# Aff – Korea Reunification

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## Inherency

#### Reunification with North Korea has fallen out of vogue as a goal, largely evaporated from the public mind despite its necessity

Lee 2-8 [Eunwoo Lee, 02-08-2022, South Korea’s Shift Away From Reunification Is a Bad Sign for the Korean Peninsula, No Publication, https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/south-koreas-shift-away-from-reunification-is-a-bad-sign-for-the-korean-peninsula/ HKR-MK]

Therefore, hopes for reunification enabled casting the North not as an existential threat but as a neighbor in need. Historically, a soft touch on South Korea’s part has gone a long way toward dissipating regional tensions. Despite the North’s 2017 nuclear test, which enraged the United States, it was Moon’s benign diplomatic maneuvers that achieved summits with Kim Jong Un the following year. Even Moon’s two conservative predecessors – Park Geun-hye and Lee Myung-bak – had tolerated provocations from the North in order to keep economic and national ties alive.

Yet once the ideological, if not realistic, goal of reunification fades away, future inter-Korean relations will hang by flimsy economic lines. These weaker motivations would become more prone to larger geopolitical influences. It will be harder to resist, let alone mediate, the tide of grander strategies and combined postures, especially given the intensifying U.S. commitment to East Asia in the aftermath of the Afghanistan debacle.

Treating the North as a lost cause and downplaying ethnic and cultural links will hamper the avuncular approach pursued by a succession of South Korean administrations. Should Pyongyang resort to more military provocations, a South Korea that has given up on reunification would be more likely to completely reject the North as a pariah state and pursue more economic sanctions and even military retaliation. South Korea has always fared relatively well without inter-Korean economic cooperation, but still stayed the course to revitalize dialogues and mutual understanding with reunification in mind. Without the overarching tenet of reunification that has defied hostility from the North, maintenance of a peaceful relationship would be fraught and bumpy.

So far, diplomatic overtures on South Korea’s part have been meant to create the conditions necessary to pave the way to eventual amalgamation of the two Korean societies. Conditions such as denuclearization, economic integration, regional leveling-up of the North, and subsequently diminished grip of autocracy have been considered indispensable precursors to reunification. South Korea has shunned building its own nuclear arsenal based on the notion of the denuclearized Korean Peninsula as a precept for enduring peace. Although the prospect of South Korea developing nuclear weapons remains dim, the evaporation of reunification in the public mind and the North’s unrelenting insistence on nuclear weapons mean one less reason not to pursue nuclearization of the South.

The ramifications stretch to humanitarian causes as well. South Korea adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis in granting citizenship, meaning that even a drop of Korean blood warrants full access to Korean society. Hence, South Korean governments have always provided North Korean defectors with social security numbers and housing. Diplomatic shuffling such as a transfer of authority over inter-Korean relations from the Ministry of Unification to the National Intelligence Service or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – as suggested by Lee Jun-seok of the PPP – relegates the status of these defectors to that of asylum seekers, toward whom the South is infamously averse.

Reunification is falling out of vogue, both in the progressive and conservative camps. Younger generations, who will guide the future of inter-Korean relations, not only spurn the concept and possibility of reunification but also are increasingly hostile to the North. Realistically speaking, reunification is becoming more far-fetched each passing day. But its perceptive framework and behavioral manifestations can still contribute to reincorporating the North into the spirit of cooperation and diffusing the malaise draped over the peninsula. Otherwise, the major shift from reunification to mere economic cooperation risks weakening the core ideology that has allowed South Korea to embrace and avoid direct confrontation with the North – that the two owe their provenance to the same language, culture, and ethnicity.

## Adv - Denuclearization

#### Reunification now spurs denuclearization - that prevents East Asia arms racing BUT forced unification prevents denuclearization, locks in instability, and causes NoKo collapse

Cronin et al. 15 [Patrick M. Cronin, Van Jackson, Elbridge Colby, Richard Fontaine, David Eunpyoung Jee, Brian Kirk, Darcie Draudt and Hannah Suh, 2015, Center for a New American Security, " SOLVING LONG DIVISION: The Geopolitical Implications of Korean Unification," pg. 22-26 HKR-MK ]

A Non-Nuclear Unified Korea

The Republic of Korea has committed to a range of nuclear nonproliferation obligations, most notably to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which Seoul signed in 1968. Under the NPT, South Korea has agreed to possess only nuclear technology designed for peaceful purposes.54 The ROK has also adhered to the Additional Protocol, which allows the International Atomic Energy Agency a high degree of compliance inspections and monitoring.55

Seoul has also steadfastly reiterated its commitment to the 1992 Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which states that “South and North Korea shall not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons” and affirms that “South and North Korea shall use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes.”56 As a member of the IAEA and a signatory to the NPT as well as other important nonproliferation agreements, South Korea is one of the United States’ strongest partners committed to peaceful nuclear energy and nonproliferation.

At the same time, South Korea is quickly becoming a critical player in the international nuclear power industry. Most recently, South Korea signed a deal with the United Arab Emirates to deliver four nu- clear reactors to meet the Emirates’ rising demand for electricity.57 Such deals are likely to increase in the future as world demand rises for a clean, stable source of energy and nuclear power becomes a key element of South Korea’s National Strategy for Green Growth.58 In accordance with its Additional Protocol, Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and associated compacts with the Republic of Ko- rea, the IAEA verifies that South Korea’s nuclear power program is exclusively for peaceful purposes.

In the event of unification, these commitments would presumably be extended to apply to a reunited Korea. From a security perspective, while Korea would still likely find itself in a tense neighborhood, surrounded by major powers, the immediate threat that had catalyzed some interest in a ROK nuclear weapons arsenal would have disappeared. Moreover, it is near certain that the relevant international actors such as the United States and China, and probably the international community as a whole, would exert intense pressure on a unified Korea to maintain its commitment as a non-nuclear weapons state.

What Would Happen to North Korea’s Weapons and Associated Infrastructure?

Assuming that a unified Korea would maintain the ROK’s non-nuclear commitments, the first and most pressing question that would arise in the event of unification would be the disposition of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons arsenal and its associated infra- structure, and above all how physically to secure and dispose of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons and materials. In a peaceful and stable reunification scenario, these issues could be dealt with in a de- liberate and consultative fashion, likely involving intensive engagement by the IAEA, other international bodies, as well as the United States and potentially other countries with particular interests in and/or expertise on the problem. Given U.S. expertise in the location, accounting for, and elimination of weapons of mass destruction (important since North Korea also possesses large stocks of other such weapons), it would likely be necessary for the United States to play a major role in the disposition and elimination of North Korea’s nuclear and other WMD programs.59

A partial analog to what might take place would be the 2005 elimination of Libya’s WMDs and associated infrastructure, which took place in a consensual setting once Moammar Gadhafi agreed to give up his weapons programs.60 The North Korean nuclear weapons program, however, is dramatically larger and more advanced than Libya’s was and is of di- rect interest to a larger and more powerful group of neighboring states, represented for example in the Six Party Talks.61 It therefore likely would involve a more complicated and internationalized process than the Libya scenario.

After the immediate effort to secure positive control and account for North Korea’s nuclear weapons (and other WMD), the international – and particularly U.S. – focus would likely shift to ensuring the continued progress, verification, and completion of the denuclearization process. This would likely evolve into more of a WMD elimination and nonproliferation effort along familiar, established lines, involving IAEA participation and likely that of officials implementing the letter or intent of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and other WMD-related treaties and legal agreements to which Korea is and would presumably be a party.

IT IS LIKELY THAT CONTINUED VERIFIABLE FORSWEARING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY KOREA WOULD BE SEEN AS A CRUCIAL PART OF STABILITY IN PREVENTING AN ARMS RACE IN THE REGION.

In addition to these formal processes, it can be as- sumed that Korea’s neighboring countries, such as China and Japan, as well as the United States would take a keen interest in monitoring this pro- cess. It is likely that continued verifiable forswearing of nuclear weapons by Korea would be seen as a crucial part of stability in preventing an arms race in the region.62 But any discussion about the implications of unification on nuclear weapons hinges on whether and how much conflict was involved in the transition to a unified Korea.

In the event that reunification was the product of a conflict involving the two Koreas, the perspec- tive on dealing with the North’s nuclear weapons program would be very different. In a wartime sce- nario, especially one in which the DPRK could be expected to consider employment of its nuclear forces, defense against or deterrence of nuclear and other WMD attack would be the top priority for the United States, the ROK, and the Combined Forces Command. Depending on the size and ma- turity of the North’s nuclear arsenal, these equities might lead the allies to seek to pre-empt and disarm the DPRK of its nuclear and other WMD forces. On the other hand, given the size and sophistication of the North’s WMD and delivery systems, the com bined forces might elect to induce North Korea not to employ these weapons, for instance by pledging to refrain from striking at certain targets.63 In ad- dition, the allies might seek to use threats and in- ducements to persuade leadership elements of the DPRK regime, particularly military commanders with responsibility for the disposition and employment of nuclear weapons, to refuse orders to use WMD.64

At some point in a conflict that was leading to reunification, however, the effort would focus on isolating and securing North Korean nuclear weapons and associated facilities. The primary goal would be to locate, isolate, seize, secure, and potentially destroy North Korean nuclear weapons, including ballistic missiles and their launch vehicles, as well as nu- clear weapons-grade material at storage facilities. These actions might have to be taken in a prompt manner to prevent the use of nuclear weapons in war and also prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, material, technology, and expertise to other state and non-state actors and terrorist organizations. With the likelihood of a massive humanitarian crisis occurring at the same time as the conflict, counterproliferation efforts across the land border to the north as well as maritime interdiction efforts would present a tremendous challenge. Locating, isolating, and securing uranium enrichment facilities, fuel fabrication facilities, reprocessing facilities, and the nuclear reactors themselves would also be critical. As the conflict proceeded and more allied forces flowed into theater, however, there would eventually be more bandwidth to secure other parts of the North Korean nuclear weapons program, including uranium mining, milling, and conversion facilities.

In the aftermath of such a war, denuclearization efforts would likely be considerably more intense and could take place in an unstable or even violent or lawless atmosphere. Even in the event of the sur- render or collapse of the DPRK regime, securing North Korea’s arsenal and associated infrastructure could be exceptionally difficult and demanding, as such an eventuality might lead to state collapse or even insurgency. This could lead to a situation analogous to the Iraq scenario in 2003–2004, in which WMD identification, location, and elimination activities took place in a contested and dangerous [FIGURE OMITTED] environment, which could greatly complicate these efforts. It is therefore likely that such a scenario would see a lasting presence of outside actors with interests in ensuring the positive control and dispo- sition or destruction of North Korea’s WMD arsenal. This could present possibly significant political challenges in the context of reunification, integration, and pacification of the North.

#### NoKo denuclearization solves every incentive for SoKo prolif

Ahn and Cho 14 [Mun-Suk Ahn: an Associate Professor in the Dept. of Political Science and Diplomacy at Chonbuk National University, South Korea, Assistant Professor in the Faculty of International Studies at Chonbuk National University, South Korea, 2014, “A nuclear South Korea?”, International Journal Vol. 69, No. 1, pg. 26-34 | HKR-MrK]

Because South Korean conservatives are separated into various constituencies, their arguments in support of nuclear armament vary as well. According to Scott Sagan, nuclear proliferation cases can be explained using three theoretical frameworks: the security model, the domestic politics model, and the symbol/ norms model. The first attributes nuclear armament to security concerns, the second to domestic bureaucratic politics, and the third to national pride and prestige.4 South Korean conservatives' arguments tend to fall into the first and third categories.

First, some advocates of South Korean nuclear possession hold that it is impossible for South Korea to defend itself against an attack from the nuclear-armed North without nuclear weapons. They cite the sinking of the corvette Cheonan and the Yeonpyeong Island attack in 2010. Cho Gap-je, a conservative journalist, con tends that a non-nuclear South Korea is utterly exposed to attacks from the nuclear North, making the South militarily subordinate to its enemy.5 Even though proponents of this argument seldom mention the probability that the North will use nuclear weapons to attack South Korea, they are concerned that nuclear North Korea is free to make provocations and thus assume the hegemony in North-South relations. This argument holds the greatest appeal for the South Korean public, both logically and emotionally.

Second, some support the South's nuclear armament as leverage vis-à-vis North Korea and China. They stand by the negotiation model that emphasizes a nuclear state's ability to bring the power of nuclear warheads to the negotiating table. Kim Dae-joong, a newspaper columnist, argues that the North's nuclear disarmament can be achieved only in a situation of nuclear balance between the two Koreas.6 At the same time, some conservative politicians and activists argue that South Korean nuclear weapons, or attempts to go nuclear, will force China to put more pressure on North Korea to give up its nuclear program.

Third, some defend a nuclear South Korea in the belief that going nuclear will heighten the country's national prestige and reinforce its sovereignty. South Korea's successful economic development and political transition to democracy have contributed to a greater assertiveness. This faction works within the symbol framework, envisioning nuclear capabilities as a potent symbol of state power. When then foreign minister Ryu Myung-hwan said in May 2009, "We need to discuss nuclear sovereignty seriously," he was deliberately heightening the ambivalence between military armament and peaceful nuclear sovereignty at a time when South Koreans were debating their response to the second North Korean nuclear test.7 Proponents of the sovereignty case hold that South Korea will restore the integrity of its sovereignty only when it obtains nuclear parity with North Korea.

Moreover, advocates of South Korean nuclear armament now doubt the effectiveness of the American nuclear umbrella. Although South Korea and the United States formed the Extended Deterrence Policy Committee in December 2011, which was designed to discuss measures to deal with North Korea's weapons of mass destruction and periodically observe and assess the effectiveness of the extended deterrence, and although the United States has frequently emphasized that it will provide extended nuclear deterrence, South Koreans fear that President Obama's present initiative—a "Nuclear Free World"—will weaken the US nuclear umbrella. Japan and Turkey share this discomfort with the US commitment. A weakened US nuclear umbrella would, the conservatives believe, be to North Korea's advantage. The contradiction between a "Nuclear Free World" and extended nuclear deterrence continues to concern South Korean conservatives.

#### Conversely, the increasing split between Noko and Soko causes Soko to proliferate

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With Russia and Ukraine at war, the situation in Northeast Asia is heating up. North Korea’s Kim Jong‐​un has launched a dozen missiles so far this year, including one long‐​range vehicle [thought to include components](https://www.wsj.com/articles/north-korea-tested-components-of-new-icbm-in-february-march-launches-u-s-officials-say-11646946061) of an ICBM capable of hitting America. Worse, Pyongyang suggested [it is prepared to restart](https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/how-north-korea-could-exploit-russias-war-against-ukraine-200895) ICBM and nuclear tests.

In the past, Kim used missile tests to push Washington to negotiate and make concessions. Before returning to diplomacy, he may have decided to bolster his arsenal. At various party gatherings and military parades, Kim has presented lengthy weapons wish lists. Despite his country’s evident economic weakness, Kim’s government has made significant progress on several new weapons systems. The Rand Corporation and Asan Institute provide this ominous assessment:

In that case, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea would possess an arsenal comparable to those of the world’s second‐​tier nuclear powers. That would give Kim room to move, offering some weapons in exchange for sanctions relief while retaining enough nukes to deter a U.S. attack. Imagine if the DPRK had 100 weapons and missiles capable of targeting the American homeland. Any U.S. president would hesitate to intervene even in a conventional war on the Korean Peninsula, since North Korea could threaten to shoot unless Washington backed down.

South Koreans have grown more uncomfortable as Pyongyang has developed its nuclear‐​weapon and missile capacities, though the South Koreans might intuitively understand the limits of extended deterrence. In any case, people in South Korean increasingly want the ability to protect themselves without having to rely on a sometimes‐​mercurial and even feckless Uncle Sam. After all, if pressed to risk Los Angeles for Seoul, most Americas would naturally say, “No thanks.”

For at least a decade, [a majority of South Koreans](https://www.nknews.org/2021/09/south-koreans-have-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-the-bomb-polling-suggests/?t=1655593720934) have favored developing their own nuclear deterrent. Although a plurality still identify the DPRK as the likeliest villain, [an increasing number](https://www.nknews.org/2022/02/china-not-north-korea-driving-major-south-korean-support-for-nukes-poll/) now cite the People’s Republic of China as the greatest future threat to South Korea. More than half of those surveyed figure the PRC will become the most serious danger to South Korea in the coming decade.

The most impressive poll number on this point is a [2021 poll by](https://www.kinu.or.kr/pyxis-api/1/digital-files/fde761e0-a57d-4a4f-aaf7-08d536296eaa) the Korea Institute for National Unification, which found 71.3 percent of respondents backed acquiring nukes if the North did not abandon its program. And 61.6 percent of those surveyed wanted to keep nuclear weapons even after reunification “as a means of securing sovereignty and survival rights from neighboring powers.” [A 2020 Asan Institute survey](http://www.asaninst.org/contents/%ED%95%9C%EA%B5%AD%EC%9D%B8%EC%9D%98-%EC%99%B8%EA%B5%90%EC%95%88%EB%B3%B4-%EC%9D%B8%EC%8B%9D-20102020%EB%85%84-%EC%95%84%EC%82%B0%EC%97%B0%EB%A1%80%EC%A1%B0%EC%82%AC-%EA%B2%B0%EA%B3%BC/) found 69.3 percent of respondents favored developing an ROK bomb in response to North Korea’s program.

Last month, the Chicago Council for Global Affairs published a detailed study of South Korean support for nuclear armament, [finding](https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/2022-02/Korea%20Nuclear%20Report%20PDF.pdf) 71 percent of surveyed South Koreans wanted the country to possess its own nuclear deterrent. The Chicago Council found that “When asked to choose between the two, the public overwhelmingly prefers a domestic weapons program to deployment of [U.S.] nuclear weapons,” adding that “support for both options appears to be insensitive to potential negative repercussions for South Korea’s relations with China, South Korea’s economic security, the alliance with the United States, or hopes for North Korea’s denuclearization.”

The Council found that South Koreans want the bomb even though they believe the U.S. would still protect the South in the event of war, noting that “Confidence that the United States will carry through on alliance commitments is positively associated with support for nuclear weapons, contrary to beliefs that alliance commitment concerns are a main driver of public views on nuclear acquisition.”

The ROK is a good friend, but the relationship is not worth bringing mass destruction and death to America. The U.S. might even have to reconsider the alliance if Washington were to intervene in a conventional fight on the peninsula that it could not afford to win, lest North Korea use its arsenal, or threaten to do so. Although Kim Jong‐​un has given no indication that he wants to leave this world atop a radioactive funeral pyre in Pyongyang, he might prefer that to more mundane defeat.

Even before the Russian attack on Ukraine, both Japan and South Korea were increasing military outlays. Given both nations’ concerns about China and DPRK, they should be doing even more than they are. However, the most important constraint on Chinese adventurism would be allowing Tokyo and Seoul to possess small but survivable deterrents.

#### It’s inevitable absent NoKo denuclearization

Lee 19 [Dr. Byong-Chul Lee 19, former special assistant to the Speaker of the Republic of Korea for unification affairs and current assistant professor at Kyungnam University’s Institute for Far Eastern Studies, 10/23/19, “Don’t be surprised when South Korea wants nuclear weaponsm,” https://thebulletin.org/2019/10/dont-be-surprised-when-south-korea-wants-nuclear-weapons/]

There are two major variables that factor into South Korea’s calculus on starting a nuclear weapons program: the feasibility of North Korea abandoning its nuclear weapons voluntarily, and the guarantee of America’s extended deterrence in the event of the nuclear crisis on the peninsula. Both are trending in the wrong direction.

North Korea’s intermittent nuclear threats have increasingly weighed on the minds of the broader public in South Korea, and South Koreans have started to suspect that there’s no ray of hope left for the complete denuclearization of North Korea. “Denuclearization is the dying wish of Kim Il-sung, the founder of the regime,” South Koreans have heard countless North Koreans say. But the North’s assertion that the founder’s dying wish is still operative is at best disingenuous and at worst an outright lie. In hindsight, denuclearization was dead on arrival.

Unsurprisingly, a growing chorus of voices in South Korea has given up on the rosy fantasy of disarming Kim Jong-un and is instead calling for arming the “Land of the Morning Calm” with destructive nuclear weapons. A September 2017 Gallup poll found 60 percent of South Koreans support nuclear armament, while only 35 percent are opposed. Though the public is anxiously waiting to see if North Korea will strike a deal with the Trump administration, few remain optimistic.

While many decision makers still believe that the best course is to rely on the extended deterrence provided by the United States nuclear umbrella, a growing number are quietly contemplating the alternatives. During a recent speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, former South Korean Foreign Minister Song Min-soon said that “the Republic of Korea taking its own measures to create a nuclear balance on the peninsula” was a “widely touted” option. Such a statement is strong evidence of just how far moderate proponents of nonproliferation have shifted.

The reason for this shift is that today, South Koreans cast a much more doubtful eye toward the United States security guarantee than ever. In particular, more conservatives, who are traditionally reliably US-friendly, do not hide their uneasiness about President Trump. Many were offended when, at a rally earlier this year, Trump brought up the issue of the burden-sharing arrangement for US personnel in South Korea and mocked that, “[i]t was easier to get a billion dollars from South Korea than to get $114.13 from a rent-controlled apartment in Brooklyn.”

More offensive, though, is that Trump has conspicuously tolerated North Korean missile tests that directly threaten South Korea, which hosts the third-largest contingent of overseas US troops as well as a US anti-ballistic missile defense system and is one of the world’s biggest buyers of US arms. The more Trump brags about the letters from Kim Jong-un, the more he alienates an ally. Even moderate South Koreans see Trump’s approach to the alliance as extremely petty and bigoted. In sum, his flagrant disregard for the traditional alliance undermines the credibility of extended deterrence and has made South Koreans pessimistic about their continued dependence upon the United States.

Many Americans, even in the administration, know all of this. In September, US Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun rhetorically asked, “at what point will voices in South Korea or Japan and elsewhere in Asia begin to ask if they need to be considering their own nuclear capabilities?” Unfortunately, though, little is being done to assuage South Korean concerns.

If these trends continue, a nuclear South Korea is a question of “when,” not “if.”

#### SoKo prolif cascades and causes Korean war - US coverage solves any benefits

Fitzpatrick 16 [Mark Fitzpatrick, February 5th 2016, “Republic of Korea,” Chapter 1 in Asia’s Latent Nuclear Powers: Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, Issue 455 of Adelphi Series, Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies-US, former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Non-proliferation, Master in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University HKR-MK]

Resumed pursuit of nuclear weapons would make South Korea intensely vulnerable in the period before it produced and fielded deliverable nuclear weapons. Given the nation's open political system, rambunctious press and undisciplined legislature, it would be nearly impossible to hide a nuclear-weapons programme. Even Park Chung-hee's authoritarian government, which ruled with little transparency, was unable to keep his programme secret from prying American eyes. In today's vibrant and adversarial democracy, the parliamentary oversight and funding authorisation required for such a programme would be liable to expose it to a legislative body notorious for disclosing secrets. Nuclear activity would also be hard to keep from the IAEA, with its well-practised access rights under the Additional Protocol.115 In fact, most South Koreans who advocate an indigenous nuclear programme expressly want any such effort to be public knowledge, in order to put diplomatic pressure on China and other external actors. If South Korea persisted with such a programme after its discovery, North Korea would see this as a hostile move, and perhaps be tempted to launch a pre-emptive attack at a time when the US defence commitment might no longer apply. Short of this worst-case scenario, North Korea would claim the South's actions as a justification for stepping up its own weapons programme, which was accelerated in response to Park's 1970s pursuit of nuclear arms.116 The idea that Seoul's acquisition of nuclear weapons would pressure Pyongyang to negotiate an end to its own nuclear programme involves a desperate gamble. It is more likely that denuclearising North Korea would become even more difficult than it is today. And, if South Korea were to acquire nuclear weapons or resume hosting US tactical nuclear weapons for negotiations that did not succeed, under what conditions could they be given up without signalling defeat? The peninsula would be left with an enduring nuclear stand-off. In addition to North Korea, other neighbouring nations would have ample reasons for viewing South Korean nuclearisation with anxiety. Russia and China could be expected, as a matter of course, to target the weapons facilities.117 Japan, as the only non-nuclear state in the region, could be prompted to reconsider its own weapons option, and in doing so Tokyo would have a large head start over Seoul. As foreign-policy scholars Choi Kang and Park Joon-sung have noted, ‘the nuclear domino game is not a “winnable” one from a South Korean viewpoint.’118 In short, if South Korea went nuclear, the Korean Peninsula and its environs would become much more tense and dangerous. The ensuing economic impact from capital flight, postponed investment and stock-market depression could be even more adverse than the direct impact of sanctions. It is hard to envisage circumstances in which US tactical nuclear weapons could be returned to South Korea. American officials, both civilian and military, are thoroughly opposed to the idea for very good reasons. The operational requirements of housing the weapons, which would include hardened bunkers and special security units, would impose new burdens on overstretched military budgets. The bases containing the systems would be targets for a potential North Korean pre-emptive attack, possibly one involving commando forces. Seizure by terrorists would be another concern. The weapons themselves are unnecessary; they have no military use that could not be served by either conventional weapons or US strategic nuclear weapons launched from submarines, missiles or long-range bombers. As is the case with US tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Europe, their purpose would be solely symbolic. But the symbolism would be double-edged. China and Russia would see it as a provocation, and North Korea might find greater sympathy abroad. At home, the weapons would reignite anti-American protests, reopening domestic divisions that would undermine bilateral relations. Before the US weapons were withdrawn in 1991, their removal was a key rallying point for South Korea's pro-democracy movement. Recalling this experience, South Korean officials have not asked for the weapons to return.

#### Perception of SoKo intent to proliferate causes preemptive NoKo strikes - extinction

Kelly 15 [Robert E. Kelly 15, associate professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy at Pusan National University in South Korea, 3/6/15, “Will South Korea Have to Bomb the North, Eventually?,”http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/will-south-korea-have-to-bomb-the-north-eventually/]

As North Korea continues to develop both nuclear weapons and the missile technology to carry them, pressure on South Korea to take preemptive military action will gradually rise. At some point, North Korea may have so many missiles and warheads that South Korea considers that capability to be an existential threat to its security. This is the greatest long-term risk to security and stability in Korea, arguably more destabilizing than a North Korean collapse. If North Korea does not arrest its nuclear and missile programs at a reasonably small, defensively-minded deterrent, then Southern elites will increasingly see those weapons as threats to Southern survival, not just tools of defense or gangsterish blackmail.

During the Cold War, the extraordinary speed and power of nuclear missiles created a bizarre and frightening “balance of terror.” Both the Americans and Soviets had these weapons, but they were enormously vulnerable to a first strike. Under the logic “use them or lose them,” there were enormous incentives to launch first: If A did not get its missiles out of the silos quickly enough, they might be destroyed by B’s first strike. One superpower could then hold the other’s cities hostage to nuclear annihilation and demand concessions. This countervalue, “city busting” temptation was eventually alleviated by “assured second strike” technologies, particularly submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). SLBMs ensured the survivability of nuclear forces; hard-to-find submarines could ride out an enemy first strike and still retaliate. So the military value of launching first declined dramatically. By the 1970s, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union had achieved enough survivability through various “hardening” efforts that nuclear bipolarity was relatively stable despite the huge number of weapons in the arms race.

The Korean nuclear race does not have this stability and is unlikely to ever achieve it. Nuclear Korea today is more like the Cold War of the 1950s, when nuclear weapons were new and destabilizing, than in the 1970s when they had been strategically integrated, and bipolarity was mature. Specifically, North Korea will never be able to harden its locations well enough to achieve assured second strike. North Korea is too small to pursue the geographic dispersion strategies the Soviets tried, and too poor to build a reliable SLBM force or effective air defense. Moreover, U.S. satellite coverage makes very hard for the North to conceal anything of great importance. North Korea’s nuclear weapons will always be highly vulnerable. So North Korea will always face the “use it or lose it” logic that incentives a first strike.

On the Southern side, its small size and extreme demographic concentration in a few large cities makes the Republic of Korea an easy target for a nuclear strike. More than half of South Korea’s population lives in greater Seoul alone (more than 20 million people), and Seoul’s suburbs begin just thirty miles from the demilitarized zone. This again raises the temptation value of a Northern strike. Both the Soviet Union and the United States were so large, that only a massive first strike would have led to national collapse. In South Korea by contrast, nuking only about five large cities would likely be enough to push South Korea toward national-constitutional breakdown. Given its extreme urbanization and centralization, South Korea is extremely vulnerable to a WMD and/or decapitation strike.

While large-scale North Korean offensive action is highly unlikely – Pyongyang’s elites most likely just want to survive to enjoy their gangster high life – nuclear weapons do offer a conceivable route to Northern military victory for the first time in decades: a first-strike mix of counterforce detonations to throw the Southern military into disarray; limited counter-value city strikes to spur social and constitutional break-down in the South; followed by an invasion and occupation before the U.S. military could arrive in force; and a standing threat to nuke Japan or the United States as well should they intervene. Again, this is unlikely, and I still strongly believe an Allied victory is likely even if the North were to use nuclear weapons. But the more nukes the North builds, the more this threat, and the “use it or lose it” first strike incentives, grow.

It is for this reason that the U.S. has pushed South Korea so hard on missile defense. Not only would missile defense save lives, but it would dramatically improve Southern national-constitutional survivability. (Decentralization would also help enormously, and I have argued for that repeatedly in conferences in Korea, but it is unlikely.) A missile shield would lessen the military-offensive value of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, so reducing both first-strike temptations in Pyongyang and preemptive air-strike pressure in Seoul. Unfortunately South Korea is not hardened meaningfully to ride-out Northern nuclear strikes. Missile defense in South Korea has become politicized as a U.S. plot to dominate South Korean foreign policy (yes, really) and provoke China. (Although opinion may, at last, be changing on this.) Air drills are routinely ignored. And no one I know in South Korea knows where their shelters are or what to do in case of nuclear strike.

Ideally North Korea would de-nuclearize. And we should always keep talking to North Korea. Pyongyang is so dangerous that freezing it out is a bad idea. Talking does not mean we must be taken advantage of by the North’s regular bargaining gimmicks. But we must admit that North Korea seems unlikely to give up its nuclear weapons. The program goes back decades, to the 1960s. Rumor has it that Pyongyang has devoted more than 5 percent of GDP in the last two decades to developing these weapons. The program continued through the 1990s, even as more than a million North Koreans starved to death in a famine resulting from post-Cold War economic breakdown. The North has repeatedly lied and flimflammed to outsiders like the ROK government and the IAEA to keep its programs alive clandestinely. Recently Kim Jong Un has referred to nuclear weapons as the “nation’s life.”

We could even go a step further and admit that a few Northern nuclear missiles are tolerable. If we put ourselves in Pyongyang’s shoes, a limited nuclear deterrent makes sense. Conventionally, North Korea is falling further and further behind. No matter how big the North Korean army gets quantitatively, it is an increasingly weak shield against high-tech opponents. U.S. regime change in the Middle East has clearly incentivized despots everywhere in the world to consider the ultimate security which nuclear weapons provide. The North Koreans have openly said that nuclear weapons ensure their post-9/11 regime security. As distasteful as it may be to us, there is a logic to that. A small, defensive-minded deterrent – say five to ten warhead-tipped missiles that could threaten limited retaliation against Southern cities – would be an objectively rational hedge against offensive action by the U.S. or South Korea. Indeed, this is almost certainly what Pyongyang says to Beijing to defend its program to its unhappy patron.

But this is the absolute limit of responsible Northern nuclear deployment and it is probably where the DPRK is right now. Further nuclear and missile development would exceed even the most expansive definition of North Korean security and takes us into the realm of nuclear blackmail, highly dangerous proliferation, and an offensive first-strike capability. Pyongyang does not need, for example, the ICBM it is supposedly working on.

In this context, my greatest fear for Korean security in the next two decades is North Korean nuclearization continuing apace, generating dozens, perhaps hundreds of missiles and warheads, coupled to rising South Korean paranoia and pressure to preemptively strike. There is no possible national security rationale for Pyongyang to keep deploying beyond what it has now, and if it does, expect South Korean planners to increasingly consider preemptive airstrikes. North Korea with five or ten missiles (some of which would fail or be destroyed in combat) is a terrible humanitarian threat, but not an existential one to South Korea (and Japan). South Korea could ride out, perhaps, five urban strikes, and Japan even more.

But a North Korea with dozens of nuclear missiles, possibly one hundred, some of them on submarines, would constitute a state- and society-breaking, constitutional threat to South Korea and Japan in the event of conflict. That in turn will incentivize pre-emptive airstrikes. Of course, China and the United States might be able to restrain such South Korean action. Unlike the Soviets and Americans in the Cold War, Seoul is uniquely tied to U.S. “permission” to act. In 2010, after two North Korean actions against the South, the then-South Korean president did want to retaliate, but the Americans talked him out of it. Similarly, offensive action against the North that potentially provokes a war – as airstrikes certainly might – would unnerve China, and China’s opposition to South Korean missile defense has already altered that discussion in Seoul. But a nuclear capability of one-hundred missiles is a whole new level of existential threat to the South (and Japan). I find it hard to believe, in lieu of very robust missile defense, that South Korean planners would tolerate this in the long-term. Airstrikes against North Korea have been considered before (1994 and 2010 especially), and this pressure will grow again.

This spiral of paranoia between North Korea nuclearization, and pressure on Seoul (or even Tokyo) to preemptively defang North Korea before it can threaten state-destruction, is entirely predictable – and the reason why everyone, even China and Russia, wants North Korea to stop building. Let’s hope they listen.

#### Korean war causes extinction

Atkin 17 [Emily Atkin, writer at The New Republic, 2017, “A nuclear conflict with North Korea would be even more dangerous than you think,” https://newrepublic.com/minutes/144258/nuclear-conflict-north-korea-even-dangerous-think]

A nuclear conflict with North Korea would be even more dangerous than you think. The short- and long-term casualties from the denotation of just one nuclear bomb in North Korea or the United States would be staggering. But a scientist who studies the climactic impacts of nuclear war is warning that deaths from a bomb’s impact and radiation are not the only dangers to consider. “If you start into something like this, it can lead to all sorts of unexpected consequences,” said Owen Brian Toon, a professor at the University of Colorado, Boulder’s Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics. One of those consequences is a nuclear winter that darkens the skies, dramatically cools the climate, causes widespread crop failures, and kills millions of people who don’t even live in the immediate conflict zone.

Just one bomb—or even two, or five, or ten—isn’t going to do this. Toon’s research on nuclear winters, the first of which was published in 1983, asserts that approximately 100 Hiroshima-size atom bombs would be needed to produce such devastating, far-reaching impacts. North Korea certainly does not have the nuclear capacity for that (Hell, the country may not even have the capacity for one.) But Toon’s concern is one that The Economist laid out this week: “The most serious danger is not that one side will suddenly try to devastate the other. It is that both sides will miscalculate, and that a spiral of escalation will lead to a catastrophe that no one wants”—namely, a confrontation between the U.S. and North Korea’s ally China.

China’s nuclear arsenal isn’t huge, but it’s certainly enough to fuel a large-scale nuclear war. Toon noted that multiple nuclear bombs would cause huge fires, and the “energy released from the fires can be 100 to 1,000 times greater than the energy released from the bombs.” Those fires, he said, “put smoke into the upper atmosphere, which blocks the sun from reaching the surface.” Temperates fall rapidly. Crops die. People starve to death. “If there’s a nuclear war somewhere else, you’re likely to be severely effected by these temperature drops,” Toon said. “This is a highly dangerous situation. One hopes the Trump administration understands that.”

#### Absent NoKo denuclearization, other US allies will proliferate, ending in nuclear war—deterioration of faith in US nuclear umbrella puts us at the brink

Terry 16 [Sue Mi Terry, a managing director for Bower Group Asia, is a former senior North Korea analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency. An American Nuclear Umbrella Means a Lot to Northeast Asia. 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/10/26/a-nuclear-arsenal-upgrade/an-american-nuclear-umbrella-means-a-lot-to-northeast-asia HKR-MK]

North Korea is racing ahead with its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Publicly available estimates suggest that by 2020 it will have the ability to hit the continental United States with a nuclear-missile; by that point it may have as many as 100 nuclear warheads. Even before then North Korea poses a growing danger to its neighbors, South Korea and Japan, which both have the technology to field their own nuclear weapons in relatively short order.

Why haven’t South Korea and Japan gone ahead and nuclearized already? A big part of the explanation is the faith they have placed in the American nuclear umbrella. But that faith is starting to erode.

There are growing calls from South Korean lawmakers in the conservative, ruling Saenuri Party to develop nuclear weapons — an option that was endorsed by 54 percent of those surveyed by Gallup Korea in January 2016. What would happen if South Korea were to go nuclear? Japan would follow suit. And then we would be in the midst of a dangerous and destabilizing nuclear-arms race involving Japan, South Korea, North Korea and China, similar to the nuclear competition that already exists between India and Pakistan. The chances of a catastrophic conflict would greatly increase. That would not be in the interests of Northeast Asia or in the interests of America.

#### NoKo will inevitably use nukes to force reunification on its own terms - causes extinction and disarm doesn't solve

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Klingner 20 [Bruce Klingner, October 2020 "North Korea’s Nuclear Strategy and Forces: Trusted Shield and Treasured Sword" Ch. 13 in Guide to Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Great-Power Competition, Adam Lowther, ed., , https://atloa.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Guide-to-Nuclear-Deterrence-in-the-Age-of-Great-Power-Competition-Lowther.pdf, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia, Heritage, 20 years with the CIA and DIA, as CIA’s deputy division chief for Korea, distinguished graduate of the National War College, where he received a master’s in national security strategy. He also holds a master’s in strategic intelligence from the Defense Intelligence College and a bachelor’s degree in political science from Middlebury HKR-MK]

North Korean Nuclear and Missile Capabilities

Pyongyang’s evolving nuclear and missile forces increasingly provide the regime with the ability to conduct a surprise preemptive first-strike, retaliatory second-strike, and battlefield counter-force attacks. Pyongyang has:

• Produced 30–60 warheads,11 can create fissile material for 7–12 warheads per year,12 and successfully tested a hydrogen (thermonuclear) weapon at least 10 times as powerful as the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs;

• Expanded and refined manufacturing facilities for fissile material, nuclear weapons, missiles, mobile missile launchers, and reentry vehicles;13

• Created a new generation of more advanced, accurate, and survivable missiles for all ranges that escalates the nuclear threat against South Korea, Japan, US bases in Okinawa and Guam, and the continental United States;

• Developed mobile land-based and sea-based missile systems that are harder to detect and target;

• Produced several different solid-fueled missiles that reduce the time necessary for launch, thereby constraining warning time for the US and its allies; and

• Practiced missile launches under wartime conditions by firing multiple missiles from numerous locations throughout the country, simulated nuclear airburst attacks over South Korea and Japan, and conducted salvo launches of several missiles simultaneously.

Pyongyang has an extensive and diversified missile force to attack targets in South Korea, Japan, US bases in the Pacific, and the continental United States.

South Korean Ports and Airfields

To prevent the US from augmenting forces in South Korea during a conflict, North Korea would use nuclear weapons on South Korean ports and airfields. In 2016, Kim Jong-un oversaw several successful surface-to-surface (SCUD) and Hwasong-7 (No Dong) mobile missile launching exercises that simulated preemptive nuclear airburst strikes against South Korean ports and airfields to be used by the US military.14

South Korean Leadership and Military Targets

Pyongyang vowed to initiate a preemptive nuclear attack against the South Korean leadership, including the presidential Blue House, if the regime perceived even a “slight sign” of US or South Korean preparations for a decapitation strike on the North Korean leadership.15 North Korea warned that it could turn South Korea into a “sea of flames” with its long-range artillery force and “reduce all bases and strongholds of the US and South Korean warmongers…into ashes.”16 The regime has deployed SCUD missiles, Pukguksong-2 (KN-15), and Hwasong-7 (No Dong) medium-range missiles. North Korea achieved breakthrough successes with several short-range missile systems in development that emphasized survivability, accuracy, and ability to defeat allied missile defenses.

Defeating Ballistic Missile Defenses (BMD)

North Korea is developing several systems and tactics that would be more effective in degrading or defeating allied missile defenses. Pyongyang has launched missiles to a higher altitude and shorter range which could allow a warhead to arrive at a steeper angle of attack and faster speed which could exceed BMD interception capabilities. The KN-18 and KN-21 SCUD variants have maneuverable reentry vehicles and the KN-23 has a flight profile that showed evasive characteristics instead of a typical ballistic parabola. The KN-23 was flown at depressed trajectories, potentially between the upper reach of Patriot missiles and below the minimum intercept altitude for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), with a final pull-up maneuver that provides a steep terminal descent.17 The KN-23 could also be used in a first strike against leadership, hardened command and control, or high-value military targets. North Korea demonstrated the ability to fire several missiles at once which could enable salvo attacks by less accurate SCUD missiles to overwhelm BMD systems.18

SLBM Threat

North Korea has successfully tested the Pukguksong-1 (KN-11) and Pukguksong-3 (KN-26) submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) which could target South Korea and Japan, potentially with a nuclear warhead. South Korea does not currently have defenses against SLBMs. The THAAD BMD system radar is limited to a 120-degree view that is directed toward North Korea, precluding it from protecting against SLBMs arriving from either the East or West Seas.19 The SM-2 missile currently deployed on South Korean destroyers only provides protection against anti-ship missiles.

Establishing North Korean Area Denial

Pyongyang could use theater nuclear strikes against US bases in Japan and Guam to prevent the flow of forces and logistics to the peninsula that are planned in the time phased force deployment data (TPFDD) plan. Pyongyang has repeatedly threatened US bases throughout the Pacific, often citing Guam.20 The regime has developed the Hwasong-10 (Musudan) and Hwasong-12 (KN-17) intermediate-range missiles to hit US bases on Okinawa and Guam.

Threatening the US Mainland

Pyongyang has threatened to “reduce the US mainland to ashes and darkness.”21 Kim was photographed in front of a map labelled “US Mainland Strike Plan,” with missile trajectories aimed at Washington, DC, Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii, San Diego (a principal homeport of the Pacific Fleet), and Air Force Global Strike Command at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana.22

In 2017, North conducted Korea three successful tests of

the Hwasong-14 (KN-20) and Hwasong-15 (KN-22) ICBMs to replace the earlier, less capable KN-08 and KN-14 ICBMs. General Terrence O’Shaughnessy, commander of North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), testified that North Korea demonstrated the capability to threaten the US homeland with thermonuclear-armed ICBMs capable of ranging most, or all, of North America.23 US Forces Korea assessed that the Hwasong-15 ICBM has a range of 8,000 miles and is capable of reaching anywhere on the US mainland.24

New War Plan

After assuming power, Kim Jong-un directed the North Korean military to develop a new strategy to invade and occupy Seoul within three days and all of South Korea within seven days. North Korea had studied US operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and concluded it must prevail quickly before US reinforcements arrived. This would necessitate early use of nuclear weapons.25

The Korean People’s Army General Staff declared that

“the first combined task units stationed in the eastern, central, and western sectors of the front will [carry] out the preemptive retaliatory strike at the enemy groups with ‘an ultra-precision blitzkrieg strike of the Korean style.’ ”26 North Korea has warned that “any military conflict on the Korean Peninsula is bound to lead to an all-out [nuclear] war, an ultra-harsh war of reaction targeting the entire US mainland.”27

Future Capabilities Open Dangerous Doors

North Korea’s continually advancing proficiencies suggest additional and more worrisome evolutions in its nuclear doctrine. Pyongyang may be on the path to developing capabilities that go beyond deterrence to a viable offensive warfighting strategy.

In a few years, North Korea could have 100–200 nuclear warheads, dozens of mobile ICBMs, and hundreds of improved, survivable short-, medium-, and intermediaterange missiles, as well as submarine-launched missiles. North Korea possessing a more formidable military threat would put allied forces at greater risk, augment the danger to the continental United States, and degrade military responses to North Korean actions.

Greater nuclear capabilities could undermine the effectiveness of existing war plans. For example, rather than fully implementing all phases of OPLAN 5015 after a North Korean attack, the allies may strive only for returning to the status quo ante rather than fully liberating North Korea. North Korea’s ability to target American cities with thermonuclear weapons could inhibit US responses or exacerbate growing allied concerns about the viability of the US extended deterrence guarantee. South Korea and Japan have already questioned US willingness to risk its cities for theirs.

The defense of the continental US is currently provided by 44 ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California. Several interceptors would likely be fired at each incoming North Korean missile since the current North Korean ICBM arsenal is small. However, continued North Korean ICBM production could overwhelm US missile defenses.

A more survivable North Korea nuclear force could create first-strike uncertainty for the United States of not being able to get all of Pyongyang’s North Korea’s nuclear weapons. Coupled with the risk of numerous American cities attacked by hydrogen bombs, Washington might be perceived as being hesitant to respond to North Korean actions. As the fictional nuclear strategist Dr. Strangelove opined, “Deterrence is the art of producing in the mind of the enemy, the fear to attack.”

If North Korea believes the US is unwilling to risk catastrophic civilian losses, the regime could feel emboldened to act more belligerently in pursuing its strategic objectives. A former North Korean official testified before Congress in 1997 that “Kim Jong-il believes that if North Korea creates more than 20,000 American casualties in the region, the US will roll back and that North Korea will win the war.”28

Pyongyang may even conclude that nuclear weapons provide the ability to fulfill its oft-stated goal of reunifying the Korean Peninsula on regime terms. Kim Jong-un declared that North Korea “should not allow the national split to persist any longer but reunify the country in our generation without fail.”29 The regime has repeatedly pledged to achieve the “final victory in a great war for national reunification.”30

Deterrence and Diplomacy:

Two Sides of the Same Coin

The arms control community argues that deterrence maintains the nuclear problem but does not solve it. They suggest that there is a need for the US to engage with North Korea to reach a diplomatic resolution to the long-standing nuclear problem.

The international community, including the United States, has repeatedly attempted to do so, having concluded eight denuclearization agreements with North Korea. All failed due to Pyongyang’s cheating or leaving obligations unfulfilled. During these and subsequent negotiations, Washington offered economic benefits, developmental assistance, humanitarian assistance, diplomatic recognition, declarations of non-hostility, turning a blind eye to violations, not enforcing US laws, and reducing allied defenses. Despite these concessions, North Korea still has an insatiable list of security, diplomatic, and economic demands. These include the conclusion of allied military exercises, withdrawal of all US troops from South Korea, abrogation of the US–South Korea defense treaty, ending the US extended deterrence guaranty, signing a peace treaty to end the Korean War, a security guarantee, non-criticism of the regime, and removal of all US and United Nations (UN) sanctions.

Currently, North Korea rejects all working-level diplomats as well as summit meetings with the United States. It is impossible to negotiate with a nation that will not pick up the phone. Until Pyongyang is willing to comply with 11 UN resolutions that require it to abandon its nuclear and missile programs, the US must maintain a comprehensive strategy of diplomacy, upholding UN resolutions, US law, and deterrence. Washington and its allies must keep their eyes open, their shields up, and their swords sharp.

Airmen must remain ever vigilant to maintain the decades long deterrence that has kept the peace on the Korean Peninsula. As George Orwell reportedly opined, “People sleep peacefully in their beds at night only because rough men stand ready to do violence on their behalf.”

#### Forced reunification on regime terms causes nuclear war, even without U.S. draw in

Maxwell 20 [David Maxwell, April 2020, The Hudson Institute, “The ROK-US Alliance: One American’s Perspective Now and for the Future,” Pathways to Peace: Achieving the Stable Transformation of the Korean Peninsula, https://www.hudson.org/research/15845-pathways-to-peace-achieving-the-stable-transformation-of-the-korean-peninsula, pg. 62-63 Associate Director of the Center for Security Studies and the Security Studies Program in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University HKR-MK]

The Value of the Alliance to the ROK and United States

It is imperative to understand the long-standing North Korean strategy. As a revolutionary nation, as described in its constitution, North Korea seeks to complete the revolution by ridding the peninsula of foreign military forces and unifying it under the domination of the “guerrilla dynasty and gulag state.” which is used to describe the idea the regime rests on the myth of anti-Japanese partisan warfare and incarcerates some 120,000 political prisoners in multiple prison camps or gulags. 210 In the calculus of the Kim family regime, unification on its terms is the only way to ensure its survival. The regime’s strategy is built on subverting the ROK to create political instability, using coercion and blackmail diplomacy to gain political and economic concessions, and, when conditions are right, using force to execute a campaign plan to occupy the entire Korean Peninsula.

To successfully execute its strategy and accomplish its goals, the North requires is a split in the ROK-US alliance. Specifically, it needs to drive US forces off the Korean Peninsula and end extended deterrence and the nuclear umbrella over the ROK and Japan. The regime has been pursuing this strategy for seven decades, and there is no evidence that it has abandoned it. Coincidently, this is also how it views the end of the US “hostile policy.” As long as there is a ROK-US alliance, the regime believes, the United States poses a threat.211

Due to this strategy, the ROK faces an existential threat from North Korea. The North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) has an active force of some 1.2 million personnel, 70 percent of whom are deployed between the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and Pyongyang. These forces are postured for offensive operations. The NPKA annual winter training cycle runs from December through March, with forces conducting echeloned training designed to achieve the highest state of readiness by its conclusion. March is the optimal attack time because the ground is still frozen, and the rice fields in the South would not obstruct a mechanized armored attack. The NKPA possesses not only nuclear weapons, but also chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In a war, North Korea would likely use all of its weapons, including these oft-ignored WMD.212 Therefore, the ROK depends on the alliance for combined defensive capabilities for its survival.

The United States has a vital national interest to deter war on the Korean Peninsula. If hostilities resume, Korea’s geostrategic location ensures that the economic effects would not be confined to the peninsula. China and Japan are the second- and third largest economies in the world, respectively, and the ROk is around the eleventh A war involving these powers will have a direct impact on the US homeland. Furthermore, conflict is likely to escalate because of the proximity of two nuclear powers, China and Russia, and one of the highest concentrations of military forces anywhere in the world. The size and proximity of the forces, from North Korea, South Korea, China, Russia, and Japan, will likely cause miscalculations and responses with significant global repercussions. Even if the United States chooses not to support its Korean and Japanese allies, it might not be able to avoid conflict, and it certainly will not avoid the economic effects of war in Northeast Asia.

## Adv - Econ

#### NoKo regime collapse is likely now

Snape 20 [. Matt Snape, “Is North Korea Starting to Collapse from Within?," InsideOver, AUGUST 19th 2020, https://www.insideover.com/politics/is-north-korea-starting-to-collapse-from-within.html, New Executive for Cision, a global earned media management company. Mat is also a journalist for Inside Over/Il Giornale \*\* Quoting NK News - unlikely to negatively portrary NoKo HKR-MK]

Is North Korea Collapsing on its Own**?**

Despite this, events over the last couple of weeks seem to suggest that the North Korean regime led by Kim Jong-un may be beginning to collapse from within.

According to North Korea News, the country’s ruling Workers’ Party elite will convene a plenary meeting on August 19th “to consider an issue of crucial significance.” Kim is expected to attend and possibly announce significant domestic and foreign policy changes. ABC News reports that the Workers’ Party intends to ‘develop the Korean revolution’ and increase the party’s “fighting efficiency.”

North Korea’s Many Challenges

During the December 2019 plenum, the North Korean leader warned citizens to expect economic hardship as his regime would no longer pursue talks with the US or seek sanctions relief for taking steps toward denuclearization. Kim was right to anticipate that 2020 would bring a plethora of issues that his regime would face later on in the year.

North Korea has received no sanctions relief as the US’s efforts to persuade Pyongyang to roll back its nuclear program in favor of the lifting of sanctions has failed. But North Korea has been able to resist the crippling effects sanctions have had on its economy thanks to its trade with China, even though that has declined in recent years.

In 2018, Chinese imports from Pyongyang plummeted by 88 percent. UN numbers show that Chinese imports of North Korean coal, iron ore and other natural resources increased dramatically from 2010 onward. Yet Beijing imported no coal from North Korea between January and March 2018. This shows that North Korea depends upon trade with China.

The Coronavirus Has Devastated North Korea’s Trade Relationship with China

Nonetheless, China’s economic fortunes this year have been affected by the global fallout caused by the coronavirus. Jong-un also took drastic action to curb the spread of the pandemic in his own nation. He ordered the city of Kaesong to be locked down last month, suspecting a defector who crossed back over the border from South Korea of introducing the virus to the north. But it is COVID-19’s economic effects that have had a more severe impact on North Korea.

The New York Times suggests that the country’s exports to China, impacted by the border shutdown, sank to $27 million in the first half of this year, a 75 percent drop from a year ago. Imports from China dropped to 67 percent, or $380 million.

There is some good news for Kim, as a Bloomberg report highlights that China’s industrial production has picked up growth and stopped shrinking in the retail sales sector. But China’s strong economic performance alone won’t save North Korea.

North Korea is in Severe Crisis

North Korea’s fortunes have also been affected by external factors. An unusually long monsoon season, as well as torrential rains in August, triggered floods and landslides in the nation. The natural disaster had damaged 96,300 acres of farmland and 16,680 homes, including roads and rail lines. To make matters worse, Kim refused to accept any international aid.

This is a regime that is in trouble. For decades, North Korea has been able to withstand sanctions and isolation from the outside world, but its luck may be running out now. As the country struggles with food shortages as well, the North Korean leader has ordered pet dogs to be confiscated in Pyongyang so that they can be used for meat. He claims that the pooches represent “Western decadence” and ‘a trend tainted by bourgeois ideology,” yet this is more of a desperate sign of a government that has reached its peak while failing to feed its own population.

North Korea’s situation is alarming. If its regime does not find a way to spark an economic recovery and fast, it is more than likely that both the economy and the government will collapse internally. As US sanctions are a contributing factor toward North Korea’s economic growth, Kim must ask himself an important question: are nuclear weapons more important than a starving population?

#### Reunification is key to North Korean econ growth—without it, human capital continues to deteriorate

Eberstadt 4/13 [(Nicholas, Henry Wendt Chair in Political Economy) “Economic Success for a Free and Unified Korea,” AEI, 4/13/22. <https://www.aei.org/foreign-and-defense-policy/economic-success-for-a-free-and-unified-korea/>] RR

We can begin with some economic questions about a Korean re-unification.

