq War. For China the opportunities in MENA were mostly economic— the region became central to China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, unveiled in 2013. By 2020 China had become a major trading partner of regional states and importer of Middle East oil, but was also at the forefront of nuclear energy cooperation.49 However, scholars have also noted that the war had another effect on China, encouraging it to ‘think globally’; to move away from isolationism and enjoy the benefits of membership in an expanded international society.50 For Russia, the opportunities were economic, strategic and political, hastening the opportunity, effectively seized by President Putin, to re-establish a regional foothold—one lost since the 1960s.51 After the Libyan intervention, which Putin opposed, that opportunity was provided decisively by the Syrian civil war, which also aligned with Russia’s more activist ‘counter-revolutionary’ foreign policy as reflected in the colour revolutions: ‘Russia’s response to the Arab Spring, most notably the diplomatic, political, and military support it provided for the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad, represented a major return of Russian power and influence in the region.’52 Russia’s growing influence in Syria was made possible not only by changes in its own foreign policy orientation, but also by the reduced US appetite for intervention after Iraq. For both Russia and China, therefore, the Iraq War helped to erode the myth of western omnipotence and open the Middle East as a competitive space for economic and strategic opportunity.

## Alt

### Critical Peace Research

#### The alternative is a critical peace research strategy that critiques and reforms sovereign conceptions of violence and peace – interrogation of why threats are constructed as such must come prior to political decision-making

Jackson 15 (Richard, ‘Towards critical peace research: Lessons from critical terrorism studies,’ chapter in *Researching Terrorism, Peace and Conflict Studies: Interaction, synthesis, and opposition*, edited by Ioannis Tellidis and Harmonie Toros, pp. 24-31) CSUF JmB TDI

Critical peace research: a proposal On the basis of the above assessment, this section briefly outlines a set of core commitments which I believe ought to characterise CPR. I conceive of ‘critical’ (peace) research in two primary senses. First, it simply means an intellectual orientation or attitude which attempts to stand apart from the existing order (while at the same time acknowledging that one can never fully escape one’s own situatedness or biases), which questions widely accepted common- sense and dominant forms of knowledge about peace and conflict, and which asks probing questions about how existing social and epistemic orders came into existence and the processes by which they are maintained. Second, and more narrowly, the term ‘critical’ is used to refer to approaches which draw upon the analytical tools and insights of Frankfurt School- inspired Critical Theory, as well as related critical-normative social theories and disciplinary approaches such as critical constructivism, post- structuralism, feminism, post- colonialism and others. In the first instance, critical approaches are characterised by a healthy scepticism towards accepted knowledge claims and dominant ideas, and instead, seek to continuously question and interrogate that which is taken for granted. In particular, critical scholars are committed to interrogating how the status quo is implicated in some of the very problems that traditional theory seeks to solve, in this case, the ‘problems’ of conflict, violence, lack of reconciliation and the like. In part, this is because critical approaches recognise that knowledge and power are intimately connected– that knowledge is never neutral, but ‘theory is always for someone and for some purpose’ (Cox 1981). Lastly, in contrast to the social scientific adoption of a purportedly neutral standpoint on political and ethical issues, critical approaches are characterised by an openly ethical- normative commitment to human rights, social justice, progressive politics, and improving the lives of individuals and communities – or what is often called ‘emancipation’ or praxis (McDonald 2009). Ontological commitments What exactly are the things called ‘conflict’, ‘peace’, ‘violence’, ‘terrorism’, ‘mediation’, ‘reconciliation’ and the like, that we study, and how should we conceive, understand and speak of them? An openly critical approach would suggest that all of these objects of study are not free- standing, ontologically distinct phenomena discoverable by objective social scientific study. Instead, things like ‘peace’, ‘humanitarian intervention’, ‘cultural violence’ or ‘reconciliation’ are social formations and sets of social activities that are in large part contingent upon, and constituted by, the terms, languages and discourses used to describe and study them. A concept like ‘peace’ is actually ‘an ontologically suspicious concept’ (Elshtain quoted in Neufeld 1993: 172), and whether a particular society is described as ‘peaceful’, ‘post- conflict’, ‘reconciled’, or ‘violent’ is not a value- free fact or ‘truth’ waiting to be discovered by a scholar through the scientific method, but the consequence of the operation of a series of academic, political and social discourses, judgements and practices in different locales. In other words, there is a discursive, political, cultural and academic process by which real world actors and processes are given meaning through the negotiated application of different kinds of political and intellectual labels, categories and narratives, including a set of discursively constructed measures by which ‘peacefulness’ or ‘violence’ can be ranked, or groups judged to be ‘spoilers’, for example. Such measurements are inherently ideological in that they prioritise some values over others: direct violence over structural violence, order over social justice, dialogue over resistance. Moreover, such labels, concepts, categories and meanings are prone to change and contestation; they never just ‘speak for themselves’. In terms of exactly what a ‘conflict’ consists of, for example, something that started as a ‘rebellion’ might then become a ‘terrorist campaign’ (or ‘The troubles’), before being designated a ‘civil war’ (usually, by virtue of reaching an arbitrary fatality threshold), a ‘genocide’ or a ‘counter-insurgency campaign’. This is not to say that critical approaches do not recognise actual physical violence in the ‘real world’ which is experienced by people as ‘civil war’ or ‘terrorism’, or conditions of low direct violence which is understood as ‘peace’. Rather, it is to adopt a Frankfurt School- inspired ontology which maintains a ‘minimal foundationalism’ in which the ontological distinction between subject and object is preserved, and discourse and materiality are conceptualised as shaping each other in a dialectical, never-ceasing dynamic, rather than the one being solely constituted by the other (Toros and Gunning 2009). Such an ontological standpoint recognizes that there are observable ‘regularities’ in human activity (what positivists might call laws), and that one can distinguish between different phenomena on the basis of their delineated characteristics, while at the same time recognising that these characteristics and how they are interpreted are a product of their social and historical context and thus, are not ‘objective facts’ in the positivist sense. Consequently, for critical scholars, the acceptance of the relative ontological insecurity of analytical concepts results in a real sensitivity to the politics of labelling and categorising, and extreme care in the use of different terms during research and teaching. However, critical approaches go even further, recognising that peace, conflict, violence, reconciliation and the like are in themselves constituted by social and political narratives, discourses and practices. As a consequence, critical scholars are interested in the constitutive nature of norms, ideas and other discursive elements which make the social practices of conflict, violence, dialogue, peace and reconciliation possible in specific historical and spatial contexts (Alkopher 2005: 716). In other words, critical approaches suggest that violent conflict cannot be fully understood apart from the particular kinds of narratives, discourses and social practices which make it possible by rendering it conceivable, legitimate and reasonable (see Jabri 1996). Crucial to this process is the role played by existing normative structures which function to construct identities, interests and modes of social action (Alkopher 2005: 720). Importantly, in addition to critical civil war research (see Jackson 2014) within the conflict analysis side of the field, a critical ontology which accepts the social construction and inherent instability of the key concepts is also starting to inform approaches to the study of peace (Richmond 2007, Shinko 2008) and conflict resolution (Hansen 2008), among others. Epistemological commitments A critical epistemology accepts that creating knowledge is ultimately a social process which depends on a range of contextual and process- related factors, not least the social position of the researcher, the institutional context within which they conduct their research, and the kinds of methods they employ. Such factors impact on the kinds of knowledge produced, as well as the purposes to which it is ultimately put. Importantly, this does not mean that all knowledge about the social world is hopelessly insecure, that scholarly standards and procedures in research should be rejected, or that ‘anchorages’ – relatively secure knowledge claims – cannot be found and built upon (Booth 2008). Rather, it suggests that CPR should be characterised by a continuous and critical reflexivity in regards to its own epistemology, methodology and assumptions. It also means that there are few if any knowledge claims about conflict, violence, peace, reconciliation and the like that cannot be challenged or questioned. Related to this, a critical perspective also recognises that no individual, including academic researchers, can completely put aside their personal identity, values, perceptions, and world view and then engage in purely objective, dispassionate, value- free research. Rather, every researcher brings with them a particular culture and set of values and understandings which shapes their research in important ways. At the very least, critical scholars argue that recognising and acknowledging the personal subjectivity of the researcher is an important step (see Breen Smyth 2009), not least because such continuous reflexivity acts as an antidote to the dangerous claim that some kinds of knowledge are objective and wholly unbiased, and therefore superior to others. Crucially, such an epistemological stance does not entail a wholesale rejection of the social scientific notion of objectivity, but instead accepts that there are multiple ways of knowing about objects of social analysis, such as conflicts or peace processes, that it is in any case beyond the capacity of any single narrative to provide the best account of such processes, and that through a pluralisation of perspectives and their inevitable clashes a more justifiable knowledge can be assembled (see Campbell 1998: 279–281). A critical approach therefore suggests that ‘continual contestation, rather than the aspirations of synthesis and totality, should be the aim of inquiry’ (ibid.: 281).

### Decolonization

#### Thus, the only alternative is an ethic of incommensurability.

**Tuck and Yang 12** (Eve Tuck, Unangax, State University of New York at New Paltz K. Wayne Yang University of California, San Diego, Decolonization is not a metaphor, Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40, JKS)

An ethic of incommensurability, which guides moves that unsettle innocence, stands in contrast to aims of reconciliation, which motivate settler moves to innocence. Reconciliation is about rescuing settler normalcy, about rescuing a settler future. Reconciliation is concerned with questions of what will decolonization look like? What will happen after abolition? What will be the consequences of decolonization for the settler? Incommensurability acknowledges that these questions need not, and perhaps cannot, be answered in order for decolonization to exist as a framework. We want to say, first, that decolonization is not obliged to answer those questions - decolonization is not accountable to settlers, or settler futurity. Decolonization is accountable to Indigenous sovereignty and futurity. Still, we acknowledge the questions of those wary participants in Occupy Oakland and other settlers who want to know what decolonization will require of them. The answers are not fully in view and can’t be as long as decolonization remains punctuated by metaphor. The answers will not emerge from friendly understanding, and indeed require a dangerous understanding of uncommonality that un-coalesces coalition politics - moves that may feel very unfriendly. But we will find out the answers as we get there, “in the exact measure that we can discern the movements which give [decolonization] historical form and content” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). To fully enact an ethic of incommensurability means relinquishing settler futurity, abandoning the hope that settlers may one day be commensurable to Native peoples. It means removing the asterisks, periods, commas, apostrophes, the whereas’s, buts, and conditional clauses that punctuate decolonization and underwrite settler innocence. The Native futures, the lives to be lived once the settler nation is gone - these are the unwritten possibilities made possible by an ethic of incommensurability. *when you take away the punctuation* *he says of* *lines lifted from the documents about military-occupied land* *its acreage and location* *you take away its finality* *opening the possibility of other futures* -Craig Santos Perez, Chamoru scholar and poet (as quoted by Voeltz, 2012) Decolonization offers a different perspective to human and civil rights based approaches to justice, an unsettling one, rather than a complementary one. Decolonization is not an “and”. It is an elsewhere.

### Pluriversal Global Nomos

#### The alternative is to affirm a pluriversal global nomos in favor of their realist – a type of third space, a plurality of coexisting independent entities, differentiated but interdependent, recognizing one another as juridically equals with the same rights of non-intervention, war-making, and neutrality – culminating in a global order that is anti-Eurocentric and antagonistic to the current state order.

Kalyvas, A. (2018). Carl Schmitt's postcolonial imagination. Constellations, 25(1), 35-53. Accessed 10-12-22 CSUF JmB

Tellingly, and rather paradoxically in light of his severe criticism of anticolonialism and his apparent nostalgia for the Eurocentric interstate order, Schmitt’s post-war writings do not advocate a return to the spatial structure and territorial distinctions of international public law. The first global nomos, its statocentrism, and the hegemony of Europe, he acknowledged, belonged irrevocably to the past and as much as he lamented their collapse, his work adapted and responded to the profound changes that were transforming world politics, including the new postcolonial reality brought about by the process of decolonization. During this period, the possibility of a new global nomos of the earth, beyond the Cold War’s bipolar system, emerges as his main theoretical and political preoccupation.116 His concerted attempts to think the contemporary global situation from the perspective of the vanishing colony are undoubtedly tentative, inconclusive, characterized by an occasional experimental quality, with sweeping positions, and often puzzling conclusions. But even though they lack the analytical rigor and conceptual sharpness of his previous studies on the history of international law and world politics they remain pertinent to the degree that they interrogated the geopolitical dualism of West and East by exploring the political promises of a post-Eurocentric world without formal colonies, that is, a world order lacking the territorial divisions, spatial distinctions, and zones of exception that defined the classical interstate system. Thus, while he traced the origins of European public law to the colonial encounter and explained its demise in terms of the abolition of the colonial difference, he also contemplated how order and balance might be restored in a global age where the formal colonial frontiers were dissolved and Europe itself displaced. In spite of the many criticisms that can be made of Schmitt’s work, his post-war reflections evoke alternative futures and open up the space for a post-European postcolonial order in the contradictions and conflicts he delineated between the movement towards world unity and the pluralization of autonomous greater regions. It is more or less around the time of the Bandung Conference in Indonesia that Schmitt begun to consider systematically the former colonies as potential harbingers of a new division of the global space and a new nomos. 117 In so doing, he revised and gave a new concrete historical and spatial content to the general idea of “pluriverse,” which he had initially proposed during the inter-war period in his theory of the political and further developed in the direction of a doctrine of greater spaces or pan-regions (Großräume) as a member of the Nazi party and in the context of Germany’s expansionist policies. 118 After the war, he posed afresh the question of a new nomos by identifying the former colonies as growing regional blocks and a possible basis for a post-European spatial ordering that will succeed the bipolar interval. 119 Already in 1952, for instance, he argued explicitly for a “third factor” (dritte Faktor), as a viable political alternative against the bleak prospect of the universal humanism of a single world sovereign. 120 He considered India, the Arab block, the Luso-Hispanic world, and China emerging international actors that could potentially break away from the transitional hegemonic phase of the two nuclear superpowers to inaugurate a new stage in world history, an era of “real pluralism” among several grand spaces capable of establishing an equilibrium of forces that will regulate and bracket war, thus instituting “a new international law of new dimensions.”121 Ten years later, he observed a “surprising number of new African and Asian states” and described the “undeveloped” and “uncommitted nations or regions” as “the neutral states of the anticolonial space” and placed them at “the point of departure of a new world order.”122 He attributed their privileged geopolitical positioning as worldhistorical actors of global change to the fact that “The previously colonized space seems to be the predestined environment for a new kind of neutrality.”123 The same year, in his treatise on the partisan, Schmitt lauded the spatial particularism and territorial dimension of anticolonial struggles by observing that “the names of Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi-minh, and Fidel Castro indicate that the tie to the soil, to the autochthonous population, and to the geographical particularities of the land” could signal the possibility of a new respatialization of the earth, resulting from a telluric politics grounded in specific places. He also praised Mao Tse-tung’s Chinese-Asiatic struggle against capitalist colonialism and endorsed his pluralistic image of a new nomos of the earth by approvingly quoting from his 1935 poem “Kunlun”: If I could stand above the heavens, I would draw my sword And cut you in three parts: One piece for Europe, Once piece for America, One piece left for China, The peace would rule the world.124 Likewise, in his last published article, in 1978, Schmitt associated the “third sphere” with the “non-aligned states” and saw again in their efforts to affirm their neutrality a clear albeit contradictory historical movement towards a new plural nomos characterized by a balance between several autonomous and politically integrated regions representing a polycentric spatial structure of the earth.125 The political spaces that decolonization has open up against the West-East bipolarity could provoke a radical restructuring of the world order, a new special revolution. Schmitt’s hypothesis of a postcolonial pluriversal spatial order, “an international order of the Grossraum,” is predicated on the assumption that it possesses all the formal attributes of his general theory of nomos and has similar effects.126 It represents a model of balanced and equitable interdependence that seeks to reconcile spatial division and political difference.127 In opposition to a boundless and spaceless universalism, and like the defunct international interstate order, the new post-Eurocentric nomos of the earth will consist of a plurality of coexisting independent entities, in this case, larger regions or continental blocks encompassing the whole earth instead only of the European states, each of which would be prohibited from intervening in the affairs of the others. Internally, each unit will have to be historically and culturally homogeneous with their own distinct political and legal forms of collective life; externally, in relation to each other, they will need to remain differentiated but interdependent, recognizing one another as juridically equals with the same rights of non-intervention, war-making, and neutrality, that is, in other words, each in possession of the monopoly of the political. The sharing of a set of common ordering principles and rules of engagement will entail new “just measures” and “sensible proportions” that will sustain an equilibrium of power among the several independent Großräume and achieve a balanced relationship of relative peace and bracketed wars without having recourse to a single hegemon or a superior sovereign standing above them.128 Schmitt expected that such a post-universal, post-state world order will carve new spatial divisions and re-establish the link between law and space by providing binding reciprocal guarantees, crucial for the maintenance of the autonomy and particularity of each distinct regional block and for the pluralism of the system as a whole. Hence, Schmitt envisions a new post-European nomos as a non-universal global law among Großräume, with the parts recognized as equal legal and political subjects, based on the non-intervention of extra-regional parts, all partaking on a common spatial order.129 In short, Schmitt’s postcolonial imagination expresses the transformation of global relations into a mutually beneficial interdependence, a new “normative order of the earth” consisting of several expectations, such as peace, stability, multilateralism, and coexistence.130 Clearly, this postcolonial vision of a new re-territorialized planetary “pluralist and multipolar” spatial order resembles and reproduces the logic, function, and effects of the older interstate public law but now mediated through the experience of the Monroe Doctrine and projected onto a bigger scale, as it would be truly global, consisting of political units much larger than the territorial state.131 A great deal can be said about Schmitt’s hypothesis, its traditional realist presuppositions, its underlying method of analogy, its globalized multi-cultural tendencies, and its indeterminate dialectics of difference and sameness. I cannot venture here into these vast and complex debates. I can only comment briefly on two evident problems that Schmitt failed to adequately address and much less to resolve. The first refers to his general account of the origins and foundations of any nomos as such; the second pertains to its conditions of possibility. Regarding the first problem, it’s important to recall that all concrete spatial orders are preceded by a spatial revolution, that is, every international order in the broader sense of the term is premised on an original and constitutive act of land-appropriation that establishes an ultimate radical legal title that determines subsequent divisions, partitions, and distributions.132 The concept of an alternative postcolonial global system of greater political spaces, however, seems to lack such a pre-juridical founding moment since, as Schmitt came to recognize, in the post-war age, land appropriation is not anymore a political option.133 Although appropriations have occurred in sea and air, and may occur in outer space with the conquest of planets, he seems to have insisted on the terrestrial, telluric dimension of human politics.134 But with the option of colonization foreclosed, he did not provide a clear alternative account of what might be the great primeval act that will usher a spatial revolution generative of the postcolonial order. The idea of a second spatial revolution is poorly theorized, elusive and uncertain to the effect that Schmitt lacks a theory of transitions from one nomos to the next. As a result, the foundations of his post-European global pluriverse remain indeterminate. Unspecified also remains the concept of the enemy that would correspond to and could sustain a new nomos of the earth. As for the second problem, an essential structural condition for the existence of a concrete order of the earth was the demarcation of a bounded space, geographically and culturally situated, of an inside that is clearly distinguished from an outside - even if the latter is included in the former - separated by divisional lines that provide a sense of orientation, measure, and commonality in relation to and against the background of what lies beyond. The hypothesis of coexisting regional or continental blocks on a planetary scale based on mutual recognition eludes the operation of a constitutive outside.135 Can a comprehensive and common global spatial order generate internal coherence, a minimum of commonality, and a shared symbolic consciousness among its diverse members without external zones of exception? Can postcolonial non-discriminatory wars among greater spaces remain limited and bracketed in the absence of free anomic conflict zones? Confining disorder to an exterior while keeping peace in the interior appears as an indispensable attribute of any concrete spatial order for the management and limitation of conflict but does not fit well with Schmitt’s allusions to the new postcolonial nomic pluriverse, which seems all inclusive and thus incapable of generating a inside/outside distinction, especially so since the soil of each and all the regional powers of the earth is conceived as juridically equivalent and equally protected. Schmitt sought to tackle both problems by introducing the idea of new industrial appropriations as an epochal equivalent of sorts to the primordial act of land taking. “Industry-appropriation,” he asserted, is the new form of appropriation that corresponds to the industrial-technical age.136 The forces that will appropriate and control the “spaces of development” (Entwicklungräume) will also divide anew the earth to determine the possibility of a postcolonial order.137 He concluded that “the space of industrial development and the division of the earth into industrially developed and underdeveloped regions and peoples” is decisive for the future nomos. 138 This is why he regarded the Third World as a foremost geopolitical terrain, “an area of conflict,” where the concrete planetary struggles for the coming nomos are fought out over industrial development and where alternative futures are enacted. 139 These incomplete and fragmented commentaries, the last Schmitt wrote on world politics, reiterate his claim that the main political question of his times is what and who will succeed the interval of the Cold War. He saw a clear opposition between the two likely outcomes: On the one hand, he denounced the dangerous prospects of “a planetary appropriation of industry” by one of the two contending Cold War super-powers emerging victorious to become the world’s sole sovereign, “the great appropriator, the great divider and distributor of our planet;” on the other, he ascertained a balanced pluralism among autonomous regional powers, unfolding in the anticolonial spaces of the postcolonies, in the combined efforts to appropriate their natural and industrial resources and break the binary spatial structure. 140 For Schmitt, eventually, the historical resolution of the antithesis between unipolarity and multipolarity, a global monopoly of a single power and a pluralism of coexisting Großräume, has a world-disclosing significance as, It will then be seen that certain nations and peoples have sufficient strength to endure within industrial development and to remain faithful to themselves, while others lose face and sacrifice their human individuality to the idol of a technicized earth.141 Reading Schmitt from the perspective of the concept of the colony opens up his political and legal theory of international law to a postcolonial horizon and indicates its contemporary actuality. What remains so interesting in Schmitt’s approach is the uncompromising attitude with which he exposed the colonial underpinnings of the modern nomos and interrogated relentlessly Western universalism in his quest for alternative post-Eurocentric global futures. One does not have to accept his political motivations and choices, or agree with all of his philosophical assumptions to recognize the significance of the insights his historical reconstruction offers in rethinking critically about world politics. By arguing with Schmitt beyond Schmitt, engaging in a kind of post-Schmittian exercise, I draw some preliminary conclusions pertaining to the relevance and limitations of his insistence that the colony is essential for the spatial constitution of political modernity. For one thing, Schmitt’s account incorporates the violent colonization and exploitation of the Americas into a broader global narrative that highlights the constitutive role of conquest in the making of the international interstate system as an originary moment of modernity. Probably the first to do so, his narrative runs against the dominant idea that the modern world order developed first within Europe, immanently, and then gradually spread outwards, exported to the rest of the world through colonial force and postcolonial imitation. Schmitt’s history of the relationship between international law and the nonEuropean world allows for a better understanding of how the global spatial revolution, which gave birth to and elevated modern Europe to the center of the world, was created by the colonial encounter and sustained with the difference between state and colony. This descriptive account includes what Bhupinder Chimni has insightfully named “a foundational critique of the history of international law,” which he associates with the Third World Approaches in International Law (TWAIL) that, like Antony Anghie, situates colonialism at the very heart of international law. 142 A similar influential critical discourse resonates powerfully in the philosophical and epistemological writings of Enrique Dussel, Aníbal Quijano, Walter Mignolo, and the decolonial perspectives from Latin America.143 It also reverberates in the original analyses of colonialism and imperialism developed from the African continent, like Samir Amin, Siba N’Zatioula Grovogui, and James Thuo Gathii. 144 Correspondingly, Schmitt’s plural and mutlipolar new nomos of the earth prefigures in later debates on a polycentric order, the transcivilizational perspective in international law, and in visions of plural legal orders and Third Worldism’s pan-regionalism as anticolonial alternatives to Western domination.145 These and other unexpected encounters between Schmitt’s theory of international law and anticolonial and postcolonial critical perspectives occur and become intelligible through the primacy assigned to the colony. It is a political primacy as well as an epistemological and historical one. Its centrality - as exception, foundation, and constitutive presence but also as a destructive force and a negative absence– animates both Schmitt’s unconventional theory of international law and the anticolonial and postcolonial radical rethinking of modernity. The colony is treated correspondingly, as essential for the making of international law, itself a fundamental determination of modernity. This shared understanding indicates the point of a certain convergence, a common position that accentuates the formative role of colonialism as the real foundation and the inescapable condition of possibility of the modern. Colonialism becomes constitutive of modernity to the extent that the modern age is regarded as irrevocably colonial. Recognizing this common ground between Schmitt and critical postcolonial approaches does not erase obvious differences, irreconcilable disagreements, and an unbridgeable chasm that expectedly and for good reasons separates them. Although points of encounter should not be neglected neither acknowledging them can cover up the obvious presence of a Eurocentric paradigm at work in Schmitt’s history of international law. This is not only because of his well-known admiration of European civilization and the praise of its superiority. It is also that his metropolitan gaze departs from the center to reach the periphery in order to return back to this very same center, whose demise he lamented. For instance, his idea of a post-Eurocentric, pluralistic, and multipolar order, a balanced coexistence among distinct regional blocks forming an equilibrium of forces, does not escape the grasp of Europe as it reproduces a model of a mechanical order based on a specific statist rationality and ontology, historically and geographically determined. This realist rationality he applied it to larger entities and at global level but organized along modern European philosophical principles, norms and rules. Schmitt’s legal and political international theory faces here an important limitation as it reproduces what it sets to repudiate. A similar impasse appears in the glaring absence of the indigenous and the colonized. This is captured by Benno Teschke’s poignant criticism of Schmitt's account that indicts him, rightly so, for “the absence of an inquiry into the inter-political nature of the encounter. The native Amerindians remain missing from his account.... They are not even acknowledged as passive bearers and victims of the incoming Spaniards and Portuguese, but nullified and written out of history.”146 It is true that Schmitt’s discussion of the conquest of the Americas ignores the standpoint of the oppressed. His, remains a European perspective, built from the singular position of the colonizer. As such, his heterodox world history is not heterodoxical enough to accommodate the political agency of the colonized. 147 Indeed, Schmitt’s postcolonial imagination is neither pure nor complete. It can be partial and flowed, contradictory, aporetic at times, cynical and ideological, occasionally distorted and distorting, even prejudicial. Notwithstanding these limitations, his international theory of politics and law and the primacy of the concept of the colony suggest three clear conclusions with a certain critical and emancipatory orientation. The first pertains to the colonial foundations of the interstate system, state sovereignty, and political modernity as such. Simply put, for Schmitt, modernity is both Eurocentric and colonial. The second refers to the opposition between anticolonialism and decolonization, on the one hand, and the modern Eurocentric international order, on the other. The former is described as a real political negation of the latter: the spatial structure of anticolonialism is inherently anti-Eurocentric. The last conclusion involves the political significance of the postcolonies as alternative spaces where greater regions and geopolitical blocks might develop into becoming founding participants and equal members of a pluriversal global nomos. As a categorical description of the intimate relationship between colonialism and modernity and their complicity in the making of colonial modernity all three of Schmitt’s conclusions register at the core of his thought the modern horizon opened by colonialism and point, however dimly, at possible decolonial global futures. 148

### Critical History

#### The alternative is a critical history of US military presence in the Arab States of the Persian Gulf. The linear narrative of the 1AC articulates existence as a field of endemic violence that requires Pastoral State action; exposing the historical production of this current moment is the only way to reanimate pedagogies oriented around producing better futures

Giroux and Evans 15 [Henry, Distinguished Visiting Professorship @ Ryerson University and Chair in English and Cultural Studies Department @ McMaster University, and Brad, senior lecturer in the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies @ University of Bristol, “Disposable Futures: The Seduction of Violence in the Age of the Spectacle,”] CSUF JmB TDI

There is an important point to stress here regarding the logics of brutality. **Violence is easily condemned when it appears exceptional. This** also unfortunately **precludes more searching and uncomfortable questions**. Normalized violence, by contrast, represents a more formidable challenge, requiring a more sophisticated and learned response. **Exposing more fully how these normalized cultures of cruelty shape the historic moment** is the main purpose of this work, as it **is integral to** the critical imagination and **those forms of political agency necessary for successfully living in a nonviolent** and civilian **future**. Our motivation for writing this book is driven by a commitment to the value of critical pedagogy in countering mechanisms of dehumanization and domination at play in neoliberal societies and beyond. We have no time whatsoever for those who reason that violence may be studied in an “objective” or “rational” way. **There are no neutral pedagogies indifferent to matters of politics, power, and ideology. Pedagogy is**, **in part, always about** both struggle and vision—**struggles over identities, modes of agency, values, desires, and visions of the possible**. Not only does **the apologetics of neutrality** lead to the most remiss intellectualism when the personal experience of violence is reduced to emotionless inquiry, but it also **announces complicity in the rationalizations of violence that depend upon the degradation of** those qualities that constitute what is essential to **the human condition**. Thus, **education** is by definition a form of political intervention. It **is always disentangling itself from particular regimes of power that attempt to authenticate and disqualify certain ways of perceiving and thinking about the world**. The larger issue is that not only is education central to politics, but the educative nature of politics begins with the assumption that how people think, critically engage the world, and are self-reflective about the shaping of their own experiences and relations to others marks the beginning with a viable and oppositional politics. We dare to perceive and think differently from both neoliberal rule and the increasingly stagnant and redundant left, which does little to counter it. **The world that we inhabit is systematically oppressive and tolerates the most banal and ritualistic forms of violence. It educates us of the need for warfare**; it prizes, above all, the values of militarism and its conceptual apparatus of “civic soldierology.” It sanctions and openly celebrates killings as if they are necessary to prove our civilization’s credentials. **It takes pride, if not pleasure, in punishing peoples of distinct racial and class profiles, all in the name of better securing society**. It promotes those within that order with characteristics that in other situations would be both criminalized and deemed pathological. **And it invests significantly in all manner of cultural productions so that we** develop a taste for violence, and even **learn to appreciate aesthetics of violence, as the normal and necessary price of being entertained.** This book inevitably draws upon a number of critical visionaries whose fight for dignity cannot be divorced from their intellectual concerns. The spirit of the late Paulo Freire in particular is impressed upon each of these pages. His critical pedagogy was unashamedly tasked with liberating both the oppressed and their oppressors from the self-perpetuating dynamics of subjugation. Freire’s prose echoed the humanizing call for a more just, literate, and tolerant world. He remains a strong influence in the field of education and in other areas of practice that require thinking about the possibility of an ethics of difference that resists violence in all its forms. The power and forcefulness of Freire’s works are to be found in the tensions, conflicts, poetry, and politics that make it a project for thinking about (non)violence meaningfully. Siding with the disempowered of history—those at the raw ends of tyranny—Freire’s work calls for a more poetic image of thought that is a way of reclaiming power by reimagining the space and practice of cultural and political resistance. His work thus represents a textual borderland where poetry slips into liberation politics, and solidarity becomes a song for the present begun in the past while waiting to be heard in the future. Freire, no less trenchant in his critique of illegitimate rule, refuses to dwell in hopelessness. His resistance is empowering because it is infused with a fearless belief in people’s abilities and finds reasons to rejoice in the transformative possibilities of living: The more radical the person is, the more fully he or she enters into reality so that, knowing it better, he or she can transform it. This individual is not afraid to confront, to listen, to see the world unveiled. This person is not afraid to meet the people or to enter into a dialogue with them. This person does not consider himself or herself the proprietor of history or of all people, or the liberator of the oppressed; but he or she does commit himself or herself, within history, to fight at their side. Freire is not our only source of inspiration. Nearly a century ago Walter Benjamin responded to the tyranny of his times by writing his famous “Critique of Violence.” Ours is a different age. And yet **the need for a critique adequate to our times is as pressing as ever. We are not lacking in knowledge of our own oppression**. Let’s be sure of that. **Oppressive power reveals enough of its violent traces for even a casual cartographer to expose its deceptions** or else retreat into conspiracy. **What we do lack is a rigorous critique of the historical moment and its varied modes of imaginative resistance**. Such modes of artistic imagination are as important as contemporary sources of oppression are in mediating suffering in the service of established contemporary power. **This requires a critique of violence that once again encourages us to think beyond its necessity**, so as to make clear that in a world in which violence is normalized, it once again becomes possible to imagine the unimaginable, **particularly the notion that collective resistance not only is possible but can transform the world with confidence**. Hence, **while authors like** Steven **Pinker cloud our perception by claiming the current era is the least violent era in human history**, relying upon credo per capita human death rates etc., **it takes only a slightly different angle of vision to see the current social order’s full range of preventable violence: impoverishment, financial predation, malnutrition, mass incarceration, and rapidly accelerating deforestation, ecological degradation, and irreversible biocide. Pinker would do well to acknowledge that political violence is poorly understood if it simply refers to a failure of liberal modernity**. Political violence cannot be reduced to such a crude and reductionist metric. Indeed, **conventional demarcations between times of war and times of peace, zones of security and zones of crises, friends and enemies, have long since evaporated. We live in complex and radically interconnected societies, whose social morphology has radically altered our sense of the world such that we are taught to accept insecurity as the natural order of things**. This is fully in keeping with the proliferation of media output, factual and fictional, that bombards us continuously with images of violence and catastrophe for subtle political gain. Indeed, what is new about the current historical conjuncture is not only a commodified popular culture of entertainment, but the emergence of a predatory society in which the suffering and death of others becomes a reason to rejoice rather than mourn. Extreme violence has become not only a commodified spectacle, but one of the few popular resources available through which people can bump up their pleasure quotient. **Our critique begins from the realization that violence has become ubiquitous, “settling like some all-enveloping excremental mist** … **that has permeated every nook of any institution or being** that has real influence on the way we live now. **We cannot escape its spectre.** Its presence is everywhere. It is hardwired into the fabric of our digital DNA. **Capitalism in fact has always thrived on its consumption. There is, after all, no profit in peace. We are not calling here for the censoring of all representations of violence as if we could retreat into some sheltered protectorate**. That would be foolish and intellectually dangerous. **Our claim is both that the violence we are exposed to is heavily mediated, and that as such we are witness to various spectacles that serve a distinct political function, especially as they either work to demonize political resistance or simply extract from its occurrence** (fictional and actual) **any sense of political context and critical insight. Moving beyond the spectacle by making visible the reality of violence in all of its modes is both necessary and politically important. What we need then is an ethical approach to the problem of violence such that its occurrence is intolerable to witness. Exposing violence is not the same as being exposed to it**, though the former too often comes as a result of the latter. **The corrupting and punishing forms taken by violence today must be addressed by all people as both the most important element of power and the most vital of forces shaping social relationships under the predatory formation of neoliberalism. Violence is both symbolic and material in its effects and its assaults on all social relations, whereas the mediation of violence coupled with its aesthetic regimes of suffering is a form of violence that takes as its object both memory and thought. It purges the historical record, denying access to** the **history** of a more dignified present, purposefully **destroying the ability to connect forms of struggle across the ages**. Memory as such is fundamental to any ethics of responsibility. Our critique of violence begins, then, as an ethical imperative. **It demands a rigorous questioning of the normalized culture of violence in which we are now immersed. It looks to the past so that we may understand the violence of our present. It looks to the ways that ideas about the future shape the present such that we learn to accept a world that is deemed to be violent by design. This requires a proper critical reading of the way violence is mediated in our contemporary moment; how skewed power relations and propagators of violence are absolved of any wider blame in a pedagogical and political game that permits only winners and losers; how any act of injustice is made permissible in a world that enshrines systemic cruelty.**