First of all: No one should ever forget that the continuing division of Korea comes at a very real price. It is being paid every day by North Korea’s captive population. They suffer a human rights nightmare, an oppression exquisitely perfected under three generations of totalitarian rule by the Kim dynasty. Living standards in the immiserated North are falling ever further behind those in the affluent South—and that gap will continue to widen so long as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is in charge up there.

A tourist looks north through a barbed wire fence on which South Korean flags and reunification banners are hung, at Imjingak pavilion near the demilitarised zone separating the two Koreas in Paju, about 55 km north of Seoul, August 27, 2010. REUTERS/Jo Yong-Hak

South Koreans may be seriously mistaken to assume that continuing division of the peninsula comes at no cost to them. Why do they think Pyongyang is amassing its nuclear arsenal, and building all those missiles? The North has a game-plan: and it does not include an indefinite peaceful partition. Those who price the North Korean threat around zero may be making a fateful economic miscalculation. The longer unification is postponed, the greater the potential cost of that particular reckoning.

Secondly, South Korea and her allies need to undertake the hard intellectual work to maximize the odds of a successful Korean reunification. This specifically includes policy planning in the realm of economics. Better understanding the many economic issues entailed in an integration of North and South should not be regarded as “thinking the unthinkable.”

A successful economic transition to a post-DPRK Korea will require both an unflinching eye and a humanistic vision: courage to recognize unwelcome truths, but also unwavering commitment to uphold the constitutional rights and progressively improve the lot of the Republic of Korea’s (ROK’s) newest citizens.

Since the Kim family regime continues to conceal the North’s true social and economic situation from outsiders, we cannot make a careful assessment of current conditions. But we can start with some educated guesses.

For one thing, given the DPRK’s severe technological backwardness and its woeful structural distortions, it is all too likely that the North’s capital stock is more or less worthless today in market terms, except perhaps for its scrap value. Almost all of the territory’s basic infrastructure—in transport, communications, and industry—will likely have to be torn down and rebuilt. But remember, that far-reaching reconstruction will also bring far-reaching economic promise: The North could end up with a newer and more productive plant structure than the South! Furthermore, with a businesslike approach under an auspicious business climate, such long-term projects ought to generate high rates of return: and thus could even ultimately pay for themselves.

For another, North Korea’s human capital—the health, nutrition, education and skills of its people—may now be painfully far behind that of the compatriots in the South. In a market system, such lags portend immense gaps in wages and earnings between most Northerners and most Southerners, at least initially. Even so: Given the miserable state of daily life in the DPRK today, the overwhelming majority of Northerners could expect not only a jump in living standards from unification, but a tremendous jump. And with attentive education and training—not only for the North’s rising youth cohorts, but for its working adults—productivity, and thus incomes, should subsequently start to equalize between the formerly divided populations.

If South Korea and her foreign allies and friends wish to make the peninsula’s eventual reunification an economic success, they can get to work today. We do not know when reunification will beckon, but there may be no time to lose.

A strong and credible international security architecture for the Korean peninsula will embed a united Korea in the Western family of nations and the global market system for trade and finance. Such a geopolitical commitment will not only reduce military and political uncertainties, but economic ones. To date the US-ROK alliance has served the world well, and there is a powerful argument for preserving it even after re-unification, for Northeast Asia looks to be a dangerous neighborhood even after the North Korean threat is finally gone. And if we look to the future we should also recognize the still unrealized promise of multilateral security networks for Asia—just look how those are working in Europe, in their current crisis. Crafting a strong multilateral security alliance binding Asia’s Western democracies is a great task, and will be a triumph of statesmanship.

Finally, the most important preparations for economic reunification that South Koreans can make at home today lie in ensuring the continuing success of their own economy. Over the past 20 years the ROK’s wealth has quadrupled—greater wealth means more options when reunification comes. A dynamic, entrepreneurial, technologically pioneering economy will be more capable of coping with the many challenges that integration with the North will inevitably pose. There is an urgency to continuing economic and legal reforms—including strengthening the domestic rule of law. These will stand the ROK in good stead today—all the more tomorrow, in welcoming the new citizens to a land not only of opportunity but also of fair play.

#### Reunification causes econ growth— a united Korean economy surpasses Germany, Japan and France as the north’s economy modernizes.

Bernstein 1/31 [(Jacob, a contributor at Investopedia who covers a wide range of topics from trade wars to pharmaceuticals.) “Economic Consequences of Korean Reunification,” Investopedia, 1/31/22. <https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/082515/will-north-and-south-korea-ever-reunite.asp>] RR

For many, the prospect of a united North and South Korea might seem far off. Through the heavily-armed military fencing that divides the two Koreas, few signs of reunification are apparent. The bellicose nuclear ambitions of the North, United Nations sanctions against their economy, and repeated human rights violations on the part of the government have all made unification less and less likely.

But changes in global politics—including the 2019 summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and the Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un, the April 2020 parliamentary elections in South Korea, and efforts of the global community to normalize relations between the hermit nation and its neighbors—have changed the reunification conversation. What would reunification mean for the global economy? Massive changes.

To understand what a united Korea might look like, we have to first look at how the two countries diverged after the 1953 armistice that divided the peninsula at the end of the Korean War.

North Korea

North Korea’s GDP of $40 billion is unique, to say the least. The communist country is led by a dynastic supreme leader, Kim Jong Un, who exerts power over all aspects of life in North Korea from the economy to the way people dress.

Designed after the Soviet system, the North Korean economy is centrally planned. Under the leadership of three generations of totalitarian rulers—Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un—North Korea has become one of the world’s most isolated economies, prioritizing self-reliance and militarism over all else.

Central to the country’s military and political goals is the development of nuclear weapons. North Korea’s relentless pursuit of a nuclear program brought them into conflict with the United States and the European Union, which in 2013 imposed severe economic sanctions targeting their ruling class, as well as other sectors of their economy.

Since 2016, North Korea has faced sanctions on the exporting of copper, nickel, zinc, silver, coal, iron, lead, seafood, textiles, and natural gas—all major aspects of their economy. As a result of these sanctions and severe isolation, the country has suffered from food shortages, mass starvation, underdevelopment, and mass unemployment.

As of Sept. 2019, China was North Korea’s largest trading partner, receiving 91% of its exports and making up 94% of its imports.

﻿ The isolated country’s main industries are military products, coal and iron mining, metallurgy, and textiles. Overall, economic growth in North Korea has been slow or nonexistent. From 2000-2005, the yearly GDP growth averaged about 2% compared to South Korea’s 6%.

﻿ From 2006-2010, the country experienced negative growth.

﻿ The nation's GDP growth for 2020 is estimated at -4.1% with a 5-year compound annual growth of -0.8%.

However, while North Korea may not be economically advanced, it does have plenty of unexplored and untapped natural resources, estimated to be worth trillions of dollars (most estimates give a figure of $6-$9 trillion).

﻿ This is one reason why countries like China and Russia are enthusiastic about investing in DPRK.

South Korea

South Korea’s economy is equally unique for different reasons. It’s safe to say that after the 1953 split when North Korea emphasized isolation, South Korea did the exact opposite. Now, it’s considered the 4th largest economy in Asia and the 14th largest in the world.

South Korea’s miraculous economic growth which brought the country out of poverty into the “trillion-dollar club” is popularly referred to as, “the miracle on the Han River.” In the span of a single generation, the country rapidly developed and modernized, earning it a spot in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1996 along with the world’s richest industrialized nations.

﻿ Many attribute South Korea’s economic success to its rigorous education system, which has historically produced a well-educated and highly motivated workforce.

The economy of South Korea is 40 times larger than that of North Korea in terms of GDP. According to 2019 figures, South Korea’s GDP is estimated to be $1.64 trillion.

﻿ Because the country has almost no natural resources, South Korea shifted to an export-oriented strategy and became the world’s fifth-largest exporter. While North Korea consistently runs a trade deficit, South Korea has emphasized exporting goods and services in the electronics, telecommunications, automobile, and chemical sectors.

﻿ In the United States, we see South Korean brands everywhere—like Samsung, SK Hynix, LG Chem, Hyundai Motors, Kia Corporation, and POSCO.

Reunification

North and South Korea were separated in 1953 and went down drastically different paths. The North, under a centrally planned economy, focused on isolation and the mining of its natural resources and became one of Asia’s poorest economies. The South, embracing a free market economy, worked towards global market integration and the expansion of its high-tech sectors, making it the 4th biggest Asian economy. But it is these differences that could make Korean reunification such a profound shift in the global economy.

According to a report by Goldman Sachs, a united Korean economy could surpass that of Germany or Japan in size and influence. Here’s their thought process: while the North Korean economic system appears to be in a constant state of chaos, it offers a wealth of minerals and a large and cheap workforce. Pair that with a mineral-poor South Korea that relies heavily on imports to feed its massive industry, and you’ve got growth. The report concluded that “a united Korea could overtake France, Germany and possibly Japan in 30-40 years in terms of GDP in U.S. dollar terms.”

Taking a country with an already well-established and productive free-market economy, and providing it with cheap labor and raw materials is a recipe for long-term growth and success.

How Likely Is Reunification?

In 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump held a summit with North Korean leader, Kim Jong Un. The two leaders discussed the possibility of normalized relations between their respective nations. Talks of denuclearization pointed toward potential future discussions of reunification. In the 2018 New Years' address, Un repeatedly mentioned reunification.

﻿ Three months later, in a summit in Panmunjom, the leaders of North and South Korea signed a deal committing to peace between both Koreas by the end of the year.

One of the most important changes, though, that may have gone unnoticed by many, were the elections in South Korea. On June 13, 2018, the left-leaning Minjoo Party won all but three of the country’s 17 races for mayor or governor and won 11 out of 12 open seats in the National Assembly. This means that President Moon Jae-in's party, which had been fighting for better relations with the North, strengthened its influence on policy decisions.

﻿ A consensus among South Korea will be instrumental if reunification talks begin. Here, we see a legislative and political basis for that consensus.

While reunification is still uncertain and far-off at best, economists are urging major economies to prepare for what could be a massive shake-up of world economic power.

#### Failed economic modernization leads to state collapse – the elites partner with the military, and economic missteps become more likely when the economy falters

Pagano and Kuznar 18 [Pagano, S. J. & Kuznar, L. A. (2018). Dr. Sabrina Pagano is the Global Practice Leader for DignityTRAC® and a Principal Research Scientist at NSI/NBI. Dr. Kuznar specializes in the ecological and economic features of traditional pastoral societies.Assessment of Pathways to Collapse in the DPRK: NSI Pathways™ Report. Arlington, VA: Strategic MulM-layer Assessment (SMA). Note – Nouveau Riche refers to “newly rich”, people in the DPRK who have recently acquired increased economic status]

Summary of Indicators and Warnings (I&W) This review of antecedent conditions, catalysts, and markers identifies several social changes that may constitute important indicators and warnings that the DPRK is on a pathway to collapse. These indicators and warnings include: • Major policy shifts not conducive to nouveau riche or military group interests • Further decrements in quality of life for the nouveau riche • Emergence of common nouveau riche, grassroot, or military grievances • Linkages between interest groups such as the nouveau riche and the military, which would constitute key l&W Disruptive responses to sanctions and financial crises Crisis of legitimacy far the regime, likely arising from a failure to develop the economy and improve overall conditions for the population, and especially the nouveau riche Acute or frequent procedural justice violations (to., unfair processes, as opposed to unfair outcomes) that are perceived by the grassroots as unjust Major policy shifts by the Kim government that threaten key stakeholder interests could lead to the development of commonly perceived grievances within these groups. In the case of the nouveau riche, this could resemble the currency devaluation of 2009 or some other curtailment of the emergent market economy. Such actions would at a minimum frustrate the ambitions of the nouveau riche, or worse, lead to a decrease in their quality of life. In the case of the military, crackdowns on corruption, or changes in military policy that threaten officer income or social/political status, could lead to the development of a perceived common grievance among the military officer corps. Internally and alone, the military and the nouveau riche do not appear to mount an effective challenge to the regime. However, should ties form between these interest groups, their ability to join forces (economic and military power) might be an indicator of a particularly potent challenge to regime control. Though presently unlikely, a sharp spike in the perception among the grassroots of procedural injustice could lead to anger and downstream support for punishment of the regime or system change—which might be associated with grassroots support for joint nouveau riche and military efforts to unseat or otherwise undermine the existing government. The heavy sanctions and attendant financial crisis could exacerbate any missteps of the regime. Potential indicators or warnings would be government responses to these stresses, such as increased disappearances, executions, imprisonment, or reprimands of stakeholder groups such as the donju or military officers. Any of the above indicators could have the effect of challenging and potentially undermining the legitimacy of the Kim regime and the political system upon which it is based. While these indicators mark the potential for collapse, it is as important to monitor the presence and robustness of key buffers, such as the state's ability to suppress dissent.

#### Extinction great power war – it’s higher magnitude than a North Korean lash out and causes loose chemical and biological weapons

Kazianis 17 [Kazianis, Harry J. Harry J. Kazianis is director of Korean Studies at the Center for the National Interest. He also serves as executive editor of its publishing arm, The National Interest. "Why the sudden collapse of North Korea would be hell on Earth." The Week, 22 Mar. 2017, theweek.com/articles/681846/why-sudden-collapse-north-korea-hell-earth.]

But in all fairness, there is one event possibly even more perilous than Pyongyang showing itself capable of launching a nuclear attack on Asia or America. Oddly enough, it is something many experts over the last few weeks have been rooting for — the collapse of North Korea's government. On the surface, the downfall of Pyongyang would seem like an unquestionable good thing, the death of a totalitarian state that should have long ago been tossed into the dustbin of history. However, just a quick walkthrough of what could happen in an uncontrolled collapse sends shivers down the spine of anyone who has studied the subject in detail — a topic that has been grossly underexamined in popular media considering the stakes. While a full review of the possible ways the North Korean state could meet its end is worthy of its own separate treatment, the dangers after a sudden collapse are quite clear. For our purposes, let us assume an internal event has caused the Kim family dynasty to come to a quick death. There is no central government and allied forces comprised of South Korea and the United States are moving across the 38th parallel to ensure order. What could be so bad? Well, for starters, there would be immediate concern over who has control over not only of Pyongyang's nuclear and atomic materials, but its perhaps much larger chemical and biological weapons stockpiles as well. While sometimes an afterthought, North Korea's chemical and biological weapons might be a much a bigger threat than its nuclear program. Most research points to Pyongyang having large quantities of chemical weapons — on display recently in the apparent assassination of Kim Jong Nam, the half-brother of Kim Jong Un — as well as a biological weapons programs capable of killing millions. U.S. and allied forces would surely need to mount an unprecedented intelligence effort to not only locate almost all of these materials but protect themselves from chemical or biological weapon attacks by forces who could be still vying for power. Allied forces would also need to ensure that no weapons of mass destruction left the country — a non-proliferation nightmare of the worst kind. As if potential loose weapons of mass destruction were not enough, there is an even more basic problem — that of a shattered society. How does one put back together a people broken by almost seven decades of being ruled as if they were slaves? How will the average North Korean, who only knows the Kim family, react to the end of the regime? Would some take up arms against those who would be there to ensure order? Is civil war a possibility? One thing is quite clear: It could take decades, but more likely generations, to wipe away the scars of psychological, emotional, and surely spiritual torture that was suffered. Then there is China. Beijing would obviously be a player in any future of North Korea, especially as its largest trading partner, providing Pyongyang with much of its food and energy needs. In fact, many national security experts in China are quick to point out that the Chinese Communist Party's greatest international worry is the collapse of the North Korean state. They fear a united Korea would become a major player in Northeast Asia, allied with America and armed with Washington's best weapons and troops. And if millions of refugees started coming across the border into China, President Xi Jinping might send his own forces into North Korea — where a superpower showdown between Washington and Beijing could be in the offing. And last, the sheer cost of rebuilding and reintegrating the North back into a united Korea would likely be in the trillions of dollars. Who would pay such costs? While South Korea is certainly an economic powerhouse, rebuilding and integrating North Korea into the south would be a historic undertaking — far greater than the merger of East and West Germany after the end of the Cold War. Back in 2013, a defector described North Korea as a "gulag masquerading as a country" — perhaps the perfect description for the most imperfect of regimes. But while the people of North Korea clearly deserve better, free of what can only be described as the vilest forms of state-sanctioned terror ever devised, a spontaneous, uncontrolled collapse could cost millions of people their lives. All the more reason for the Trump administration to act cautiously in the months to come.

#### CBW causes extinction

Sandberg, 8 -- Oxford University Future of Humanity Institute research fellow

[Anders, PhD in computation neuroscience, and Milan Cirkovic, senior research associate at the Astronomical Observatory of Belgrade, "How can we reduce the risk of human extinction?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 9-9-2008, thebulletin.org/how-can-we-reduce-risk-human-extinction, accessed 8-13-14]

The risks from anthropogenic hazards appear at present larger than those from natural ones. Although great progress has been made in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world, humanity is still threatened by the possibility of a global thermonuclear war and a resulting nuclear winter. We may face even greater risks from emerging technologies. Advances in synthetic biology might makeit possible to engineerpathogens capable ofextinction-levelpandemics. The knowledge, equipment, and materials needed to engineer pathogens are more accessible than those needed to build nuclear weapons. And unlike other weapons, pathogens are self-replicating, allowing a small arsenal to become exponentially destructive. Pathogens have been implicated in the extinctions of many wild species. Although most pandemics "fade out" by reducing the density of susceptible populations, pathogens with wide host ranges in multiple species can reach even isolated individuals. The intentional or unintentional release of engineered pathogens with high transmissibility, latency, and lethality might be capable of causing **human extinction**. While such an event seems unlikely today, the likelihood may increase as biotechnologies continue to improve at a rate rivaling Moore's Law.

## Adv - Gendered Violence

#### Female refugees flee to China in hopes of getting to South Korea but are subjected to high levels of gendered violence

**Engstran et al 20** [(Erin Engstran, Caitlin Flynn and Meg Harris,Erin Engstran is a Master's candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University where she studies issues related to humanitarian affairs and gender. Caitlin Flynn is a Master's candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University where she focuses on issues related to gender and human security. Meg Harris is a Master's candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Her studies at Fletcher focus primarily on international communication and public diplomacy, as well as Pacific Asia) “Gender and Migration from North Korea”, Princeton Journal of Public and International Affairs, 5/1/20, https://jpia.princeton.edu/news/gender-and-migration-north-korea#0] kzheng

Migration out of North Korea is a story of women and gendered policies. The brutal North Korean dictatorship, upheld by a system of corruption and abuse, is responsible for egregious human rights abuses, many of which are gendered and have contributed to changing migration demographics out of North Korea. Thousands of defectors, now predominantly women, risk torture and execution each year to flee North Korea for a chance to escape the repressive regime. Many arrive in China with the ultimate goal of reaching South Korea, but are seized by Chinese officials and sent back to North Korea before completing the journey—in violation of China’s legal obligations to uphold the principle of non-refoulement as a signatory to the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention.[**[1]**](https://jpia.princeton.edu/news/gender-and-migration-north-korea#1) Faced with the prospect of repatriation, female refugees are especially vulnerable to abuse, as they lack the means and social networks to travel, work, protect themselves, and report abuse. Along the perilous journey, female refugees consistently negotiate trade-offs between their immediate personal safety and long-term security, often exchanging one type of gendered violence for another. Policies and interventions designed to support female refugees from North Korea cannot be successful without a deep understanding of the gendered aspects of their migration.



#### Migration attempts have skyrocketed for women---gendered violence in both North Korea and in indirect migration pathways make it highly dangerous and often idealistic

**Engstran et al 20** [(Erin Engstran, Caitlin Flynn and Meg Harris,Erin Engstran is a Master's candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University where she studies issues related to humanitarian affairs and gender. Caitlin Flynn is a Master's candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University where she focuses on issues related to gender and human security. Meg Harris is a Master's candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Her studies at Fletcher focus primarily on international communication and public diplomacy, as well as Pacific Asia) “Gender and Migration from North Korea”, Princeton Journal of Public and International Affairs, 5/1/20, https://jpia.princeton.edu/news/gender-and-migration-north-korea#0] kzheng

There are many motivating factors that push North Koreans to risk the dangers associated with escape. The gendered aspects of state-perpetuated human rights abuses and patriarchal societal structures have pushed women to leave at higher rates than men. Between 1998 and 2002, the gender balance of DPRK migrants fleeing to South Korea flipped from mostly male to predominantly female. While in 1998 women made up only 12 percent of refugees into South Korea, by 2002 female migration reached 55 percent and stood at 80 percent in 2019 (South Korean Ministry of Unification 2020). STATE ABUSES AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) is responsible for some of the world’s worst human rights abuses. North Koreans live with frequent power outages, information embargoes, and arbitrary detention. As punishment for unproven crimes, people are sent to labor camps and even sentenced to death. Anyone who is perceived to be a threat of any kind to Kim Jong-un’s regime may be labeled an enemy of the state and subjected to beatings, systematic starvation, and torture (United Nations Human Rights Council 2014, 240). Perceived political crimes are punished for three generations in order to eliminate “factionalists and class enemies” (United Nations Human Rights Council 2014, 63). Sexual violence is endemic in North Korean detention. According to a report from the UN Human Rights Council, female prisoners are coerced into providing sexual favors in exchange for food or less severe labor assignments. A 2014 Human Rights Council report noted, “The guards had the prettier among the female inmates sit close to the bars, so that they could grope their breasts. The same witness also knew several women who agreed to sexual contacts with the guards to receive more than the usual starvation rations or other benefits that allowed them to survive” (United Nations Human Rights Council 2014, 255). Female prisoners are punished for pregnancies. They may be given harsher labor assignments, subjected to forced abortions, or executed. Children born in state detention are killed without exception (United Nations Human Rights Council 2014, 238). Officials perpetrate sexual violence with impunity, and women very rarely report abuse for fear of reprisal. Women in state custody experience longer periods of detention, beatings, or forced labor if they attempt to refuse the officials or speak out (Human Rights Watch 2018, 2). North Korean women who are routinely harassed, sexually assaulted, and arbitrarily detained by authorities and law enforcement officials are especially incentivized to escape the abuse by fleeing North Korea. ABUSE IN THE DOMESTIC SPHERE Gender inequality is deeply embedded in North Korean society. Although the state was founded and organized based on the principles of Marxist communism, patriarchal interpretations of Confucianism have played a major role in shaping North Korean society (Lim 2018). Women and men are deeply segregated in most parts of daily life, ranging from work assignments to gender-segregated dinner tables, where women receive smaller portions of food (Demick 2008, 13-14). Studies have found that an alarming 70 percent of North Korean women are routinely abused by their husbands, and there are no legal sanctions against domestic violence (Um et al. 2016, 2038). Language in North Korea fundamentally lacks the vocabulary to discuss sexual, gender-based, and domestic violence, which contributes to the underreporting of abuse (Human Rights Watch 2018, 14). Despite well-documented systemic sexual abuse at the state and domestic levels, in 2015 there were only five rape convictions in all of North Korea. North Korean officials tout this statistic as proof of a society free from sexual violence (Human Rights Watch 2018, 14). Instead, this statistic illustrates the dearth of protections for survivors of abuse and the lack of accountability mechanisms. Abhorrent human rights violations have forced up to 200,000 North Koreans to attempt to escape through China, and the gender-specific violence has been a factor in the increasingly female migration flow out of North Korea (Korea Future Initiative 2019, 12). FAMINE AND CHANGING ROLES OF WOMEN Famine put increased stress on women, with many shifting into informal markets to compensate for the collapse of the state and their livelihoods. In the early days of its independence, North Korea promised major advances in gender equality, guaranteeing women’s empowerment and liberation from domestic work. In reality, women faced the double burden of formal employment, restricted to traditionally feminized roles, on top of their existing domestic duties which generally included cooking, housekeeping, and child care (Haggard and Noland 2013, 52). Food production and distribution in North Korea were centralized under a strictly regulated system. Collectivized farms produced agricultural outputs and food was distributed to citizens through the Public Distribution System (PDS). In the 1990s, political and economic mismanagement by the state led to a terrible famine in North Korea. The famine was exacerbated by a series of decisions by North Korean officials that prioritized political elites at the expense of the general population. Common estimates place the total number of famine-related fatalities between one million and three million people (Weissman 2011). The famine shattered any illusions of North Korean self-sufficiency. Without the backing of the Soviet Union, North Korea’s institutions, including the PDS, could not support its population. Many North Koreans still live each day with food shortages caused by state negligence and an intentionally unequal distribution of resources. It is not uncommon for young children to suffer chronic malnutrition, and many subsequently die of starvation (Nebehay 2018). In fact, one in five children in North Korea today is stunted as a result of chronic malnutrition (WFP DPR Korea Country Brief 2019). While they were especially salient during and immediately following the famine, food insecurity and hunger are still cited as reasons for leaving North Korea today (Noland and Haggard 2011, 29). When they could no longer rely on the state for food distribution, farmers created jangmadang, informal markets, that spread across the country (Wilson Center 2002). Despite their illegality, the markets flourished as people sought new ways to feed themselves and their families. The marketization of North Korea was born of necessity to cope with state failures, and only years later were policies changed to accommodate this shift. Women lost their jobs with state-owned enterprises at higher rates than men, because working for the state was considered “men’s work” (Haggard and Nolan 2013, 53). Unemployed women often tried to make money in the emerging market system. Although the specific goods varied based on the resources available in each region, women often sold used household items, homemade snacks, crops grown in private gardens, and sometimes smuggled goods from other countries. As government resources dwindled and men were less likely to be paid on time or at all, many families came to rely heavily on the income generated by female traders at informal markets. Gender roles shifted and women took on a larger share of financial responsibility. Women had greater freedom of movement and were surveilled less than men because the government viewed them as less of a security threat. Women, dealing with the harsh reality of an increased economic burden and dwindling food supply, became increasingly likely to consider migration a viable option. The famine forced a fundamental shift in the socioeconomic structure of the North Korean state. The famine provided the opportunity for women to gain some financial autonomy through market trading, and learn about the wealth and freedom of the world outside of North Korea through access to Western goods. However, the illegality of the informal market system left women vulnerable to abuse and manipulation by the predominantly male authorities (Haggard and Nolan 2013, 51-66). Even after the government loosened restrictions on the markets, they continued to operate in a legal gray area, and market officials continued to harass, intimidate, and demand bribes, which often included sexual abuse of the female traders (Human Rights Watch 2018, 6, 56). Women, dealing with the harsh reality of an increased economic burden and dwindling food supply, became increasingly likely to consider migration a viable option. Although men and women were involved in cross-border trading with China, men continued day trips across the border to China for economic activity, including trade and day laboring, whereas women began leaving without intending to return (Human Rights Watch 2018). As the famine worsened, North Korean women began to leave the country in record numbers.

#### The DMZ makes it impossible for immediate refuge by direct North-South migration, necessitating passage through China

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Several factors explain why North Koreans do not, or more accurately cannot, move directly from North Korea to South Korea but instead pass through China.

First, the demilitarized zone (DMZ) that separates the two countries along the 38th parallel is patrolled by armed North and South Korean soldiers and is laden with active landmines and electrified fences.

Second, human mobility within North Korea is highly restricted, and most North Koreans must obtain permission even to travel to areas just outside of their residence and employment.

#### North Korean female refugees are specifically targeted and swept into the sex trafficking industry in China during passage

Ochab 19 [(Ewelina U. Ochab, Dr. Ewelina U. Ochab is a human rights advocate, author and co-founder of the Coalition for Genocide Response) “Trafficking of North Korean Women in China”, Forbes, 7/1/19, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ewelinaochab/2019/07/01/trafficking-of-north-korean-women-in-china/?sh=36c51f177af0 ] kzheng

In May 2019, Korea Future Initiative published a [report](https://www.koreafuture.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Korea_Future_Initiative-Sex_Slaves.pdf) about the situation faced by North Korean women in China. It alleged that these women were subjected to systematic rape, sex trafficking, sexual slavery, sexual abuse, prostitution, cybersex trafficking, forced marriage and forced pregnancy. The report is the fruit of over two years of research and interviews with more than 45 North Korean women and girls who were subjected to sexual slavery in China. The report suggests that tens of thousands of North Korean women and girls were trafficked into China and sold into the sex trade. It identifies that North Korean women and girls are uniquely vulnerable to sex trafficking and the sex trade. It also emphasizes that it is the demand for sex slaves in China that is fuelling the exploitation and abuse of North Korean women and girls. The business of the sale of North Korean women is worth an estimated $105 million annually. It is a business that will not cease without intervention and certainly not until an organized international effort is underway. These North Korean women were forced out of North Korea as a result of atrocities perpetrated by the North Korean regime. They are “passed through the hands of traffickers, brokers, and criminal organizations before being pulled into China’s sex trade, where they are exploited and used by men until their bodies are depleted.” One of the survivors, Park Jihyuan, wrote in the foreword of the report that: Trafficked into China, I was deceived by a broker and sold into marriage for ¥5000 Chinese Yuan ($720 United States Dollars). I spent six years as a slave. I gave birth to a son. I was arrested by Chinese police. And I was repatriated to North Korea. For the ‘crime’ of being trafficked and sold, the Government of North Korea incarcerated me in a camp where I was forced to endure acts that will haunt me for the rest of my life.” The report found that the majority of victims are women and girls between the ages of 12 and 29. Many of them are sold more than once and subjected to different types of abuse. The report identifies that “An estimated 60% of female North Korean refugees in China are trafficked into the sex trade. Of that number, close to 50% are forced into prostitution, over 30% sold into forced marriage, and 15% pressed into cybersex.” The primary pathway into the sex trade is prostitution (which has overtaken forced marriage). Prostitution primarily targets women and girls between the ages of 15 and 25 who are subjected to the most violent sexual acts. Generally speaking, prostitution is a significant issue in China with the business [reportedly](http://www.apple.com/) contributing 6% to China’s gross-domestic-product. Many of the brothels masquerade as service providers or entertainment, for example, “bathhouses, saunas, karaoke bars, cafes, massage parlours, beauty parlours, barbershops, hair salons, small hotels, and restaurants.” According to the report, victims are subjected to “penetrative vaginal rape, groping, forced masturbation, and gang-rape” many undergoing such treatment several times a night. One victim recalled: I was sold [to a brothel] with six other North Korean women at a hotel. We were not given much food and were treated badly (...) After eight months, half of us were sold again. The broker did bad things to me. When I arrived [at the new brothel] I had bruises on my body.” Cybersex trafficking (“the recruitment and transportation of victims and their live-streamed rape, sexual abuse, and sexual exploitation by traffickers, some of whom operate under the instructions of a paying online audience”) is also becoming more prevalent. Its victims are often girls as young as 9 years of age who are “forced to perform graphic sex acts and are sexually assaulted in front of webcams which are live-streamed to a paying global audience, many of whom are believed to be South Korean men.” A cybersex live-stream featuring a North Korean girl between 9 and 14 years of age can cost between $60-$110, more than of any older women and girl. One woman described her anguish: We only had one room where we slept and ate. It was small. The windows were always closed so nobody could see us and it became very hot (...) If we fell asleep when we were waiting [for online clients], [the trafficker’s wife] was told and she would stab us repeatedly with a sewing needle. She used a sewing needle so the marks would not show on the camera.” The practice of forced marriage, which is omnipresent in China, also affects North Korean women who “continue to be bought, raped, exploited, and enslaved by Chinese husbands.” These issues, so far as they affect women and girls from North Korea, remain greatly underreported and have yet to be addressed. They suffer in silence and beyond the public eye. They escaped one regime just to be abused by yet another perpetrator who prays on their vulnerability. It may appear that there are inherent difficulties in ensuring that those responsible, especially those in China, will be brought to justice, but they must. However, some of the perpetrators, especially the service users of cybersex, live in countries that are proud of their human rights records. Combating issues like the abuse of children through cybersex will be the real test of whether their human rights records are sound. One may not be able to put an end to the abuse North Korean women suffer in China but small steps can be taken to address the issues, step by step.

#### The DMZ is a physical & psychological barrier for women and disallows the easy flow of migrants---plan is prereq to establishing peace on the peninsula

JeongAe 19 [(Ahn-Kim JeongAe is a member of the Presidential Truth Commission on Deaths in the Military (South Korea) and was representative of Women Making Peace, founded in South Korea in March 1997 as a women’s peace movement organization) “Women Making Peace in Korea: The DMZ Ecofeminist Farm Project”, Social Justice, 2019, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26873838>] kzheng

The DMZ is a site of confrontation and conflict, with over a million land mines, that is heavily militarized by all sides—including both North and South Korea, as well as the US military. The DMZ has also been a serious economic and psychological barrier for the people of North and South Korea. The continued existence of the DMZ is used as justification for the stationing of US troops in South Korea and maintaining the unequal Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the United States and South Korea. From 1971 to the present, South Korean and UN representatives have proposed numerous peaceful alternative uses of the DMZ, but none of them have been actualized so far (see Appendix 1). The Panmunjom Declaration highlights the creation of a peace zone in the DMZ as essential, a view echoed during the 2018 Women’s Peace Walk, when women demanded that the DMZ be turned into a peace zone (see Appendix 2). We need a project that transforms the DMZ into a zone of North and South Korean women’s peaceful coexistence, a communal space where life and peace are valued.

## Plan texts

#### The Republic of Korea and The Democratic People's Republic of Korea ought to adopt open borders for human migration across the Korean Military Demarcation Line and Demilitarized Zone

#### Justice requires open borders for human migration across the Korean Military Demarcation Line and Demilitarized Zone

## Solvency

#### Immediate open borders cause Korean Reunification

Kim 03 [Beom Soo Kim, May 2003, University of Southern California, An essay on Korean reunification : spatial effects of regional integration and is implications for regional and transportation policies, https://academic.naver.com/article.naver?doc\_id=79473745 HKR-MK]

Hence, this study will supplement the limited data by testing analogies from around the world in the Korean context. For example, German reunification provides evidence of the need to fill transportation infrastructure gaps when borders are opened with some detailed insights about new economic landscape caused by labor migration. The U.S.—Mexico border illustrates the problems of huge cross-border income differentials, with the possibility of building low-income housing and factories close to the North-South border as a deterrent to migration south, which would result in major absorption problems in Seoul. The

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China-Hong Kong case offers how the border between North and South Korea can be controlled while the two Koreas maintain their own political sovereignty over their own territory. The extreme reunification strategies are i. immediate open borders; and ii. major investments in infrastructure and job creation in the North for an interim period combined with semi-closed borders. At present, the latter approach appears more attractive, but it would require a detailed spatial development plan for the interim development of the North and the subsequent integration of the North and South Korean economies. Designing a feasible plan is a major objective of this research.

#### Most likely implementation - prefer the:

Constitutional Handbook on Korean Unification 2002 [Constitutional Handbook on Korean Unification, 2002, Volume 1, Chapter 4 "The Case of Korean Unification, Page 280 HKR-MK]

In a second phase, the main emphasis should be put on building democratic structures "from below". To reach improved standards, the participation possibilities of the North Korean population will have to be increased. This includes the freedom of information and organization. At the end of the interim period -after a process of economic adjustment or a reasonable amount of time- North Korea would participate in the elections to the national assembly and thus become an equal part of the unified Korea with open borders and a legal unity.

#### Aff is goldilocks - preserves both regimes but reshapes NoKo

Robertson 21 [Heidi Robertson, 09-24-2021, A Roadmap to Permanent Peace in The Korean Peninsula: A Three-Step Plan to Unite North, South Korea, York St John University HKR-MK]

It could be possible to have open borders similar to those in the United Kingdom, they could be a united Korea even while being different countries and governments. Trade would be made much easier, food and resources can be traded which should lead to economic growth, creating more jobs and improved living conditions for millions of North Koreans.

#### Alternatives fail - plan is key to effective engagement and NoKo reform

OH and HASSIG 01 [KONGDAN OH and RALPH C. HASSIG, The Journal of East Asian Affairs, "Guessing Right and Guessing Wrong about Engagement," Vol. 15, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 2001), pp. 15-41 (27 pages), https://www.jstor.org/stable/23255896 HKR-MK]

An effective engagement policy must begin with a clear definition of goals. One of the shortcomings of the sunshine policy's "comprehensive reciprocity" principle is that it seeks to achieve the broad goals of pacifying, opening and reforming North Korea by relying on the limited web of contacts made available by the temperamental Kim Jong-Il government. Upon closer examination, a serious contradiction lurks in these goals. The sunshine policy explicitly renounces the desire to absorb North Korea, with President Kim speaking of achieving reunification only after a period of 20 or 30 years. Yet accomplishing political and economic reforms in the North will require open borders, which would invite millions of North Koreans to seek a better life in the South, thus marking a significant first step toward reunification by absorption. The choice for South Korea is confusing: either accept a continuation of the status quo on the Korean peninsula, with slow improvements made in the North's economy, or work for significant change in North Korean society to achieve opening and reform, inviting early reunification. In the context of U.S.-South Korean policy coordination, it should be noted that Washington's engagement goals are more clear cut: an elimination of North Korea's WMD arsenal and a reduction in its conventional forces. This would be a clear departure from the status quo.

#### Absent the plan the future is no engagement

Park 3-10 [Ju-Min Park, 3-10-2022, Analysis: New S.Korea president may be a nail in the coffin of N.Korea engagement, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/new-skorea-president-may-be-nail-coffin-nkorea-engagement-2022-03-10/ HKR-MK]

Resuming it is among the many efforts at engagement that appear on hold for the foreseeable future amid Pyongyang's increasingly confrontational moves and Yoon's vow to take a harder line on the North.

"I wish there is a miracle. But I am afraid under the Yoon government, South-North Korea relations will only get worse, even to a level where there will be provocative acts and exchanges," said Park. His Rok-Sec Garments now makes a sixth of what it used to in Kaesong, he said, without providing exact amounts.

Yoon's victory may be a nail in the coffin for outgoing President Moon Jae-in's policy of engagement with North Korea, which failed to make meaningful headway throughout his term.

Yoon, a former prosecutor with no foreign policy background, has pledged a muscular military strategy and said pre-emptive strikes may be the only ways to counter an imminent launch by North Korea's new hypersonic missiles.

The president-elect's team said he will seek to restart talks with North Korea, but on the condition that it takes concrete actions to denuclearise.

They also call for boosting military deterrence including by strengthening ties with Washington.

"I will sternly respond to North Korea's illegal and unreasonable acts according to principles but always leave the door open for South-North dialogue," Yoon said in his first public policy speech as president-elect on Thursday.

Yoon's presidency may see more heated rhetoric, but analysts and campaign aides say North Korea already appears set on a course toward escalation, at least in the short term, regardless of who occupies the South's presidential Blue House.

North Korea tested a record number of missiles in January, has suggested it could resume testing of nuclear bombs or intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and appears to be preparing to launch a spy satellite.

International monitors have also reported activity at North Korea's main nuclear reactor and test site.

"I expect North Korea to raise tensions more, soon, and sufficiently for Yoon to not even be able to pay lip service to the notion of engagement," said Christopher Green, a Korea specialist at Leiden University in the Netherlands.

#### China, SoKo, US all follow on

Kydd ‘15 [Andrew H. Kydd, The Washington Quarterly, “Pulling the Plug: Can There Be a Deal with China on Korean Unification?”, 38:2; DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2015.1064710, PhD, U Chicago, Professor at Department of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin, pg. 68-69, HKR-MK]

The Outlines of a Deal What kind of deal could enlist Chinese support for unification at a price tolerable to South Korea and the United States? China would have to withdraw support for the North Korean regime in order to pressure it to join the ROK. To convince the North Korean leadership to leave power, it would be very helpful to offer them asylum in China, permanently protecting them from criminal trials or reprisals.17 South Korea would have to agree to reunification with the North on the condition that it immediately dismantles the North Korean nuclear program under full international inspections and reaffirms Korea’s adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapons state. The United States would have to agree to reduce its role in Korea. It would almost certainly have to withdraw its military forces from united Korea, and possibly scale back or eliminate its alliance relationship as well. Korea could be “neutralized,” much as Austria was early in the Cold War, to remove it from the superpower competition.18 The key quid pro quo is Chinese termination of support for the North in exchange for U.S. withdrawal from the South. What would each of the major players have to gain from such a deal? China would reap benefits in at least four areas. First, it would see U.S. troops off the continent of Asia. China views U.S. troops as a threat that is bad enough for now, but would be **even worse** if Korea unified, with U.S. troops moving north to the Yalu. Second, a deal would eliminate other security threats generated by North Korea, in particular the possibility of war—even nuclear war—on the Korean peninsula. Third, a unified Korea would be an economic dynamo for northern China, contributing to investment and cross-border prosperity.19 Finally, it would permanently end the refugee problem posed by northern poverty. It’s true that there would be a temporary period of instability and migration within Korea and possibly across the Korean-Chinese border, but South Korea would have to take responsibility for this issue and the problem would diminish with time, as it did in the German case. Two downsides of unification may prove especially salient for China, in addition to the fear of contagion mentioned above. First, the fall of the DPRK would deprive China of a lever against the United States: China may believe that North Korea is useful in the overall relationship with the United States because it poses a threat to the United States that only China can help manage. Once North Korea goes, they may feel, the United States will feel more able to push China harder on other issues such as the territorial disputes with Japan and other Southeast Asian nations. Second, in losing the DPRK, China would lose its buffer against South Korea. Given how close South Korea is to the United States and Japan, this is a serious consideration. However, geopolitical alignments are not fixed in stone. A unified Korea next to a friendly China would almost certainly grow more distant from the United States and even more so from Japan.20 Korean-Japanese cooperation is a product of strategic necessity, one that papers over deep animosities resulting from a half century of colonization and war. In that regard, Korea shares much more with China than Japan. An intelligent Chinese policy toward a unified Korea could draw it away from its Cold War friends and toward China, securing China’s northeast flank much better than a bankrupt DPRK could. For South Korea, the key question is whether unification is worth a reduction in ties to the United States to facilitate Chinese acceptance. Unification has not been uncontroversial in South Korean politics.21 Some South Koreans see North Koreans as increasingly different, and view unification as costly and unnecessary. However, President Park Geun-hye, who took office in February 2013, has embraced a pro-unification platform and an optimistic view of the economic consequences of reunification, emphasizing opportunity rather than costs.22 South Koreans might prefer unification with U.S. troops to unification without, but given the choice between unification without U.S. troops and continued or perhaps permanent division, a majority would probably support unification. Turning to the United States, a deal holds at least two major advantages. First, the United States has long stood for peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula under democratic rule from Seoul. The deal would make that goal a reality. Second, analysts across the political spectrum agree that a major security concern facing the United States today is nuclear terrorism. Stopping the proliferation of fissile material production capabilities to states that might use them irresponsibly is a key task in addressing that threat. North Korea, in its quest to survive, might sell related technologies abroad, or even fissile material itself.23 This would be an extraordinary threat: once fissile material is in the hands of terrorists, they would have overcome the main hurdle to building atomic bombs and destroying U.S. cities.

#### Noko agrees - regime priorities and Chinese pressure

Kydd ‘15 [Andrew H. Kydd, The Washington Quarterly, “Pulling the Plug: Can There Be a Deal with China on Korean Unification?”, 38:2; DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2015.1064710, PhD, U Chicago, Professor at Department of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin, pg. 70-71, HKR-MK]

Finally, what about North Korea itself? Pyongyang’s leadership would definitely be opposed to any move to unification. However, we should not write off the possibility that they would consent under duress. Given the decay of communist ideology, by this point, the central motivation of the North Korean leadership is probably a mixture of greed and concern for their personal safety. But given the fragility of the regime, they are riding a tiger and need help to dismount. China could meet this need with a guarantee of asylum in China for the top leaders (which should be combined with an amnesty offer from South Korea for lower-level officials who remains in Korea). To the extent that they also wish to save face and appear to have prevailed in their struggle with U.S. imperialism, the deal offers them a semblance of their long-standing goal: eliminating U.S. troops from Korea and achieving unification “by our nation itself,” as the North Koreans like to put it. A suitable transition could be arranged with a referendum on unification and Korea-wide elections for a new parliament, which would highlight the role of all Koreans in the process. If North Korean leaders prove unmoved by this vision, Chinese economic sanctions would confront them with a downward slope into complete economic collapse. North Korea is dependent on China for energy and food.27 Hitherto, however dissatisfied China was with North Korean behavior, there were strict limits on how much coercive leverage China could apply because it did not want the regime to collapse. With a negotiated deal in place, this preference would disappear, and the self-imposed limits on China’s coercive leverage would disappear along with it. The North could of course threaten war, so the end-game would require delicate handling.

# 1AR

## 1AR - T - Borders

#### We meet - the DMZ is a demarcation

History.Com 10 [History, 6-14-2010, Demilitarized Zone, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/korea/demilitarized-zone HKR-MK]

The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) is a region on the Korean peninsula that demarcates North Korea from South Korea. Roughly following the 38th parallel, the 150-mile-long DMZ incorporates territory on both sides of the cease-fire line as it existed at the end of the Korean War (1950–53). The areas north and south of the demarcation are heavily fortified, though skirmishes between the two sides are rare. Located within the territory is the “truce village” of P’anmunjom, but most of the rest of the land has reverted to nature, making it one of the most pristine undeveloped areas in Asia.

#### It divides - must be a border

**KKAB no date** [Korea Konsult AB - adventures to another world!, (), no date, “Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) guide, North Korea“, https://www.koreakonsult.com/Attraction\_DMZ\_eng.html] ndsjag

The Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) is a strip of land running across the Korean Peninsula that serves as a buffer zone between North and South Korea. The DMZ is a de facto border barrier, which runs in the vicinity of the 38th parallel north — which divides the Korean Peninsula roughly in half. The 38th parallel was the original boundary between the United States and Soviet brief administration areas of Korea at the end of World War II. Upon the creation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) in 1948, it became a de facto international border and one of the most tense fronts in the Cold War.

NOTE: the border between North and South Korea is closed, meaning that NOBODY can cross the border between two Koreas: there is no way to travel directly from South Korea to the DPR Korea, or other way around. To travel between Koreas one needs to transfer to a third country first, for example, to China or Russia. The only place where it is possible to make a couple of steps into an opposite side is T1-T3 conference rooms also known as blue houses - tent-like one-story buildings sitting just at the demarcation line.

#### Counterinterp: Borders are real or artificial lines that separates geographic areas

National Geographic ND, Diane Boudreau, Melissa McDaniel, Erin Sprout, Andrew Turgeon, National Geographic Encyclopedia, <https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/border> /tanya

A border is a real or artificial line that separates geographic areas. Borders are political boundaries. They separate countries, states, provinces, counties, cities, and towns. A border outlines the area that a particular governing body controls. The government of a region can only create and enforce laws within its borders.

Borders change over time. Sometimes the people in one region take over another area through violence. Other times, land is traded or sold peacefully. Many times, land is parceled out after a war through international agreements.

Borders—particularly national borders—affect travel and migration. People can usually move freely within their own country’s borders, but may not be allowed to cross into a neighboring country.

On the opposite extreme, the Korean Demilitarized Zone—the border between communist North Korea and democratic South Korea—is the most heavily militarized border in the world. The zone, which is 4 kilometers (2.5 miles) wide and 243 kilometers (151 miles) long, separates the two countries with barbed-wire fences, land mines, and armed guards. Citizens of most countries must have a passport and official permission to enter the borders of North Korea. North Koreans must also have official permission before they leave the secretive nation.

Most countries have some sort of military or law-enforcement presence along their borders. Countries protect their borders for several reasons. One is to keep out invaders. This is especially true in areas where two or more countries have fought over the same land for many years. Cambodia and Thailand, for example, have disputed the territory of the Preah Vihear Temple for more than a century. Cambodian and Thai military units are positioned along the border near Preah Vihear Temple, and skirmishes often result in deaths on both sides.

Sometimes, borders serve to keep citizens in. Most governments with these “closed borders” are not democratic. In addition to North Korea, nations such as Myanmar and Cuba rarely allow their residents to cross their borders.

Many border disputes occur when people fight over natural resources. For instance, Sudan and Egypt have quarreled for decades over a region called Hala’ib. This triangle of land along the Red Sea is rich in the mineral manganese, which is essential to iron and steel production. It is also used as an additive in unleaded gasoline. The Sudanese government claims the land rightfully belongs to Sudan, but it currently belongs to Egypt.

Many times, political borders divide groups of people who share a common religion, culture, ancestry, or language. The border between North Korea and South Korea, for example, is a purely political one; the Korean people share a united history, culture, and language. The nation of Germany was divided between East Germany and West Germany from 1949-1989. Like the Korean border, this was a purely political division, between the democratic West and the communist East. Germany reunified in 1990, and the border disappeared.

#### Borders can be physical

SSUS n.d. [StudySmarter US, (no date), “Types of Borders: Definition &amp; Examples“,

https://www.studysmarter.us/explanations/geography/migration-and-identity/types-of borders/] ndsjag

Borders–Definition

Borders are geographic boundaries that can be divided into physical borders and political borders. It can be a real or artificial line that separates geographic areas.

#### DMZ's are borders

Wikipedia n.d. [Wikipedia, xx-xx-xxxx, "Border," https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Border HKR-MK]

A demilitarized zone (DMZ) is a border separating two or more nations, groups or militaries that have agreed to prohibit the use of military activity or force within the border's bounds. A DMZ can act as a war boundary, ceasefire line, wildlife preserve, or a de facto international border. An example of a demilitarized international border is the 38th parallel between North and South Korea.[24] Other notable DMZ zones include Antarctica and outer space (consisting of all space 100 miles away from the earth's surface), both are preserved for world research and exploration.[25][26] The prohibition of control by nations can make a DMZ unexposed to human influence and thus developed into a natural border or wildlife preserve, such as on the Korean Demilitarized Zone, the Vietnamese Demilitarized Zone, and the Green Line in Cyprus.[27][28]

#### True for Korea - reject ev divorced from context

Ullah 18 [A. K. M. Ahsan Ullah and Asiyah Az-Zahra Ahmad Kumpoh, December 2018, Sage Publications, Inc. "Are Borders the Reflection of International Relations? Southeast Asian Borders in Perspective," Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 3, pg. 304, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/48602179, HKR-MK]

Fortified borders are generally created for military and, sometimes, violent encounters with other countries or cultural groups (Collins, 2008; Kaur, 2006) (i.e., Hadrian’s Wall, Korean DMZ, Israel–Palestine Wall, Western Sahara Berm), but more commonly for immigration and economic reasons (e.g., the USA–Mexico, India–Bangladesh, Iron Curtain). Of the about 195 international land borders, only 42 were/are fortified (Andreas, 2003), from wired fences to militarized. And 57 per cent of these fortified borders are used exclusively for border control of illegal immigration, smuggling of products, drug trafficking and terrorists, rather than for military purposes (Andreas, 2003). The most common fortified borders today are built of wire fences (72%), often electrified (17%). During 1945–1951, the German– German border was fortified with taller wire fences and security installations. By 1961, ‘the border was strengthened and guarded more than any other political frontier in the democratic world’ (Lenz, 1983, p. 250). Nevertheless, only in Berlin and a few villages on the border were walls ever constructed

#### The DMZ is a border - just heavily fortified

Choi 22 [Chris Choi, (senior editor), 3-5-2022, “What is the DMZ in Korea &amp; is it Safe to Visit?“, VIP Travel, https://www.vviptravel.com/blog/dmz-in-korea] ndsjag

What is the DMZ in Korea?

The Korean Demilitarized Zone is where North and South Korea come together to form the most heavily-fortified border on the planet. DMZ Korea is the most unique destination in the country and one of the most fascinating places to see in the entire world. Curious travellers from all over the globe flock to experience this mysterious destination, hoping to gain an insider understanding of North Korea – the world’s most secretive country. Rated the number one tourist activity in the nation, the DMZ in Korea offers a deep dive into history, politics, and the Korean War.

Can you visit the DMZ in South Korea?

Not only can you visit the DMZ in Korea, but this is, in fact, a must! An estimated 1.2 million visitors come to this historic area each year. You will only be allowed to go on one of the official DMZ tours led by a licensed tour guide. Why? Due to its unique position as a heavily-guarded border, there are many rules to abide by in order to help maintain peace and stability. From how many people are allowed to enter at once to what time of day you can visit, the tours follow strict regulations imposed by the United Nations. Going on a certified tour is also the best way to learn all that is noteworthy in a safe and responsible manner.

In short: no, the Demilitarized Zone in Korea may not be crossed. This applies both to soldiers and visitors. While North and South Korea share this border, the two countries have different immigration and travel policies. The North is also notorious for its restrictions on travel, so venturing fully inside North Korea will need additional visa arrangements and paperwork.

#### No extra T violation

Brady 19 [Lisa M. Brady, 2019, "Valuing the Wounds of War: Korea's DMZ as Nature Preserve," Part 3, Chapter 7 in " Collateral Values: The Natural Capital Created by Landscapes of War," https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18891-4 pg. 160 HKR-MK]

above the DMZ (see Fig. 7.2). The industrial complex in particular aimed at strengthening ties between the two nations through mutual economic growth when it opened in 2004 (the DPRK received needed infusions of cash through wages, the South Korean companies got access to cheap labor, and the ROK benefitted from an increased tax base on goods produced there). Beyond the financial incentive, the Sunshine Policy and its affiliated projects intended to break down political barriers so that families separated by the 1950—1953 Korean War could reunite, if not permanently, then at least more easily and more frequently for brief periods. Together, supporters of the policy anticipated that it would help facilitate diplomatic conversations and negotiations, thus bringing the two Koreas Closer to more open borders and, potentially, unification, thus making the DMZ obsolete.

## 1AR - Taiwan DA

#### Case turns - NoKo nukes facilitate invasion - pacify allies, force US repositioning, and erode credibility

Cho and Mastro 22 [Sungmin Cho and Oriana Skylar Mastro, 2-3-2022, North Korea Is Becoming an Asset for China, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2022-02-03/north-korea-becoming-asset-china, CHO is a Professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, an academic institute of the U.S. Department of Defense, is a Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. HKR-MK]

In this context, North Korea’s tests take on a new meaning—and it is dangerous for U.S. ambitions. The heightened threat of North Korean missile attacks incentivizes both Japan and South Korea to avoid alienating Beijing, which they hope will help keep Pyongyang in check. (China is North Korea’s main patron and sole ally.) It also means both Japan and South Korea are likely to redouble their militaries’ focus on Pyongyang rather than support U.S. operations elsewhere in Asia. And if the United States has to bolster its armed posture on the Korean Peninsula, whether to assuage Seoul’s and Tokyo’s fears, better deter North Korea, or fight in an actual conflict, Washington will need to reposition forces designed to constrain China elsewhere. Pyongyang’s weapons program was long seen as a liability for Beijing, given the erratic and unpredictable behavior of North Korea’s leaders. Now, it is becoming an asset.

For China, this switch comes at an opportune time. Under President Xi Jinping, Beijing has grown more impatient, expansionist, and belligerent. It is increasingly possible that China will try to seize control of Taiwan, especially since the peaceful unification of the mainland and the island is clearly no longer an option. Xi is closely watching the U.S. response to North Korea’s provocations and drawing lessons about Washington’s credibility. To prevent conflict in the Korean Peninsula and keep pace in its competition with Beijing, the United States will need to come up with new ways to unite its allies and prove its resolve in the region.

#### They also redirect key forces that protect Taiwan

Cho and Mastro 22 [Sungmin Cho and Oriana Skylar Mastro, 2-3-2022, North Korea Is Becoming an Asset for China, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2022-02-03/north-korea-becoming-asset-china, CHO is a Professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, an academic institute of the U.S. Department of Defense, is a Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. HKR-MK]

To reassure its allies, the United States may also need to refocus military attention on the Korean Peninsula, reducing its ability to operate in other parts of Asia. In 2017, when North Korea conducted ICBM and nuclear tests, the United States responded by sending more strategic assets, including heavy naval power, near the Korean Peninsula. If tensions rise high enough, Washington may have to do so again, including by shifting the Seventh Fleet’s operational focus to the area. Stationed in the middle of Japan, this fleet has been one of the United States’ primary tools for deterring Beijing, conducting patrols near the Taiwan Strait and promoting freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. But given past positioning patterns, a crisis on the Korean Peninsula would also most certainly drag the fleet farther north, undermining Washington’s ability to carry out operations elsewhere.

#### That makes Taiwan's defeatfait accompli

Cho and Mastro 22 [Sungmin Cho and Oriana Skylar Mastro, 2-3-2022, North Korea Is Becoming an Asset for China, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2022-02-03/north-korea-becoming-asset-china, CHO is a Professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, an academic institute of the U.S. Department of Defense, is a Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. HKR-MK]

A major war on the Korean Peninsula would prove particularly devastating to the United States’ competition with Beijing. In addition to the Seventh Fleet, the United States Forces Korea’s 28,000 soldiers, 40 F-16 fighters, 90 military aircrafts, 40 attack helicopters, and other assets would immediately become unavailable for operations beyond the peninsula. A majority of the United States Forces Japan’s aircraft, ships, and approximately 55,000 military personnel would also be deployed to Korea. Japan’s own military, which could help the United States if it needed to fight China, would grow busy providing combat support to protect U.S. naval forces—including antisubmarine operations and sea minesweeping—as U.S. troops prepared for an amphibious landing on the peninsula.

Beijing, by comparison, is in a better position. The United States has to worry that China will use a North Korea–spurred crisis to invade Taiwan, but the inverse isn’t true: Beijing isn’t concerned that Seoul or Washington will start a war over Taiwan if Pyongyang launches an attack. China’s commitment to North Korea is also not as comprehensive as the United States’ is to Seoul. In the event of a renewed Korean war, China plans to send mostly ground forces into the North. Its air and naval assets would remain focused across the Taiwan Strait.

For China, therefore, a crisis on the peninsula—especially one that evolves into a conflict—would be a golden opportunity to expand its power. It may even make it possible to defeat Taipei. With U.S. intelligence assets supporting troops in Korea, a Chinese amphibious force might be able to move on the island without giving the United States advanced warning. China could establish beachheads on Taiwan long before U.S. forces, bogged down on the peninsula, have time to arrive. The war’s eventual outcome would be a fait accompli.

#### No Taiwan invasion absent US weakness

Westcott 19 [Ben Westcott ‘19 is a Digital News Producer based in Hong Kong, who joined CNN in 2016. He writes about China, Australia and Indonesia, June 24th, 2019, “A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be a bloody, logistical nightmare” from https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/23/asia/taiwan-china-invasion-intl-hnk/index.html, accessed 7/5/19 || OES-AT]

Roaring out of the sky, an F-16V fighter jet lands smoothly to rearm and refuel on an unremarkable freeway in rural Taiwan, surrounded by rice paddies. ¶ In different circumstances, this could be alarming sight. Taiwan's fighter pilots are trained to land on freeways between sorties in case all of the island's airports have been occupied or destroyed by an invasion. ¶ Luckily, this was a training exercise. ¶ There's only really one enemy that Taiwan's armed forces are preparing to resist -- China's People's Liberation Army (PLA). And as China's reputation as an economic and military superpower has grown in recent years, so too has that threat of invasion, according to security experts. ¶ Taiwan has been self-governed since separating from China at the end of a brutal civil war in 1949, but Beijing has never given up hope of reuniting with what it considers a renegade province. ¶ At a regional security conference in June, Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe said: "If anyone dares to split Taiwan from China, the Chinese military has no choice but to fight at all costs for national unity." In some shops in mainland China, you can buy postcards and T-shirts emblazoned with patriotic emblems promoting the retaking of Taiwan. ¶ But for seven decades, China has resisted attacking Taiwan partly for political reasons, including the prospect of a US intervention and the potential heavy human toll. But the practical realities of a full-blown invasion are also daunting for the PLA, according to experts. ¶ Ferrying hundreds of thousands of troops across the narrow Taiwan Strait to a handful of reliable landing beaches, in the face of fierce resistance, is a harrowing prospect. Troops would then have a long slog over Taiwan's western mudflats and mountains to reach the capital, Taipei. ¶ Not only that, but China would face an opponent who has been preparing for war for almost 70 years. ¶ At mass anti-invasion drills in May, Taiwan military spokesman Maj. Gen. Chen Chung-Chi said the island knew it had to always be "combat-ready." ¶ "Of course, we don't want war, but only by gaining our own strength can we defend ourselves," he said. "If China wants to take any action against us, it has to consider paying a painful price." ¶ Difficult and bloody ¶ It could be easy to assume that any invasion of Taiwan by Beijing would be brief and devastating for Taipei: a David and Goliath fight between a tiny island and the mainland's military might, population and wealth. ¶ With nearly 1.4 billion people, the People's Republic of China has the largest population in the world. Taiwan has fewer than 24 million people -- a similar number to Australia. China has the fifth largest territory in the world, while Taiwan is the size of Denmark or the US state of Maryland. And Beijing runs an economy that is second only to the United States, while Taiwan's doesn't rank in the world's top 20. ¶ But perhaps most pertinently, China has been building and modernizing its military at an unprecedented rate, while Taiwan relies on moderate US arms sales. ¶ In sheer size, the PLA simply dwarfs Taiwan's military. ¶ China has an estimated 1 million troops, almost 6,000 tanks, 1,500 fighter jets and 33 navy destroyers, according to the latest US Defense Department report. Taiwan's ground force troops barely number 150,000 and are backed by 800 tanks and about 350 fighter aircraft, the report found, while its navy fields only four destroyer-class ships. ¶ Under Chinese President Xi Jinping, the PLA has rapidly modernized, buoyed by rises in military spending and crackdowns on corruption in the army's leadership. ¶ "China's leaders hope that possessing these military capabilities will deter pro-independence moves by Taiwan or, should deterrence fail, will permit a range of tailored military options against Taiwan and potential third-party military intervention," according to a 2019 US Defense Intelligence Agency report on China's military. ¶ Yet while China hawks in the media might beat the drum of invasion, an internal China military study, seen by CNN, revealed that the PLA considers an invasion of Taiwan to be extremely difficult. ¶ "Taiwan has a professional military, with a strong core of American-trained experts," said Ian Easton, author of "The Chinese Invasion Threat" and research fellow at the Project 2049 Institute, as well as "highly defensible" terrain. ¶ In his book he described an invasion by China as "the most difficult and bloody mission facing the Chinese military." ¶ The plan to take Taiwan ¶ China's Taiwan invasion plan, known internally as the "Joint Island Attack Campaign," would begin with a mass, coordinated bombing of Taiwan's vital infrastructure -- ports and airfields -- to cripple the island's military ahead of an amphibious invasion, according to both Easton and Sidharth Kaushal, a research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies. ¶ At the same time, the Chinese air force would fly over the Taiwan Strait and try to dominate the island's air space. Once the PLA was satisfied it had suitably disabled Taiwan's air and naval forces, Kaushal said soldiers would begin to invade on the west coast of the island. ¶ The island's rocky, mountainous east coast is considered too inhospitable and far from mainland China. ¶ The amphibious invasion needed to put troops on Taiwan, however, could be the biggest hurdle facing the PLA. ¶ In its 2019 report to Congress, the US Department of Defense said China -- which has one of the largest navies in Asia -- had at its command 37 amphibious transport docks and 22 smaller landing ships, as well as any civilian vessels Beijing could enlist. ¶ That might be enough to occupy smaller islands, such as those in the South China Sea, but an amphibious assault on Taiwan would likely require a bigger arsenal -- and there is "no indication China is significantly expanding its landing ship force," the report said. ¶ That makes it vital for Beijing to neutralize Taiwan's navy and air force in the early stages of an attack, Kaushal said. ¶ "The Taiwanese air force would have to sink around 40% of the amphibious landing forces of the PLA in order to render this sort of mission infeasible," he said. ¶ Essentially, that's only about 10 to 15 ships, he added. ¶ If they did make it across the strait, the PLA would still need to find a decent landing spot for its ships. ¶ China's military would be looking for a landing site both close to the mainland, and a strategic city, such as Taipei, with nearby port and airport facilities. ¶ That leaves just 14 potential beaches, Easton said -- and it's not only the PLA that knows it. Taiwanese engineers have spent decades digging tunnels and bunkers in potential landing zones along the coast. ¶ Furthermore, the backbone of Taiwan's defense is a fleet of vessels capable of launching anti-ship cruise missiles, on top of an array of ground-based missiles, and substantial mines and artillery on the coastline. ¶ "Taiwan's entire national defense strategy, including its war plans, are specifically targeted at defeating a PLA invasion," Easton said. ¶ Chinese troops could be dropped in from the air, but a lack of paratroopers in the PLA makes it unlikely. ¶ If the PLA held a position on Taiwan, and could reinforce with troops from the mainland to face off about 150,000 Taiwan troops, as well as more than 2.5 million reservists, it would have to push through the island's western mud flats and mountains, with only narrow roads to assist them, towards Taipei. ¶ Finally, the mobilization of amphibious landing vessels, ballistic missile launchers, fighters and bombers, as well as hundreds of thousands of troops, would give Taiwan plenty of advance warning of any attack, Kaushal said. ¶ "It's extremely unlikely that the invasion could come as a bolt from the blue," Kaushal added. ¶ There is, of course, one final deterrent to any PLA invasion of Taiwan. ¶ It isn't clear whether or not such an attack by China would spark an intervention by the United States on Taipei's behalf. ¶ Washington has been a longtime ally of the island, selling weapons to the Taiwan government and providing implicit military protection from Beijing. ¶ Easton said that, at present, the US would likely intervene in Taiwan's favor, both to protect investment by US companies on the island and reassure American allies in the region, who are also facing down a resurgent PLA in the East and South China seas. ¶ Collin Koh Swee Lean, research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies' Maritime Security Program in Singapore, said there would also be "immense political consequences" from taking over Taiwan, in the event of a successful China invasion. ¶ "It will likely mean that China will be seen as the bad guy in the neighborhood, who uses force," he said. "It will alienate some regional partners and the good will which China has been trying to build over the years will evaporate. And it will set China on a collision course with the US." ¶ But Taipei isn't taking anything for granted. ¶ On the sidelines of the massive Han Guang drills, Taiwan's Maj. Gen. Chen pointed out the hundreds of spectators who had come out to watch and support the island's military. ¶ "These exercises let people know the national army of the Republic of China is ready," he said. ¶ Taiwan is taking no chances.

## 1AR - China DA

#### Official Chinese stance supports nonmilitary unification

Kim 14 [Kim, Heung-Kyu, 04-xx-2014, Brookings, China's Position on Korean Unification and ROK-PRC Relations, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Kim-Heung-Kyu-paper.pdf, pg. 1 HKR-MK]

The established assumption is that the People’s Republic of China (either PRC or China) has consistently supported North Korea’s position on Korean unification since the Cold War-era. Officially, China has voiced support for peaceful Korean unification achieved through peaceful means and not by military means; and this principle also applies to North Korea. The general perception, however, is that China’s policy in practice has adhered to a strategy of deferring or deterring South Korea-led unification. This perception originates from the dichotomous thinking that is the legacy of the Cold War-era, but also reflects accumulated experience with China and reflects the current strategic situation of China.

#### Unification is in China’s interest

Tiezzi 14, Shannon Tiezzi, 1-14-2014, "How China Could Benefit From a United Korea," No Publication, <https://thediplomat.com/2014/01/how-china-could-benefit-from-a-united-korea/> /tanya

For one thing, while China is understandably anxious of a U.S.-allied Korea on its border, once unification is achieved, there’s little strategic value to continuing the U.S.-South Korean alliance — at least from South Korea’s point of view. The major driving force behind the partnership is the need for South Korea to guard against the military threat from the North. With a unified Korea, this threat no longer exists. Would the South Korean government continue to pay over [$800 million a year](https://rt.com/news/south-korea-us-military-470/) to house U.S. troops on its soil under these circumstances? Rather than fulfilling China’s nightmare scenario of U.S. troops stationed near the Yalu River, a unified Korea might actually boot U.S. troops out of the country altogether.

Further, without the problem of North Korea, South Korea’s foreign policy is more in line with China’s than the United States’. Once Korean unification is achieved, South Korea might decide the alliance with the U.S. is more trouble than it’s worth — particularly as the U.S. is always cajoling South Korea to improve ties with Japan. Korean unification, in other words, could destabilize the U.S. alliance system in Northeast Asia, which would be a huge net gain for China both in its bilateral relationship with South Korea and in its general geopolitical strategy to gain more influence in the Western Pacific.

Even if a unified Korea was unwilling to cut military ties with the U.S., it’s unlikely that the country would make any moves that overtly threaten China, such as allowing U.S. troops to be stationed above the 38th parallel. As noted above, South Korea’s economic ties with China are hugely important. The South Korean government simply cannot afford to antagonize China, and would likely consult with the Chinese government to ensure Korean unification happened on terms Beijing could accept.

Also, in the event of unification, China would be even more economically important to Korea. Korea would face a massive rebuilding project in the underdeveloped and impoverished north. China would be the logical choice to help jump-start this region’s new economy, which would fulfill China’s long-held dream of full access to North Korean markets and resources. In addition to reaping the economic benefits of new contracts and trade flows, China would also make itself even more indispensable as an economic partner for a unified Korea.

Long-term, Korean unification could be a win for China, both economically and politically. This is especially true if South Korea were to believe that China played a positive role in the unification process. The South Korean good-will China would win from such a move is incalculable, and would go a long way towards cementing a new China-South Korean partnership. On the other hand, if China is seen as actively preventing unification, it could easily cause the relationship with South Korea to go sour.

#### US and Soko reaffirmed commitment over Taiwan

Xiaoci and Caiyu 5-22 [Deng Xiaoci and Liu Caiyu, 5-22-2022, US, South Korea boost military cooperation, intensifying peninsula crisis, No Publication, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202205/1266275.shtml HKR-MK]

Biden stressed during his meeting with Yoon that "our joint commitment to the freedom of South Korea and our firm opposition to changing borders by force has flourished with decades of peace and cooperation," according to another White House release of the event.

The remarks have been widely seen as an apparent reference to Russia's military operation in Ukraine and the Taiwan question for China, Reuters reported on Saturday.

The joint statement said that Yoon and Biden "reaffirm their commitment to maintain peace and stability, lawful unimpeded commerce, and respect for international law including freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful use of the seas, including in the South China Sea and beyond" and that "the two presidents reiterate the importance of preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait as an essential element in security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.

#### Literally any US-Korea coop link already happened

White House 22 [White House, 5-21-2022, United States-Republic of Korea Leaders’ Joint Statement, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/21/united-states-republic-of-korea-leaders-joint-statement/ HKR-MK]

President Yoon and President Biden reaffirm their mutual commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea and the combined defense posture under the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty. President Biden affirms the U.S. extended deterrence commitment to the ROK using the full range of U.S. defense capabilities, including nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities. The two Presidents also agree to reactivate the high-level Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group at the earliest date. Both leaders commit to further strengthen deterrence by reinforcing combined defense posture, and reiterate commitment to a conditions-based transition of wartime operational control. With this in mind, and considering the evolving threat posed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), both leaders agree to initiate discussions to expand the scope and scale of combined military exercises and training on and around the Korean Peninsula. Both leaders also reaffirm the commitment of the U.S. to deploy strategic U.S. military assets in a timely and coordinated manner as necessary, as well as to enhance such measures and identify new or additional steps to reinforce deterrence in the face of DPRK destabilizing activities. In this vein, the United States and ROK will significantly expand cooperation to confront a range of cyber threats from the DPRK, including but not limited to, state-sponsored cyber-attacks.

President Yoon and President Biden reiterate their common goal of the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and agree to further strengthen the airtight coordination to this end. The two Presidents share the view that the DPRK’s nuclear program presents a grave threat not only to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula but also the rest of Asia and the world. Both leaders condemn the DPRK’s escalatory ballistic missile tests this year, including multiple launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles, as clear violations of United Nations Security Council resolutions and reaffirm their joint commitment to work with the international community to urge the DPRK to abandon its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs.Both leaders urge all UN Member States to fully implement all United Nations Security Council resolutions and also call on the DPRK to abide by its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions as well as its previous commitments and agreements.

#### US raised defense coop with Japan

Bryen 22 [Stephen Bryen, 1-10-2022, US, Japan to crank up cooperation vis-a-vis China, Asia Times, https://asiatimes.com/2022/01/us-japan-to-crank-up-cooperation-vis-a-vis-china/ HKR-MK]

There are occasions when reading diplomatic documents where similar techniques are needed to make sense of the words put on paper. On January 7, a “two plus two” high-level meeting of foreign and defense ministers was held between Japan and the United States.

The virtual meeting was attended by Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi and Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi. The new US ambassador to Japan, Rahm Emanuel, also took part.

The ministers released a statement that goes into considerable detail on what was agreed, although there remain some missing parts. Luckily, the joint document does not need the equivalent of Kremlinologists to ascertain that significant progress was made at the meeting.

It’s clear that Japan and the US significantly upscaled their defense relationship, focused clearly on the China threat and, between the lines, worked on ways to block China’s efforts to challenge Japan’s sovereignty over the southern Senkaku islands and to improve their joint capability to support Taiwan militarily.

According to Nikkei Asia, the US and Japan “committed to increasing joint or shared use of US and Japanese facilities, ‘including efforts to strengthen Japan Self-Defense Forces’ posture in areas including its southwestern islands …”

That assessment is borne out by the two sides’ Joint Statement and more. Nikkei Asia correctly identified the island of Yonaguni as the most critical because of its proximity to Taiwan.

Strong language

The Joint Statement contains strong language about defense cooperation. Here are some highlights where “They” refers to the “two plus two” ministers:

\* They noted the need to augment security cooperation and capacity-building initiatives with partners in Southeast Asia and Pacific Island countries.

\* The United States and Japan resolved to ensure alignment of Alliance visions and priorities through key forthcoming national security strategy documents. Through its strategic review process, Japan expressed its resolve to examine all options necessary for national defense including capabilities to counter missile threats.

\* Japan and the United States underscored the need to closely coordinate throughout this process and welcomed our robust progress on evolving Alliance roles, missions, and capabilities, and on bilateral planning for contingencies.

\* The Ministers underscored the critical importance of strengthened cross-domain capabilities, particularly integrating the land, maritime, air, missile defense, space, cyber, electromagnetic spectrum and other domains

\* Stressing the need to advance readiness, resiliency and interoperability, they welcomed the deepening of cooperation, including asset protection missions and joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations, and realistic training and exercises, as well as flexible deterrent options and strategic messaging.

\* They also committed to increase joint/shared use of US and Japanese facilities, including efforts to strengthen Japan Self-Defense Forces’ posture in areas including its southwestern islands.

\* They concurred on deepening cooperation on space domain awareness, mission assurance, interoperability and joint responses to serious threats to, from and within space, including by continuing discussion on proliferated low earth orbit satellite constellations.

\* The Ministers committed to pursue joint investments that accelerate innovation and ensure the Alliance maintains its technological edge in critical and emerging fields, including artificial intelligence, machine learning, directed energy and quantum computing.

\* The Ministers concurred to conduct a joint analysis focused on future cooperation in counter-hypersonic technology.

\* They stressed collaboration on streamlined procurement and resilient defense supply chains.

\* Through its strategic review process, Japan expressed its resolve to examine all options necessary for national defense including capabilities to counter missile threats.

Firm foundations

While the Joint Statement stopped short of declaring a common command structure to confront China, the ministers certainly laid the foundation for such cooperation.

That was seen in the statement’s clear language supporting “joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations, and realistic training and exercises, as well as flexible deterrent options and strategic messaging.”

The statement language that says the ministers “committed to increase joint/shared use of US and Japanese facilities, including efforts to strengthen Japan Self-Defense Forces’ posture in areas including its southwestern islands” is important when one recognizes that today the physical defense of the southwestern islands (southern Senkaku) is minimal.

The US Pacific Command has recommended the US reinforce these islands by moving the HIMARS (High Mobility Rocket System) to one of them, with Yonaguni the most likely because it is closest to Taiwan and has the infrastructure to support a Marine contingent and HIMARS.

#### Taiwan lashout inevitable – PLA and CCP expansion, digital authoritarianism, tech dominance

Beckley 21, Hal Brands, Michael Beckley, 9-24-2021, "China Is a Declining Power—and That’s the Problem," Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/24/china-great-power-united-states/> /tanya

No doubt, counter-China cooperation has remained imperfect. But the overall trend is clear: An array of actors is gradually joining forces to check Beijing’s power and put it in a strategic box. China, in other words, is not a forever-ascendant country. It is an already-strong, enormously ambitious, and deeply troubled power whose window of opportunity won’t stay open for long.

In some ways, all of this is welcome news for Washington: A China that is slowing economically and facing growing global resistance will find it exceedingly difficult to displace the United States as the world’s leading power—so long as the United States doesn’t tear itself apart or otherwise give the game away. In other ways, however, the news is more troubling. History warns the world should expect a peaking China to act more boldly, even erratically, over the coming decade—to lunge for long-sought strategic prizes before its fortunes fade.

What might this look like? We can make educated guesses based on what China is presently doing.

Beijing is already redoubling its efforts to establish a 21st century sphere of economic influence by dominating critical technologies—such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and 5G telecommunications—and using the resulting leverage to bend states to its will. It will also race to perfect a “digital authoritarianism” that can protect an insecure Chinese Communist Party’s rule at home while bolstering Beijing’s diplomatic position by exporting that model to autocratic allies around the world.

In military terms, the Chinese Communist Party may well become increasingly heavy-handed in securing long, vulnerable supply lines and protecting infrastructure projects in Central and Southwest Asia, Africa, and other regions, a role some hawks in the People’s Liberation Army are already eager to assume. Beijing could also become more assertive vis-à-vis Japan, the Philippines, and other countries that stand in the way of its claims to the South and East China Seas.

Most troubling of all, China will be sorely tempted to use force to resolve the Taiwan question on its terms in the next decade before Washington and Taipei can finish retooling their militaries to offer a stronger defense. The People’s Liberation Army is already stepping up its military exercises’ intensity in the Taiwan Strait. Xi has repeatedly declared Beijing cannot wait forever for its “renegade province” to return to the fold. When the military balance temporarily shifts further toward China’s favor in the late 2020s and as the Pentagon is forced to retire aging ships and aircraft, China may never have a better chance of seizing Taiwan and dealing Washington a humiliating defeat.

To be clear, China probably won’t undertake an all-out military rampage across Asia, as Japan did in the 1930s and early 1940s. But it will run greater risks and accept greater tensions as it tries to lock in key gains. Welcome to geopolitics in the age of a peaking China: a country that already has the ability to violently challenge the existing order and one that will probably run faster and push harder as it loses confidence that time is on its side.

## 1AR - NoKo Lashout DA

#### Case solves

#### No coercion - NoKo lacks credibility

Jackson 17 [Jackson, Van. “DOES NUCLEARIZATION IMPACT THREAT CREDIBILITY?: Insights from the Korean Peninsula.” In North Korea and Nuclear Weapons: Entering the New Era of Deterrence, edited by SUNG CHULL KIM and MICHAEL D. COHEN, pg. 91-92. Georgetown University Press, 2017. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1ps318b.11. HKR-MK]

Recent research has found that North Korea’s track record of following through on threats (or its failure to) had a significant effect on whether the US and South Korean governments believed its subsequent threats.1 In this chapter, I find that this basic claim holds even when confining our examination of North Korean credibility to only the period during which it is thought to have a nuclear weapon capability.2 This finding not only illustrates the enduring importance of reputation in international relations, but also is significant for debates about the coercive utility of nuclear weapons. Since successful coercion requires the ability to make credible threats, and credible threats depended mostly on North Korea’s past word and deed despite having a nuclear capability, the North Korean case suggests that nuclear weapons do not have the intrinsic coercive value that some scholars seem to assign to them. Instead, the ability to coerce—even when possessing nuclear weapons—is still contingent on having cultivated a reputation for following through on threats made in the recent past. In other words, whatever the benefits or drawbacks of nuclear weapons, they do not change the basic formula for threat credibility: capability, the balance of interests, and perceived willingness to follow through on a threat (that is, a reputation for resolve).

The remainder of this chapter will briefly introduce two separate but related theoretical debates that the case material weighs in on: reputations and the coercive value of nuclear weapons. It then examines two case histories involving North Korea since 2002, when it was suspected of developing a nuclear capability.3 The first case involves North Korean threats vis-à-vis the United States through 2009. The second focuses on patterns of hostility between North and South Korea leading up to and through 2010.

There are multiple reasons for choosing these cases. First, lessons from the cases themselves are relevant to policymakers even today. As recently as August 2015, North and South Korea experienced a crisis during which violence, military mobilization, and threats of war temporarily crowded out all other concerns. Second, on the basis of insights about credibility in the nuclear deterrence literature, the cases represent contexts in which threat credibility and reputation for resolve should be constant. In the US case they occur in a nuclear dyad, and in the South Korea case North Korea ostensibly has a nuclear advantage over the South. In such situations, the massive destructive power of a nuclear weapon makes the cost of incredulity about an adversary’s threats so high that North Korea’s threats should, out of an abundance of caution, be automatically believed.

Third, and relatedly, the nuclear asymmetry between North and South Korea provides an interesting opportunity to observe how a state lacking nuclear weapons deals with an adversary possessing them. If ever nuclear weapons were to offer a coercive advantage to those who possess them, it would surely be against a state that lacks nuclear arms itself. Yet North Korean coercive violence against South Korea in 2010 did not prevent South Korean threats in turn, including several postcrisis “hand-tying” and “sunk cost” initiatives that can be interpreted as indicators of South Korean resolve. North Korean nuclear weapons did not seem to deter South Korean willingness to retaliate, which was constrained only by US entreaties based on escalation concerns.

Why Reputation Matters (and Why Some Don’t Think So)

Reputation plays an outsized role in the lives of individuals and governments alike. Everyday mechanisms that allow for ratings based on performance—Yelp, Uber, and Airbnb, for example—operate reputational systems that empower users to make judgments about future quality based on past experience. Financial systems of all types also operate on the basis of reputation; this is why credit histories and loan defaults, whether individuals or governments, affect interest rates and future credit worthiness. Reputation is one way that people and states deal with a world of imperfect and incomplete information. In international relations, Thomas Schelling defined reputation as the “interdependence of commitments”—the causal relevance of past actions to expectations of future actions, mediated through the perception of others.4

Reputation affects a great many things, but most salient for theories of coercion is the effect of a reputation for resolve/irresoluteness on the ability to make credible threats. The entire research program on coercion is concerned with when and how threats do or do not work, and most of the early research on the subject recognized that, since perception is what determines reputation and perception has much to do with observations of past actions, judgments in the present about whether a threat is to be believed hinges to a great extent on observations of a track record.5 Quite simply, states look to discern the intentions of others not only by assessing their capability but also by their past word and deed. Past performance in comparable contexts is an imperfect heuristic that states use in conjunction with other factors to make judgments about believability.

#### Inability to pursue extended war and insufficient nukes mean no coercion

Lee 21 [Manseok Lee, 02-22-2021, Deterring North Korea’s Dynamic Nuclear Strategy, War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2021/02/deterring-north-koreas-dynamic-nuclear-strategy/, PHD at UC Berkeley Goldman School of Public Policy, East Asia Security and Nuclear Nonproliferation expert and an active duty army major of the Republic of Korea. His research interests include international relations in East Asia, strategic stability, nuclear nonproliferation regime, North Korea's nuclear strategy, and US-China relations. HKR-MK]

Because it faces international sanctions and general economic collapse, without any remaining sources of foreign assistance, North Korea lacks the economic capacity to pursue both nuclear weapons development and a modernized military force. The Kim regime has chosen to prioritize nuclear and missile development over conventional weapons. This means that North Korea’s conventional forces are aging, and Pyongyang lacks the logistical capabilities necessary to conduct a war over an extended period of time without foreign support. But North Korea has steadily developed its nuclear capabilities. Although the exact size of the country’s nuclear stockpile remains unclear, North Korea is estimated to possess approximately 20 to 60 nuclear warheads as well as sufficient fissile material to create another 60 nuclear warheads.

However, the number of nuclear weapons and the level of technology possessed by North Korea are still far from the capabilities required to pursue coercive nuclear strategies, such as nuclear escalation or brinkmanship. These strategies involve the threat of pre-emptive nuclear attacks or the use of limited nuclear strikes to force the enemy to offer greater concessions. For North Korea, however, 20 to 60 nuclear warheads would seemingly be insufficient to effectively use such strategies. In addition, North Korea’s tactical nuclear weapons, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched ballistic missile technologies, which are still in the development stage, appear inadequate for coercive nuclear strategies.

#### No incentive for coercion - SoKo's too strong

Roehrig 20 [Terence Roehrig, 10-9-2020, "North Korea and Reunification: The Limits of Nuclear Coercion," University of California Press, <https://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-abstract/60/5/859/112076/North-Korea-and-ReunificationThe-Limits-of-Nuclear?redirectedFrom=fulltext> // JB]

Scholars continue to debate the role that acquiring nuclear weapons plays in a state’s foreign policy ambitions. In particular, does it encourage states to use their new-found capability to alter the status quo through intimidation and a willingness to take on greater risk? **Thus, are these assessments correct that North Korea is likely to use its nuclear capability in an aggressive fashion to coerce reunification under its leadership?** What are the chief factors that would enter into North Korea’s calculus for whether to pursue this outcome? While both North and South Korea hold closely to the goal of reunification and speak the language of reunification, the reality is much more complex. North Korea continues to proclaim the goal in official statements and in its state-controlled media. Yet despite the domestic political requirements for declaring a commitment to reunify, there are **two chief reasons** that North **Korea will not and could not use nuclear weapons** to pursue a coercive reunification strategy. **First**, the scenarios for this are **implausible**, typically assuming **North Korean leaders** would be willing to take on an **inordinate amount of risk**, while South Korea would acquiesce to nuclear threats by the DPRK. Second, subduing the South and integrating a modern, **technologically advanced democracy** with **twice the population and an economy** that dwarfs the North’s would be a recipe for disaster. The Kim regime would quickly **lose control politically and economically**, leading to an **internal implosion**. Thus, the North Korean case provides another example for the nuclear coercion literature that there is little utility in wielding nuclear weapons to compel state behavior.

## 1AR - Consult US CP

### US involvement fails

#### US involvement prevents meaningful reunification—

Millman 18 [(Noah, a screenwriter and filmmaker, a political columnist and a critic. From 2012 through 2017 he was a senior editor and featured blogger at The American Conservative. His work has also appeared in The New York Times Book Review, Politico, USA Today, The New Republic, The Weekly Standard, Foreign Policy, Modern Age, First Things, and the Jewish Review of Books, among other publications) “Is America the main obstacle to peace in Korea?” The Week, 2/14/18. <https://theweek.com/articles/754895/america-main-obstacle-peace-korea>] RR

Well, where would such an endgame leave the United States?

It is vanishingly unlikely that North Korea — or its Chinese allies — would agree to any formal program for reunification while American troops remained in South Korea and our alliance remained intact. North Korea built its nuclear deterrent in the first place because, in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was ample reason to believe that the United States would seek to resolve the long-dormant Korean conflict by force. And much of America's foreign policy since the end of the Cold War — from incorporation of a reunified Germany, the Warsaw Pact states and the Baltic republics into NATO, to the two wars in Iraq, to the intervention in Libya — has given the Kim family every reason to believe that trusting America to respect North Korean independence or the Kim family's interests would be folly.

But consider how the prospects for unification would look if the United States simply abandoned the field. From Beijing's perspective, the value of its alliance with North Korea would drop to zero, if not lower. South Korea would be a far more valuable partner in both the short and the long term, and Beijing's primary goal would be to convince South Korea to become that partner without alarming Japan into rearmament. Crucial to that effort would be bringing North Korea fully to heel, which would require convincing the Kim family that their best hope for survival would be putting themselves completely in Beijing's hands and entering into reconciliation talks on the basis of full denuclearization and elimination of its missile program. The Kim family would have few other options than to agree — and they would have more reason to trust Beijing than Washington to avoid interfering with their internal politics.

The readiest path to political reconciliation between the two Koreas, in other words, requires imagining that the United States would be willing to surrender its influence on the Korean Peninsula. This, of course, would have consequences beyond Korea. If Washington were willing to hand Seoul to Beijing, surely we'd be willing to hand off Taipei, Bangkok, and Manila. Even Tokyo wouldn't be out of the question. The ripple effect across the region would leave China the overwhelmingly dominant power in the Western Pacific. Those are the potential stakes for the United States, and they go far toward explaining why sharp observers of President Moon believe the main goal of his subtle policy toward the North of mixed threat and diplomacy is to reduce tensions without provoking American opposition.

None of the foregoing means that the United States is wrong to try to hold onto its influence in Korea, nor even that South Korea doesn't appreciate having the United States in its corner. Seoul would far prefer to play Washington and Beijing off each other than to submit to Chinese domination. And if conflict were to come, America is by far the most powerful ally in the world to have. All that talk about being the leaders of the free world isn't just chin music.

Still, we shouldn't be fooled by the moral posturing of the international commentariat — or the vice president. There are no realistic prospects for non-violent regime change in North Korea, and trying to force change by violence would risk killing hundreds of thousands, if not millions, on both sides of the DMZ. The most plausible path to truly ending the Korean conflict is through an agreement between the two Koreas that leaves the brutal Kim regime in place. And the main obstacle to any such agreement is the material interests of the United States.

### AT: Heg impact

#### Empirics go neg – most qualified studies disprove hegemonic stability theories.

Fettweis 17 –Christopher J. Fettweis is an American political scientist and the Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. “Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace, Security Studies” 26:3, 423-451; EG)

Even the most ardent supporters of the hegemonic-stability explanation do not contend that US influence extends equally to all corners of the globe. The United States has concentrated its policing in what George Kennan used to call “strong points,” or the most important parts of the world: Western Europe, the Pacific Rim, and Persian Gulf.64 By doing so, Washington may well have contributed more to great power peace than the overall global decline in warfare. If the former phenomenon contributed to the latter, by essentially providing a behavioral model for weaker states to emulate, then perhaps this lends some support to the hegemonic-stability case.65 During the Cold War, the United States played referee to a few intra-West squabbles, especially between Greece and Turkey, and provided Hobbesian reassurance to Germany’s nervous neighbors. Other, equally plausible explanations exist for stability in the first world, including the presence of a common enemy, democracy, economic interdependence, general war aversion, etc. The looming presence of the leviathan is certainly among these plausible explanations, but only inside the US sphere of influence. Bipolarity was bad for the nonaligned world, where Soviet and Western intervention routinely exacerbated local conflicts. Unipolarity has generally been much better, **but whether or not this was due to US action is again unclear.** Overall US interest in the affairs of the Global South has dropped markedly since the end of the Cold War, as has the level of violence in almost all regions. There is less US intervention in the political and military affairs of Latin America compared to any time in the twentieth century, for instance, and also less conflict. Warfare in Africa is at an all-time low, as is relative US interest outside of counterterrorism and security assistance.66 **Regional peace and stability exist where there is US active intervention, as well as where there is not**. No direct relationship seems to exist across regions. If intervention can be considered a function of direct and indirect activity, of both political and military action, a regional picture might look like what is outlined in Table 1. These assessments of conflict are by necessity relative, because there has not been a “high” level of conflict in any region outside the Middle East during the period of the New Peace. Putting aside for the moment that important caveat, some points become clear. The great powers of the world are clustered in the upper right quadrant, where US intervention has been high, but conflict levels low. **US intervention is imperfectly correlated with stability, however. Indeed, it is conceivable that the relatively high level of US interest and activity has made the security situation in the Persian Gulf and broader Middle East worse.** In recent years, substantial hard power investments (Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq), moderate intervention (Libya), and reliance on diplomacy (Syria) have been equally ineffective in stabilizing states torn by conflict. While it is possible that the region is essentially unpacifiable and no amount of police work would bring peace to its people, it remains hard to make the case that the US presence has improved matters. **In this “strong point,” at least, US hegemony has failed to bring peace.** In much of the rest of the world, the United States has not been especially eager to enforce any particular rules. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been enough to inspire action. Washington’s intervention choices have at best been erratic; Libya and Kosovo brought about action, but much more blood flowed uninterrupted in Rwanda, Darfur, Congo, Sri Lanka, and Syria. The US record of peacemaking is not exactly a long uninterrupted string of successes. During the turn-of-the-century conventional war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a highlevel US delegation containing former and future National Security Advisors (Anthony Lake and Susan Rice) made a half-dozen trips to the region, but was unable to prevent either the outbreak or recurrence of the conflict. Lake and his team shuttled back and forth between the capitals with some frequency, and President Clinton made repeated phone calls to the leaders of the respective countries, offering to hold peace talks in the United States, all to no avail.67 The war ended Table 1. Post-Cold War US intervention and violence by region. High Violence Low Violence High US Intervention Middle East Europe South and Central Asia Pacific Rim North America Low US Intervention Africa South America Former Soviet Union in late 2000 when Ethiopia essentially won, and it controls the disputed territory to this day. The Horn of Africa is hardly the only region where states are free to fight one another today without fear of serious US involvement. Since they are choosing not to do so with increasing frequency, something else is probably affecting their calculations. Stability exists even in those places where the potential for intervention by the sheriff is minimal. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. It seems hard to make the case that the relative peace that has descended on so many regions is primarily due to the kind of heavy hand of the neoconservative leviathan, or its lighter, more liberal cousin. Something else appears to be at work.

### Heg bad - Terror

#### Unipolarity is specifically responsible for the globalization of extremism – that makes heg unsustainable.

Ibrahimi 18 (2/19/18; S. Yaqub Ibrahimi, [researcher and instructor of political science. PhD @ Carleton University] “Unipolar politics and global peace: a structural explanation of the globalizing jihad”; taylor and francis <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17467586.2018.1428763?needAccess=true)>

* JSG = Jihadi-Salafi Groups

Three conclusions can be drawn from this paper. First, the peacefulness of the contemporary unipolar system could be discussed beyond the interstate conflict and the likelihood of great powers competition debate. The new forms of asymmetric warfare, particularly the emergence of JSGs and their violent activities at different levels of the global order, could be assessed as another variable in debates on the peacefulness of the system. These actors DYNAMICS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 59 emerged and operate under the unipolarity conditions. Unipolarity, in this sense, has generated conflict-producing mechanisms and nonstate actors that drove sovereign states in lengthy wars against JSGs. This argument makes a significant contribution to the unipolarity-peace puzzle, which is conventionally addressed from the interstate conflict perspective. Second, unipolarity transformed Islamist-oriented terrorism from domestic to global. In addition to other conflict-generating conditions produced under unipolarity, the United States’ unipolar policies in Muslim regions transformed the traditional near-enemy-centric narrative of jihad into a far-enemy-centric ideology. As a result of the transformation of this doctrine, new forms of JSGs emerged that posed a threat to peace and security at all levels. Finally, because of the unipolarity of the system, global peace depends largely on the sole great power’s foreign and military policies. The US interventionism, due to the absence of a challenging great power, might not generate interstate conflict. However, it would engage the US in asymmetric warfare with nonstate actors that would emerge independently or on behalf of states to disrupt the US hegemony through insurgency, terrorism, and other forms of violence at different levels. These all might not challenge the durability of unipolarity, drastically, but they would disrupt peace and security at all domestic, regional, and global levels.

### Heg bad - counterbalancing

#### Pursuit of hegemony leads to Sino-Russia alliance and is unsustainable.

Porter, DPhil, 19

(Patrick, ModernHistory@Oxford, ProfInternationalSecurityAndStrategy@Birmingham, Advice for a Dark Age: Managing Great Power Competition, The Washington Quarterly, 42:1, 7-25)

Even the United States cannot prudently take on every adversary on multiple fronts. The costs of military campaigns against these adversaries in their backyards, whether in the Baltic States or Taiwan, would outstrip the losses that the U.S. military has sustained in decades. Short of all-out conflict, to mobilize for dominance and risk escalation on multiple such fronts would court several dangers. It would overstretch the country. The U.S. defense budget now approaches $800 billion annually, not including deficit-financed military operations. This is a time of ballooning deficits, where the Congressional Budget Office warns that “the prospect of large and growing debt poses substantial risks for the nation.”27 If in such conditions, current expenditure is not enough to buy unchallengeable military preponderance—and it may not be—then the failure lies not in the failure to spend even more. Neither is the answer to sacrifice the quality of civic life at home to service the cause of preponderance abroad. The old “two war standard,” a planning construct whereby the United States configures its forces to conduct two regional conflicts at once, would be unsustainably demanding against more than one peer competitor, or potentially with a roster of major and minor adversaries all at once.28 After all, the purpose of American military power is ultimately to secure a way of life as a constitutional republic. To impose ever-greater debts on civil society and strip back collective provision at home, on the basis that the quality of life is expendable for the cause of hegemony, is perversely to set up power-projection abroad as the end, when it should be the means. The problem lies, rather, in the inflexible pursuit of hegemony itself, and the failure to balance commitments with scarce resources. To attempt to suppress every adversary simultaneously would drive adversaries together, creating hostile coalitions. It also may not succeed. Counterproliferation in North Korea is difficult enough, for instance, but the task becomes more difficult still if U.S. enmity with China drives Beijing to refuse cooperation over enforcing sanctions on Pyongyang. Concurrent competitions would also split American resources, attention and time. Exacerbating the strain on scarce resources between defense, consumption and investment raises the polarizing question of whether preponderance is even worth it, which then undermines the domestic consensus needed to support it. At the same time, reduced investment in infrastructure and education would damage the economic foundations for conducting competition abroad in the first place. Taken together, indiscriminate competition risks creating the thing most feared in traditional U.S. grand strategy: a hostile Eurasian alliance leading to continuous U.S. mobilization against hostile coalitions, turning the U.S. republic into an illiberal garrison state. If the prospect for the United States as a great power faces a problem, it is not the size of the defense budget, or the material weight of resources at the U.S. disposal, or popular reluctance to exercise leadership. Rather, the problem lies in the scope of the policy that those capabilities are designed to serve. To make the problem smaller, Washington should take steps to make the pool of adversaries smaller.

#### A strong Sino-Russian alliance combined with expanded US military presence ensures joint retaliation — goes nuclear

Klare 18 – Professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College. (Michael T., “The Pentagon Is Planning a Three-Front ‘Long War’ Against China and Russia,” April 4, 2018, https://fpif.org/the-pentagon-is-planning-a-three-front-long-war-against-china-and-russia/)//sy

In relatively swift fashion, American military leaders have followed up their claim that the U.S. is in a new long war by sketching the outlines of a containment line that would stretch from the Korean Peninsula around Asia across the Middle East into parts of the former Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and finally to the Scandinavian countries. Under their plan, American military forces — reinforced by the armies of trusted allies — should garrison every segment of this line, a grandiose scheme to block hypothetical advances of Chinese and Russian influence that, in its global reach, should stagger the imagination. Much of future history could be shaped by such an outsized effort. Questions for the future include whether this is either a sound strategic policy or truly sustainable. Attempting to contain China and Russia in such a manner will undoubtedly provoke countermoves, some undoubtedly difficult to resist, including cyber attacks and various kinds of economic warfare. And if you imagined that a war on terror across huge swaths of the planet represented a significant global overreach for a single power, just wait. Maintaining large and heavily-equipped forces on three extended fronts will also prove exceedingly costly and will certainly conflict with domestic spending priorities and possibly provoke a divisive debate over the reinstatement of the draft. However, the real question — unasked in Washington at the moment — is: Why pursue such a policy in the first place? Are there not other ways to manage the rise of China and Russia’s provocative behavior? What appears particularly worrisome about this three-front strategy is its immense capacity for confrontation, miscalculation, escalation, and finally actual war rather than simply grandiose war planning. At multiple points along this globe-spanning line — the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, Syria, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea, to name just a few — forces from the U.S. and China or Russia are already in significant contact, often jostling for position in a potentially hostile manner. At any moment, one of these encounters could provoke a firefight leading to unintended escalation and, in the end, possibly all-out combat. From there, almost anything could happen, even the use of nuclear weapons. Clearly, officials in Washington should be thinking hard before committing Americans to a strategy that will make this increasingly likely and could turn what is still long-war planning into an actual long war with deadly consequences.

## 1AR - Sanctions CP

#### The counterplan is seen as appeasement and makes future talks impossible

Lee 20 [Christy Lee, reporter at Voice of America News. "Experts: Sanctions Relief Will Not Make North Korea Denuclearize." VOA, 2-6-2020, accessed 7-25-2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific\_experts-sanctions-relief-will-not-make-north-korea-denuclearize/6183850.html] HWIC

Experts think relaxing sanctions at this point would do more harm than good because Pyongyang has not made new offers to move toward denuclearization.

“In the absence of steps by North Korea on its nuclear program, easing sanctions unilaterally could send the wrong signal to Pyongyang — that if it continues to hold out, the international community will loosen sanctions further,” said Troy Stangarone, senior director of the Korea Economic Institute.

Bruce Klingner, former CIA deputy division chief for Korea and current senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation said, “To ease sanctions without positive North Korean action would be to provide the regime with unique immunity for violating U.N. resolutions.”

If sanctions are eased, Bosco thinks North Korea would pressure the U.S. for additional concessions such as a formal end to the Korean War, recognition of its status as a nuclear state, and increased aid to compensate for losses caused by sanctions.

“They will conclude, as communist regimes always do, that Western concessions indicate weakness, and they become more adventurist and aggressive to extract more concessions,” Bosco said.

Also, if sanctions were lifted, experts said re-imposing them would be difficult if North Korea refused to return to the negotiations.

“A better approach would be an agreement not to increase sanctions if North Korea refrained from further tests and engage in substantive talks,” Stangarone said.

William Brown, former U.S. intelligence official who heads the Northeast Asia Economics and Intelligence Advisory, said “It would be hard to put tough sanctions, like we have now, back in place without some other larger North Korean provocations.”

#### A weak international sanctions regime greenlights WMD programs in NoKo and abroad

Yeo 7/8 [Andrew Yeo, Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for East Asia Policy Studies SK-Korea Foundation Chair in Korea Studies. "Why further sanctions against North Korea could be tough to add." Brookings, 7-8-2022, accessed 7-24-2022, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/07/08/why-further-sanctions-against-north-korea-could-be-tough-to-add/] HWIC

WHAT HAPPENS TO THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME?

Beyond the Korean Peninsula, Security Council vetoes by China and Russia pose further challenges for the world’s broader nuclear nonproliferation regime.

What happens if North Korea conducts a seventh nuclear test? Given the hardening of divisions between authoritarian powers such as China and Russia, and the United States and its allies, the prospects of a unanimous Security Council resolution in response appear dim, based on Beijing and Moscow’s defense of their May vetoes. Both [China and Russia criticized](https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-united-nations-general-assembly-politics-north-korea-china-e434caaa0cb3193d4c4b1058828fe507) the U.S.-led resolution for “chanting empty slogans for dialogue and increasing sanctions against the DPRK.”

And a failed attempt at a U.N. resolution following a North Korea nuclear test would be a first for the Security Council, further damaging its credibility. A growing concern to proliferation experts is the potential message to [other nuclear proliferators, including Iran](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/16/us/politics/iran-nuclear-program-tehran.html). Would Iran try to exploit a perceived gap in the nonproliferation regime? Iran is reportedly enriching uranium and [building a network of tunnels](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/16/us/politics/iran-nuclear-program-tehran.html) near nuclear production sites. However, Iran, like North Korea, is unlikely to face repercussions within the Security Council.

Greater [China-Russia strategic cooperation](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf) now appears to be further complicating global governance mechanisms, with ripple effects on a range of existing global challenges — including [North Korea’s](https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20220624010400325?section=nk/nk) weapons program. The big challenge in addressing North Korean denuclearization rests with the Pyongyang regime’s own [insecurity](https://www.hudson.org/research/16752-fear-and-insecurity-addressing-north-korean-threat-perceptions) and [isolation](https://www.voanews.com/a/un-investigator-calls-for-end-to-north-korean-isolation-/6494908.html) as it continues to ignore requests to resume dialogue. The lack of international solidarity in responding to North Korean provocations, however, may now make it even harder to persuade or pressure Pyongyang to roll back its nuclear program.

#### Lifting sanctions doesn’t solve the humanitarian crisis

Arnold, PhD, 21 [Aaron Arnold, served as the finance and economics expert on the UN Panel of Experts for DPRK sanctions, Senior Associate Fellow with the Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies at RUSI, PhD and MPP in public policy and national security from George Mason University. "How to Deliver Relief to North Koreans Without Lifting Sanctions." The Diplomat, 11-20-2021, accessed 7-25-2022, https://thediplomat.com/2021/11/how-to-deliver-relief-to-north-koreans-without-lifting-sanctions/] HWIC

Despite evidence to the contrary, Russia and China argue that lifting the overseas labor repatriation requirement would “enhance the livelihood of the civilian population.” This position simply ignores that North Korea’s overseas laborers are — in effect — forced laborers. They work back-breaking jobs in exchange for a pittance and squalid living quarters, only to see their earnings confiscated and sent back to the regime.

In early October, the U.N. Security Council released the[latest report from the Panel of Experts](https://undocs.org/S/2021/777) on the North Korean sanctions regime. To be sure, the report also paints an equally depressing picture — pointing to official statements that summarized the country’s failure to fulfill its grain production quotas for the year as a “food crisis.” But unsurprisingly, the panel’s report also found that despite the growing humanitarian crisis, North Korea continued to make improvements to its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, procure goods and technologies for its weapons programs, illicitly import petroleum, and conduct a range of cyber operations aimed at hacking banks and exchange houses.

Lifting sanctions to relieve the humanitarian crisis is not only ineffective, but smacks of an all too expedient solution that glosses over the regime’s brutal history of diverting the country’s scarce resources to support its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. When not spending on his nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, Kim Jong Un spends scarce resources on white elephant projects that most of the country will never benefit from.

Practically, North Korea remains under a range of autonomous sanctions that effectively freeze the country out of international trade and financial systems. That means, even if there were some forms of international sanctions relief, North Korea would still find itself unable to repatriate overseas earnings. The Financial Action Task Force, which is the international standard-setting body for financial crime still considers North Korea to be a “high risk” jurisdiction, citing serious flaws in the country’s anti-money laundering rules and regulations — as in, there are none.

Lifting sanctions is also somewhat of a moot point, given North Korea’s self-imposed border closures. Although there may be emerging signs that point to the county reopening trade along its border with China, others have concluded that the draconian measures have instead undermined humanitarian efforts.

Rather than lifting sanctions and giving material benefits to a regime that has no interest in giving up its nuclear weapons, a better approach is to effectively address points of failure. The first order of business is for the U.N. Security Council Sanctions Committee on North Korea to quickly find a solution to the lack of a stable banking channel for humanitarian work. As highlighted in the panel’s reports since 2017, the lack of a banking channel severely hamstrings aid workers’ ability to conduct in-country operations. In the absence of proper banking channels, humanitarian organizations have had to resort to alternative methods to move currency into North Korea, which puts personnel at risk. Interestingly, despite the political gridlock among the committee’s permanent members, establishing and ensuring a stable and transparent banking channel enjoys widespread support.