## Impact

### Endless War

#### The logic that underpins the security dilemma locks in endless wars.

Harnett 2022 (Liane Hartnett, Australian National University, [Luke Glanville](javascript:;), [Cian O'Driscoll](javascript:;), [Lauren Wilcox](javascript:;), [Alexander Bellamy](javascript:;), [Brent Steele](javascript:;), “Winning? The Politics of Victory in an Era of Endless War“ <https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viac006>) TDI

In his 1904 letter on the Russo–Japanese war, Leo Tolstoy—the literary figure turned prophet of peace—admonished against the possibility of endless war (Tolstoy 1904, 4; Moyn 2020). Tolstoy may have foretold of this era of endless war that has besieged us since the “war on terror” was first waged over twenty years ago, yet it is also written into the very logic that shapes the study of international relations and its approach to war and worlds. Implicit in the realist embrace of the tragic, contained in the Augustinian conviction that “to the end of history the peace of the world … must be gained by strife” (Niebuhr 2013, 256), promulgated by a liberal pursuit of perpetual peace that fails to interrogate how it propagates perpetual war, and contained in the constructivist doxa that war-making is world-making, the specter of endless war seems destined to haunt our horizons. The ubiquity of “victory” in war talk is coupled with an ambiguity of what it actually means to win a war, which only serves to exacerbate and inscribe war’s endlessness. Despite the burgeoning literatures on endless war (Wertheim 2020; Moyn 2021) and indeed victory (Martel 2011; Hom, O’Driscoll, and Mills 2018; O’Driscoll 2019), there is little substantive engagement with how these themes intersect when thinking ethically about the question of war and what passes for peace. This forum seeks to spark a conversation to address this gap. We ask: What might we render visible and redress by thinking critically of the politics of victory in an era of endless war? Further, to the extent that just-war theory has long offered a grammar for the ethics of war, how does it help or hinder this quest? Beyond the claim that engaging with these questions reveals something about the ethical elision of the tragedy (O’Driscoll 2019) or absurdity (Hartnett and O’Driscoll 2020) of war, this conversation aims to both unsettle the abstractions, which inhere in the ethics of war, and recover its promise to pay heed to the particularity and plurality of life and lived experience. This forum begins by revealing the ironic: endless wars are never won, yet the pursuit of victory perpetuates and perhaps even presupposes them. Lauren Wilcox, therefore, invites us to consider war as the ongoing practice of transforming injuring and killing into world-making. In their emphasis on the historic, Lauren Wilcox, Alex Bellamy, and Luke Glanville articulate how the moral categories of just war are predicated upon contradictory yet co-constituted conceptions of power and justice, and a flawed temporal and colonial logic. Focusing on practices of protection, reparation, and restitution, Alex Bellamy and Luke Glanville ask how to reconceive responsibility in an epoch of enmeshment, where it is no longer clear when war and its legacies begin or end. Finally, Brent Steele and Cian O’Driscoll seek to recuperate just-war theory, beyond war, traditionally conceived, and its canon. Brent Steele reimagines just war as a just struggle against the Covid-19 pandemic, while Cian O’Driscoll writes of an ethics of war that begins to theorize from our bare existence. Attentive to irony, the conversation, then, continues in hope: in its calls to interrogate the logics of victory and violence, to reckon with responsibility, to reimagine an ethics of war that centers on life, we collectively seek an ethics of war and peace tethered to the pursuit of justice.

#### Its extensential

Charlotte Heath-Kelly 18, Associate Professor in Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick, Ph.D. in International Politics from Aberystwyth University, 2018, “Forgetting ISIS: enmity, drive and repetition in security discourse,” Critical Studies on Security, Vol. 6, No.1, p. 85-86

Security never seems to make any progress. Despite military investments, security reviews and ever more powerful technological surveillance, European and North American populations are continually represented as unsafe. The most powerful states in the world, enjoying historically unprecedented levels of health, prosperity and stability, are simultaneously the most hysterically possessed by security-related fears. The compulsion to experience the self as insecure, despite evidence to the contrary, is the starting point for this paper. ¶ Much has been written about political anxiety in the fields of political theory and sociology. Corey Robin has explored the developing permutations of fear in Western philosophical thought as an operational concept (Robin 2004); Frank Furedi has explored how the social alienation and declining community ties associated with contemporary neoliberalism have led to cultures of insecurity (Furedi 2002), and Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck have both written about the transformation of risk and anxiety in an age where technology produces its own, sometimes existential, dangers (Beck 1992; Giddens 1990). Fear and risk are prominent topics on sociological and philosophical landscapes.¶ Not wanting to be left behind, international relations has also produced substantial literatures on the risk discourses and anxieties which dominate contemporary political life. Much of this research was initially located within the Copenhagen School of securitisation theory, which analysed the construction of threat by political elites and the centrality of speech acts to processes of securitisation (Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde 1998; Hansen 2012a; McDonald 2008). The functionality of securitisation is here understood in terms of identity: identifying and invoking an external threat serves to performatively constitute the nation (Jackson 2005; McCrisken 2003).¶ In the wake of securitisation theory, European international relations developed a poststructuralist critique of Beck’s ‘Risk Society’ thesis. In their rethinking of risk, Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster critiqued Beck’s macro-sociological assumptions that risks exist independently in the world from the governmental technologies which invoke them (Aradau and Van Munster 2007). The incalculability of contemporary risks does not make them ungovernable, as Beck suggests; rather governance structures have shifted to incorporate the unpredictability of certain dangers into precautionary risk management. Incalculability becomes the modality of security.1 Poststructuralist International Relations has found fertile terrain in the idea of risks and their governance. Pushing this research beyond its focus on the security sector, Emmy Eklundh, Andreja Zevnik and Emmanuel Pierre-Guittet have explored the logics of anxiety at play in austerity politics and security governance, and the anxious and resistant subjectivities produced therein (Eklundh, Zevnik, and Pierre-Guittet 2017).¶ But what does it mean to centralise anxiety, fear and risk in Western political and sociological thought at a time of relative geopolitical stability and wealth? In his own take on the politics of anxiety, Mark Neocleous (2000) tackled the proliferation of (in)security and risk discourse in sociology and international relations, arguing that the acceleration of (in) securitisation reflects the policing of civil society to protect bourgeois property and status. The articulation of pollution, terrorism and migration as security threats depoliticises them; it silences the social and political creation of these issues, enabling governing structures to pursue technocratic solutions which efface the real genesis of threats: capital accumulation.¶ It is important to note that the arguments made by Neocleous, poststructuralist scholars of risk and securitisation theorists share more in common than their focus on political anxiety. They all also describe ambivalence within security practices towards the threat object. While politicians promise that destroying the enemy will bring about resolution and ontological stability, IR literatures show that frames of enmity enable the pursuit of other goals: biopolitical governance, identity consolidation and the furtherance of capital accumulation. There is a gap between security and its threat object. The threat object is made hypersignificant in political discourse, but it is simultaneously treated ambivalently and can be replaced at will. New objects wait in the wings as potential vessels for enmity.

# NR

## FW

### Militarized Academy

#### You should apply a high level of skepticism to their impact analysis because of the military’s investment into institutions writ large

Howell 2018 [Allison. Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, Newark) . Forget “militarization”: Race, disability and the “martial politics” of the police and of the university. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 20(2), 117-136.] CSUF JmB TDI

Just as “militarization” has guided inquiry into contemporary police violence, it has also been used to call attention to worrying connections between the university and the US national security apparatus. One prominent example is the series of Vice News reports exposing the “100 Most Militarized Universities in America” (Arkin and O’Brien 2015a, 2015b). The authors of the study note that initially they were reluctant to use the term “militarization,” which was not meant to simply evoke … ROTC [Reserve Officer Training Corps] drills held on a campus quad. It was also a measure of university labs funded by US intelligence agencies, administrators with strong ties to those same agencies, and, most importantly, the educational backgrounds of the approximately 1.4 million people who hold Top Secret clearance. (Arkin and O’Brien 2015a) But “militarization” leads us to underestimate the depth and extent of national security ties to the university, past and present, and to assume that universities can revert to some non-militarized past. This limitation is also evident in scholarly literature. One of the central scholarly texts on the so-called “militarization” of the university is Giroux’s The University in Chains (2007). Cited hundreds of times, and reported on in popular media, it argues that the post-9/11 period saw a significant acceleration of the corporatization and militarization of the university (Giroux 2007, 2008). Giroux goes so far as to say that while corporatization had previously taken root in the university, “it is only in the aftermath of 9/11 that the university has also become an intense site of militarization” (Giroux 2008, 58). Furthermore, “militarization” of the university begins for Giroux only after World War II (see also Chomsky et al. 1998). These popular and scholarly works identify important changes in the nature of military involvement in universities. For example, the Vice report notes that funding now flows to intelligence-gathering disciplines (e.g., computer science) rather than solely weapons-oriented ones (e.g., physics). Yet research guided by the concept of “militarization” falls into the trap of imagining military encroachment on previously civil institutions: “the idea of the university as a site of critical thinking, public service and socially responsible research appears to have been usurped” (Giroux 2008, 63). This is a fantasy. The university was never such a pure site. Many American universities were built with slave labor or its proceeds (Brown University Committee on Slavery and Justice n.d.), and from the outset have contributed vitally to colonization and White supremacy. By positing a purely civilian “before” to a military “after,” “militarization” accounts wrongfully elide this history. In the American university no such “before” exists. This is not to say nothing has changed. Seeing the university as a site of “martial politics” allows us to provide a historical account attuned to the ways in which politics is shaped by the precise forms warfare takes. Most academic disciplines – the very categories by which we organize knowledge – were fundamentally shaped by conquest, warfare and military funding. This is not only true for IR, a discipline born out of colonialism and war (Vitalis 2015), but for any number of other disciplines from physics (Gusterson 1998, 2011) to business (Cowen 2014) to neuroscience (Howell 2017). Excavating these histories gives us a sense of how thoroughly we live with “martial politics.” Several disciplines were said to have been “militarized” after 9/11. Most controversially, medicine, psychiatry, psychology and anthropology all had major debates about involvement in torture and warfare in their professional associations. In anthropology, for example, this debate concerned the 2008 establishment of Project Minerva (which provided $50 million in defense funding to social sciences) and the recruitment of anthropologists in counterinsurgency warfare through the Human Terrain Program (Gusterson 2009). To describe this as the “militarization” of anthropology, however, is to ignore that anthropology is foundationally a colonial discipline set up to catalog “primitive” subject peoples, with a long history of entanglement with the security state, not least in Cold War-era counterinsurgency operations in Latin America and Asia (Gusterson 2009). The concept of “martial politics” allows us to pose new questions about the historical relationship between formal knowledge production and forms of warfare, rather than just relations between the university and the military. It allows us to ask how certain forms of warfare are produced by, and produce, academic disciplines. The nature of this mutual production will differ depending on the particular military strategy undertaken at any historical moment. The case of psychology is instructive here. After psychologists were implicated in devising, administering and overseeing torture at the US naval base at Guantánamo Bay (Howell 2007), concern was raised about the “militarization” of psychology (Ariggo, Eidelson, and Bennett 2012). Again, this concern assumes that the discipline was once free from involvement in war or colonialism, and that an unusual trespass occurred after 9/11. Not so. Since almost its very foundation, psychology has been tied to forms of military strategy. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, psychology was a fledgling discipline and was understood as a humanistic form of knowledge. That changed drastically in World War I. At that time Robert Yerkes, a eugenics proponent and professor of psychology, was President of the American Psychological Association. Convinced that psychologists could be of service in the war, and that war could be useful to psychologists, Yerkes approached the US Army with a proposition: he could help the Army with its personnel problem (of appropriately placing the massive number of new recruits) in return for funding and access to an unprecedented number of subjects on which to experiment: soldiers. World War I enabled the first mass scientific experiment in psychology in the form of intelligence testing. The data accumulated provided fodder for a generation of psychologists, establishing the experiment as the primary methodology of psychology and massively reshaping the discipline from a philosophical/humanistic one into an (American) science. This constitutes a symbiotic relationship: psychology was not “militarized” in World War I. Rather, it propelled a particular kind of warfare: industrial warfare conducted on frontlines, involving mass mobilization and requiring new personnel management techniques. Wartime support, in return, worked to reshape psychology into a science. The academy is not the victim of military breach but has foundationally been produced and formed, in its specificities, through warfare – and has formed warfare in return as a technology of security (Howell 2011). Psychology was already well steeped in the racist and ableist science of eugenics prior to World War I (Mitchell and Snyder 2003; Carey 2009; Thomson 2010), but through military funding it was able to systematize its eugenicism as a science of “intelligence.” This martial entanglement did not end with the war and the return of psychology to “domestic” applications. Intelligence data not only established psychology as a science but went on to practical applications in war-like relations of disability and race both within the US and other colonial settings. Three examples follow that demonstrate this move. First, the data from the Army experiment produced results that “proved” that the average American had the intelligence level of a 13-year-old, just above the level of “moron” (an ableist construct). This contributed to a moral panic about the degeneration of the “stock” of the American nation due to Southern European immigrants, and led to some of the first sweeping US immigration restrictions. It also bolstered mental hygiene and eugenics movements, promoting the sterilization of disabled, racialized, Indigenous or “promiscuous” women who were labeled feeble-minded (Carey 2003). This form of martial politics perpetrates violence especially on women’s bodies, managing their sexuality and reproductive capacities for the purposes of extirpating “dangerous” or degenerate populations. Second, since they were constructed by White men who saw “intelligence” in their own image, the Army tests unsurprisingly placed the “negro” at the bottom of a racist (and sexist) hierarchy of intelligence (Mensh and Mensh 1991; Gould 1999). With their sheen of objective science, these very same Army tests were administered in South Africa and other colonies, justifying colonial rule and later Apartheid. Finally, Carl Brigham, who was part of the Army experiment team, and later a Princeton University professor and member of the advisory council of the American Eugenics Society, went on to create the high school Scholastic Aptitude Tests (SATs). The SATs remain the cornerstone of one of the most pernicious and racist aspects of the Army tests’ afterlife: standardized testing. This regime, to this day, outrageously ranks African American students as having lower intelligence, or aptitude, significantly reducing access to higher education and thus economic mobility. All this history, all these contributions of the discipline of psychology to unjust dynamics surrounding race, disability, poverty and gender, are shuttered by a “militarization” framework because it assumes that when psychology is used in war (e.g., in torture) that this is an aberration rather than part of a broad history of violence done to marginalized people, citizens and enemies alike. In thinking through the “martial politics” of the university, any number of disciplines could be subjected to this kind of analysis. Returning to Maneuvers, consider the case of nursing, to which Enloe (2000) directs her attention in assessing the “militarization” of women’s lives. The chapter in question perceptively begins with Florence Nightingale, who is widely considered to be the “mother” of nursing, a pioneer in statistical visualization and a major figure in the reform of public health and medical care in both the Crimean War and Victorian workhouses. Yet Nightingale sits uneasily in a framework that inquires into the “militarization” of women’s lives because, as Enloe (2000, 204) shows, as a patriotic upper-class White English woman, she herself was active in propelling “militarization.” Because of its “militarization” framework, Enloe’s account misses the fact that warfare and nursing were both modernized and professionalized through their mutual encounter. Nightingale’s innovations transformed siege warfare, helping ensure British victory in the Crimea, and laid the foundations for World War I industrial warfare. After Nightingale returned from the war she was instrumental in creating nursing as a profession and discipline of study, using techniques developed for military purposes in “domestic” settings such as workhouses. The story here is not one of military encroachment on nursing; rather, nursing became a discipline and profession initially through war, and subsequently through war-like relations with the poor. This symbiosis between war and academic disciplines such as nursing, psychology and – for that matter – IR should make it unsurprising when war-like relations are propelled through knowledge created in these disciplines. When we view academic disciplines, or indeed the university as a whole, through the lens of “martial politics” it becomes clear they are not innocent domains sullied by military values. Rather, like the can of soup, their form and function are embedded in how they emerge out of and simultaneously shape warfare. Even when “militarization” accounts are historical, they lead us to misconstrue the importance and nature of that history. When there is violence in domestic political life – whether the outright violence of killer cops or the structural violence of the SATs – it is not that “war” is encroaching on “peace,” and it is not that “the military” is trespassing on the “civilian.” Rather, “martial politics” are fundamental to the constitution and continued production of liberal democracies such as the US. This is not directed equally at all parts of the population but targets those who are constituted as a threat to the nation’s strength or civil order.

## Permutation

### End of History DA

#### There is end of history disad to the permutation – politicizing geopolitics and saying the US did something bad and we should redress those issues falls fate to the bad predictions of Fukuyama because that ignores the ecological approach to geopolitics that the alternative takes.

Grove 2019 [Jairus Victor. Jairus Victor Grove is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai‘i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa. Savage Ecology : War and Geopolitics at the End of the World : War and Geopolitics at the End of the World, Duke University Press. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/fullerton/detail.action?docID=5826044.] CSUF JmB TDI

Yet the double movement of politicizing ecol­ogy and historicizing geopolitics is insufficient, as it can become too easily and too narrowly anthropocentric— ­ “we” make nature and therefore “we” make history. Instead, “we” humans, ­ as defined as late moderns, are in desperate need of an ecological approach to geopolitics as well. By ecological, I mean a form of analysis characterized by multispecies encounters and deep relational processes across geographical scales rather than a form of political thinking that relies on discreteness, causality, and human agency. Hence an ecological approach does not center principally on the environment, what in international relations is called environmental security; nor does it limit global politics to states, international organizations, social movements, or even ­ humans. Instead, I take ecology to mean that all things ­ that make a difference in the vast landscape of global security ought ­ to be included in the geopolitical considerations of con­temporary life. From this ecological perspective, geopolitics has culminated in a planetary epoch in which a particular Anthropos is capable of making a “cene.” 24 However, I think the Anthropocene as a philosophical and political crisis has been too quick to forget the geopolitical arrangements of power and vio­ lence that have brought us to this point. Not all of “us” have played an equal part in the making of either ­ the Anthropos or the Anthropocene. In part, the often narrow focus on climate change and the fever pitch of the contemporary crisis erases the Euro-­American role in building and maintaining the current world order. The argument often advanced by great ­ powers and environmentalists alike amounts to something like this: now that every­ thing is broken, it is everyone’s problem, so pointing fingers only gets in the way of a solution. Even critical and posthumanist approaches often lose sight of the role of hegemony and power. This is, in part, because ­ the effort of those ­ lines of thought to decenter the human ­ as the sole locus of thinking and action is also a necessary but insufficient maneuver. This chapter attempts to relax the focus on a narrow human ­ world while holding on to the very specifically human ­ and often national assemblages that broke this planet.

## Impact

### AT: Extinction

#### Their impact analysis is not egalitarian – rather the cartography and racialized nature of the Eurocene as it creates an idea of who lives and who dies – their utilitarian risk calculus favors the greatest number which has no geographical or historical sensibility of how unequally goods are distributed

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Rather than see ­these two career ­ trajectories as opposed, I think Crutzen’s thinking displays a continuous concern for the Northern Hemisphere and a particular cartography, rather than a geography, of human ­ survival. 9 Crutzen, as well as the concept of the Anthropocene itself, cannot escape preceding geopolitical conceptions of the Earth. Crutzen and ­others who rush so quickly to the necessity to transition efforts from climate abatement to climate modification are unsurprisingly not moved by claims that artificial cooling will ­ likely cause droughts and famines in the tropics and subtropical zones of the global south; nor are they moved by how such plans may accelerate ocean acidification. 10 The utilitarian risk calculus that ­ favors the greatest good for the greatest number has no geo­ graphical or historical sensibility of how unequally aggregate conceptions of the good are distributed around the planet. Global thinking, even in its scientific and seemingly universalist claims to an atmosphere that “we” all share, belies the geopolitics that enlivens scientific concern, as well as the global public policy agenda of geoengineering that seeks to act on behalf of it. Saving humanity as an aggregate, ­ whether from nuclear war, Styrofoam, or climate turbulence, has never meant an egalitarian distribution of survivors and sacrifices. Instead, our new cosmopolitanism— ­ the global environment— follows ­ almost exactly the drawn lines, that is, the cartography or racialized and selective solidarities and zones of indifference that characterize economic development, the selective application of combat, and, before that, the zones of settlement and colonization. More than a result of con­ temporary white supremacy or lingering white privilege, the territorialization of who lives and who dies, who matters and who must be left behind ­ for the sake of humanity, represents a five-­ hundred-­ year geopolitical tradition of conquest, colonization, extraction, and the martial forms of life that made them all possible through war and through more subtle and languid forms of organized killing. I am not suggesting that Crutzen and others ­ are part of a vast conspiracy; rather, I want to outline how climate change, species loss, slavery, the elimination of native peoples, ­ and the globalization of extractive capitalism are all part of the same global ordering. That is, all of these crises are geopolitical. The particular geopolitical arrangement of what others ­ have called the longue durée , and what I am calling the Eurocene, is geologically significant but is not universally part of “­ human activity” despite the false syllogism at the heart of popular ecological thinking that a global threat to humanity must be shared in cause and crisis by all of humanity. 11

#### Extinction is a question of life – that question must be answered is in what other forms of life can be theorized within catastrophe – only that can break the martial form of life and dispose the form of life that has dominated the Eurocene

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Political theory and history follow similar stories of development and continuous upward mobility. Claims to the ubiquity of Western political forms such as the state, universal theories of rights and norms premised on provincial Kantian and Hegelian traditions, chauvinistic species claims to natural resources in Locke and Marx— all ­ these ­ traditions find refuge in presumptions of crypto-­ providence, that is, the idea that success of a particular way of being is selected by nature for its superior functionality or character. In “Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View,” Kant calls it “nature’s secret plan.” 10 Furthermore, the idea that life, ideas, and ways of life improve as time moves forward, and that outmoded forms of life are culled or left behind, ­ has as its tableau an image of nature that is vicious but consistent, such that se­ lection can drive a grand ­ dialectic forward toward ­ improvement. If accidents, exogenous interventions, and unforeseen and meaningless alliances of organisms and environments determine the fate of living things, ­ then what security can be found in rectitude and superiority? None. According to Gould, “we grant too much power to the calm of daily life because we live within its immediate surrounding pervasiveness. We therefore fail to realize that rare and unusual events set the basic patterns of history.” 11 This does not mean giving up on order altogether. Gould, following Georges Cuvier, argues that the fossil record is catastrophic but that “this sequence of catastrophes imparted a directional history to earth and life. . . . ​ Life’s vector of progress records an increasing adaptation to harsher climates of a cooling earth.” 12 So life is more complex and this striving for complexity can be seen intensifying over time, what Gould calls a “vector of progress.” Yet the history of mutation and adaptation cannot be mechanistically reduced to a process of natural selection. Instead, there ­ is a dynamic, natural history of creativity, se­ lection, catastrophe, alliance, convergence, divergence, and real chance at work in the emergence of the human ­ estate. Following Gould, I want to consider how we might theorize differently if our attempts at making sense of the world accorded with the actual world we have inherited. What onto-­ ethical adventures might come out of the tumultuous and catastrophic history of our planet? And why, despite our claims to intellectual progress, do we humans remain so indebted to a gradualist image of thought that refused, until the middle of the nineteenth ­ century, to even accept that there ­ had been a single extinction of an organism? Unlike many of his peers, political theorist William Connolly has become interested in the turn away from gradualism to catastrophism in contemporary geology and evolutionary theory. Although geology seems a strange touchstone for a political theorist, the history of the world— deep ­ geological time— confounds ­ much of our inherited wisdom about the relationship between humanity and the planet that creates the condition of possibility for humanity’s existence. 13 In a blog post at The Con­temporary Condition , Connolly and I note how even secular stalwarts of political theory such as John Rawls follow a very literalist Christian view of the planet. 14 The formative geological events responsible for the creation of Earth from the big bang to the cooling of the planet’s surface took place in the “beginning” and have since been replaced by the imperceptible and thus politically insignificant cyclical behavior of a “mature” planet. ­ There was creation and now there ­ is the age of man. The geological history of our planet and even the more recent history of life on our planet tells a very different story. Geologists and paleontologist describe at least five great ­ extinctions generally defined as the loss of more than 70 ­percent of the species on Earth. In almost all cases, exogenous events such as asteroids, or in one case the emergence of a new mountain range, set into motion a series of amplifying feedbacks that accelerated too rapidly for the majority of the planet’s life forms to adapt. In this light, Alfred North Whitehead’s characterization of life as a war against entropy takes on a more startling and dramatic character. 15 Not only is the world not promised to humanity; it is not even guaranteed to be hospitable to organic life. There ­ are no promises. For Connolly and Whitehead, this is the opening for the possibility of freedom and ethics. If life, human ­ flourishing, and planetary systems were ­ in some sense irrefutable, it would also mean we lived in a mechanical, law-­ driven world devoid of the possibility of novelty, which is a precondition for something like freedom. 16 Contrary to a world of tight and perpetual equilibria, life is, in the final instance, novel and not reducible to initial conditions. It is here that we can also see Connolly’s attraction to the “teleodynamism” and “teleosearching” of biologist Terrance Deacon as it resonates too with Whitehead’s concept of aim, or creative struggle, in the evolutionary process. 17 Reality is not path dependent. Precisely what makes catastrophe possible is also what makes creative evolution possible, or the capacity to effect change that is unprecedented, novel, and therefore unpredictable. This is as true for the innovation of the eye as it is for the rise of U.S. hegemony or industrialized animal slaughter. Therefore, Connolly and Whitehead’s interpenetrating open systems from microbe to cosmos have to be capable of catastrophe— that ­ is, not self-­ correcting—if something like real creativity is to exist. This is the speculative wager Connolly makes in The Fragility of Things ­ , which I hope to push further into the thinking about the many apocalypses of humanity and earth. An Apocalyptic Tone Apocalypse is a touchy subject even for ­those of us in critical traditions prone to question developmentalist and teleological theories. We often respond to the possibility of catastrophe with skepticism. The practiced intervention is to criticize those ­ proposing the possibility of apocalypse with critiques of eschatological thinking or to argue that representations of the end-­ time stem from cultural malaise or a reactionary romanticism for simpler times. Cultural theory has long since been enamored with the under­ lying psychic and discursive explanations of the fear of human ­ extinction. Much of this work located the advent of nuclear weapons as the zero point for a renewed sense of apocalypse. In general, this work— such ­ as Martin Heidegger’s dread in ­later works like The Question Concerning Technology , Jacques Derrida’s “Missives and Missiles,” or the vast troves of literary theory on science fiction— ­ focuses on what apocalypse represents in the sense that it does not actually represent the possibility of apocalypse. It must be something else ­ that we are obsessing about. There are good reasons to be skeptical of apocalyptic thinking, particularly because ­ it has become an entertainment industry in its own right. ­ After all, much of the genre of American apocalypse horror, from the disaster movies of the 1990s such as Deep Impact and Armageddon to the popular tv series The Walking Dead , depends on the narrative adventures of mostly white privileged people ­ having to live like most of the rest of the world does on a daily basis: no food security, the risk of being forced from one’s home, unpredictable access to basic things ­ like medicine and emergency care, terrifying people ­ or zombies or robots coming to get you in the dead of night. There ­ is something undeniably precious about this vision of apocalypse where people with perfect teeth pretend to be terrified at the possibility of killing and preparing their own food. But the genre is also dangerous because ­ images that depict the loss of a manageable world do not remain in the world of fiction. The fear that is amplified and given form by ­ these immersive experiences of doom find their way into the major budgetary and strategic decisions at the U.S. Department of Defense as well as many other military agencies across the planet. 18 Since the second term of the George W. Bush administration, the dod has been the most out­ spoken division of the U.S. government on the dangers of climate change as a driver for apocalyptic upheaval. 19 The fear of security analysts is that U.S. citizens ­ will require military repression to maintain order during the inevitable tumult of sea-­ level rise and agricultural disruption resulting from erratic weather and seasons. 20 In the case of many environmental advocacy groups, it is the apocalypse that is coming for the poor and the marginal that will ­ be most impacted by the storm surges and food shortages. Given the high density of low-­ income populations near costal zones, this will likely be true. However, there are as many reasons to believe that what is ­ really animating the intensity of both military and environmentalist fears is that climate change will ­ bring a particular way of life to an end. It is a way of life that is as threatened by peak oil or any of the other shortages of minerals or capital that are necessary for the predictable routines that many Americans and Eu­ro­pe­ans have grown accustomed to, undoubtedly at the expense of the rest of the planet’s population of ­ human and nonhuman Earthlings. 21 So why study apocalypses? In part because ­ we can learn a lot about the Earthling condition from how that condition has and ­ w ill be punctuated by events far beyond our control. 22 We live in a world sensitive to perturbation, prone to turbulences of vari­ ous kinds, and it is out of that noise that creativity can be cultivated even if only by alliance rather than willed individualism. So to come to grips with apocalypses means also to think about the scales of action and efficacy with which we can participate while also cultivating attentiveness to what kinds of living things we want to intervene with and on behalf of. This is the mess that we find ourselves in. Transformation is possible but its possibility may be indifferent, or at least inured, to our existence. This puts the emphasis on how to live and how to die rather than whether ­ we live or die. This is, I think, also present in the cacophony of apocalypticisms. There ­ are minor strains of what, much more than Kant’s sense of enlightenment, we ought ­ to call maturity. This time it is not the knowledge of our unique capacity for reason that should be championed and cultivated but the limited ­ hold we have on this world and just how vulnerable we are to forces beyond our control. Maturity as humility and tragedy bares the marks of what many have called the Anthropocene much more than the particular consequences of sea-­ level rise in the course of any one human ­ life. ­ Whether our current trajectory toward ­ climate turbulence succeeds in mass extinction cannot exclusively cause or prevent the apocalypse before us. The confrontation with the Earth system, its fragility, and its capricious grip on life will ­ irreversibly change what it is to be human. ­ So there ­ must be both concern and sanguinity in preparing ourselves for what is already happening. We need to find an immortality, what Whitehead called perishing, worthy of the event of humanity. What this means is that we should not be fighting so hard to avoid perishing as a species, if that even means something, but rather we should be trying to perish better. This is a dangerous endeavor. For all the reasons Connolly’s work has fought so hard against negative critique and the debilitating stupor of Theodor Adorno, Giorgio Agamben, and other followers of the dark arts that see this life as damaged or in need of redemption, we have to find a place to take the catastrophism of the universe seriously while also following Deleuze’s invitation to intensify belief in this world. 23 This might ask too much of words and ideas. Connolly warns that catastrophes “shatter the bond of trust in the world that had tacitly bound you to humanity and the world.” 24 Or even worse yet, apocalypses may, as Bataille writes, “conceal a possibility of enticement.” 25 I hope that we, particularly in the extravagant and luxurious countries of the world, are reaching a point of saturation in which apocalypse is becoming so obvious as to no longer paralyze or entice but to finally provoke. I suppose we will ­ see.