## 1AR - Case

## 1AR - AT Prolif Good

### General

#### Deterrence fails and prolif is highly destabilizing – empirics and expert consensus prove there’s a high risk of war and accidents

Barash 18 [David Barash, Professor of Psychology at the University of Washington, author or editor of over 40 books, citing a body of area and field-study experts, The Guardian, June 14, 2018. “Nuclear deterrence is a myth. And a lethal one at that,” <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/14/nuclear-deterrence-myth-lethal-david-barash>]

In his classic The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (1989), Lawrence Freedman, the dean of British military historians and strategists, concluded: ‘The Emperor Deterrence may have no clothes, but he is still Emperor.’ Despite his nakedness, this emperor continues to strut about, receiving deference he doesn’t deserve, while endangering the entire world. Nuclear deterrence is an idea that became a potentially **lethal ideology**, one that **remains influential** despite having been **increasingly discredited**. After the United States’ nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, war changed. Until then, the overriding purpose of military forces had ostensibly been to win wars. But according to the influential US strategist Bernard Brodie writing in 1978: ‘From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose.’ Thus, nuclear deterrence was born, a **seemingly rational** arrangement by which peace and stability were to arise by the threat of **mutually assured destruction** (MAD, appropriately enough). Winston Churchill described it in 1955 with characteristic vigour: ‘Safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation.’ Importantly, deterrence became not only a purported strategy, but the **very grounds** on which governments **justified nuclear weapons** themselves. Every government that now possesses nuclear weapons claims that they deter attacks by their threat of **catastrophic retaliation**. Even a brief examination, however, reveals that deterrence is not **remotely as compelling** a principle as its reputation suggests. In his novel The Ambassadors (1903), Henry James described a certain beauty as ‘a jewel brilliant and hard’, at once twinkling and trembling, adding that ‘what seemed all surface one moment seemed all depth the next’. The public has **been bamboozled** by the **shiny surface** appearance of deterrence, with its promise of strength, security and safety. But what has been touted as profound strategic depth **crumbles with surprising ease** when subjected to critical scrutiny. Let’s start by considering the core of deterrence theory: that it has worked. Advocates of nuclear deterrence insist that we should thank it for the fact that a third world war has been avoided, even when **tensions between the two superpowers** – the US and the USSR – ran high. Some supporters even maintain that deterrence set the stage for the fall of the Soviet Union and the defeat of Communism. In this telling, the West’s nuclear deterrent prevented the USSR from invading western Europe, and delivered the world from the threat of Communist tyranny. There are, however, **compelling arguments** suggesting that the US and the former Soviet Union avoided world war for **several possible reasons**, most notably because **neither side wanted to go to war**. Indeed, the US and Russia never fought a war prior to the nuclear age. Singling out nuclear weapons as the reason why the **Cold War never became hot** is somewhat like saying that a junkyard car, without an engine or wheels, never sped off the lot only because **no one turned the key**. Logically speaking, there is **no way to demonstrate** that nuclear weapons kept the peace during the Cold War, or that they do so now. Perhaps peace prevailed between the two superpowers simply because they had no quarrel that justified fighting a terribly destructive war, even a conventional one. **There is no evidence**, for example, that the Soviet leadership **ever contemplated** trying to conquer western Europe, much **less that it was restrained** by the West’s nuclear arsenal. Post facto arguments – especially negative ones – might be the **currency of pundits**, but are **impossible to prove,** and offer no solid ground for evaluating a counterfactual claim, conjecturing why something has not happened. In colloquial terms, if a dog does not bark in the night, can we say with certainty that no one walked by the house? Deterrence enthusiasts are like the woman who **sprayed perfume on her lawn** every morning. When a perplexed neighbour asked about this strange behaviour, she replied: **‘I do it to keep the elephants away.’** The neighbour protested: ‘But **there aren’t any elephants** within 10,000 miles of here,’ whereupon the perfume-sprayer replied: **‘You see, it works!’** We should not congratulate our leaders, or deterrence theory, much less nuclear weapons, for keeping the peace. What we can say is that, as of this morning, those with the power to exterminate life have not done so. But this is not altogether comforting, and **history is** no more reassuring. The duration of ‘nuclear peace’, from the Second World War to the end of the Cold War, lasted less than five decades. More than 20 years separated the First and Second World Wars; before that, there had been more than 40 years of relative peace between the end of the Franco-Prussian War (1871) and the First World War (1914), and 55 years between the Franco-Prussian War and Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo (1815). Even in war-prone Europe, decades of peace have not been so rare. Each time, when peace ended and the next war began, the war involved weapons available at the time – which, for the next big one, would likely include nuclear weapons. The only way to make sure that nuclear weapons are not used is to make sure that there are no such weapons. There is certainly no reason to think that the presence of nuclear weapons will prevent their use. The first step to ensuring that humans do not unleash nuclear [winter] holocaust might be to show that the Emperor Deterrence has no clothes – which would then open the possibility of replacing the illusion with something more suitable. It is possible that the post-1945 US-Soviet peace came ‘through strength’, but that need not imply nuclear deterrence. It is also undeniable that the presence of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert capable of reaching each other’s homeland in minutes has made both sides edgy. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 – when, by all accounts, the world came closer to nuclear war than at any other time – is not testimony to the effectiveness of deterrence: the crisis occurred because of nuclear weapons. It is more likely that we have been spared nuclear war not because of deterrence but in spite of it. Even when possessed by just one side, nuclear weapons have not deterred other forms of war. The Chinese, Cuban, Iranian and Nicaraguan revolutions all took place even though a nuclear-armed US backed the overthrown governments. Similarly, the US lost the Vietnam War, just as the Soviet Union lost in Afghanistan, despite both countries not only possessing nuclear weapons, but also more and better conventional arms than their adversaries. Nor did nuclear weapons aid Russia in its unsuccessful war against Chechen rebels in 1994-96, or in 1999-2000, when Russia’s conventional weapons devastated the suffering Chechen Republic. Nuclear weapons did not help the US achieve its goals in Iraq or Afghanistan, which have become expensive catastrophic failures for the country with the world’s most advanced nuclear weapons. Moreover, despite its nuclear arsenal, the US remains fearful of domestic terrorist attacks, which are more likely to be made with nuclear weapons than be deterred by them. In short, it is not legitimate to argue that nuclear weapons have deterred any sort of war, or that they will do so in the future. During the Cold War, each side engaged in conventional warfare: the Soviets, for example, in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Afghanistan (1979-89); the Russians in Chechnya (1994-96; 1999-2009), Georgia (2008), Ukraine (2014-present), as well as Syria (2015-present); and the US in Korea (1950-53), Vietnam (1955-75), Lebanon (1982), Grenada (1983), Panama (1989-90), the Persian Gulf (1990-91), the former Yugoslavia (1991-99), Afghanistan (2001-present), and Iraq (2003-present), to mention just a few cases. Nor have their weapons deterred attacks upon nuclear armed states by non-nuclear opponents. In 1950, China stood 14 years from developing and deploying its own nuclear weapons, whereas the US had a well-developed atomic arsenal. Nonetheless, as the Korean War’s tide was shifting dramatically against the North, that US nuclear arsenal did not inhibit China from sending more than 300,000 soldiers across the Yalu River, resulting in the stalemate on the Korean peninsula that divides it to this day, and has resulted in one of the world’s most dangerous unresolved stand-offs. In 1956, the nuclear-armed United Kingdom warned non-nuclear Egypt to refrain from nationalising the Suez Canal. To no avail: the UK, France and Israel ended up invading Sinai with conventional forces. In 1982, Argentina attacked the British-held Falkland Islands, even though the UK had nuclear weapons and Argentina did not. Following the US-led invasion in 1991, conventionally armed Iraq was not deterred from lobbing Scud missiles at nuclear-armed Israel, which did not retaliate, although it could have used its nuclear weapons to vaporise Baghdad. It is hard to imagine how doing so would have benefitted anyone. Obviously, US nuclear weapons did not deter the terrorist attacks on the US of 11 September 2001, just as the nuclear arsenals of the UK and France have not prevented repeated terrorist attacks on those countries. Deterrence, in short, does not deter. The pattern is deep and geographically widespread. Nuclear-armed France couldn’t prevail over the non-nuclear Algerian National Liberation Front. The US nuclear arsenal didn’t inhibit North Korea from seizing a US intelligence-gathering vessel, the USS Pueblo, in 1968. Even today, this boat remains in North Korean hands. US nukes didn’t enable China to get Vietnam to end its invasion of Cambodia in 1979. Nor did US nuclear weapons stop Iranian Revolutionary Guards from capturing US diplomats and holding them hostage (1979-81), just as fear of US nuclear weapons didn’t empower the US and its allies to force Iraq to retreat from Kuwait without a fight in 1990. In Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy (2017), the political scientists Todd Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann examined 348 territorial disputes occurring between 1919 and 1995. They used statistical analysis to see whether nuclear-armed states were more successful than conventional countries in coercing their adversaries during territorial disputes. They weren’t. Not only that, but nuclear weapons didn’t embolden those who own them to escalate demands; if anything, such countries were somewhat less successful in getting their way. In some cases, the analysis is almost comical. Thus, among the very few cases in which threats from a nuclear-armed country were coded as having compelled an opponent was the US insistence, in 1961, that the Dominican Republic hold democratic elections following the assassination of the dictator Rafael Trujillo, as well as the US demand, in 1994, following a Haitian military coup, that the Haitian colonels restore Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power. In 1974-75, nuclear China forced non-nuclear Portugal to surrender its claim to Macau. These examples were included because the authors honestly sought to consider all cases in which a nuclear-armed country got its way vis-à-vis a non-nuclear one. But no serious observer would attribute the capitulation of Portugal or the Dominican Republic to the nuclear weapons of China or the US. All of this also suggests that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran or North Korea is unlikely to enable these countries to coerce others, whether their ‘targets’ are armed with nuclear or conventional weapons. It is one thing to conclude that nuclear deterrence hasn’t necessarily deterred, and hasn’t provided coercive power – but its extraordinary risks are even more discrediting. First, deterrence via nuclear weapons **lacks credibility**. A police officer armed with a backpack nuclear weapon would be unlikely to deter a robber: ‘Stop in the name of the law, or I’ll blow us all up!’ Similarly, during the Cold War, NATO generals lamented that towns in West Germany were less than two kilotons apart – which meant that defending Europe with nuclear weapons would destroy it, and so the claim that the Red Army would be deterred by nuclear means was **literally incredible**. The result was the elaboration of smaller, **more accurate tactical weapons** that would be more usable and, thus, whose employment in a crisis would be more credible. But deployed weapons that **are more usable**, and thus **more credible as deterrents**, are more liable to be used. Second, deterrence requires that each side’s arsenal **remains invulnerable** to attack, or at least that such an attack would be prevented insofar as a potential victim **retained a ‘second-strike’ retaliatory capability**, sufficient to prevent such an attack **in the first place**. Over time, however, nuclear missiles have become increasingly accurate, raising concerns about the vulnerability of these weapons to a ‘counterforce’ strike. In brief, nuclear states are **increasingly able** to target their adversary’s nuclear weapons for destruction. In the **perverse argot** of deterrence theory, this is called counterforce **vulnerability**, with ‘vulnerability’ referring to the target’s nuclear weapons, not its population. The **clearest outcome** of increasingly accurate nuclear weapons and the ‘counterforce vulnerability’ component of deterrence theory is to **increase the likelihood of a first strike**, while also **increasing the danger** that a potential victim, fearing such an event, might be tempted to **pre-empt with its own first strike**. The resulting situation – in which each side **perceives** a possible **advantage** in striking first – is **dangerously unstable**. Third, deterrence theory **assumes optimal rationality** on the part of decision-makers. It presumes that those with their fingers on the **nuclear triggers** are **rational actors** who will also remain calm and cognitively unimpaired under extremely stressful conditions. It also presumes that leaders will **always retain control** over their forces and that, moreover, they will always retain control over their emotions as well, making decisions based **solely on a cool calculation** of strategic costs and benefits. Deterrence theory maintains, in short, that each side will **scare the pants off the other** with the prospect of the most **hideous, unimaginable consequences**, and will then conduct itself with the **utmost deliberate and precise rationality**. Virtually everything known about human psychology suggests that **this is absurd**. In Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A Journey Through Yugoslavia (1941), Rebecca West noted that: ‘Only part of us is sane: only part of us loves pleasure and the longer day of happiness, wants to live to our 90s and die in peace …’ It requires no arcane wisdom to know that people often act out of misperceptions, anger, despair, insanity, stubbornness, revenge, pride and/or dogmatic conviction. Moreover, in certain situations – as when either side is **convinced that war is inevitable**, or when the pressures to avoid losing face are **especially intense** – an irrational act, including a **lethal one**, can appear appropriate, even unavoidable. When he ordered the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese defence minister observed that: ‘Sometimes it is necessary to close one’s eyes and jump off the platform of the Kiyomizu Temple [a renowned suicide spot].’ During the First World War, Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany wrote in the margin of a government document that: ‘Even if we are destroyed, England at least will lose India.’ While in his bunker, during the final days of the Second World War, Adolf Hitler ordered what he hoped would be the total destruction of Germany, because he felt that Germans had ‘failed’ him. Consider, as well, a US president who shows signs of mental illness, and whose statements and tweets are **frighteningly consistent** with dementia or genuine psychosis. National leaders – nuclear-armed or not – aren’t immune to mental illness. Yet, deterrence theory **presumes otherwise**. Finally, there is **just no way** for civilian or **military leaders to know** when their country has **accumulated enough nuclear firepower** to **satisfy the requirement** of having an ‘effective deterrent’. For example, if one side is **willing to be annihilated** in a counterattack, **it simply cannot be deterred**, no matter the threatened retaliation. Alternatively, if one side is **convinced** of the other’s implacable hostility, or of its presumed indifference to loss of life, **no amount of weaponry** can suffice. Not only that, but so long as accumulating weapons **makes money** for defence contractors, and so long as designing, producing and deploying new ‘generations’ of nuclear stuff advances careers, the truth about deterrence theory will **remain obscured**. Even the sky is not the limit; militarists want to put weapons in outer space. Insofar as nuclear weapons also serve symbolic, psychological needs, by demonstrating the **technological accomplishments** of a nation and thus conveying legitimacy to otherwise **insecure leaders and countries**, then, once again, there is no **rational way** to establish the minimum (or cap the maximum) size of one’s arsenal. At some point, additional detonations nonetheless come up against the **law of diminishing returns**, or as Winston Churchill pointed out, they simply ‘make the rubble bounce’. In addition, ethical deterrence is an oxymoron. Theologians know that a nuclear war could never meet so-called ‘just war’ criteria. In 1966, the Second Vatican Council concluded: ‘Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas along with their populations is a crime against God and man itself. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation.’ And in a pastoral letter in 1983, the US Catholic bishops added: ‘This condemnation, in our judgment, applies even to the retaliatory use of weapons striking enemy cities after our own have already been struck.’ They continued that, if something is immoral to do, then it is also immoral to threaten. In a message to the 2014 Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, Pope Francis declared that: ‘Nuclear deterrence and the threat of mutually assured destruction cannot be the basis of an ethics of fraternity and **peaceful coexistence** among peoples and states.’ The United Methodist Council of Bishops go further than their Catholic counterparts, concluding in 1986 that: ‘Deterrence must no longer receive the churches’ blessing, even as a temporary warrant for the maintenance of nuclear weapons.’ In The Just War (1968), the Protestant ethicist Paul Ramsey asked his readers to imagine that traffic accidents in a particular city had suddenly been reduced to zero, after which it was found that everyone had been required to strap a newborn infant to the bumper of every car. Perhaps the most frightening thing about nuclear deterrence is its **many paths to failure**. Contrary to what is widely assumed, the **least likely** is a **‘bolt out of the blue’** (BOOB) attack. Meanwhile, there are **substantial risks** associated with **escalated conventional** war, accidental or unauthorised use, irrational use (although it can be argued that any use of nuclear weapons would be irrational) or **false alarms**, which have happened with **frightening regularity**, and could lead to **‘retaliation’ against an attack that hadn’t happened**. There have also been numerous **‘broken arrow’ accidents** – accidental launching, firing, theft or loss of a nuclear weapon – as well as circumstances in which such events as a **flock of geese, a ruptured gas pipeline or faulty computer codes** have been interpreted as a **hostile missile launch**. The above describes only some of the **inadequacies** and **outright dangers** posed by deterrence, the **doctrinal fulcrum** that manipulates nuclear hardware, software, deployments, accumulation and escalation. Undoing the ideology – verging on theology – of deterrence won’t be easy, but neither is living under the **threat of worldwide annihilation**. As the poet T S Eliot once wrote, unless you are in over your head, how do you know how tall you are? And when it comes to nuclear deterrence, we’re all in over our heads.

#### Second-generation proliferators have less expertise AND technological capacity with nuclear weapons-increases the odds of deterrence failure.

Reisman 18 [W. Michael Reisman 18. Myres S. McDougal Professor of International Law, Yale Law School. 03/08/2018. Will a Policy of Preemptive Self-Defense Make Us All Safer? SSRN Scholarly Paper, ID 3162033, Social Science Research Network. papers.ssrn.com, https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3162033.]

V Until now, what one might call the “operational code” with respect to the deployment of nuclear weapons has differed from that of other weapons systems. Wholly apart from the presence or absence of formal “no-first-strike” commitments and putting aside the question of their credibility, a system of “mutually assured destruction” or “MAD” has effectively deterred any preemptive gamble as between the major nuclear powers. For these states, essential national security has come to rest on the ability to ensure that an adversary’s first strike will not disable the target state which would still be able to respond with devastating effect on the attacker. Any sought advantage of a first-strike is, thus, guaranteed to be pyrrhic. This odd, counter-intuitive and even morally perplexing system of reciprocal defense must assume, first, a world of administratively effective and not failed or faux states; second, the rationality of the principal actors; and third, the capacity of their early warning systems to both timeously detect attacks as well as to avoid false positives. According to Murphy’s Law, whatever can go wrong in engineered systems will go wrong. To date, that category contains only near misses, both in the United States and Russia, but it does not take great imagination to construct plausible scenarios, which, either because of human error, technical glitches or sabotage, do not have happy endings. The peril of the eventuation of unhappy endings increases exponentially in two, interrelated scenarios; first, the proliferation of nuclear states and, second, the possible emergence of nuclear-capable non-state actors. To stem the proliferation of nuclear states, the major nuclear powers share an interest in preserving their monopoly. That also requires the cooperation of non-nuclear states, part of which was secured by a commitment by the major nuclear powers to cooperate in reducing their nuclear arsenals and moving toward nuclear disarmament. Article 6 of the 191- party Non-Proliferation Treaty requires them “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”42 Although the Obama Administration took some initial steps to comply with this obligation, no intention has been expressed by the new Administration to pursue this goal. President Trump’s Draft Nuclear Review goes in the other direction. He is reported to have said that he would add a nearly ten-fold increase in the U.S. nuclear arsenal.43 (President Putin, not to be outdone, has trumpeted new weapons.)44 In the meanwhile, thanks to statements that have been made, the credibility of alliances, which until now reassured some non-nuclear states, may be eroding. The more nuclear states, the more likely that there will be still more nuclear states. The more nuclear states, the greater the likelihood that fissile material may reach non-state actors. It is well to remember that the leakage of nuclear and missile material to nuclear aspirants has not come only from North Korea. Under international law, preemptive attacks against illegal WMD facilities in rogue states are prohibited but in the two incidents on record, they appear in retrospect, to have been the right thing to do, based upon their circumstances and the consequences of inaction. Both succeeded in preventing, at least in the short term, the proliferation of nuclear weapons. When, however, the objectives of the military operation were broadened to include regime change, preemptive actions ostensibly in the self-defense of the actor may in fact, as the U.S. experience in Iraq showed, result in less rather than more security, and legal and moral condemnation rather than approval. That is not to minimize the dangers of allowing proliferation but simply to acknowledge that preemptive action under the guise of self-defense may, by itself, be an insufficient tool on which to rest national and global security and that a broad program of all-around denuclearization is required, lest the world end with a bang and not a whimper.

### Japan

#### Japanese prolif cascades globally and causes war

Newman ’19 [Sean A; Lieutenant in the United State Navy, MA in Security Studies from the Naval Postgraduate School; September 2019; “Japan and the Bomb: Perspectives from South Asia”; https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/63489/19Sep\_Newman\_Sean.pdf; NPS Theses and Dissertations; accessed 8/25/20; TV]

The initial response by Japanese leaders to Chinese proliferation was to respond in kind. Several months after the Chinese tests, U.S. intelligence warned President Lyndon Johnson that Japanese Prime Minister Sato Eisaku and his foreign minister were, “hot for proliferation.”116 Sato confirmed these reports and reportedly told United States officials that “if the Chicoms had nuclear weapons, the Japanese should have them [too].”117 U.S. intelligence estimated that, should Japan choose to acquire nuclear weapons they could “‘test its first nuclear device as early as 1971’ and produce ‘as many as 100 nuclear equipped Medium Range Ballistic Missiles/Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles by 1975.”118 In 1964, Japan had both the technology and resources to acquire nuclear weapons, and momentarily, it appeared they had the will to do so.

The potential for Japan to acquire nuclear weapons in response to China’s nuclear test presented a challenge to the United States policy of non-proliferation and stoked fears of an Asian-Pacific arms race. Should Japan acquire nuclear weapons, other nuclear-states in challenging security environments might quickly follow suit. At the same moment as Japan—India, Israel, and Sweden all had “the technical ability to produce nuclear weapons” and were “considering whether or not to do so.”119 The risk of rapid worldwide proliferation had the potential to disrupt international stability, increase the risk of catastrophic conflict and undercut an emerging norm of non-proliferation. Should the United States tolerate proliferation by Japan, West Germany would “doubtlessly come to feel that it had accepted second-class status by not acquiring its own independent nuclear force.”120 The United States decided to act decisively to contain the fallout from the Chinese nuclear test and satisfy regional security concerns.

#### Japan prolif causes arms races, NPT collapse, Saudi prolif, and nuclear terrorism.

Stangarone 16, Senior Director for Congressional Affairs and Trade at the Korea Economic Institute of America (Troy, July 28th, “Is Trump Right to Suggest that South Korea and Japan Should Go Nuclear?” Korea Economic Institute of America, http://keia.org/trump-right-suggest-south-korea-and-japan-should-go-nuclear)

Is it inevitable that South Korea and Japan will develop nuclear weapons? As Mark Fitzpatrick of the Institute for International Security Studies points out, the United States’ nuclear umbrella and policy of extended deterrence have provided reassurances to Seoul and Tokyo about their security posture. Both countries would likely pursue a nuclear option if they believed that the security assurances of the United States were in doubt.

At the same time, both South Korea and Japan have refrained from developing nuclear weapons despite North Korea’s continued pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. If the possession of nuclear weapons by a neighboring state were an indicator of a country’s likelihood of developing nuclear weapons, one would have expected South Korea and Japan to already have done so. Ultimately, a Trump administration policy of weakening U.S. security commitments to Seoul and Tokyo would likely do more to encourage them to develop a nuclear weapons program than anything North Korea has done to date.

If the U.S. nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence can reassure U.S. allies and therefore also help to constrain nuclear proliferation, is Trump right to suggest that it is a burden that the United States can no longer afford? As Robert Samuelson at the Washington Post points out, the United States is wealthy enough to pay for domestic needs and a robust presence abroad. Since 1950, U.S. GDP has risen from $2.2 trillion to $16.3 trillion last year in inflation adjusted terms. At the same time, Japan’s per capita GDP is only 69 percent of the United States’ and South Korea’s less so. While a debate over the best usage of resources in any society is legitimate, the United States is clearly wealthy enough to meet its commitments abroad should society at large deem them to be beneficial.

More to Trump’s point about burden sharing, South Korea already contributes a great deal to the alliance in contrast to what he has suggested. Seoul provides 55 percent of the non-personnel costs for stationing U.S. troops in South Korea, including annual increases. It spends more on defense, 2.6 percent of GDP, than any other ally in Europe and Asia, and fields an active military of 630,000 troops through conscription. South Korea has also historically contributed troops to assist the U.S. in past wars and peace keeping missions than any ally other than the United Kingdom and a few others.

This brings us to the last of Trump’s arguments, that the United States does not benefit enough from its commitments abroad. Is this the case? As previously noted, U.S. commitments to our allies have helped constrain nuclear proliferation, but the United States benefits in other ways as well. U.S. commitments abroad provide necessary stability around the world to maintain the peace and order that helps to enable the international commerce necessary for U.S. prosperity. U.S. bases abroad also provide forward positioning to allow the United States to deal with military threats abroad before they endanger the homeland.

At the same time, the idea of allowing South Korea and Japan to develop nuclear weapons to lessen the burden on the United States would face a series of constraints and concerns. As we have noted on previous occasions, there are real economic and foreign policy constraints on South Korea developing a nuclear weapon. Many of these would apply to Japan as well.

Seoul and Tokyo would need to either violate their commitments to or withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). If they, along with Saudi Arabia and other countries, did so as a result of Trump’s policy, it would likely be the end of the NPT and increase nuclear proliferation worldwide. This has significant security implications for the United States, especially as it relates to terrorism. As more states develop nuclear programs there will increasingly be more states with access to fissile material that a bad actor could utilize to threaten peace and stability.

More practically, even with U.S. support, other countries might decide to hold the line on nuclear non-proliferation. If that was the case, the Nuclear Suppliers Group would likely end shipment of nuclear fuel to South Korea and Japan, placing the United States in the awkward position of having to supply nuclear fuel to prevent power shortages in South Korea, though to a much lesser extent in Japan.

There could be economic consequences more broadly as well. As with prior efforts by states such as North Korea and Iran to develop nuclear weapons, Japan and South Korea could also face economic sanctions in the absence of a broader global agreement on nuclear proliferation.

Eliminating U.S. extended deterrence commitments to South Korea and Japan, along with Trump’s previous suggestions that he would withdraw U.S. troops if both countries did not pay more for their stationing, raises questions about how the United States would fulfill its obligations on the mutual defense treaties it has with both nations.

Lastly, one disconcerting question Trump’s policy would raise for policy makers in South Korea and Japan is whether he would abandon efforts to denuclearize North Korea and agree with Kim Jong-un that North Korea should be recognized as a nuclear weapons state?

Rather than reducing the burden on the United States and improving U.S. security, encouraging South Korea and Japan to develop their own nuclear deterrent would likely result in increasing instability in East Asia, declining U.S. influence with U.S. allies and in the region, and, more broadly, a lessening of U.S. national security interests.

#### Saudi prolif causes nuclear war---it’s fast and destabilizing.

Edelman 11 [Eric S. Edelman 11. Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, former U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Finland, and former Principal Deputy Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs, “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran: The Limits of Containment,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2011, NU Libraries.]

There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also offered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the CSS-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads effectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This "Islamabad option" could develop in one of several different ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the NPT since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan's weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India's reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT.

### SoKo

#### South Korean proliferation collapses the NPT, destroys US credibility, aggravates China, and prevents NoKo resolution

Kuzminski 16 (Frank Kuzminski - Strategic Planner and National Security Professional for the US army specializing in Asia-Pacific regional security issues. “No Nukes in South Korea”. 2/29/16. DOA: 6/28/19. https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/03/01/no\_nukes\_in\_south\_korea\_109090.html)

In a recent article, U.S. Army Major Christopher Lee argues that the United States should allow South Korea to obtain its own nuclear arsenal, stating that it is the only way for the South to prevent Kim Jong-Un from furthering his nuclear and ballistic missile program. This argument is a false dichotomy and fails to consider, or at least properly weigh, the global and strategic consequences of such an outcome. First of all, the United States does not dictate which countries can and cannot pursue nuclear weapons; South Korea is party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and remains committed to not developing a nuclear arsenal. Moreover, a nuclear-armed Republic of Korea (ROK) will, in fact, make the region less secure, and threaten to turn the South into a pariah state like its errant, northern neighbor. Additionally, Seoul going nuclear would undermine the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and lead to a collapse of the delicate nonproliferation regime. By encouraging a nuclear-armed South Korea, the United States risks seriously eroding the credibility of its extended deterrent, and the strength of its alliances. South Korea acquiring its own nuclear arsenal will achieve little beyond destabilizing the region. While North Korea defiantly continues its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, it keeps the bulk of its military positioned forward and able to attack the South with little or no warning; North Korea’s long range artillery and known stocks of chemical and biological weapons are just as threatening as, if not more destructive than, North Korea’s nascent nuclear arsenal. Kim Jong-Un does not need a nuclear-tipped Unha-3 ballistic missile, or even a submarine launched ballistic missile to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire.” The real purpose behind Pyongyang’s nuclear program is to ensure the regime’s long-term survival, and to convince the world that North Korea be taken seriously. According to the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, James R. Clapper, North Korea’s ballistic missile threat is aimed at the United States, and a nuclear South Korea will not neutralize this threat. Instead, it will dramatically alter the regional balance of power and incense China, which already strongly opposes the deployment of a U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery to South Korea. China will likely consider its interests directly threatened, leading to further polarization over the North Korean issue, and a costly breakdown in Sino-South Korean relations. China is South Korea’s top trading partner by far – South Korea can only lose in a strategic contest with China. One can also speculate that Japan, which forswears nuclear weapons largely due to being the only country ever attacked by them, will not tolerate being left out of a North East Asian nuclear arms race, especially given the recent security reforms championed by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. These effects may spill over into other regions, such as the Middle East, where the potential for nuclear proliferation exists. If countries perceive the United States is ceding its leadership in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, in favor of the parochial interests of a regional power like South Korea, one can easily envision that other countries, such as Saudi Arabia, will withdraw from the NPT and develop their own nuclear weapons. The potential for a nuclear arms race among second-tier powers will not make the world a safer place. At stake is not only the viability of the global nonproliferation regime, which has kept the total number of nuclear-armed states to nine, but also other agreements, such as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which limits Iran’s capacity to produce fissile material in exchange for sanctions relief, and is predicated on the enduring strength of the NPT. Controlling the world’s most dangerous weapons is founded on global consensus and confidence in the international community’s commitments to keeping the costs of acquiring nuclear weapons prohibitively high. If the U.S. suddenly reverses its long-standing policies, and encourages South Korea to develop nuclear weapons, the whole system is at risk of collapsing. The subsequent finger-pointing and accusations by those opposed to a nuclear-armed South Korea will also seal the growing perception that America’s global leadership on important matters is waning towards irrelevance.

### EA

#### East Asian prolif uniquely causes instability

**Friedberg 15** Aaron L. Friedberg (2015) Friedberg is Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. His most recent book is Beyond Air-Sea Battle: The Debate Over US Military Strategy in Asia (Routledge for the IISS, 2014) The Debate Over US China Strategy, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 57:3, 89-110, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2015.1046227 dw

If it were to happen overnight, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by current US security partners in East Asia (perhaps including Taiwan, as well as Japan and South Korea) might improve their prospects for balancing against Chinese power. But here again, there is likely to be a significant gap between theory and reality. Assuming that Washington did not actively assist them, and that they could not produce weapons overnight or in total secrecy, the interval during which its former allies lost the protection of the American nuclear umbrella and the point at which they acquired their own would be one in which they would be exposed to coercive threats and possibly pre-emptive attack. Because it contains a large number of tense and mistrustful dyads (including North Korea and South Korea, Japan and China, China and Taiwan, Japan and North Korea and possibly South Korea and Japan), a multipolar nuclear order in East Asia might be especially prone to instability.48

#### East Asian proliferation is uniquely unstable - reject defense

Ogilvie-White 14 [Tanya, research fellow in the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Programme of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London (funded by the Stanton Nuclear Security Fund) and a senior lecturer in international relations at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand, “The Urgent Need for Nuclear Risk Reduction in Asia,” August 2014, http://a-pln.org/sites/default/files/apln-analysis-docs/PB14.pdf HKR-MK]

In Asia, the expansion and modernization of nuclear weapons programs is occurring against a backdrop of rising strategic tensions, doctrinal dissonance, weak command and control systems and a worrying absence of crisis stability mechanisms. As a result, the potential for deadly miscalculation leading to nuclear use is growing. In particular, the nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan, and tensions between the US (plus its allies in North East Asia) and China demand our attention. Ambiguities and competing ideas about nuclear deterrence among these nucleararmed adversaries make it more likely that a conflict that begins as limited and conventional could spiral into a full-blown nuclear exchange. Despite these dangers, there is a high level of nuclear complacency among international elites and general publics. Urgent steps are needed to improve communication channels, raise awareness of nuclear dangers, foster cooperative approaches to security and increase support for nuclear disarmament.

### BioW

#### Countermeasures solve bioweapons but not nuclear war – that also deters states from using them even f countermeasures fail

Koblentz 15 [Gregory D. Koblentz is an associate professor and deputy director of the Biodefense Graduate Program in the School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs at George Mason University. He is the author Living Weapons: Biological Warfare and International Security (Cornell University Press, 2009). The myth of biological weapons as the poor man’s atomic bomb. March 18, 2015. https://thebulletin.org/roundtable\_entry/the-myth-of-biological-weapons-as-the-poor-mans-atomic-bomb/]

The second major difference between nuclear and biological weapons concerns the availability of defenses. There are no effective defenses against the effects of a nuclear attack. There are, however, a number of countermeasures that can be taken before, during, and after a biological attack that can mitigate the consequences of such an attack. Masks and filters can prevent exposure to biological agents. Biological weapons are also unique in that vaccines can be used to protect soldiers and civilians before an actual attack occurs. Because diseases have an incubation period of days to weeks, defenders have a window of opportunity to detect an attack using sensors and biosurveillance systems. Early detection can trigger the distribution of medical countermeasures to treat the victims of an attack and there are already vaccines and /or treatments available for the most lethal diseases such as anthrax, plague, smallpox, and tularemia. As a result, the effects of a biological attack are not absolute and incontestable; they can be mitigated and limited by a well-prepared defender. This possibility is likely to reduce the confidence of states in their ability to reliably inflict unacceptable damage against an adversary in a retaliatory strike. The full panoply of defenses need not be deployed constantly at full readiness because the very availability of these defenses may be sufficient to dissuade a state from calculating that it can inflict unacceptable damage. Although civilian populations will remain more vulnerable to biological weapons than will military forces, damage limitation remains a viable option for larger, more advanced states facing less sophisticated adversaries.

#### The secrecy required to develop bioweapons means they fail as a deterrent – issuing threats allows countermeasures

Koblentz 15 [Gregory D. Koblentz is an associate professor and deputy director of the Biodefense Graduate Program in the School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs at George Mason University. He is the author Living Weapons: Biological Warfare and International Security (Cornell University Press, 2009). The myth of biological weapons as the poor man’s atomic bomb. March 18, 2015. https://thebulletin.org/roundtable\_entry/the-myth-of-biological-weapons-as-the-poor-mans-atomic-bomb/]

Third, biological weapons have limited value as strategic deterrents due to the need for states to shroud their biological weapons programs in strict secrecy. This need for secrecy is driven by normative, legal, and strategic considerations. In the strategic context, the availability of defenses against biological weapons places a premium on the attacker achieving surprise. This undermines the ability of a state to use biological weapons as a deterrent in two ways. First, the secrecy required to retain the element of surprise in a biological attack reduces a state’s ability to issue credible threats to inflict unacceptable damage against an adversary. To make a deterrent threat credible, a state would not only have to admit that it was violating international norms and laws but it would also have to reveal details about its offensive biological warfare capabilities such as the types of agents it has developed and their means of delivery. These revelations could reduce the effectiveness of these weapons by allowing the defender to mobilize appropriate countermeasures. In contrast, the superpowers flaunted their nuclear forces during the Cold War for deterrent purposes. They were able to do this because these demonstrations of their nuclear capabilities did not provide the other side with an improved means of defending against them. Second, secrecy is a flimsy means of protecting strategic forces designed for deterrence. Strategic forces that depend on secrecy for their protection are vulnerable to intelligence breakthroughs by an adversary. If a defender gained inside information about an attacker’s capabilities, it would be possible to develop and stockpile new pharmaceuticals, immunize the at-risk population, distribute protective masks and treatments, enhance public health surveillance, and take other precautions that could substantially mitigate the impact of a first-strike or retaliatory attack with biological weapons. Although such information is difficult to acquire, the cases of Soviet biologist Vladimir Pasechnik, former Soviet bioweapons program official Ken Alibek, and Iraqi weapons official Hussein Kamal attest to the risk posed by the defection of high-level government officials knowledgeable about their nation’s biological warfare programs.

#### You’re certain of the destructive power of nukes but not bioweapons – any risk of the aff outweighs

Koblentz 15 [Gregory D. Koblentz is an associate professor and deputy director of the Biodefense Graduate Program in the School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs at George Mason University. He is the author Living Weapons: Biological Warfare and International Security (Cornell University Press, 2009). The myth of biological weapons as the poor man’s atomic bomb. March 18, 2015. https://thebulletin.org/roundtable\_entry/the-myth-of-biological-weapons-as-the-poor-mans-atomic-bomb/]

The first significant difference involves the level of uncertainty associated with the employment of these weapons. Nuclear weapons deliver instantaneous, overwhelming, and predictable levels of destruction. The effects of biological weapons, on the other hand, are delayed, variable, and difficult to predict due to their sensitivity to environmental conditions and the importance of pathogen-host interactions. In addition, the lack of operational experience with these weapons and the inability to simulate realistically their effects (short of massive human experimentation) impedes the ability of states to substantially reduce this level of uncertainty.

## 1AR – Gendered Violence

### AT: Leaving Good Turn

#### Turn — heavy flow of migration is k2 regime collapse which forces gov to prioritize humanitarian issue solvency — only widens plan solvency

Fahy 15 [(Sandra, Sandra Fahy is Assistant Professor of Anthropology in the Faculty of Liberal Arts at Sophia University in Tokyo. The author was a Korea Foundation–Mansfield Foundation U.S.-Korea Nexus Scholar in 2013–14. Her first book is titled Marching through Suffering: Loss and Survival in North Korea) “Internal Migration in North Korea:: Preparation for Governmental Disruption”, National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), July 2015, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/24905072.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A0079a34aa12eabab2e7402d63ffcdb9c&ab_segments=&origin=&acceptTC=1>] kzheng

Refugee flows have not always been perceived by China, the United States, or South Korea as a problem per se. Early in the 2000s, instigating outward migration from North Korea was explored as a means to destabilize the regime.15 Leading military personnel from China, South Korea, and Russia met in Seoul in early 2002 to determine the impact of 100,000 North Korean migrants flooding into South Korea.16 Although migration can be used as a weapon between states, it can also be used as a stabilizing feature of society.17 The opportunity to manage migration within and out of North Korea could secure the socioeconomic and political well-being of the region. “Displacement is not always a problem,” Courtland Robinson writes; rather, “it can be an adaptive, even life-saving strategy in the face of natural and human-made disaster.”18 If we can remove the causal factors precipitating the movement of migrants into China, South Korea, and Russia, and instead enable North Koreans to solve problems on their own territory, these actions will likely stem the numbers of migrating populations.

### AT: Migration Management

#### Migrants have no other options — DMZ is heavily trafficked for fast passage but ridden with land mines – Beijing and Moscow aren’t viable options either

Fahy 15 [(Sandra, Sandra Fahy is Assistant Professor of Anthropology in the Faculty of Liberal Arts at Sophia University in Tokyo. The author was a Korea Foundation–Mansfield Foundation U.S.-Korea Nexus Scholar in 2013–14. Her first book is titled Marching through Suffering: Loss and Survival in North Korea) “Internal Migration in North Korea:: Preparation for Governmental Disruption”, National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), July 2015, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/24905072.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A0079a34aa12eabab2e7402d63ffcdb9c&ab_segments=&origin=&acceptTC=1>] kzheng

In addition, security mechanisms exist to control the flow of migrants into South Korea, China, and Russia. If migrants could travel across the border between North and South Korea by rail or through Panmunjom, their movement would be strictly controlled by South Korean and allied forces.19 Even unguarded or with restrictions removed, the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and the civilian control zone near its southern boundary are impassable for large numbers of migrants because of landmines.20 The DMZ is the most heavily mined tract of land on earth, and this physical barrier ensures that vast numbers of North Koreans have few options. China, for its part, is unwavering in its harsh treatment of North Korean “economic migrants,” and there is no sign of change in the future.21 Beijing would likely forcefully repatriate migrants or erect physical barriers to prevent entry. Many people thus may not want to risk the perilous journey to an uncertain future in China. North Korea’s border with Russia is only 17.5 kilometers in length, running along the Tumen River and Lake Khasan. There is a Korean-Russian Friendship Bridge that carries a train line from Rason to Vladivostok. Some North Koreans have defected across the Russian-DPRK border, though the number is very low. Nonetheless, the two countries negotiated a return agreement for illegal migrants, an indication that migration occurs enough to draw government attention.22

# Neg – Korea Reunification

### 1NC – T Borders

#### Borders are geographic boundaries which excludes borderland regions and demilitarized zones.

Kukathas 10, [Chandran Kukathas, (Professor Chandran Kukathas is Dean and Lee Kong Chian Chair Professor of Political Science at School of Social Sciences, Singapore Management University. He was Head, Department of Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) from 2015 to 2019. He also served as the Chair of Political Theory in the Department of Government and as Warden of High Holborn and Grosvenor House Halls of Residence at LSE. Before his appointment at LSE, Chandran was Neal A. Maxwell Professor of Political Theory, Public Policy and Public Service at the University of Utah and has taught at the University of New South Wales, Oxford University and the Australian National University), January 2010, “Expatriatism: The theory and practice of open borders”, In Citizenship borders and human needs New York, (pp. 324-342), Pennsylvania: State University Press, <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/237298123.pdf//> Accessed: 07-22-2022] Sachin

Any defense of open borders must begin by explaining what borders are. Borders are geographic boundaries demarcating or defining political entities or legal jurisdictions. They can be used to distinguish countries or states but can also distinguish a variety of other entities, including subnational administrative units, such as provinces, counties, boroughs, townships, municipalities, Indian reservations (United States), Indian reserves (Canada), cantons, territories, and parishes; and supranational entities (such as empires) or superstates (such as the European Union). Borders today are clearly defined boundaries that are no more than imaginary lines that do not themselves occupy any space. They thus differ from the marchlands of earlier times, when political entities were separated by border regions or borderlands—spaces that were beyond the authority of the rulers on either side. There are remnants of this past practice in the modern world in the shape of demilitarized zones—such as that between North and South Korea—but these are rarities. Borders are notional rather than physical, and can run not only across lands but also across waters, along rivers, through streets, and even through buildings.

#### Violation: They defend the Korean DMZ---it’s an armistice line.

Shvili 21, [Jason Shvili, (Jason Shvili is a freelance writer in Toronto, who specializes in politics, current events, and history), 7-20-2021, "Korean Demilitarized Zone," WorldAtlas, <https://www.worldatlas.com/geography/korean-demilitarized-zone.html//> Accessed: 07-22-2022] Sachin

The Korean Demilitarized Zone, or DMZ, is a buffer between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, otherwise known as North Korea, and the Republic of Korea, also known as South Korea. This swathe of land, which is 250 km long and 2 km wide, was put in place following the end of the Korean War (1950-1953). It marks the final battle line between Chinese and North Korean forces in the north and forces supported by the United Nations in the south, which were led by the United States. The DMZ straddles the former border between North and South Korea, which was the 38th parallel prior to the Korean War. It is not meant to be a permanent border between the two countries, but simply an armistice line, as no formal treaty has been signed officially ending the Korean War.

#### Both countries agree.

Mizokami 21, [Kyle Mizokami, (Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national-security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast. In 2009, he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch), 4-7-2021, "No Man’s Land: Why the Korean DMZ Is Truly Hell on Earth," National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/no-man%E2%80%99s-land-why-korean-dmz-truly-hell-earth-182088//> Accessed: 07-22-2022] Sachin

The current demarcation line between North and South Korea was settled by the Korean Armistice Agreement of July 1953. The two sides agreed on a demilitarized zone approximately 2.5 miles wide approximately 160 miles long, bisecting the peninsula. Technically there is no “border,” as neither Korea really considers the other Korea separate country, and so the DMZ has become the de facto border. Although the DMZ is commonly referred as following the thirty-eighth parallel line, it actually falls beneath the thirty-eighth parallel in the west and goes above it in the east.

## 1NC - Taiwan DA

#### Reunification incentivizes Chinese invasion of Taiwan through decreased US commitment and isolation of Taiwan

Newcomb 18 [Melissa, 10-23-2018, National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) "A Unified Korea, a Vulnerable Taiwan," https://www.nbr.org/publication/a-unified-korea-a-vulnerable-taiwan/ Project Manager with the Political and Security Affairs group at the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) HKR-MK]

In early October, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo met with North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un for nearly four hours and announced the next steps for a second summit between Kim and President Donald Trump. The meeting built on discussions between Trump and Kim at their first summit in Singapore on June 12. On that same day, the American Institute in Taiwan concluded a decades-long process by unveiling its new building with a ceremony that was the most public affirmation of unofficial U.S.-Taiwan relations to date. However, the building’s opening was eclipsed by the Trump-Kim summit in Singapore. Singapore was also the site where Taiwan’s then president Ma Ying-jeou and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) president Xi Jinping met in 2015. Over the three years since the summit between Xi and Ma, relations between Taiwan and China have deteriorated. On the Korean Peninsula, however, President Moon Jae-in of the Republic of Korea (ROK) has a rosy outlook on the future of relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). A resolution of the conflict between North and South Korea still seems unlikely, but the recent inter-Korean dialogue and positive momentum on the peninsula have breathed new life into hopes for reunification. This raises questions about how reunification would affect the region broadly, and specifically what implications it would have for cross-strait relations between Taiwan and the PRC. This commentary briefly compares the history of the two frozen conflicts and then explores how a potential reunification of the Korean Peninsula could affect Taiwan’s national security and economy. Two Frozen Conflicts ROK-DPRK relations and ROC-PRC relations are both frozen conflicts born from the Cold War. Taiwan and South Korea are like siblings—both were colonized by Japan, both have historic ties to China, and both are partners of the United States who have undergone radical economic growth and democratization in the last 30 years. Indeed, neither South Korea nor Taiwan could exist as it does today without U.S. intervention following the end of World War II. However, their counterparts, the PRC and DPRK, have not followed similar paths. North Korea is one of the least-developed countries in the world. Any modernization has come in spurts, generally to the benefit of elites in Pyongyang alone. China, meanwhile, is the second-largest economy in the world and has improved the quality of life for its citizens across the country (though not equally). China is also poised to overtake the United States economically and technologically in the coming years. Cross-strait relations and inter-Korean relations face very different challenges in their respective levels of engagement and power imbalances. Taiwan and the PRC began opening relations in 1993, and the two sides have signed a series of agreements on travel, trade, people-to-people ties, and engagement between government authorities. Currently, cross-strait activities have chilled, but they have not completely come to a standstill. North and South Korea, meanwhile, have had three historic head-of-state meetings, family reunions, and cooperation during the 2018 Pyeongchang Olympics. Despite such progress, however, travel between the North and the South is still prohibited, trade has dropped dramatically, the exchange of information between family members is not possible, and the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) remains one of the most heavily militarized borders in the world. With full acknowledgment of the differences between inter-Korean and cross-strait relations, the compelling parallels merit a comparison of the two cases. One underlying theme is unification; although what that means to each country is unique. In a case of strange bedfellows, Taiwan and the DPRK are aligned in that unification poses a great risk of loss of autonomy or regime survival, whereas the ROK and the PRC have a relatively low risk of losing their autonomy or undergoing regime change in the event of unification. Politically, unification is enshrined in the constitutions of both the North and South Korean governments. But whether each side has the political will to actually achieve unification, and what that would look like, remains unclear despite President Moon’s eagerness to make peace with the North. For Taiwan, unification was the dream of the former authoritarian ruler, Chiang Kai-shek, and his Kuomintang party at the outset of their exile, but now unification is favored by only 2% of the population. The PRC, meanwhile, has made territorial integrity a central tenet of its national interests, and patriots dutifully fight any offense that suggests that Taiwan is not a part of China. Not even a Gap t-shirt will go unnoticed. The frozen cross-strait and inter-Korean conflicts are often analyzed as if they are two completely parallel but independent political dramas. The reality is that they have both been heavily influenced by U.S. foreign policy in Asia and are intertwined. Whereas many analysts have examined how the reunification of the Korean Peninsula would affect China, Taiwan is rarely included in such analysis. Given the current dynamism of inter-Korean relations and the high level of international interest, this analysis only focuses on how changes in the DPRK-ROK relationship could affect cross-strait relations. While cross-strait relations do have implications for inter-Korean relations, there is little interest on the peninsula in considering Taiwan in its foreign policy strategy. Peace on the Korean Peninsula Brings Dangers and Opportunities for Taiwan In the military dimension, cross-strait relations could be affected by a peace treaty between the DPRK and the ROK, as it almost certainly would entail a decreased U.S. military presence in the Indo-Pacific. At the Trump-Kim summit in June, President Trump promised to halt joint military exercises with South Korea. During the subsequent Moon-Kim summit in September 2018, the two leaders declared an “era with no war,” to include a cessation of military drills by the countries aimed at one another by November 1. How the latter pledge will affect U.S. and UN forces is unclear. Regardless, these statements signal a change that could lessen the region-wide impact of deterrence that the U.S. troop presence in South Korea provides. ROK-DPRK unification could also include actual demilitarization of the DMZ and, depending on the terms, an open border. A true DMZ could mean the loss of U.S. forces at the joint command and would translate into fewer resources for deterrence against PRC aggression in the region. A peace agreement or unification could reduce the DMZ to a single UN observation office, or remove UN observers altogether, which could weaken international attention to developments on the peninsula. In short, there would be fewer checks on the PRC’s military activities in Korea. If U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula are severely reduced or removed altogether, then Taiwan’s military will need reforms in terms of both hardware and human capital. In 2017, President Tsai Ing-wen announced that Taiwan’s military spending will increase by 20% by 2025, with a focus on capabilities such as submarine, unmanned aircraft, and missile defense capabilities. Taiwan may also need to increase its naval forces or coast guard activities to counter maritime aggression. It recently switched from a conscription force to a voluntary military service, but people in Taiwan currently view the military with derision. The death of a military trainee in 2013 sparked massive protests, and there is a general distrust among young people toward the armed forces. Taiwan’s military lacks the general respect and attractive benefits for service members offered in the United States. Attracting and retaining talent will require increasing the military’s prestige among citizens, especially young people. The easiest way to increase the size of Taiwan’s armed forces would be to include more women. There is a great gender imbalance in the military, which was only 14% women as of 2017. Taiwan could learn much from Israel, a similar small power besieged by larger aggressors, whose military requires all citizens, regardless of gender, to serve. A return to conscription would be deeply unpopular, but providing more benefits to young, healthy people or technical professionals, especially women, would improve morale while enhancing military preparedness in the event of aggression from the PRC. Benefits could include measures as simple as saving plans with higher interest rates, subsidized housing, tuition funding, or preference to move into civil service. If the two Koreas unite or sign a peace treaty, Beijing will use the situation to its advantage, lauding the treaty as an example of why the “two Chinas” should unite as well. The PRC can be expected to direct stronger rhetoric and misinformation toward its own population as well as to people in Taiwan. Taiwan already has strong anti-propaganda agencies and news literacy programs, but to counteract intensified propaganda or “information warfare,” it would be critical for the country to significantly prioritize and ramp up public awareness campaigns in the lead-up to any sort of unification scenario on the Korean Peninsula. Taiwan would do well to copy Sweden’s example and create an official guidebook for citizens on how to prepare for and respond to crisis and conflict in the event that the PRC were to take unilateral action to unify with Taiwan. It will be important for Taiwan to prevent itself from being shutout of a unified Korean Peninsula or having its international space further constrained after a removal or drawdown of U.S. forces. To prevent a shutout, Taiwan must cultivate strong ties to the United States and regional partners, especially the two Koreas. Beijing may try to diplomatically isolate the island by asking a new, unified Korea to reaffirm its commitment to the one-China principle. North Korea will probably have no issue with this, but Taiwan could leverage its relations with South Korea (and ask for support from the United States) to prevent a complete capitulation on the issue. A new security framework with the United States may be necessary to protect Taiwan’s ability to defend itself—something more substantive than the current Taiwan Relations Act—potentially through legislation that codifies the Six Assurances and Three Joint Communiqués into law. Congress is already boosting U.S.-Taiwan relations: the Taiwan Travel Act was passed in March 2018; Taiwan was explicitly mentioned in the National Defense Authorization Act for 2019; and a bill called the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act was introduced to deter current allies of Taiwan from switching allegiance to the PRC. Taiwan could also look to the Indo-Pacific region, especially India, for support. Strengthening ties with India, a country historically willing to stand up to China on a range of issues, such as their disputed border and refugees from Tibet, could benefit Taiwan going forward. In the economic dimension, a unified Korea could present an amazing opportunity for Taiwan’s economy. North Korea could be the next Myanmar—a deeply underdeveloped, resource-rich country with a large untapped labor force. In fact, North Korea is reportedly already Taiwan’s fourth-largest trading partner. In 2017, Taiwan imported US$2.7 million in goods from the DPRK and exported US$45,000 to the country, down from US$12 million and US$560,000, respectively, in 2016 before sanctions were enacted. According to the Taiwan Ministry of Finance, exports to North Korea have dwindled over the last ten years, but imports remained robust until 2015, peaking in 2012 at US$42 million. If sanctions were lifted, and North Korea liberalized its economy, trade between the two countries could increase quickly and be worth billions. That being said, a unified Korea could also pose a grave threat to Taiwan’s economy. If the PRC’s investment or other funding comes with stipulations that Taiwan be excluded from the market, or if North Korea and South Korea jointly decide not to involve it in the economic development of a united Korean Peninsula, then Taiwan could stand to lose millions. It is incumbent that Taiwan innovate its economy so that it can withstand such a potential loss or have an economy too strong to ignore—either by being embedded in supply chains or by offering what no other country can in the region, such as advancements in the Internet of Things, affordable renewable energy models, and advanced medical equipment and systems, among other options. Taiwan’s ability to respond to this economic threat is complicated by the fact that it follows international sanctions against the DPRK (as a courtesy rather than out of obligation, given that it is not a member of the United Nations). Whatever options it pursues, Taiwan will need to tread carefully so as to preserve its partnership with the United States. Conclusion Going forward, Taiwan would benefit from considering more carefully how inter-Korean relations could affect its national interests. This broad assessment of the potential impact across military, political, and economic dimensions shows that a unified Korea would most likely not change the PRC’s power vis-à-vis Taiwan. Yet it could change the regional dynamics in ways that leave the island exposed to dangers it had not previously considered. If Taiwan prepares adequately, it can adapt to a new Indo-Pacific region and continue to counter Chinese aggression. If, however, its long-term strategic planning fails to consider the ramifications of a unified Korean Peninsula for cross-strait relations, Taiwan may find itself in a vulnerable position.

#### Nuke War

Pettyjohn and Wasser 5-20 [Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Becca Wasser, 22, 5-20-2022, A Fight Over Taiwan Could Go Nuclear, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-05-20/fight-over-taiwan-could-go-nuclear, STACIE L. PETTYJOHN is a senior fellow and director of the defense program at the Center for a New American Security. BECCA WASSER is a fellow in the defense program and co-lead of The Gaming Lab at the Center for a New American Security. HKR-MK]

A recent war game, conducted by the Center for a New American Security in conjunction with the NBC program “Meet the Press,” demonstrated just how quickly such a conflict could escalate. The game posited a fictional crisis set in 2027, with the aim of examining how the United States and China might act under a certain set of conditions. The game demonstrated that China’s military modernization and expansion of its nuclear arsenal—not to mention the importance Beijing places on unification with Taiwan—mean that, in the real world, a fight between China and the United States could very well go nuclear.