### Global Nomos

#### The political imagination of the 1AC’s standard as a metric to resolve violence or conflict results in a global nomos of colonization since 1492 the Europaeum have plagued the world that maintains the distinction between the global north and the global south

Kalyvas, (2018). (Andreas is Associate Professor in the Department of Politics at The New School for Social Research. Carl Schmitt's postcolonial imagination. Constellations, 25(1), 35-53. Accessed 10-12-22) CSUF JmB TDI

It is certainly true that Schmitt often described the age of conquest in the conventional and celebratory language of the “discovery of a new world,” the “achievement of newly awaked Occidental rationalism,” “the product of an intellectual and scientific culture,” suggesting it was the necessary and legitimate outcome of a presumed European superiority (Schmitt, 1942/2015, p. 59, 1950/2003, p. 132). As many commentators have rightly noted, there is a nostalgic yearning that elevates the age of conquest into a great, epic moment of European history, an unprecedented civilizational accomplishment, which Schmitt depicted as one of the highest manifestations of human reason and “the last great heroic act of the European peoples” (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 151, 1957/2003, p. 349). It seems reasonable to infer that Schmitt saw the global rise of Europe as the result of a purely endogenous and autonomous dynamic, internal only to that continent, caused by the intrinsic tendencies of an already formed higher geopolitical and cultural totality. At times he sounds almost Hegelian as if the global rise of Europe was a foretold story, justified by a pre-established superiority that was fated to conquer the world (Schmitt, 1942/2015, p. 59). These statements, however, do not adequately represent the novelty of Schmitt's history of international law. Notwithstanding an explicit celebration of a bygone age and the concomitant lamentation for its irrevocable demise, there is a parallel narrative that runs through his writings on the modern spatial order and world politics and hints at a different historico-political understanding and geographic imagination. What I wish to emphasize is this tendency to give an account opposed to the conventional theories of the history of international law, which is signaled by Schmitt's insistence on the centrality of the category of the colony as indispensable to the spatial constitution of the international system of states and the geopolitical rise of Europe. On this issue, he sounded unequivocal: “The whole spatial structure of the earth in European international law was based on the distinctive territorial status of colonial overseas lands” (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 221, emphasis added). This bold proposition identifies the colonies and their “distinctive territorial status” as the basis (die Grundlage) of the Eurocentric order, its “basic spatial fact” (raumhafte Grundtatsache) (Schmitt, 2011, pp. 114, 117). It is the colony, for Schmitt, and its special significance in international law, that determined and sustained the Eurocentric order.7 For one thing, against internalist and teleological views, Schmitt's approach questions traditional accounts that have propagated the idea of the political and legal order of sovereign territorial states that emerged in Europe, autochthonously, so to speak, arrived in the colonies fully formed, and became global through time by simply extending its sphere of application on a larger scale with the quantitative inclusion of new non-European entities into an existing stable interstate spatial structure.8 Instead, his heterodox history highlights how modern international law and the advent of the Eurocentric global order “did not derive essentially from internal European land-appropriation and territorial changes, but rather from the European land-appropriation of a non-European new world” (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 183). He could not have been more explicit. The very existence of the jus publicum Europaeum depended upon a “free colonial soil outside Europe” as it did on the sea (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 198, emphasis added, see also Schmitt, 1943, pp. 7). The modern interstate system originated outside the geographical confines of Europe with the colonial expansion to the Americas, as the effect of an illegal and violent land taking (Schmitt, 1940/1995b, p. 241, 1943, p. 1–2, 1950/2003, pp. 48–9, 132, 135, 352, 1955/2003, 1958/2015, pp. 77–78). For this reason, he described “The landappropriation of a new world,” its colonization, as “the global event in the history of European international law,” which, with “[v]ast, seemingly endless free spaces made possible and viable the internal law of an interstate European order” (Schmitt, 1950/2003, pp. 83, 183, 140, emphasis added). For it is the conquest of the Americas that “led to a new spatial order of the earth” and, as he repeatedly maintained, “for 400 years it supported a Eurocentric international law: the jus publicum Europaeum” (Schmitt, 1950/2003, pp. 87, 140, 49, emphasis added). Thus, for Schmitt, it is 1492 and not 1648 that marks the beginning of the modern world and the global rise of international public law, defined as “a law among states, among European sovereigns. This European core determined the nomos of the rest of the earth” (Schmitt, 1941/1995, pp. 401, 403–4, 408–409, 1950/2003, p. 126–127).9 This “unrepeatable historical event” inaugurated a new epoch, the first complete spatial revolution on a planetary scale, propelling Europe to the geopolitical center of the earth (Schmitt, 1940/1995a, p. 388, 1941/1995, pp. 406, 1942/2015, pp. 55–64, 1950/2003, pp. 39, 49, 2011, p. 118). The colonization of an extra-European world is the real constitutive event of global modernity (Schmitt, 1941/1995, pp. 405, 408–409, 2011 p. 118). How the conquest and colonization of a new continent gave rise to the modern interstate system of international law is explained by Schmitt's singular interpretation of the global lines (first, with the Spanish-Portuguese divisional lines but mostly with the French-English amity lines) that were drawn by European powers from the end of the 15th to the middle of the 17th century in order to regulate their inter-imperial rivalries. These lines were foundational and generative of the first global spatial order as they put into effective play the rule of colonial difference (Jameson, 2005, p. 201; Schmitt, 1943, pp. 2–3, 7, 1950/2003, pp. 86–100, 228, 2011, p. 116; Stirk, 2011, pp. 276– 283). In fact, the “distinctive” territorial status of the colonial overseas lands originates with the division of the earth into two distinct spatial zones, the statist and the colonial, the European and the non-European, the civilized and the uncivilized. For Schmitt, this division indicates the world-historical uniqueness of the modern nomos (Schmitt, 1950/2003, pp. 49, 50–5).10 The new discoveries and the circumnavigation of the globe unified geographically the earth by carving “internal divisions … within the framework of one and the same spatial order” (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 92). The global lines encompassed for the first time in human history the whole earth by differentiating between two spheres, Europe and the rest of the world (Schmitt, 1950/2003, pp. 198, 140, 148). The colony is the effect of this partition of the earth and it is foundational, like the free sea, as it partakes in a constitutive act of spatial ordering. For this reason Schmitt considered the special meaning of the colony and its exceptional territorial status both as a symptom and an effect of global linear thinking (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 87). He understood it in relation to the originary split between “the soil of European states, i.e. state areas in the specific sense, and the soil of overseas possessions, i.e. colonial lands” (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 184, emphasis added; see also Schmitt, 1940/1995a, pp. 244–245). The New World, the colonized territories, came to designate an extra-European, non-sovereign realm located outside international law but immanent to and productive of the spatial structure of the global nomos (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 93): The sense and core of the Christian-European law of peoples, its fundamental order, lay in the partition of the new earth. Among themselves the European peoples were, without much planned reflection, united in treating the non-European soil of the earth as colonial soil, i.e., as an object for their conquest and exploitation. This side of historical development is so important that one can equally well, and perhaps more rightly, call the Age of Discoveries the Age of European land appropriation. (Schmitt, 1942/2015, p. 64, emphasis added) The territorial status of the colony is special and distinctive, therefore, to the extent that, while it rests outside international law, not subject to and thus not guided by Europe's interstate rules of war, it remains internal to the global spatial order (Levinson, 2005, pp. 206–209; Schmitt, 1948/2005, p. 794).11 Schmitt describes a case of an inclusive exclusion. This explains, for instance, how wars could be waged between European powers in the colonies despite peace being concluded in Europe; or, likewise, how treaties and agreements among states that were valid for Europe did not apply to the colonies; or, how the dualism in English law between English soil, where common law ruled, and other areas where the king's power was unrestricted, reached global proportions. Included into modern world politics by means of their exclusion, the colonies occupy an exceptional position in the structure of the Eurocentric order. Schmitt regarded this exception as foundational because it produced a normal, relatively pacified, secure, and stable space against an anomic zone, a lawless colonial space free for appropriation that became the indispensable site of limitless violence and wars of expansion and annihilation (Agamben, 1998, p. 36; Rasch, 2003, pp. 124–126; Schmitt, 1940/1995b, pp. 241–242). “The old Eurocentric system of international law,” Schmitt asserted, “rested upon the differentiation of international law of a European space of states of fully valid state order and implemented peace from a non-European space of free European expansion,” that is, between “the soil of the metropolis” and “colonial soil” (Schmitt, 1940/1995b, p. 245, 1950/2003, pp. 218, 148, 2011 p. 114): The special territorial status of colonies thus was as clear as was the division of the earth between state territory and colonial territory. This division was characteristic of the structure of international law in this epoch and was inherent in its spatial structure. (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 199). The construction of a European normal space (the core) upon and in opposition to an anomic colonial zone (the periphery) was foundational for the Eurocentric order of the earth in the same way that the concept of the colony was special for the development of modern international law (Schmitt, 1940/1995b, p. 242, 1942/2015, p. 60). Schmitt claimed that in these extra-European spaces the imperial powers displaced their violent conflicts outside their continent, outsourcing them to the new world (Müller, 2003, pp. 88–91). They imagined the non-European world “without a master, uncivilized or half-civilized, an area of colonization, an object for the seizure of holdings through European powers” (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 228; see also Schmitt, 1942/2015, p. 60); “a sphere outside the law and open to the use of force” since “everything that occurred ‘beyond the line’ remained outside the legal, moral, and political values recognized on this side of the line” (Schmitt, 1950/2003, pp. 94, 93). It was there that sovereigns could freely wage absolute wars against each other and against the indigenous populations, that is, colonial wars, sparing the European territory from the destruction they brought about (Schmitt, 1962/2007, p. 11). The spatial ordering and legal orientation that resulted from the distinction of the two zones unburdened the state-making process as the colonial powers went on to formalize and bracket their wars on one side of the line, shielding Europe from destructive conflicts, which could be now removed and exorcised, on the other side, “beyond the lines” (Schmitt, 1943, pp. 2–3, 7, 1950/2003, p. 94, 2011, p. 117; see Rasch, 2005, pp. 257–278).12 The politicojuridical system of sovereign states, which rested upon the externalization of violence, was valid only in Europe. This spatial order of a regulated and balanced coexistence among territorial sovereigns, their equilibrium, their mutual recognition as equal and independent subjects of international law, the “humanization,” “bracketing,” “rationalization,” and “formalization” of European wars, “ended here,” Schmitt emphatically proclaimed, on this side of the lines, in Europe and on its soil (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 93). It did not extend to the other side, the overseas colonies. Thus, “Both civil wars and colonial wars remained outside this bracketing,” outside the limits and restraints of international interstate law, in the colonial territories, removed from Europe and civilization” (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 309). The colonies, therefore, have another, additional exceptional meaning and the special territorial status they possess in the Eurocentric international order as overseas zones derives from their designation as stateless and lawless, extra-legal and normless, that is, as conflict zones. Their existence was necessary for the pacification of modern Europe (Galli & Fay, 2010, p. 6). Europeans could conduct their total wars freely, outside the law, in those overseas colonial “zones designated for agonal test of strength,” “where force could be used freely and ruthlessly” and “only the law of the stronger applied” (Schmitt, 1943, pp. 4–8, Schmitt, 1950/2003, pp. 93, 94, 95, 97, 99, 140–171, 148, 309). The designation of a conflict zone outside Europe contributed also to the bracketing of European wars, which is its meaning and its justification in international law. (Schmitt, 1950/2003, pp. 97–98, emphasis added; see also Rasch, 2003, p. 124) This unprecedented geopolitical distinction between Europe and its colonies differentiated the war-in-form from colonial wars, the just enemy (justus hostis) from the just cause (justa causa), removed civil warfare from domestic politics, and produced the spatial conditions for a secure and protected geopolitical framework conducive to the development and rise of the European interstate order (Schmitt, 1962/2007, p. 9). “Classical European international law,” Schmitt asserted, “pushed both of these dangerous forms of war and enmity [i.e. civil and colonial wars] to the margins” (Schmitt, 1962/2007, p. 11. Europe was spared total war because “the upholders of this international law had available sufficient free space in the colonies in order to rob their mutual confrontations in Europe of a genuine existential severity” (Schmitt, 2011 pp. 117, 116, emphasis added). In the absence of such colonial spaces and their anomalous territorial status it would have been impossible for Europe to bracket war (1940/1995b, p. 244, Schmitt, 1950/2003, pp. 145– 147).13 The significance of the amity lines in 16th and 17th century international law was that great areas of freedom were designated as conflict zones in the struggle over the distribution of a new world. As a practical justification, one could argue that the designation of a conflict zone at once freed the area on this side of the line—a sphere of peace and order ruled by European public law—from the immediate threat of those events “beyond the line,” which would not have been the case had there been no such zone. (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 97) In short, the distinction of state and the colony, law and anomie, inside and outside, the civilized and the uncivilized, which made possible a continental law of European sovereigns with a global reach, explains the special territorial status of the colony (Schmitt, 2011 p. 114). Here. Then. lies the centrality of this concept for Schmitt: The decisive meaning of the overseas colony for international law lies in the fact that the concrete reality of the conceptswar and peace of hitherto existing international law could only be understood on the basis of this image of space. One must always be reminded of the fact that international law is a law of war and peace, jus belli ac paci. (Schmitt, 2011 p. 115) This conceptual primacy of the colony in Schmitt's theory is reflected nowhere better than in his original interpretation of the doctrine of the natural state in modern political thought, which strongly evokes his earlier famous distinction between the norm and the exception (Schmitt, 1988/1922). The relationship between the two is now framed explicitly in concrete spatial terms as Schmitt came to identify the intellectual origins of the modern doctrine of the state of nature in the historical experience of European land appropriation and colonization (Schmitt, 1950/2003, pp. 95–97).14 Shifting attention from the familiar view that saw in the concept of the natural state a metaphor for the religious civil wars in Europe, Schmitt introduced a geopolitical reading that instead located it in the extra-European colonial spaces of the Americas. The depiction of a normless state of war of all against all, devoid of sovereignty and government, deprived of state and law, he argued, was influenced by how Europeans imagined human existence beyond the lines, outside politics and civilization (Rasch, 2003, pp. 126, 129; Schmitt, 1940/1995b, p. 242, 1950/2003, p. 96). It is in this manner that Schmitt redefined the traditional contrast between the natural and political state as a distinction between colonial spaces of exception, that is, extra-European lawless zones of war, violence, and expansion, and an interstate international order that self-regulates its internal discord and contains war.15 In a similar vein he designated the juridical domestic state of exception as a spatial correlate analogous to the extra-European colonies (Blanco and de Valle, 2014, pp. 3, 6–7; Schmitt, 1943, pp. 4–5, 1950/2003, pp. 98, 207).16 Thus, hidden underneath the normative foundations of the political philosophy of the modern state, at the very roots of its justification, Schmitt hinted at the sublimated presence of a colonial geography whose existence was acknowledged insofar as it had to be negated and disavowed. These colonial zones of exception constituted the spatial foundation of the Eurocentric global norm and sustained the political and cultural idea of Europe as such (Schmitt, 1932, pp. 185–186). Modern Europe, in other words, emerges only with the global lines, through its encounter with and distinction from the overseas territories (Levinson, 2005, p. 206). It is the difference that colonialism introduces, as an exception to the law, which effectively grounds the concrete unity of a global spatial order, the “Family of Nations,” and supplies it with a common European culture and shared legal and moral values, always against the background of the colonies (Rasch, 2005, pp. 255–259; Schmitt, 1940/1995b, pp. 242, 245, 1942/2015, pp. 61–64, 1950/2003, pp. 86, 141, 168). Schmitt identifies here the necessary presence of a colonial difference against which the statocentric political and legal identity of modern Europe was constructed, took roots, and was enthroned at the center of the earth (Schmitt, 1950/2003, pp. 233–234). In the end, Schmitt's understanding of the colony is determined by how the spatial structure of political modernity works by excluding its own foundation. As a “basic spatial fact” of the modern nomos, the colony is constitutive of the European order of the earth. This atypical history of the rise of the Eurocentric nomos underscores how the norm (i.e., the state, the European center, international law) yet again rests on and depends upon an exception (i.e., the colony, the extra-European periphery) (Rasch, 2003, pp. 128–130; Schmitt, 1942/2015, pp. 61–62).

### Foreign Policy Analysts Wrong

#### You should be skeptical of the predictions of the aff – foreign policy analysts are riddled with bad predictions about conflict – they do this because it gives them a pay check – especially overexaggerating Russian and Chinese power

Drezner 21 [Daniel W. is a professor of international politics at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University 1-15-2021 Foreign Policy Wonks Gone Wild https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/15/foreign-policy-predictions-always-bad-worst-international-relations-rewards-catastrophic-thinking/ Accessed 3-7-2021] CSUF JmB NDT 2021 TDI

In a world defined by scarcity, there will always be a bountiful harvest of bad predictions about the future. This is true for both foreign policy and Foreign Policy alike. In January 1989, East Germany’s leader, Erich Honecker, declared that the Berlin Wall would still be standing in “50 or even 100 years.” He turned out to be off by 49 to 99 years; the wall crumbled 10 months after his statement. No one writing in the pages of this magazine has been as consequentially wrong as Honecker. Nonetheless, even a cursory perusal of Foreign Policy’s archives reveals some serious errors in foresight. One article in the Winter 1999-2000 issue by the Russia expert Daniel Treisman claimed that Boris Yeltsin’s successor as president of Russia would “find himself blocked in by the realities of Russia’s political game, pushed back toward a set of policies and a style of governing that closely resemble Yeltsin’s.” In retrospect, this seems like a poor description of Vladimir Putin’s style of governance. This is less Treisman’s fault than a consequence of the ever present danger of believing the status quo will persist. Similarly, a 1995 article by the sociologist Jack A. Goldstone asserted that rapid economic growth would not save the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and that “we can expect a terminal crisis in China within the next 10 to 15 years.” It is safe to say that the CCP has, so far, managed to endure and entrench itself. Goldstone was proved wrong because the past didn’t predict the future; Chinese economic growth accelerated to a historically unprecedented rate. Likewise, in early 2009, the economist William Easterly forecast that the 2008 financial crisis would immiserate those who had just emerged from extreme poverty. Over the next five years, however, growth in the developing world actually outpaced growth in the wealthier economies of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Predictions that did not come true were by no means limited to the pages of Foreign Policy; the field of international relations is full of them. In the 1970s, the Club of Rome predicted that resource depletion would stunt global prosperity. Instead, the greatest reduction in global extreme poverty began a few years later. In the late 1990s, when petroleum prices were plummeting, some took to these pages to predict the end of OPEC. Instead, the price of oil skyrocketed well past $100 a barrel. This, in turn, led to renewed claims of “peak oil”—the idea that petroleum reserves would near depletion and the industry would go into decline. Fracking and the development of alternative energy systems proved that to be wrong as well. When the Cold War ended, multiple prognosticators predicted geopolitical chaos in Europe and a great-power rivalry between the United States, Europe, and Japan. Oops. The 100th anniversary of the start of World War I led many historians to envisage a replay of those events in the Pacific Rim in 2014. Thankfully, this too did not come to pass. With a surfeit of bad takes, it would be logical to conclude that there have been few good foreign-policy ideas over the same time period. This assumption is incorrect. Consider two examples from the early 1970s. After the 1973 OPEC embargo, the fear of commodity cartels gripped national security analysts. The political scientist Stephen D. Krasner argued in this magazine, however, that oil was the exception. History proved him right. The push by civil rights activists to make human rights a key component of U.S. foreign policy during the Carter administration was one of those ideas that seemed to bear little fruit at the time. This emphasis, however, persisted into the Reagan administration, and the result was the dawn of the third wave of democratization that transformed Latin America, Eastern Europe, and the Pacific Rim. Some ideas that are underappreciated when first proposed acquire momentum over time. A number of concrete foreign-policy ideas have been responsible for tangible improvements in people’s lives. Weirdly, however, these constructive arguments get less attention than famously wrong ones, like Samuel P. Huntington’s proposed clash of civilizations or the neoconservative belief that forcible regime change can contribute to democratization. The past 30 years have demonstrated that wars within civilizations are far more bloody than those between them and that forcible regime change is far more likely to lead to military quagmires than Madisonian republics. For anyone intimately familiar with the marketplace of foreign-policy ideas, this phenomenon should be unsurprising. Scholars like to think that, in the public sphere, good notions drive out bad ones, but that’s not necessarily true. Even foreign-policy experts tend to dwell on spectacularly bad ideas rather than helpful suggestions. Francis Fukuyama has a long, distinguished career of trenchant scholarship, but most foreign-policy observers remember him only for his premature prediction of the “end of history” in the early 1990s—the idea that Cold War ideological confrontation would give way to the triumph of liberal democracy. A review of the worst predictions and most useful ideas of the past half-century reveals a few lessons for the readers of Foreign Policy. The first is that foreign-policy observers are a pessimistic lot. We are awash with doomsaying that has proved no more accurate than a cult member holding a sign declaring “The end is nigh” on the street corner. The second is that when examining trends within countries, the primary source of bad predictions is the fallacy of extrapolation: the belief that the future will be just like the present, only more so. The third is that the most useful ideas are not rooted in grand strategy or doctrine. Sometimes grand narratives get the big things right, but just as often they create cognitive blinders that make it difficult to recognize error. By contrast, small-bore ideas—grounded in concrete, specific, well-defined problems—have made the most tangible contributions to international affairs. To be fair, international relations experts are hardly the only social scientists with a poor record of projecting the future. Economists have also proved extremely bad at forecasting, even though there are some awfully powerful incentives for economists to get things right. What makes foreign-policy analysts different is the bias in their forecasting errors. Economists are overly rosy about the future. This profound “optimism bias” explains the errors of the Bretton Woods institutions. On average, for example, a 10-year macroeconomic forecast from the International Monetary Fund or World Bank overestimates a country’s annual GDP growth by 1.1 percentage points. Political forecasters, however, suffer from a different bias: We are a profoundly pessimistic lot. As the Yale University professor John Lewis Gaddis once delineated in painstaking detail, international relations scholars failed to predict both the peaceful end of the Cold War and the manner of the Soviet collapse. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, realists in particular made overly pessimistic predictions about how the post-Cold War order would affect NATO, nuclear proliferation, violent conflict, and balancing against the United States. In reality, the 20 years after the breakup of the Soviet Union saw dramatic declines in almost every category of political violence. The realist line sounds slightly more accurate now, but prognosticators earn no points for predictions that might come true 30 years late. There are three reasons why foreign-policy analysts are so morose. First, it’s good for business. International relations is a countercyclical profession; bad times in the world are good times for geopolitical analysts—and there are incentives for doomsaying. The growth industry of political risk analysis, the first generation of which emanated from international relations scholarship, is predicated on things going wrong. One high-ranking officer at a prominent risk consultancy once explained the company’s sales pitch as follows: “You scare the shit out of them first. That’s what gets the clients through the front door.” Second, much like the reasons for having insurance on your house or car, it pays to devote greater attention to the extreme negative event. Over the past 50 years, there have been positive events: the end of the Cold War, collapse of apartheid, reduction in extreme poverty, and growing ease of cross-border communication. Nonetheless, both government officials and corporate leaders are compelled to respond to negative shocks like a terrorist attack, a global financial crisis, or a pandemic, which will have a far greater impact on politics and profits than a spate of good news. This is partly because human beings are hard-wired to be wary of threats; governments are, too. As one academic paper recently observed, “States tend to inflate threats, exhibit loss aversion, and learn more from failures than from successes.” Even if the probability of bad events happening is low, warning about them has minimal downside. No officials have ever been punished because they were too prepared for a worst-case contingency. Leaders get punished for sleeping at the wheel far more than they do for appearing too vigilant. Finally, there’s an asymmetry in the marketplace of foreign-policy ideas. It is much safer to predict doom and gloom than to predict that everything will work out fine. Warnings about disaster scenarios that never happen carry less cost to one’s reputation—that is someone just being cautious and prudent—and if you happen to be right, you’re treated as a prophet, as the Foreign Policy columnist and health writer Laurie Garrett recently discovered. History has stigmatized optimistic prognosticators who, in retrospect, turned out to be wrong—see, for example, the caricatures of Norman Angell’s 1909 book, The Great Illusion, which predicted that economic interdependence would make war obsolete, or Fukuyama’s end of history. When in doubt, predict the worst-case scenario. These professional tendencies have led to some bad collective forecasts. The end of U.S. hegemony in world politics has been the hardiest of bad predictions. By my count, in Foreign Policy’s 50 years, the death of U.S. hegemony has been declared after at least six different events: the collapse of the Bretton Woods regime in the early 1970s, the stagflation of the mid-1970s, the late 1980s “twin deficits” crisis, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, and the election of Donald Trump. U.S. hegemony will end at some point, but America’s status as a superpower has outlived many of its most pessimistic prognosticators. If forecasters have been too pessimistic about the state of the world, they have been too complacent in their assessments of the great powers. When it comes to country analyses, the natural tendency has been to extrapolate from current trends. Indeed, two political scientists made this very point in these pages in 2012 when characterizing U.S. National Intelligence Council documents: “The reports almost inevitably fall into the trap of treating the conventional wisdom of the present as the blueprint for the future 15 to 20 years down the road.” While this is a natural human tendency, large complex societies have a way of confounding that instinctual view. Sometimes trends do persist, but just as often they stop abruptly or reverse course. Predictions about China are a case in point. Two decades ago, predictions about the future of Chinese politics ran the gamut from democratization to stable authoritarianism. In March 2000, U.S. President Bill Clinton predicted, “The more China liberalizes its economy, the more fully it will liberate the potential of its people. … And when individuals have the power not just to dream but to realize their dreams, they will demand a greater say.” Even more sober analysts noted that by the early 2000s China had seemed to institutionalize the transfer of power, a rarity in authoritarian regimes. Instead, under Xi Jinping, China has transformed into the most personalist regime since the days of Mao Zedong. The fallacy of extrapolation also applies to forecasts about China’s economy. A decade ago, Robert Fogel, a Nobel-winning economist, made waves with a Foreign Policy article predicting that China’s economy would swell to $123 trillion by 2040. He made this prediction simply by assuming that China’s double-digit growth rates from the early 2000s would persist and extrapolating from there. In the decade since, China’s growth rate has slowed significantly—and even those growth figures are likely to be exaggerated. Over the past quarter century, China’s productivity growth has fallen by two-thirds. Now, some experts believe that people should fear a faltering China more than a rising one. China is the standout for bad predictions about national trajectories, but it is hardly alone. U.S. analysts persistently overestimated the capabilities of Soviet Russia during the Cold War. These same analysts underestimated Russian power during the days of Yeltsin. Under Putin, the pendulum has swung back toward exaggerating Russian power. Fifteen years ago, in his book Expert Political Judgment, the political scientist Philip Tetlock warned about the poor predictive ability of most political experts. The discipline’s short-term predictive abilities are lackluster. Worse, the public tends to pay attention to the out-of-the-box prediction that proves correct. The problem is that these kinds of predictions also tend to be wrong more frequently. Tetlock later wrote that these conditions would create a ripe environment for charlatans: “The demand for accurate predictions is insatiable. Reliable suppliers are few and far between. And this gap between demand and supply creates opportunities for unscrupulous suppliers to fill the void by gulling desperate customers into thinking they are getting something no one else knows how to provide.” It would be easy to infer from this that the foreign-policy community has produced nothing but 50 years of bad ideas. Indeed, this is what younger generations tend to think. A recent Rand Corp. report concluded, “A generation of Americans have come of age in an era in which foreign policy setbacks have been more frequent than advances.” Anyone as old as Foreign Policy has some memory of successful foreign policies: containment, the peaceful end of the Cold War, the cessation of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, beneficial trade agreements, and the expansion of U.S.-created international institutions to the rest of the world. Any American who came of age after the 9/11 terrorist attacks would be hard-pressed to identify similarly successful policies in this century. Any autopsy of this shift is likely to arrive at the same explanation for the cause. Because the U.S. diplomat George F. Kennan’s strategy of containment is now viewed as a smashing foreign-policy success, successive generations of foreign-policy analysts have tried to devise a similar “big idea” in grand strategy that would prove to be just as valuable. The world is a more complex place than it was during the 1950s, however, making it next to impossible for a single grand strategy to suffice. None of the post-Cold War grand strategies, from George W. Bush’s neoconservative democracy-promotion-by-force to Donald Trump’s America First, has served the United States well. This does not mean, however, that there haven’t been any good ideas in foreign policy. A more fine-grained analysis reveals the success of small-bore initiatives. The most significant foreign-policy accomplishment of the post-Cold War era was arguably the Nunn-Lugar program. This program helped ensure the security of the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal after the collapse in 1991. Over the next two decades, the program succeeded in preventing both nuclear material and nuclear scientists from furthering proliferation across the globe. Unsurprisingly, as one historian noted, “this success did not get major publicity at the time, and remains largely unknown today outside the expert communities in both countries.” The Barack Obama-era Nuclear Safety Summits might be viewed through a similar lens. Another tangible success has been the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), created by the Bush administration in 2003. It was announced at a time when the HIV epidemic was lowering life spans in sub-Saharan Africa. According to the program’s website, the U.S. government has since invested some $85 billion in the global HIV/AIDS response, saving more than 18 million lives. This is a rare case of the United States doing well by doing good. Global surveys of public attitudes toward the United States since PEPFAR was launched consistently show that recipient countries display more positive attitudes toward America. As infectious disease prevention moves to the top of the global policy queue, the United States should learn from PEPFAR’s success. A final example is the 2014 bilateral climate deal between the United States and China. This might seem like an odd inclusion, since it was soon supplanted by the 2015 Paris climate change accords, which the Trump administration abandoned. But the earlier bilateral deal played a crucial role in paving the way for a more wide-ranging agreement. By getting Beijing to formally pledge to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the 2014 deal reversed China’s long-standing position that, as a developing country, it should not bear any responsibility to reduce climate change. Once China shifted its approach, it became far easier to cajole developing countries into an international agreement. The takeaway from all this is clear: To stand out, future foreign-policy observers will become less pessimistic and more concrete. Of course, I am making a prediction here. The odds are excellent that I am wrong.