Beijing views Taiwan as a breakaway republic. If the Chinese Communist Party decides to invade the island, its leaders may not be able to accept failure without seriously harming the regime’s legitimacy. Thus, the CCP might be willing to take significant risks to ensure that the conflict ends on terms that it finds acceptable. That would mean convincing the United States and its allies that the costs of defending Taiwan are so high that it is not worth contesting the invasion. While China has several ways to achieve that goal, from Beijing’s perspective, using nuclear weapons may be the most effective means to keep the United States out of the conflict.

GEARING FOR BATTLE

China is several decades into transforming its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into what the Chinese President Xi Jinping has called a “world-class military” that could defeat any third party that comes to Taiwan’s defense. China’s warfighting strategy, known as “anti-access/area denial,” rests on being able to project conventional military power out several thousand miles in order to prevent the American military, in particular, from effectively countering a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Meanwhile, a growing nuclear arsenal provides Beijing with coercive leverage as well as potentially new warfighting capabilities, which could increase the risks of war and escalation.

China has historically possessed only a few hundred ground-based nuclear weapons. But last year, nuclear scholars at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the Federation of American Scientists identified three missile silo fields under construction in the Xinjiang region. The Financial Times reported that China might have carried out tests of hypersonic gliders as a part of an orbital bombardment system that could evade missile defenses and deliver nuclear weapons to targets in the continental United States. The U.S. Department of Defense projects that by 2030, China will have around 1,000 deliverable warheads—more than triple the number it currently possesses. Based on these projections, Chinese leaders may believe that as early as five years from now the PLA will have made enough conventional and nuclear gains that it could fight and win a war to unify with Taiwan.

Our recent war game—in which members of Congress, former government officials, and subject matter experts assumed the roles of senior national security decision makers in China and the United States—illustrated that a U.S.-Chinese war could escalate quickly. For one thing, it showed that both countries would face operational incentives to strike military forces on the other’s territory. In the game, such strikes were intended to be calibrated to avoid escalation; both sides tried to walk a fine line by attacking only military targets. But such attacks crossed red lines for both countries, and produced a tit-for-tat cycle of attacks that broadened the scope and intensity of the conflict.

For instance, in the simulation, China launched a preemptive attack against key U.S. bases in the Indo-Pacific region. The attacks targeted Guam, in particular, because it is a forward operating base critical to U.S. military operations in Asia, and because since it is a territory, and not a U.S. state, the Chinese team viewed striking it as less escalatory than attacking other possible targets. In response, the United States targeted Chinese military ships in ports and surrounding facilities, but refrained from other attacks on the Chinese mainland. Nevertheless, both sides perceived these strikes as attacks on their home territory, crossing an important threshold. Instead of mirror-imaging their own concerns about attacks on their territory, each side justified the initial blows as military necessities that were limited in nature and would be seen by the other as such. Responses to the initial strikes only escalated things further as the U.S. team responded to China’s moves by hitting targets in mainland China, and the Chinese team responded to Washington’s strikes by attacking sites in Hawaii.

A NEW ERA

One particularly alarming finding from the war game is that China found it necessary to threaten to go nuclear from the start in order to ward off outside support for Taiwan. This threat was repeated throughout the game, particularly after mainland China had been attacked. At times, efforts to erode Washington’s will so that it would back down from the fight received greater attention by the China team than the invasion of Taiwan itself. But China had difficulty convincing the United States that its nuclear threats were credible. In real life, China’s significant and recent changes to its nuclear posture and readiness may impact other nations’ views, as its nuclear threats may not be viewed as credible given its stated doctrine of no first use, its smaller but burgeoning nuclear arsenal, and lack of experience making nuclear threats. This may push China to preemptively detonate a nuclear weapon to reinforce the credibility of its warning.

China might also resort to a demonstration of its nuclear might because of constraints on its long-range conventional strike capabilities. Five years from now, the PLA still will have a very limited ability to launch conventional attacks beyond locations in the “second island chain” in the Pacific; namely, Guam and Palau. Unable to strike the U.S. homeland with conventional weapons, China would struggle to impose costs on the American people. Up until a certain point in the game, the U.S. team felt its larger nuclear arsenal was sufficient to deter escalation and did not fully appreciate the seriousness of China’s threats. As a result, China felt it needed to escalate significantly to send a message that the U.S. homeland could be at risk if Washington did not back down. Despite China’s stated “no-first use” nuclear policy, the war game resulted in Beijing detonating a nuclear weapon off the coast of Hawaii as a demonstration. The attack caused relatively little destruction, as the electromagnetic pulse only damaged the electronics of ships in the immediate vicinity but did not directly impact the U.S. state. The war game ended before the U.S. team could respond, but it is likely that the first use of a nuclear weapon since World War II would have provoked a response.

## 1NC - China Lashout DA

#### US-China relations stable but fragile now – diplomacy is key

Haenle and Bresnick 2-21 [Paul Haenle, Maurice R. Greenberg Director’s Chair at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and is a visiting senior research fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, served as the White House China director on the National Security Council staffs of George W. Bush and Barack Obama; Sam Bresnick, assistant editor and senior research analyst. "Why U.S.-China Relations Are Locked in a Stalemate." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 02-21-2022, accessed 7-21-2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/02/21/why-u.s.-china-relations-are-locked-in-stalemate-pub-86478] HWIC

Biden has opted to use a calmer, more restrained tone with Beijing than did his predecessor, with the aim of avoiding escalation. Moreover, unlike some Trump administration [officials](https://www.wsj.com/articles/secretary-of-state-pompeo-to-urge-chinese-people-to-change-the-communist-party-11595517729), Biden’s team has made it clear that Washington is not seeking regime change in China. And though Biden [criticized](https://www.cfr.org/election2020/candidate-tracker) Trump’s lack of a clear set of goals or a coherent interagency policy framework for addressing the China challenge, his administration has yet to release its long-awaited [China strategy](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-01-14/washingtons-missing-china-strategy) (though China does figure prominently in its recently issued [Indo-Pacific Strategy](https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf)). Until that document is issued, the finer points of the administration’s plans to compete with Beijing, as well as the end goal of such competition, will remain fuzzy. A clear articulation of U.S. aims would be helpful in Washington’s efforts to secure greater international cooperation from allies and partners in addressing the challenges China poses. It would also provide Chinese and U.S. leaders a starting point from which to negotiate the future of bilateral ties.

In China, there is considerable room for greater self-reflection. Chinese leaders should closely examine how Beijing’s own aggressive diplomacy, economic statecraft, military buildup, and human rights violations have alarmed and unsettled the United States and many other countries, especially those in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. Across many conversations, few, if any, Chinese experts have acknowledged that Beijing’s actions have played a role in the cratering of U.S.-China relations. Furthermore, they are reluctant to acknowledge that numerous nations’ hardening stances toward China are driven by China’s activities rather than U.S. coercion. Acknowledging its agency in harming relations, as well as its ability to take proactive steps to put U.S.-China ties on better footing, would constitute important initial gestures by the Chinese side. Moreover, China’s willingness to take more responsibility for its own actions and modify its policy and rhetoric would go a long way toward stabilizing bilateral dynamics.

There is no doubt the U.S.-China relationship will remain competitive going forward. Preventing bilateral ties from becoming even more hostile and adversarial, however, should constitute a common aim for both countries. Biden understands this, as he stressed the importance of developing guardrails and establishing strategic stability talks between the two governments [during his virtual summit](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/11/16/readout-of-president-bidens-virtual-meeting-with-president-xi-jinping-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/) with Xi. Implementing robust crisis management mechanisms would also prove a useful step in augmenting both nations’ abilities to control escalation in the event of a military incident in the increasingly crowded waters and air space off of China’s eastern and southern coasts.

Washington and Beijing also should establish an effective problem-solving mode for the bilateral relationship. Many observers stress the importance of U.S.-China cooperation on transnational issues where the two sides have common interests—[climate change](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/planetpolicy/2021/10/28/rebuilding-us-chinese-cooperation-on-climate-change-the-science-and-technology-opportunity/), [nuclear nonproliferation](https://www.brookings.edu/research/revitalizing-nonproliferation-cooperation-with-russia-and-china/), and [global health](https://www.csis.org/analysis/advancing-us-china-health-security-cooperation-era-strategic-competition), among others. These efforts are certainly important, but they are quite ambitious and often hampered by Washington’s and Beijing’s different approaches to managing international issues. The two countries have thus far failed to make progress in most areas. That does not mean they should abandon these efforts. But perhaps the United States and China should devote more energy toward trying to create a problem-solving approach for addressing more pointed irritants, such as limits on journalist visas and consulate closures. Such a method has already yielded dividends regarding the [former issue](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/16/us/politics/us-china-journalists.html). The two countries should focus on how to build on those smaller successes to work through larger problems in other areas.

By committing to this pragmatic approach, the United States and China may be able to find a way to put a floor under deteriorating relations, begin to build goodwill, and lay the foundation for taking on the larger structural issues in areas, like trade and technology, that will be key to determining the future health and welfare of the U.S.-China relationship over the long term. Despite the two nations’ differing mindsets and approaches to bilateral ties, starting small could prove the best method through which to, eventually, realize large gains.

#### US alliance commitments means support for a democratic Korean unification which China perceives as aggression

Revere 15, Evans JR Revere [Degree in EA Studies at Princeton, Senior Fellow at Brookings], 1-20-2015, "Korean Reunification and U.S. Interests: Preparing for One Korea," Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/korean-reunification-and-u-s-interests-preparing-for-one-korea/amp/> /tanya

It is also no surprise then that, despite Seoul’s hopes and fervor, the actual prospects for near-term reunification seem as distant as ever. There is today no common South-North vision of a united Korea. Indeed, the contrasting visions of what a united Korea might look like are zero-sum mirror images of each other – reflecting the Manichean nature of the South-North struggle for supremacy on the Korean Peninsula. One of the most important and eloquent statements of Seoul’s vision is to be found in President Park Geun-hye’s trustpolitik policy of seeking to build relations of confidence, cooperation, and transparency with the DPRK. [[4]](https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/korean-reunification-and-u-s-interests-preparing-for-one-korea/amp/%22%20%5Cl%20%22ftn4) Her idealistic vision is based on the belief that such ties can eventually be forged between North and South, despite their radically different political, economic, and social systems. North Korea has not only been unwilling to reciprocate this vision with positive actions, it has responded to it with acrimony, accusation, threat and insult. [[5]](https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/korean-reunification-and-u-s-interests-preparing-for-one-korea/amp/%22%20%5Cl%20%22ftn5) Despite occasional tactical shifts by the North, such as the high-level DPRK delegation’s visit to the ROK in connection with the Asian Games and, more recently, Kim Jong Un’s expressed willingness to consider a North-South summit, [[6]](https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/korean-reunification-and-u-s-interests-preparing-for-one-korea/amp/%22%20%5Cl%20%22ftn6) military provocations and probing, ad hominem attacks on the ROK president, and threatening language directed at the ROK have more often than not characterized the North’s approach to the South. All of this suggests that the ROK goal of easing tensions, building transparency, and creating an atmosphere in which reconciliation might lead to reunification is unlikely to be realized any time soon. Further complicating the ROK’s task is the fact that the DPRK has its own reunification plan – one that would eliminate the ROK and end its democratic system. The gulf between the two Koreas’ respective visions of a united nation suggests that Seoul’s hope for a reconciliation-based reunification faces a major challenge. Nevertheless, for the United States, supporting the ROK and staying in sync with Seoul’s on reunification serves U.S. interests and should be a priority. Support for Seoul’s approach demonstrates appropriate solidarity with a long-time ally. It also recognizes that South Korea’s pursuit of reconciliation and incremental steps towards peaceful reunification will reduce the possibility of North-South confrontation and accord well with the U.S. goal of maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula. And U.S. support for the ROK’s approach reaffirms that South Korea is usually the best judge of how far and how fast to push North Korea in the direction of reunification, keeping the ROK in the lead in determining the future of the peninsula. But the United States must also be mindful of other priorities, including North Korea’s growing nuclear and missile threats. Nuclear Weapons and Reunification A second factor complicating the path to peaceful reunification is the challenge posed by the DPRK’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. The DPRK’s growing ability to threaten the region with nuclear weapons may, in the not-too-distant future, require the United States to respond in new, more aggressive ways to defend itself, its interests, and its allies. Some possible responses could affect North Korea’s stability or even bring about the regime’s collapse. At a minimum, North Korea’s goal of posing a credible nuclear threat to its neighbors and the United States will soon compel the United States and the ROK to make difficult choices with important ramifications for peninsular stability. North Korea’s nuclear weapons- and ballistic missile-related capabilities are expanding. Credible reports and analysis indicate that the DPRK may have constructed an additional uranium enrichment facility at its Yongbyon nuclear complex, boosting the DPRK’s ability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. [[7]](https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/korean-reunification-and-u-s-interests-preparing-for-one-korea/amp/%22%20%5Cl%20%22ftn7) A new study warns that the North could have material to make as many as 79 nuclear weapons by 2020. [[8]](https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/korean-reunification-and-u-s-interests-preparing-for-one-korea/amp/%22%20%5Cl%20%22ftn8) Meanwhile, the DPRK may also be making significant strides in missile development, including in the ability to mount a miniaturized nuclear warhead on a missile. [[9]](https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/korean-reunification-and-u-s-interests-preparing-for-one-korea/amp/%22%20%5Cl%20%22ftn9) Pyongyang has long since declared that nuclear weapons development is, together with economic modernization, one of the twin pillars of its byungjin national development plan. The DPRK’s status as a nuclear power is enshrined in its constitution. And during the summer of 2014 a senior DPRK official told a European interlocutor that Pyongyang was prepared to engage in dialogue with the United States “as one nuclear weapons state to another” – another indicator of Pyongyang’s belief that it is now a nuclear weapons state. [[10]](https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/korean-reunification-and-u-s-interests-preparing-for-one-korea/amp/%22%20%5Cl%20%22ftn10) Through words and actions, the DPRK has made clear it has no intention of giving up its nuclear weapons program. In doing so it has rejected the central goal of the Six-Party denuclearization talks that were suspended in 2008. And today, there is no diplomatic process capable of slowing or stopping the DPRK’s development of nuclear weapons. Over the years, the United States and its allies and partners have tried a variety of means to convince the DPRK to end its nuclear pursuit. Nothing has worked. United States policy remains focused on trying to convince North Korea to resume implementation of its denuclearization commitments. Washington is also mindful that a denuclearized North Korea would make inter-Korean rapprochement more attainable, sustainable, and credible. However, North Korea’s behavior suggests it will not be swayed from its current path. When North Korea does develop the capability to deliver accurately a miniaturized nuclear warhead using a medium- or long-range missile, it will have a profound effect on the Northeast Asia region. It will change the security calculus and perceptions of many of the region’s actors, who will have to take into account a new threat to regional stability. It will raise concerns among North Korea’s neighbors about their vulnerability to intimidation and nuclear blackmail. Pyongyang’s possession of a credible nuclear delivery capability may prompt allies to question the U.S. deterrent and the assurances they have received from Washington to defend them. This could, in turn, spark a debate in Seoul and Tokyo about the need to consider developing their own nuclear weapons. Concern among U.S. allies and partners will probably require the United States to make its deterrent commitments and assurances even more explicit. It may also compel the United States to take other measures to deal with North Korea, including new missile defense-related deployments and exercises, in order to reassure allies and partners. Some of these steps may be interpreted by the PRC as a U.S. attempt to neutralize China’s strategic forces, using the pretext of a North Korean threat. This would seriously complicate U.S.-China relations. Indeed, there are signs that this issue is already having an effect as witnessed by Beijing’s negative reaction to the possible U.S. deployment of the THAAD missile defense system on the Korean Peninsula. [[11]](https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/korean-reunification-and-u-s-interests-preparing-for-one-korea/amp/%22%20%5Cl%20%22ftn11) As North Korea nears the ability to strike regional targets with nuclear weapons, calls for tougher and more direct measures to deal with the DPRK are likely to intensify in U.S. policy circles. With North Korea destined to pose a credible nuclear threat to its neighbors and even the United States, policymakers in the United States and elsewhere may begin to conclude that the only way to achieve the North’s denuclearization is to end the regime itself. Some prominent U.S. figures are already arguing that it is time for the United States to move in this direction. [[12]](https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/korean-reunification-and-u-s-interests-preparing-for-one-korea/amp/%22%20%5Cl%20%22ftn12) Even short of a policy of regime change, more intensive economic and banking sanctions would put unprecedented pressure on North Korean and, if effectively crafted and applied, could undermine its ability to sustain itself. Increased efforts to interdict suspect cargoes entering or leaving the DPRK through such initiatives as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) would also put new strains on a regime that relies on illicit arms trade to earn hard currency. And a sharply focused policy aimed at cutting off financial flows into the DPRK could put the regime’s survival at stake. [[13]](https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/korean-reunification-and-u-s-interests-preparing-for-one-korea/amp/%22%20%5Cl%20%22ftn13) While such measures might compel the North Korean regime to resume denuclearization talks, they could also destabilize North Korea and bring about its collapse, with uncertain consequences. Attempts to destabilize or force the collapse of the DPRK would certainly be strongly resisted by Pyongyang, possibly through military means. And absent a major turnabout in China’s policy, the PRC might also oppose such approaches, including via intervention if it believed its own interests were threatened. The pursuit of significantly more aggressive measures to counter North Korea’s rising nuclear capability would mark a significant shift in U.S. policy away from its current focus. Adoption of a regime change policy would require the United States to run the risks associated with such an approach, including the dangers inherent in the precipitate collapse of the North Korean regime. Either of these approaches could put the United States at odds with its ROK ally if Seoul were not prepared to abandon its preference for gradualism and its emphasis on reconciliation. For Seoul, abandoning that approach would mark a dramatic turning point in South-North relations – a step that any ROK government might be reluctant to take. Accordingly, a decision to move policy towards the DPRK in a more confrontational direction would be a difficult one to take for both Washington and Seoul. Nevertheless, North Korea’s current trajectory may eventually present the United States and the ROK with no other choice. Today, there seems to be no prospect of a change in Pyongyang’s determined development of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. Nor does there seem to be any near-term hope for the resumption of serious denuclearization talks with Pyongyang. The DPRK’s single-minded pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability and the strides it is making towards that end will soon pose a major new challenge to the Northeast Asia region. Sooner rather than later, that challenge may require Washington and Seoul to choose between continuing their current approach on the one hand, and taking measures on the other that run the risk of instability in order to avoid the greater evil of a nuclear-armed North Korea that can threaten its neighbors with nuclear weapons.

#### That justifies Chinese lashout

Sun 2-23, Yun Sun, [Yun Sun is a Senior Fellow and Co-Director of the East Asia Program and Director of the China Program at the Stimson Center. MA in international policy from George Washington University], 2-23-2022, "South Korea and the Taiwan Contingency: The Chinese View • Stimson Center," Stimson Center, <https://www.stimson.org/2022/south-korea-and-the-taiwan-contingency-the-chinese-view/> /tanya

Despite the overall positive trajectory of China-South Korea relations under the Moon administration, Beijing has been [highly alarmed](https://youwuqiong.top/496527.html) by the potential “China-related cooperation of the US-ROK alliance” as the Biden administration works to repair its alliance relationship with Seoul. From Beijing’s perspective, cooperation between Washington and Seoul on Chinese-related issues covers key areas of the Sino-US strategic competition, including Taiwan, Asia-Pacific, economics and trade, science and technology, as well as the broader international order. Seoul’s potential participation in the Quad system (through Quad+) has been in discussion for some time, and the recent [lifting of missile guidelines](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-06/news/us-lifts-missile-limits-south-korea) has further deepened China’s suspicion that the U.S. intends to unleash South Korea to deploy intermediate-range missiles, the range of which far exceeds what is needed to target North Korea. On nontraditional security issues, South Korea plays a critical role in the global supply chain of the high-tech industry. The recent semiconductor [dialogue and cooperation](https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2021/12/09/business/tech/semiconductor-US-Korea/20211209182241330.html) between the U.S. and South Korea touches a Chinese nerve due to its own vulnerable position in the supply chain. From climate change to high tech and vaccine cooperation to a values-based alliance, South Korea’s identified areas of cooperation with the United States draw a clear picture of a [South Korean preference](http://www.uscnpm.com/model_item.html?action=view&table=article&id=26226) to cooperate with the U.S. over China and participate in the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. The fact that China has been trying to drive a wedge between the U.S. and South Korea and exploit the opportunities created by the Trump administration—such as the exorbitant increase in military burden-sharing and overall antagonistic approach to allies—to consolidate Sino-ROK cooperation; shifts in South Korea’s alignment, even if only nuanced, have a significant impact on China’s regional strategy. Taiwan as the Focal Point In this context, the issue of Taiwan carries particular importance and sensitivity in China’s assessment of South Korea’s future position in the U.S.-China strategic competition. For China, the reference to Taiwan in the Biden-Moon joint statement is the [first time](https://youwuqiong.top/496527.html) the US-ROK alliance “infringed upon China’s internal affairs… [and] therefore is a particularly important indicator of the alliance’s future planning.” While the joint statement did not include anything inconsistent for either country, Biden and Moon [emphasized](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/05/21/u-s-rok-leaders-joint-statement/) “the importance of preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.” As mainland China ramps up its strategy of intimidation and coercion against Taiwan, the reference in the joint statement came across as a direct message to Beijing about the implications of its strategy on regional peace and security. It also raised the question as to what actions the U.S. and South Korea could jointly take in the event of a Taiwan contingency, especially one that is initiated by mainland China. After the leadership summit, the South Korean vice foreign minister [emphasized](http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20210523000253) on May 23, 2021 that stability and peace in the Taiwan Strait have a direct impact on South Korea’s national interests. This was followed by [a discussion among Japanese and South Korean vice foreign ministers and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman in Tokyo on July 20, 2021 on preserving peace](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-japan-skorea-discuss-taiwan-strait-issues-nkorea-2021-07-21/) in the Strait. China’s biggest concern is that the U.S. and South Korea could develop and regularize their security cooperation in relation to the Taiwan Strait, following the model of U.S.-Japan cooperation. After many years of South Korea’s detached and relatively noncommittal position on the utility of the US-ROK alliance toward Taiwan, Beijing worries that South Korea’s commitment—even to something as vague as the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait—could evolve from rhetoric to concrete actions. In particular, the Chinese are suspicious that South Korea will not be able to stop the U.S. from mobilizing or deploying U.S. troops in South Korea to participate in a Taiwan contingency. In documents, such as the [Joint Communique of the 52nd U.S.-Republic of Korea Security Consultative Meeting of 2020](https://kr.usembassy.gov/101520-joint-communique-of-the-52nd-u-s-republic-of-korea-security-consultative-meeting/), the application of the alliance has expanded beyond the Korean Peninsula to “the region.” These changes ring alarm bells for Beijing. As China prepares for military options in a potential Taiwan contingency, the role and involvement of U.S. allies, especially South Korea and Japan, are particularly worrisome for Beijing. At the minimum, if the U.S. is allowed to use its military bases in the two countries and to deploy troops that are currently based there, the first and foremost question for China is whether it should treat them as targets and take military actions. Doing so would inevitably equate a declaration of war against South Korea and Japan, and thus, the United States as well. Different Chinese Reactions to Japan and South Korea Although the Taiwan Strait was mentioned in U.S.-Japan and US-ROK joint statements, the official Chinese reaction to each significantly differed. For example, the Chinese Foreign Ministry was surprisingly harsh and critical of [the U.S.-Japan joint statement](https://www.state.gov/u-s-japan-joint-press-statement/) from March 16, 2021 calling the U.S. and Japan “[villainous colluders ignoring the truth.”](http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2021-03/17/c_1211071525.htm) (狼狈为奸，罔顾真相.) Beijing’s condemnation of Japan is rather unprecedented. It [claimed](http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2021-03/17/c_1211071525.htm) that Japan was “serving as a U.S. strategic vassal, abandoning its promises, damaging Sino-Japanese relations, showing wolves into the house, and selling out the region’s interest,” which it claimed was “[shameless and unpopular](http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2021-03/17/c_1211071525.htm).” The harshness is almost as bitter and severe as China’s position during the nadir of bilateral relations in 2012 after the Japanese government nationalized the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. In comparison, China’s reaction to the same reference in the US-ROK joint statement was so mild that it hardly constituted a slap on the wrist. When inquired about China’s position, its Foreign Ministry merely [encouraged](https://cn.reuters.com/article/china-mofa-us-kr-summit-0524-idCNKCS2D50KX) “related countries to be careful about their words and actions and to not play with fire.” Not only was South Korea not named, but it also did not result in any serious criticisms or accusations. The root of the difference lies in the Chinese perception of Japan having closer historical and emotional ties with Taiwan, as well as Japan’s deeper military involvement in the U.S. planning for a Taiwan contingency. Due to the inclusion of Taiwan in the U.S.-Japan defense guideline, Beijing remains convinced that Japanese involvement in the Taiwan Strait is almost guaranteed. In comparison, most South Korean involvement in a Taiwan contingency is theoretical. It is limited to a commitment to peace and stability, rather than to the defense of Taiwan, and is so far, just verbal. These perceptions of differing levels of commitment, potential roles, and involvement are why it issued such vastly different responses to the two countries. China’s Coercive Methods China’s response to Japan’s potential commitment and role in a Taiwan contingency also serves as a strong indicator that if South Korea is embarking on the same path, the Chinese will leave no stone unturned to influence, coerce and punish unfavorable South Korean decisions. Currently, two potential policy instruments are seen as being Beijing’s likely and most effective options. The first is economic sanctions. Although non-Chinese observers don’t see economic sanctions as an effective tool, as they failed to reverse South Korea’s decision to deploy the THAAD system in 2016, China saw it as being mostly effective as it pushed South Korea to commit to the “[Three Noes](https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Moon-Jae-in-s-visit-to-US-tinged-by-promises-to-China)”: 1) no additional deployment of the THAAD system, 2) no participation in a U.S.-led regional missile defense system, and 3) no morphing of a trilateral security alliance with the U.S. and Japan into a military alliance.). Moreover, its economic impact and damage were also so severe that it could serve—and has, for the most part—to preempt similar future actions that offend China. Taiwan is evidently much more crucial for China, and China’s response to South Korea having a concrete role in a Taiwan contingency will likely include a strong economic sanctions component. The second channel for coercion will likely be on the North Korean front. While China may not be in a position to prompt North Korea to launch a new round of provocations just to punish or distract South Korea, closer Sino-DPRK ties, including political and economic support, will be inevitable and indispensable if China deems that the US-ROK alliance has been strengthened to counter its activities during a Taiwan contingency. It opens up many possibilities and will complicate Seoul’s agenda on national unification and U.S. efforts to revive a denuclearization process. Conclusion Although the discussion is nascent, the role of South Korea in a Taiwan contingency is both important and impactful. It will have a critical impact on Chinese war planning, as well as the U.S.’s regional strategy. Needless to say, it will put South Korea in an extremely difficult position, as both the US-ROK alliance and South Korea’s ties with China are vital for Seoul’s national security and unification agenda. However, as U.S.-China strategic competition deepens, this is unlikely to be an issue that Seoul can permanently avoid. Understanding and preparing for China’s strategic reactions will be highly important for the planning of all parties.

#### Military backing and cooperation causes confrontation

Taylor & Sands 6-30, Guy Taylor and David R. Sands, [National Security Team Leader at The Washington Times and master's degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University] 6-30-2022, "China lashes out against ‘Asian version of NATO’," Washington Times, <https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2022/jun/30/china-and-north-korea-nato-mind-your-own-business/> /tanya

The decision by [NATO](https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/north-atlantic-treaty-organization/) leaders to highlight the global security threat posed by [China](https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/china/) for the first time has triggered outrage in [Beijing](https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/beijing/), where the Chinese foreign ministry on Thursday accused the Western military alliance of pushing a narrative that “distorts the truth” and “promotes confrontation” between the West and [China](https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/china/). [Beijing](https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/beijing/)‘s accusations came after [North Korea](https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/north-korea/)‘s authoritarian regime, which is backed by [China](https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/china/), hurled similar warnings this week, saying military coordination among the U.S., [South Korea](https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/south-korea/) and [Japan](https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/japan/) represents a “dangerous prelude to the creation of [an] ‘Asian version of [NATO](https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/north-atlantic-treaty-organization/).’” [North Korea](https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/north-korea/)‘s official KCNA news service on Thursday reprinted an analysis by a local think tank scholar arguing [NATO](https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/north-atlantic-treaty-organization/) has “brought disaster” to Eastern Europe and now seeks to do the same thing in the Asia-Pacific region. “All things considered, there is an ominous sign that dark waves of the North Atlantic will break the silence of the Pacific sooner or later,” wrote Kim Hyo Myong, identified by KCNA as a researcher of the Society for International Politics Study. “[NATO](https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/north-atlantic-treaty-organization/) is nothing but a perpetrator of the U.S. hegemonic strategy. It is simply a tool for local invasion. … After transforming the Western Hemisphere into the unstable international region of dispute, [NATO](https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/north-atlantic-treaty-organization/) is turning its sinister eyes to the far-off Eastern Hemisphere this time.” [North Korea](https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/north-korea/)‘s warnings came as President [Biden](https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/biden/) met with [his](https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/biden/) South Korean and Japanese counterparts on the sidelines of the major [NATO](https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/north-atlantic-treaty-organization/) summit in [Madrid](https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/madrid/), while the Chinese warning was a response to the newly updated “strategic doctrine” that [NATO](https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/north-atlantic-treaty-organization/) formally endorsed during its summit, which wrapped up Thursday. While heavily focused on the threat from Russia, the [NATO](https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/north-atlantic-treaty-organization/) strategy blueprint for the first time in its 75-year history singled out [China](https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/china/) as a “systemic challenge to Euro-Atlantic security” and condemned [Beijing](https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/beijing/)‘s warming ties with Moscow. “The deepening strategic partnership between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order run counter to our values and interests,” the [NATO](https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/north-atlantic-treaty-organization/) document said. It reflected frustration among [NATO](https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/north-atlantic-treaty-organization/) leaders over Chinese military muscle flexing, aggressive maritime territorial claims and support for Russia — frustration that has mounted in recent years and that U.S. and other alliance officials spoke openly about during this week’s summit. “The relationship that we all have with [China](https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/china/) is among the most complex and consequential of any relationship that we have with another country and … there are aspects, increasingly, where we have to contest what [China](https://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/china/) is doing,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on Wednesday.

#### US-China military confrontation goes nuclear

Talmadge ’18 (CAITLIN TALMADGE is Associate Professor of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. This essay is adapted from “Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War With the United States,” International Security, Spring 2017., "Beijing’s Nuclear Option",Foreign Affairs, 10-15-2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option) // ris

As China’s power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, China has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington’s fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil. A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but the prospect of a military confrontation—resulting, for example, from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan—no longer seems as implausible as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think. Members of China’s strategic com­munity tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as “somewhere between nil and zero.” This assurance is misguided. If deployed against China, the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent’s key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power. China, by contrast, not only has nuclear weapons; it has also intermingled them with its conventional military forces, making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other. This means that a major U.S. military campaign targeting China’s conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal. Faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to. As U.S. and Chinese leaders navigate a relationship fraught with mutual suspicion, they must come to grips with the fact that a conventional war could skid into a nuclear confrontation. Although this risk is not high in absolute terms, its consequences for the region and the world would be devastating. As long as the United States and China continue to pursue their current grand strategies, the risk is likely to endure. This means that leaders on both sides should dispense with the illusion that they can easily fight a limited war. They should focus instead on managing or resolving the political, economic, and military tensions that might lead to a conflict in the first place.

## 1NC - Korea Lashout DA v1

#### Reunification is the heart and soul of North Korean propaganda and will only be done under North Korean terms – modernization of ICBMs prove coercive capability

**Young 21** [Benjamin R. Young, 11/9/21, "North Korea’s Push for Reunification Isn’t Just Empty Rhetoric," No Publication, [https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/30130/pyongyang-s-push-for-korean-reunification-isn-t-empty-rhetoric //](https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/30130/pyongyang-s-push-for-korean-reunification-isn-t-empty-rhetoric%20//) JB]

Setting aside for a moment the policy debate over whether that would be a good idea, it is worth considering the logical end of such a peace treaty: Korean reunification. While many in the **West assume reunification** of the two Koreas would **occur on Seoul’s terms**, history and recent developments on the peninsula suggest that might **not be the case**. Since the Korean War ended with a truce in 1953, North Korea has never given up its goal of reunifying the peninsula **on** its **own terms**.

In July 2012, months after Kim Jong Un ascended to power in Pyongyang, a revolutionary hymn dedicated to Kim began airing on North Korean state-run media. Entitled “[Onwards Toward the Final Victory](https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/07/kim-jong-uns-official-new-theme-song-translated/259475/),” the propaganda song’s lyrics emphasized national pride and loyalty to the Kim family regime: “Let’s go, Great Baekdu-mountain nation, by the calling of the political party. Onward, onward to the final victory.”

While [foreigners may debate what “**final victory**” means](https://www.nknews.org/2021/09/understanding-north-koreas-final-victory-and-why-it-matters/), North Koreans know that it implies the **reunification** of the Korean Peninsula **under** Pyongyang’s **red banner**. Since the founding of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 1948, the “final victory” of reunification has been the basis of Pyongyang’s **long-term** strategic **ambitions**. Under Kim, this revolutionary idea has not faded away. On the contrary, the 37-year-old dictator has prioritized it in his public statements.

The Kim family regime’s sacred goal of reunifying the two Koreas began with the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950. In [a letter to Joseph Stalin dated Aug. 31 of that year](https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119400.pdf?v=84eeb802564a0492b1e201f8301b48d1), North Korea’s founding leader, Kim Il Sung, wrote, “We are fully determined to fight until final victory in the battle against the Americans and the other interventionists striving to again enslave Korea.”

More than 70 years later, North Korean political elites have not abandoned this **nationalistic fervor** for reunification, nor has Pyongyang relinquished its claim as the sole legitimate government on the peninsula. For example, in April 2019, North Korea’s state-run media began referring to Kim Jong Un as the “[Supreme Representative of all the Korean People](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/4/16/is-kim-jong-un-supreme-representative-of-all-the-korean-people).” A 2017 [North Korean propaganda book](http://www.bannedthought.net/Korea-DPRK/SouthKorea/UnderstandingKorea-10-ReunificationQuestion-2017.pdf) put it bluntly: “Korea’s **reunification is inevitable** because, first, putting an end to **domination** and intervention by outside forces and reunifying the divided country into one is the aspiration and demand of all the Korean people.”

Reunification occupies a central place in North Korea’s **utopian ideology** of total self-reliance, known as [*Juche*, which was first developed by Kim Il Sung](https://www.marxists.org/archive/kim-il-sung/1955/12/28.htm). In the Kim regime’s view, the independence and national sovereignty of the Korean people can never be fully achieved unless they reunify their two countries into one ethno-state and completely **remove the U.S military presence** from the peninsula. [Under Kim Jong Un’s rule](https://www.marxists.org/archive/kim-il-sung/1955/12/28.htm), self-reliance has been even further reinvigorated as the ideological basis of the DPRK’s national dignity and identity.

Importantly, Kim’s emphasis on achieving reunification is **not limited to nationalistic rhetoric** and ideology. North Korea’s recent **military** **development** suggests that the regime aims to do more than simply ensure its survival. Under Kim, the Korean People’s Army has emphasized the advancement of asymmetric capabilities, such as special operations forces, cyberattacks and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

According to a recently published [report from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency](https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/NKMP.pdf), the KPA does not currently have the capability to forcibly reunify the Korean Peninsula, “but Kim’s forces are **developing capabilities** that will provide a wider range of asymmetric options to menace and deter his regional adversaries, quickly **escalate** any conflict **off the peninsula**, and severely complicate the environment for military operations in the region.” Aside from [its robust **nuclear arsenal**](https://www.nytimes.com/article/north-korea-arsenal-nukes.html) and [sophisticated cyber capabilities](https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/15/north-korea-missiles-cyberattack-hacker-armies-crime/), North Korea’s recent [testing of a hypersonic missile](https://www.cnn.com/2021/09/29/asia/north-korea-hypersonic-missile-intl-hnk-ml/index.html), which would likely evade missile defense systems, could further **tilt the balance** of military power on the peninsula in **Pyongyang’s favor**.

U.S. military leaders have recently begun to take note of North Korea’s reunification strategy. As the DIA report clearly states, “The North Korean military, once considered a threat that would be confined to the 20th century, has never abandoned its ambition of dominating the peninsula and, if possible, reunifying it under Pyongyang’s rule.” A [2017 report to Congress from the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense](https://media.defense.gov/2018/May/22/2001920587/-1/-1/1/REPORT-TO-CONGRESS-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-DEMOCRATIC-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-KOREA-2017.PDF) warned that the regime’s recent rhetoric and activities suggest it “seeks to achieve a capability that goes beyond minimal deterrence to one that could provide greater freedom of action for North Korean aggression or coercion against its neighbors.” Whether U.S. policymakers will act on these reports remains to be seen, but the Pentagon appears willing to at least acknowledge the destructive nature of the Kim family regime’s end goals.

#### North Korean foreign policy is framed by nuclear coercion and international dominance

**McDowell 20** [Semaj N. McDowell, 12-13-2020, "North Korea’s Nuclear Coercion as Diplomatic Statecraft," Geopolitical Monitor, [https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/north-koreas-nuclear-coercion-as-diplomatic-statecraft //](https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/north-koreas-nuclear-coercion-as-diplomatic-statecraft%20//) JB]

The wielding of nuclear weapons is paramount to the legitimacy of the North Korean regime in the modern era in relation to its neighboring foes and its near abroad foe: The United States. The diplomatic strategy of the DPRK comprises of three main pillars: the status of the DPRK within the international community, the termination of the hostile actions the United States conducts toward Pyongyang in the form of US-South Korea military exercises and economic sanctions, and political settlements for the Korean Peninsula that include eventual reunification of Korea into a single polity.  For all three foundations to the North Korean diplomatic effort to succeed, the possession of a robust nuclear arsenal, including second-strike capabilities, is essential to accomplishing all three objectives.

*DPRK diplomatic strategy*

North Korean diplomacy is ingrained in the strategic culture of the country. It is infused with the myths and lore of the Kim family and the sustained psychological trauma of the legitimization of Japanese occupation via the 1905 Portsmouth Treaty and 1919 Treaty of Versailles. This trauma from Japanese occupation, Korean independence, and the Korean War are the three main sources of public diplomacy coercion by the Kim dynasty, to be wielded not just internationally, but domestically against the citizens of the DPRK. The number one objective for the DPRK’s diplomatic strategy is the survival of the Kim regime through the [paradox](http://keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/jukas_4.2_north_koreas_diplomatic_strategy.pdf) of stabilized instability. According to this paradox, whenever the Kim dynasty believes that the United States and South Korea are considering a pre-emptive assault on the DPRK, Pyongyang will seek to diplomatically defuse tensions, all while covertly advancing North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. Conversely, Pyongyang when is confident in the power of its nuclear deterrence mechanisms, North Korea becomes more assertive in its claims against the United States, Japan, and South Korea. To bolster the legitimacy of the Kim dynasty as sole authority and sovereign on the peninsula, being recognized as a nuclear state is paramount.

For Pyongyang, [recognition](http://keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/jukas_4.2_north_koreas_diplomatic_strategy.pdf) as a nuclear state, despite its economic realities, must be secured from South Korea, the United States, China, Russia, and Japan to elevate the stature of North Korea as a great power peer in international relations and security. In light of the fact that recognition as a nuclear power from China, Russia, South Korea, and Japan has not been garnered, the Singapore diplomatic summit between Kim Jung-un and President Donald Trump was a strategic maneuver by Pyongyang to secure international recognition of North Korea as a nuclear armed state without any agreements of substantial concessions that could potentially undermine the political legitimacy of the Kim regime. [Evan Medeiros](http://keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/jukas_4.2_north_koreas_diplomatic_strategy.pdf), former Director of U.S. National Security Council for Asia under President Barack Obama stated that the Singapore summit validated and advanced “Kim’s goal of being recognized as a de facto nuclear state.” The legitimacy of the Kim dynasty was heightened with Pyongyang positioning itself as an international negotiating power determining the future of the Korean Peninsula, including the process and scope of denuclearization. For North Korea, [demilitarization](http://keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/jukas_4.2_north_koreas_diplomatic_strategy.pdf) involves the complete withdrawal of the United States from East Asia, diminishing the presence of U.S. anti-ballistic missile defense systems, and the disavowal of the U.S. security and nuclear defense guarantees for South Korea and Japan. These diplomatic successes are featured prominently in domestic propaganda to bolster national loyalty and obedience to the Kim dynasty.

Emphasis on the necessity of a nuclear arsenal only grew amid US military interventions in Iraq, Libya, and the Balkans. For Pyongyang, the surrendering of nuclear weapons tended to portend a grim fate: military intervention and regime change by the United States and coalition forces. In 2018, Kim Jong-un [emphasized](https://www.heritage.org/insider/summer-2018-insider/why-does-north-korea-want-nukes) in a speech that “as a responsible nuclear weapons state, our Republic will not use a nuclear weapon unless its sovereignty is encroached upon by an aggressive hostile force with nukes.”

More importantly, just as nuclear weapons are meant to deter the United States and coerce South Korea toward favorable peninsula reunification terms, so too are DPRK nuclear weapons utilized to coerce and deter the Chinese and Russians. North Korean mistrust toward Beijing stems from [1964](https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/north-korea/nuclear/) when Mao Zedong denied the request of Kim Il-Sung to acquire Chinese nuclear military technology and the Soviet abandonment of Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

#### Nuclear coercion draws in US – preemptive first strike, escalation, use or lose it pressures – extinction

**Bennet et al. 21** [[Bruce W. Bennett](https://www.rand.org/about/people/b/bennett_bruce.html), [Kang Choi](https://www.rand.org/pubs/authors/c/choi_kang.html), [Myong-Hyun Go](https://www.rand.org/pubs/authors/g/go_myong-hyun.html), [Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr.](https://www.rand.org/pubs/authors/b/bechtol_bruce_e_jr.html), [Jiyoung Park](https://www.rand.org/pubs/authors/p/park_jiyoung.html), [Bruce Klingner](https://www.rand.org/pubs/authors/k/klingner_bruce.html), [Du-Hyeogn Cha](https://www.rand.org/pubs/authors/c/cha_du-hyeogn.html), April 2021, “Countering the Risks of North Korean Nuclear Weapons” Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2021. <https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA1015-1.html>. // JB]

The use of nuclear weapons appears increasingly likely in any conflict on the Korean Peninsula. That use could be limited to threats and coercion, an application of the so-called nuclear shadow.63 Or, the use of nuclear weapons could involve the actual launch of nuclear weapons. A key factor in nuclear weapon use would be how a war might start. Pyongyang might assume that conditions for small-scale military action were favorable and use nuclear threats to coerce Seoul to accept regime demands and deter the United States from responding. North Korea also could begin with a massive attack, as it did in June 1950, which would be consistent with the seven-day plan. In this context, Pyongyang would begin with a massive artillery, missile, nuclear weapon, and conventional force attack. The regime likely would use chemical weapons—both persistent agents against rear areas to degrade resupply, reinforcement, and attack operations and nonpersistent agents against frontline units to facilitate breakthrough attacks. The regime also might use biological weapons against key ROK and U.S. command and control, airfield, port, and logistical facilities. Alternatively, the United States could precipitate hostilities by conducting a preemptive or preventive attack on North Korea, as it considered doing in 1994 and 2017. This kind of campaign could be limited to standoff attacks or could involve a full invasion of the North. Such action could trigger a nuclear response either immediately or after allied forces had entered North Korea. Pyongyang also might assess that such an attack was imminent and preempt this preemption. There is also the potential for stumbling into a major war. A North Korean provocation or tactical-level clash along the border could inadvertently escalate into major strategic conflict. Pyongyang frequently depicts allied military exercises as precursors to an attack on or an invasion of North Korea. It is uncertain whether the regime’s declarations are merely for propaganda purposes or truly reflect a perception that the regime is in imminent danger. Given its poor intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities, the regime could also misperceive allied military exercises or signaling actions as a prelude to attack and decide to preempt what it perceives to be an ROK and U.S. preemption. Each side could misinterpret the other’s intentions, fueling tensions, intensifying a perceived need to escalate, and raising the risk of miscalculation, especially with a preemptive attack. If the U.S. were to initiate a limited attack on a few targets, would North Korea instead perceive it as the first phase of a major attack and invasion? Pyongyang could assume the worst and rush to use its nuclear weapons out of fear of losing them to the allied preemption in the early stages of hostilities. The ROK has developed independent preemptive attack plans and acquired weapons that are capable of attacking North Korean WMD.64 Seoul created a three-part strategy consisting of the kill chain detection and preemptive attack system to target North Korean missiles prior to launch; the Korea Air and Missile Defense System; and the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation to attack nuclear, missile, and leadership targets after attack or upon detection of signs of imminent North Korean attack. The ROK defense minister announced that a special forces unit could be used to assassinate the North Korean leadership.65 The ROK and the United States might be increasingly forced to rely on a preemption strategy because North Korea’s growing nuclear capabilities are an existential threat to the ROK and a potentially serious threat to the United States. Advocacy of preemption both by North Korea and by U.S allies is destabilizing and could lead to greater potential for either side to miscalculate. Pyongyang might not realize that the more it achieves, demonstrates, and threatens to use its nuclear prowess, the more likely an ROK or U.S. preemption during a crisis becomes.

### 2NR – AT: Cooperation

#### No cooperation

**Revere 15** [Evans J.R. Revere, 1-20-2015, "Korean Reunification and U.S. Interests: Preparing for One Korea," Brookings, [https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/korean-reunification-and-u-s-interests-preparing-for-one-korea //](https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/korean-reunification-and-u-s-interests-preparing-for-one-korea%20//) JB]

In addition to describing the U.S. stake in Korean reunification, this paper has also explored some of the challenges likely to complicate the process of Korean reunification. Analyzing the full range of such challenges would require a paper of much greater length and scope than this one. Such a paper would also have to explore the possibility, only briefly addressed here, that Korean **reunification could occur** through **other than peaceful** means, including as a result of the sudden collapse of North Korea, major internal unrest in the DPRK, or even a second Korean War.

The **consequences** of such violence **would be significant**, including widespread destruction and numerous casualties in both the North and the South. The aftermath of violence would impose a major burden on the Korean people and their leaders as they sought to recover and build a united nation. That possibility, however remote, explains why South Korean **leaders** have **acted with considerable** prudence and caution is addressing **reunification**, and why they have consistently stressed the importance of achieving it through only peaceful means.

But Korean policymakers – and their U.S. counterparts – are wise to be contemplating a future in which Korea is reunified by other means, as well. **North Korea,** despite its military might, its nuclear weapons, and its aggressive posturing, is almost **certainly on an unsustainable path**.

Pyongyang has **rejected** the thoroughgoing **reforms** that would **modernize** and open its economy. It has refused to implement the **denuclearization commitments** that would enable it to become a normal member of the international community. Instead, the DPRK is pursuing the chimera of *byungjin*, oblivious to the fact that, while it may seek both economic growth and nuclear weapons development, it cannot have both.

And with the international community’s attention focused more sharply than ever on the North’s horrific human rights record, it seems only a matter of time before the regime and its leaders will be called to account for what they have inflicted on their people.

North Korea is living on borrowed time. Now is the moment when the United States and the ROK, together with China and Korea’s other neighbors, should begin discussing and planning an alternative future for the Korean Peninsula.

### 2NR – AT: No ! Nuke Coercion

#### Nuclear coercion draws in US – preemptive first strike escalates

**Dalton 22** [Toby Dalton, 4-4-2022, Toby Dalton is senior fellow and co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "How Washington and Seoul Can Get on the Same Page to Deter North Korea," War on the Rocks, [https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/how-washington-and-seoul-can-get-on-the-same-page-to-deter-north-korea //](https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/how-washington-and-seoul-can-get-on-the-same-page-to-deter-north-korea%20//) JB]

Moscow is using the threat of nuclear escalation to deter outside powers coming to Kyiv’s aid while it continues its devastating military assault on Ukraine. Not surprisingly, the Russo-Ukrainian War stimulated a [boisterous debate](http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20220225000458) in Seoul on how to make sure Kim Jong Un doesn’t follow Vladimir Putin’s playbook. Even though **South Korea** is a U.S. treaty ally covered by extended nuclear deterrence guarantees, which Ukraine is not, **fears in** Seoul of **North Korean nuclear coercion are growing**. The resulting policy debate centers on what steps the United States **should** take to **increase the presence** and visibility of nuclear weapons in the South Korean-U.S. alliance. As the Biden administration recalibrates policies to deal with the fallout from Russia’s invasion, addressing deterrence demands from allies in East Asia will be high on the list.

**To deter North Korean nuclear coercion**, and to disarm it in a crisis if needed, president-elect Yoon Suk-yeol has pledged to strengthen the South Korean-U.S. alliance and **further develop capabilities for a pre-emptive strike**. Some [conservative politicians](https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/09/south-korea-nuclear-deterrent-north-korea/) want Yoon to go further: to ask the United States to deploy nuclear weapons in South Korea or to “share” its nuclear weapons with South Korea, as it does with its NATO allies in Europe. These are not new ideas, but conservatives see the war in Ukraine as an opportunity to push Yoon to adopt them after he [changed](https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20210922005300320) his [position](https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20220225009800315) on nuclear weapons during the presidential campaign.

With a **new Korean** peninsula **crisis looming**, fueled by North Korea’s [**missile test**](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/nkorea-fired-unidentified-projectile-off-east-coast-skorea-military-2022-03-24/) and another possible nuclear test, the Yoon and Biden administrations ought to quickly get on the same page on how to deter North Korean nuclear coercion. The best way to prevent such coercion and to temper South Korean fears is for the Biden and Yoon administrations to make a high-profile announcement of new deterrence initiatives once the latter takes office on May 10.

## 1NC - Korea Lashout DA v2

#### Defectors across the North Korean border is considered a national embarrasment for Kim –

Seulkee Jang, 7-26-2022, "Kim Jong Un orders investigation into the recent defection of five N. Koreans into China," Daily NK, https://www.dailynk.com/english/kim-jong-un-orders-investigation-into-the-recent-defection-of-five-n-koreans-into-china/ RD

Following this declaration, the country’s authorities ordered nationwide travel bans and tighter patrols along the China-North Korea border. The recent defections have reportedly caused embarrassment among North Korea’s leadership given that the defectors somehow skirted the ban on movement and side-stepped strengthened patrols in the border region before entering Dandong. Kim’s order has also called for the punishment of those responsible for the incident under “wartime law” given that the entire North Korean government is now operating under a “wartime system” led by the State Emergency Anti-Epidemic Command. The Ministry of State Security has responded to Kim’s order by tightening border patrols in North Pyongan Province, Yanggang Province, and other areas. It has also opened investigations into all personnel at Ministry of State Security checkpoints (No. 10 checkpoints) in the Sinuiju area, which is where the defections took place. The authorities may hand down collective punishments over the incident, netting not only ordinary soldiers at the checkpoints, but also regiment, company, and battalion commanders. Daily NK understands that all personnel at street corner checkpoints on roads heading in the direction of China – including those in Sinuiju’s Sokha (Pihyon), Sangdan, Hadan and Paeksa areas – have already been replaced. North Keorean authorities believe that the defectors would have had a difficult time making their way into Dandong from Sinuiju without help. That is because they would have had to make it past several Ministry of State Security checkpoints, along with those operated by disease control authorities. North Korean authorities are conducting a census in and around the city under the theory that the defectors could be residents of the China-North Korea border region. They also believe somebody inside the Ministry of State Security could have helped the defectors cross over the border. A preliminary investigation by the authorities has found that the five people who defected likely left from the villages of Sangdan-ri or Hadan-ri on Wihwa Island on the mouth of the Yalu River near Sinuiju. North Korean officials also believe the defectors are locals who had good knowledge of the region’s geography and waterways gleaned from previous smuggling activities in the area. While there has been speculation that the defectors entered Dandong near Hwanggumpyong or Gulouzi, North Korean authorities believe this unlikely since a Korean People’s Army battalion is stationed on Hwanggumpyon

#### North Korean borders are severly restricted in order to maintain Kim’s image of flawless pandemic execution and political control

Condé Nast, 1-22-2020, "No cases? No chance. The truth about North Korea and Covid-19," WIRED UK, https://www.wired.co.uk/article/north-korea-covid-news RD

Kim Jong-un acted quickly. On January 22, 2020, North Korea closed its borders with China and Russia to stop a new, mysterious virus from spreading into the country. At the time, what we now know as Covid-19, had killed just nine people and infected 400 others. More than a year later, the hermit kingdom’s border remains sealed tight shut. North Korea’s response to the pandemic has been one of the most extreme and paranoid in the world, experts say. The lockdowns and quarantines it has imposed have been strict, while border restrictions have put a halt to fishing and the smuggling of goods into the country. At the same time the nation’s state media and propaganda apparatus has pumped out messages warning its citizens of the dangers of Covid-19 and praising the country’s “flawless” approach to the pandemic. But the real impact of Covid-19 on North Korea – and its citizens – remains a mystery. Faced with a global health crisis, the country has turned inwards more than ever. “North Korea, in general, is more difficult to know this year or last year than at almost any point in the last two decades,” says Sokeel Park, the director of research at Liberty in North Korea, a group that works with defectors from the country to understand what happens inside its borders. “It seems clear to me that, nonetheless, the North Korean government has massively overreacted”. Officially, North Korea has recorded no cases of Covid-19. Weekly [reports](https://www.who.int/southeastasia/outbreaks-and-emergencies/novel-coronavirus-2019/sear-weekly-situation-reports) from the World Health Organisation’s South-East Asia office show that North Korean samples from PCR tests are being processed in 15 laboratories but all of these have come back negative. As of January 8, the most recent date for which figures are available, 26,244 samples from 13,259 people have come back negative. Around 700 North Koreans, out of a population of 25 million, are being tested each week. “I don't know many people in the North Korea watcher, analyst and journalist community that actually believe there are no cases,” Park says. All of the North Korea experts spoken to for this article agree. Some [have accused](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/31/world/asia/north-korea-coronavirus.html) North Korea of lying, while others suggest its approach is all about keeping control and public perception. The closest officials got to admitting there may be a case was in July when state newspaper Rodong Sinmun reported a “state of emergency” had been declared in Kaesong City, in the south of the country. The newspaper reported a defector who had returned to the country from South Korea was “suspected” to have Covid-19. But the case was never confirmed. Kim Yo-jong, the sister of Kim Jong-un, has hit back at suggestions from South Korea that the country may have had cases, [describing](https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/kims-sister-slams-seoul-over-questioning-zerovirus-claim-kim-jong-un-north-sister-south-korea-foreign-minister-b1768417.html) such talk as “reckless”. From the outside, it is impossible to prove the scale of the Covid-19 crisis in North Korea. All official messaging is controlled by Kim Jong-un’s regime and international diplomats and humanitarian groups have largely left the country. The last remaining members of the International Committee of the Red Cross left the country on December 2. The result is that little reliable information finds its way out of North Korea – those with contacts inside the country and who work with defectors say it has been impossible to work out the reality of the health situation on the ground. Despite reporting no cases of Covid-19, North Korea has been quarantining potential suspected cases. As of December 3, 33,223 people had been released from quarantine, according to the figures reported to the WHO – though no numbers have been reported since. Quarantine rules in North Korea are also strict, according to reports. When an outbreak occurred in China, North Korea tracked down all Chinese visitors in the town of Rason ​and quarantined​ them ​on an island for a month. In its attempts to control Covid-19, North Korea has taken a similar, though more extreme, approach to other nations. It has restricted people’s movement and travel, gatherings of people are limited, masks are mandatory and state media has been blanketed with public health information. Such measures are coupled with existing [limits on freedoms](https://freedomhouse.org/country/north-korea/freedom-world/2019), [human rights abuses](https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/north-korea), [economic failure](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-55563598) and [food shortages](https://www.telegraph.co.uk/global-health/science-and-disease/north-korea-brink-famine-secretive-state-cuts-world/). The country is also subject to [wide-ranging international sanctions](https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-know-about-sanctions-north-korea) linked to its development of nuclear weapons. “They've really reinforced border security with more border guards,” says Jieun Baek, a fellow with the Korea Project at Harvard’s Belfer Center. “They've created buffer zones between one and two metres wide at the border.” The country is reported to have “shoot-to-kill” orders in place to stop anyone bringing Covid-19 inside its borders. South Korean intelligence agencies [claim to have uncovered](https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/11/27/939478095/north-korea-executed-coronavirus-rule-breaker-says-south-korean-intelligence) the execution of one Covid rule-breaker within North Korea. In September the country was forced to apologise to South Korea after it [shot and burned the body](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-54291550) of a South Korean official who was in the North’s waters. The strict rules North Korea has put further strain on a country already on the brink. New satellite data and [analysis](https://globalfishingwatch.org/fisheries/2020-analysis-dark-fleets/) from the non-government organisation Global Fishing Watch shows that illegal North Korean fishing in Russian waters dropped 95 per cent last year and fishing in North Korea’s waters dropped 50 per cent in the last part of its season. These findings are in line with border controls [placed](https://apnews.com/article/pandemics-epidemics-south-korea-north-korea-coronavirus-pandemic-865072be9d18d218660041c8f63d694f) around the country’s fishing industry. Meanwhile, within North Korea, the message has been clear: people need to follow the rules. “North Korean state media has been unusually upfront about the need to prevent the virus spreading, describing it as a matter of ‘national survival’ and ‘life or death’,” says Pratik Jakhar, an expert on North Korea at BBC Monitoring. The state-run media outlets – including TV stations, radio and newspapers – have told people about the symptoms of Covid-19 and broadcast images and videos of workers disinfecting public places. “The coverage appears to send a message domestically that the strict measures Kim Jong-un took have worked, and that he has saved North Koreans from the virus,” Jakhar says. He points to an October 16 article in the state-run DPRK Today that claimed the country is “a uniquely clean land on the planet” and “a place free of infection from the virus.” When North Korean officials locked down Kaesong City in July, party propaganda said the state had “established a strict and flawless anti-epidemic measure”. In November Rodong Sinmun argued the country must “maintain an ironclad barrier” if it was going to protect itself from Covid-19. Such extreme steps may reflect the country’s paranoia about Covid-19. “North Korean media have also been pushing out fringe theories and unverified claims on how the virus is spread,” Jakhar adds. “It has warned that smokers are at a higher risk of contracting Covid-19, and that migratory birds or even snowfall could spread the virus”. As reported by NK News, an independent publication reporting on what happens inside North Korea from anonymous sources both inside and outside the country, the [warning about snow](https://www.nknews.org/2020/12/dont-play-with-snow-north-korea-warns-foreigners-ahead-of-a-covid-19-winter/) included advice that people wear a mask, glasses and a cap to protect themselves. While claiming that it has defeated Covid-19, North Korean media has also been keen to [point out](https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1611209936-983523041/press-review/) the spiralling global case count and death toll. Internally, this makes its response look strong. ADVERTISEMENT Earlier this month, at North Korea’s Eighth Congress of the Korean Workers’ Party the country tried to set an example of how normal things are. Thousands of people [gathered](https://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2021/jan/15/kim-jong-un-puts-on-show-of-force-at-end-of-workers-party-congress-in-pictures) indoors and outdoors without masks or any form of social distancing during the eight day event. But just days before, at its new year firework celebrations, everyone outdoors was [pictured wearing masks](https://youtu.be/fDfyFTgXef0?t=346). “Image for the regime is really important,” says Jung H. Pak, a former CIA officer and now senior fellow in Korea Studies at Brookings Institution’s Center for East Asia Policy Studies. “And they still want to project this sense that they have got things under control”. The threat of widespread Covid-19 transmission within North Korea is likely being taken seriously due to its fragile healthcare system. Studies [have found](https://conflictandhealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13031-020-00284-y) the country’s universal healthcare system has “large disparities” and that many people “struggle to obtain healthcare” from the state. “Most people don't have access to hand sanitisers or soaps, much less PPE,” Baek says. “And many people do live in very close quarters.” Hanna Song, a researcher at the South Korea-based Database Center for North Korean Human Rights, agrees that healthcare is a major concern. “There is a depletion in a lack of medical supplies [during the pandemic],” she explains. “This is not something that we have heard directly from North Koreans but this is something that we predict has been happening.” The full impact of Covid-19 on North Korea may never be known – at best, experts believe details will trickle out over the coming years. The border controls put in place have been an effective buffer in stopping information coming out. The number of defectors, normally a key source of knowledge for what happens in North Korea, plummeted last year. Recent figures from South Korea show just 229 people entered the country from the North in 2020 – an all-time low. In 2019, that figure stood at 1,047. Despite tough border controls, there’s one thing that North Korea does want to flow freely into the country: Covid-19 vaccines. At the end of November it was reported that state-sponsored hackers had targeted [AstraZeneca](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-healthcare-coronavirus-astrazeneca-no/exclusive-suspected-north-korean-hackers-targeted-covid-vaccine-maker-astrazeneca-sources-idINKBN2871A2); South Korea has reported attempts on its [own vaccine infrastructure](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/nov/27/north-korean-hackers-tried-to-disrupt-vaccine-efforts-in-south-says-spy-agency) and Microsoft has also [found](https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/11/13/health-care-cyberattacks-covid-19-paris-peace-forum/) similar hacking efforts linked to North Korea. The country has since [quietly requested](https://www.wsj.com/articles/north-korea-requests-covid-19-vaccines-from-global-group-11609756202) international help in obtaining vaccines. Analysis of vaccine distribution [predicts](https://www.eiu.com/n/rich-countries-will-get-access-to-coronavirus-vaccines-earlier-than-others/) that the jabs may be widely available in North Korea in 2022 or 2023. Living under strict controls until then could have a long term impact. Park, from Liberty in North Korea, worries that the country may use the pandemic to keep even stricter control measures in place even once the pandemic is over. “The mode of operating under global pandemic conditions could become a new normal in North Korea,” he says.

#### Disullusionment with Kim’s image and fleeing North Korean citizens means Kim launches international provocations to consolidate power.

Keeping Kim: How North Korea's Regime Stays in Power Authors: [Daniel Byman](https://www.belfercenter.org/person/daniel-byman) Jennifer Lind | July 20 RD

The Kim regime's foreign policy behavior, though frequently called erratic or crazy, has a rational basis. International provocations help to stoke popular nationalism, shoring up the regime’s domestic position, particularly within the military. The Paradox of Sanctions. Effective sanctions—those that target Kim's power base—are likely to be rejected by key stakeholder countries because of the risk they pose of regime collapse and the chaos that would likely ensue. The Staying Power of the Kim Regime Predictions of the Kim regime's demise have been widespread for many years, particularly in the 1990s, as upwards of 1 million North Koreans perished in a famine. Limited openness in the form of bustling markets and some cross-border trade were viewed as a possible threat to the regime's control. Recently, analysts have argued that North Korean bellicosity—for example, the March 2010 attack on a South Korean warship and its nuclear and missile tests in 2009—is aimed at a domestic audience: an effort by a weak regime to shore up support among the North Korean military in advance of succession. Analysts also point to surprising popular protests after Pyongyang's botched 2009 currency reform and to increased information flows as reasons to think the regime may soon fall. Decisionmakers and analysts, however, often underestimate the power of tyranny. Like other dictatorships, the Kim regime relies on numerous tools of authoritarian control to stay in power. Although data are opaque, Kim Jong-il's hold on power seems more secure than many pundits suggest: the regime does not appear vulnerable to coups d'état or revolution. The greatest threat to the Kim regime is the challenge of succession. Prior to his death in 1994, Kim Il-sung skillfully applied a variety of tools from the "authoritarian toolbox" to ensure a smooth transfer of power for his son—for example, creating a cult of personality around the younger Kim. The current regime has not yet made similar preparations for Kim Jong-il's successor, which raises the risk of contested succession and regime collapse after Kim's death or incapacitation. Understanding the Kim regime's resilience requires an understanding of the tools it has used to stay in power. The first is social engineering—creating a country where the very building blocks of opposition are lacking. North Korea has no merchant or land-owning class, independent unions, or clergy. Intellectuals are regime-loyal bureaucrats, not dissidents, and strict restrictions on the activities of students have cowed them into submission. Second, the regime pushes an ideology. The Supreme Leader (suryong) system established Kim Il-sung as the center of a cult of personality. At the core of the regime's juche ideology is nationalism with a xenophobic, even racist, slant. Anti-Japanese sentiment, hostility to South Korea, and propaganda against the United States create legitimacy for the regime. As the regime inculcates its ideology and cult of personality, it strives for tighter controls on information. In the 1990s, after the famine, the regime's control of information decreased and cross-border smuggling grew, but recently the regime has tried to reassert its control. Perhaps most important, the North Korean regime is brutal in its use of force. Dissent is detected through an elaborate network of informants working for multiple internal security agencies. People accused of relatively minor offenses undergo "reeducation"; those accused of more serious transgressions are either immediately executed or interred in miserable political prison camps. Even more daunting, according to the "three generations" policy, the regime punishes not only the individual responsible for the transgressions but his or her whole family. At the same time, Kim Jong-il uses perks and rewards to co-opt military and political elites. Members of this class receive more and better food, in addition to the most desirable jobs working for the regime. During the famine, the core class was protected, so that the famine's devastation was concentrated on the people deemed least loyal. This group acquiesced to the succession of Kim Jong-il after his father's death; it keeps Kim in power and will influence his choice of successor. Kim Jong-il has co-opted the military by bestowing on it policy influence and prestige, as well as a large share—perhaps 25 percent—of the national budget. The military also has a favored position in policy circles and is lauded in regime propaganda. Nuclear weapons provide another tool for cultivating the military's support. They bring prestige to an institution whose morale has been challenged by hunger and by its relative inferiority to South Korea's military forces. Kim Jong-il's regime manipulates foreign governments to generate the hard currency needed to buy off elites and sustain his military. China and the Soviet Union propped up North Korea during Kim Il-sung's reign. Kim Jong-il continues to rely on Chinese patronage, but he has also been adept at extracting extensive aid from his adversaries. Since the late 1990s, Pyongyang has used promises of denuclearization to extort more than $6 billion in aid, as well as hundreds of thousands of tons of food, not only from South Korea but also from the United States, China, and Japan. Economic initiatives associated with South Korea's sunshine policy, such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex, have also provided Pyongyang with a significant revenue stream. Although Seoul initially announced cuts in this economic support after the March 2010 attack on the South Korean warship, only a few months later it began to backtrack. Should co-optation fail and domestic elites grow dissatisfied, the Kim regime has coup-proofed North Korean institutions in ways that deter, detect, and thwart anti-regime activity among these elites. North Korean military leaders are chosen for their political loyalty rather than military competence. Key positions are granted to individuals with family or other close ties. Kim Il-sung ruled with the help of relatives and his fellow anti-Japanese guerrillas. Kim Jong-il relies on multiple and competing internal security agencies to reduce the unity of the security forces and to maximize the information he receives about anti-regime activities. The Kim regime has created parallel security forces to protect itself from a military coup. Implications and Policy Recommendations This analysis suggests several implications for foreign policy toward North Korea, in particular the effort to pressure Pyongyang to give up its nuclear arsenal. Sanctions aimed at weakening North Korea's broader economy are unlikely to exert much coercive pressure on Pyongyang; Kim Jong-il (like Joseph Stalin, Saddam Hussein, and many other dictators) protects his elite core while shifting the burden of sanctions to the people. A more effective economic lever with which to move the regime would be to directly threaten its access to hard currency and luxury goods, which it needs to bribe elites. Policies such as freezing North Korean assets overseas and embargoing luxury items are thus the most promising options. Ironically, the United States and other countries will be hesitant to apply the kinds of sanctions that have the best chance of success. In China, South Korea, and the United States, fears of war or chaos on the Korean Peninsula and the calamity of refugees pouring across borders are likely to lead these states to continue to prop up the Kim regime, helping it to weather crises and keeping the country poor, starved, and brutalized. North Korea is unlikely to yield to pressure to relinquish its nuclear arsenal. Although much debate focuses on the regime's security motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons, these weapons also serve as a tool of its survival. They help to curry the favor of the military, and they provide a bargaining chip that earns the regime billions of dollars in hard currency. In contrast to the media, which persist in portraying Kim Jong-il as a madman or an incompetent playboy, this analysis shows him to be a shrewd, if reprehensible, leader. His meticulous use of the authoritarian toolbox reveals him to be a skilled strategic player. Kim shows every sign of being rational—and thus deterrable.

## 1NC - Consult US CP

#### CP: The members of the United States Department of State should enter into a prior and binding consultation with the Republic of Korea over [[plan]]. Members will enter support the proposal and adopt the results of consultation. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea should eliminate their nuclear arsenals.

#### Consultation is key to prevent nuke war and prevent US econ decline— it denuclearizes Noko and prevents GDP collapse— absent consultation reunification runs the risk of conflict on the peninsula

Botto 19 [(Kathryn, a senior research analyst in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Her research focuses on Asian security issues, with particular emphasis on the Korean Peninsula and U.S. defense policy towards East Asia.) “Denuclearization Alone Won’t Lead to Peace on the Korean Peninsula,” Carnegie Endowment, 5/28/19. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/05/28/denuclearization-alone-won-t-lead-to-peace-on-korean-peninsula-pub-79212>] RR

While Washington is fixated on denuclearizing North Korea, Seoul and Pyongyang have a bigger plan in mind: reunifying the peninsula after nearly seventy-five years apart. Though their visions of unification differ greatly, South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un agreed in Panmunjom in April 2018 that their ultimate goal is that “South and North Korea will reconnect the blood relations of the people and bring forward the future of co-prosperity and unification.”

The prospect of denuclearization would open the door to the lifting of sanctions. This could foster humanitarian and development assistance, economic integration, and further interpersonal contact—the building blocks of a peacefully unified peninsula. Even if nuclear talks remain at an impasse, it is important that policymakers begin thinking ahead proactively about what exactly peace on the Korean Peninsula will look like.

Establishing true peace is not as simple as denuclearization and a peace treaty replacing the Korean Armistice Agreement. Unification is one vision of how to create this peace, but it will likely take decades to address the governance and economic challenges facing the peninsula’s inhabitants. Moreover, the two countries have vastly different visions of where integration would lead.

Assuming that South Korea leads on unification, it could significantly improve the quality of life for millions of people suffering in North Korea. But even with the best of intentions and under the best of circumstances, unifying the two Koreas would create the world’s most unequal society overnight. Whether unification were to occur peacefully, if the North Korean state were to collapse, or through conflict, the fact remains that North Korea is a fragile state, while South Korea is a strong democracy with a thriving economy.

These political, social, and economic rifts are not worthy of attention for purely humanitarian reasons. Given North Korea’s fragility, if unification were not handled carefully, it could economically, socially, and politically destabilize the peninsula. Failing to integrate 25 million North Koreans into a free and democratic system would leave the Korean Peninsula vulnerable to crisis.

And that is if the process is peaceful—with the added potential for physical violence in the event of regime collapse in Pyongyang or conflict, things would be far messier. No matter how it unfolds, progress toward unification will be a multilayered process, not a discrete event.

This process might seem distant now, but it is in Washington’s best interest to plan exactly how it will support Seoul’s unification plans early on. Preventing instability in South Korea is essential to protecting a strong democracy and free-market economy in the Indo-Pacific, especially as Chinese regional influence grows. A destabilizing event could also be economically damaging, given how interlinked the U.S. and South Korean markets are. The Economist Intelligence Unit predicted in 2018 that conflict on the Korean Peninsula would reduce U.S. real gross domestic product (GDP) growth to 1 percent.

A STABILIZATION TO-DO LIST

Much as Seoul and Pyongyang might wish otherwise, unification will not occur in a foreign policy vacuum. To support South Korean stability, the United States and other international partners should think about the process of unification in terms of stabilization. The U.S. government’s 2018 Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR) describes stabilization as “an integrated civilian-military process to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence.” The SAR draws from the United States’ positive and negative stabilization experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Somalia to provide a vision of how to improve stabilization assistance.

The SAR focuses on conflict zones, but its recommendations can apply to any fragile environment. However, in a peaceful scenario, most stability actions would require different methods of implementation and magnitude of efforts. Although this stabilization rubric is a U.S. government concept, the basic goals and tasks are equivalent to those in UN peacekeeping operations and general principles for building stable, well-governed, inclusive societies. The SAR is a U.S. government document, which uses a U.S. lexicon. But South Korea will need to employ the same principles that the SAR outlines to stabilize the peninsula and lay the groundwork for integrating the two Koreas, and can use its framework to carry out similar operations.

The process of stabilization involves five lines of effort: establishing civil security (physically protecting people from internal and external threats), restoring essential services, establishing rule of law and civil authority, supporting governance (in democratic institutions), and supporting economic development. Actions in each category occur simultaneously, but the sequence of each task, and the amount of effort required to accomplish them, may differ. This broadly applicable framework is a practical way to prepare for unification, instead of trying to predict in vain precisely how events might unfold. Rather than a sequence of events, practitioners should focus on what actions will need to be taken in response to ensure the local population’s safety.

A KOREAN-LED AND U.S.-SUPPORTED ENDEAVOR

While South Korea will likely need the United States’ support, Washington should tread carefully. Like nearly all inter-Korean agreements, the Panmunjom Declaration says that the unification process should be “led by Koreans.” Korea’s history of colonization by Japan and division by foreign powers has understandably made South Korea cautious about foreign involvement in unification.

However, while South Korea should certainly lead the process, foreign actors will affect unification. These other actors will have their own respective interests in terms of maintaining influence, benefiting from new economic conditions, and ensuring that uncertainty on the peninsula does not affect their own security. The impact of these outside actors could be positive or negative, depending on how their roles are handled. South Korea should discuss preemptively with other countries how they could be supportive, beyond the initial negotiations and into the long-term process of integration.

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One specific example is how Seoul and its partners would divide the responsibilities of establishing civil security. Because South Korea is a non-nuclear weapon state according to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, it is prohibited from accessing information and materials related to nuclear weapons. Thus, it will require the support of a nuclear weapons state to secure and dismantle weaponized aspects of North Korea’s nuclear program. Although South Korea can deal with non-weapons-related aspects of the nuclear program, the weapons-related aspects are likely intermingled with the rest of the nuclear program, making it hard to differentiate them. If violence broke out, discerning weapons-related aspects would likely be even more difficult. South Korea could lead the dismantlement of chemical and biological weapons, but needs a detailed plan with its international partners for how to divide responsibility for the nuclear program.

Similarly, every aspect of unification will require a division of labor, as the magnitude of this task will require substantial international support, both public and private. Even in peaceful scenarios, unification cost estimates can easily reach 1 trillion dollars. South Korea’s GDP is roughly $1.5 trillion and could be far less in the event of destructive conflict. If South Korea wants to ensure foreign powers do not usurp control of the unification process, it would be well served to determine in advance what their roles will be.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM PAST STABILIZATION EFFORTS

To see how stabilization might play out, it is useful to look at other formerly divided or otherwise fragile states that have faced similar challenges. As one of the United States’ largest recent stabilization efforts, Iraq is a noteworthy example that enjoyed some successes but also critical failures. Most notably, the de-Baathification of the new Iraqi government after Saddam Hussein’s regime was toppled in 2003 was a huge miscalculation. The Baath Party was so omnipresent and integral to Iraqi institutions that purging its members led to a breakdown of said intuitions, which contributed to the insurgency and the country’s continued fragility.

There is a risk that such a misstep could recur in Korean unification. North Korean elites have been complicit in the regime’s brutality, and many North and South Koreans will call for their removal. Yet failing to vet and include these people in a unified Korea could have damaging consequences.

This is particularly important in terms of the professionals who work on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. They will pose a proliferation risk if they are not otherwise reassured of their futures. Such individuals and other elites would need to be vetted, and those responsible for brutality tried for crimes against humanity, akin to the process implemented in the Nuremberg trials. But others – who were unavoidably caught up in state institutions – should be allowed to participate in political parties and recruited to suitable jobs. Scientists who have worked on the country’s weapons programs will have lucrative skills that other nations would find attractive, so making sure their futures in Korea are secured would be imperative. The biggest obstacle to inclusion would likely be the Korean public, who would probably oppose the inclusion of former North Korean elites in politics and society. However, given the potentially destabilizing impact of not integrating them, this option is certainly the lesser of two evils.

As daunting as it seems, inclusivity tends to beget stability. All citizens need to be confident that the state’s influence on their lives is not arbitrary or extractive, and that the government’s actions are based on a legitimate, fair set of norms that are applied equally to everyone. Yet inclusive institutions also redistribute power and wealth. Those who have benefited from the Kim regime will not take kindly to such arrangements.

Even in Germany, the leading example of successful reunification efforts, an east-west divide still undermines the country’s political unity. The far-right populist party known as Alternative for Germany has surged in popularity in recent years primarily in parts of former East Germany, gaining seats in parliament and, in some polls, surpassing the center-left Social Democratic Party in popularity. Most policymakers and business leaders still come from what used to be West Germany. Nearly thirty years after reunification, economic disparities have greatly improved. The former East lags West in GDP by around 27 percent, far less than disparities between many U.S. states. Yet as recently as 2017, the east German unemployment rate stood at 8.5 percent compared to a west German rate of 5.6 percent, and average income still stands at around 15 percent of former-West Germany. This economic and political imbalance has led to a perception that former East Germans have less control over the direction of their country.

Predictably, some differences remain between former East and West Germany after only a generation of separation. After nearly seventy-five years apart, the South-North Korean divide will take even longer to bridge. According to a 2018 report, North Korea’s miniscule GDP per capita rests at between 2 and 6.7 percent of the South Korean figure. In a unified Korea, this gaping inequality could easily create exclusionary political and economic institutions that could entrench divisions, cause civil unrest, disenfranchise North Koreans, or even embolden a far-right party.

The North Korean state has divided society geographically, occupationally, and educationally into distinctive state-assigned sociopolitical classes called songbun. If unification took place, it would be difficult to restore essential services and share resources fairly with the lowest songbun—the poorest residents of North Korea, many of whom live in rural areas that are hardly accessible by road and therefore logistically difficult for humanitarian assistance to reach. But it is imperative to care for this population. Perceptions of favoritism could lead to questions of a united government’s evenhandedness and legitimacy, or even pave the way for civil unrest.

South Korea’s current plan to develop North Korea relies heavily on investment from behemoth family-run conglomerates called chaebol, such as Samsung or Hyundai. While chaebol have been integral to South Korea’s miraculous post–Korean War economic development, their investment in North Korea also would have the potential to be extractive. It could further concentrate wealth in South Korean conglomerates. Beyond South Korea, other nations would almost certainly find North Korea’s young, inexpensive labor force attractive. There is also a risk that future investors would shut down North Korean factories and enterprises, due to their lack of adequate machinery, technology, and state of disrepair. This happened after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and still contributes to disparate growth and labor shortages in the east of Germany, as millions of Germans migrated westward for better job opportunities.

This means a unified Korean government would have to work hard to protect North Koreans from predatory investment, and to build on the entrepreneurial dexterity seen in North Korea’s growing domestic markets. Despite the perception of North Korea as a strictly command economy, private markets have become a necessary means of survival. Their uncontrollable proliferation even has led the North Korean state to tacitly allow their operation since 2003. Helping participants in these markets to thrive will be an important means of creating wealth, creating jobs, and preventing a labor shortage in North Korea as a result of southward migration.

#### State department says yes—

Dorell 18 [(Oren, covers foreign affairs at USA TODAY, focusing on security issues and conflicts around the world, especially in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and East Asia. He's traveled to countries in each of those regions, and to nearly all the lower 48 and Central America.) “U.S. would support reunified Korean Peninsula — without nukes, State Department says,” USA Today, 1/25/18. <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2018/01/25/u-s-would-support-reunification-korean-peninsulnorth-koreas-call-reunification-could-line-u-s-policy/1067341001/>] RR

The State Department said Thursday the U.S. could support North Korea's call for reunification of the Korean Peninsula, but denuclearizing the North is the first priority.

North Korea issued an announcement directed at "all Koreans at home and abroad,” calling for better relations with South Korea and “a breakthrough for independent reunification,” according to the state-run Korean Central News Agency.

The statement also said Koreans should reject attempts to brand the North's nuclear weapons program as a hurdle to improved North-South relations.

State Department spokeswoman Heather Nauert told USA TODAY that the United States could support such an outcome "if (the peninsula) arrives at that peacefully."

"The United States supports the peaceful reunification of the peninsula, but as the secretary has said, we do not seek to accelerate reunification,” Nauert added.

She stressed that the U.S. goal is a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, and talks between the U.S. and North Korea cannot proceed until that end point is agreed upon. “We’re not there yet,” she said.

The Trump administration has increased pressure on North Korea, lobbying for new sanctions by the United Nations Security Council and threatening to interdict and inspect ships going to and from North Korea to prevent banned goods from reaching the reclusive country. The increased U.S. attention comes as the North has stepped up its tempo of nuclear and ballistic missile tests.

North Korea says it seeks a nuclear weapon that can reach the U.S. mainland to deter a possible American attack.

President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un have traded insults, and both leaders have threatened nuclear war.

North and South Korea began direct talks this month ahead of the February Olympic Games in South Korea and agreed to let athletes march and compete under one flag.

North Korea's history of talks with the South and the United States is rife with unkept promises and broken deals.

Pyongyang’s announcement called on Koreans to “pave a wide avenue to rosy future of the nation which will be reunified, strong and prosperous!”

The statement said Koreans should "promote contact, travel, cooperation between the North and South," but do so without the help of other countries.

#### US econ growth is key to heg—

Dabat and Leal 20 [(Alejandro, ) (Paulo, ) “The rise and fall of the United States in global hegemony “ SciElo, 6/19/20. <http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?pid=S0301-70362019000400087&script=sci_arttext&tlng=en>. Graphs omitted.] RR

The rise of two new poles has not been lineal in nature. The USA's conversion into the hegemonic superpower in capitalism went through periods of relative international isolation as well as total involvement in international affairs, prolonged periodic surges (after the second world war and during the 1990s) and dips (crises in the 1930s, 1970s, and part of the 1980s, see Figure 1). This paper’s proposal is that from the dot com crisis onwards, the USA has found itself deep in a process of decline of its hegemony from which it will be difficult to recover, a stage similar to that which afflicted the British hegemony at the end of the 19th century (see Figure 1).

Similar to the rise of the USA to the forefront of the world stage in those times, today we see the rise of China and, to a lesser degree, that of other countries such as Germany, Russia or Korea, which seems to make up a new stage of transition in the world hegemony.

The case of China is a long and complex phenomenon. After being a leading world power until the 15th century, China then went on to become a decadent and conservative empire, semi-colonized by imperialist powers in the 19th century, almost to the point of territorial division. Later on, based on a strong national and revolutionary movement, China became the great power that it is today, taking advantage of its vast natural resources and workforce to generate production, thereby increasing its presence in the world using a strategy of exports and FDI.

2001 turned out to be key in the downfall of the USA's absolute hegemony as it marks the end of its economic expansion; the terrorist attack in September of that year was a clear challenge to its military hegemony. That, and China's joining the WTO made up a series of historical facts which marked the beginning of the transition hegemonic transition process.

The end of the dot com bubble was based on dropping interest rates and growing public debt with the goal of resuscitating the economy. They in fact achieved it, but only by generating a financial (real estate) bubble, similar to what happened at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century with the British hegemonic crisis.

Said bubble burst in 2008 and gave way to the crisis of 2009. Since then, the USA has found itself in a deep recession, which has been gradually improving thanks to a policy of quantitative easing which established interest rates close to 0%. While these have gradually risen, the USA finds itself in a situation similar to that which Keynes called a liquidity trap and which consists of low interest rates which do not generate significant growth in productive investment nor in employment in spite of great liquidity in the world. While it does generate world uncertainty and hoarding as well as increasing debt, it does not generate strong economic growth (see Table 4).

In the case of China, they have maintained sustained GDP growth rates in exports and production during the entire American fiasco (similar to what happened in 1870 and 1928, with the United States and the UK, see Tables 1 and 2).

Towards the end of this decade, one sees hat the transformation process of the world economy is faster than ever before, and it is important to look back in order to gauge the importance of these changes which have arisen. In this regard, Global Trends (2012), an American governmental organism, believes that by 2030, the USA will no longer be the hegemonic country which dictates the destinies of the world, as it did after the second world war as it will have to share the world hegemony with China, which will by then have surpassed by far the USA in economic terms. Nevertheless, there will be no country which will meet the requirements needed to exercise an absolute hegemony as the USA has, so that the world will head towards a multi-polar order.5

As can be seen in table 4, the USA continues to have an important technological, scientific and business superiority. Although China stands out not only for the vastness of its popular technological learning processes but also for these being geared towards civil and social ends (Dabat and Leal, 2013). One must add that China's road forward is still quite limited due to a lack in political openness and other social, institutional, cultural and environmental requirements; although the US does not find itself further ahead despite of their triumphantist discourse.

The rise of the USA to a world hegemony currently finds itself in an important process of change, in which there is an ongoing debate regarding the final destination of the American world hegemony. The main concern facing this debate is not accurately measuring the current level of decline of the USA, but rather approaching the problem from a qualitative and historical manner through the interrelationship of the seven proposed indicators, such as the analysis of the country's historical possibilities to preserve its hegemonic role in the world when faced by the rise of China and other countries in the surrounding world.

As such, one can conclude that though the USA is still the primary world power, it is so in a declining fashion due to a variety of reasons, among which the following standout: the country standing within the international division of labor (a standing which is ever less productive and competitive) derived as much from internal conditions (techno productive, institutional, and social) as well as its lack of competitive capabilities at a world level and an inability to sustain its hegemonic power (Dabat and Leal, in the press).

The uncertainty created by the possible outcomes of president Donald Trump’s trade policies, recognizing the wear on its infrastructure, its aging population and the decline of its leadership in the Middle East, among other things, indicates that the world is heading towards a multipolar order with China, Russia, Germany and other nations playing an important role in balancing the scales. Similar to what happened with the USA in the 20th century, China leads in various indicators (see Table 3).

Nevertheless, beyond the production and manufacturing analysis, one can see how the USA leads and lags in the indicators for a world hegemony (see Table 4).

#### US leadership in this decade solves global war and results in a peaceful end to Chinese revisionism **Erickson and Collins 10/21** [(Andrew, A professor of strategy in the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute)(Gabriel, Baker Botts fellow in energy and environmental regulatory affairs at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy) “A Dangerous Decade of Chinese Power Is Here,” Foreign Policy, 10/18/2021] \*brackets for ableist languageU.S. and allied policymakers are facing the most important foreign-policy challenge of the 21st century. **China’s power is peaking**; so is the political position of Chinese President Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) **domestic strength.** In the long term, China’s **likely decline** after this peak is a **good thing.** But right now, it creates a **decade of danger** from a system that increasingly realizes it only has a **short time** to fulfill some of its **most critical**, long-held **goals.**

Within the next five years, China’s leaders are likely to conclude that its deteriorating demographic profile, structural economic problems, and technological estrangement from global innovation centers are eroding its leverage to annex Taiwan and achieve other major strategic objectives. As Xi internalizes these challenges, his foreign policy is likely to become even more accepting of risk, feeding on his nearly decadelong track record of successful revisionist action against the rules-based order. Notable examples include China occupying and militarizing sub-tidal features in the South China Sea, ramping up air and maritime incursions against Japan and Taiwan, pushing border challenges against India, occupying Bhutanese and Tibetan lands, perpetrating crimes against humanity in Xinjiang, and coercively enveloping Hong Kong.

The relatively low-hanging fruit is plucked, but Beijing is emboldened to grasp the biggest single revisionist prize: Taiwan.

Beijing’s actions over the last decade have triggered backlash, such as with the so-called AUKUS deal, but concrete constraints on China’s strategic freedom of action may not fully manifest until after 2030. It’s remarkable and dangerous that China has paid few costs for its actions over the last 10 years, even as its military capacities have rapidly grown.

Beijing will likely conclude that under current diplomatic, economic, and force postures for both “gray zone” and high-end scenarios, the 2021 to late 2020s timeframe still favors China—and is attractive for its 68-year-old leader, who seeks a historical achievement at the zenith of his career.

U.S. planners must mobilize resources, effort, and risk acceptance to maximize power and thereby deter Chinese aggression in the coming decade—literally starting now—and innovatively employ assets that currently exist or can be operationally assembled and scaled within the next several years. That will be the first step to pushing back against China during the 2020s—a decade of danger—before what will likely be a waning of Chinese power.

As Beijing aggressively seeks to undermine the international order and promotes a narrative of inevitable Chinese strategic domination in Asia and beyond, it creates a dangerous contradiction between its goals and its medium-term capacity to achieve them. China is, in fact, likely nearing the apogee of its relative power; and by 2030 to 2035, it will cross a tipping point from which it may never recover strategically. Growing headwinds constraining Chinese growth, while not publicly acknowledged by Beijing, help explain Xi’s high and apparently increasing risk tolerance. Beijing’s window of strategic opportunity is sliding shut.

China’s skyrocketing household debt levels exemplify structural economic constraints that are emerging much earlier than they did for the United States when it had similar per capita GDP and income levels. Debt is often a wet blanket on consumption growth. A 2017 analysis published by the Bank for International Settlements found that once the household debt-to-GDP ratio in a sample of 54 countries exceeded 60 percent, “the negative long-run effects on consumption tend to intensify.” China’s household debt-to-GDP ratio surpassed that empirical danger threshold in late 2020. Rising debt service burdens thus threaten Chinese consumers’ capacity to sustain the domestic consumption-focused “dual circulation” economic model that Xi and his advisors seek to build. China’s growth record during the past 30 years has been remarkable, but past exceptionalism does not confer future immunity from fundamental demographic and economic headwinds.

As debt levels continue to rise at an absolute level that has accelerated almost continuously for the past decade, China also faces a hollowing out of its working-age population. This critical segment peaked in 2010 and has since declined, with the rate from 2015 to 2020 nearing 0.6 percent annually—nearly twice the respective pace in the United States. While the United States faces demographic challenges of its own, the disparity between the respective paces of decline highlights its relative advantage compared to its chief geopolitical competitor. Moreover, the United States can choose to access a global demographic and talent dividend via immigration in a way China simply will not be able to do.

Atop surging debt and worsening demographics, China also faces resource insecurity. China’s dependence on imported food and energy has grown steadily over the past two decades. Projections from Tsinghua University make a compelling case that China’s oil and gas imports will peak between 2030 and 2035. As China grapples with power shortages, Beijing has been reminded that supply shortfalls equal to even a few percentage points of total demand can have outsized negative impacts.

Domestic resource insufficiency by itself does not hinder economic growth—as the Four Asian Tigers’ multi-decade boom attests. But China is in a different position. Japan and South Korea never had to worry about the U.S. Navy interdicting inbound tankers or grain ships. In fact, the United States was avowedly willing to use military force to protect energy flows from the Persian Gulf region to its allies. Now, as an increasingly energy-secure United States pivots away from the Middle East toward the Indo-Pacific, there is a substantial probability that energy shipping route protection could be viewed in much more differentiated terms—with oil and liquefied natural gas cargoes sailing under the Chinese flag viewed very differently than cargoes headed to buyers in other regional countries.

Each of these dynamics—demographic downshifts, rising debts, resource supply insecurity—either imminently threatens or is already actively interfering with the CCP’s long-cherished goal of achieving a “moderately prosperous society.” Electricity blackouts, real estate sector travails (like those of Evergrande) that show just how many Chinese investors’ financial eggs now sit in an unstable $52 trillion basket, and a solidifying alignment of countries abroad concerned by aggressive Chinese behavior all raise questions about Xi’s ability to deliver. With this confluence of adverse events only a year before the next party congress, where personal ambition and survival imperatives will almost drive him to seek anointment as the only Chinese “leader for life” aside from former leader Mao Zedong, the timing only fuels his sense of insecurity. Xi’s anti-corruption campaigns and ruthless removal of potential rivals and their supporters solidified his power but likely also created a quiet corps of opponents who may prove willing to move against him if events create the perception he’s lost the “mandate of heaven.” Accordingly, the baseline assumption should be that Xi’s crown sits heavy and the insecurity induced is thereby intense enough to drive high-stake, high-consequence posturing and action.

While Xi is under pressure to act, the external risks are magnified because so far, he has suffered few consequences from taking actions on issues his predecessors would likely never have gambled on. Reactions to party predations in Xinjiang and Hong Kong have been restricted to diplomatic-signaling pinpricks, such as sanctioning responsible Chinese officials and entities, most of whom lack substantial economic ties to the United States. Whether U.S. restraint results from a fear of losing market access or a belief that China’s goals are ultimately limited is not clear at this time.

While the CCP issues retaliatory sanctions against U.S. officials and proclaims a triumphant outcome to its hostage diplomacy, these tactical public actions mask a growing private awareness that China’s latitude for irredentist action is poised to shrink. Not knowing exactly when domestic and external constraints will come to bite—but knowing that when Beijing sees the tipping point in its rearview mirror, major rivals will recognize it too—amplifies Xi and the party’s anxiety to act on a shorter timeline. Hence the dramatic acceleration of the last few years.

Just as China is mustering its own strategic actions, so the United States must also intensify its focus and deployment of resources. The United States has taken too long to warm up and confront the central challenge, but it retains formidable advantages, agility, and the ability to prevail—provided it goes all-in now. Conversely, if Washington fails to marshal its forces promptly, its achievements after 2030 or 2035 will matter little. Seizing the 2020s would enable Beijing to ~~cripple~~ [destroy] the free and open rules-based order and entrench its position by economically subjugating regional neighbors (including key U.S. treaty allies) to a degree that could offset the strategic headwinds China now increasingly grapples with.

Deterrence is never certain. But it offers the highest probability of avoiding the certainty that an Indo-Pacific region dominated by a CCP-led China would doom treaty allies, threaten the U.S. homeland, and likely set the stage for worse to come. Accordingly, U.S. planners should immediately mobilize resources and effort as well as accept greater risks to deter Chinese action over the critical next decade.

The greatest threat is armed conflict over Taiwan, where U.S. and allied success or failure will be fundamental and reverberate for the remainder of the century. There is a high chance of a major move against Taiwan by the late 2020s—following an extraordinary ramp-up in People’s Liberation Army capabilities and before Xi or the party state’s power grasp has ebbed or Washington and its allies have fully regrouped and rallied to the challenge.

So how should policymakers assess the potential risk of Chinese action against Taiwan reaching dangerous levels by 2027 or possibly even earlier—as emphasized in the testimonies of Adms. Philip Davidson and John Aquilino? In June, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Mark Milley testified to the House of Representatives that Xi had “challenged the People’s Liberation Army to accelerate their modernization programs to develop capabilities to seize Taiwan and move it from 2035 to 2027,” although China does not currently have the capabilities or intentions to conduct an all-out invasion of mainland Taiwan.

U.S. military leaders’ assessments are informed by some of the world’s most extensive and sophisticated internal information. But what’s striking is open-source information available to everyone suggests similar things. Moving forward, a number of open-source indicators offer valuable “early warning lights” that can help policymakers more accurately calibrate both potential timetables and risk readings as the riskiest period of relations—from 2027 onward—approaches.

Semiconductors supply self-sufficiency. Taiwan is the “OPEC+” of semiconductors, accounting for approximately two-thirds of global chip foundry capacity. A kinetic crisis would almost certainly disrupt—and potentially even completely curtail—semiconductor supplies. China presently spends even more each year on semiconductor imports (around $380 billion) than it does on oil, but much of the final products are destined for markets abroad. Taiwan is producing cutting-edge 5-nanometer and 7-nanometer chips, but China produces around 80 percent of the rest of the chips in the world. The closer China comes to being able to secure “good enough” chips for “inside China-only” needs, the less of a constraint this becomes.

Crude oil, grain, strategic metals stockpiles—the commercial community (Planet Labs, Ursa Space Systems, etc.) has developed substantial expertise in cost-effectively tracking inventory changes for key input commodities needed to prepare for war.

Electric vehicle fleet size—the amount of oil demand displaced by electric vehicles varies depending on miles driven, but the more of China’s car fleet that can be connected to the grid (and thus powered by blockade-resistant coal), the less political burden Beijing will face if it has to weather a maritime oil blockade imposed in response to actions it took against Taiwan or other major revisionist adventures. China’s passenger vehicle fleet, now approximately 225 million units strong, counts nearly 6.5 million electric vehicles among its ranks, the lion’s share of which are full-battery electrics. China’s State Council seeks to have 20 percent of new vehicles sold in China be electric vehicles by 2025. This target has already basically been achieved over the last few months, meaning at least 3.5 to 4 million (and eventually many more) new elective vehicles will enter China’s car fleet each year from now on.

Local concentration of maritime vessels—snap exercises with warships, circumnavigations, and midline tests with swarms of aircraft highlight the growing scale of China’s threat to Taiwan. But these assets alone cannot invade the island. To capture and garrison, Beijing would need not only air, missile, naval, and special operations forces but also the ability to move lots of equipment and—at the very least—tens of thousands of personnel across the Taiwan Strait. As such, Beijing would have to amass maritime transport assets. And given the scale required, this would alter ship patterns elsewhere along China’s coast in ways detectable with artificial intelligence-facilitated imagery analysis from firms like Planet Labs (or national assets).

Only the most formidable, agile American and allied deterrence can kick the can down the road long enough for China’s slowdown to shut the window of vulnerability. Holding the line is likely to require frequent and sustained proactive enforcement actions to disincentivize full-frontal Chinese assaults on the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. Chinese probing behavior and provocations must be met with a range of symmetric and asymmetric responses that impose real costs, such as publishing assets owned by Chinese officials abroad, cyber interference with China’s technological social control apparatus, “hands on” U.S. Navy and Coast Guard enforcement measures against Maritime Militia-affiliated vessels in the South China Sea, intensified air and maritime surveillance of Chinese naval bases, and visas and resettlement options to Hong Kongers, Uyghurs, and other threatened Chinese citizens—including CCP officials (and their families) who seek to defect and/or leave China. U.S. policymakers must make crystal clear to their Chinese counterparts that the engagement-above-all policies that dominated much of the past 25 years are over and the risks and costs of ongoing—and future—adventurism will fall heaviest on China.

## 1NC - Sanctions CP

#### CP text: States currently imposing economic sanctions against the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea should lift these sanctions.

#### Sanctions are unethical – they’re a major cause of poverty and economic turmoil in North Korea

Essertier 20 [Joseph Essertier, associate professor at the Nagoya Institute of Technology in Japan. "Cutting Off the Lifelines of North Koreans? That’s Called a Siege, Not “Sanctions”." CounterPunch.org, 1-9-2020, accessed 7-22-2022, https://www.counterpunch.org/2020/01/09/cutting-off-the-lifelines-of-north-koreans-thats-called-a-siege-not-sanctions/] HWIC

“Trump’s push for ‘maximum pressure’ resulted in a global and almost total ban on North Korea-related trade, investment, or financial transactions. This effectively put the whole country under siege, with all the consequences this implies for the innocents within.” These are the words of [Henri Feron](https://www.nknews.org/2019/12/the-rising-toll-of-trumps-maximum-pressure-on-north-korea/), a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and one of the authors of a new study entitled “[The Human Costs and Gendered Impact of Sanctions on North Korea](https://koreapeacenow.org/first-comprehensive-assessment-of-the-impact-of-sanctions-against-north-korea-shows-adverse-consequences-for-civilians-especially-women/)”. See the [video here](https://koreapeacenow.org/video-how-sanctions-harm-civilians-in-north-korea-especially-women/).

Yong Suk Lee would probably concur, at least about the “already marginalized hinterlands.” He finds that the gap in wealth between places like that and Pyongyang is getting worse. And even without any special study, it seems obvious that women are hurt when exports of textiles are banned, since textiles is an industry in which the overwhelming majority of workers are women. Resolution 2375 of September 2017 targeted textiles.

Perhaps there are certain sanctions that hurt the autocrats of North Korea without hurting the people, but looking at the overall situation, neither the scholar Feron nor the journalist Cockburn mince their words. They both call the sanctions a “siege.” Such is their cumulative effect. Cockburn goes further and posits that when the sanctions amount to “collective punishment of millions of innocent civilians who die, sicken or are reduced to living off scraps from the garbage dumps,” the siege constitutes a “war crime.” Another sense in which a siege can constitute a war crime is when they are used to start wars, e.g., how sanctions were used to [provoke the Empire of Japan](https://www.independent.org/news/article.asp?id=1930) to strike Us first. One could draw many parallels between North Korea today and the Empire of Japan in 1941.

The study “The Human Costs” breaks the news to us ever so gently, but even in that cautious document, one finds evidence of a siege: “There is increasing evidence that the sanctions regime on the DPRK is having adverse humanitarian consequences, even as the relevant UN resolutions explicitly state this is not the intention. The UN Panel of Experts has determined that the ‘[UN] sectoral sanctions are affecting the delivery of humanitarian-sensitive items’ and that their implementation has ‘had an impact on the activities of international humanitarian agencies working to address chronic humanitarian needs in the country.’”

“Has had an impact” = “has made it extremely difficult to help” North Koreans. A similar message about the obstacles that humanitarian organizations must overcome are evidenced, too, in the film about the Eugene Bell Foundation “[Out of Breath](https://www.pih.org/article/out-breath-provides-inside-look-north-koreas-battle-against-tb)”. They have had some success, in spite of many setbacks caused by sanctions, to help North Koreans deal with stubborn strains of TB.

The items prohibited under Resolution 2397 (December 2017) include “irrigation equipment and prefabricated greenhouses; medical appliances, such as ultrasound machines and orthopaedic appliances for persons with disabilities; and any item with a metallic component, including ‘screws, bolts, nails, staples’ that are ‘often components of humanitarian-sensitive goods.’” Do these things sound like parts that are essential for nukes or other WMD—materials or technology that North Korea does not already have?

This year the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) estimate that “10 million people are food insecure and in need of urgent food assistance.”

Conclusion: We Eat and Drink While Tomorrow They Die

Cockburn wrote, “Economic sanctions are like a medieval siege but with a modern PR apparatus attached to justify what is being done. A difference is that such sieges used to be directed at starving out a single town or city while now they are aimed at squeezing whole countries into submission.” Indeed. Again, one only needs look at the documented effects of sanctions on Iraq to see their poor track record. Cockburn and Henri Feron use the word “siege” to convey the fact that the overall impact of sanctions on North Korea is to starve and, during the bitter winter of the Korean Peninsula, freeze vulnerable sectors of the population to death. There may be a good argument for certain types of sanctions, such as those that would block the sale of critical parts of weapons in a nuclear weapons program—which would not apply to Iran since, unlike North Korea, they do not have such a program —but there are no good arguments for prohibiting the sale of “humanitarian-sensitive items,” such as syringes; agricultural machinery including tractors and pumping equipment; and fuel. Cutting off these lifelines of the vulnerable will only hurt them, not the elites. For example, “The Human Costs” mentions that “shortages of fuel, electricity and pumping equipment limit the ability to irrigate, reducing yields and making crops susceptible to extreme weather shocks, such as droughts and heatwaves.”

Anyone can see that North Koreans need help. Instead of demanding that their government strip down naked, as Trump did in Hanoi, we could demand of the U.N. that they discontinue Resolutions 2375 and 2397 (for starters), and of the U.S. that they follow through with Trump’s promise and actually provide North Korea with a security guarantee.

Compared to the U.S., North Korea is a small, poor country with a micro military budget. The notion that they might strike the U.S. first is absurd. The demand at Hanoi—the sentence that begins by saying they must fully dismantle their “nuclear infrastructure, chemical and biological warfare program…”—was ridiculous. The U.S. has so much to gain and so little to lose by giving North Korea what it wants, and what the people need.

#### Noko sanctions are ineffective and make economic integration impossible – lifting them facilitates engagement

Feffer 21 [John Feffer, director of Foreign Policy In Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies and has been an Open Society fellow, a PanTech fellow in Korean Studies at Stanford University, a Herbert W. Scoville fellow, a writing fellow at Provisions Library in Washington, DC, and a writer in residence at Blue Mountain Center and the Wurlitzer Foundation. "The Problem of Sanctions against North Korea." Foreign Policy in Focus, 11-22-2021, accessed 7-21-2022, https://fpif.org/the-problem-of-sanctions-against-north-korea/] HWIC

It is not easy to do away with U.S. sanctions against North Korea. As Jessica Lee points out, “none of the economic sanctions against North Korea have a sunset clause, so they are difficult to amend or remove.” Presidential waivers are possible, but presidents are [generally reluctant](https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/its-time-to-reexamine-us-sanctions-on-north-korea/) to invoke such waivers because of congressional pushback and the generally negative perception of North Korea in U.S. public discourse.

The most immediate task is to consider a range of exemptions to the current sanctions to ensure that the international community can help avert a humanitarian disaster in North Korea. Even the UN Special Rapporteur on North Korean Human Rights Tomas Ojea Quintana has [argued](http://world.kbs.co.kr/service/news_view.htm?lang=e&id=IK&Seq_Code=164730) for such a relaxation of the sanctions regime in order to safeguard the livelihoods of ordinary citizens.

Beyond the humanitarian crisis, however, the United States should consider more radical approaches to North Korea that go beyond sanctions.

Donald Trump was willing to consider this more radical approach in part because he was more taken with grand gestures and foreign policy spectacles than with day-to-day political calculations. He attempted the top-down approach of engaging directly with Kim Jong Un. But he frankly didn’t understand the terms of engagement and, when frustrated by North Korea’s apparent lack of reciprocity, fell back on the default policy of applying even more sanctions. The virtue of Trump’s approach was that it established, at least on the surface, a measure of symmetry between the two sides: two “deciders” sweeping aside the procedural requirements to hammer out a deal. But in the end, Trump wasn’t willing to abandon the underlying carrot-stick mentality.

No U.S. administrations have seriously considered the “Chinese option” of undertaking a break-through agreement with North Korea comparable to the Nixon-Kissinger approach of the 1970s. Such an approach would reduce and eventually eliminate economic sanctions in order to facilitate North Korea’s engagement with the global economy in the expectation that it will become a more responsible global actor, which China has in fact become (certainly in comparison to its Cultural Revolution days). Constrained by the rules of the global economy, nudged away from illegitimate and toward legitimate economic activities, and cognizant of the importance of preserving new trade ties, North Korea would still possess weapons of mass destruction—as well as a considerable conventional military—but would be less likely to consider using them.

The United States took such a radical move with China in the 1970s in order to gain a geopolitical edge with the Soviet Union. It could do the same with North Korea today in order to gain some leverage over China.

The major objection, of course, is that the United States would unilaterally give up a powerful tool of influence by removing sanctions on North Korea. But, as has been detailed above, sanctions haven’t been effective. Instead of more coercive sticks, perhaps the United States should consider better carrots.

To persuade North Korea to reduce its nuclear weapons program, the United States should consider offering something akin to the Agreed Framework but substituting renewable energy for the civilian nuclear power plants of that deal. With Chinese and South Korean cooperation, the United States could offer to help North Korea leapfrog to an entirely different economy independent of fossil fuels. It was, after all, the huge jump in energy prices in the late 1980s and early 1990s that helped to precipitate North Korea’s agricultural and industrial collapse, from which it has never really recovered. A new energy grid that eliminates the country’s dependency on imported energy would be of great interest to the leadership in Pyongyang.

The current standoff between North Korea and the rest of the world is based on two fundamental misconceptions. North Korea believes that its nuclear weapons program provides it with long-term security. And the rest of the world believes that economic sanctions will eventually force North Korea to give up that program. The two misconceptions have generated a series of failed agreements and failed negotiations.

The United States in particular must consider instead a different kind of approach based not on bigger sticks but better carrots that can give North Korea what it really wants: engagement with the global economy on its own terms based on a stronger and more self-sufficient domestic economy. A more prosperous North Korea that is no longer backed into a corner would be a benefit to its own citizens, to the overall security of the Korean peninsula, and to the international community more generally.