## Assorted Answers

### Alt solvency – Reject

#### Even if we lose the alternative you should still reject the affs emergency politics because the K is a deconstruction of the US militarism – that deconstruction produces a relationality that rejects the dominate form of life that will help us confront the end of this epoch

Grove 2019 [Jairus Victor. Jairus Victor Grove is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai‘i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa. Savage Ecology : War and Geopolitics at the End of the World : War and Geopolitics at the End of the World, Duke University Press. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/fullerton/detail.action?docID=5826044.] CSUF JmB TDI

The emergency politics of the Anthropocene, particularly when contracted into the last decade of political stalemate and neoauthoritarian retrenchment, also resonates with a particular geopolitics in the sense that it favors the power politics of the same states and the same practices of state­ craft that made the Anthropocene. For 90 percent ­ of the planet, this is a five-­ hundred-­ year emergency with catastrophic punctuations of disease, famine, and warfare. In so much as ­ there is a “we,” we do not live in a contemporary emergency of decades but a centuries-­ long present of slow violence. 40 In this sense, we are not finished with the tools of rhetorical analysis as an essential way to make sense of how we have come to understand our current moment. And yet that framing would not be possible without the eruptions of hurricanes, insurgencies, disappearing megafauna, and spectacular accidents. However, the lag between the scale of violence and catastrophe and the recognition of the crisis says something about hegemony, and who can speak and what is legible or sensible. I do not think I am alone in wanting to open up to the global magnitude of what confronts the planet. Yet in this chapter, I want to do so without losing sight of the real differences in politics, geography, history, meaning, and cosmology that modulate how each one of us ­ w ill confront the end of this epoch. In so doing, ­ I hope to emphasize a refrain that the end of the world is never the end of every­ thing. An apocalypse is always more and less than an extinction, and what­ ever makes a life out of the mess we are currently in will ­ depend in some ways on how we come to understand the con­ temporary condition. Ideas ­ matter even if they cannot save us. Stories, explanations, and philosophical adventures are the best of what the human ­ estate has to offer. No matter ­ how desperate things ­ get, someone will ­ still ask why this is happening and we ­ will share in that question the possibility of thinking together. As we explore the dark fascination with the ­futures of our species, the catastrophic inadequacy of our dominate form of life becomes more and more apparent. The dominant forms of planetary life display an obsession with warfare and order— part ­ technological hubris, part ecological sabotage— ­ which have ripped their way through ­ e very continent on the planet, making a geological mark. The making of the Eurocene has been created by no single class or nation, much less by a clearly defined agenda. An aggregating and heterogeneous collection of people, ­ things, ­ perspectives, hatreds, malignancies, and creeping global expansions has unleashed our con­ temporary condition. We live in a moment imperiled by an immature giganticism. All of us experience this moment differently, but a rare few can escape even for a moment the degree to which a weight impinges upon us all. We live in an apocalyptic era unequally created by a minority bent on the accumulation of wealth and a self-­ interested regenerating political order. However, the “we” that w ­ ill bear the burden of this five-­ hundred-­ year project of rationalized exploitation is much vaster, and includes bumblebees; humpback w ­ hales; poison arrow frogs; wolves; Hawaiians; Micronesians; African Americans; the inhabitants of Flint, Michigan; Syrians; Mayans; Queers; Christians; Muslims; Atheists; transhumanists; hipsters; shamans; entrepreneurs; homeless veterans; war orphans; albatrosses; elephants . .

#### **It’s a prior question – speculative planning in the simulation of military policy mandates a ‘readiness’ to roll-back the plan. Historicizing war-making exposes the reproduction of military presence through everyday conditions.**

Hyde 15 (Alexandra, faculty fellow at the Gender Institute, “The present tense of Afghanistan: accounting for space, time, and gender in processes of militarization,” *Gender, Place & Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography* [http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/0966369X.2015.1058759 retrieved 7/25/15](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/0966369X.2015.1058759%20retrieved%207/25/15) R.C.)

What the rupture of op minimise shows is that **even when particular spaces have been constructed as fixed and stable, such as ‘home’ as a place of** identity, security and ‘reassuring **boundedness’** (Massey 1994, 169), **they cannot be** understood as **insulated against the contingency of political events and dismissed from** an understanding of the depths to which ‘**international relations’** penetrate. Fundamentally, **it is a spatial logic that posits soldiers** **in the role of geopolitical actors** who are ‘**mobilised’ as part of** the global reach of contemporary **US** and British **military power**, for example, **while their wives are ‘left behind’** (Massey 1994, 10) to maintain place as a fixed locus of belonging (Massey 1994, 180). **Such a configuration underestimates the ways in which any place is an active site of presence that is constituted in different ways at different times. What is at stake** in a multi-dimensional understanding of militarisation and its effects, one that takes into account the contingency of time and the experience of the same events in different places, **is the imperative to take the presence of Afghanistan as it is experienced by** the **families** of service personnel **as seriously as a soldier’s experience of being present in Afghanistan**. But the mandate to pay attention to everyday times and spaces of militarisation goes beyond the need to look simply at moments of rupture and discontinuity. As Woodward has argued, **war is merely the most obvious manifestation of military force, the apex of a pyramid that at its base includes the ‘continual preparations which states make in order to be able to wage war’** (2004, 4). **Although military** bases such as Camp Bastion **have gained** totemic **visibility** as part of current theatres of war, for example, **more detailed accounts of the everyday workings of such bases attest to** a curious degree of **ambiguity with respect to their war-fighting purpose. Paying attention to their** internal, **day-to-day** function **illustrates how even** those bases that might be described as ‘**front line’ installations betray the more banal manifestations of military presence**: [t]ours in Iraq and Afghanistan, lengthened to one year like a tour in South Korea, have many of the accoutrements of garrison life, such as gymnasiums, cafeterias, post exchanges, and other qualities that evince a more stable garrison life than a nation at war. (Morgan 2006, 208) **Such research highlights the need to pay attention to the reproduction of the military as an institution6 and the everyday conditions in and through which war is normalised**. As Lefebvre argues ‘The army has its everyday life’ ([1961] 2008, 41). **In the same way that battle’s other is the homefront, ‘war’s shadow’ is ‘readiness’** (Lutz 2001, 7). **Research on** or around **military bases** (Lutz 2001; MacLeish 2013) **reveals the** repetition, **rehearsal and simulation entailed in the military’s requirement for ‘combat readiness’, which ‘because it involves peering into the void of the future** and the blurry shapes of the present’, Lutz argues, ‘**must also be mythic’** (2001, 87). **The everyday life of the army, therefore, is founded on temporal conditions that go beyond the sudden interruption of events, and are bound up in the contingency of what might happen**. Militarily, **these conditions reach their apotheosis in the pre-emptive strike**, and within critical scholarship, war games and combat readiness can tell us much about the mythologies of the nation and its others (Lutz 2001, 87). Less common, however, is research on the everyday lived experience of this contingency, an altogether more diffuse process of militarisation. In the concluding section of this essay, therefore, I wish to consider some of the everyday forms this contingency takes, which can be understood as the way in which Afghanistan makes its presence felt.

### AT: Movements Fail

#### the only way out of US neoimperalism is to continue to fight – the Vietcong and Chinese and North Korean forces are proof that movements can stand up to US imperialism

Sirohi & Bhupatiraju 2021 (Rahual Assistant Professor, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology & Bhupatira is a School of Development Studies, Tata Institute of Social Sciences (2020). Reassessing the Pink Tide: Lessons from Brazil and Venezuela. Springer Nature. doi:10.1007/978-981-15-8674-3) CSUF JmB TDI

For the left to accept such a possibility however would be to miss the polarizing effects of capitalism on a global scale; it would be to ignore the reality of the vast transfers of surpluses from the South to the North that sustain the system. Moreover, to accept such an understanding would also put the left in direct confrontation with its mass base-the poorest sections of society who bear the brunt of imperialism. This is precisely why a generation of anti-imperialist thinkers argued that the way out of underdevelopment and poverty that the peripheries were stuck in, was *to break away* from *global trading and financial networks* and not in the hope that imperialism could be made benevolent. Their preferred strategy was for 12Here Harvey seems to be differentiating between “accumulation by dispossession” on the one hand and “primitive accumulation” on the other. By doing so, even as he takes to task those versions of Marxism that relegate the violence of dispossession to the margins of capitalism and even as he asserts the continued relevance of such forms of accumulation, his reading nonetheless remains stuck in a stadial conceptualization of capitalism. 4 REARMING THE LEFT 179 peripheral regions to regain hold of the nation state and use the national sovereignty thus obtained to push against the boundaries of imperialism. Thus while radical critics of capitalism are correct in suggesting that only an “inner” transformation of our societies can provide lasting answers to the problems that we face today, for the Global South this process must begin first and foremost through an “outer” transformation of its external links. What is more is that this assertion of sovereignty does not necessarily have to come at the cost of socialist internationalism and indeed historically, the most vociferous demands for political and economic independence have gone hand in hand with heroic acts of internationalism. In a speech delivered in 1965, Che Guevara emphasized this relation as follows: “To raise the living standards of the underdeveloped nations, therefore, we must fight against imperialism. And *each time a country is torn away from the imperialist tree, it is not only a partial battle won against the main enemy but it also contributes to the real weakening of that enemy*, and is one more step toward the final victory. There are no borders in this struggle to the death. We cannot be indifferent to what happens anywhere in the world, because a victory by any country over imperialism is our victory, just as any country’s defeat is a defeat for all of us. The practice of proletarian internationalism is not only a duty for the peoples struggling for a better future, it is also an inescapable necessity” (Guevara 1965). These words remain as true today. Countries like Brazil and India which have diversified industrial bases and major agricultural capabilities can afford to think of an ambitious project of delinking, but such a strategy is likely to be much harder for smaller economies without some sort of international or at least regional level cooperation. Moreover, countries of the Global South that seek to radically challenge capitalism in this way are bound to face the wrath of capital in imperial centres through sanctions, military interventions and so on, and thus the success of delinking in any one country no doubt can benefit from cooperation and support of workers and peasants across the world. Left forces in the North have a particularly important role to play in this regard and in some senses the new contours of the global world economy make such solidarity more possible than ever before. Because although imperialism today continues to rely on extracting super profits from the peripheries, this renewed cycle of imperialism today has gone hand in hand with an erosion of the welfare state in the North and an intense commodification of labour in these parts of the world, all of which have served to weaken the “internal alliances” between capital and labour; Alliances, one 180 R. A. SIROHI AND S. BHUPATIRAJU might add, that Samir Amin at one point saw as constituting a crucial feature of autonomous capitalist development in centres of world capitalism. Conditions such as these can serve to sharpen class conflict and raise working-class consciousness to an entirely new levels in the North, thus providing fertile soil for genuine socialist internationalism. Beyond Developmentalism If the left in the Global South is to emphasize delinking, then such a strategy directly brings home the question of state power to the centre of discussion. It was Lenin’s major contribution to show how important it was for the left not to be satisfied merely by taking state power. In order for socialist movement to move forward and not get trapped within the boundaries of capitalism, *the state would have to be “smashed”.* And yet the very concept of “smashing” has been very fuzzy. Smashing the state did not for once imply a rejection of economic planning for instance. It was not some nihilistic strategy aimed at the destruction of all things that the state had its hands in. It did not for example mean that there was no room for provision of public services like health and education within socialist society.13 It however did mean destruction of the army, prisons and all those arms of the state that were bulwarks of status quo. It also implied a level of decentralization that the capitalist state could never dream of accommodating. Thus what Marxists implied when they sought the smashing of the state was the destruction of the alienating form that the state took; an institution that people create but one that nonetheless comes to dominate them as if it were an external force.

### AT: Cannot Collapse

#### The signals of the collapse of neo-imperialism along with capitalism are being revealed – the 2008 financial crisis, collapse of the Eurozone, and challenges to US hegemony are all proof of it – the alternative is the only method to find a way out of neo-imperialism because it galvanizes movements toward material decolonization – like the Vietcong, the Chinese and North Koreans during the Korean war prove that we can stand up to US neo-imperialism but only through collectivity

Yu 20 [Bin, Neo-imperialism, the Final Stage of Imperialism, Taylor & Francis Online, International Critical Thought, Vol. 10, 1 p. 495-518 Accessed 3-11-21] CSUF JmB NDT 2021 TDI

In the 1980s, the Japanese-American scholar Yoshihiro Francis Fukuyama advanced the concept of “the end of history” (Luo 2019), the essence of which is the contention that the form of human society will end with the neo-imperialism that is now in its heyday. However, the course of events before and after the US financial crisis shows that it is neo-imperialism that is facing its end. William Tabb was once concerned that the United States might go bankrupt due to a loss of competitiveness and the excessive cost of maintaining the operations of imperialism (Tabb 2006). After making an elaborate calculation, Joseph Stiglitz and Professor Linda Bilmes from Harvard University concluded that based on a conservative estimate the total US expenditure on the Iraq War would reach 3 trillion US dollars, and that the sum might perhaps be even more than the 5 trillion US dollars (discounted for inflation) that the United States spent on the Second World War (Bilmes and Stiglitz 2009). Such a huge cost is obviously unbearable for neo-imperialism. When asked by a journalist if the Iraq War was the cause of the slowdown of the US economy, Stiglitz answered in the affirmative. 17 When confronting the socialist camp, (neo-)imperialism for a time made relatively large concessions to the domestic working class, even adopting a strategy of buying off the working class in the countries of the neo-imperialist core through implementing the so-called “welfare state” model (Meng 1981). After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, however, the neo-imperialist countries one after another seized their “peace dividend,” slashing workers’ welfare provisions and withdrawing numerous concessions made earlier to the working class. Despite this, the European sovereign debt crisis shows that neo-imperialism, perhaps surprisingly, now finds this model unbearable. Marx once stated, Without the great alternative phases of dullness, prosperity, over-excitement, crisis and distress, which modern industry traverses in periodically recurring cycles, with the up and down of wages resulting from them, as with the constant warfare between masters and men closely corresponding with those variations in wages and profits, the working-classes of Great Britain, and of all Europe, would be a heart-broken, a weakminded, a worn-out, unresisting mass, whose self-emancipation would prove as impossible as that of the slaves of Ancient Greece and Rome. (Marx [1853] 2010, 169) Obviously, with the economic crisis in the neo-imperialist countries and the great reduction of welfare caused by the US financial crisis, opposition on the part of the working class inside the neo-imperialist group will grow increasingly strong. The fact that the US financial crisis of 2008 was triggered by a financial product, subprime mortgages, shows that neo-imperialism is the last stage of imperialism and the last stage of capitalism, in which money capital and productive capital experience the most thorough separation. In the face of this situation, human society can move forward only by actively rejecting capitalism, which is obsolete and unsuited to the development of the productive forces. Only by advancing toward socialism can human society rid itself of the economic crisis that has brought disaster to billions of people, and attain salvation. Although neo-imperialism possesses an arsenal powerful enough to destroy the earth and all humanity, this cannot stave off the system’s demise. On the contrary, neo-imperialism is forced to devote immense wealth to its armaments industry, and to continuously conduct research and development on weapons such as unmanned aerial vehicles that need no or few humans to pursue the fight. This is precisely a manifestation of the vulnerability of neo-imperialism, and proof that neo-imperialism dare not trust or rely on anyone. In reviewing the history of the twentieth century, Yu and Zhang also pointed out that during the Korean War in the 1950s, the United States had the most powerful navy and air force (its ground forces were second only to those of the Soviet Union) and absolute air supremacy. Nevertheless, China and North Korea fought side by side for three years and finally defeated US imperialism. In the Vietnam War of the 1960s and 1970s, the United States still had absolute air supremacy, and US planes kept bombing Vietnam. The people of Vietnam, however, were united as one, fought dauntlessly, and with the support of people all over the world finally drove out the US invaders. These examples demonstrate that even countries that are at a disadvantage can defeat US imperialism so long as their people unite and fight bravely. It should also be pointed out that Cuba, located in the “backyard” of the United States, has thwarted endless US conspiracies and adhered to socialism for sixty years. The fact that Cuba remains standing is further proof of the mythical nature of the claim that “the empire is invincible.” When saluting the Cuban people, we should brim with confidence that we can rise to the challenge posed by neo-imperialism, and defeat its menaces (Yu and Zhang 2003). The productive forces of neo-imperialism can no longer promote the development of the capitalist relations of production, since these productive forces have now developed to such an extent that capitalist relations can no longer accommodate them. Neo-imperialism has become a roadblock obstructing the further development of the productive forces, and when the productive forces begin to break through this obstacle, the whole of neo-imperialist society must fall into chaos. The new and higher relations of production, i.e., socialist relations of production, have already started bursting through the constraints of capitalism, and through their distinctive practice, are providing both positive and negative experience. All round the world, people have scientific Marxism as their guide. The end of neo-imperialism and the complete demise of capitalism are not only unavoidable, but no longer belong solely to the distant future.

### AT: Imperialism worse than Neoimperialism

#### The aff is another failed project of anti-imperialism – like British in Hong Kong who installed a systems of laws and governance that favored them – the PRC uses those codes in order to justify neoimperialism – like what US empire has done since its inception of its empire

Sophia Chan 19 12-29-2019 Lausan For Hong Kong, Beijing's so-called 'anti-imperialism' is a sham https://lausan.hk/2019/beijing-sham-anti-imperialism-hong-kong/ Accessed 3-16-2021] CSUF JmB NDT 2021 TDI

Since the beginning of the anti-extradition movement in Hong Kong, which has now evolved into a broader struggle for democracy and against police brutality, Beijing has repeatedly rebuffed foreign criticism of Hong Kong authorities’ handling of the political crisis. In response to criticism from then-British Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt, for example, a Chinese government spokesperson issued an immediate and harsh rebuke: that Hunt was “fantasizing in the faded glory of British colonialism.” More recently, as Hong Kong activists met with members of the U.S. Congress to rally support for the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act—which enables the U.S. government to sanction officials responsible for the erosion of the city’s guaranteed autonomy under “One Country, Two Systems”—the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shaung reacted angrily and demanded that the U.S. “respect China’s sovereignty.” Time and again, Beijing has made the argument that, since 1997, it has liberated Hong Kong from the yoke of European colonialism and continues to keep the West’s imperialistic foreign influence at bay. This is part of the Chinese Communist Party’s broader narrative, in which they have portrayed themselves as the anti-imperialist revolutionary agents that re-built China from its “Hundred Years of Humiliation,” a long century of invasions and unequal treaties starting from when the first European gunboat docked at Chinese shores. This history of Western imperialism is, to a large extent, true. The harm done by European colonialism—of which systematic exploitation and racial inequality were integral features—is not to be taken lightly, and certainly nothing to be nostalgic about. Moreover, Western capitalist powers like the United States have repeatedly exercised their political and economic influence to further their own agendas across the world, often at the expense of the very values protestors in Hong Kong are fighting for. Wholehearted trust in help from these corridors of power seems naïve at best, and at worst a betrayal of the movement’s demand for self-determination. Yet if we—especially those on the left—buy into the narrative that Beijing tells about its “anti-imperialism” today, we would be, as former PRC President Jiang Zemin once berated Hong Kong, “too simple, sometimes naïve.” The fact is: for Hong Kongers, Beijing’s contemporary version of anti-imperialism is a gross distortion and betrayal of the core principles of anti-colonialism, a body of political thought that grew out of the revolutionary movements of the 20th century. The colonial structure A central belief, shared by many Asian and African anti-imperial leaders and thinkers, is that a change in the identity of the ruling class and the formal recognition of states’ borders were only small steps towards achieving decolonization. Decolonization was more than a movement for national independence; it was about enacting an egalitarian revolution. Anti-colonialists saw that colonialism was not only foreign domination, but crucially also a system of governance in which political rights, economic resources, and social status were distributed unequally within the colonial society, and between the colony and metropole. In the prominent postcolonial theorist Partha Chatterjee’s words, colonial governance followed “the rule of colonial difference.” Colonialism divided people along racial, religious, ethnic, linguistic, and other forms of difference, and distributed rights and privileges along that difference. The result is that colonies were rife with deep social divisions and hierarchies, making it easier and more manageable for a European minority to rule over large populations. Amílcar Cabral, one of Africa’s foremost anti-colonial leaders, was the founder and leader of the African Party for the Independence and Unity of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC). He led a 17-year long armed struggle against Portuguese colonialists (and had read and admired the writings of China’s own anti-colonial thinker, Mao Zedong). He describes inequality under colonialism as a “pyramid.” At the “summit” of the pyramid, Cabral argues, is the ruling class, which includes both the foreign and local rulers. “The colonizer installs chiefs who support him, and who are to some degree accepted by the masses; he gives these chiefs material privileges .… Above all, by means of the repressive organs of colonial administration, he guarantees economic and social privileges to the ruling class in their relations with the masses.” Next on the pyramid is the “indigenous petite bourgeoisie,” which “stands midway between the masses of the working class … and the small number of local representatives of the foreign ruling class.” This indigenous middle class comprises of professionals, civil servants, businesspeople, landowners, and so on, and most of them “aspire to a way of life which is similar if not identical with that of the foreign minority.” They indirectly or directly help colonizers control the masses, and benefit from colonialism. Lastly, the working class, or the rural and urban masses, is at the base of the pyramid, to be exploited, repressed, and completely marginalized. These political and economic structures of inequality do not simply wither away with the hoisting of a new flag. Rather, without comprehensive reforms to the political and economic institutions of the post-colony, inequality remains deeply entrenched. Whereas colonizers formerly occupied positions of power and privilege, the same positions are now occupied by local capitalists and the ruling elite. In Hong Kong, 22 years after British colonialism was replaced by Beijing’s rule, inequality here remains rampant. The politics of inequality Under Beijing’s rule, ordinary citizens are given meager say in Hong Kong’s undemocratic political system. Instead, a small committee dominated by Beijing-friendly business interests selects the Chief Executive. The Legislative Council’s so-called “functional constituencies,” a system created by the British allowing the city’s business sectors to elect their own legislators, all but ensure the dominance of establishment politicians over representatives from the opposition, who are favored by Hong Kong citizens. Without universal suffrage, Hong Kong people lack the power to hold their rulers accountable. Instead, Hong Kong tops measurements of crony capitalism, a form of collusion in which the state gives economic benefits to business interests in return for political support. This ensures China-backed capitalists and corporations, not the general population, make Hong Kong’s policy’s choices: low income taxes and non-existent capital gains taxes, meager spending on social welfare, a lack of basic labor rights such as collective bargaining, a persistent shortage of affordable housing, and so on. As a result, Hong Kong has the developed world’s largest gap between rich and poor: with a Gini coefficient of 0.539 in 2018, Hong Kong’s economic inequality is only second to New York among the world’s cities. A report in 2017 found that the city’s richest 10 percent earns about 44 times what the poorest family makes. Among the many protest graffiti photographed by the media in the past few months, one particularly strikes at the heart of the matter: scrawled along a main highway, the graffiti reads, “7k for a house like a cell and you really think we out here [are] scared of jail?” Toward a genuine decolonization Anti-colonial thinkers saw that in order to tie governance to the interests of the masses, political equality in the form of democracy is a basic and essential requirement of a decolonized political system. Léopold Senghor, anti-colonial activist and first President of Senegal, stressed the importance of democratization in the country’s postcolonial era. Reflecting in 1960 on the country’s independence from France, Senghor argues that, “Upon reflection, even independence is not, of itself, political independence. At any rate, not for the people …. Sovereignty, restored to the Senegalese people, had to be exercised by this people and for this people.” Today, Senegal is one of the most stable democracies on the African continent. To achieve genuine and full decolonization, anti-colonial thinkers saw it as crucial to address colonial-era economic exploitation by redistributing wealth and the means of production. Land reform, for example, was an important part of many 20th century anti-colonial programs. Without political and economic egalitarian reforms, the freedom won by anti-colonial struggles would only be as empty as the freedom to wave a different flag. It is, of course, much easier for the Chinese government (and its Hong Kong lackeys) today to pretend that anti-imperialism is only about keeping out all forms of external influence. It allows the government to dismiss any Chinese and Hong Kong persons promoting progressive change, by smearing them as foreign agents. Indeed, rather than engaging with these popular demands for egalitarian reform, Beijing has chosen to hail the PRC flag–waving, national anthem–singing crowds as the “true patriots”, while ignoring the festering injustices that pro-democracy protesters seek to address. No wonder symbols of Chinese national pride have become, for many people in Hong Kong, symbols of oppression rather than emancipation. Hence, on July 1 of this year—the same day Chinese officials and Hong Kong’s elite drank champagne to celebrate the anniversary of the city’s handover in 1997 from rule by the United Kingdom to rule by the People’s Republic of China—protestors in Hong Kong stormed the Legislative Council and defaced the emblem of Hong Kong. On October 1, the 70th anniversary of the founding of the PRC, protestors in Hong Kong burned the national flag and demanded the end of one-party rule. (The bloody day, filled with clashes between citizens and the police, ended with a secondary school student being shot.) In fact, Frantz Fanon, the French West Indian anti-colonial writer and revolutionary, foresaw this in 1963. “Nationalism,” he writes in The Wretched of the Earth, “is not a program … [A] government needs a program if it really wants to liberate the people politically and socially. Not only an economic program but also a policy on the distribution of wealth and social relations.” Without such a program, “nationalism … leads to a dead end …. It is then that flags and government buildings cease to be the symbols of the nation.” Here, Fanon warns that postcolonial rule grounded on a superficial nationalism that does not address structural inequality will ultimately fail. Citizens of such a postcolonial regime will come to see the regime as alienating as foreign rule. Anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism in their truest sense requires radical egalitarian reforms at all levels of society: political, economic, and social. Yet, in its bid to stifle dissent and remain in power at all costs, the Chinese Communist Party today has abandoned a core insight of the anti-colonial tradition: that a liberated people consists not of detached elite leaders and their disempowered subjects, but, as Fanon writes, “the enlightened and coherent praxis of the men and women.”

## Vs Persian Gulf

### Gulf =/= Strait of Hormoz

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Haynes 19 [Suyin London School of Economics and Political Science in International Relations and History July 23, 2019 1 19 7-23-2019 Time The Strait of Hormuz Is at the Center of Iran Tensions Again. Here's How the Narrow Waterway Gained Wide Importance https://time.com/5632388/strait-of-hormuz-iran-tanker/ Accessed 7-7-2023] CSUF JmB TDI

The Strait of Hormuz is only 21 miles wide at its narrowest point, but it’s once again the biggest waterway in the news headlines, after Iran seized a British oil tanker in what is widely regarded as the world’s most strategically important passage for international trade. Twenty percent of the global oil supply flows through the Strait, which links the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. And though it is technically regulated by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 (UNCLOS), Iran has signed but not ratified that convention and has historically acted to protect its interests in the passage.

## Aff Answers

### 1AR --- Research Good

#### Our authors have self-interest against data inflation.

Ravenal 9 (Earl C., Distinguished Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute also professor emeritus of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, “What's Empire Got to Do with It? The Derivation of America's Foreign Policy.” Critical Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Politics and Society 21.1 (2009) 21-75) TDI

The underlying notion of “the security bureaucracies . . . looking for new enemies” is a threadbare concept that has somehow taken hold across the political spectrum, from the radical left (viz. Michael Klare [1981], who refers to a “threat bank”), to the liberal center (viz. Robert H. Johnson [1997], who dismisses most alleged “threats” as “improbable dangers”), to libertarians (viz. Ted Galen Carpenter [1992], Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy of the Cato Institute, who wrote a book entitled A Search for Enemies). What is missing from most analysts’ claims of “threat inflation,” however, is a convincing theory of why, say, the American government significantly (not merely in excusable rhetoric) might magnify and even invent threats (and, more seriously, act on such inflated threat estimates). In a few places, Eland (2004, 185) suggests that such behavior might stem from military or national security bureaucrats’ attempts to enhance their personal status and organizational budgets, or even from the influence and dominance of “the military-industrial complex”; viz.: “Maintaining the empire and retaliating for the blowback from that empire keeps what President Eisenhower called the military-industrial complex fat and happy.” Or, in the same section: In the nation’s capital, vested interests, such as the law enforcement bureaucracies . . . routinely take advantage of “crises”to satisfy parochial desires. Similarly, many corporations use crises to get pet projects— a.k.a. pork—funded by the government. And national security crises, because of people’s fears, are especially ripe opportunities to grab largesse. (Ibid., 182) Thus, “bureaucratic-politics” theory, which once made several reputa- tions (such as those of Richard Neustadt, Morton Halperin, and Graham Allison) in defense-intellectual circles, and spawned an entire sub-industry within the field of international relations,5 is put into the service of dismissing putative security threats as imaginary. So, too, can a surprisingly cognate theory, “public choice,”6 which can be considered the right-wing analog of the “bureaucratic-politics” model, and is a preferred interpretation of governmental decision- making among libertarian observers. As Eland (2004, 203) summarizes: Public-choice theory argues [that] the government itself can develop sepa- rate interests from its citizens. The government reflects the interests of powerful pressure groups and the interests of the bureaucracies and the bureaucrats in them. Although this problem occurs in both foreign and domestic policy, it may be more severe in foreign policy because citizens pay less attention to policies that affect them less directly. There is, in this statement of public-choice theory, a certain ambiguity, and a certain degree of contradiction: Bureaucrats are supposedly, at the same time, subservient to societal interest groups and autonomous from society in general. This journal has pioneered the argument that state autonomy is a likely consequence of the public’s ignorance of most areas of state activity (e.g., Somin 1998; DeCanio 2000a, 2000b, 2006, 2007; Ravenal 2000a). But state autonomy does not necessarily mean that bureaucrats substitute their own interests for those of what could be called the “national society” that they ostensibly serve. I have argued (Ravenal 2000a) that, precisely because of the public-ignorance and elite-expertise factors, and especially because the opportunities—at least for bureaucrats (a few notable post-government lobbyist cases nonwithstanding)—for lucrative self-dealing are stringently fewer in the defense and diplomatic areas of government than they are in some of the contract-dispensing and more under-the-radar-screen agencies of government, the “public-choice” imputation of self-dealing, rather than working toward the national interest (which, however may not be synonymous with the interests, perceived or expressed, of citizens!) is less likely to hold. In short, state autonomy is likely to mean, in the derivation of foreign policy, that “state elites” are using rational judgment, in insulation from self-promoting interest groups—about what strategies, forces, and weapons are required for national defense. Ironically, “public choice”—not even a species of economics, but rather a kind of political interpretation—is not even about “public” choice, since, like the bureaucratic-politics model, it repudiates the very notion that bureaucrats make truly “public” choices; rather, they are held, axiomatically, to exhibit “rent-seeking” behavior, wherein they abuse their public positions in order to amass private gains, or at least to build personal empires within their ostensibly official niches. Such sub- rational models actually explain very little of what they purport to observe. Of course, there is some truth in them, regarding the “behavior” of some people, at some times, in some circumstances, under some conditions of incentive and motivation. But the factors that they posit operate mostly as constraints on the otherwise rational optimization of objectives that, if for no other reason than the playing out of official roles, transcends merely personal or parochial imperatives. My treatment of “role” differs from that of the bureaucratic-politics theorists, whose model of the derivation of foreign policy depends heavily, and acknowledgedly, on a narrow and specific identification of the role- playing of organizationally situated individuals in a partly conflictual “pulling and hauling” process that “results in” some policy outcome. Even here, bureaucratic-politics theorists Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999, 311) allow that “some players are not able to articulate [sic] the governmental politics game because their conception of their job does not legitimate such activity.” This is a crucial admission, and one that points— empirically—to the need for a broader and generic treatment of role. Roles (all theorists state) give rise to “expectations” of performance. My point is that virtually every governmental role, and especiallynational-security roles, and particularly the roles of the uniformed military, embody expectations of devotion to the “national interest”; rational- ity in the derivation of policy at every functional level; and objectivity in the treatment of parameters, especially external parameters such as “threats” and the power and capabilities of other nations. Sub-rational models (such as “public choice”) fail to take into account even a partial dedication to the “national” interest (or even the possibility that the national interest may be honestly misconceived in more paro- chial terms). In contrast, an official’s role connects the individual to the (state-level) process, and moderates the (perhaps otherwise) self-seeking impulses of the individual. Role-derived behavior tends to be formalized and codified; relatively transparent and at least peer-reviewed, so as to be consistent with expectations; surviving the particular individual and trans- mitted to successors and ancillaries; measured against a standard and thus corrigible; defined in terms of the performed function and therefore derived from the state function; and uncorrrupt, because personal cheating and even egregious aggrandizement are conspicuously discouraged. My own direct observation suggests that **defense decision-makers** attempt to **“frame”** the structure of the **problems** that they try to solve **on the basis of the** most accurate intelligence. **They** make it their business to know **where** the **threats come from**. Thus, **threats** are not “socially constructed” (even though, of course, some values are). A major reason for the rationality, and the objectivity, of the process is that much security planning is done, not in vaguely undefined circum- stances that offer scope for idiosyncratic, subjective behavior, but rather in structured and reviewed organizational frameworks. Non-rationalities (which are bad for understanding and prediction) tend to get filtered out. People are fired for presenting skewed analysis and for making bad predictions. This is **because something important is riding on the** causal analysis and the contingent **prediction.** For these reasons, “public choice” does not have the “feel” of reality to many critics who have participated in the structure of defense decision-making. In that structure, obvious, and even not-so-obvious,“**rent-seeking” would** not only be shameful; it would **present a** severe risk of career termination**.** And, as mentioned, the defense bureaucracy is hardly a productive place for truly talented rent-seekers to operatecompared to opportunities for personal profit in the commercial world. A bureaucrat’s very self-placement in these reaches of government testi- fies either to a sincere commitment to the national interest or to a lack of sufficient imagination to exploit opportunities for personal profit.

#### Empiricism is the only way to understand the world---proves the K doesn’t turn the case

Walt, 2005 Stephen 6-15-2005 Professor of International relations at the Harvard Kennedy School at Harvard University and a political scientist. “The Relationship Between Theory and Policy in International Relations.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 8: 23-48. TDI

First and most obviously, a good theory should be logically consistent and empirically valid, because a logical explanation that is consistent with the available evidence is more likely to provide an accurate guide to the causal connections that shape events.

Second, a good theory is complete; it does not leave us wondering about the causal relationships at work (Van Evera 1997). For example, a theory stating that “national leaders go to war when the expected utility of doing so outweighs the expected utility of all alternative choices” (Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman 1992) may be logically impeccable, but it does not tell us when leaders will reach this judgment. Similarly, a theory is unsatisfying when it identifies an important causal factor but not the factor(s) most responsible for determining outcomes. To say that “human nature causes war,” or even that “oxygen causes war,” is true in the sense that war as we know it cannot occur in the absence of these elements. But such information does not help us understand what we want to know, namely, when is war more or less likely? Completeness also implies that the theory has no “debilitating gaps,” such as an omitted variable that either makes its predictions unacceptably imprecise or leads to biased inferences about other factors (Nincic & Lepgold 2000, p. 28).

A third desideratum is explanatory power. A theory’s explanatory power is its ability to account for phenomena that would otherwise seem mystifying. Theories are especially valuable when they illuminate a diverse array of behavior that previously seemed unrelated and perplexing, and they are most useful when they make apparently odd or surprising events seem comprehensible (Rapaport 1972). In physics, it seems contrary to common sense to think that light would be bent by gravity. Yet Einstein’s theory of relativity explains why this is so. In economics, it might seem counterintuitive to think that nations would be richer if they abolished barriers to trade and did not try to hoard specie (as mercantilist doctrines prescribed). The Smith/Ricardo theory of free trade tells us why, but it took several centuries before the argument was widely accepted (Irwin 1996). In international politics, it seems odd to believe that a country would be safer if it were unable to threaten its opponent’s nuclear forces, but deterrence theory explains why mutual vulnerability may be preferable to either side having a large capacity to threaten the other side’s forces (Wohlstetter 1957, Schelling 1960, Glaser 1990, Jervis 1990). This is what we mean by a powerful theory: Once we understand it, previously unconnected or baffling phenomena make sense.

Fourth, at the risk of stating the obvious, we prefer theories that explain an important phenomenon (i.e., something that is likely to affect the fates of many people). Individual scholars may disagree about the relative importance of different issues, but a theory that deals with a problem of some magnitude is likely to garner greater attention and/or respect than a theory that successfully addresses a puzzle of little intrinsic interest. Thus, a compelling yet flawed explanation for great power war or genocide is likely to command a larger place in the field than an impeccable theory that explains the musical characteristics of national anthems.

Fifth, a theory is more useful when it is prescriptively rich, i.e., when it yields useful recommendations (Van Evera 1997). For this reason, George advises scholars to “include in their research designs variables over which policymakers have some leverage” (George 2000, p. xiv; also Glaser & Strauss 1967, Stein 2000). Yet a theory that does not include manipulable variables may still be useful to policy makers. For example, a theory that explained why a given policy objective was impossible might be very useful if it convinced a policy maker not to pursue such an elusive goal. Similarly, a theory that accurately forecast the risk of war might provide a useful warning to policy makers even if the variables in the theory were not subject to manipulation.

Finally, theories are more valuable when they are stated clearly. Ceteris paribus, a theory that is hard to understand is less useful simply because it takes more time for potential users to master it. Although academics often like to be obscure (because incomprehensibility can both make scholarship seem more profound and make it harder to tell when a particular argument is wrong), opacity impedes scientific progress and is not a virtue in theoreticalwork. An obscure and impenetrable theory is also less likely to influence busy policy makers.

### 1AR --- Martial Politics Wrong

#### The world isn’t defined by Martial politics. IR doesn’t calcify war as inevitable but averts extinction.

**Mott 20** (Christopher, PhD in Political Science from St. Andrews. “Savage Ecology: War and Geopolitics at the End of the World, A Book Review,” <https://geotrickster.com/2020/01/01/savage-ecology-war-and-geopolitics-at-the-end-of-the-world-a-book-review/> ) TDI

Where **I disagree with the** author, however, is his **very concept of the ‘Eurocene.’ If the present international state system wasn’t working for states across the globe it would be dying out, but it seems to strengthening. There is no way we are getting through** what I will remain calling **the anthropocene without some level of a command economy for resources and research direction for technologies. Many of these resources** will be scare and **will be competed over**. The competitive nature of the state system means something Darwinistic is occurring, which is good as **we do not yet have the answer for surviving our current era and so multiple approaches must be tried and the best will serve as models for others and the worst will die out**.

**I** also **do not see anything particularly European about modernity anymore. While a new era did begin with the** biological and demographic **takeover of the western hemisphere and its forceable wedding to Europe**-previously a minor and not particularly important subcontinental peninsula of Asia-**any Eurasian actor could have potentially done the same thing. The bureaucratic state was first born in China and the agricultural state came from the Middle East, and those strike me as just as relevant to where we are now than the maritime-industrial states of post medieval Europe**. Furthermore, **as India and China move their way into full industrialization on their own terms and countries like Japan have long held that position dating back to the colonial era, I find little to argue for something called specifically ‘The Eurocene.’** That being said, the author is entirely correct that our currently unsustainable methods of development are a type of self-replicating virus imposed by force. But so too will any solutions have to follow that path.

It may come as no surprise that I, a person very into geopolitics (and making speculative realist geopolitics in particular) also take a more neutral tone on the field than this author. I think **geopolitics are as likely to get us out of this mess as they are to dig us deeper**. Aside from general environmental goals, **I see little universal in how we will escape from pollution and mass extinction and more a variety of paths which depend on the varying ecologies of different countries**. As it is, some countries will benefit from climate change and their interests cannot be said to be comparable with those who will suffer. **A stateless world is a de facto neoliberal world in practice and the author’s fear of political homogenization is not caused by realism or geopolitics but rather prevented by those same actors. Diversity can only thrive in the absence of grand universal projects**.

### 1AR --- Militarism Useful Concept

#### Howell is wrong – militarism is a useful concept

Nicole Wegner postdoctoral researcher in Gender and War at the University of Sydney, 29 Oct 2019, In partial defense of militarization, Can we really “forget” militarization? A conversation on Alison Howell’s martial politics, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14616742.2019.1668285?casa_token=3lsh69WaZ7IAAAAA:2XotzDSFLjeWcEKB8cF8qSt13aaEQhGBkNmodOkynkxTM8bgWouYzaBYGlNibe0cHKzH6hTcfMRR2rQ> accessed) TDI

Martial politics is a timely and important contribution to international relations (IR), but I am not convinced that we need to “throw the baby out with the bath water.” In other words, while underdeveloped and, at times, overly simplistic, militarization does have utility. I am curious if the “militarization” framework to which Howell contrasts her “martial politics” is somewhat caricatured. Should scholars be concerned about conceptual slippage in scholarly use of militarization? Yes. But I am not totally convinced of Howell's assumption that the “militarization” framework always already assumes a “non-militarized before” and an “overtly militarized after.”

The critique that militarization frameworks reify politics (things that happen “at home”) and war (things that happen “over there”) is actually an embedded assumption of mainstream IR, one that has been actively problematized by critical feminists. Feminist work on militarization has sought to dismantle these falsely bifurcated spaces. Enloe's study of “everyday” sites where militarization “occurs” (2000) breaks down assumptions about domestic/international or war/peace dichotomies. It may be true that Enloe's “can of soup” example could be taken further to show the deeper militarized history of food preservation, as Howell does in her article. But the utility of militarization as a concept still holds value, both analytically and pedagogically. I would like to think that Howell's demand for more does not require that we do away with militarization as a concept, but instead asks us to push our feminist politics beyond the bounds of neatly divided spaces set out by liberalist IR theory.

Howell's critique that the primary emphasis on gender to the exclusion of race, coloniality, disability, and poverty in conceptual uses of militarization is incredibly useful and necessary. Martial politics is a framework to unpack broader systems of oppression in our research. Howell's nuanced historical examination of the history of policing quite convincingly shows the value of martial politics for understanding broader systems of colonial and racist relations in which modern police “militarization” has occurred. However, we cannot “forget” militarization when studying the police, because the particular iterations of modern policing – including the phenomenon of local police forces purchasing outdated military equipment with public tax dollars – is both an important and notable departure from previous relations and an acute phenomenon that is nevertheless troublesome for contemporary colonized and racialized persons.

There is still value in analyzing new, particular, or nuanced militarized iterations of excess in state power. For example, in my own work, I have analyzed recruitment videos of the Canadian Forces to demonstrate an aesthetic shift toward a more militarized image in their 2006 “Fight” campaign (Wegner 2018). While the semiotics of this campaign are problematic on their own, I situate this “militarized shift” in a broader history of national fantasies about liberal peacekeeping and the violence obscured in such mythologies. Militarization is useful for understanding socio-political celebrations of military values and therefore is a theoretical framework to resist that normative agenda.

Howell's demand to “do better” asks us to not only consider the excessive funding and normative exaltation of the military in Western democracies, but also the violence inherent in “fundamental war-like histories of” liberal orders (2018, 120). I would like to think that we need not “forget” militarization, but instead commit ourselves to a more careful, historical, and critical use of this concept and framework.

### 1AR --- Presence is a Force for Good

#### US military presence is non-coercive and a force for good---allies welcome our troops because of the security and economic benefits.

Kane 19. Timothy JP Conte Fellow in Immigration Studies at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University; PhD in economics from UC San Diego. "The United States as a Promethean Power." Hoover Institution. 6-17-2019. <https://www.hoover.org/research/united-states-promethean-power> TDI

The global scope of American military power has been described in many ways: hegemony, primacy, and unipolarity. Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth (2012)1 cover the nuances of the terminology well, and I agree with their preference for the term “Deep Engagement” that Joseph Nye coined in a 1995 article.2 The complex patterns and nuances of engagement remain poorly understood, with a focus on conflict that ignores the preponderance of cases, where U.S. forces have been peacefully based for decades. In short, foreign policy has focused on the heat instead of the light – countless studies, essays, and books on Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq stand in contrast to the negligible attention given to countries where the U.S. maintained large-scale and long-term troop basing such as Belgium, Korea, Turkey, and Kuwait.

Is the United States an empire? We may just as well debate whether an elephant most closely resembles a Tyrannosaurus Rex or Triceratops. Some will point to the imperial characteristics that are reflected in the United States force posture. But characteristics of dinosaurs or empires (size, martial strength, breadth) really have no meaning in a world where that entire order is extinct. The 21st century is filled with a new order of nation-states, markedly different from eras prior to 1945.

American power is best understood not by its type: hard, soft, or smart, but its motivation. This is not to say the “imperial” motivation has disappeared from human affairs; self-preservation and domination are instinctive human qualities. But there is a new aspect to international relations that has been in place for more than a century, a form of altruism, illustrated by the widespread support that exists in the U.S. and other countries for universal human rights. For many decades now, nations have routinely sought to advance something beyond their narrow national interests. I call this a Promethean motivation, and America a Promethean power.

The phrase is rooted in the myth of Prometheus, the rebellious god of ancient Greek mythology who stole fire from Zeus and gave it to the human race, sparking the beginning of technology, growth, civilization, and prosperity. Zeus was the ruler of the Gods of Olympus, archetype of the emperor/king. The Gods were rulers, and humans were mere subjects. Prometheus represents rebellion, the trickster God, undercutting the authority of the imperial order. Legend has it that Prometheus tricked Zeus – repeatedly – in order to help uplift the human race.

Critics of American intervention reflexively use the term “imperial” when discussing foreign affairs. By far the dominant theme of imperialism in American foreign policy has been voiced by Leftist thinkers such as Howard Zinn, Gabriel and Joyce Kolko, and Gore Vidal. But since 1990, the end of the Cold War, neo-isolationists on the right have adopted the term as well, notably Pat Buchanan and Congressman Ron Paul. Thus the tendency is for thinkers on the political extremes – globalists on the left, nationalists on the right – to find common cause, whereas centrists tend to view American power more favorably, as do many foreign scholars.

Following the 9/11 attacks and concerns about state failure abroad, proponents of American intervention began suggesting American empire in explicit and favorable ways. Such voices included Richard Haas, Sebastian Mallaby, and Max Boot. The fullest expression of this new theme is found in Colossus, a 2004 book by Niall Ferguson3 (now a colleague at the Hoover Institution), who argued “not merely that the United States is an empire, but that it always has been an empire” and that the ultimate threat to the nation is its own “absence of a will to power.” The book is an unappreciated gem, but one wonders if Ferguson and his intellectual opponents share the same framework, which refuses to draw a line between imperial states of the 15th-19th centuries and the modern states of the 21st.

Ferguson wonderfully skewers the slipperiness of the term hegemon, which remains “the most popular term among writers on international relations.” Hegemony refers to a coercive state, like an empire, but one that aims to create mutually beneficial relationships. Trying to define the nature of state power by the distribution of benefits (exploitative or shared) misses the point. The point is: what are first principles that motivate foreign action?

America on the world stage should be understood in the context of its revolutionary founding. The republic’s anti-imperial birth and its sense of manifest destiny have colored foreign affairs from early on. Consider again Thomas Jefferson’s “Empire of Liberty,” which was more than a poetic phrase. In 1809 Jefferson wrote to his successor James Madison, “I am persuaded no constitution was ever before so well calculated as ours for extensive empire & self-government.” In one of his final letters, written in 1824, Jefferson wrote, “where this progress will stop no-one can say. Barbarism has, in the meantime, been receding before the steady step of amelioration; and will in time, I trust, disappear from the earth.”

To simplify matters, let’s accept the framework of definitions on the Left (and also popularly understood by Americans throughout history). Define an empire as a nation that exploits foreign peoples, aiming to colonize them and/or extract their resources for the advantage of the empire and at the cost of the foreigners. And for the sake of clarity, recognize a bright line that distinguishes imperial relationships as those where subjugated peoples do not want but are forced to abide by foreign intervention. To be specific, the U.S. role in South Korea fails the imperial test, as does the post-1955 role of the U.S. in Germany and Japan. Those three countries accounted for nearly three-quarters of U.S. troop deployments since 1950. Not to mention Spain, Turkey, Taiwan, and Kuwait. All of these are voluntary alliances, and qualitatively distinct from forces based in Iraq.

For the Leftist criticism of American empire to hold, evidence of domination should be easy to see. One would expect to see the countries of the world that are occupied by American troops suffering economic decline as a result, or at a minimum a relative decline. Here the critique falls apart. The countries of the world that have hosted the greatest number of American troops since 1950 have grown the fastest economically. Furthermore, host countries have experienced faster declines in child mortality, faster increase in overall longevity, faster growth in infrastructure, and even greater improvements in the broadly measured human development index (HDI). Consider as evidence the average economic growth rates presented in table 2, reproduced from Jones and Kane (2012).4

The record shows that America’s engagement with allied nations is unequivocally beneficial for those countries. But the context is what matters for future policy choices. Public perceptions of world affairs are dominated by negatives: bombings in Iraqi cities, AIDS rampant in Africa, genocides, earthquakes. Foreign policy experts focus on negatives of a subtler nature: the dilemma over Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, the poppy trade and corruption in Afghanistan, the strategic mystery that is China. Yet despite real and looming crises, the underlying theme of the American century is a patient march of human prosperity, deepening and broadening as economic growth unfolds in the free world.

The American strategy of patient, forward deployment of U.S. troops, even and especially when it is not self-interested, has benefitted our allies and the world. America’s engagement in Asia and Europe since 1945 created a security umbrella fostering peace and unprecedented prosperity. If this model were applied to the Middle East – supporting allies rather than hunting monsters – it would reshape the region’s future for the better. On this point, Fallows might agree.

The question that haunts contemporary foreign policy is not whether the U.S. military is a force for good around the globe. It is. The question is: Can Promethean power be sustained? Does the United States have the willpower to maintain a forward force posture?

### 1AR --- LIO Good

#### Liberal internationalism provides the ground for reform---the alt cedes that potential.

G. John Ikenberry 20. Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University, in South Korea. “The Next Liberal Order The Age of Contagion Demands More Internationalism, Not Less”. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-09/next-liberal-order> TDI

Liberal internationalists need to acknowledge these missteps and failures. Under the auspices of the liberal international order, the United States has intervened too much, regulated too little, and delivered less than it promised. But what do its detractors have to offer? Despite its faults, no other organizing principle currently under debate comes close to liberal internationalism in making the case for a decent and cooperative world order that encourages the enlightened pursuit of national interests. Ironically, the critics’ complaints make sense only within a system that embraces self-determination, individual rights, economic security, and the rule of law—the very cornerstones of liberal internationalism. The current order may not have realized these principles across the board, but flaws and failures are inherent in all political orders. What is unique about the postwar liberal order is its capacity for self-correction. Even a deeply flawed liberal system provides the institutions through which it can be brought closer to its founding ideals. However serious the liberal order’s shortcomings may be, they pale in comparison to its achievements. Over seven decades, it has lifted more boats—manifest in economic growth and rising incomes—than any other order in world history. It provided a framework for struggling industrial societies in Europe and elsewhere to transform themselves into modern social democracies. Japan and West Germany were integrated into a common security community and went on to fashion distinctive national identities as peaceful great powers. Western Europe subdued old hatreds and launched a grand project of union. European colonial rule in Africa and Asia largely came to an end. The G-7 system of cooperation among Japan, Europe, and North America fostered growth and managed a sequence of trade and financial crises. Beginning in the 1980s, countries across East Asia, Latin America, and eastern Europe opened up their political and economic systems and joined the broader order. The United States experienced its greatest successes as a world power, culminating in the peaceful end to the Cold War, and countries around the globe wanted more, not less, U.S. leadership. This is not an order that one should eagerly escort off the stage. To renew the spirit of liberal internationalism, its proponents should return to its core aim: creating an environment in which liberal democracies can cooperate for mutual gain, manage their shared vulnerabilities, and protect their way of life. In this system, rules and institutions facilitate cooperation among states. Properly regulated trade benefits all parties. Liberal democracies, in particular, have an incentive to work together—not only because their shared values reinforce trust but also because their status as open societies in an open system makes them more vulnerable to transnational threats. Gaining the benefits of interdependence while guarding against its dangers requires collective action.

#### All data proves heg is the most peaceful system.

Stephen Brooks & William Wohlforth 16. William, Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. Stephen Brooks, Ph. D in Political Science from Yale, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. Page 103-108 TDI

Consistency with influential relevant theories lends credence to the expectation that US security commitments actually can shape the strategic environment as deep engagement presupposes. But it is far from conclusive. Not all analysts endorse the theories we discussed in chapter 5. These theories make strong assumptions that states generally act rationally and focus primarily on security. Allowing misperceptions, emotions, domestic politics, desire for status, or concern for honor into the picture might alter the verdict on the strategy’s net expected effects. And to model the strategy’s expected effects we had to simplify things by selecting two mechanisms— assurance and deterrence— and examining their effects independently, thus missing potentially powerful positive interactions between them.

This chapter moves beyond theory to examine patterns of evidence. If the theoretical arguments about the security effects of deep engagement are right, what sort of evidence should we see? Two major bodies of evidence are most important: general empirical findings concerning the strategy’s key mechanisms and regionally focused research.

General Patterns of Evidence Three key questions about US security provision have received the most extensive analysis. First, do alliances such as those sustained by the United States actually deter war and increase security? Second, does such security provision actually hinder nuclear proliferation? And third, does limiting proliferation actually increase security?

Deterrence Effectiveness The determinants of deterrence success and failure have attracted scores of quantitative and case study tests. Much of the case study work yields a cautionary finding: that deterrence is much harder in practice than in theory, because standard models assume away the complexities of human psychology and domestic politics that tend to make some states hard to deter and might cause deterrence policies to backfire. 1 Many quantitative findings, mean- while, are mutually contradictory or are clearly not relevant to extended deterrence. But some relevant results receive broad support:

* Alliances generally do have a deterrent effect. In a study spanning nearly two centuries, Johnson and Leeds found “support for the hypothesis that defensive alliances deter the initiation of disputes.” They conclude that “defensive alliances lower the probability of international conflict and are thus a good policy option for states seeking to maintain peace in the world.” Sechser and Fuhrmann similarly find that formal defense pacts with nuclear states have significant deterrence benefits. 2 3
* The overall balance of military forces (including nuclear) between states does not appear to influence deterrence; the local balance of military forces in the specific theater in which deterrence is actually practiced, however, is key. 4
* Forward- deployed troops enhance the deterrent effect of alliances with overseas allies. 5
* Strong mutual interests and ties enhance deterrence. 6
* Case studies strongly ratify the theoretical expectation that it is easier to defend a given status quo than to challenge it forcefully: compellence (sometimes termed “coercion” or “coercive diplomacy”) is extremely hard.

The most important finding to emerge from this voluminous research is that alliances— especially with nuclear- armed allies like the United States— actually work in deterring conflict. This is all the more striking in view of the fact that what scholars call “selection bias” probably works against it. The United States is more inclined to offer— and protégés to seek— alliance rela- tionships in settings where the probability of military conflicts is higher than average. The fact that alliances work to deter conflict in precisely the situations where deterrence is likely to be especially hard is noteworthy.

More specifically, these findings buttress the key theoretical implication that if the United States is interested in deterring military challenges to the status quo in key regions, relying only on latent military capabilities in the US homeland is likely to be far less effective than having an overseas military posture. Similarly, they lend support to the general proposition that a forward deterrence posture is strongly appealing to a status quo power, because defending a given status quo is far cheaper than overturning it, and, once a favorable status quo is successfully overturned, restoring the status quo ante can be expected to be fearsomely costly. Recognizing the significance of these findings clearly casts doubt on the “wait on the sidelines and decide whether to intervene later” approach that is so strongly favored by retrenchment proponents.

The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation Matthew Kroenig highlights a number of reasons why US policymakers seek to limit the spread of nuclear weapons: “Fear that nuclear proliferation might deter [US leaders] from using military intervention to pursue their interests, reduce the effectiveness of their coercive diplomacy, trigger regional instability, undermine their alliance structures, dissipate their strategic attention, and set off further nuclear proliferation within their sphere of influence.” These are not the only reasons for concern about nuclear proliferation; also notable are the enhanced prospects of nuclear accidents and the greater risk of leakage of nuclear material to terrorists. 9 8

Do deep engagement’s security ties serve to contain the spread of nuclear weapons? The literature on the causes of proliferation is massive and faces challenges as great as any in international relations. With few cases to study, severe challenges in gathering evidence about inevitably secretive nuclear programs, and a large number of factors in play on both the demand and the supply sides, findings are decidedly mixed. Alliance relationships are just one piece of this complex puzzle, one that is hard to isolate from all the other factors in play. And empirical studies face the same selection bias problem just discussed: Nuclear powers are more likely to offer security guarantees to states confronting a serious threat and thus facing above- average incentives to acquire nuclear weapons. Indeed, alliance guarantees might be offered to states actively considering the nuclear option precisely in order to try to forestall that decision. Like a strong drug given only to very sick patients, alliances thus may have a powerful effect even if they sometimes fail to work as hoped. 10

Bearing these challenges in mind, the most relevant findings that emerge from this literature are:

* The most recent statistical analysis of the precise question at issue concludes that “security guarantees significantly reduce proliferation proclivity among their recipients.” In addition, states with such guarantees are less likely to export sensitive nuclear material and technology to other nonnuclear states. 12 11
* Case study research underscores that the complexity of motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons cannot be reduced to security: domestic politics, economic interests, and prestige all matter. 13
* Multiple independently conceived and executed recent case studies nonetheless reveal that security alliances help explain numerous allied decisions not to proliferate even when security is not always the main driver of leaders’ interest in a nuclear program. As Nuno Monteiro and Alexandre Debs stress, “States whose security goals are subsumed by their sponsors’ own aims have never acquired the bomb. … This finding highlights the role of U.S. security commitments in stymieing nuclear proliferation: U.S. protégés will only seek the bomb if they doubt U.S. protection of their core security goals.” 15 14
* Multiple independently conceived and executed recent case research projects further unpack the conditions that decrease the likelihood of allied proliferation, centering on the credibility of the alliance commitment. In addition, in some cases of prevention failure, the alliances allow the patron to influence the ally’s nuclear program subsequently, decreasing further proliferation risks. 17
* Security alliances lower the likelihood of proliferation cascades. To be sure, many predicted cascades did not occur. But security provision, mainly by the United States, is a key reason why. The most comprehensive statistical analysis finds that states are more likely to proliferate in response to neighbors when three conditions are met: (1) there is an intense security rivalry between the two countries; (2) the prospective proliferating state does not have a security guarantee from a nuclear- armed patron; and (3) the potential proliferator has the industrial and technical capacity to launch an indigenous nuclear program. 18 19 16

In sum, as Monteiro and Debs note, “Despite grave concerns that more states would seek a nuclear deterrent to counter U.S. power preponderance,” in fact “the spread of nuclear weapons decelerated with the end of the Cold War in 1989.” Their research, as well as that of scores of scholars using multiple methods and representing many contrasting theoretical perspectives, shows that US security guarantees and the counter- proliferation policy deep engagement allows are a big part of the reason why. 20

The Costs of Nuclear Proliferation General empirical findings thus lend support to the proposition that security alliances impede nuclear proliferation. But is this a net contributor to global security? Most practitioners and policy analysts would probably not even bring this up as a question and would automatically answer yes if it were raised. Yet a small but very prominent group of theorists within the academy reach a different answer: some of the same realist precepts that generate the theoretical prediction that retrenchment would increase demand for nuclear weapons also suggest that proliferation might increase security such that the net effect of retrenchment could be neutral. Most notably, “nuclear optimists” like Kenneth Waltz contend that deterrence essentially solves the security problem for all nuclear- armed states, largely eliminating the direct use of force among them. It follows that US retrenchment might generate an initial decrease in security followed by an increase as insecure states acquire nuclear capabilities, ultimately leaving no net effect on international security. 21

This perspective is countered by “nuclear pessimists” such as Scott Sagan. Reaching outside realism to organization theory and other bodies of social science research, they see major security downsides from new nuclear states. Copious research produced by Sagan and others casts doubt on the expectation that governments can be relied upon to create secure and controlled nuclear forces. The more nuclear states there are, the higher the probability that the organizational, psychological, and civil- military pathologies Sagan identifies will turn an episode like one of the numerous “near misses” he uncovers into actual nuclear use. As Campbell Craig warns, “One day a warning system will fail, or an official will panic, or a terrorist attack will be misconstrued, and the missiles will fly.” 22 23

Looking beyond these kinds of factors, it is notable that powerful reasons to question the assessment of proliferation optimists also emerge even if one assumes, as they do, that states are rational and seek only to maximize their security. First, nuclear deterrence can only work by raising the risk of nuclear war. For deterrence to be credible, there has to be a nonzero chance of nuclear use. If nuclear use is impossible, deterrence cannot be credible. It follows that every nuclear deterrence relationship depends on some probability of 24 nuclear use. The more such relationships there are, the greater the risk of nuclear war. Proliferation therefore increases the chances of nuclear war even in a perfectly rationalist world. Proliferation optimists cannot logically deny that nuclear spread increases the risk of nuclear war. Their argument must be that the security gains of nuclear spread outweigh this enhanced risk.

Estimating that risk is not simply a matter of pondering the conditions under which leaders will choose to unleash nuclear war. Rather, as Schelling established, the question is whether states will run the risk of using nuclear weapons. Nuclear crisis bargaining is about a “competition in risk taking.” Kroenig counts some twenty cases in which states—including prominently the United States—ran real risks of nuclear war in order to prevail in crises. As Kroenig notes, “By asking whether states can be deterred or not … proliferation optimists are asking the wrong question. The right question to ask is: what risk of nuclear war is a specific state willing to run against a particular opponent in a given crisis?” The more nuclear- armed states there are, the more the opportunities for such risk- taking and the greater the probability of nuclear use. 27 26 25

#### Liberal international order is good -- the overall historical record is decidedly improving with changes in political norms and ideas in American diplomats, which disproves their whole theory, but dispensing with moralistic totalizations is necessary to prevent future active measures

**Carothers 18** [THOMAS CAROTHERS is Senior Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 3/12. "Is the U.S. Hypocritical to Criticize Russian Election Meddling?" <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2018-03-12/us-hypocritical-criticize-russian-election-meddling>] TDI

The U.S. response to Russian meddling in the 2016 election has been **extraordinarily weak**. Not only that, it has been accompanied by an attitude of “**whataboutism**” on the part of some Americans—the **relativistic view** that the **U**nited **S**tates has **little ground to complain** about Russia’s actions given its own **history** of meddling in other countries’ political campaigns and elections. It is certainly **essential** to be honest and realistic about the considerable record of past U.S. electoral meddling, and the contrast between Russia and the United States in this domain is certainly not black and white. Yet neither is it one of **indistinguishable shades of gray**. The United States is simply not engaging in electoral meddling in a manner comparable to Russia’s approach.

THE PAST IS NOT THE PRESENT

**Two key flaws** underlie relativist accounts. First, such a position fails to distinguish adequately between the pattern of U.S. interventionism during the Cold War, on the one hand, and U.S. activity since the end of the Cold War on the other. During the former period, the **U**nited **S**tates did indeed illegitimately intervene in numerous foreign elections, trying to tilt outcomes in favor of candidates the United States preferred and in a smaller number of cases laboring to oust legitimately elected leaders Washington saw as hostile to its security and economic interests. The record is long and dark, marked by some especially well-known cases in Guatemala and Iran in the early 1950s and in Chile and Nicaragua in the 1970s and 1980s.

Since the end of the Cold War, however, such interventionism has **decreased significantly** because U.S. policymakers no longer view the world as enmeshed in a **global ideological struggle** in which every country, no matter how small, is a critical piece on a larger **strategic chessboard**. Washington has thus become much less concerned about the outcomes of most foreign elections and much less engaged in trying to tilt them in any particular direction.

Of course, one can identify a few cases over the past 25 years when the United States has tried to manipulate foreign elections with the aim of getting its preferred candidate into power. When Russian President Boris Yeltsin faced reelection in 1996, the Clinton administration mobilized some economic relief to Yeltsin, to try to help him win. In the Palestinian elections of 2006, the George W. Bush administration employed U.S. economic assistance to try to bolster Fatah in its contest with Hamas (with predictably counterproductive results). In the lead up to the 2005 Iraqi elections, the Bush administration formulated a plan to funnel covert funds to favored Iraqi candidates and parties but reportedly backed away from the plan after Congress objected. In 2009, according to former Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ memoir, the United States worked behind the scenes prior to the Afghanistan elections to push President Hamid Karzai aside and keep him from winning.

There have no doubt been other cases, known only to those with access to classified information. Yet **on the whole**, U.S. electoral meddling has **decreased significantly** since the Cold War years. This is true because of the change in U.S. **interests** and because of an **evolution of norms** in many parts of the U.S. policy establishment about the acceptability of such actions. The overall picture today is of a Russia actively expanding its covert electoral meddling in multiple regions as U.S. meddling **continues to decline.** Those convinced that Washington must still routinely use covert means to influence election outcomes all around the world should consider the available evidence: in the last few years the rising pattern of Russian efforts to **manipulate the political life** of countries in central **Europe**, western Europe, the Balkans, the **U**nited **S**tates, and **Latin America** has left many telltale **fingerprints**—it seems highly unlikely Washington could have carried out a **similar pattern** of activities and not leave behind at least **some noticeable traces** of them.