#### Continued sanctions cause Chinese and Russian backlash – allows them to leverage influence against the UN and US

Lynch 21 [Colum Lynch, senior staff writer at Foreign Policy. "‘It Was Like Having the Chinese Government in the Room With Us’: China’s method for blocking sanctions regimes." Foreign Policy, 10-15-2021, accessed 7-22-2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/15/china-sanctions-north-korea-hardball/] HWIC

In the summer, U.S. authorities provided the U.N. panel of experts for North Korea with a satellite photograph of a North Korean ship transferring coal to a Chinese-flagged vessel, a clear violation of a U.N. embargo aimed at cutting off Pyongyang’s ability to finance its illicit development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. But what grabbed the U.N. sanctions experts’ attention was the presence of a Chinese coast guard ship passively watching the transaction play out.

The photograph proved highly embarrassing to Chinese authorities in Beijing and prompted the panel’s Chinese expert to mount a vigorous effort to block the photo from appearing in the panel’s latest report documenting U.N. sanction violations. In a written response, China chided the expert panel, saying it is “completely normal” for Chinese coast guard vessels to patrol in the region and asked the panel “not to include in its report unverified information” about the Chinese ship, saying it was a matter of national security.

In the end, the panel reached a compromise: It would limit the photo to a confidential annex of the report that would not be released to the public. But the panel report included a written description of the photograph, plus a footnote indicating one of the panel experts objected to the inclusion of any reference to the Chinese patrols.

This episode provides the latest snapshot in a decadeslong drama featuring China and the United States over the enforcement of sanctions against North Korea and other rogue countries. More than a decade of sanctions has deepened Pyongyang’s isolation and stunted its economy, but they have failed to achieve their primary objective: halting North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, which the country continues to fund through a maze of illicit enterprises, including the sale of weapons technology, cyber-extortion, and coal exports.

It also underscores the contradiction between Beijing’s attempt to assert itself as a champion of multilateralism while it persistently seeks to air brush out the record of its failure to live up to those commitments. Debate over China’s commitment to sanctions comes at a particularly fraught moment in U.S.-Chinese relations, as Beijing seeks to more forcefully assert its role as a global leader and the Biden administration increasingly seeks to portray China as a lawless and irresponsible world power.

In recent months, the United States has [expressed increasing concern](https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/01/biden-north-korea-nuclear-weapons-kim-jong-un-sanctions/) about China’s failure to enforce sanctions. In an April letter to Congress, Naz Durakoglu, the acting U.S. assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of Legislative Affairs, said since August 2018, the United States proposed sanctioning 50 individuals, entities, and vessels allegedly violating North Korea sanctions, including 26 individuals and vessels between May 2020 and April 2021. The vast majority involved Chinese entities or entities linked to China, according to a diplomatic source familiar with the matter.

In February, the United States and other G-7 countries delivered a formal diplomatic démarche to Beijing and the Chinese mission to the United Nations documenting China’s “failures to implement and enforce sanctions relating to [North Korea],” according to the April letter. The démarche included specific examples of North Korea-related maritime activities occurring in Chinese territorial waters or involving Chinese-flagged vessels.

“The work of the [North Korea] Panel of Experts is fundamental to the implementation of international sanctions against North Korea,” it added. “The semi-annual reports of the Panel are some of the most objective and influential sources of information on sanctions violations and serve as a touchstone for international cooperation on sanctions implementation.”

“China and Russia have gotten better at putting pressure on the panel members to take stuff out of the reports.”

But some former panel members feel the council’s chief champions on the Security Council—Britain, France, and the United States, known informally as the P3—have not responded forcefully enough to China and Russia’s efforts.

“There are the twin forces of a weakening of resolve among the P3 to fight this stuff and the determination and efficacy of the Chinese and Russians to undermine it,” said Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, the former U.S. representative on the panel. “China and Russia have gotten better at putting pressure on the panel members to take stuff out of the reports.”

“One problem is the U.S. was constrained by the interagency process and declassification process,” she added. “The panel needs actual evidence. The U.S. government is not upping its game fast enough.”

The North Korea panel is distinct from most other U.N. sanctions panels, which employ independent experts on arms trafficking, financial crimes, and regional politics to investigate sanction violations. It is comprised of representatives handpicked by the Security Council’s five major powers—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—and other governments, such as South Korea and Japan, that have a direct interest in curtailing North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. But big-power confrontations over North Korea extend to many other parts of the world, where China and Russia have worked closely together to check other expert panels’ authorities.

China has made no secret of its ambivalence toward U.N. sanctions, which it views as a tool of Western hegemony. But for decades, it has gone along with sanctions, withholding its veto and, in some cases, openly backing the imposition of punitive measures, including in North Korea, where it hoped sanctions could get the United States and North Korea back to political talks aimed at ending the peninsula’s decadeslong state of war.

But behind the scenes, China has sought to use its growing influence at the United Nations to whittle away such sanction regimes’ power and efficacy. Much of that influence involves checking the authority of U.N. sanctions enforcers on the U.N. panel of experts for North Korea, but it has also targeted expert panels in Africa, where it recently blocked the appointment of a new slate of sanctions experts for the mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a move that effectively ground investigations to a halt. Moscow joined Beijing in [holding up the panel](https://apnews.com/article/europe-middle-east-africa-russia-united-nations-5736d78d22ec648198dfab74600d9132).

Beijing’s strategy has largely focused on sanitizing investigations that have shed light on Chinese sanctions violations and blocking the reappointment of panel experts that have uncovered evidence of Chinese weaponry in territory subject to U.N. sanctions.

China’s hardball strategy isn’t new. Nearly a decade ago, China [blocked](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/chinas-arms-exports-flooding-sub-saharan-africa/2012/08/25/16267b68-e7f1-11e1-936a-b801f1abab19_story.html) the release of a panel report detailing armed groups’ use of Chinese ammunition in Darfur, Sudan, in violation of the U.N. arms embargo. The panel never accused China of violating the sanctions, considering it more likely that ammunition was exported legally to Sudan, where it was then sold to armed groups in Darfur. But China refused to cooperate with the investigation and subsequently blocked the German expert who uncovered the Chinese shells from having his contract renewed, effectively kicking him off the panel.

But China has gradually pursued new means of constraining the inspectors. For instance, it has prohibited expert panels from seeking information on sanctions from Taiwan, which has extensive business, intelligence, and security interests in the region; China’s representative has insisted that any reference to Taiwan include a clause saying it is a province of China. Beijing has also required all requests for information from Hong Kong-based entities to be channeled through China’s mission to the U.N., slowing down the panel’s investigations. China, along with Russia, also used its position on the U.N. budget committee to limit the financial resources available to sanctions experts.

“It was difficult to get satellite imagery, particularly the latest images, because of the amount of money required to purchase it, and China and Russia were active on the [U.N.] Fifth Committee that allocates the money,” said Neil Watts, a South African who served on the North Korea panel from 2013 to 2018. “I got the impression that China would view it as an intrusion of their territorial sovereignty.”

China’s efforts to contain U.N.’s sanctions panels have been particularly strenuous and successful over North Korea, which shares a border with China—its biggest trading partner. In contrast to other sanctions panels—which are composed of independent experts—the U.N. panel of experts on North Korea draws its experts from China, Russia, and the United States, who exhibit varying degrees of independence. China’s representative on the panel acts as a surrogate for the Chinese foreign ministry and would routinely seek instructions from the Chinese mission as the panel debated on what to include in its reports. “The Chinese member of the panel would call the mission during our report negotiations,” said Kleine-Ahlbrandt. “It was like having the Chinese government in the room with us.”

The Chinese panel expert, sometimes with the backing of his Russian counterpart, has sought to remove, question, or downplay information that could prove embarrassing to the Chinese government.

In recent months, the Chinese panel expert—sometimes with the backing of his Russian counterpart—has sought to remove, question, or downplay information that could prove embarrassing to the Chinese government. The Chinese and Russian experts challenged a section of the report, based on information from an unnamed U.N. member state saying 4.8 million metric tons of coal and other sanctioned materials had been exported from North Korea to China, arguing the information “requires verification.”

A series of internal U.N. accounts of meetings between Chinese officials and expert panels reveal constant interrogation of the experts’ tactics and their reliance on foreign intelligence sources to make their case. In a typical exchange in the delegates’ lounge in January 2017, Sun Lei, a diplomat from the Chinese Mission to the United Nations, urged a group of panel members to not name several Chinese banks, which were being scrutinized for their facilitation of North Korean sanctions evasion.

“Counsellor Sun stated that China preferred these banks and cases not be disclosed in the Panel’s report,” according to a note of the meeting. “He also stated that if [North Korea] is antagonized, it will react strongly, which may impact any sort of cooperation in the future in the long run.”

He also expressed irritation with the frequent information requests related to potential sanctions violations involving Chinese nationals or entities. “China does not want to be bothered with so many cases, letters, and etc.,” he told the experts.

**Democratic governance provides social goods and remedies global problems – climate change, decline, and authoritarian transition makes a Russian or Chinese led order inevitable, resulting in nuclear disaster**

**Kolodziej ’17** [Edward; Emeritus Research Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; EUC Paper Series, “Challenges to the Democratic Project for Governing Globalization,” May 19, 2017, https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/96620/Kolodziej Introduction 5.19.17.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y] TDI

The Rise of a Global Society Let me first sketch the global democratic project for global governance as a point of reference. We must first recognize that globalization has given rise to a global society for the first time in the evolution of the human species. We are now stuck with each other; seven and half billion people today — nine to ten by 2050: all super connected and interdependent. In greater or lesser measure, humans are mutually dependent on each other in the pursuit of their most salient values, interests, needs, and preferences — concerns about personal, community, and national security, sustainable economic growth, protection of the environment, the equitable distribution of the globe’s material wealth, human rights, and even the validation of their personal and social identities by others. Global warming is a metaphor of this morphological social change in the human condition. All humans are implicated in this looming Anthropogenic-induced disaster — the exhausts of billions of automobiles, the methane released in fracking for natural gas, outdated U.S. coal-fired power plants and newly constructed ones in China. Even the poor farmer burning charcoal to warm his dinner is complicit. Since interdependence surrounds, ensnares, and binds us as a human society, the dilemma confronting the world’s diverse and divided populations is evident: the expanding scope as well as the deepening, accumulating, and thickening interdependencies of globalization urge global government. But the Kantian ideal of universal governance is beyond the reach of the world’s disparate peoples. They are profoundly divided by religion, culture, language, tribal, ethnic and national loyalties as well as by class, social status, race, gender, and sexual orientation. How have the democracies responded to this dilemma? How have they attempted to reconcile the growing interdependence of the world’s disputing peoples and need for global governance? What do we mean by the governance of a human society? A working, legitimate government of a human society requires simultaneous responses to three competing imperatives: Order, Welfare, and Legitimacy. While the forms of these OWL imperatives have differed radically over the course of human societal evolution, these constraints remain predicable of all human societies if they are to replicate themselves and flourish over time. The OWL imperatives are no less applicable to a global society. 1. Order refers to a society’s investment of awesome material power in an individual or body to arbitrate and resolve value, interest, and preference conflicts, which cannot be otherwise resolved by non-violent means — the Hobbesian problematic. 2. The Welfare imperative refers to the necessity of humans to eat, drink, clothe, and shelter themselves and to pursue the full-range of their seemingly limitless acquisitive appetites. Responses to the Welfare imperative, like that of Order, constitute a distinct form of governing power and authority with its own decisional processes and actors principally associated either with the Welfare or the Order imperative. Hence we have the Marxian-Adam Smith problematic. 3. Legitimacy is no less a form of governing power and authority, independent of the Order and Welfare imperatives. Either by choice, socialization, or coerced acquiescence, populations acknowledge a regime’s governing authority and their obligation to submit to its rule. Here arises the Rousseaunian problematic. The government of a human society emerges then as an evolving, precarious balance and compromise of the ceaseless struggle of these competing OWL power domains for ascendancy of one of these imperatives over the others. It is against the backdrop of these OWL imperatives — Order, Welfare, and Legitimacy — that we are brought to the democratic project for global governance. The Democratic Project For Order, open societies constructed the global democratic state and, in alliance, the democratic global-state system. Collectively these initiatives led to the creation of the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and the European Union to implement the democratic project’s system of global governance. The democratic global state assumed all of the functions of the HobbesianWestphalian security state — but a lot more. The global state became a Trading, Banking, Market, and Entrepreneurial state. To these functions were added those of the Science, Technology and the Economic Growth state. How else would we be able to enjoy the Internet, cell phones and iPhones, or miracle cures? These are the products of the iron triangle of the global democratic state, academic and non-profit research centers, and corporations. It is a myth that the Market System did all this alone. Fueled by increasing material wealth, the democratic global state was afforded the means to become the Safety Net state, providing education, health, social security, leisure and recreation for its population. And as the global state’s power expanded across this broad and enlarging spectrum of functions and roles, the global state was also constrained by the social compacts of the democracies to be bound by popular rule. The ironic result of the expansion of the global state’s power and social functions and its obligation to accede to popular will was a Security state and global state-system that vastly outperformed its principal authoritarian rivals in the Cold War. So much briefly is the democratic project’s response to the Order imperative. Now let’s look at the democratic project’s response to the Welfare imperative. The democracies institutionalized Adam Smith’s vision of a global Market System. The Market System trucks and barters, Smith’s understanding of what it means to be human. But it does a lot more. The Market System facilitates and fosters the free movement of people, goods and services, capital, ideas, values, scientific discoveries, and best technological practices. Created is a vibrant global civil society oblivious to state boundaries. What we now experience is De Tocqueville’s Democracy in America on global steroids. As for the imperative of Legitimacy, the social compacts of the democracies affirmed Rousseau’s conjecture that all humans are free and therefore equal. Applied to elections each citizen has one vote. Democratic regimes are also obliged to submit to the rule of law, to conduct free and fair elections, to honor majority rule while protecting minority rights, and to promote human rights at home and abroad. The Authoritarian Threat to the Democratic Project The democratic project for global governance is now at risk. Let’s start with the challenges posed by authoritarian regimes, with Russia and China in the lead. Both Russia and China would rest global governance on Big Power spheres of influence. Both would assume hegemonic status in their respective regions, asserting their versions of the Monroe Doctrine. Their regional hegemony would then leverage their claim to be global Big Powers. Moscow and Beijing would then have an equal say with the United States and the West in sharing and shaping global governance. The Russo-Chinese global system of Order would ascribe to Russia and China governing privileges not accorded to the states both aspire to dominate. Moscow and Beijing would enjoy unconditional recognition of their state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference in their domestic affairs, but they would reserve to themselves the right to intervene in the domestic and foreign affairs of the states and peoples under their tutelage in pursuit of their hegemonic interests. President Putin has announced that Russia’s imperialism encompasses the millions of Russians living in the former republics of the Soviet Union. Russia contends that Ukraine and Belarus also fall under Moscow’s purported claim to historical sovereignty over these states. Forceful re-absorption of Crimea and control over eastern Ukraine are viewed by President Putin as Russia’s historical inheritances. Self-determination is not extended to these states or to other states and peoples of the former Soviet Union. Moscow rejects their right to freely align, say, with the European Union or, god forbid, with NATO. 4 In contrast to the democratic project, universal in its reach, the Russo-Chinese conception of a stable global order rests on more tenuous and conflict-prone ethno-national foundations. Russia’s proclaimed enemies are the United States and the **European Union**. Any means that **undermines the unity of these entities is viewed by Moscow as a gain**. The endgame is a poly-anarchical interstate system, potentially as **war-prone** as the Eurocentric system before and after World War I, but now populated by states with **nuclear weapons**. Global politics becomes a zero-sum game. Moscow has no compunctions about corrupting the electoral processes of democratic states, conducting threatening military exercises along NATO’s east border, or violating the more than 30-year old treaty to ban the deployment of Intermediate-Range missile launchers, capable of firing nuclear weapons. Nothing less than the dissolution of the democratic project is Moscow’s solution for global Order. China also seeks a revision of the global Order. It declares sovereignty over the South China Sea. Rejected is The Hague Tribunal’s dismissal of this claim. Beijing continues to build artificial islands as military bases in the region to assert its control over these troubled waters. If it could have its way, China would decide which states and their naval vessels, notably those of the United States, would have access to the South China Sea. Where Moscow and Beijing depart sharply are in their contrasting responses to the Welfare imperative. Moscow has no solution other than to use its oil and gas resources as instruments of coercive diplomacy and to weaken or dismantle existing Western alliances and international economic institutions. China can ill-afford the dismantling of the global market system. In his address to the Davos gathering in January of this year, Chinese President Xi asserted that “any attempt to cut off the flow of capital, technologies, products, industries and people between economies, and channel the waters in the ocean back into isolated lakes and creeks is simply not possible.” Adam Smith could not have said it better. Both Moscow and Beijing have been particularly assiduous to legitimate their regimes. President Putin’s case for legitimacy is much broader and deeper than a pure appeal to Russian nationalism. He stresses the spiritual and cultural unity of Russianspeaking populations spread across the states of the post-Soviet space. A central core of that unity is the Russian Orthodox Church, a key prop of the regime. Reviled is Western secularism, portrayed as corrupt and decadent, viewed by Putin as an existential threat to the Russian World. The Chinese regime, secular and atheistic, can hardly rely on religion to legitimate the regime. Beijing principally rests its legitimacy on its record of economic development and nationalism. The regime’s success in raising the economic standards of hundreds of millions of Chinese reinforces its claim to legitimacy in two ways. On the one hand, the Communist Party can rightly claim to have raised hundreds of millions of Chinese from poverty within a generation. On the other hand, the Communist Party insists that its model of economic growth, what critics scorn as crony capitalism, is superior to the unfettered, market-driven model of the West. Hence capitalism with Chinese characteristics is more effective and legitimate than the Western alternative. Where Moscow and Beijing do converge is in fashioning their responses to the Legitimacy imperative. They repudiate Western liberal democracy. Both reject criticisms of their human rights abuses as interventions into their domestic affairs. Dissidents are harassed, incarcerated, or, in some instances, assassinated. Journalists are co-opted, selfcensored, silenced, or imprisoned. Social media is state controlled. Both the Putin regime 5 and the Chinese Communist Party monopolize the public narratives evaluating governmental policy. Transparency and accountability are hostage to governmental secrecy. Civil society has few effective avenues to criticize governmental actions. Moscow adds an ironic twist to these controls in manipulating national elections to produce an elected authoritarian regime. Whether either of these authoritarian responses to the Legitimacy imperative will survive remains to be seen. Beijing’s use of economic performance and nationalism to underwrite its legitimacy is a double-edged sword. If economic performance falters, then legitimacy suffers. Whether top-down nationalism will always control nationalism from the bottom-up is also problematic. In resting legitimacy on nationalism, dubious historical claims, and crypto-religious beliefs, Moscow is spared Beijing’s economic performance test. That said, there is room for skepticism that in the long-run Russians will exchange lower standards of living for corrupt rule in pursuit of an elusive Russian mission antagonistic to the West. The implosion of the Soviet Union, due in no small part to its retarded economic and technological development, suggests that the patience of the Russian people has limits. Demonstrations in March 2017 against state corruption in 82 Russian cities, led largely by Russian youth, reveal these limits. They are an ominous omen for the future of the Putin kleptocracy. Meanwhile, neither Russia nor China offers much to solve the Legitimacy imperative of global governance.

## 1NC – Case

### 1NC - Denuclearization

#### NoKo won't denuclearize

Metzl 17 [Jamie, 7/22/17, "Why Korean Reunification is in China’s Strategic National Interest", Jamie Metzl, https://jamiemetzl.com/why-korean-reunification-is-in-chinas-strategic-national-interest/, senior fellow of the Atlantic Council, has served on the U.S. National Security Council, State Department and Senate Foreign Relations Committee and with the United Nations in Cambodia. HKR-MK]

Because North Korea’s leaders are structurally xenophobic, ideologically dependent on maintaining a hyper-paranoid state of war, feel they will be safer with nuclear weapons than without them**,** and have a long and consistent history of non-compliance with arms reduction agreements they have signed, no amount of cajoling or engagement is likely to convince Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons program. There is simply no assurance the United States, South Korea, and/or Japan could conceivably offer capable of changing Pyongyang’s calculus. The only way North Korea will give up its nuclear weapons is if its leaders come to believe the cost of maintaining nuclear weapons is greater than the cost of giving them up.

#### No Korea war

**Horowitz 18** [Michael C. Horowitz is professor of political science and the associate director of Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania. He is the co-author of “Why Leaders Fight” and Elizabeth N. Saunder is an associate professor of political science at George Washington University. She is the author of “Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions.” “Why nuclear war with North Korea is less likely than you think,” WaPo, 1/3/18, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/01/03/why-nuclear-war-with-north-korea-is-less-likely-than-you-think/?utm\_term=.b9d78f24ab1d HKR-MK]

On Tuesday night, in response to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s claim to have a nuclear button on his desk, President Trump tweeted, “I too have a Nuclear Button, but it is a much bigger & more powerful one than his, and my Button works!”//// This is not the first time that things have gotten personal in the U.S.-North Korea standoff. Much of the rhetoric between the two leaders and media commentary about the risk of war focuses on the leadership of Trump and Kim — or “Little Rocket Man,” as Trump has called the North Korean leader.//// But how much could these two singular leaders really propel us to a nuclear war? Trump’s tweets and other actions certainly can increase the risk of conflict — consistent with our research on how the decisions of individual leaders affect military conflict.//// North Korea said it would reopen a border hotline with South Korea Jan. 3, hours after President Trump said he has a “bigger" nuclear button than Kim Jong Un. (Reuters)//// However, in this case, other factors, including geography and military capabilities, will matter more than tweets or the characteristics of leaders. And these factors reduce the likelihood of war.//// Leaders can be important for international conflict//// For the past few generations, political scientists who write about the outbreak of conflict mainly argued that leaders were irrelevant, focusing instead on international factors such as great power relations or domestic political factors such as whether the two countries involved had democratic institutions.//// But more and more scholarship suggests that leaders make a large difference in determining whether and how countries go to war. And it’s not just in dictatorships such as that of North Korea; even more constrained leaders, such as U.S. presidents, matter. Leaders’ beliefs and experiences before coming into office can be critical in determining whether a country goes to war and what military strategy will be used in the event of war.//// But structural forces are strong in this case//// Even if leaders have discretion, they are constrained by material and situational constraints. No U.S. or North Korean leader can realistically change or avoid some of these constraints.//// One constraint stems from the two sides’ formidable military capabilities, which mean that a general war with North Korea would be devastating, as Barry Posen argued last year. Even before North Korea acquired a nuclear capability, its artillery put tremendous pressure on South Korea. Add to that its missile arsenal — which, as nuclear experts have chronicled, can now probably deliver an intercontinental ballistic missile armed with a nuclear warhead against the United States.//// A second unavoidable constraint is geography, which may make war less likely. North Korean artillery points directly at Seoul, just 35 miles from the demilitarized zone (DMZ). South Korea may oppose a war, which could influence U.S. behavior. North Korea also borders China, a powerful country whose economic support keeps North Korea afloat.//// But China faces its own geographic reality with respect to North Korea, and China is increasingly frustrated with North Korea’s behavior. In the event of war, China does not want refugees flooding across the border into China. Yet China also does not want a unified Korean Peninsula with U.S. troops on its border.//// Indeed, in the Korean War, the United States tested geographic constraints by pushing beyond the prewar dividing line, the 38th parallel, in an attempt to unify Korea. China intervened to prevent such an outcome, and the conflict stopped where it started.//// All sides know that a war would be a huge and difficult military and political problem. So there are strong incentives to try to deter the other side, rather than escalate.//// U.S. and North Korean leaders have reason to make war even less likely//// Although the focus on Trump and Kim almost always suggests that their behavior increases the risk of war, they actually have strong incentives to reduce the prospect of war.//// Despite rhetoric about North Korea’s irrationality, Kim’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles was rational. He wants to stay in power, and nuclear weapons constitute invasion insurance. But a war probably would spell the end of the regime, giving North Korea little reason to start a war. //// On the U.S. side, few wars probably have been war-gamed more than a conflict on the Korean Peninsula. U.S. decision-makers know how costly a war might be. Knowledge of these costs makes war less likely. //// A leader-driven war would have to overcome strong structural pressures //// If “leaders matter” for military decision-making, then with different leaders, we might get a different outcome. So what about Trump and Kim might lead to conflict? //// One factor from Trump’s side could be risk acceptance. Trump could decide that he wants to start a war despite the costs, and count on U.S. missile defenses to shoot down North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile launches and protect the homeland (an awfully big gamble). In theory, Trump’s lack of experience also could make him less cognizant of the costs of war and less able to draw on his more experienced advisers. //// From Kim’s side, studies suggest that dictators — who face fewer checks and balances — are more risk-acceptant. With fewer people to tell them no, they are more likely to escalate in general. //// If war occurs, one pathway is through a misreading of one side’s incentives by the other. For example, Kim’s desire to stay in power could lead Trump to believe that, even in the face of limited U.S. strikes against North Korean nuclear and missile facilities, Kim will back down instead of escalate. But it would be hard to credibly signal that those strikes would be limited, and if Kim believes the United States is coming after him, escalation becomes more likely. //// Of course, war could also come via miscalculation and, eventually, some kind of preemptive strike. But research suggests that war spirals of that sort are extremely rare. //// In war, as in elections, the fundamentals matter //// Many questions in political science and history boil down to this: Do individuals or structural forces shape events? ////Although recent evidence in international relations scholarship points to the importance of leaders, the North Korean standoff reminds us of the power of structural factors. That may provide some comfort to those who read the president’s tweet on Tuesday night and worried about the risk of war.

#### No East Asia prolif - regardless of security guarantees.

\* obviously don't read w/ prolif good lol

Green 18 [Brendan Rittenhouse Green 18. Assistant professor of political science at the University of Cincinnati. 01/29/2018. “Primacy and Proliferation: Why Security Commitments Don’t Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons.” US Grand Strategy in the 21st Century: The Case For Restraint, Routledge.]

But according to the large mass of literature in political science, primacy's syllogism is flawed. At its heart is the strong intuition that security concerns represent the core reason for acquiring nuclear weapons—an intuition many of the realist champions of restraint share. Yet if we are to take the mainstream of research on “demand side” drivers of proliferation seriously, then this motive is far less powerful than either the policymaking world or the grand strategy debate generally acknowledge. Author after author emphasizes instead the multiple and wide-ranging set of constraints that confront would-be proliferators. Even if US withdrawal were to increase regional insecurity, security concerns have high hills to climb in order to push states toward the fateful step of nuclear acquisition. Proliferation has been a historically slow and haphazard process, and is likely to remain so. Primacy’s arguments receive their strongest support from relatively recent, dissenting research. But this research—impressive as it is—cuts in multiple directions. If Monteiro and Debs are correct, then US commitments will incentivize nuclear proliferation as often as they deter it. The weak states that Washington’s mentorship are most likely to influence are also the least likely to proliferate if its protection is withdrawn. If Miller is correct, dominoes may indeed be more likely to fall than the literature suspects, but it is unclear how much more likely. If Hymans or Solingen is right, then there are strong internal impediments to proliferation even in the face of a regional state’s nuclear acquisition. Moreover, a number of sanctions will remain: available for influencing the calculations of would-be proliferators. Looking to the future, what can be said about the odds of proliferation in a world with greatly weakened alliance commitments? East Asia, where the chance of major war with a regional power is greatest, would appear to have a number of factors pushing against further proliferation after American withdrawal. Regional allies are dominated by internationalist, trade-oriented coalitions unlikely to risk the consequences of American economic coercion. While their legal-rational Weberian bureaucracies would likely make them more technically adept at weaponization, these same bureaucracies provide a number of veto points for any decision to do so. In any case, there are not so many oppositional nationalists in these democratic polities who might be willing to take the fateful leap. Finally, South Korea and Taiwan are weak, making them exposed to Chinese coercion without American protection. Beijing is not likely to look kindly on either state proliferating.

#### No war - costs of aggression are too high

Porter 14 [Dr. Patrick Porter is a reader in War and International Security and Leverhulme Research Fellow at the University of Reading, and a fellow of the UK Chief of the Defence Staff’s Strategic Forum, War on the Rocks, January 28, 2014, "IT’S TIME TO ABANDON THE GLOBAL VILLAGE MYTH", http://warontherocks.com/2014/01/its-time-to-abandon-the-global-village-myth/ HKR-MK]

Strategic space is not a politically uncontested thoroughfare of climate and terrain simply to be moved through. (That is not even true of tourism!) Space is a medium into which other humans intrude, through which (and for which) violent political struggle takes place. Amidst the white noise of globalisation rhetoric, this distinction has been lost.

Nowhere is this more true than along Asia’s maritime peripheries. New weapons and instruments have widened, rather than shrunk, the Asia-Pacific space. Surveillance assets in the hands of watchful defenders make it harder to inflict a sudden surprise long-range attack like Pearl Harbor. Tools of “access denial”—such as long-range anti-ship missiles—make it easier for states to fend off enemy fleets and raise the costs of aggression. Even weaker enemies can inflict a devastating, even fatal sting on aggressors. This makes it harder for America to intervene in a war with China—but harder also for China to expand. Conquest has become an expensive rarity

#### Noko collapse inevitable and good— it destroys Nokos nuclear arsenal and turns the case

Berlinger 21 [(Joshua, a Digital Producer at CNN's Hong Kong bureau. He has been with the company since 2013.) “If Kim Jong Un destroyed North Korea's economy to keep Covid-19 out, will sanctions stop him from pursuing nuclear weapons?” Cnn, 1/18/21. <https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/18/asia/north-korea-covid-sanctions-dst-intl-hnk/index.html>] RR

(CNN)After arguably the most challenging year of his near-decade rule of North Korea, Kim Jong Un is sticking to his guns.

Kim announced last week at the Eighth Workers' Party Congress -- a meeting for North Korea's governing elite -- that his country plans to beef up Pyongyang's already dangerous nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs with new, sophisticated armaments, such as tactical nuclear weapons designed for use on the battlefield and warheads designed to evade American-made missile defense systems.

And at a parade marking the conclusion of the Congress, Kim's military showed off a new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).

Kim's message was crystal clear: Right now, North Korea needs its nuclear weapons to deter the United States "no matter who is in power," he said -- and no matter the cost.

The young leader's ambitious plans for modernizing his nuclear arsenal will prove expensive, at a time when money is already tight. North Korea voluntarily severed the last of its scant ties with the outside world in 2020 to prevent an influx of Covid-19. That included cutting off almost all trade with Beijing, an economic lifeline the impoverished country needs to keep its people from going hungry.

North Korea's economy is now in the gutter, and its food supply is reportedly in peril.

To ward off the pandemic, Kim effectively did to his country what many in Washington hoped economic sanctions would do: bring the North Korean economy close to the brink of collapse. That he did it on his own volition has led many to question if sanctions ever be strong enough to change Kim's thinking.

Some analysts disagree with that line of thinking. They see opportunity.

With North Korea's economy already on the ropes, they believe now is the time to deliver the knockout punch -- a blow of crippling coercive measures that, once and for all, convinces Kim that his continued pursuit of nuclear weapons does not guarantee his regime's safety, it threatens it.

Either way, Kim's plans will prove to be a major challenge for President-elect Joe Biden.

Trump, like Obama and President George W. Bush, will leave his successor a more-dangerous and better-armed adversary than the one he inherited.

Maximum pressure

Before Trump agreed to sit face-to-face with Kim in 2018, his administration put in place an aptly named strategy called "maximum pressure."

The goal was to use sanctions, diplomacy and other coercive measures, short of armed conflict, to convince Kim to agree to the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs.

As North Korea tested missiles and nuclear bombs at an unprecedented clip in 2017, the Trump administration turned up the heat. The US mission to the United Nations successfully lobbied the UN Security Council to put in place resolutions that went after North Korea's ability to make money by selling regular goods, such as coal and seafood. The Treasury Department used its tremendous power and influence over the global financial system to enact their own, unilateral sanctions. And diplomats successfully lobbied US partners to close Pyongyang's embassies overseas, which the regime has been accused of using as fronts for money-making opportunities.

By the end of 2017, North Korea was barred from almost all international trade. Even long-time North Korean ally China agreed to sign on to incredibly punitive UN sanctions that year, and Beijing appeared to be enforcing them at first.

That momentum didn't last. As Trump pivoted to diplomacy with Pyongyang in 2018, the United States took its foot off the gas on the pressure campaign. Hundreds of new sanctions that were ready to go were put on hold ahead of Trump's first summit with Kim in Singapore, the President said. Sanctions have been issued at a much slower clip since.

As the threat subsided and its relationship with the United States crumbled, China began loosening its enforcement of restrictions, Washington alleged, though Beijing repeatedly denies any claims that it does not fully enforce UN sanctions.

Many experts believe Washington gave up on maximum pressure too soon.

Some, including former US acting assistant secretary of state for East Asia and the Pacific Evans Revere, argue Biden's team should seriously consider a new maximum pressure model, ramping up sanctions "in ways that would impose even more pain and isolation on North Korea."

"Intensification of sanctions, plus other diplomatic, economic and banking and military pressures that you could apply on North Korea could certainly shake the regimes foundations, particularly now that we see that the regime is suffering a severe economic crisis the likes of which we haven't seen in a while," Revere said.

Revere and other proponents of sanctions argue there are still tools left in the US arsenal to pressure North Korea, and they should be pursued. The Biden administration could, for example, try harder to close North Korean trading companies in conjunction with US allies and target Chinese banks that help North Korea access foreign currency.

"There is much, much more to be done that could squeeze, isolate and undermine North Korea in ways that would shake their confidence in their long-standing assumption that nuclear weapons are their salvation and would also drive the point home that not only are nuclear weapons not your salvation, they are the thing that has the potential to undermine the stability of your regime," Revere said.

Risky business

Revere said he recognizes that such an approach is risky.

It could force North Koreans to choose between feeding its people and funding its nuclear weapons, and history shows Kim would likely choose the latter.

Kim Jong Il, the current leader's father and predecessor, let millions die of starvation during a famine in the 1990s rather than reform, accept aid or or do anything that might have threatened his iron grip on leadership.

Things aren't that bad in North Korea right now, but analysts believe the economic situation is more dire than it has been since the famine. Devastating storms, the punishing sanctions and the pandemic pummeled North Korea's economy in 2020. There appears to be enough food to go around, but the supply is under more strain than any time since the famine, according to Chad O'Carroll, the CEO of Korea Risk Group, which produces North Korea publications NK Pro and NK News.

#### No SoKo prolif

\* obviously don't read w/ prolif good lol

Lankov 19 [Andrei Lankov is a professor of Korean Studies at Kookmin University in Seoul and the author of several books on North Korea, 5-8-2019, "Will South Korea Get Nuclear Weapons?," Valdai Club, https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/will-south-korea-get-nuclear-weapons HKR-MK]

But most probably there is no cause for alarm and nuclear dominoes are unlikely to start falling in East Asia any time soon. Even if we assume that the South Korean conservatives (and the question of nuclear weapons is mooted only in the conservative camp, which is currently in opposition) will try to live up to their nuclear ambitions after coming to power in an election, they most likely are in for a failure. The obstacle to Seoul achieving its nuclear ambitions does not lie in technological or financial problems. There are no such problems for South Korea and it would take it a couple of years at the most to develop its own nuclear weapons. But if Seoul started working on nuclear weapons (which is frankly improbable), it would immediately face serious economic and political consequences which, more likely than not, would force it to change position and abandon its nuclear ambitions. By withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, South Korea would very probably lay itself open to international sanctions. For a number of reasons, on which we have no need to dwell, sanctions against South Korea would be less strict than those imposed on North Korea. Nevertheless, they would have a tangible impact on the country’s economic situation, given its strong dependence on international trade. China’s position will be an even more serious problem. Right now China is the country with the most reason to fear that the “nuclear dominoes” scenario in East Asia will become a reality. With the exception of South Korea, all countries in the region with the potential to acquire nuclear weapons of their own will do so primarily in order to contain China. For this reason, China must prevent the dissolution of the nuclear non-proliferation system in East Asia, for which purpose Beijing will stop at nothing, including operations by secret services, clandestine support for anti-nuclear groups in South Korea, and sabotage at research centers (if this seems like an exaggeration, please recall Israel’s reaction to the Iranian nuclear program). So, if and when South Korea’s putative nuclear project gets under way, the country will be subjected to the most severe Chinese sanctions. China may go as far as imposing a near total embargo on trade with South Korea. These sanctions will be a crushing blow for the South Korean economy, given that China accounts for nearly 23% of South Korean trade. International and particularly Chinese sanctions will inevitably result in a substantial deterioration in the country’s economic status. We saw something like this, albeit on a modest scale, in 2017, when Seoul allowed the United States to deploy its THAAD missile defense system on its territory and China in response introduced sanctions against South Korean companies. The sanctions were of a limited nature and included a restriction on the travel of Chinese tourists to South Korea and various “unofficial” obstacles for South Korean firms in China. Nevertheless, even this moderate action had a certain impact on the economy and proved a shock for the South Korean public. Eventually, the Moon Jae-in administration made concessions to Beijing. Any large-scale sanctions would cause a full-blown economic crisis and a perceptible drop in living standards. The resultant disaffection would be much greater than what came in the wake of those semi-symbolic moves that were undertaken in response to the THAAD deployment. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of South Koreans do not feel that their country is facing an existential threat or that its very existence is in question. With the exception of the right-wing conservative radicals, the people at large are surprisingly calm and relaxed with regard to the North Korean nuclear program. Seoul is certainly far from pleased with the fact that the neighboring hostile state has developed nuclear weapons, but the majority of South Koreans have no fear. Most of them are absolutely sure that North Korea will under no circumstances use nuclear weapons against its ethnic brothers [siblings]. This certainty may be naïve but it is a political factor in its own right. This means that the ordinary South Korean voters, though theoretically supporting the idea of South Korea as a nuclear power, are not prepared to make considerable sacrifices for the sake of this goal. On the other hand, economic success is the criterion by which the South Korean public assesses the efficiency of any government. The Moon Jae-in administration has to become convinced of this once again as it sees the steady decline of its popularity ratings in the wake of a gradual deterioration in the economy. Therefore, the South Korean electoral reaction to a potential crisis provoked by international and Chinese sanctions would most likely be unequivocal. Outraged by a perceptible slide in living standards, voters would demand an immediate renunciation of the economically damaging and, from their point of view, hardly justified nuclear ambitions. If the ruling party refused to make concessions, its chances of winning the next election would drop to zero. In addition, the South Korean media, though extremely politicized, are not controlled by any single force, being equally divided between the left and right wings. Therefore, the right-wingers, even if they found themselves in a position of power, would hardly be able to carry out a proactive propaganda campaign in favor of the nuclear option. More likely than not, however, things will not go as far as this, since most Korean politicians are aware – or at least feel intuitively – that all attempts to create South Korea’s own nuclear potential are doomed to failure. There is every likelihood that all the talk about nuclear weapons, although reflecting the hidden hopes of many right-wing politicians, is just an additional means for bringing pressure to bear on Washington and the world community, a “soft blackmail” method, if you will. In this way, South Korea wants to elicit a more serious international attitude to the North Korean nuclear issue and is reminding the world that Seoul too can pose problems to the nuclear non-proliferation regime on a par with Pyongyang.

### 1NC - Econ

#### No North Korea collapse - the economy’s sustainable

Kim 21 [Sang Ki Kim 21, 2/1/21, 38north, “The Fallacy of North Korean Collapse,” https://www.38north.org/2021/02/the-fallacy-of-north-korean-collapse/, research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification; and Eun-ju Choi, research fellow at the Sejong Institute, HKR-MK]

In an op-ed in the Washington Post on January 15, 2021, Dr. Victor Cha, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, warned that the United States may confront a military crisis arising from North Korea’s regime instability or its collapse. He argued that the North Korean economy could not survive “for another year or longer” due to existing sanctions and border blockades for quarantine measures, and thus the North Korean government may be tempted to take military actions against external enemies, or it may lose control of its nuclear weapons.

Cha is one of the most influential North Korea analysts in Washington; unfortunately, in this case, his argument is closer to fiction than reality. The inaccuracies and distorted description of North Korea’s situation themselves create risks. Such a view not only makes it more difficult to solve the North Korean nuclear problem, but also might even lead to policy miscalculations, such as a military option. In this article, we rebut Cha’s claim in hopes of providing a more accurate basis for considering diplomatic and policy options.

Flawed Economic Analysis

First, there is almost no possibility that the North Korean economy will collapse. Cha argues that the recent North Korean economy is in a situation “comparable to the Great Famine in the 1990s.” However, the reality is entirely different from his assertion. North Korea experienced a terrible crisis in the years after the end of the Cold War, during which about two million people starved to death despite foreign aid. There were no strong sanctions and a border blockade at that time, but there was mass starvation. On the contrary, recently, starvation is not pervasive in North Korea even with tough economic sanctions and border blockades as far as we know.

Why does this difference exist? The reason is that North Korea has already developed internal conditions for survival with which it can manage to muddle through strong sanctions. Since the early 2010s, the government in Pyongyang has pursued an economic policy of reform and openness to strengthen its survival capacity and resilience. In 2018, its national strategy shifted from a military-first approach to an economy-first one. New economic changes in North Korea encompass a wide range of areas such as facilitating import substitution and domestic production, adopting competitive systems, expanding markets, reforming financial institutions, establishing commercial banks, and promoting science and technology. However, the opening-up policy has been postponed because of strong economic sanctions caused by North Korea’s nuclear program.

In particular, the adoption of both the “socialist corporate responsible management system” and “field responsibility system” has increased production and facilitated distribution in light industry and agriculture. The former grants firms substantive management rights to run business autonomously, and the latter permits individual farmers to be rewarded for their crop yields. As a result of an import substitution policy, the proportion of domestically manufactured products has rapidly increased in markets.

Also, exchange rates and market prices for items such as rice and gasoline have become relatively stable. North Korea has secured internal economic conditions that enable people to have at least three modest meals a day. Comparing the current North Korean economy to the Arduous March in the mid-to-late-1990s is a deeply flawed approach that considers only the magnitude of challenges facing North Korea, ignoring its enhanced ability to cope with them.

Of course, the decline in trade and investment due to sanctions and border blockades poses a major obstacle to North Korea’s economic development. However, North Korea has already secured an internal economic foundation, thanks to which citizens do not starve to death amid intensified sanctions. At the Eighth Congress of the Korean Workers’ Party last month, General Secretary Kim Jong Un admitted that the five-year economic development strategy had fallen short of meeting its goals in almost every category, but this should not be construed as a complete failure of North Korean economy. Besides, the economic recession caused by COVID-19 is a global phenomenon, not just for North Korea.

Under the sanctions regime, it will be difficult for North Korea to achieve economic prosperity through its self-reliance strategy, but it will have no problem in maintaining the status quo or achieving a low level of gradual economic development.[1]

#### No NoKo CBW Impact

Harris 20 [Elisa Harris 20, Distinguished Fellow at Stimson. She has served as a Senior Research Scholar at the Center for International and Security Studies, "North Korea and Biological Weapons: Assessing the Evidence," Stimson Center, 11/06/2020, https://www.stimson.org/2020/north-korea-and-biological-weapons-assessing-the-evidence/. HKR-MK]

Others, however, have offered a definition, most notably the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) investigating Iraq’s biological warfare activities in the early 2000s. Under UNMOVIC’s approach, a biological warfare program requires certain key elements: political will (i.e., a decision to pursue a BW program); basic knowledge of biological warfare agents, including their properties and how to safely test and maintain those properties; infrastructure, including personnel with the requisite technical know-how; delivery and weapons systems; and security and concealment measures for its facilities.46

It is not clear, based on official public information, whether North Korea has all of these elements, particularly the one that is most essential to developing and producing biological warfare agents: the supporting infrastructure and necessary personnel.47 Therefore, by this definition, probably the most that can be said is North Korea may have or have had a biological warfare program.

Program Uncertainty

A second theme is the high degree of uncertainty about exactly what the purported North Korean program entails. This is reflected in the many qualifications used by US government agencies in their public comments on the North Korean program: that the DPRK has built a biological infrastructure that could be used to develop and produce biological warfare agents; that it likely is capable of producing militarily significant quantities of such agents quickly; that its conventional munitions infrastructure could be used to weaponize biological warfare agents; and that North Korea may consider the use of BW as a military option. All but the last of these could be said of any other country with civilian biotechnology and military weapons industries.

Even more uncertainty surrounds what is known, or at least what US government officials are willing to say publicly, about actual North Korean stocks of biological weapons: that North Korea could produce biological warfare agents like anthrax, cholera and plague; that it possibly has weaponized biological warfare agents; and that it may have BW available for use. As noted above, even after more than 30 years, the most that a recent US Army report could say about North Korea’s purported BW activities was that it is highly likely that North Korea has done BW research and that it has possibly produced anthrax or smallpox munitions that could be mounted on missiles targeted at regional adversaries.48 The same uncertainty has been apparent in South Korean government reports for the last 14 years: that North Korea was able or suspected of being able to produce agents such as anthrax, smallpox and cholera.

Inconsistent Assessments and Policy Responses

A third theme that emerges from this review is the lack of consistency in the public assessments of government agencies or between the assessments and actions of governments. In the case of the United States, the most striking inconsistency is in the State Department’s unclassified compliance reports. These have gone from charging North Korea with having a mature, offensive biological warfare program involving the development, production and possible weaponization of biological agents, to focusing for nine years largely on the continued development of North Korea’s biological R&D infrastructure, and then back again to the same accusation from 20 years earlier of biological warfare agent development, production and possible weaponization.

The intelligence community’s written threat assessment testimony on the North Korean BW threat has also shifted significantly over the years, from referring to the DPRK’s legitimate biotechnology infrastructure in 2004, to charging the North with an active biological warfare program, including possible weapons in 2005, to not mentioning the issue at all from 2006 until 2018. Then, after reiterating previous statements concerning the biological warfare potential of North Korea’s biotechnology infrastructure, nothing further was said on the subject in 2019, the last year threat assessment testimony was provided to Congress.

In the case of the South Korean government, there has been a lack of consistency both in its public reports and between those reports and its actions. Regarding the former, South Korea has gone from accusing North Korea of maintaining BW facilities and stocks to referring only to agents that North Korea is able or suspected of being able to develop and produce. This seeming shift in South Korea’s assessment may help to explain the government’s failure to procure anthrax or other vaccines to protect its military personnel and civilian population, despite earlier claims regarding North Korea’s biological warfare capabilities.49

Interagency Differences

A fourth theme that emerges from this review is that of conflicting assessments between government agencies. As noted above, after some 12 years of not mentioning the North Korean biological weapons issue in its threat assessment testimony to Congress, in 2018, the DNI reiterated earlier statements regarding the ability of North Korea’s biotechnology infrastructure to support a biological warfare program. The DNI then said nothing about North Korea in 2019, even as the State Department was again charging the North with developing, producing and possibly weaponizing biological warfare agents.

Fragmentary Intelligence Information

The 2019 State Department report also points to a final theme, and one that likely helps explain the previous four: the fragmented insight the US government has into North Korea’s biological warfare capabilities and intentions. As is well known, BW development and production activities are among the most challenging intelligence collection targets, given that much of the equipment and materials can be used for both civilian and military purposes. And any available intelligence has been even more highly compartmented, i.e., controlled, within the US government, in the decade and a half since the Iraqi WMD intelligence debacle.

Moreover, the availability of modern equipment, such as the fermenters seen at a new biopesticide facility shown on North Korean television in June 2015,50 or training in handling microorganisms, including using biotechnology,51 does not translate directly into an ability to produce biological warfare agents successfully. As Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley has pointed out, personnel must be able to adapt from industrial to military-related work. This requires not only scientific expertise but also a stable, continuously resourced work environment.52 Given the closed nature of North Korean society, both internally and to the outside world, it is unlikely that the US or South Korean governments would know without highly credible sources on the ground whether the North has given BW this degree of priority.53

In the final analysis, North Korea may once have had an interest in acquiring BW and may indeed still be pursuing what in 2012 DOD called a potentially robust capability, possibly including the use of biotechnology to develop new types of BW agents. DOD’s vaccination decisions, as well as its programs to enhance both its own and South Korea’s ability to detect and identify a covert or other biological attack, can certainly be viewed as supporting that conclusion.

It is also possible that North Korea never moved beyond an early stage of BW activities, perhaps involving R&D on traditional agents like anthrax, together with the establishment of a biotechnical infrastructure that could be diverted to biological warfare agent production in the event of imminent hostilities.54

Finally, it is possible that, as in the case of Libya, the North Korean program never moved beyond initial planning, or like Iraq, the North’s program, whatever its previous nature, has essentially ended. But one thing seems clear: Nothing in the official public record to date indicates that North Korea has an advanced BW program, notwithstanding media reports to the contrary.

#### Reunification wrecks Korea's economy - humanitarian crises, conflict, and intervention

Lind 15 [Jennefer Lind, 02-23-2015, The Perils of Korean Unification, The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2015/02/the-perils-of-korean-unification/ HKR-MK]

While unification “bulls” expect a bonanza, unification “bears” warn about the costs and challenges of lifting the North up to the South’s level. A 2013 ROK Ministry of Finance report calculated that the cost of unification could run as high as 7 percent of GDP (about $80 billion) for a decade. More recently, South Korea’s Financial Services Commission estimated the cost at $500 billion over a 20-year period. The Economist dismissed this as “optimistically low.” It argued that raising up the North to Southern standards “without massive internal migration southwards or post-unity civil chaos is likely to cost far more than $500 billion, and most of this will fall on Southern taxpayers for decades.”

The Dangers of Transition

But aside from bulls and bears, there’s an 800-pound gorilla in the room: the great uncertainty of the transition period. Aidan Foster-Carter cautions that discussions of a unification bonanza tend to start with the assumption of a peaceful, negotiated transition. But the road to unification could, of course, be far messier, and could include a humanitarian disaster, a refugee crisis, civil war, and loose nukes.

The way that the Koreas unify will have profound effects on the country’s future economic success and political stability. Analysts of Korean unification have long discussed “soft” versus “hard” landings.” Regarding the former, unification might indeed occur peacefully, through a negotiated settlement and an orderly transition (which avoids an anarchic, unstable period in which authority is contested). This was the fortunate end to German division, and this would be the most orderly, least dangerous way for the Koreas to unite — and the quickest way for a unified Korea to realize an economic bonanza.

But unification might also occur through the collapse of the North Korean government — perhaps during an interstate war, or in the midst of a power struggle or civil war in the North. In contrast to a negotiated settlement, collapse scenarios could be extremely dangerous.

RAND political scientist Bruce Bennett and I modeled one collapse scenario, seeking to estimate the force requirements for military operations to stabilize a post-collapse North Korea. In our study we adopted self-consciously optimistic assumptions: for example, that the North Korean military and people would accept and cooperate with a stabilization effort. We made this assumption in order to generate force requirements in a best-case scenario — with the implication that the demands of stabilization could be far higher. (Bennett and I previously discussed our study with 38 North.)

In the wake of a North Korean regime collapse, instability could take a variety of forms. If government-provided food and health services were to cease, the result could be a humanitarian disaster fraught with hunger and disease. Militias or gangs could seize the country’s numerous weapons caches, and could prey on the population or fight for territory. Hunger and insecurity could lead people to flee to China or South Korea for safety. And don’t forget North Korea’s arsenal of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Assembled atomic bombs, fissile material, pathogens, and toxic chemicals could disappear across international borders.

If such instability were to occur, South Korea and other countries may decide to send military forces into North Korea to perform stability operations. In the scenario we examined, such operations might include direct humanitarian relief and policing of major cities and roads, border control, elimination of WMD, conventional weapons disarmament, and operations to deter or defeat pockets of violent resistance.

### 1NC – Gendered Violence

#### Migration can’t solve---multiple warrants---Soko infrastructure can’t sustain, psychological adaptation is excruciatingly difficult, trauma-induced vulnerability prevents assimilation, and deeply entrenched Soko prejudices turn the advantage

Fahy 15 [(Sandra, Sandra Fahy is Assistant Professor of Anthropology in the Faculty of Liberal Arts at Sophia University in Tokyo. The author was a Korea Foundation–Mansfield Foundation U.S.-Korea Nexus Scholar in 2013–14. Her first book is titled Marching through Suffering: Loss and Survival in North Korea) “Internal Migration in North Korea:: Preparation for Governmental Disruption”, National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), July 2015, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/24905072.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A0079a34aa12eabab2e7402d63ffcdb9c&ab_segments=&origin=&acceptTC=1>] kzheng

If South Korea were to welcome North Korean migrants, current social policies and practices would struggle to manage the deluge of even several thousand newcomers. Not only could the practical needs of new settlers not be met, but newcomers themselves would struggle to adapt. “Mass” refugee flows are identified as anything above 10,000 people.29 Arguably, South Korea has already experienced mass migration from North Korea, with the number of defectors reaching 27,000 in total, but never all at once. Instead the movement has been gradual, slowly increasing with a few dips over the years. If the South were to receive that number of refugees in one year alone, however, there would be huge difficulties. The ROK is already undergoing challenges in its efforts to help North Korean refugees adapt to life outside the North, as studies on psychological issues, the adaption rate, and the opinions of North Koreans indicate.30 The problems of adaption to South Korean society indicate greater vulnerability and sensitivity to crime and violence within South Korea, along with higher instances of depression and isolation.31 Contemporary South Korean media overrepresents North Koreans in reportage of crime and is growing indifferent or unfriendly to defectors.32

#### Can’t solve influx of migrations in Soko---plan gets circumvented absent migration management

Fahy 15 [(Sandra, Sandra Fahy is Assistant Professor of Anthropology in the Faculty of Liberal Arts at Sophia University in Tokyo. The author was a Korea Foundation–Mansfield Foundation U.S.-Korea Nexus Scholar in 2013–14. Her first book is titled Marching through Suffering: Loss and Survival in North Korea) “Internal Migration in North Korea:: Preparation for Governmental Disruption”, National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), July 2015, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/24905072.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A0079a34aa12eabab2e7402d63ffcdb9c&ab_segments=&origin=&acceptTC=1>] kzheng

The scenario, whether sudden, gradual, or driven by a coup d’état, will result in different migration patterns over time from differing regions of North Korea. Estimates for outward migration have ranged from 300,000 in a few months, to several million in the first year. In short, there is no doubt that migrants will exit, and if permitted unfettered migration to South Korea, China, and Russia, they will overwhelm these nations’ social systems. All the calculations demonstrate a certainty that neighboring countries cannot accept an uncontrolled flow of newcomers because of the knock-on effects to socioeconomic, political, and humanitarian equilibrium; North Korean out-migration must invariably be managed and regulated. If estimates of refugee flows are correct, this does not reduce the concerns of internal migration but rather raises this issue further because neighboring countries are unlikely to take in more people than they can manage. The majority of North Koreans will remain in the DPRK and likely migrate within North Korea itself. If the government is dissolved, this migration will be far from peaceful and uncomplicated. Instead, it will place huge portions of the population in jeopardy as they seek access to food, health services, and information.