WHAT ABOUT ALL THAT DEMOCRACY PROMOTION?

A second problematic element of the relativist position is the charge that U.S. efforts to **promote democracy** abroad—which make use of diplomatic leverage, democracy aid, and cooperation with pro-democratic multilateral organizations—are just another, more **covert form** of electoral meddling akin to what the Russians are doing. Russian President Vladimir **Putin** is a **strong subscriber to this viewpoint**, convinced that U.S. and other Western democracy programs in his country represent efforts to manipulate its domestic political life against him. Many Western observers—acutely aware of the long record of U.S. interventionism—have their suspicions as well.

U.S. pro-democracy diplomacy and assistance do indeed seek to shape the political direction of other countries. And they are carried out with a strong sense of self-interest, not out of unalloyed idealism. They are driven by the belief that democratic outcomes abroad will generally be favorable to U.S. security and economic interests by producing stable governments amenable to deeper partnerships thanks to shared political values. But unlike Russian electoral meddling, U.S. democracy promotion does not seek to **exacerbate** sociopolitical **divisions**, systematically spread **lies**, favor **particular candidates**, or undercut the technical **integrity of elections**. On the whole, it seeks to help citizens exercise their basic **political** and **civil rights** in electoral processes, enhance the technical integrity of such processes, and increase electoral transparency.

**Skeptics** reluctant to accept the idea that democracy diplomacy and assistance are not about manipulating elections should look at some **recent cases**—such as U.S. efforts to support **Tunisia**’s democratic evolution, to help **Gambia** resolve the blockage that followed its 2016 elections, to encourage the **Hungarian** government to respect media freedom and civic space, and to push the **Myanmar military** at the start of this decade to make room for at least some **democratic political life** in the country.

Skeptics should also note that although the U.S. organizations **engaged in democracy** work are mostly funded by the U.S. government itself, they are **regularly at odds** with the preferences of U.S. **diplomats**, who often hold on to relationships with **friendly autocrats**, as they are wary of the strategic value of democratic change. In the mid-1990s, this was true in **Indonesia** under former President **Suharto** and in **Kazakhstan** under President Nursultan **Nazarbayev**. And in the first decade of this century, the same occurred in **Egypt** under former President Hosni Mubarak and in **Azerbaijan** under the **Aliyev** family. Skeptics should also bear in mind that in most cases where the **U**nited **S**tates is engaged in promoting democracy abroad, it is working alongside and sometimes in active partnership with other democracies not known for geopolitical **interventionism**, such as Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden.

GRAY AREAS Although the overall case is strong for distinguishing U.S. democracy support abroad from the sort of political meddling that Russia is now making a habit of, there are several difficult issues that necessarily complicate the comparison. First, in a small but important number of cases, the United States does assist one side of a contested electoral campaign against the other. This occurs when a strongman leader of doubtful democratic fidelity is trying to legitimate himself and perpetuate his rule through elections. In various such cases, as with Chilean President Augusto Pinochet’s plebiscite in 1988, Slobodan Milosevic’s reelection campaign in 2000, and various Belarusian elections in the 2000s, the United States and a number of other Western actors offered assistance both to the opposition political forces challenging the strongman and to civic groups that were mobilizing get-out-the-vote campaigns. From the Western point of view, such actions are not interfering in a free and fair election but rather trying to help level the playing field in an election that is stacked unfairly against the challengers. From the point of view of the power holders, of course, the United States and its allies are trying to shape the outcome of the election in a partisan fashion. Second, although U.S. and other Western assistance to civil society aims to aid civic actors in their advocacy of rights and democracy—not to take sides in partisan political struggles and campaigns—the line between political society and civil society is often blurry. What to Western providers are principled civic actors working to advance universally valid political and civil rights and democratic values such as transparency and accountability, are to local authorities political animals cloaked in civic garb challenging their hold on power. This is especially true in partially or fully closed political environments such as exist in Cambodia and Venezuela, where regimes have choked off the opposition and demonstrated an ability to undermine elections. Third, despite the fact that most U.S. and Western democracy promotion is carried out in a transparent manner, some aid providers are becoming less transparent in their assistance in order to protect their recipients from being harassed or persecuted. As a result, a growing number of regimes have accused the West of engaging in clandestine political meddling. This scenario creates a vicious cycle in which undemocratic regimes charge democracy promoters of secretive meddling and persecute those they work with, thus driving such organizations to adopt less transparent methods. This in turn further reinforces the perception of secretive meddling. U.S. democracy assistance directed at Iran, for example, has become much less transparent over the past ten years as crackdowns by the Iranian government on recipients of foreign assistance have intensified. Fourth, U.S. democracy policy is markedly inconsistent, even though U.S. efforts to promote democracy in other countries are generally driven by genuine pro-democracy motives. The U.S. government makes more funds available for democracy programs in countries that the United States views as strategic enemies, such as Iran and Cuba, than it does in nondemocratic countries the United States views as strategic partners, such as Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia. The inconsistency is not absolute. Washington does make some efforts to promote democracy and rights in states ruled by “friendly tyrants.” The Trump administration’s decision last year to withhold some U.S. assistance to Egypt as a means of expressing dissatisfaction with President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s antidemocratic policies is just one example. And the fact that one is inconsistent in applying the principle does not render meaningless the applications that are made. Nevertheless, the inconsistency hurts the larger case that democracy promotion has real roots in principle.

DIVERGENT PATHS

It is not yet clear what it will take for the **U**nited **S**tates to move forward in putting together an **effective response** to **Russian electoral meddling**, but dispensing with the argument that Washington has **no moral standing for objecting** to such actions is certainly **one necessary step**. The arguments over “whataboutism” merit some careful reflection and assessment given that the facts are not simple and not all the facts are available. The **U**nited **S**tates does have a past record of electoral meddling, particularly during the Cold War. Yet the trends of U.S. and Russian behavior are **divergent**, not convergent—with Russia on the **negative side of the divide**. And although the domain of U.S. democracy promotion is hardly free of flaws and serious past mistakes, it is not the **dark twin** of the illicit, covert election meddling that Russia seems intent on making one of its **defining signatures abroad**.

### 1AR --- AT: Infinite Interventions

#### No backup for infinite intervention—the plan solves those

Beckley 15 (Michael Beckley is a research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs., “The Myth of Entangling Alliances Michael Beckley Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts”, <http://live.belfercenter.org/files/IS3904_pp007-048.pdf> ) TDI

Despite this deep policy interest in entanglement, however, there are few rigorous studies on the subject. Most studies on alliances examine issues only partially related to entanglement, such as the design of alliance agreements,15 the reliability of allies in wartime,16 the causes of alliance formation,17 and the effect of alliances on the likelihood of international conflict.18 The few studies that focus on entanglement engage primarily in theory building, rather than theory testing, and analyze, at most, a handful of cases.19 As a result, scholars’ hunches about the security risks of the United States’ alliances remain largely just that—hunches.

To address this shortcoming, this article tests two competing perspectives on entanglement. The first, which I call “entanglement theory,” holds that alliances drag states into wars by placing their reputations at risk, socializing their leaders into adopting allied interests and norms, and provoking adversaries and emboldening allies.20 The other perspective, which I call “freedom of action theory,” maintains that great powers can avoid entanglement by inserting loopholes into alliance agreements, sidestepping costly commitments, main taining a diversified alliance portfolio that generates offsetting demands from different allies, and using explicit alliance commitments to deter adversaries and dissuade allies from initiating or escalating conflicts.21

I test these competing perspectives by analyzing the extent of U.S. entanglement in all postwar U.S. military conflicts. Specifically, I examine every militarized interstate dispute (MID) in which the United States participated from 1948, the year it signed its first standing alliance, to 2010 and ask a basic question: To what extent was U.S. involvement driven by formal alliance commitments?

Admittedly, this is a limited ambition, as I evaluate only the frequency of past cases of U.S. entanglement, not the current level of U.S. entanglement risk. Moreover, I do not account for other potential costs of maintaining alliances, such as higher levels of military spending or poorer diplomatic relations with non-allied countries. Nevertheless, entanglement is arguably the most important cost of alliances, and providing a systematic account of past cases is an important step in gauging the United States’ current level of entanglement risk.

The results of this analysis strongly support freedom of action theory. Over a sixty-two-year period in which the United States maintained more than sixty alliances, I find only five ostensible episodes of U.S. entanglement—the 1954 and 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crises, the Vietnam War, and the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s. Even these cases are far from clear-cut, because in each there were other important drivers of U.S. involvement; U.S. policymakers carefully limited support for allies; allies restrained the United States from escalating its involvement; the United States deterred adversaries and allies from escalating the conflict; or all of the above.

To be sure, the United States has intervened on the side of allies on numerous occasions. In most cases, however, U.S. actions were driven by an alignment of interests between the United States and its allies, not by alliance obligations. In fact, in many cases, U.S. policymakers were the main advocates of military action and cajoled reluctant allies to join the fight.

In addition, there are many cases in which alliances restrained the United States, or in which the United States restrained its allies or sidestepped costly commitments. I examine only cases of military conflict and therefore cannot evaluate fully the prevalence of such cases of nonconflict. Even within my biased sample, however, there are at least four cases in which alliances prevented U.S. escalation, and another seven cases in which the United States reneged on security commitments, restrained an ally from attacking a third party, or both.

At worst, therefore, alliances have had a mixed effect on U.S. involvement in military conflicts—some alliances at some times have encouraged U.S. military involvement; others have discouraged it; and some have simply been ignored by U.S. policymakers. The only way to build a powerful case for entanglement theory is to commit serious methodological errors. For example, one could spin correlation as causation by characterizing cases in which the United States backed allies for self-interested reasons as cases of entanglement. One also could select on the dependent variable by highlighting evidence of entanglement while ignoring instances in which the United States shirked alliance commitments or in which alliances restrained the United States or prevented conflicts from breaking out in the first place. Such practices are common in the existing literature, but they are flawed and feed an exaggerated fear of entangling alliances in American society.

### 1AR --- Permutation

#### Criticism of military strategy has a necessary political purpose

Simon Dalby, Professor of Geography, Environmental Studies and Political Economy at Carleton University in Ottawa, 10 [“Recontextualising violence, power and nature: The next twenty years of critical geopolitics?” *Political Geography*, Vol. 29, Issue 5, June 2010, p. 280-288) TDI

The first(?) twenty years

In the two decades since critical geopolitics first emerged, as the moniker for the writings of a loose assemblage of political geographers concerned to challenge the taken for granted geographical specifications of politics on the large scale, much has been written on the theme. The number of contributors to the discussion has increased greatly as has the variety of intellectual tasks undertaken. The theoretical resources available to be brought to bear on political matters in the discipline have expanded dramatically too with the turn to social theory and the extension into feminism, popular culture, and most recently, affect and emotional geographies (Ingram and Dodds, 2009, Pain, 2009 and Pain and Smith, 2008). The themes under the rubric critical geopolitics continue to appear in the disciplinary journals and elsewhere; critical geopolitics is clearly flourishing even if there is nothing close to a consensus on what the term designates or how these matters are to be studied. It may now only be, as Ó Tuathail (in press) suggests, a convenient fiction; in Mamadouh's (in press) phrasing, it certainly has an identity problem.

The geopolitical circumstances have also changed in the last two decades (Dalby, 2008a). In the aftermath of the cold war first, and more recently in the aftermath of the events still simply called 9/11, the political world is no longer divided into geopolitical blocs in the sense understood from the late 1940s until the late 1980s. War has apparently morphed into something “new” and the geographies of violence are now apparently very different as human insecurities spill over traditional boundaries. Yet, as Gregory (2004) has so eloquently shown, drawing on Edward Said's work (Said, 1978), the Orientalist concerns with imperial visions and the imaginative geographies at the heart of contemporary architectures of enmity have reappeared again in contemporary Western narratives about the Middle East in particular.

Through the early days of “critical geopolitics” a tension between scholarly practices and political commitments was obvious. The initial provocation implicit in the term critical geopolitics is now in danger of proliferating to such an extent that the term simply becomes a synonym for contemporary political geography. Challenging the mappings of danger used to legitimate political power remains a scholarly task worth doing just as it was in the 1990s (Campbell, 1998); whatever else might now fly under the label “critical geopolitics” the argument in this paper asserts that, if it is to have any coherence within the discipline, it is still about trying to challenge militarist mappings of global space and to help render Yves Lacoste's much cited statement “La Géographie, ça sert, d'abord, à faire la guerre” no longer the case.

However, as the texts and analyses have proliferated in recent years, the focus on critique, deconstruction and strategic discourses, summarised in the epigraph from Gerard Toal's key book above, has been diluted and stretched as the label “critical geopolitics” has been applied to numerous matters of war, politics, culture, representation, identity, economy, resources, resistance, gender, development, fear, emotional geographies and related matters. In the process the function of critical geopolitics specifically as critique of the geographical discourses used in legitimizing violence, foreign policy and military strategy, whether in the formal texts, or the more practical and popular forms that Hewitt (1983) highlights above, frequently gets lost. The proliferation of scholarly research on numerous things loosely related to identity, war, militarisation and fear attests to a healthy disciplinary concern with many pressing human priorities, but, as the intense discussion of all this at the University of Durham conference on “Critical Geopolitics at 20” in September 2008 attests, how all of this might be understood specifically as critical geopolitics, isn't necessarily clear. In light of this discussion the rest of this paper offers a series of reflections on the debate loosely clustered around three themes.

First, pondering the scope of the term critical geopolitics the paper looks back briefly over twenty years of scholarship reflecting on the shifting agendas of critical geopolitics. Key to the argument is the simple but unavoidable point that critical geopolitics is about challenging how contexts are constructed to justify violence. But, with the recent revival of concerns with war and peace across the discipline recently, it is now useful to be more precise about the scope and purpose of critique applied to geopolitics specifically, if not to militarism and war generally. This coupled to Sparke, 2005 and Sparke, 2007 problematization of geography, and his suggestions that post-foundational themes are key to ethical scholarship, an argument that builds in part on the earlier insights of the critical geopolitics literature, implies that most of the discipline should have a similar critical ethos. This is especially clear in discussions of war and non-violence. Specifying a distinct sub field of critical geopolitics, and putting it in the context of both the discipline and the larger changing context of global politics is ever more difficult it seems, but the reasons for critique remain compelling even as social science agendas change.

Second, following on from this point, and from Jones and Sage's (in press) discussion, self-reflection on our own identities as academic geographers, the practical matters we turn our scholarly attention to, and the wider audiences beyond the discipline we seek to address, all need attention. Where geopolitics happens, and who participates in its practices is not necessarily as self evident as it might seem. Militarization and the proliferation of security discourses since 9/11 has made many daily practices within state bureaucracies and elsewhere part of geopolitics. But to focus only on these practices is always in danger of diverting attention from military matters, grand strategy and the geographies of resistence from peripheral places in what is now frequently called assymetric warfare. Focusing on the geography of such violence could greatly facilitate dialogue with critical security studies in particular and larger academic debates about war and strategy more generally.

Finally, thinking about the future, and what critique might have to offer, this paper suggests that the links between global environmental change and security now offer a framework that links the discipline's traditional concerns with nature much more directly to the “spatial” tradition which has been the focus in most of the critical geopolitics literature. Here critical work on environment and development links to the future tasks of critical geopolitics, a synthesis that is much more pressingly urgent now, than when the environmental security discussion appeared in the early 1990s (Dalby, 1992 and Detratz and Betsill, 2009). But in so far as these things are now articulated in the terms of climate security, or the security threats from migrations and weather events, these too often reprise earlier Malthusian discourses of imperial administration. Now, however these explicitly connect violence to the key issues of which societies threaten what where, and how such threats are once again represented in geopolitical tropes in the Anthropocene.

Critique in context

The initial editorial formulations of the co-edited publications on critical geopolitics in the 1990s (Dalby and Ó Tuathail, 1996, Ó Tuathail and Dalby, 1998 and Ó Tuathail and Dalby, 1994) deliberately tried to encourage political and methodological pluralism to open up new ways of thinking about the geo in politics and the politics of geography. From the beginning there were concerns about disrupting the hegemonic practices of statecraft, challenging the taken for granted specifications of the world in various mappings by elites and by academics (Dalby, 1990 and Ó Tuathail, 1986; Ó Tuathail & Agnew, 1992). The political purpose of all this was initially a challenge to American power and the military use of it in the cold war. The identities mobilised in that struggle were a key focus for analysis (Sharp, 2000). But critical geopolitics also looked to the geographical knowledges invoked in how places were specified as having certain characteristics either making them amenable to certain modes of governance, or in some cases “requiring” certain of modes of conduct, in such places as Antarctica (Dodds, 1997).

After the cold war critical geopolitics flourished in the 1990s when the geopolitical divides were fluid and the binary logics of nuclear strategy and fears of a “central war” were no longer so obviously relevant to many situations. The metropolitan debates about global security shifted the focus of danger from the Soviet Union to matters of development and insecurity in the fringes of the global political economy. New insecurities were posited as dangerous and discourses of wild zones and failed states intruded on the discussions of security in many policy-making bureaucracies (O'Tuathail & Luke, 1994). These formulations were suddenly very much more urgent on September 12th 2001. Mapping dangerous places once again got the attention of military cartographers. Now these places were known through satellite surveillance systems and coded with GIS coordinates which all too easily turn into target sets just as soon as social relations are rendered a matter of war (Galgano, 2006). The whole planet is potentially a battlefield in the “global” war on terror, and hence a target set as Gregory (2006a) and Graham, 2004, Graham, 2010a and Graham, 2010b in particular have repeatedly reminded us of late.

Simultaneously critical geopolitics proliferated into discussions of Iraq and Bosnia (Ó Tuathail, 2003 and Ó Tuathail, 2005), cultures and the identities constructed in the discourses of geopolitics (Dittmer, 2005, Hannah, 2006 and Sharp, 2000), the historical dimension of geopolitical traditions (Dodds & Atkinson, 2000), into movie criticism (Dodds, 2003 and Power and Crampton, 2007), and crucially into how gender matters in all these things (Hyndman, 2001 and Hyndman, 2004). The recent appearance once again of geographical publications relating to war and militarism (Cowen and Gilbert, 2008, Flint, 2005, Graham, 2004, Gregory and Pred, 2007, Kobayashi, 2009 and Woodward, 2004) raises questions about the specificity of critical geopolitics in this larger scholarship. Of late Agnew, 2003 and Agnew, 2009a work in particular might be understood to be critical geopolitics but he doesn't usually situate his work as such. Recently he has also noted that there are various precursors to the literature of the last two decades, which with the benefit of hindsight might now too be termed critical geopolitics (Agnew, 2009b)! Using critical geopolitics as a label to encompass so many things has, it seems, in the last few years, lead to a distracting dilution of its original purpose concerning the writing of global space, and a lack of clarity as to how to proceed.

The debate about in what sense all this is “critical” loosely parallels debates within the wider geography discipline (Blomley, 2007) as well as in larger intellectual discussions concerning the place of the academy in a globalised neo-liberal world in light of contemporary social theory which explicitly problematizes foundations. This is especially interesting given that the larger discussions of critical geographies often simply ignore the geopolitics altogether (see Bauder & Engel-Di Mauro, 2008). How all this contributes to geography for peace rather than for war (Kobayashi, 2009 and O'Loughlin and Heske, 1991), is, well, complicated.

From very different perspectives Megoran (2008) and Kelly (2006) have posed pointed questions about critical geopolitics' ethico-political purpose in general and more specifically the questions of non-violence and possibilities of emancipation. The newer literature has also pointedly raised the issue of the scholarly limitations that come with a narrow focus on foreign policy discourse, and likewise raised the questions of the connections between critique and political activism (Koopman, 2008). Now too the geopolitical gaze in Western capitals has once again turned its attention to matters of environment and discussions of the security implications of environmental disruptions, and climate change in particular (Busby, 2008). The human costs of disruption, and the possible political dislocations of mass migration and other coming disruptions are on the agenda posing new agendas of danger, and mappings of fear that are worthy of the attention of a new generation of geographers. The links between geopolitics and human insecurity, traced by feminist analysts of the violence written on women's bodies (Hyndman, 2001 and Hyndman, 2004), are now directly linked to the issues of borders and migration and the possibilities of escape in the face of imminent danger (Franke, 2009).

This focus on how geopolitics plays out in particular places links to Thrift's (2000) frequently cited argument that critical geopolitics leaves out “the little things”. Thrift had two criticisms of critical geopolitics. First, critical geopolitics is apparently mesmerized by texts to the exclusion of the sociology of power. Which leads to the second apparent problem – the failure of critical geopolitics to deal with matters of embodiment and the actual functions of the clerks and secretaries, the functionaries of foreign ministries and defence departments who actually make foreign and military agencies operate. In suggesting that texts are merely texts, rather than discourses embedded in the practices of security with all their multitudinous representations of places as sources of threats requiring military action and practices of security, Thrift misrepresents the purpose of the critique. Thrift wants critical geopolitics to do all sorts of things, but not it seems, engage in the critique of the reasoning practices of intellectuals of statecraft, whether in terms of formal geopolitical reasoning, or the more practical versions in media and political discourse.

In diverting attention from the political purpose of critique to the practical lived experiences of people in bureacracies and the non-representational aspects of text and identity production, Thrift also facilitiates the traditional modes of doing geography, field work, ethnography, interviews and giving voice to many who are not usually heard. But in doing so the engagement with the rationalisations of military power and the practices of mapping that legitimize military action, are abandoned. This may be an engagement with geopolitics very loosely understood, but it is not the “tactical” form of knowledge that challenges and deconstructs the imperial justifications of violence that Gerard Toal discusses in the epigraph to this paper. While Thrift (2000) may have no interest in tackling the conceptual infrastructure of military violence, in abandoning this critical edge his suggested agenda eviscerates the political purpose of critical geopolitics precisely as Macdonald (in press) suggests by leaving out the “big things”.

#### Withdrawal from the region must be included in any strategy to rein in U.S. violence

David VINE, associate professor of anthropology at American University in Washington, D.C, 14 [“Tomgram: David Vine, A Permanent Infrastructure for Permanent War,” *TomDispatch.com*, November 13, 2014, http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175922/tomgram%3A\_david\_vine,\_a\_permanent\_infrastructure\_for\_permanent\_war/] TDI

With the launch of a new U.S.-led war in Iraq and Syria against the Islamic State (IS), the United States has engaged in aggressive military action in at least 13 countries in the Greater Middle East since 1980. In that time, every American president has invaded, occupied, bombed, or gone to war in at least one country in the region. The total number of invasions, occupations, bombing operations, drone assassination campaigns, and cruise missile attacks easily runs into the dozens.

As in prior military operations in the Greater Middle East, U.S. forces fighting IS have been aided by access to and the use of an unprecedented collection of military bases. They occupy a region sitting atop the world’s largest concentration of oil and natural gas reserves and has long been considered the most geopolitically important place on the planet. Indeed, since 1980, the U.S. military has gradually garrisoned the Greater Middle East in a fashion only rivaled by the Cold War garrisoning of Western Europe or, in terms of concentration, by the bases built to wage past wars in Korea and Vietnam.

In the Persian Gulf alone, the U.S. has major bases in every country save Iran. There is an increasingly important, increasingly large base in Djibouti, just miles across the Red Sea from the Arabian Peninsula. There are bases in Pakistan on one end of the region and in the Balkans on the other, as well as on the strategically located Indian Ocean islands of Diego Garcia and the Seychelles. In Afghanistan and Iraq, there were once as many as 800 and 505 bases, respectively. Recently, the Obama administration inked an agreement with new Afghan President Ashraf Ghani to maintain around 10,000 troops and at least nine major bases in his country beyond the official end of combat operations later this year. U.S. forces, which never fully departed Iraq after 2011, are now returning to a growing number of bases there in ever larger numbers.

In short, there is almost no way to overemphasize how thoroughly the U.S. military now covers the region with bases and troops. This infrastructure of war has been in place for so long and is so taken for granted that Americans rarely think about it and journalists almost never report on the subject. Members of Congress spend billions of dollars on base construction and maintenance every year in the region, but ask few questions about where the money is going, why there are so many bases, and what role they really serve. By one estimate, the United States has spent $10 trillion protecting Persian Gulf oil supplies over the past four decades.

Approaching its 35th anniversary, the strategy of maintaining such a structure of garrisons, troops, planes, and ships in the Middle East has been one of the great disasters in the history of American foreign policy. The rapid disappearance of debate about our newest, possibly illegal war should remind us of just how easy this huge infrastructure of bases has made it for anyone in the Oval Office to launch a war that seems guaranteed, like its predecessors, to set off new cycles of blowback and yet more war.

On their own, the existence of these bases has helped generate radicalism and anti-American sentiment. As was famously the case with Osama bin Laden and U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, bases have fueled militancy, as well as attacks on the United States and its citizens. They have cost taxpayers billions of dollars, even though they are not, in fact, necessary to ensure the free flow of oil globally. They have diverted tax dollars from the possible development of alternative energy sources and meeting other critical domestic needs. And they have supported dictators and repressive, undemocratic regimes, helping to block the spread of democracy in a region long controlled by colonial rulers and autocrats.

After 35 years of base-building in the region, it’s long past time to look carefully at the effects Washington’s garrisoning of the Greater Middle East has had on the region, the U.S., and the world.

“Vast Oil Reserves”

While the Middle Eastern base buildup began in earnest in 1980, Washington had long attempted to use military force to control this swath of resource-rich Eurasia and, with it, the global economy. Since World War II, as the late Chalmers Johnson, an expert on U.S. basing strategy, explained back in 2004, “the United States has been inexorably acquiring permanent military enclaves whose sole purpose appears to be the domination of one of the most strategically important areas of the world.”

In 1945, after Germany’s defeat, the secretaries of War, State, and the Navy tellingly pushed for the completion of a partially built base in Dharan, Saudi Arabia, despite the military’s determination that it was unnecessary for the war against Japan. “Immediate construction of this [air] field,” they argued, “would be a strong showing of American interest in Saudi Arabia and thus tend to strengthen the political integrity of that country where vast oil reserves now are in American hands.”

By 1949, the Pentagon had established a small, permanent Middle East naval force (MIDEASTFOR) in Bahrain. In the early 1960s, President John F. Kennedy’s administration began the first buildup of naval forces in the Indian Ocean just off the Persian Gulf. Within a decade, the Navy had created the foundations for what would become the first major U.S. base in the region -- on the British-controlled island of Diego Garcia.

In these early Cold War years, though, Washington generally sought to increase its influence in the Middle East by backing and arming regional powers like the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Iran under the Shah, and Israel. However, within months of the Soviet Union’s 1979 invasion of Afghanistan and Iran’s 1979 revolution overthrowing the Shah, this relatively hands-off approach was no more.

Base Buildup

In January 1980, President Jimmy Carter announced a fateful transformation of U.S. policy. It would become known as the Carter Doctrine. In his State of the Union address, he warned of the potential loss of a region “containing more than two-thirds of the world’s exportable oil” and “now threatened by Soviet troops” in Afghanistan who posed “a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil.”

Carter warned that “an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America.” And he added pointedly, “Such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”

With these words, Carter launched one of the greatest base construction efforts in history. He and his successor Ronald Reagan presided over the expansion of bases in Egypt, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and other countries in the region to host a “Rapid Deployment Force,” which was to stand permanent guard over Middle Eastern petroleum supplies. The air and naval base on Diego Garcia, in particular, was expanded at a quicker rate than any base since the war in Vietnam. By 1986, more than $500 million had been invested. Before long, the total ran into the billions.

Soon enough, that Rapid Deployment Force grew into the U.S. Central Command, which has now overseen three wars in Iraq (1991-2003, 2003-2011, 2014-); the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan (2001-); intervention in Lebanon (1982-1984); a series of smaller-scale attacks on Libya (1981, 1986, 1989, 2011); Afghanistan (1998) and Sudan (1998); and the "tanker war" with Iran (1987-1988), which led to the accidental downing of an Iranian civilian airliner, killing 290 passengers. Meanwhile, in Afghanistan during the 1980s, the CIA helped fund and orchestrate a major covert war against the Soviet Union by backing Osama Bin Laden and other extremist mujahidin. The command has also played a role in the drone war in Yemen (2002-) and both overt and covert warfare in Somalia (1992-1994, 2001-).

During and after the first Gulf War of 1991, the Pentagon dramatically expanded its presence in the region. Hundreds of thousands of troops were deployed to Saudi Arabia in preparation for the war against Iraqi autocrat and former ally Saddam Hussein. In that war’s aftermath, thousands of troops and a significantly expanded base infrastructure were left in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Elsewhere in the Gulf, the military expanded its naval presence at a former British base in Bahrain, housing its Fifth Fleet there. Major air power installations were built in Qatar, and U.S. operations were expanded in Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman.

The invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and of Iraq in 2003, and the subsequent occupations of both countries, led to a more dramatic expansion of bases in the region. By the height of the wars, there were well over 1,000 U.S. checkpoints, outposts, and major bases in the two countries alone. The military also built new bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (since closed), explored the possibility of doing so in Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, and, at the very least, continues to use several Central Asian countries as logistical pipelines to supply troops in Afghanistan and orchestrate the current partial withdrawal.

While the Obama administration failed to keep 58 “enduring” bases in Iraq after the 2011 U.S. withdrawal, it has signed an agreement with Afghanistan permitting U.S. troops to stay in the country until 2024 and maintain access to Bagram Air Base and at least eight more major installations.

An Infrastructure for War

Even without a large permanent infrastructure of bases in Iraq, the U.S. military has had plenty of options when it comes to waging its new war against IS. In that country alone, a significant U.S. presence remained after the 2011 withdrawal in the form of base-like State Department installations, as well as the largest embassy on the planet in Baghdad, and a large contingent of private military contractors. Since the start of the new war, at least 1,600 troops have returned and are operating from a Joint Operations Center in Baghdad and a base in Iraqi Kurdistan’s capital, Erbil. Last week, the White House announced that it would request $5.6 billion from Congress to send an additional 1,500 advisers and other personnel to at least two new bases in Baghdad and Anbar Province. Special operations and other forces are almost certainly operating from yet more undisclosed locations.

At least as important are major installations like the Combined Air Operations Center at Qatar’s al-Udeid Air Base. Before 2003, the Central Command’s air operations center for the entire Middle East was in Saudi Arabia. That year, the Pentagon moved the center to Qatar and officially withdrew combat forces from Saudi Arabia. That was in response to the 1996 bombing of the military’s Khobar Towers complex in the kingdom, other al-Qaeda attacks in the region, and mounting anger exploited by al-Qaeda over the presence of non-Muslim troops in the Muslim holy land. Al-Udeid now hosts a 15,000-foot runway, large munitions stocks, and around 9,000 troops and contractors who are coordinating much of the new war in Iraq and Syria.

Kuwait has been an equally important hub for Washington’s operations since U.S. troops occupied the country during the first Gulf War. Kuwait served as the main staging area and logistical center for ground troops in the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq. There are still an estimated 15,000 troops in Kuwait, and the U.S. military is reportedly bombing Islamic State positions using aircraft from Kuwait’s Ali al-Salem Air Base.

As a transparently promotional article in the Washington Post confirmed this week, al-Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates has launched more attack aircraft in the present bombing campaign than any other base in the region. That country hosts about 3,500 troops at al-Dhafra alone, as well as the Navy's busiest overseas port. B-1, B-2, and B-52 long-range bombers stationed on Diego Garcia helped launch both Gulf Wars and the war in Afghanistan. That island base is likely playing a role in the new war as well. Near the Iraqi border, around 1,000 U.S. troops and F-16 fighter jets are operating from at least one Jordanian base. According to the Pentagon’s latest count, the U.S. military has 17 bases in Turkey. While the Turkish government has placed restrictions on their use, at the very least some are being used to launch surveillance drones over Syria and Iraq. Up to seven bases in Oman may also be in use.

Bahrain is now the headquarters for the Navy’s entire Middle Eastern operations, including the Fifth Fleet, generally assigned to ensure the free flow of oil and other resources though the Persian Gulf and surrounding waterways. There is always at least one aircraft carrier strike group -- effectively, a massive floating base -- in the Persian Gulf. At the moment, the U.S.S. Carl Vinson is stationed there, a critical launch pad for the air campaign against the Islamic State. Other naval vessels operating in the Gulf and the Red Sea have launched cruise missiles into Iraq and Syria. The Navy even has access to an “afloat forward-staging base” that serves as a “lilypad” base for helicopters and patrol craft in the region.

In Israel, there are as many as six secret U.S. bases that can be used to preposition weaponry and equipment for quick use anywhere in the area. There’s also a “de facto U.S. base” for the Navy’s Mediterranean fleet. And it’s suspected that there are two other secretive sites in use as well. In Egypt, U.S. troops have maintained at least two installations and occupied at least two bases on the Sinai Peninsula since 1982 as part of a Camp David Accords peacekeeping operation.

Elsewhere in the region, the military has established a collection of at least five drone bases in Pakistan; expanded a critical base in Djibouti at the strategic chokepoint between the Suez Canal and the Indian Ocean; created or gained access to bases in Ethiopia, Kenya, and the Seychelles; and set up new bases in Bulgaria and Romania to go with a Clinton administration-era base in Kosovo along the western edge of the gas-rich Black Sea.

Even in Saudi Arabia, despite the public withdrawal, a small U.S. military contingent has remained to train Saudi personnel and keep bases “warm” as potential backups for unexpected conflagrations in the region or, assumedly, in the kingdom itself. In recent years, the military has even established a secret drone base in the country, despite the blowback Washington has experienced from its previous Saudi basing ventures.

Dictators, Death, and Disaster

The ongoing U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia, however modest, should remind us of the dangers of maintaining bases in the region. The garrisoning of the Muslim holy land was a major recruiting tool for al-Qaeda and part of Osama bin Laden’s professed motivation for the 9/11 attacks. (He called the presence of U.S. troops, “the greatest of these aggressions incurred by the Muslims since the death of the prophet.”) Indeed, U.S. bases and troops in the Middle East have been a “major catalyst for anti-Americanism and radicalization” since a suicide bombing killed 241 marines in Lebanon in 1983. Other attacks have come in Saudi Arabia in 1996, Yemen in 2000 against the U.S.S. Cole, and during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Research has shown a strong correlation between a U.S. basing presence and al-Qaeda recruitment.

Part of the anti-American anger has stemmed from the support U.S. bases offer to repressive, undemocratic regimes. Few of the countries in the Greater Middle East are fully democratic, and some are among the world’s worst human rights abusers. Most notably, the U.S. government has offered only tepid criticism of the Bahraini government as it has violently cracked down on pro-democracy protestors with the help of the Saudis and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Beyond Bahrain, U.S. bases are found in a string of what the Economist Democracy Index calls “authoritarian regimes,” including Afghanistan, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Yemen. Maintaining bases in such countries props up autocrats and other repressive governments, makes the United States complicit in their crimes, and seriously undermines efforts to spread democracy and improve the wellbeing of people around the world.

Of course, using bases to launch wars and other kinds of interventions does much the same, generating anger, antagonism, and anti-American attacks. A recent U.N. report suggests that Washington’s air campaign against the Islamic State had led foreign militants to join the movement on “an unprecedented scale.”

And so the cycle of warfare that started in 1980 is likely to continue. “Even if U.S. and allied forces succeed in routing this militant group,” retired Army colonel and political scientist Andrew Bacevich writes of the Islamic State, “there is little reason to expect” a positive outcome in the region. As Bin Laden and the Afghan mujahidin morphed into al-Qaeda and the Taliban and as former Iraqi Baathists and al-Qaeda followers in Iraq morphed into IS, “there is,” as Bacevich says, “always another Islamic State waiting in the wings.”

The Carter Doctrine’s bases and military buildup strategy and its belief that “the skillful application of U.S. military might” can secure oil supplies and solve the region’s problems was, he adds, “flawed from the outset.” Rather than providing security, the infrastructure of bases in the Greater Middle East has made it ever easier to go to war far from home. It has enabled wars of choice and an interventionist foreign policy that has resulted in repeated disasters for the region, the United States, and the world. Since 2001 alone, U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Yemen have minimally caused hundreds of thousands of deaths and possibly more than one million deaths in Iraq alone.

The sad irony is that any legitimate desire to maintain the free flow of regional oil to the global economy could be sustained through other far less expensive and deadly means. Maintaining scores of bases costing billions of dollars a year is unnecessary to protect oil supplies and ensure regional peace -- especially in an era in which the United States gets only around 10% of its net oil and natural gas from the region. In addition to the direct damage our military spending has caused, it has diverted money and attention from developing the kinds of alternative energy sources that could free the United States and the world from a dependence on Middle Eastern oil -- and from the cycle of war that our military bases have fed.

### 1AR --- Scenario Planning

#### Scenario planning in the context of evaluating existential risks is good.

Tim Stevens 18. Senior Lecturer in Global Security at Kings College London. Millennium: Journal of International Studies. “Exeunt Omnes? Survival, Pessimism and Time in the Work of John H. Herz”. 2018. pp. 283-302. TDI

Herz explicitly combined, therefore, a political realism with an ethical idealism, resulting in what he termed a ‘survival ethic’.65 This was applicable to all humankind and its propagation relied on the generation of what he termed ‘world-consciousness’.66 Herz’s implicit recognition of an open yet linear temporality allowed him to imagine possible futures aligned with the survival ethic, whilst at the same time imagining futures in which humans become extinct. His pessimism about the latter did not preclude working towards the former.

As Herz recognized, it was one thing to develop an ethics of survival but quite another to translate theory into practice. What was required was a collective, transnational and inherently interdisciplinary effort to address nuclear and environmental issues and to problematize notions of security, sustainability and survival in the context of nuclear geopolitics and the technological transformation of society. Herz proposed various practical ways in which young people in particular could become involved in this project. One idea floated in the 1980s, which would alarm many in today’s more cosmopolitan and culturally-sensitive IR, was for a Peace Corps-style ‘peace and development service’, which would ‘crusade’ to provide ‘something beneficial for people living under unspeakably sordid conditions’ in the ‘Third World’.67 He expended most of his energy, however, from the 1980s onwards, in thinking about and formulating ‘a new subdiscipline of the social sciences’, which he called ‘Survival Research’.

68 Informed by the survival ethic outlined above, and within the overarching framework of his realist liberal internationalism, Survival Research emerged as Herz’s solution to the shortcomings of academic research, public education and policy development in the face of global catastrophe.69 It was also Herz’s plea to scholars to venture beyond the ivory tower and become – excusing the gendered language of the time – ‘homme engagé, if not homme révolté’.70 His proposals for Survival Research were far from systematic but they reiterated his life-long concerns with nuclear and environmental issues, and with the necessity to act in the face of threats to human survival. The principal responsibilities of survival researchers were two-fold. One, to raise awareness of survival issues in the minds of policy-makers and the public, and to demonstrate the link between political inaction now and its effect on subsequent human survival. Two, to suggest and shape new attitudes more ‘appropriate to the solution of new and unfamiliar survival problems’, rather than relying on ingrained modes of thought and practice.71 The primary initial purpose, therefore, of Survival Research would be to identify scientific, sociocultural and political problems bearing on the possibilities of survival, and to begin to develop ways of overcoming these. This was, admittedly, non-specific and somewhat vague, but the central thrust of his proposal was clear: ‘In our age of global survival concerns, it should be the primary responsibility of scholars to engage in survival issues’.72 Herz considered IR an essential disciplinary contributor to this endeavour, one that should be promiscuous across the social and natural sciences. It should not be afraid to think the worst, if the worst is at all possible, and to establish the various requirements – social, economic, political – of ‘a livable world’.73 How this long-term project would translate into global policy is not specified but, consistent with his previous work, Herz identified the need for shifts in attitudes to and awareness of global problems and solutions. Only then would it be possible for ‘a turn round that demands leadership to persuade millions to change lifestyles and make the sacrifices needed for survival’.

74 Productive pessimism and temporality

In 1976, shortly before he began compiling the ideas that would become Survival Research, Herz wrote:

For the first time, we are compelled to take the futuristic view if we want to make sure that there will be future generations at all. Acceleration of developments in the decisive areas (demographic, ecological, strategic) has become so strong that even the egotism of après nous le déluge might not work because the déluge may well overtake ourselves, the living.

Of significance here is not the appeal to futurism per se, although this is important, but the suggestion this is ‘the first time’ futurism is necessary to ensuring human survival. This is Herz the realist declaring a break with conventional realism: Herz is not bound to a cyclical vision of political or historical time in which events and processes reoccur over and again. His identification of nuclear weapons as an ‘absolute novum’ in international politics demonstrates this belief in the non-cyclical nature of humankind’s unfolding temporality.76 As Sylvest observes of Herz’s attitude to the nuclear revolution, ‘the horizons of meaning it produced installed a temporal break with the past, and simultaneously carried a promise for the future’.

This ‘promise for the future’ was not, however, a simple liberal view of a better future consonant with human progress. His autobiography is clear that his experiences of Nazism and the Holocaust destroyed all remnants of any original belief in ‘inevitable progress’.78 His frustration at scientism, technocratic deception, and the brutal rationality of twentieth-century killing, all but demanded a rejection of the liberal dream and the inevitability of its consummation. If the ‘new age’ ushered in by nuclear weapons, he wrote, is characterized by anything, it is by its ‘indefiniteness of the age and the uncertainties of the future’; it was impossible under these conditions to draw firm conclusions about the future course of international politics.79 Instead, he recognised the contingency, precarity and fragility of international politics, and the ghastly tensions inherent to the structural core of international politics, the security dilemma.

80 Herz was uneasy with both cyclical and linear-progressive ways of perceiving historical time. The former ‘closed’ temporalities are endemic to versions of realist IR, the latter to post-Enlightenment narratives feeding liberal-utopian visions of international relations and those of Marxism.81 In their own ways, each marginalizes and diminishes the contingency of the social world in and through time, and the agency of political actors in effecting change. Simultaneously, each shapes the futures that may be imagined and brought into being. Herz recognised this danger. Whilst drawing attention to his own gloomy disposition, he warns that without care and attention, ‘the assumption may determine the event’.82 As a pessimist, Herz was alert to the hazard of succumbing to negativity, cynicism or resignation. E.H. Carr recognised this also, in the difference between the ‘deterministic pessimism’ of ‘pure’ realism and those realists ‘who have made their mark on history’; the latter may be pessimists but they still believe ‘human affairs can be directed and modified by human action and human thought’.83 Herz would share this anti-deterministic perspective with Carr. Moreover, the possibility of agency is a product of a temporality ‘neither temporally closed nor deterministic, neither cyclical nor linear-progressive; it is rooted in contingency’.

### 1AR --- Debate Good

#### Only constructive policy debates nurture information literacy necessary for every model of politics – the process of sifting through evidence and subjecting positions to researched scrutiny is essential to managing emerging crises and information overload

Leek 16 [Danielle R. Leek, professor of communications at Grand Valley State University, “Policy debate pedagogy: a complementary strategy for civic and political engagement through service-learning,” Communication Education, 65:4, 399-405] TDI

Through policy debate, students can develop information literacy and learn how to make critical arguments of fact. This experience is politically empowering for students who will also build confidence for political engagement. Information literacy While there are many definitions of information literacy, the term generally is understood to mean that a student is “able to recognize when information is needed , and have the ability to locate, evaluate, and use effectively the information needed” for problem- solving and decision-making (Spitzer, Eisenberg, & Lowe, 1998, p. 19). Information exists in a variety of forms, in visual data, computer graphics, sound-recordings, film, and photographs. Information is also constructed and disseminated through a wide range of sources and mediums. Therefore, “information literacy” functions as a blanket term which covers a wide range of more specific literacies. Critiques of service-learning’s knowl- edge-building power, such as those articulated by Eby (1998) and Colby (2008), are chal- lenging both the emphasis the pedagogy places on information gained through experience and the limited scope of political information students are exposed to in the process. Policy debate can augment a student’s civic and political learning by fostering extended information literacies. Snider and Schnurer (2002) identify policy debate as an especially research intensive form of oral discussion which requires extensive time and commitment to learn the dimensions of a topic. Understanding policy issues calls for contemplating a range of materials, from traditional news media publications to court proceedings, research data, and institutional propaganda. Moreover, the nature of policy debate, which involves public presentation of arguments on two competing sides of a question, motivates students to go beyond basic information to achieve a more advanced level of expertise and credibility on a topic (Dybvig & Iverson, n.d.). This type of work differs from traditional research projects where students gather only the materials needed to support their argument while neglecting contrary evidence. Instead, the “debate research process encourages a kind of holistic approach, where students need to pay attention to the critics of their argument because they will have to respond to those attacks” (Snider & Schnurer, 2002, p. 32). In today’s attention economy, cultivating a sensibility for well- rounded information gathering can also aid students in recognizing when and how the knowledge produced in their social environments can be effectively translated to specific contexts. The “cultural shift in the production of data” which has followed the emergence of Web 2.0 technologies means that all students are likely “prosumers”—that is, they consume, produce, and coproduce information online all at the same time (Scoble, 2011). Coupling service- learning with policy debate calls on students to apply information across registers of public engagement, including their own service efforts and their own public argumentation, in and outside of their debates. Information is used in the service experience, which in turn, informs the use of information in debates, where students then produce new information through their argumentation. The process is what Bruce (2008) refers to “informed learning,” or “using information in order to learn.” When individuals move from learning how to gather materials for a task to a cognitive awareness and understanding of how the information-seeking process shapes their learning, they are engaged in informed learning. Through this process, students can come to recognize that information management and credibility is deeply disciplinary and historically con- textual (Bruce & Hughes, 2010). This understanding, combined with practical experience in locating information, is a critical missing element in contemporary political engage- ment. Over 20 years ago, Graber (1994) argued that one of the biggest obstacles to political engagement was not apathy, but a gap between the way news media presents information during elections, and the type of information voters need and will listen to during electoral campaigns. The challenge extends beyond elections into policy-making, especially as younger generations continue to revise their notions of citizenship away from institutional politics towards more social forms of activism (Bennett, Wells, & Freelon, 2011). For stu- dents to effectively practice more expressive forms of citizenship they need experience managing the breadth of information available about issues they care about. As past research indicates a strong correlation between service-learning experience and the motiv- ation and desire for post-graduation service, it seems likely that students who debate about policy issues related to service areas will continue their informed learning practices after they have left the classroom (Soria & Thomas-Card, 2014). Arguing facts In addition to building information literacies, students who combine policy debate with service-learning can practice “politically relevant skills,” which will help them have confidence for political engagement in the future. As Colby (2008) explains, this confidence should be tempered by tolerance for difference and differing opinions. On the surface, debating about institutional politics might seem counterintuitive to this goal. Politicians and the press have a credibility problem among college-aged students, and this leaves younger generations less inclined to feel obligated to the state or to look to traditional modes of policy- making for social change (Bennett et al., 2011; Manning & Edwards, 2014). This lack of faith in government and media outlets also makes political argument more difficult (Klumpp, 2006). Whereas these institutions once served as authoritative and trustworthy sources of information, the credibility of legislators and journalists has decreased over the last 40 years or so. Today, politicians and pundits are viewed as political actors interested in spectacle, power, and profit rather than truth-seeking or the common good. While some political controversies are rooted in competing values, Klumpp (2006) explains that arguments about policy are more often based in fact. Indeed, when engaged in public arguments over questions of policy, people tend to “invoke the authority of facts to support their positions.” Likewise, “the governmental sphere has developed elaborate legal and deliberative processes in recognition of the power of facts as the basis for a decision.” Yet, while shared values are often quickly agreed upon, differences over fact are more difficult to resolve. Without credible institutions of authority that can disseminate facts, public deliberation requires more time, information-gathering, evaluation, and reasoning. The Bush administration’s decision to take military action in Iraq, for example, was presumably based on the “fact” that Saddam Hussein had acquired weapons of mass destruction. This has now become a classic example of poor policy-making grounded in faulty factual evidence. This shortcoming is precisely why policy debate is a valuable complement to service- learning activities. Not only can students use their developing literacies to better understand social problems, they can also learn to access a broader range of knowledge sources, thereby mitigating the absence of fact-finding from traditional institutions. Fur- thermore, policy advocacy gives students experience testing the reasoning underlying claims of fact. Issues of source credibility, analogic comparisons, and data analysis are three examples of the type of critical thinking skills that students may need to apply in order to engage a question of policy (Allen, Berkowitz, Hunt, & Louden, 1999). While the effect may be to undermine government action in some instances, in others students will gain a better understanding of when and where institutional activities can work to make change. As students gain knowledge about the relationship between institutional structures and the communities they serve, they grow confidence in their ability to engage in future conversations about policy issues. Zwarensteyn’s (2012) research high- lights these sorts of effects in high school students who engage in competitive policy debate. Zwarensteyn theorizes that even minimal increases in technical knowledge about politics can translate to significant increases in a student’s sense of self-efficacy. Many students start off feeling very insecure when it comes to their mastery of insti- tutional politics; policy debate helps overcome that insecurity. Moreover, because training in policy debate encourages students to address issues as arguments rather than partisan positions, it encourages them to engage policy-making without the hostility and incivility that often characterizes today’s political scene. Indeed, it is precisely that perceived hostility and incivility that prompts many young people to avoid politics in the first place. I do not mean to imply that students who debate about their service-learning experi- ences will draw homogenous conclusions about policies. Quite the contrary. Students who engage in service-learning still bring their personal visions and history to bear on their debates. As a result, students will often have very different opinions after engaging in a shared debate experience. More importantly, the practice of debating should operate to particularize students’ knowledge of community partners and clients, working against the destructive generalizations and power dynamics that can result when students feel privileged to serve less fortunate “others.” For civic and political engagement through service-learning to be meaningful and productive, it must do more to challenge students’ concepts of the homogenous “we” who helps “them.” Seligman (2013) argues that this civic spirit can be cultivated through the core pedagogical principle of a “shared practice,” which emphasizes the application of knowledge to purpose (p. 60). Policy debate achieves this outcome by calling on students to consider and reconsider their understanding of themselves, institutions, community, and policy every time the question “should” may arise. As Seligman writes: ... the orientation of thought to purpose (having an explanation rest at a place, a purpose) is of extreme importance. We must recognize that the orientation of thought to purpose is to recognize moving from providing a knowledge of, to providing a knowledge for. This means that in the context of encountering difference it is not sufficient to learn about (have an idea of) the other, rather it means to have ideas for certain joint purposes—for a set of “to-does.” A purpose becomes the goal towards which our explanations should be oriented. (p. 61) Put another way, policy debate challenges students “to maintain a sense of doubt and to carry on a systematic and protracted inquiry” in the process of service-learning itself (Seligman, 2013, p. 60). This is precisely the type of complex, ongoing, reflective inquiry that John Dewey had in mind. Political engagement through policy debate This essay began with a discussion of the growing attention to civic engagement programs in higher education. The national trend is to accomplish higher levels of student civic responsibility during and after their time in college through service-learning experiences tied to curricular learning objectives. A challenge for service-learning scholars and teachers is to recognize a distinction between civic activities that are accomplished by helping others and political activities that require engagement with the collective institutional structures and processes that govern social life. Both are necessary for democracy to thrive. Policy debate pedagogy can help service-learning educators accomplish these dual objectives. To call policy debate a pedagogy rather than just a style of debate is purposeful. A pedagogy is a praxis for cultivating learning in others. The pedagogy of service-learning helps students to know and engage social conditions through physical engagement with their environments and communities. Policy debate pedagogy leads students to know and engage these same social conditions while also challenging them to apply their knowledge for the purpose of political advocacy. These pedagogies are natural compliments for cul- tivating student learning. Therefore, future studies should explore how well service-learn- ing combined with policy debate can resolve concerns that policy debate alone does not go far enough to invest students with political agency (Mitchell, 1998). The present analysis suggests the potential for such an outcome is likely. Moreover, research is clear that the civic effects of service-learning as an instructional method are improved simply by increasing the amount of time spent on in-class discus- sion about the service work students do (Levesque-Bristol, Knapp, & Fisher, 2010). Policy debates related to students’ service can accomplish this goal and more. Policy debates can also facilitate the political learning students need to build their political efficacy and capacity for political engagement. Through informed learning about the political process—especially in the context of service practice—students develop literacies that will extend beyond the classroom. Using this knowledge in reasoned public argument about policy challenges invites students to move beyond cynical disengagement towards a productive recognition of their own potential voice in the political world. Policy debate pedagogy brings unique elements to the process of political learning. By emphasizing the conditional and dynamic nature of political arguments and processes, debates can work to relieve students of the misconception that there is a single “right answer” for questions about policy-making and politics, especially during election time. The communication perspective on policy debates also highlights students’ collective involvement in the ever-changing field of political terms, symbols, and meanings that constitute interpretations of our social world. In fact, the historical roots of the term “communication” seem to demand that speech and debate educators call for such emphasis on political learning. “To make common,” the Latin interpretation of communicare, situ- ates our discipline as the heart of public political affairs (Peters, 1999). Connecting policy debate to service-learning helps highlight the common purpose of these approaches in efforts to promote civic engagement in higher education.

### 1AR --- Extinction

#### Preventing existential risk and framing it as a “we” claim is good.

Coles and Susen 18—Research Professor at the Institute for Social Justice at Australian Catholic University AND Reader in Sociology at the School of Arts and Social Sciences of City, University of London (Romand and Simon, “The Pragmatic Vision of Visionary Pragmatism: The Challenge of Radical Democracy in a Neoliberal World Order,” Contemporary Political Theory May 2018, Volume 17, Issue 2, pp 250–262) TDI

Visionary pragmatism is driven by a political ethos that accents radical receptivity and a sense that a greater degree of wildness in our efforts is indispensable for transformative democratic movements. While some of my earlier works accented the ethical character of receptive generosity in political life, Visionary Pragmatism argues that receptivity is indispensable for generating democratic power – precisely because receptivity involves vulnerability, relationship formation, capacities to modulate, and learning in unexpected ways amidst difficult differences. Drawing on my engagements with the movement for democratic action research in Northern Arizona, I argue that receptive practices engender remarkable capacities for fostering grassroots critique and alternatives, powerful political assemblages across differences, and transformative dynamics in the face of what otherwise appear to be intractable problems. Our best and most powerful possibilities for co-creating urgent democratic change almost always advance along pathways engendered partly through relationships of careful attentiveness to what we initially took to be oblique, unintelligible – or, perhaps, even odious.

For these reasons, my political, theoretical, and pedagogical engagements move across many different configurations and a wider range of situations, ideologies, modes, and commitments than most. Eschewing a single subject position, in Visionary Pragmatism, I experiment with first-person plurals in which the ‘we’ morphs in relation to the different loci of initiative that animate my reflections. Sometimes ‘we’ refers to proponents of radical and ecological democracy very broadly, sometimes to scholars in higher education, sometimes to political theorists, sometimes to the action research movement that formed among people at Northern Arizona University and its community partners, sometimes to a specific action research team, sometimes to all people facing the possibility of planetary ecological collapse. Among the many things I find compelling about the writing of James Baldwin is how he shifts his pronouns without notice – for example, sometimes using ‘we’ to represent black people, sometimes as an uncanny member of the white-majority United States. This rhetorical shiftiness encroaches upon and pulls his readers – especially white readers – beyond the ‘innocence that constitutes the crime’ of their assumed individual and collective white subjectivities in ways that work in visceral, relational, and conceptual registers (Baldwin, 1992, p. 6). Such uncertainty has significant capacity to erode habits and defences, as one finds oneself unexpectedly drawn into perspectives, locations, energies, and tendencies that unsettle and reorient one’s own subjectivity. Much of my work has theorized ‘moving democracy’, and my rhetorical shifting of the first-person plural is a textual practice that aims to enhance this in ways that facilitate reflection.

Throughout Visionary Pragmatism, I argue that there are powerful reasons for active hope. At the same time, we do not live far from tipping points beyond which planetary ecological collapse, globalizing neoliberal fascism, and violent chaos may overwhelm our efforts. I do not think so much in terms of pessimism or optimism as I do about seizing and co-creating opportunities for catalysing dynamic changes in theory and practice that foster a powerful movement of receptive democracy, for complex democratic commonwealth and ecological flourishing. In one sense, as Walter Benjamin’s discussion of Paul Klee’s ‘Angelus Novus’ makes poignantly clear, it is always ‘too late’ for so much and so many, as catastrophic history keeps piling wreckage at our feet. At the same time, there are what Benjamin (1968) calls ‘weak messianic powers’ that emerge as the retroactive force of salvaged aspects of past struggles ignite sparks with emerging struggles to explode the continuum of progress. In this sense, up to our day, it is never altogether too late. With the language of ‘game-transformative practice’, I argue that a visionary-pragmatic movement of radical democracy must do something analogous in response to the fierce urgency of now, to avoid a sixth extinction in which this possibility could well become a casualty.

#### Preventing extinction isn’t liberal futurity or naïve optimism---mobilizing against dangerous conditions is preferable to fatalism that consigns the planet to nuclear war.

Tim Stevens 18, Lecturer in Global Security, King’s College London, “Exeunt Omnes? Survival, Pessimism and Time in the Work of John H. Herz,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 283-302 TDI

Herz explicitly combined, therefore, a political realism with an ethical idealism, resulting in what he termed a ‘survival ethic’.65 This was applicable to all humankind and its propagation relied on the generation of what he termed ‘world-consciousness’.66 Herz’s implicit recognition of an open yet linear temporality allowed him to imagine possible futures aligned with the survival ethic, whilst at the same time imagining futures in which humans become extinct. His pessimism about the latter did not preclude working towards the former.

As Herz recognised, it was one thing to develop an ethics of survival but quite another to translate theory into practice. What was required was a collective, transnational and inherently interdisciplinary effort to address nuclear and environmental issues and to problematize notions of security, sustainability and survival in the context of nuclear geopolitics and the technological transformation of society. Herz proposed various practical ways in which young people in particular could become involved in this project. One idea floated in the 1980s, which would alarm many in today’s more cosmopolitan and culturally-sensitive IR, was for a Peace Corps-style ‘peace and development service’, which would ‘crusade’ to provide ‘something beneficial for people living under unspeakably sordid conditions’ in the ‘Third World’.67 He expended most of his energy, however, from the 1980s onwards, in thinking about and formulating ‘a new subdiscipline of the social sciences’, which he called ‘Survival Research’.68

Informed by the survival ethic outlined above, and within the overarching framework of his realist liberal internationalism, Survival Research emerged as Herz’s solution to the shortcomings of academic research, public education and policy development in the face of global catastrophe.69 It was also Herz’s plea to scholars to venture beyond the ivory tower and become – excusing the gendered language of the time – ‘homme engagé, if not homme révolté’.70 His proposals for Survival Research were far from systematic but they reiterated his life-long concerns with nuclear and environmental issues, and with the necessity to act in the face of threats to human survival. The principal responsibilities of survival researchers were two-fold. One, to raise awareness of survival issues in the minds of policy-makers and the public, and to demonstrate the link between political inaction now and its effect on subsequent human survival. Two, to suggest and shape new attitudes more ‘appropriate to the solution of new and unfamiliar survival problems’, rather than relying on ingrained modes of thought and practice.71 The primary initial purpose, therefore, of Survival Research would be to identify scientific, sociocultural and political problems bearing on the possibilities of survival, and to begin to develop ways of overcoming these. This was, admittedly, non-specific and somewhat vague, but the central thrust of his proposal was clear: ‘In our age of global survival concerns, it should be the primary responsibility of scholars to engage in survival issues’.72 Herz considered IR an essential disciplinary contributor to this endeavour, one that should be promiscuous across the social and natural sciences. It should not be afraid to think the worst, if the worst is at all possible, and to establish the various requirements – social, economic, political – of ‘a livable world’.73 How this long-term project would translate into global policy is not specified but, consistent with his previous work, Herz identified the need for shifts in attitudes to and awareness of global problems and solutions. Only then would it be possible for ‘a turn round that demands leadership to persuade millions to change lifestyles and make the sacrifices needed for survival’.74

Productive pessimism and temporality

In 1976, shortly before he began compiling the ideas that would become Survival Research, Herz wrote:

For the first time, we are compelled to take the futuristic view if we want to make sure that there will be future generations at all. Acceleration of developments in the decisive areas (demographic, ecological, strategic) has become so strong that even the egotism of après nous le déluge might not work because the déluge may well overtake ourselves, the living.75

Of significance here is not the appeal to futurism per se, although this is important, but the suggestion this is ‘the first time’ futurism is necessary to ensuring human survival. This is Herz the realist declaring a break with conventional realism: Herz is not bound to a cyclical vision of political or historical time in which events and processes reoccur over and again. His identification of nuclear weapons as an ‘absolute novum’ in international politics demonstrates this belief in the non-cyclical nature of humankind’s unfolding temporality.76 As Sylvest observes of Herz’s attitude to the nuclear revolution, ‘the horizons of meaning it produced installed a temporal break with the past, and simultaneously carried a promise for the future’.77

This ‘promise for the future’ was not, however, a simple liberal view of a better future consonant with human progress. His autobiography is clear that his experiences of Nazism and the Holocaust destroyed all remnants of any original belief in ‘inevitable progress’.78 His frustration at scientism, technocratic deception, and the brutal rationality of twentieth-century killing, all but demanded a rejection of the liberal dream and the inevitability of its consummation. If the ‘new age’ ushered in by nuclear weapons, he wrote, is characterised by anything, it is by its ‘indefiniteness of the age and the uncertainties of the future’; it was impossible under these conditions to draw firm conclusions about the future course of international politics.79 Instead, he recognised the contingency, precarity and fragility of international politics, and the ghastly tensions inherent to the structural core of international politics, the security dilemma.80

Herz was uneasy with both cyclical and linear-progressive ways of perceiving historical time. The former ‘closed’ temporalities are endemic to versions of realist IR, the latter to post-Enlightenment narratives feeding liberal-utopian visions of international relations and those of Marxism.81 In their own ways, each marginalises and diminishes the contingency of the social world in and through time, and the agency of political actors in effecting change. Simultaneously, each shapes the futures that may be imagined and brought into being. Herz recognised this danger. Whilst drawing attention to his own gloomy disposition, he warns that without care and attention, ‘the assumption may determine the event’.82 As a pessimist, Herz was alert to the hazard of succumbing to negativity, cynicism or resignation. E.H. Carr recognised this also, in the difference between the ‘deterministic pessimism’ of ‘pure’ realism and those realists ‘who have made their mark on history’; the latter may be pessimists but they still believe ‘human affairs can be directed and modified by human action and human thought’.83 Herz would share this anti-deterministic perspective with Carr. Moreover, the possibility of agency is a product of a temporality ‘neither temporally closed nor deterministic, neither cyclical nor linear-progressive; it is rooted in contingency’.84

Again quoting from his autobiographical account of the impact of Nazism, Herz described the relationship between his early pessimism and his developing intellectual stance:

The world became a theatre of the absurd. Suicide would probably have been the logical next move, and I considered it from time to time. But I was still too young for such a radical step. One thing, however, emerged: a growing interest in domestic and, above all, international politics. My complete resignation was no longer appropriate. If not from within, fascism might perhaps still be destroyed from without. To my continuing interest in theory, therefore, was added a practical interest in action.85

Channelling the spirit of E.H. Carr, he wrote of this ‘brutal awakening’ to the nature of power politics in the 1930s that, ‘Study could no longer be “pure” research; it had to become research committed to warn of the deadly peril and show the way to the necessary action.’86 His commitment to active engagement was an early one, gestated during his personal experiences of Nazism in the 1930s.87 This desire to combat Nazism from the outside was manifest in his activities for the Allies during and after World War II but it coloured his scholarly life also. Herz recognised pessimism was a powerful force in his life but, rather than overcome or mask it, he used it to propel his intellectual project further, and to engage with, not withdraw from, the world. He was, as van Munster and Sylvest relate, ‘[d]eeply pessimistic yet a committed social thinker’.88

Herz was explicit about this: a realistic and consistent pessimism can clarify where we are and prepare us to do what is necessary.89 Pessimism is a necessary component of a realistic view of the world, upon which proper and reasoned action can be founded. In this sense, pessimism can be productive. It produces positive outcomes through action, rather than negative ones through inaction or resignation. These are subjective value-judgements, to be sure, but are obtained through a process of realist engagement with the world, rather than blind [mere] fumbling or ideological railroading. Survival Research was a response to Herz’s pessimism about the future, not a rejection of it. This leads us to two observations about the relevance of pessimism to the study of international relations.