#### Plan does nothing to solve lack of resources, empower female voice, or wholly address sexual violence on the peninsula — at worse this means they shouldn’t be able to weigh marginal offense they garner vs. [neg offense]

JeongAe 19 [(Ahn-Kim JeongAe is a member of the Presidential Truth Commission on Deaths in the Military (South Korea) and was representative of Women Making Peace, founded in South Korea in March 1997 as a women’s peace movement organization) “Women Making Peace in Korea: The DMZ Ecofeminist Farm Project”, Social Justice, 2019, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26873838>] kzheng

From the division of Korea and the Korean War to the present state of perpetual warfare, countless women have become casualties and victims of war, militarism, and patriarchy: as war widows, as refugees from North Korea often separated from their families, as survivors of mass executions before and after the war, as sex workers around US military bases, and as women scattered in the Korean diaspora. For the women of Korea, peace means having full control of our lives, being at one with the land, and never again ending up as victims. At Women Making Peace, we envision peace on the Korean Peninsula as follows: 1. No war. Peaceful coexistence without nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction; 2. Peaceful coexistence as a win-win model grounded in respect for land and nature; 3. Freedom from foreign intervention; 4. Korean women’s initiatives and participation in the peace process—following principles of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security—from the kitchen table to the negotiating table; 5. Freedom from patriarchy, male supremacy, and militarism; 6. Gender equality in all aspects of society, politics, economy, and culture; 7. Safety for women from sexual violence; and 8. Women’s economic self-sufficiency and independence.

#### Moral equality means even a small risk of preventing extinction outweighs structural violence – future generations

Bostrom 12 [(Nick, director of the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford, recipient of the 2009 Gannon Award) “We're Underestimating the Risk of Human Extinction”, Interview with Ross Andersen, freelance writer in D.C., <http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/were-underestimating-the-risk-of-human-extinction/253821/>] kzheng

Ross Anderson**:** Some have argued that we ought to be directing our resources toward humanity's existing problems, rather than future existential risks, because many of the latter are highly improbable. You have responded by suggesting that existential risk mitigation may in fact be a dominant moral priority over the alleviation of present suffering. Can you explain why?

Nick Bostrom**:**Well suppose you have a moral view that counts future people as being worth as much as present people. You might say that fundamentally it doesn't matter whether someone exists at the current time or at some future time, just as many people think that from a fundamental moral point of view, it doesn't matter where somebody is spatially---somebody isn't automatically worth less because you move them to the moon or to Africa or something. A human life is a human life. If you have that moral point of view that future generations matter in proportion to their population numbers, then you get this very stark implication that existential risk mitigation has a much higher utility than pretty much anything else that you could do. There are so many people that could come into existence in the future if humanity survives this critical period of time---we might live for billions of years, our descendants might colonize billions of solar systems, and there could be billions and billions times more people than exist currently. Therefore, even a very small reduction in the probability of realizing this enormous good will tend to outweigh even immense benefits like eliminating poverty or curing malaria, which would be tremendous under ordinary standards.

### 1NC – Solvency

#### Reunification fails - normalization solves

Mueller 20 [John Mueller, 6/22/20, "Nuclear Anti‐​Proliferation Policy and the Korea Conundrum: Some Policy Proposals," https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/nuclear-anti-proliferation-policy-korea-conundrum-some-policy, political scientist at Ohio State University and a senior fellow at the Cato Institute HKR-MK]

This does not mean that unification is in the offing. The economic and cultural divergence of the two Koreas over the last seven decades has been extensive, and the notion that they could or should be unified any time soon is at best romantic and at worst dangerous. The unification of the two Germanys was a remarkably difficult and costly process even though those two countries were far less different from each other than the two Koreas have grown to be. A better model might be found in the peaceful and mutually advantageous coexistence of Germany and Austria — two separate countries that share a common language, history, and cultural heritage. It is very sensible for South Korea to expand economic and social contacts with North Korea, and to seek family reunifications. But a conscious drive for unification in the near future would be unwise for the South and threatening to the North.

## 1NC – Prolif Good

### Japan

#### Japan prolif solves- AND- conventional militarization is a bigger internal link to their impacts

Pickar, 16 [Joshua, "Japan's Defensive Constitution: Nuclear Weapons as a Better Alternative than Expanding Collective Self-Defense," International Immersion Program Papers, 2016, https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1025&context=international\_immersion\_program\_papers, University of Chicago Law School, JD 2017, accessed 6-7-20]

Not only would defensive nuclear weapons be normatively preferable to Japan as compared to collective self-defense forces because defensive nuclear weapons will stabilize the region, but they are also preferable because they will calm citizens’ fears of Japan becoming an international aggressor through an expanded military. As explored above, a large proportion of Japanese citizens believe that Japan should exercise its right to self-defense to a limited extent.11' However, the citizenry fears that collective self-defense forces would allow Japan to revert to the international aggressor it was during World War II, as the government could send troops anywhere in the world without public input, straying away from Japan’s pacifist disposition.114 Given the strong public backlash against Prime Minister Abe’s unilateral reinterpretation of the Constitution,111 defensive nuclear proliferation could both provide the collective defense that the Prime Minister desires, while responding to the cries of pacifism from the citizenry. According to CNN, “Opponents of the legislation say seven decades of Japanese postwar pacifism are simply being tossed away without proper public debate or discourse. [They] worry about the consequences of potentially sending troops into battle without actual combat experience.”1\*' Proliferation solves these dual concerns: (1) abandoning Japan’s pacifist foreign policy and (2) a lack of military preparedness. Defensive nuclear weapons present a more pacifist, deterrence-based policy than collective self-defense forces.

Japan certainly retains a right to self-defense.11 However, Japan’s Constitution prohibits the government from maintaining ground forces; in fact, it is unclear whether it would even be constitutional for a citizen’s militia to form were an attack to occur.1 lK Many scholars argue that the national right of self-defense emanates from Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.159 As Article 51 states, “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs ... until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”160 Japan’s continued self-defense policies are important, but they must take into account the citizens’ clear cries for pacifism.

A major concern for those opposing Japanese proliferation is that proliferation is not pacifist. Yet, “pacifism,” as a concept, exists along a spectrum. Some argue that Japan would never opt to obtain nuclear weapons because of Japanese reticence towards nuclear power after the Fukushima disaster and because the U.S. opposes Japanese acquisition of nuclear weapons.161 And some reiterate that Japan is the only country to experience a nuclear attack, and the fallout of that attack is still ingrained in the minds of its citizens.162 In any case, the better solution is to view nuclear proliferation as a compromise between the government’s proposal and the citizens’ cries— nuclear proliferation may not be wholly pacifist but, as discussed below, it is more pacifist than collective self-defense forces and, therefore, is an option more true to Japan’s pacifist ethos.

Not unsurprisingly, a large source of the anger toward Prime Minister Abe is from the Japanese citizens of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—the only two cities in the world to have actually felt the power and fallout of a nuclear attack.163 Former Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama stands by the citizens of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in their aversion to nuclear weapons: “Those in Hiroshima and Nagasaki suffered the first atomic bombs. People know these things well—that is why we made a vow that we will not repeat the same mistake.”164 The historical memory of those living where the attacks occurred is a concern in advocating for the acquisition of nuclear weapons. But by acquiring exclusively defensive nuclear weapons, Japan will ensure that such an experience never occurs again, instead of leaving itself defenseless, as it currendy stands.

While on their face nuclear weapons may not appear pacifist, the acquisition of nuclear weapons can cohere with a pacifist policy. Black’s Law Dictionary defines pacifism as “The advocacy of peaceful methods rather than war as a means of solving disputes.”163 Further, Black’s acknowledges that the concept of “armed peace” is possible as “a situation in which two or more countries, while at peace, are actually armed for possible or probable hostilities.”166 While not pacifist by nature, defensive nuclear weapons are consistent with Japan’s pacifistic objectives, where (1) all attempts are made to solve conflicts peaceably first; and (2) weapons are employed only to defend oneself from another state’s aggression. Whereas collective self-defense forces retain the ability to travel anywhere in the world and affirmatively launch invasions, defensive nuclear weapons are exclusively responsive, and can only ensure Japan’s continue security without the possibility of undertaking an expansionist regime. The keystone of Japan’s foreign policy will be deterrence, and history has demonstrated that defensive nuclear weapons further this goal.

Importantly, the idea of acquiring nuclear weapons under the constraints of Article 9 is not novel. As early as 1965, only two decades after the drafting of the Constitution, the CLB determined that the possession of nuclear weapons would not run counter to the prohibition against war potential under Article 9.'67 Further, “Successive administrations have reinforced the CLB interpretation by consistently declaring that Article [9] does not prohibit the possession of nuclear weapons,” reminding that the distinction between defensive and offensive nuclear weapons remains relevant to an analysis of the prohibitions under Article 9.I6K

A further problem for Japan in creating collective security forces as compared to nuclear weapons is the cost. The price to refurbish an existing nuclear weapon would be approximately S2 million, while Japan spends upwards of $4 billion per year on maintenance of U.S. bases and the SDF.169 This figure would only expand were Japan to engage in collective security. This fiscal concern should lead both the U.S. and Japan to seriously consider proliferation of defensive nuclear weapons as a viable alternative. Therefore, both in terms of finances and popular support, Japan should acquire defensive nuclear weapons as opposed to creating collective self-defense forces.

d. Japanese Acquisition of Defensive Nuclear Weapons Is in the United States’s Geopolitical Interest

Given that the U.S. provides for Japan’s defense, and this is costly for the U.S., it would be in the U.S.’s international political interest to find a way to disentangle itself from Japan’s security so that it can save money while ensuring Japan’s continued economic and political success. Recently, Japan sought to cut spending on U.S. military bases in Japan to lower government expenditures.170 Concurrently, there are strong domestic pressures in the U.S. counseling government to cut defense spending.1 1 While the U.S. does not spend an exorbitant amount of money in absolute terms (some $526.8 million in 2014) the spending is used in the operation of its bases in Japan, particularly in Okinawa.1 2 There is also strong Japanese resistance to the continued maintenance of the U.S. base in Okinawa.173

While reduction in spending is certainly a motivating factor for an American acceptance of Japanese proliferation, so too should the U.S. feel comfortable in this decision, because it will help disentangle the U.S. from contentious disputes in Asia. Given that the U.S. provides for Japan’s defense, Japan may be constrained in its foreign policy.174 This means that the U.S. has a strong interest in Japan’s geopolitical strategy, but also that the U.S. feels compelled not to allow Japan to act against the U.S.’s interests regarding other nations. For example, while the U.S. currently takes a neutral approach to its interactions with Taiwan,1 1 a politically independent Japan with deterrent capabilities could negotiate with China to change the geopolitical arrangements of East Asia. Another situation where the U.S. would benefit from Japanese autonomy would be in the aforementioned disputes over islands in the South and East China Seas.176 Presumably, the U.S. does not want to become entangled in long-term negotiations regarding the geographic boundaries of Asian nations under UNCLOS in which the U.S. lacks any stake, fearing that the world community would view decisions taken by Japanese leadership as attributable to the United States. Therefore, by allowing Japanese proliferation, the U.S. would empower Japan to engage in negotiations, without the U.S. having to fend off Japan’s adversaries. Ultimately, allowing Japanese proliferation is in the best interest of the United States, both permitting a reduction in U.S. military spending, and empowering Japan to make its own foreign policy decisions without deep U.S. entrenchment.

IV. CONCLUSION

Where the Japanese government fears for its safety and the Japanese public clings to its pacifist roots, we see an interesting and pressing dilemma. Proliferation of defensive nuclear weapons will be the most effective means for Japan to quell its fears under the security dilemma, while simultaneously responding to the unease expressed by the Japanese populace of a full military armament, because it will provide security while encouraging pacifism—understanding the aversion to a large standing collective self-defense force, albeit still defensive in orientation. Moreover, the U.S. will see this solution as favorable, as it will allow the U.S. to reduce defense spending in attempts to demonstrate to the international community that the future will entail a less interventionist foreign policy after the disasters in the Middle East of the early twenty-first century. Additionally, nuclear weapons will stabilize East Asia, as Japan will balance China’s power in negotiations on hot issues, such as the Senkaku/Daiyou Island dispute in the East China Sea.1

Even those who find this argument normatively preferable may question the feasibility of such an arrangement, citing the strong international norms against proliferation and many regimes’ stated goals of “nuclear zero.”1 K While nuclear zero may be an aspirational ideal, it is not in many states’ best interest, as governments often take for granted the fact that nuclear weapons have provided international stability for decades.179 Nuclear zero is also unfeasible, because states cannot “un-learn” how to produce nuclear weapons; the best that nuclear zero would do is extend a country’s breakout time before being able to launch an attack.Is,> To that end, the whole rationale behind nuclear weapons—providing long-term, deterrent stability because other countries know that you have the capacity to attack—would be undermined in a nuclear zero world.

Consequently, given that nuclear weapons already exist, the best option is to use them for stability, not to ban them with the hopes that everyone will abide by the ban. If the Japanese were to acquire nuclear weapons, it would ease the government’s security dilemma without inciting the massive backlash that expanded collective self-defense forces would provoke. Not only is this a good option for Japan, but it is also in the U.S.’s strategic interest, as it could save large sums of money on defense spending and disentangle the U.S. from contentious disputes in Asia. This proposed solution is feasible, practical, and respects the complicated history and adherence toward pacifism of the Japanese people. Finally, despite the fact that acquisition of defensive nuclear weapons may violate international law, it is in many states’ best interest to allow Japanese proliferation, and these states should quickly acquiesce to a Japanese nuclear acquisition.

#### Solves NoKo

Carpenter, 17 [Ted Galen, "The North Korea Crisis Proves Why Japan and South Korea Need Nuclear Weapons," National Interest, 9-5-2017, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/the-north-korea-crisis-proves-why-japan-south-korea-need-22171, National Interest contributing editor accessed 6-7-2020]

However, while such direct deterrence remains quite credible, there is always the danger of a miscalculation. The development of a robust North Korean nuclear arsenal and delivery system also significantly erodes the credibility of extended deterrence—Washington’s commitment to risk nuclear war to protect such allies as Japan and South Korea. A bold North Korean leader might very well wonder whether U.S. leaders would really chance the destruction of American cities to protect third parties, even valued allies.

The credibility dilemma of extended deterrence often troubled Washington’s European allies during the Cold War, and was a key reason why NATO members sought not only multiple assurances but the presence of U.S. troops as a tripwire to guarantee that the United States would honor its commitment if Moscow challenged it. The East Asian allies now face a similar problem involving a far more unpredictable adversary.

Various analysts have argued recently that the United States must climb down from its long-standing demand that North Korea abandon its nuclear and missile ambitions. Instead, they advocate moving to a new policy based on negotiations, containment and deterrence. Such proposals are more realistic than the current bankrupt approach insisting that Pyongyang return to nuclear virginity, and they are far more prudent than reckless suggestions that the United States consider launching a preemptive conventional or nuclear attack.

However, they still contain the central defect of retaining America’s role as the lead player in trying to contain and deter Pyongyang. Washington’s chief objective instead should be to reduce America’s risk exposure in Northeast Asia’s increasingly dangerous strategic environment.

That means recognizing the reality that primary deterrence has greater credibility than extended deterrence. In other words, it is time for North Korea’s neighbors to acquire their own nuclear deterrents, with America’s blessing. Unfortunately, too many American officials, political figures and pundits believe that all forms of nuclear proliferation are equally bad. That is not true, and in any case, nuclear proliferation is already far advanced in Northeast Asia. When China, governed by a dictatorial regime, and North Korea, a bizarre communist monarchy, already have nuclear weapons, it is misplaced to fret about stable, status quo–oriented democracies such as South Korea and Japan possessing modest nuclear deterrents.

Moving to empower Tokyo and Seoul in that fashion is necessary to credibly deter North Korea over the coming decades. During the 2016 presidential election campaign, Donald Trump indicated that he would not necessarily object to Japan and South Korea acquiring independent nuclear arsenals. He should return to that position. A doctrine of mutually assured destruction between North Korea and its noncommunist neighbors, along the same lines as the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, is hardly an optimal solution. But it beats having America continue being on the front lines of a potentially catastrophic confrontation. It is time to offload that risk to the countries that have the most at stake in deterring North Korea.

#### Solves all Asian war

Corr, 17 -- Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University

[Anders Corr, worked in military intelligence for five years, including on nuclear weapons,, "Japan: Go Nuclear Now," Forbes, 1-31-2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2017/01/31/japan-go-nuclear-now/#555972517745, accessed 6-8-2020]

Japan needs nuclear weapons. Surrounded by authoritarian threats, including Russia, China, and China’s close ally, North Korea, Japan would make all democracies safer by protecting itself with a nuclear weapon. A stronger Japan will check China’s expansion and free U.S. military resources for deployment elsewhere.

Russian and Chinese nuclear-capable forces surround Japan with threatening patrols that ring the country by air and sea. Over the last nine months through December, the Japanese air force was forced to scramble jets against mostly Chinese, but also Russian, air incursions a record 883 times. North Korea regularly threatens Japan and its allies with lurid language of nuclear attacks and storms of fire. Dozens of North Korean missile tests took place near Japan over the last couple years, with some hitting Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). North Korea has even threatened a nuclear attack on U.S. bases in Japan. It is time for Japan to say, enough. To protect itself, Japan needs to go nuclear now.

Japan supposedly enjoys protection from an American “nuclear umbrella”. But Japanese leaders are unsure that the U.S. would come to its defense in a major war, much less a nuclear war. Russian, Chinese, and possibly even North Korean missiles can deliver nuclear weapons to the U.S., its territories, and its military bases in Asia. North Korea could even put a nuclear weapon in a cargo container and ship it to a U.S. mainland port. In defense of Japan, would the U.S. really strike a major conventional or even nuclear blow against the military forces of one of these authoritarian states, and thereby risk a cold-hearted nuclear counter-attack against Honolulu, San Francisco, New York, or Washington, DC? Such a counter-attack could destroy the U.S. economy for decades, cause a fiscal crisis that would mean decreased military expenditures and military retreat from U.S. forward-deployed positions, and kill millions of Americans.

Military and diplomatic analysts in Japan are increasingly unsure that Washington would take this risk after Japan itself may have suffered a conventional or nuclear blow that devastates its military strength as an ally. If Japan questions the willingness of the U.S. to counterstrike a nuclear-armed adversary, then Russia, China, and North Korea are likely questioning Washington’s commitment as well. They may see the current lack of commitment as an opportunity for a preemptive conventional or nuclear strike against Japan’s military. This is not a safe position for any country to be in, especially a country like Japan whose military forces are daily threatened by the aggressive nuclear and other brinkmanship of these same adversaries.

Because Russia, China, and North Korea may perceive a lack of U.S. commitment, Japan needs an iron-clad nuclear deterrent force. There is no better such deterrent than one that Japan would own and control itself, coupled with a public announcement to reserve the option of using that deterrent force against any state that attacks it or infringes its sovereignty. This is a far stronger and more reliable nuclear deterrent than the current U.S. umbrella.

Some have argued that a Japanese nuclear weapon would cause China or North Korea to attack Japan militarily. They are wrong. Once Japan goes nuclear, China and North Korea cannot attack without factoring in the risk of a devastating nuclear counter-blow. A Japanese nuclear deterrent would also decrease worries in Japan that China dominates the upper rungs of the escalation ladder theorized by Herman Kahn. Japan’s conventional military, combined with an indigenous nuclear deterrent and its strong U.S. alliance, would thereby have far more latitude to stop Chinese, Russian, and North Korean attacks and blustering.

### SoKo

#### South Korean prolif leads to stability – deterrence, negotiation, integrity

**Ahn and Cho 14** (Mun Suk Ahn, Chonbuk National University. Young Chul Cho, Leiden University. "A nuclear South Korea?," International Journal March 2014 vol. 69 no. 1 26-34. Sage, D: 6/1/15, MT)

Because South Korean conservatives are separated into various constituencies, their arguments in support of nuclear armament vary as well. According to Scott Sagan, nuclear proliferation cases can be explained using three theoretical frameworks: the security model, the domestic politics model, and the symbol/norms model. The first attributes nuclear armament to security concerns, the second to domestic bureaucratic politics, and the third to national pride and prestige.4 South Korean conservatives’ arguments tend to fall into the first and third categories. First, some advocates of South Korean nuclear possession hold that it is impossible for South Korea to defend itself against an attack from the nuclear-armed North without nuclear weapons. They cite the sinking of the corvette Cheonan and the Yeonpyeong Island attack in 2010. Cho Gap-je, a conservative journalist, contends that a non-nuclear South Korea is utterly exposed to attacks from the nuclear North, making the South militarily subordinate to its enemy.5 Even though proponents of this argument seldom mention the probability that the North will use nuclear weapons to attack South Korea, they are concerned that nuclear North Korea is free to make provocations and thus assume the hegemony in North–South relations. This argument holds the greatest appeal for the South Korean public, both logically and emotionally. Second, some support the South’s nuclear armament as leverage vis-à-vis North Korea and China. They stand by the negotiation model that emphasizes a nuclear state’s ability to bring the power of nuclear warheads to the negotiating table. Kim Dae-joong, a newspaper columnist, argues that the North’s nuclear disarmament can be achieved only in a situation of nuclear balance between the two Koreas.6 At the same time, some conservative politicians and activists argue that South Korean nuclear weapons, or attempts to go nuclear, will force China to put more pressure on North Korea to give up its nuclear program. Third, some defend a nuclear South Korea in the belief that going nuclear will heighten the country’s national prestige and reinforce its sovereignty. South Korea’s successful economic development and political transition to democracy have contributed to a greater assertiveness. This faction works within the symbol framework, envisioning nuclear capabilities as a potent symbol of state power. When then foreign minister Ryu Myung-hwan said in May 2009, “We need to discuss nuclear sovereignty seriously,” he was deliberately heightening the ambivalence between military armament and peaceful nuclear sovereignty at a time when South Koreans were debating their response to the second North Korean nuclear test.7 Proponents of the sovereignty case hold that South Korea will restore the integrity of its sovereignty only when it obtains nuclear parity with North Korea.

#### SoKo prolif solves deterrence and encourages China to check NoKo

Bandow 17 [Doug Bandow a senior fellow at the Cato Institute 2017 and a former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan – “It’s Time for America to Cut South Korea Loose,” Cato Institute, April 13, 2017, https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/its-time-america-cut-south-korea-loose]

But even if South Korea couldn’t defend itself, the argument would still fall short. American soldiers shouldn’t be treated as defenders of the earth, deployed here, there, and everywhere. The United States should go to war only when its most important interests are at stake. ///// South Korea’s prosperity is not one of those vital interests, at least in security terms. A renewed conflict confined to the two Koreas would be horrific, but the consequences for the United States would be primarily humanitarian and economic, not security. The cost would be high but fall primarily on the region. In contrast, direct U.S. involvement in another Korean War would be much more expensive than the Afghan and Iraqi conflicts, which have cost America thousands of lives and trillions of dollars. ///// Of course, the North’s possession of what we assume to be a growing and at some point deliverable nuclear arsenal skews the peninsula’s balance of power. However, this doesn’t create a need for a conventional American military presence on the peninsula. Washington could still guarantee massive retaliation against any North Korean use of nuclear weapons, providing a deterrent against the North’s threats. **/////** But it is worth contemplating whether it would be better to allow South Korea to construct its own deterrent. In the late 1970s, South Korean President Park Chung‐​hee worried about Washington’s reliability and began work on a Korean bomb — only to stop under U.S. pressure. Since then, support for reviving such work has periodically surfaced in South Korea. Encouraging such efforts might actually be in the best interests of the United States, even if America has to maintain its nuclear umbrella while the Korean bomb is developed. ///// Yes, encouraging nuclear proliferation is a risky path. But the United States would gain from staying out of Northeast Asia’s nuclear quarrels. China, fearful that Japan would join the nuclear parade, might take tougher action against Pyongyang in an attempt to forestall Seoul’s efforts. The South could feel confident in its own defense, rather than remaining reliant upon U.S. willingness to act

### EA

#### Allied East Asian prolif good – stabilizes the region by moderating Chinese and North Korean aggression AND averts otherwise inevitable US draw in

Bandow ’20[Doug Bandow, “America Can’t Contain China, but Maybe Proliferation Can,” CATO, July 28, 2020, https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/america-cant-contain-china-maybe-proliferation-can, senior fellow at the Cato Institute]

The COVID-19 crisis accelerated the confrontation between the U.S. and People’s Republic of China. So far the challenge is more economic and political than military, though the U.S. Navy recently sent two aircraft carriers into the South China Sea in an attempt to intimidate Beijing. The PRC, however, hopes to develop anti‐​access/​area denial capabilities to prevent America from using such vessels in the future to coerce China in its own neighborhood.

Washington continues to possess the larger and more capable armed forces. But present doctrine, which presumes that America will continue to dominate every nation on every continent, no longer is realistic. The cost of extending military power is far greater than that of deterring intervention. America was running a trillion‐​dollar annual deficit before COVID-19. Now that number should exceed $4 trillion in 2020. Next year the deficit will be over $2 trillion, and perhaps much more after Congress approves a third bailout. Washington must set priorities.

The simplest and smartest strategy would be to expect allied and friendly states in the region to create their own deterrent forces. The PRC is surrounded by countries with which it has been at war: Russia, India, Vietnam, Korea, and Japan. All but the first are at least friendly to Washington, sharing its concern over Beijing’s ambitions. And rapprochement by the U.S. to Moscow could dampen the latter’s burgeoning partnership with the People’s Republic of China.

Moreover, East Asia is filled with states capable of constraining Chinese adventurism. Japan has assembled capable armed forces, called a “self‐​defense force” for constitutional purposes, despite limiting military expenditures to 1 percent of GDP. South Korea could handle defense against North Korea and contribute to regional security. Australia and Singapore possess competent militaries. Indonesia and Vietnam have significant potential. Even before India’s recent border flare‐​up with China, New Delhi was increasing its regional involvement, also promoting a peaceful balance of power.

There is one further step the U.S. should take, however, to encourage greater regional capabilities. Reconsider Washington’s commitment to nonproliferation.

Admittedly, such a change would send shock waves through Washington’s foreign policy‐​making community. And it would be a dramatic change. Yet today’s policy, reflexively backed by liberal internationalists and conservative war hawks alike, should be viewed suspiciously.

Proliferation creates additional risks for conflict and leakage, both of which could prove dangerous. Yet the nuclear age is more than 75 years old and has proved to be remarkably stable. No country has used nuclear weapons since World War II, no nuclear powers have gone to war against each other, despite persistent concern over India and Pakistan, and no great power has attacked another great power or a weaker state that possessed nukes, despite occasional threats, such as by Washington against North Korea. This result is evidence of the stabilizing impact of nuclear weapons.

Still, the U.S. might reasonably prefer to resist proliferation, except for the problem of extended deterrence. That is, many if not most of America’s allies expect the U.S. to risk its homeland on their behalf. Which in most cases makes no strategic sense for America. Few of these relationships warrant taking that kind of risk.

During the Cold War, Washington’s nuclear guarantee for Europe had some credibility. War‐​ravaged Europe was vulnerable to the victorious Red Army. Moreover, Soviet domination of Eurasia would present America with a threatening international environment. The U.S. had intervened in Europe twice in little more than two decades to prevent a hegemonic power from conquering that continent and left a garrison to defend its allies at the second conflict’s end. To thereafter test the U.S. would entail unacceptable risks for the Soviet Union, which had no compelling reason to invade its distant neighbors.

But none of these factors apply today. The Europeans are well able to arm themselves. Russia is not poised for European let alone global dominion. The PRC cannot easily dominate Asia, let alone Eurasia. The Korean peninsula has lost much of its strategic significance for America — it no longer fits within a larger global struggle, such as the Cold War. The stakes simply are not worth the potential destruction of American cities.

Still, it is in Washington’s interest to preserve the independence and freedom of China’s neighbors, which individually look small compared to the emerging colossus. If the U.S. is not prepared to guarantee nuclear deterrence for others, then it could stop objecting to proposals that they develop their own arsenals.

Current policy has perverse consequences. Rather like gun control, it ensures that only bad guys in East Asia are armed: North Korea, China, and Russia. In response, Washington has put the American homeland at risk in confronting all three. Yet friendly states are interested in developing countervailing nuclear arsenals.

For instance, polls indicate that a majority of South Koreans favor creating their own deterrent. The political class, including President Moon Jae‐​in, is less enthused, but the DPRK’s continued development of its arsenal might shift opinions. The issue is more difficult for Japan, but in his prior premiership Prime Minister Shinzo Abe seemed open to the idea. Abe already has pushed to increase Tokyo’s military role in response to a growing threat from both China and North Korea. And if the ROK moved to develop nukes, Tokyo would be forced to debate the issue.

Other possible nuclear states are Taiwan and Australia. The former genuinely needs nukes, though acquiring nuclear weapons would dramatically exacerbate tensions with the PRC. Beijing would be tempted to preempt any Taiwanese attempt to exercise the nuclear option. Direct transfer from the U.S. would be an admittedly highly controversial option. Canberra is dependent on China economically yet has challenged Beijing on the latter’s role in COVID-19 and crackdown in Hong Kong. With increasing uncertainty over America’s long‐​term commitment to Australia and the region, nuclear weapons might eventually look attractive Down Under.

Merely broaching the possibility would have geopolitical value: faced with the possibility of multiple potentially hostile nuclear powers, the PRC might press North Korea harder to limit or eliminate its program. Although the two governments are not close, their relationship improved once the Trump–Kim summit loomed. As negotiations with the U.S. have stalled, China’s role in the North has grown.

Washington and Beijing have no intrinsic conflicts that warrant war. Threatening a major geopolitical clash is the seemingly inevitable confrontation between a much stronger PRC determined to assert a Monroe Doctrine with Chinese characteristics and prevent U.S. coercion along its borders, and a still powerful but increasingly financially strapped America attempting to retain the ability to dictate to China, like every other nation, in its own region.

Rather than place such a burden on the American people, Washington should shift defense responsibilities to those with the most at stake in limiting Chinese dominance in East Asia and adjoining waters. And the most cost‐​effective way for them to do so is to develop their own nuclear deterrents. They might reject such an option. But it is time to confront the issue directly, instead of foreclosing the policy due to inertia, allowing the dead hand of past policymakers to set American security policy in the future.

### General

#### Stopping prolif causes chemical and bio weapons

Narang 16 [Neil Narang, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, Senior Advisor in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy on a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellowship, 4/6/2016 “All Together Now? Questioning WMDs as a Useful Analytical Unit for Understanding Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation,” The Nonproliferation Review. Volume 22. Issue 3-4. pp. 457-468. Taylor and Francis]

The first inference that one may be tempted to draw from past findings is that a policy focused on achieving reductions in the global nuclear stockpile could cause a rise in chemical and biological weapons proliferation as more states view them as a “poor man's atomic bomb.” As noted above, our findings suggested that states appear to seek chemical and biological weapons for many of the same reasons as they pursue nuclear weapons. Furthermore, our findings also indicate that states that do not possess nuclear weapons appear to be systematically more likely to pursue chemical and biological weapons than states that do possess them. When combined, it may seem reasonable to suppose that, conditional on some level of demand for one of these types of weapons, reductions in the global supply of nuclear weapons could cause some states to pursue chemical and biological weapons as “imperfect substitutes” for the deterrence and compellence benefits of nuclear weapons. A second inference that one may be tempted to draw is that a strengthened NPT may increase the risk of chemical and biological weapons proliferation. Understood in the terms of our study, policies and institutions designed to monitor and sanction the unilateral pursuit or dissemination of nuclear weapons material and technical expertise—like the NPT or the Nuclear Suppliers Group—might be understood as supply constraints that effectively increase the transaction costs of nuclear weapons acquisition. Furthermore, previous research has shown that the supply of sensitive nuclear assistance and civilian nuclear assistance are both positively associated with the risk of nuclear weapons pursuit and acquisition across states and over time.17 When combined, it may seem reasonable to suppose that, given some demand for a “weapon of mass destruction,” chemical and biological weapons could seem like relatively cheaper pursuits under a more robust global nuclear nonproliferation regime that further regulates the supply of nuclear weapons. A third inference that one may be tempted to draw is that reductions in the global supply of nuclear weapons and a strengthening of the nuclear nonproliferation regime could increase the risk of chemical and biological weapons pursuit by terrorist groups. If one is willing to assume terrorist groups aim to influence governments by threatening to impose costs in order to achieve concessions— whether this be through strategies like coercion, provocation, spoiling, or outbidding—then it may seem reasonable to suppose that limiting the availability of nuclear weapons might shift the demand to other coercive instruments such as chemical and biological weapons.18

#### They’re more dangerous that nuke war

Kortunov 18 [Director General of the Russian International Affairs Council, RIAC member. Why Chemical Weapon Is More Dangerous Than Nuclear. May 11, 2018. russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/why-chemical-weapon-is-more-dangerous-than-nuclear/] **\*\*Added a bracketed term to fix an obvious translation issue – MMG**

Nevertheless, there is a popular opinion today that chemical agents are less dangerous and under greater control than nuclear weapons. This view results from the obvious fact that the world reached a breakthrough in chemical disarmament for last 25 years. Almost 200 countries joined the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, which is about 98 percent of the planet. The Organization for the Prohibition of the Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was based on this convention and has already become a watchdog for the liquidation of more than 92 percent of chemical agents and inspected almost five thousands chemical facilities globally. It seemed that the world should make one more decisive step forward to finish the full and overall chemical disarmament. In 2013, the OPCW was fairly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

However, recent events in the UK’s Salisbury (the poisoning of the ex-Russia spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter as well as the following accusations of the Kremlin of committing the crime) and Syrian city of Duma (another use of chemical weapons against Syrian citizens) make one reassess the problem of chemical weapons. The full and overall disarmament is postponed to an uncertain term. On the contrary, the problem of chemical weapons seems to be aggravating. There is a reason to believe that chemical weapons pose a more obvious and potentially more dangerous threat to the humanity than even nuclear weapons. There are at lest four reasons for these concerns.

Four reasons

First, poor groups use chemical weapons. Those who possess nuclear arsenal are belonged to the privileged club in the global politics. All of them are technologically advanced countries. Every member of the nuclear club had to invest a great deal of energy, resources and time to create nuclear weapons. The nuclear powers are highly reluctant to accept new members in their club, and the entire global community supports this reluctance. In contrast, chemical weapons can be created within the shortest terms, in the countries with very limited financial, economic and technological opportunities. Most importantly, unlike a nuclear weapon, a chemical one could be more available to non-state actors (terrorists), provided enough desire and minimal material resources. That’s why chemical agents could be seen as an ideal weapon for terrorist acts (such as the one, conducted by the cult movement Aum Shinrikyo in the Tokyo subway in March 1995) or separate campaigns during a civil war (such as the Syrian war).

Second, the fact of the possession of chemical weapons (as well as it annihilation) is much more [difficult] to verify than in the case of nuclear weapons. One could remember the beginning of the American invasion in Iraq in March 2003, which eventually destabilized the entire Middle Eastern region for years. Before the invasion, then-U.S. State Secretary Collin Powell accused the regime of the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein of producing chemical weapons secretly and refusing from chemical disarmament. These accusations turn out to have been false. Ten years later, in September 2013, Russia, the U.S. and Syria signed an agreement on the liquidation of chemical weapons, and its stores were moved from Syria and subsequently liquidated under the OPCW control.

Third, nuclear weapons were initially created and deployed to intimidate, not to use during a battlefield. Seventy years after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombing, none of nuclear powers were insane to start a nuclear war. Even during the most critical moments of history (such as the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis), the opponents were patient and reasonable enough not to cross the line, which separated the humanity from a nuclear apocalypse. Yet chemical weapons have never been viewed as a weapon of the Judgment Day, which was capable to destroy the life on our planet. Nobody knows exactly how many times chemical agents have been used in a battlefield or against the civilian population throughout the last century, yet everybody knows that it was used hundreds or even thousands of times. One can safely say that there have been much more victims from chemical attacks historically than it was in the case of the 1945 Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings.

### Defense

#### No impact to SoKo prolif

**Sapolsky 14** [Harvey M. Sapolsky is Professor Emeritus and the Former Director of The MIT Security Studies Program. Christine M. Leah is a Stanton Fellow at the MIT Security Studies Program. 4-14-2014 http://nationalinterest.org/feature/let-asia-go-nuclear-10259 HKR-MK]

Tailored proliferation would not likely be destabilizing. Asia is not the Middle East. Japan, South Korea, Australia, and even Taiwan are strong democracies. They have stable political regimes. Government leaders are accountable to democratic institutions. Civilian control of the military is strong. And they don’t have a history of lobbing missiles at each other—they are much more risk-averse than Egypt, Syria or Iran. America’s allies would be responsible nuclear weapon states. A number of Asian nations have at one time or another considered going nuclear, Australia for example, with tacit U.S. Defense Department encouragement in the 1960s. They chose what for them was the cheaper alternative of living under the US nuclear umbrella. Free nuclear guarantees provided by the United States, coupled with the US Navy patrolling offshore, have allowed our allies to grow prosperous without having to invest much in their own defense. Confident that the United States protects them, our allies have even begun to squabble with China over strings of uninhabited islands in the hope that there is oil out there. It is time to give them a dose of fiscal and military reality. And the way to do that is to stop standing between them and their nuclear-armed neighbors. It will not be long before they realize the value of having their own nuclear weapons. The waters of the Pacific under those arrangements will stay calm, and we will save a fortune.

#### Use or lose relies on a false dichotomy. Nuclear war is never guaranteed, and they’d always have more to lose

Kroenig 18 [Matthew Kroenig, Associate Professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters, Oxford UPress, pg. 137-142]

Furthermore, UELE arguments are unpersuasive for a second reason. These arguments overlook the fact that the inferior state has a more attractive option at each stage of the crisis: backing down and living to fight another day. A state in a position of inferiority involved in a high-stakes crisis always has a choice between three options: (1) intentionally launching a nuclear first strike in a devastating nuclear war that it will almost certainly lose; (2) playing brinkmanship, escalating the crisis, and raising the risk of nuclear war in a contest that it is also likely to lose; or (3) simply de-escalating the crisis and avoiding any further danger. Faced with this menu, option 1 is by far the least attractive, but this is precisely the option we must believe leaders will purposely choose in order for the UELE logic to hold. This is untenable. Indeed, much of nuclear deterrence theory and strategy as it has developed over the past 70 years is based on the premise that option 1 is simply unacceptable. Contrary to the claims of strategic stability theorists, therefore, UELE does not pose a problem to strategic stability.

To be sure, if a nuclear war were preordained to occur with 100% certainty, then an inferior state might have good reason to go first, but the risk of nuclear war is never certain. Indeed, the risk of nuclear war is in the control of both states. To avoid any risk of nuclear conflict, all they must do is capitulate. While an unattractive option, it is more desirable than intentionally launching a devastating nuclear war that it is bound to lose. Indeed, even the highly stylized game theoretic model in chapter 1, which relies on a spontaneous risk of nuclear war, assumes that states can avoid any further risk of catastrophe by submitting at any stage of the crisis.

#### No accidental war

Williscroft 10 [ “Accidental Nuclear War” http://www.argee.net/Thrawn%20Rickle/Thrawn%20Rickle%2032.htm, Six patrols on the John Marshall as a Sonar Technician, and four on the Von Steuben as an officer – a total of twenty-two submerged months. Navigator and Ops Officer on Ortolan & Pigeon – Submarine Rescue & Saturation Diving ships. Watch and Diving Officer on Oceanographer and Surveyor, HKR-MK]

Is there a realistic chance that we could have a nuclear war by accident? Could a ballistic submarine commander launch his missiles without specific presidential authorization? Could a few men conspire and successfully bypass built-in safety systems to launch nuclear weapons? The key word here is “realistic.” In the strictest sense, yes, these things are possible. But are they realistically possible? This question can best be answered by examining two interrelated questions. Is there a way to launch a nuclear weapon by accident? Can a specific accidental series of events take place—no matter how remote—that will result in the inevitable launch or detonation of a nuclear weapon? Can one individual working by himself or several individuals working in collusion bring about the deliberate launch or detonation of a nuclear weapon? We are protected from accidental launching of nuclear weapons by mechanical safeguards, and by carefully structured and controlled mandatory procedures that are always employed when working around nuclear weapons. Launching a nuclear weapon takes the specific simultaneous action of several designated individuals. System designers ensured that conditions necessary for a launch could not happen accidentally. For example, to launch a missile from a ballistic missile submarine, two individuals must insert keys into separate slots on separate decks within a few seconds of each other. Barring this, the system cannot physically launch a missile. There are additional safeguards built into the system that control computer hardware and software, and personnel controls that we will discuss later, but—in the final analysis—without the keys inserted as described, there can be no launch—it’s not physically possible. Because the time window for key insertion is less than that required for one individual to accomplish, it is physically impossible for a missile to be launched accidentally by one individual. Any launch must be deliberate. One can postulate a scenario wherein a technician bypasses these safeguards in order to effect a launch by himself. Technically, this is possible, but such a launch would be deliberate, not accidental. We will examine measures designed to prevent this in a later column. Maintenance procedures on nuclear weapons are very tightly controlled. In effect always is the “two-man rule.” This rule prohibits any individual from accessing nuclear weapons or their launch vehicles alone. Aside from obvious qualification requirements, two individuals must be present. No matter how familiar the two technicians may be with a specific system, each step in a maintenance procedure is first read by one technician, repeated by the second, acknowledged by the first (or corrected, if necessary), performed by the second, examined by the first, checked off by the first, and acknowledged by the second. This makes maintenance slow, but absolutely assures that no errors happen. Exactly the same procedure is followed every time an access cover is removed, a screw is turned, a weapon is moved, or a controlling publication is updated. Nothing, absolutely nothing is done without following the written guides exactly, always under two-man control. This even applies to guards. Where nuclear weapons are concerned, a minimum of two guards—always fully in sight of each other—stand duty. There is no realistic scenario wherein a nuclear missile can be accidentally launched...ever...under any circumstances...period!

#### No impact to prolif

Suzuki 15 [Akisato Suzuki ’15, Researcher, Institute for International Conflict Resolution and Reconstruction, Dublin City University “Is more better or worse? New empirics on nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict by Random Forests,” Research and Politics, pgs. 3-4, http://rap.sagepub.com/content/2/2/2053168015589625]

The main findings reveal that the optimist expectation of the relationship between nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict is empirically supported:9 first, a larger number of nuclear states on average decreases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict;

and second, there is no clear evidence that the emergence of new nuclear states increases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict. Gartzke and Jo (2009) argue that nuclear weapons themselves have no exogenous effect on the probability of conflict, because when a state is engaged in or expects to engage in conflict, it may develop nuclear weapons to keep fighting, or to prepare for, that conflict. If this selection effect existed, the analysis should overestimate the conflict-provoking effect of nuclear proliferation in the above model. Still, the results indicate that a larger number of nuclear states are associated with fewer disputes in the system.

This conclusion, however, raises questions about how to reconcile this study’s findings with those of a recent quantitative dyadic-level study (Bell and Miller, 2015). The current paper finds that nuclear proliferation decreases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict, while Bell and Miller (2015) find that nuclear symmetry has no significant effect on dyadic conflict, but that nuclear asymmetry is associated with a higher probability of dyadic conflict. It is possible that nuclear proliferation decreases conflict through the conflict-mitigating effects of extended nuclear deterrence and/or fear of nuclear states’ intervention, to the extent that these effects overwhelm the conflict-provoking effect of nuclear–asymmetrical dyads. Thus, dyadic-level empirics cannot solely be relied on to infer causal links between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for conflict. The systemic-level empirics deserve attention.

#### No prolif impact

**Cohen ’17** (Michael D; senior lecturer in security studies at Macquarie University in Australia, former Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and the Center for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark, former visiting scholar at the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, author of Nuclear North Korea: Deterrence and International Conflict; March 2017; “How nuclear proliferation causes conflict: the case for optimistic pessimism”; http://tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10736700.2016.1256541; The Nonproliferation Review, Volume 23, Pages 425-442; accessed 7/23/17)

But there is a systematic effect of experience with nuclear weapons on the conflict propensity of states. The Soviet Union stopped challenging the status quo in Berlin and Cuba after 1963. The number of fatalities from terrorist violence in Kashmir in 2012 was almost that of 1989.83 Mao never again challenged Soviet forces after the 1969 Zhenbao conflict. Recent quantitative studies have also concluded that experience with nuclear weapons moderates the conflict propensity of new nuclear powers. Most quantitative scholarship concludes that nuclear proliferation does not lead to conventional conflict because quantitative tests showed no relationship between these variables.84 States that develop nuclear weapons are highly conflict prone, so a high propensity for conflict likely causes nuclearweapon development and further conflict.85 But statistical research has ignored the role of experience with nuclear weapons. Temporally disaggregating the effect of nuclear proliferation on state conflict uncovers a robust correlation between nuclear-weapon proliferation, experience, and international dispute behavior. University of Pennsylvania’s Michael Horowitz conducted a statistical analysis and found that the probability of new nuclear states reciprocating disputes quickly increases and then decreases over time. The probability that a nuclear state will reciprocate a dispute with a non-nuclear state drops from .53 one year after developing nuclear weapons to .23 in year 56. Two new nuclear powers are 67 percent more likely to reciprocate a dispute than two average non-nuclear states. Two experienced nuclear powers are 65 percent less likely to reciprocate than two average non-nuclear states. The probability of dispute reciprocation between an experienced and new nuclear power is 26 percent greater than two non-nuclear states, and the probability of a very experienced state and a somewhat experienced state reciprocating is 42 percent less than two non-nuclear states.86 University of California-San Diego’s Erik Gartzke conducted a similar statistical test when the dependent variable was dispute initiation rather than reciprocation and found similarly robust results.87 Gartzke found that, while the overall effect of nuclear proliferation on conflict propensity is neutral, there is variation in the effect of proliferation over time. Nuclear proliferation influences the timing, rather than the occurrence, of disputes. While new nuclear states are prone to initiate militarized disputes, over time they moderate their policies and become as likely to initiate disputes as they were before nuclear proliferation.88 These effects wash out in statistical tests that do not control for experience with nuclear weapons. In short, if Iran and North Korea develop nuclear weapons and challenge their regional status quo, the historical record suggests that they will not do so for long. Thus James M. Lindsay and Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations recently claimed that a nuclear Iran would be most dangerous “at first, when it would likely be at its most reckless.” But, “like other nuclear aspirants before them, the guardians of the theocracy might discover that nuclear bombs are simply not good for diplomatic leverage or strategic aggrandizement**.**” 89 Conclusion: proliferation pessimism, Iran, and North Korea Three of the four mechanisms long alleged to make nuclear proliferation cause interstate conflict find little to no empirical support when the endogeneity, omitted-variable bias, and conceptual-confusion issues addressed above are recognized and applied to the evidence. Preventive-war motivations, nonsurvivable arsenals, and organizational logics that lead to accidents do not cause armed conflict. The only mechanism that has systematically led to conflict is conventional aggression by weak revisionists after nuclear proliferation, but a few years of experience with nuclear weapons moderates the conflict propensity of new nuclear states. By failing to specify how frequently we should observe preventive motivations, their effect on nonsurvivable arsenals, or how organizational logics lead to conflict, accidents, and nuclear war, proliferation pessimist claims are unfalsifiable. Pessimist scholars need to specify how much longer we should observe them not leading to conflict before concluding that their threat has been greatly exaggerated. The undesirability of nuclear use has prevented scholars from coming to terms with what a more careful and systematic reading of the historical record suggests about the relationship between these mechanisms and conflict. Sagan has argued that proliferation fatalism and deterrence optimism reduce incentives to combat proliferation.90 But these same dynamics have led scholars to vastly exaggerate the number of threats posed by the spread of nuclear weapons. If the greatest danger posed by nuclear proliferation is conventional aggression in the short-term, scholars need to rediscover how deterrence can moderate the high conflict propensity of new nuclear states.91 Arguments about the frequency of nuclear escalation, however, say nothing about its cost. Isn’t the possibility of nuclear escalation on the Korean peninsula, for example, evidence against the arguments made throughout this paper? A few cases of accidental, unintentional, or deliberate nuclear escalation could show that the mechanisms offered by pessimist scholars linking nuclear proliferation and conflict survive the criticisms leveled at them here. A lower bar for the proliferation-pessimist theory to pass might be one case of nuclear escalation. But after seventy years, nuclear weapons have not once led to conflict through the mechanisms addressed here. This is not the place for a lengthier treatment of how the United States and its allies should deal with the challenges posed by a North Korean (or possible Iranian) nuclear bomb. But the historical record suggests that Israeli, South Korean, and others’ preventive motivations to strike will not lead to military action, and that any strike would likely not escalate to conflict unless the United States or its allies decide to topple the regimes in Tehran and Pyongyang. The nonsurvivability of an Iranian or North Korean arsenal will not tempt others to strike. The arguments made here have contrasting findings for preventive-strike considerations. On the one hand, strikes are less costly than many believe because they rarely cause escalation. On the other hand, strikes are less necessary than many believe because the costs of nuclear proliferation are much lower than usually assumed. Nuclear accidents may occur, but these will likely only cause conventional or nuclear escalation if Tehran or Pyongyang have already attempted to revise their status quo. The historical record also suggests that a few years of experience with the bomb will teach Tehran and Pyongyang the limits of nuclear coercion and that any conflict will stop short of nuclear escalation. Future research should further refine proliferation pessimism and integrate it with optimist perspectives through addressing what causes new nuclear states to moderate their aggression and what policies by the United States and its allies might cause this. An optimistic pessimism toward the spread of nuclear weapons can better come to terms with how and when they lead to interstate conflict and form the basis for better policies to reduce the dangers.

### 2NR - No Saudi Prolif

#### No Saudi prolif – reputation and sanctions.

**Burkhard ‘17** [Sarah; March 30; Research Fellow at the Institute for Science And International Security & Erica Wenig & David Albright & Andrea Stricker; “Saudi Arabia’s Nuclear Ambitions and Proliferation Risks,” https://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/SaudiArabiaProliferationRisks\_30Mar2017\_Final.pdf HKR-MK]

Disincentives. Saudi Arabia is expected to continually weigh these incentives to acquire advanced nuclear capabilities (which possibly include the ability to weaponize fissile material and deliver a nuclear weapon) against a considerable list of disincentives. For starters, Saudi Arabia would jeopardize its good standing in the international community, which it has established through signing several treaties and joining nonproliferation regimes. These include the NPT, IAEA, Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), and 2005 amendment of the CPPNM. Following the discovery of a covert program, Saudi Arabia would risk severe United Nations and other countries’ sanctions. While economic in nature, the sanctions take on a security dimension because Saudi Arabia’s economy is predominantly reliant on its oil exports. They accounted for nearly 50 percent of gross domestic product and about 85 percent of export earnings in 2015.39 Its imported reactors would also likely remain dependent on the supply of low enriched uranium fuel. Therefore, a targeted sanctions regime focused on Saudi oil exports and imported nuclear fuel could cripple [devastate] its economy and hurt its security. On the other hand, the countries and organizations applying sanctions would have to weigh their own significant energy and security demands against concerns that Saudi Arabia could get advanced nuclear capabilities. Saudi Arabia’s contribution to the global oil market (which is roughly three times greater than that of Iran) grants it substantial leverage in determining global oil prices.40 As such, establishing a credible sanctions regime targeting Saudi oil would pose a difficult choice for the oil-dependent West. This will be particularly true if some in the international community become sympathetic to a Saudi desire to obtain a nuclear deterrent to balance Iran. The threat of potential sanctions would also carry great weight in Saudi Arabia’s nuclear weapons calculus as the government is facing its largest budget deficit in history. It is currently seeking to diversify its energy usage in order to sell more oil abroad rather than use it domestically at an expensive loss.41 If there is a decrease in revenue, the Saudis would be unable to spend as much money balancing Iranian influence in neighboring countries as they are now.

#### They lack capabilites and motive - US response undermines

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Military experts say it is theoretically possible that the missiles could be made operational, modernized, and retrofitted with nuclear warheads acquired from China, Pakistan, or perhaps, within a few years, North Korea. Any attempt to do so, however, would present immense technical and political difficulties—so much so that Saudi Arabia might emerge even less secure. Aside from the fact that such a nuclear program would violate the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and place Saudi Arabia in the category of global nuclear outlaw along with North Korea, the Saudis’ acquisition of warheads would encounter strenuous opposition from the United States and Israel. Having watched Washington’s reaction to Pakistan’s nuclear tests in 1998, the Saudis are well aware that U.S. law requires economic and military sanctions against nuclear proliferators. And whereas Pakistan and India had friends in Congress who were willing to help them escape the network of mandatory sanctions, Saudi Arabia does not. If an angry Congress cut off Saudi Arabia from future purchases of U.S. military equipment and Israel threatened a preemptive strike, the kingdom’s position would be untenable. Having committed itself to a long-term national development strategy that assumes full integration with the global economy and extensive foreign investment, Saudi Arabia would undermine its own interests if it turned into a nuclear rogue and alienated the industrialized nations. Moreover, however strong its antipathy to Iran, Saudi Arabia does not face any current or foreseeable domestic or external threat to its security to which the use of nuclear weapons would be a relevant response. No country is capable of invading the kingdom, especially while it is under U.S. protection, and nuclear weapons are useless against domestic troublemakers or border infiltrators. The benefits of acquiring nuclear weapons, if any, would be psychological and political rather than strategic, including a potential deterrent effect against reckless neighbors. There appears to be no possibility that Saudi Arabia, so long as it is ruled by the Al-Saud family, would ever consider nuclear weapons for aggressive purposes because the kingdom has not threatened any of its neighbors since the last border issues were settled decades ago, but deterrence might be another matter. The kingdom’s strategic weaknesses at the time of its Chinese missile acquisition—long porous borders, inviting targets, armed forces of untested capability, relatively small population—have not been overcome. For the possible deterrent effect alone, some analysts think the kingdom would feel compelled to seek nuclear weapons if Iran developed a nuclear arsenal.