The first is that pessimism does not imply disengagement from the world. If anything, the example of John Herz suggests the opposite. He was a pessimist, but his brand of pessimism was no ‘passive fatalism’.90 As he recalled a few years before he died, ‘I consider myself a realist who comes sometimes to pessimistic conclusions, but never gives up looking for solutions if ever so difficult ones’.91 Pessimism can be a spur to thought and to action and need not be a watchword for conservatism in theory or practice.92 This is not to say being a pessimist is easy. Morgenthau, for his part, ‘never flagged in efforts to use his conceptual skills to help improve the human condition’, despite his pessimism about the ability and will of people to take the long view on significant political issues.93 This required that scholars chart different paths through troublesome times and articulate alternative visions of international order, not to preclude political action but to facilitate it; not quite the conservative position realism is often assumed to occupy.94 In the face of worldly frustrations and horrors, it is this attention to the production of alternative futures that prevents ‘pessimism from turning into fatalism’.95

The second observation is that it is unhelpful and misleading to treat pessimism and optimism as oppositional.96 Pessimism and optimism are commonly regarded as antonyms but often enjoy a symbiotic relationship. In Herz, they mingle and cross-pollinate in ways that defy easy explication. Stirk claims, for instance, that Herz’s optimism about how the world could be refashioned ‘was never more than guarded’, restrained by his fierce attachment to the importance of the security dilemma.97 Puglierin notes that his ‘blatant pessimism’ (eklatanter Pessimismus) was always accompanied by some form of optimism.98 We are reminded of Gramsci’s famous statement regarding ‘pessimism of intellect, optimism of the will’ as the cognitive binary at work in the political mind.99 Even as his pessimism deepened over the course of his career, he was always wont to end his analyses with a ‘yet’ or ‘in spite of it all’.100 Importantly, as he became more pessimistic, ‘the solutions he proposed became ever more ambitious’.101 His growing pessimism was accompanied by increasing resolve to tackle the problems of the world head-on, although, as he admitted in a footnote in the 1980s, ‘Not for a moment do I have the illusion that what I have proposed is likely to happen’.102 A suitably pessimistic aside, perhaps, but it did not deter him from continuing his project for another twenty years. This drive seems not to be rooted in optimistic conviction, nor even a subtle version of hope, but in a properly pessimistic reading of the world and its possibilities, engendered as they were by the ontological temporality of perpetual change.

**Nuclear extinction is a unique vector of violence – it erases every individual and singular vector of personhood, but rejecting the conditions of the debate reinforces the bad parts/**

**Fishel 15** [Stefanie, Department of Political Science, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Stern Hall, Geneva, NY, “Remembering nukes: collective memories and countering state history”, Critical Military Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2] TDI

Countering state narratives What lessons can be drawn from these narratives of the same event? One clear message is that memorialization controlled by the interests of the nation-state fails to bring to the fore our nuclear vulnerability. In part, this is due to the ability of omnicidal weapons to cast doubt on both the state and broader Western conceptions of social order. As mentioned earlier in the article, nuclear weapons broadly question a liberal’s progressive theory of human potential – this is also clear in Japan’s official story of progress and peace – as well as the realist’s belief in a cyclical nature of time. Specifically, thermonuclear war makes recreating the state (the Leviathan) after war impossible in Hobbesian theory and Lockean theory. As Craig writes, “if war occurs no one may be left to point out how bad the war was, and then call for the construction of a state that could have prevented it” (Craig 2003, xvii). Beyond the challenge to the state, for Morgenthau, nuclear weapons made even death and time irrelevant categories. Nuclear death is a difference in kind rather than degree: the scale of nuclear destruction takes away the individuality of death, rendering it meaningless. It destroys immortality and “meaning of life by throwing life back upon itself” (Morgenthau 1961). There is, then, a radical difference in meaning between a man risking death by an act of will and 50 million people simultaneously reduced – by somebody switching a key thousands of miles away – to radioactive ashes, indistinguishable from the ashes of their houses, books, and animals (Morgenthau 1961). Morgenthau stresses that thinking and acting as if nuclear death were no different than other deaths and as if “it has no bearing upon the meaning of life and death” reduces our “noble” words to “absurd clichés”. Humans must come to understand that one cannot defend “freedom and civilization” with nuclear weapons, as these weapons negate the very possibility of society’s survival (Morgenthau 1961). Schell echoed these sentiments in 1998, writing that stopping nuclear proliferation is a pressing moral issue only made more important by the end of the Cold War. Danger lies in additional countries beyond the US and the former USSR “thinking the unthinkable” by creating or expanding nuclear weapons programmes (Schell 2001). In both cases, the state counters the legitimacy crisis, or unthinkability, posed by nuclear weapons by leading the debate away from nuclear weapons to hide this fundamental questioning of the basis of order itself. The state relies on an unrelenting formation of what it means to be a citizen of a nation-state, not as a human vulnerable to nuclear destruction. Unfortunately for this vision of the future, the nation-state is ethically deficient. The nation-state, based on sharp boundaries between “us and them”, creates violence in its very existence (Fishel 2013). It is naturally divisive, and focuses on a destructive account of hypostasized forms of ethnic identity that keep different political communities from forming. It divides the world into mutually exclusive opposing forces armed with thermonuclear weapons that are many times more destructive than Fat Man and Little Boy. If the nation, due to its interest in hiding its impotence in the face of nuclear weapons and covering up past aggressions, fails in creating stable and ethical communities, will Hiroshima and Nagasaki be claimed as a global memory? Can they be used to aid in shaping us into a community of memory based on thick relations of caring – using the nuclear attacks “as warning signposts in moral history” (Margalit 2002, 71)? It is the contention of this article that contextual, collective remembrance can imagine a future where we are not hapless victims, but rather a global collective aware of its vulnerabilities. This collectivity needs to be less concerned about consolidating identity – personal or national – and focus on the “eruptive force of remembering otherwise” (Simon 2005) and what this can mean for ethical relations and the future. As shown, to focus on simple, dualistic debates that serve nationalist agendas loses the power of multivocality in collective memory and also supports future war fighting which adds more categories of “acceptable” collateral damage. Atomic victimization and wartime aggression both forget “the causes and conditions of total war” unless coupled with robust public debate (Giamo 2003, 705).

#### Anticipating nuclear extinction breeds empathy and entangled care. Distancing ourselves from considering extinction reifies detached elitism.

Offord, 17—Faculty of Humanities, School of Humanities Research and Graduate Studies, Bentley Campus (Baden, “BEYOND OUR NUCLEAR ENTANGLEMENT,” Angelaki, 22:3, 17-25) TDI

You are steered towards overwhelming and inexplicable pain when you consider the nuclear entanglement that the species Homo sapiens finds itself in. This is because the fact of living in the nuclear age presents an existential, aesthetic, ethical and psychological challenge that defines human consciousness. Although an immanent threat and ever-present danger to the very existence of the human species, living with the possibility of nuclear war has infiltrated the matrix of modernity so profoundly as to paralyse [shut down] our mind-set to respond adequately. We have chosen to ignore the facts at the heart of the nuclear program with its dangerous algorithm; we have chosen to live with the capacity and possibility of a collective, pervasive and even planetary-scale suicide; and the techno-industrial-national powers that claim there is “no immediate danger” ad infinitum.8

This has led to one of the key logics of modernity's insanity. As Harari writes: “Nuclear weapons have turned war between superpowers into a mad act of collective suicide, and therefore forced the most powerful nations on earth to find alternative and peaceful ways to resolve conflicts.”9 This is the nuclear algorithm at work, a methodology of madness. In revisiting Jacques Derrida in “No Apocalypse, Not Now (Full Speed Ahead, Seven Missiles, Seven Missives),”10 who described nuclear war as a “non-event,” it is clear that the pathology of the “non-event” remains as active as ever even in the time of Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un with their stichomythic nuclear posturing.

The question of our times is whether we have an equal or more compelling capacity and willingness to end this impoverished but ever-present logic of pain and uncertainty. How not simply to bring about disarmament, but to go beyond this politically charged, as well as mythological and psychological nuclear algorithm? How to find love amidst the nuclear entanglement; the antidote to this entanglement? Is it possible to end the pathology of power that exists with nuclear capacity? Sadly, the last lines of Nitin Sawhney's “Broken Skin” underscore this entanglement:

Just 5 miles from India's nuclear test site

Children play in the shade of the village water tank

Here in the Rajasthan desert people say

They're proud their country showed their nuclear capability.11

As an activist scholar working in the fields of human rights and cultural studies, responding to the nuclear algorithm is an imperative. Your politics, ethics and scholarship are indivisible in this cause. An acute sense of care for the world, informed by pacifist and non-violent, de-colonialist approaches to knowledge and practice, pervades your concern. You are aware that there are other ways of knowing than those you are familiar and credentialed with. You are aware that you are complicit in the prisons that you choose to live inside,12 and that there is no such thing as an innocent bystander. You use your scholarship to shake up the world from its paralysis, abjection and amnesia; to unsettle the epistemic and structural violence that is ubiquitous to neoliberalism and its machinery; to create dialogic and learning spaces for the work of critical human rights and critical justice to take place. All this, and to enable an ethics of intervention through understanding what is at the very heart of the critical human rights impulse, creating a “dialogue for being, because I am not without the other.”13

Furthermore, as a critical human rights advocate living in a nuclear armed world, your challenge is to reconceptualise the human community as Ashis Nandy has argued, to see how we can learn to co-exist with others in conviviality and also learn to co-survive with the non-human, even to flourish. A dialogue for being requires a leap into a human rights frame that includes a deep ecological dimension, where the planet itself is inherently involved as a participant in its future. This requires scholarship that “thinks like a mountain.”14 A critical human rights approach understands that it cannot be simply human-centric. It requires a nuanced and arresting clarity to present perspectives on co-existence and co-survival that are from human and non-human viewpoints.15

Ultimately, you realise that your struggle is not confined to declarations, treaties, legislation, and law, though they have their role. It must go further to produce “creative intellectual exchange that might release new ethical energies for mutually assured survival.”16 Taking an anti-nuclear stance and enabling a post-nuclear activism demands a revolution within the field of human rights work. Recognising the entanglement of nuclearism with the Anthropocene, for one thing, requires a profound shift in focus from the human-centric to a more-than-human co-survival. It also requires a fundamental shift in understanding our human culture, in which the very epistemic and rational acts of sundering from co-survival with the planet and environment takes place. In the end, you realise, as Raimon Panikkar has articulated, “it is not realistic to toil for peace if we do not proceed to a disarmament of the bellicose culture in which we live.”17 Or, as Geshe Lhakdor suggests, there must be “inner disarmament for external disarmament.”18 In this sense, it is within the cultural arena, our human society, where the entanglement of subjective meaning making, nature and politics occurs, that we need to disarm.

It is 1982, and you are reading Jonathan Schell's The Fate of the Earth on a Sydney bus. Sleeping has not been easy over the past few nights as you reluctantly but compulsively read about the consequences of nuclear war. For some critics, Schell's account is high polemic, but for you it is more like Rabindranath Tagore: it expresses the suffering we make for ourselves. What you find noteworthy is that although Schell's scenario of widespread destruction of the planet through nuclear weaponry, of immeasurable harm to the bio-sphere through radiation, is powerfully laid out, the horror and scale of nuclear obliteration also seems surreal and far away as the bus makes its way through the suburban streets.

A few years later, you read a statement from an interview with Paul Tibbets, the pilot of “Enola Gay,” the plane that bombed Hiroshima. He says, “The morality of dropping that bomb was not my business.”19 This abstraction from moral responsibility – the denial of the implications on human life and the consequences of engagement through the machinery of war – together with the sweeping amnesia that came afterwards from thinking about the bombing of Hiroshima, are what make you become an environmental and human rights activist. You realise that what makes the nuclear algorithm work involves a politically engineered and deeply embedded insecurity-based recipe to elide the nuclear threat from everyday life. The spectre of nuclear obliteration, like the idea of human rights, can appear abstract and distant, not our everyday business. You realise that within this recipe is the creation of a moral tyranny of distance, an abnegation of myself with the other. One of modernity's greatest and earliest achievements was the mediation of the self with the world. How this became a project assisted and shaped through the military-industrial-technological-capitalist complex is fraught and hard to untangle. But as a critical human rights scholar you have come to see through that complex, and you put energies into challenging that tyranny of distance, to activate a politics, ethics and scholarship that recognises the other as integral to yourself. Ultimately, even, to see that the other is also within.20

#### Studying existential risk is key to disaster management – you’re biased to deflate the risk with cherry picked examples BUT the negative effects of fear and insecurity are massively exaggerated – Masco is the worst account of security politics

Zimmerman 15 [Vera. MA in Political Science from George Mason University, BA in Global Affairs from George Mason University; BA in Translation between English, Russian, Ukrainian from Mariupol State University, Research Analyst at the Hudson Institute, “Book Review: The Theater of Operations: National Security Affect from the Cold War to the War on Terror. By Joseph Masco (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2014)”, 5-23, <https://verair.wordpress.com/2015/05/23/the-theater-of-operations-national-security-affect-from-the-cold-war-to-the-war-on-terror-by-joseph-masco-durham-and-london-duke-university-press-2014/>] TDI

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the United States prompted a global debate about nuclear terrorism to justify the invasion of Iraq, provoking much disapproval around the world, yet criticism at home about the country’s unilateral actions—unsuitable for a Western liberal democracy—did not seem to be as vociferous. In his latest book The Theatre of Operations, Professor of Anthropology, Joseph P. Masco, explains this acquiescence by the American society as a result of the well-designed population reprogramming based on fear of a nuclear catastrophe at home. This allowed for the rearrangement of the social contract, society’s docile obedience, and the expansion of national security apparatus to a planetary scale. The book portrays the state and a society as two organisms of one nervous system, both overreacting to fear of the imagined nuclear existential threat. What strikes the reader is the revelation that the United States has already practiced emotional management of its society during the Cold War. The strategic surprise attack on 9/11 triggered the return to a Schmittian state with friend-enemy distinctions, obsessed with anticipation, prevention, and proliferation of “present, contingent, projected, imagined terror” (194). The book contains five chapters written in protest against the amplification of national security threats, emotional manipulation of citizens, enlargement of security apparatus, and too much secrecy—the elements that enabled the counterterror state and created a global theater of operations. Masco shows that fear of an existential threat is a powerful emotion able to make officials overreact in their policies and convince people to sacrifice their civil liberties in the name of defense. The author does not believe that the 9/11 attacks and the receipt of a few anthrax letters were necessarily an existential threat to the U.S. national security but only served as a pretext to justify expanded defense, population management, and projection of power globally. As he puts it: “The amplification of threat has been one of the key attributes of this new system, which relies on an affective atmosphere of imminent danger to unlock new forms of governmental agency.” He makes a strong case that the American liberal democracy turned into a counterterror state which “thrives on a proliferating insecurity, using vulnerability and imaginative creativity, scenarios, fears, nightmares as its raison d’etre” (197). It “promises a world without terror via the constant production and response” of terror (156). Throughout the book, Masco maintains that the created counterterror state based on the secrecy/threat matrix is incompatible with democratic governance. Statements such as these are found all through the book with a notable lack of competing explanations to his argument. While only briefly recognizing the existence of the real threats, Masco’s critical interpretations of the government’s actions seem over confident and biased. In chapter one, “Survival Is Your Business: Engineering Ruins and Affect in Nuclear America,” Masco argues that the fear of existential nuclear devastation is embedded in every day American culture. The lively depiction of existential disasters (equated to the effects from nuclear explosions) found in recent Hollywood blockbusters of the 1990s like Armageddon and Deep Impact is reminiscent of a 1950s civil defense documentary spectacle Cue for Survival on the effects of a post-nuclear explosion in American city. The films demonstrate how the fear of the anticipated, imaginary nuclear devastation not only built a nuclear state as a response but produced a culture of nuclear fear that enabled the present counterterror state. To mobilize the American society after 9/11, the government only had to attach the image of WMD to a terrorist. More recent evidence that highlighted the strong impact of nuclear imagery in American culture was the perception and presentation of hurricane Katrina. In chapter two “Bad Weather: On Planetary Crisis,” Masco shows a strong link between nuclear war and ecological crisis in American culture. Instead of viewing Katrina as a result of climate change, the destruction was understood by America’s leadership, media, and citizens only in terms of nuclear catastrophe and was linguistically equated to an atomic explosion in Hiroshima. In “Sensitive but Unclassified: Secrecy and the Counterterror State”, Masco argues that excessive secrecy, which enabled the counterterror regime, has become nothing more than “a means to power” and is incompatible with democracy. Resorting to claims based on secrecy, the executive power asserts superior knowledge which not only helps manipulate threats but avoids legal persecution. Masco interprets the reclassification of the declassified documents that occurred after 9/11 as “the government’s refusal to admit its responsibility for the creation of boundless, endless nuclear and counterterror state.” In chapter four, “Biosecurity Noir: WMDs in a World without Borders,” Masco singles out concrete evidence of the amplification of the invisible biothreat triggered by the receipt of a few anthrax letters in 2001 to support his argument about the made-up ambiguous link to WMD. The author highlights that by proliferating ~~visions~~ [depictions] of catastrophic danger, biosecurity created a militarized response of global preemption in the name of domestic defense. Masco argues his case well and sharply, providing compelling evidence, but his interpretations of evidence at times seems exaggerated and biased. Though Masco does not deny the existence of the real threats, his recognition of them is too brief, while consideration of an alternative view is rather weak. He acknowledges that terrorist violence is not fictitious but insists that for the most part the United States inflated threats and politically exploited potential danger to declare and maintain the state of emergency. Such focus on the amplification of threats seems to suggest that for the most part the threats are not that real. Masco suggests that the link between terrorists and WMD is mainly inflated. Yet there is a real global concern about 2,000 tons of highly-radioactive nuclear materials being stored in poorly secured civilian locations around the world. The book never mentions the threat of a dirty bomb, which today is viewed as a more likely occurrence than an atomic bomb explosion. The IAEA cites a hundred reported thefts of nuclear materials on average each year. There is a good chance terrorists can get their hands on enough nuclear materials to produce a dirty bomb. The United States meets these challenges with increased international cooperation. Masco’s main argument that “the US is no longer constrained by territorial limits” is exaggerated. The only two cases cited when the United States appeared unconstrained were the invasion of Iraq. Though the invasion of Iraq was opposed by some U.S. allies (France, Germany, and New Zealand), it was still a combined force coalition from the U.S., the UK, Australia, and Poland. The United States does not have an unrestricted reach as Masco wants to depict. It is constrained by sovereignty and territorial integrity of other stable states. The unstable nuclear regimes in North Korea and Iran present that existential nuclear threat to the U.S. described by Masco, but the United States is in no rush to invade these countries. According to the anticipatory and preemptive logic Masco prescribes to the United States, it could have already invaded those states to prevent the disaster. Another limitation of his argument is that he paints the nuclear and counterterror states as consistent through all the presidencies, thus, drawing all administrations under a common denominator. Under Obama, the counterterror state became a liberal democracy again. The ‘unrestrained’ theater of operation has shrunk by ending the presence in Iraq and withdrawing from Afghanistan, even though our presence there could have been extended based on the preemption logic. Obama recognized the faults of the Bush administration in acting unilaterally, scaled back stability operations, and emphasized sharing the costs and responsibilities of global leadership. The emergence of the real ISIL threat undermines the book’s core argument of threat amplification, the U.S. preemption logic of response, and unconstrained global reach. The U.S.-led global effort against ISIL amounts to more than 50 nations, which shows the unified nature of the fight. Masco asserts that U.S. superpower depends on the ability of the state to monopolize a discourse of danger, but he doesn’t discuss how the United States succeeded in doing that. Masco could have developed his argument by tracing how the United States was able to use its soft power to mobilize like-minded states to agree with U.S. hegemony on WOT. It will be interesting to trace the U.S. internalization of fear and terror. He could have examined how allies responded to U.S. domestic mobilization of its population and whether other states imitated U.S. emotional management projects to mobilize their own populations. This would boost his argument that the U.S. was able to project its power on the global scale. In *Theatre of Operations*, Masco makes a compelling argument about the creation of the unrestrained theater of operations via domestication of fear and terror carried over from the Cold War days. His anthropological study reveals the extent to which a democracy is willing to use fear to assure the core principle of the social contract, defined by Hobbes as the exchange of public obedience for collective security. A democracy that chooses to be preoccupied with security risks to forgo core democratic values resulting in the lack of transparency, restriction of free flow of information, and negligence of non-military threats—no less threatening than nuclear terrorism. Making criticism of U.S. actions the main focus of the book, however, Masco’s interpretations are not properly balanced and sometimes appear biased. Still, reading Masco’s insight of the purpose of U.S. actions in the post-9/11 context offers opportunities to think critically about the effects of 9/11 emotional reprogramming of society and state of emergencies in U.S. history.

### 1AR --- Alt Causes US Delcine

#### Decline triggers US lash-out and pursuit of leadership inev

**Beckley 12** [“China’s Century Why America’s Edge Will Endure” research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs He will become an assistant professor of political science at Tufts University in the fall of 2012, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Chinas\_Century.pdf] TDI

One danger is that declinism could prompt **trade conflicts** and immigration restrictions. The results of this study suggest that the United States beneªts immensely from the free ºow of goods, services, and people around the globe; this is what allows American corporations to specialize in high-value activities, exploit innovations created elsewhere, and lure the brightest minds to the United States, all while reducing the price of goods for U.S. consumers. Characterizing China’s export expansion as a loss for the United States is not just bad economics; it blazes a trail for jingoistic and protectionist policies. It would be tragically ironic if Americans reacted to false prophecies of decline by cutting themselves off from a potentially vital source of American power.

Another danger is that declinism may impair foreign policy decisionmaking. If top government officials come to believe that China is overtaking the United States, they are likely to react in one of two ways, both of which are potentially disastrous.

The first is that policymakers may imagine the United States faces a closing “window of opportunity” and should take action “while it still enjoys preponderance and not wait until the diffusion of power has already made international politics more competitive and unpredictable.”158 This belief may spurpositive action, but it also invites parochial thinking, reckless behavior, and **preventive war**.159 As Robert Gilpin and others have shown, “[H]egemonic struggles have most frequently been triggered by fears of ultimate decline and the perceived erosion of power.”160 By fanning such fears, declinists may inadvertently promote the type of violent overreaction that they seek to prevent.

### 1AR --- AT: Offshoring Link

#### LAWs development encourages disarmament and de-escalation of nuclear weapons.

Umbrello et al 19 [Umbrello, Steven, et al. “The Future of War: Could Lethal Autonomous Weapons Make Conflict More Ethical?” AI & SOCIETY, Springer London, 6 Feb. 2019, link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00146-019-00879-x] TDI

More generally speaking, the growing use of UAVs in conflict situations is consistent with a broader trend toward high-precision weaponry and away from larger, more destructive weapons like those in the world’s nuclear arsenals (Wilson 2013). There are some reasons for welcoming this shift. For example, the use of high-precision weapons like LAWs to achieve a state’s military objectives could reduce the probability and proportion of indiscriminate harm, thus violating the LoW and “rules of engagement” (RoE) less than might otherwise have been possible. Even more, the “ease-of-use” of LAWs that are fully autonomous could enhance the “balance of terror” that prevents conflict from breaking out by providing a credible means for retaliation: “If you strike me first, I will unleash a swarm of LAWs that devastate your infrastructure, poison your streams, set fire to your farms, destroy your armies, and assassinate your leaders.” The precision and effectiveness of LAWs could also accelerate the process of nuclear disarmament, seeing as the conception of LAWS regards them as agents capable of conventional weapons use rather non-conventional weapons platforms. First, consider that research on the potential climatic consequences of a nuclear war resulted in the replacement of MAD (“mutually-assured destruction”) with SAD (“self-assured destruction”). The reason is that an exchange of nuclear weapons—even a regional one [citation]—could initiate a “nuclear winter” that causes global agricultural failures, widespread starvation, the spread of infectious disease, and other catastrophic sequelae that cannot be contained within national borders (Mills et al. 2014; Xia et al. 2015). Consequently, a nuclear war would all but guarantee the self-annihilation of states involved. As Seth Baum (2015) notes, though, LAWs could provide a kind of “winter-safe deterrence” by providing states with a credible threat of retaliation without the global catastrophic risks of nuclear confict. Thus, LAWs could render the world’s nuclear arsenals irrelevant and, in doing so, lower the overall risk of human annihilation.

### 1AR --- Rev Fails

#### Revolutionary methodology empirically fails.

Fred HALLIDAY IR @ London School of Economics 3 [“Finding the Revolutionary in Revolution” in *The Future of Revolutions* ed. John Foran p 306-309] TDI

A second issue central to discussion of revolution today is that of the historic legacy of revolutions. Writers on revolution like to invoke Marx's observation about the weight of past generations lying on the minds of the present; it has been often stated that all revolutions invoke symbols and claims derived from the past, real or imagined. The revolutionaries of the twentieth century all looked, in some degree, backwards: Lenin and Trotsky to 1789, Mao and Ho to I9I7, Castro to the 1890s, Khomeini to the seventh century. The present discussion of revolution seems, at first sight, not to do this. Political sociologists do look at earlier revolutions, but this is without practical import. Discussion of the possibility of change, particularly that linked to the anti-globalization movement, seems to be curiously ahistorical. The price of this is, however, that not only is inspiration from the past muted but, equally, lessons are not learnt. Here something curious seems to have happened since the collapse of communism: the amnesia of neoliberal discussion, which consigns all that was associated with the communist experiment to the dustbin, seems to be replicated in the case of the radical movements of today. But to do this is questionable. In this latter respect, there are dangers, of an amnesia that is long on enthusiasm but short on responsibility and realism. For the fact is that the history of revolution in modern times is one not only of resistance, heroism and idealism, but also of terrible suffering and human disaster, of chaos and incompetence under the guise of revolutionary transformation, of the distortion of the finest ideals by corrupt and murderous leaders, and of the creation of societies that are far more oppressive and inefficient than those they seek to overthrow. The anti-globalization movement makes much of revolutionary internationalism: tills is not some benign panacea, but a complex, often abused, transnational practice (Halliday I999). All of this entails confronting something that revolutionaries have always assumed but too often failed to discuss: the ethics of revolution. Denunciation of the given and invocations of an ideal other are not enough (Geras 1989). To grasp this involves a shift beyond the political sociology of revolutions, an academic pursuit that focuses in large measure on the incidence of revolutions, to an analysis of the consequences and longer term records of revolutionary states. In the course of recent years, in writing my own work on revolutions, I have had reason to visit a number of cities that had served as the centers of world revolution and, if not revolution, anti-imperialist radicalism: Beijing, Havana, Tripoli, Tehran. These were the culminations of upheavals that had produced revolutionary regimes by some strange numerical consistency in, respectively, I949, I959, I969, I979· In every case, one could still discern the outlines of the original revolutionary project: a rejection of exploitation, foreign and domestic, a comnlitment to the transformation of society, internationalist support in rhetoric and deed for those resisting oppression elsewhere. But in the 1990S this had all faded: these were not the wave of the future. Whatever else, it could not be said that the initial revolutionary project was in good shape: few in these countries now believed in the ideological project that had initiated the revolution; corruption and inefficiency were widespread; there was a pervasive desire for change, towards a more open, liberal, society; the initial internationalist appeals had faded. Revolution had, in effect, become tired. It was indeed capitalism, not revolutionary socialism and third-worldism, which in the 1990S formed the global vision of the future. This haphazard and impressionistic response has, however, to be compounded by a reflection on the overall legacy of the century of revolutions: neither form of amnesia—counterrevolutionary or revolutionary—is acceptable. Indeed, amnesia invites the repetition of another common saying with regard to revolutions, that those who ignore history are doomed to repeat it. Here perhaps is one of the most worrying aspects of the contemporary radical movement, be it in its national or internationalist forms: the failure to reflect, critically, on the past record of revolutionary movements. This pertains to models of alternative political and social orders. It pertains to the dangers inherent in any utopian, radicalized, mass movement that lacks clear forms of authority and decision-making. It also involves the espousal, spirited but onlinous, of alternative social orders that could work only if imposed by an authoritarian state. A pertinent contemporary example is that of radical environmentalism: the program of de-industrialization, and restricted consumption and travel, entailed by such ideas could only be established, and maintained, by a coercive state. In the international sphere, the simple invocation of solidarity may too often conceal interests of power, and manipulation. In the days of authoritarian Communist Parties, but equally in that of national and communal movements today, unconditional solidarity with repressive organizations may be at odds with any commitment to emancipatory values. Such a critical reflection has to apply, too, to the individuals often invoked for contemporary purposes: Lenin was a visionary, but also a cruel, pompous bigot; Che was a man of heroism and solidarity, but his econonlic programs were a disaster and his austere romanticism at times led to cruelty; Mao freed a quarter of mankind from imperialism, but also repeatedly plunged his society into barbarous conflict and social experimentation; Khomeini overthrew the Shah, but his social and political program was reactionary and repressive. A similar pause in romanticization might be applicable to some of the supposed components of the anti-globalization front today: few might defend Saddam Hussein, Kim Jong-il or Ayatollah Khamenei, but there is perhaps too little questioning of the commitment to emancipatory values of the PKK in Turkey, Sendero Luminoso, the FARC in Colombia, the Chechen rebels, to name but some. The Zapatista movement has become for many an icon of hope: but, as contributors to this volume make clear, it is not always itself a model of democratic practice. More importantly, one has to ask if this is the most important experience in the Latin America of the I990S to study: it is part of, but only one part of, a broader crisis of the authoritarian PRI regime that beset Mexico and resulted in the rise on the one hand of the PRD and on the other of the election of Fox in 2000. An open assessment of challenges to authoritarian, and neoliberal, policies in Latin America in the I990S would also examine democratization in Brazil and Chile, and the experience of social movements, be they of women, workers or indigenous peoples, who engaged with reformist states. This need for a critical retrospective on the historical legacy of revolutions is, however, linked to another, perhaps even more pressing, issue, one that pervades the pages of this book, namely the relation of revolution to liberal democracy as a whole. Several contributors point out that where liberal democracy is established revolution is off the agenda. But this reflection may be taken further to ask the question of whether, faced with the alternative, one or other outcome is preferable. The implication of much 'revolutionary' writing over the past century has been that liberal democracy is to be denounced, and those who engage with and in it are reformists, dupes, or, in older language, 'class traitors'. Such a view lives on, in some of the contributions to this book, as in parts of the left. Yet this contrast of reform with revolution is not some eternal polarity. It too needs to be set in historical context, and seen for what it is, a product of the particular context of the twentieth century, starting with the split between the moderate and revolutionary factions of the socialist movement in 19I4. The costs of this division are evident enough, and it would be desirable, in the aftermath of the collapse of the revolutionary socialist models, to re-examine it (Therborn I989). Part of this re-examination would involve a questioning of the automatic antinomy of reform and revolution present in much contemporary and recent writing, and of the assumed contradictory relation of revolutionary ideas to those of another critical, and internationalist, trend produced by modernity: liberalism. This has immediate implications for the discussion in this book. In particular, it relates to an issue that is widely present in contemporary academic and political discussion, but that writers on revolution tend to avoid, namely the question of rights. The language of rights was long denounced by the left, and its revolutionary part, as a bourgeois myth, except where it was for tactical reasons deemed pertinent to use it, as with regard to workers' rights, or the right of nations to selfdetermination. The record of the revolutionary tradition, once it came to power, is a very mixed one: a strong commitment to certain social and economic rights, whose abolition by neoliberal policies many in the former Communist states regret; and a sustained, cruel and dogmatic denial of political rights, collective and individual. Yet the program of rights embodied in national, regional and international codes is, as much as any flamboyant radicalism, both a critique and a program that confronts the contemporary world. Faced with the record of the Communist tradition on rights on the one hand, and the aspirations of liberalism on the other, this disdain for rights, and the related adherence to a denunciation of reformism and liberalism, should be questioned. Invocations of a romanticized I968, of the nicer cases of armed struggle, or of Seattle may be fine for mobilization: they are not a serious answer to the problems of the contemporary world.